Shmone Prakim English

Virtue as the Mean: Defining the Good Character Trait

I. Recap: The Unresolved Question About the Middle

Instructor: Okay, I hope my mic is connected. The story is, what did I say last week that we have to talk about? I know what I have to talk about, I just don't know the answer to the question. Or I know a little bit of it. What we said is that we talked about a lot of different things last week. Which were? The main point was that the side point which ended up taking a lot of time was that *midos* [middot: character traits] is based on the actions that you do. So like the sum of the actions that you do and not some internal measurement of your temperature. Something like that. But then you're saying that the middle means the right, it's just the right action. I'm trying to figure out exactly how is it even a middle. Meaning, you can have courage. The middle is to have courage. The things that are not... So what we talked about, which were the things that we're not talking about, is that there's a whole bunch. Let's go back, okay?

II. The Full Argumentative Context: From Happiness to Virtue

A. The Starting Point: Happiness as the Ultimate Goal

Instructor: There is a question that goes like this. We already know that we want to be happy. I'll give you the whole *chazara* [review] and *shevet* [sitting/session]. We already know that you want to be happy, which is the highest, the best thing. The best thing is to be happy, because that's what people want to be for no reason. Right? That's the goal. *Nachon* [correct]? Remember? The one thing that you don't give a reason for is being happy. Which means being the best kind of you. It doesn't mean feeling happiness, but that's another whole *derushe* [discourse/sermon]. And the being happy is about doing what you are well, doing what you should be doing well. That's what makes you happy.

B. Virtue as Human Excellence

Instructor: Which is why the human happiness or the human perfection consists in living according with virtue. Virtue is just another word for excellence or perfection. Like in everything we say, something like the good and the doing well are the same for everything. The camera-ing well is the same thing as being a good camera. So human-ing well is the same thing as being a good human. Right? So therefore, being a good human and a happy human means acting in accordance with virtue. Right?

C. Character Virtues Specifically

Instructor: There are a few kinds of virtue which we're not very much concerned with right now, the distinctions of them. Mostly distinguished into what's called character virtue. I don't like how the camera looks. We have to lower the whole thing. Put the whole thing lower, not that. I have to not wear a white shirt, that's another issue. Take the whole thing and put it down. This stick, this big stick in the middle, turn the thing and put it down a bunch. Probably that way. Yeah, and then make the camera straight instead of pointing down. So it should actually go on my face mostly. There's one other thing that you turn somewhere that does it, I don't know which. I don't know, I don't want to mess up.

Student: You're not going to mess anything up, don't worry. Have some courage.

Instructor: No, it doesn't look like it's that one. It doesn't turn by itself, you have to loosen it and then turn it, right? Oh, that was not good. That was the one, now you know which one it is.

Student: Yeah. See? Very basic thing to find out how things work. You break them and you see which part breaks.

Instructor: True. Basic rule of debugging. Yeah, that's good, right? Very good. No, better. Color is still off, but that's my fault.

Okay. *B'kitzur* [in short], remember, there's a few kinds of being good, which have to do with a few parts of the soul and all of that. And *b'kitzur*, now we're discussing specifically what we call character virtues, things that have to do with feeling and action, not with knowledge and things like that, although they're not disconnected from knowledge because everything needs a kind of knowledge. We went through this a little bit already. Right?

III. What Being Good Means: Action and Pleasure

A. The Necessity of Liking the Good

Instructor: Now, being a good person means doing good things. Right? Is that what it means? Liking to do them, wanting to do them. But, right, there's this but, which we will elaborate later at length in the discussion of self-control versus being virtuous or having not self-control but liking it. But in short, nobody calls someone good if they're against doing good things, if it hurts them, if it pains them, if they don't find pleasure in it, which is why pleasure is a very important thing to talk about, what you like, liking. Right? Which is why being good consists of being a good human, especially a happy human, because also one of the things that you won't be if you're fighting with yourself all the time is happy. This is also something that has to do with the whole thing boiling down to happiness, which is one of the reasons why we're always after liking what we do instead of forcing ourselves to do the right thing. Right?

B. Contrast with Kantian Ethics

Instructor: This is why people like Immanuel Kant were explicitly against Eudaimonian ethics or ethics based on happiness. Also have the definition of ethics as doing something that you don't like or acting out of duty, out of the motive of duty, instead of out of the motive of what is best for me or subjectively best. But in any case, that's another whole *drush* [discourse].

C. Summary of What We Know

Instructor: And now we're in the part where, so there are good things, but it still consists of doing good things and liking to do them, right? And having whatever it means that you like to do the good things. Okay? That's the kind of thing that being good is. But we still don't know what kind of thing or what kind of things are the good things to do. Right? Specifically the kind of good things which we call as pertaining to character, because there are other kinds of good things which are higher perfections really, which has to do with knowledge and understanding, which we're leaving on the side for now, although those are the best things and there's a whole other discussion about the life of thought, right? Life of contemplation. Now we're still talking about something like a social life, a political life, an active life.

IV. The Central Question: Which Habits Are the Good Ones?

A. Locating Our Position in the Argument

Instructor: Now, so this is the question. Do you understand how I got you to this question? In other words, we already know what kind of thing virtue is. Why virtue? We already discussed and so on. What kind of thing virtue is or being a virtuous person is? We already know. It's a kind of having a kind of something we call like a habit or a habit together with a liking, or a habit together with a liking together with a kind of judgment that allows you to see what is good and so on. That's what kind of thing. But what is it? Right? Or we could say, which sort of this kind of thing is it? Someone's at the door. Is it that makes things good? We still don't, that makes actions good and therefore the habits or the character traits that make you want them good. We still don't know that. Right? No? That's where we are in the course of the book.

B. The Mean as the Answer

Instructor: And that is where the answer of the middle thing comes in. This is very important to realize, to realize, at least in the source in Aristotle, where this idea of a mean even enters into the discussion. The place where it even entered into the discussion was, and this is how we organized it, precisely this place, after we know what he says, we know the genus, we know what kind of thing virtue is, but we don't know which of it it is. Right? In other words, there's many habits, there's many, people can do many different things, and therefore they can have many different, what we call the *midda* [character trait], not really a good word. We should call it the trait, the character trait, the habit is maybe a better word. Even that is not a good word. Aristotle just calls it a hexis [Greek: disposition/state].

C. Terminology: Kinyan and Its Meaning

Instructor: Now, you have a Greek word to put in place of that, which we don't know what it means, but some kind of condition, right? Some kind of state of the soul, or habit is the Latin translation, habitus, which gives us in Hebrew things like second nature, which is kind of a nature, right? Or how did the *Rambam* [Maimonides] call it? A kind of *kinyan* [acquisition/possession].

And I said a wrong *pshat* [interpretation] on that last time, I looked it up. *Kinyan*, the reason it's called *kinyan* is not because it's something you buy, although that's in some sense true, it's because it's something that belongs to you. And it's translated by the Arabic, this Ibn Tibbon, I'm confusing you now, right? Any case, Ibn Tibbon back-translated this from Arabic, because in Arabic, what Aristotle called hexis, usually there's some other words, and in Latin it's translated as habitus, is what's translated as something like *malakat*, which is something the same as *melech* [king/ownership] in Hebrew, like originally, something like leadership, or ownership, or belonging. They say it about you could own anything, and it's like something that you own. That's how we got the word *kinyan* for this. And of course, I think he's thinking of the *Mishna* that says things like *kinyan Torah* [acquisition of Torah], and things like that, and he interprets it that way, but he explicitly says in *Be'er Sheva* [commentary on Mishnah Zeraim], that that's how he got the word *kinyan* for these kinds of things. And he says that it means something like nature, nature and what makes a thing do what it does.

D. Returning to the Question

Instructor: So, anyway, this thing, just to get back to where I am, we know what this is, hopefully we know what this is, because that's what we spend a lot of time figuring out what that is. But there are many of those, right? You could be good ones and bad ones, right? So we need some word which will distinguish the good ones from the bad ones.

The Mean as Definition of Virtue: Aristotelian Logic and Philosophical Method

The Etymology and Meaning of *Kinyan*

Instructor: They say it about you could own anything, and it's like something that you own. That's how we get the word *kinyanim* [acquisitions/possessions] for this. And, of course, I think he's thinking of the Mishnah that says things like *kinyan Torah* [acquisition of Torah], and things like that, and he interprets it that way, but he explicitly says in *Bepeirush l'mishnayos l'zeraim* [in his commentary on Mishnah Zeraim] that's how he got the word *kinyan* for these kinds of things, and he says that it means something like a nature, a nature, what makes a thing do what it does.

Distinguishing Good Habits from Bad: The Need for Specific Difference

So, anyway, this thing, now just to get back to where I am, we know what this is, hopefully we know what this is, because that's what we spend a lot of time figuring out what that is. But there are many of those, right? You could be good ones and bad ones, right? So we need some word which will distinguish the good ones from the bad ones, right?

Aristotelian Logic: Genus and Species

If you know Aristotelian logic, you know that this is called looking for the specific difference, or the species instead of the genus. Remember this? In an example of if we ask what a human being is, first we ask of what kind of thing he is, right? What sort of thing he is? If we say a human being is an animal, then we say, but which kind of animal? And we say he's a rational animal. So that's the difference between humans, and in Hebrew it's translated as a *hevdel* [difference], the difference between a human and a different animal, which is, which kind of animal is he, right?

So first, two ways of saying the word kind, right? The same thing—what thing is, what is he, which kind of thing is he, is an animal, that's the bigger group that he belongs to, and which group does he belong to in that, that's what we call the species, usually, that's the Hebrew translation for these things. So *sug* [genus/type] is the bigger one, and *min* [species] is the smaller one, and that's what's defined by the specific difference.

Applying the Structure to Virtue

In the same exact way, we know what kind of thing good *middos* [character traits] are, or virtues are, right? They are habits, but we don't know which of those they are, right? So what's the specific difference that makes a habit into a good habit? And for this, Aristotle gives us the answer of the middle way. So now we know what this whole middle way is for, why it exists.

The Nature and Limitations of Definitions

And, of course, this is what we call the definition, right? The definition, usually, is this, is both of these things. The definition in Aristotelianism is *geder* [definition], okay? If you ever went to yeshiva, you heard the word *geder*. *Geder* is a word that Jewish Aristotelians made up, also, probably through Arabic or something, to translate the word, Aristotelian word, definition, and it doesn't have the exact meaning of definition in English.

Definition has this very precise meaning in Aristotelianism. Definition means giving the genus and the kind and the species of a thing. The definition of a human being is a rational animal. The definition of a *kinyan* is a *ma'aseh shemechayev et hachoshech* [an act that obligates the darkness], and so on, right? The definition of the good activities, or the good human being, is having *middos* which are intermediate. That's how we get to this definition.

Why Definitions Begin with General Principles

That's why whenever someone is going to present to you the theory, he's going to give you the most general definition, always. That's just how science is supposed to work. That's why we usually get this, but it's important to realize that that's all it's trying to answer. It's trying to answer the exact kind of thing that good things are.

Definitions Don't Tell You Much

But remember that we're still talking about a kind, right? Remember that this definition, telling that a human being is a rational animal, doesn't tell you very much about a human being. It's telling you, at most, something like, OK, I see there's animals, and I sort of... Animals are things that move under their own volition, or some kind of... That's also a definition. And there are things that move under... You notice, right? Animals are things, or maybe I should say living things, that move by themselves. I give you what kind of thing it is, and which one of that kind it is, right?

You'll notice that, naturally, we also give definitions always in this way, but they define it very precisely. In the same way, but that doesn't tell you much about a human being. All it tells you is how to distinguish a human being from other animals. And therefore, we say this is what is most... Human being of human being mostly is, is most, right? Because that's what defines him. But that doesn't give you a lot of information. All it gives you is... His science is about looking for the most general definitions always of everything. And then we can drill down and drill down and drill down and drill down.

There's a very famous Porphyry's tree [a diagram showing hierarchical classification from genus to species], which shows you how you can drill down from body all the way to some very specific thing. If you haven't seen the picture, it's a nice picture. You can look it up.

The Point of This Methodological Discussion

But the reason I'm telling you all of this is just so you understand how this language works and how saying that the definition of good actions is the middle is not supposed to give you much more than that. Make sense? Is that helpful? And it's not supposed to give you a lot more than saying a human being is a rational animal.

The Diogenes Story

Famously, the guy, you know, the famous guy that made a joke. What was the... Diogenes or someone came into the Platonic Academy and said he has a man because one day they were playing with definitions and they said that human beings are featherless bipeds and they brought a chicken, or something like that. Right? A plucked chicken. They plucked the chicken and said, here's your man. Right?

And that's a joke that's trying to express... Of course, that's not the correct definition of a man anyways. But it's a good joke that shows you how useless definitions sometimes are, especially if you get the wrong ones. But even if you get the right ones, they don't give you a lot of information. And you might... In the same way, this definition of good things as the middle things doesn't give us a lot. Or if you want to work backwards and it doesn't...

Student: To prove that the species is incorrect, because it's not differentiated, right?

Instructor: Right. Then that was wrong. Exactly. He found an exception which shows that it's not the correct definition, of course. But it's still not extremely informative. I can't tell you a whole lot about a human being. Even the rational animal thing doesn't tell you a whole lot. Unless it's worked backwards, right?

Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Learning: Rambam vs. Mishnah

The Two Directions of Learning

Just to understand, this is what caused... And you remember that this is really because, as we keep on discussing, the Rambam always presents things backwards. Or really in the correct way, but in the wrong way for learning, right? Remember that Plato told us several times that there's an up... Remember, right? There's a top-down way of learning and a bottom-up way of learning, right? The way up is the way down. But they're different, right? The way up is collection and the way down is division.

When you learn from the principles to their particulars, or from the particulars to the principles, right? Or sometimes you call it induction and deduction. It's not exactly the same thing.

Rambam's Top-Down Method

In other words, if I start from a general definition, and then I tell you this is a case of that, usually this is the correct way of things, right? Because reality has primarily, even Aristotle thinks this, that the rules, the classes of things, the forms of things, the definitions of things, are primary ontologically to their cases, right? This is why the Rambam tries always to teach this way, and it also strikes us as a logical way to teach. If you read the halacha, also the Rambam tries to give you the *klal* [general principle] before the *prat* [particular detail].

Of course, you'll notice that the Mishna doesn't do this. And people say this is because the Rambam is more philosophical than the Mishna. It's precisely the opposite.

Why Chazal Are More Philosophical Than Rambam

I'm going back to my same hack as I say always, but I never said it in this way. You have to understand something. The Rambam is less philosophical than the Mishna. This is just because I remind myself of someone saying this week again, the same *shtus* [nonsense] that *Chazal* [the Sages] are not philosophers. They are much more philosophical than the Rambam, that's for sure.

Why? Because the Rambam gives you the result of philosophy, which is the correct way, right? He starts the tree from the top, like the Rambam starts with the first principle, you know, you saw this, and you go all the way down to *hilchos Sanhedrin* [laws of the Sanhedrin], you know, you realize, right? The Rambam, *Sefer Hamada* [Book of Knowledge], all the way to *Sefer Shoftim* [Book of Judges].

The Structure of Mishneh Torah

The worst, the last thing in the order of reality, is that there is halacha that you have to follow the judges, you know, like *Sefer Shoftim*. It is, because that's how the world looks. It's just about managing people down here and having conflict and stuff. The last thing is that *mashiach* [messiah], you know, the smallest thing. You have to do everything else before you have *mashiach*, right? We work the opposite. We work the opposite.

Philosophy as Ascent to Principles

Now, like Aristotle Plato used to say, are we going to the principles or coming from them? Generally, philosophy is supposed to be going to the principles, not coming from them. The goal of philosophy is to get from the principles back down, right? But what we usually identify as philosophy is actually learning, which is we find ourselves in ignorance in this world, we find ourselves in ignorance in this world, we're starting to think we can see and then we try to ascend to the principles, right?

Example: Hilchos De'os

Now, the Rambam, for example, this is a very good example of the Rambam doing it backwards, right? Actually, in *Hilchos De'os* [Laws of Character Traits], he starts a little bit with the details. But, for example, here in *Hilchos De'os*, where he just started and gave you this definition, it says, let me give you the final result, because he's making things short and easy for you, supposedly. He doesn't want to burden you with all the dialectic of how we get to this. He just tells you, well, the middle way is the correct path. Thank you very much.

But the problem is that since we don't even know how to deduce this, we don't know how did he get to this. People have very wrong opinions of how they got to this. They just imagine things, which are not in the text or not anywhere. And, therefore, the only way to read the Rambam is dogmatically most of the time instead of philosophically or dialectically.

The Mishna's Bottom-Up Method

Versus the Mishna, for example, I'm just saying this because I have to finish my thought about that, and it's very important. Versus the Mishna that, for example, always, even when the Mishna gives a *klal* or a general form or a general definition, it's always posterior, it's always after the details, right? The Mishna will always give you a long list, and they say, *zeh haklal* [this is the general principle]. The Gemara will say, *zeh haklal she'omru* [this is the general principle they stated], find one more detail, because what is that *klal*? Is that a *klal*? It's because it's a *klal*. No, who cares about *klal*, right? No, of course, there's a *klal*. There's always a *klal*. But the *klal* is always after the details.

And it's true. Even if you read the Rambam and you start something with the definition, you're going to understand what he's saying. Only if you're coming to it after the Gemara, and you know, oh, so this is the general definition that makes sense of everything. Right?

In the same way, that's why I think that the Gemara and the Mishna are actually a lot more philosophical than the Rambam. Of course, they don't discuss theology too much, but even when they do, they're more philosophical than the Rambam is.

Student: Good *pshat* [interpretation], right?

The Common Misconception

Instructor: People always think that the Rambam is logical and the Mishna is illogical. It's just the opposite. The Rambam gives you the results of a certain logic, and that's why the Rosh [Rabbeinu Asher ben Yechiel], and I said it, actually, last Thursday, I think that he's right now. The Rosh [transcript ends mid-sentence]

The Mean as Definition of Virtue: Understanding Through Examples

The Rambam's Method vs. The Mishnah's Method

Why Mishnah and Gemara Are More Philosophical Than Rambam

Instructor: In the same way, that's why I think that the *Gemara* and the *Mishna* are actually a lot more philosophical than the *Rambam*. Of course, they don't discuss theology too much, but even when they do, they're more philosophical than the *Rambam* is. Good *pshat* [interpretation/explanation], right?

People always think that the *Rambam* is logical and the *Mishna* is illogical. It's just the opposite. The *Rambam* gives you the results of a certain logic, and that's why the *Rosh* [Rabbi Asher ben Yechiel, major Talmudic authority], and I said it, actually, last Thursday, I think that he's right now.

The *Rosh* quotes a great man in Barcelona that said that we don't understand the *Rambam* if we don't learn *Gemara* [Talmud]. Remember? Very famous statement, because there are some people that say that we have to pass *halacha* [Jewish law] from the *Rambam*. The *Rambam* told us we don't have to read *Talmud* anymore.

And the *Rosh*, arguing with this, said that it's all... Firstly, he disagrees that the *Rambam* is an authority, so he thinks that he can say it just like the *Rambam* could. But he says that even if the *Rambam* would be an authority, he doesn't think that the people that read the *Rambam* understand the *Rambam*.

And he quotes a great man in Barcelona that told him that the parts of the *Rambam* where he learned the *Talmud* for it, he understands the *Rambam*, and the parts where he didn't learn, like *Kodshim* [the order of the Mishnah dealing with sacrifices], things like the subject of the little reading *yeshiva* [Torah academy] over there. So he doesn't know the *Gemara*, he doesn't understand the *Rambam*.

This is also somewhat of an indictment of the *Rambam's* project, which tries to make the *Gemara* unnecessary and turns out to not actually succeed.

Why Definitions Need Details First

But I think more significantly, it's a really true point, that you don't really get... If I tell you a man is a rational animal, you're like, OK, what do you want from my life?

If you notice, wait, we've been going through all the things that men do, and then we're trying to think what is the essence, what's the one thing that includes all of these things, and I get to this, then you understand that I helped you somewhat, I'm giving you something. But if I didn't go through all the details, and I just started with this, you realize that it's somewhat of an empty... it doesn't have much meaning.

So *kitzurim* [summaries] and *klalim* [general rules] are very good after the details, not before. There are problems with this, of course. There's also pedagogical problems, it's very hard, and most people don't ever get to the rules. That's why the *Sifri* [halakhic midrash on Numbers and Deuteronomy] says you should learn Torah, *klalim*, and...

But anyways, the *Rambam* follows that advice of the *Sifri*. But it's a good way, that's why we learn *Mishnayos* [plural of Mishnah], teach *Mishnayos* to kids and so on. But even the *Mishna* is not really that kind of... OK, in any case, I'm getting lost in this discussion.

The Mean as General Definition

The First Function of the Mean

My point is just that in the same way here, we have to understand that I think that the first thing that the middle thing, the word middle is doing, is to give us a general definition for all the good things. That's the important thing, the important work that it does.

Of course, this helps us somewhat. Of course, if you find an exception, it will be a problem with our definition. I'm not saying that it's not supposed to include everything and it's supposed to be the correct definition. But it's not supposed to be the most informative definition at all. It's not looking to be informative, it's looking to be something like the opposite of informative. It's looking to find the essence of it.

Now, of course, we have to explain why we think that this is a good candidate for being the essence. And there would be several ways of going about this. Several ways of explaining why we think that the essence of the good habits and the good activities consist of them being a mean. And what I even mean. That's why I discuss them. We also have to understand what I even mean by saying this.

So the first thing, I will tell you. Should I say that first or should I say first the other thing? Do you understand my point? That's one point that I'm making.

Student: You're saying that we should first say what the habits are?

Instructor: Really, we should first. In some sense, yes. That's not what Aristotle does, so I can't say that's the correct method because it's not what anyone really does. He does do it a little bit. In other words, even *Rambam* did it a little bit.

How Aristotle Explains the Mean

In other words, there's like four. If you look in his book, in the Ethics, I wrote down exactly where he does this, but I don't have my chapter numbers and stuff here. But if you look here, you'll see that he does three or four different explanations of why he thinks that virtue is a mean. He always uses also examples, just to be clear. You can't do this without examples. Which means that we always assume that you already know something.

If I tell you, for example, right? If I tell you some parts of something, he tried to take always the first two virtues that we talk about are temperance and courage, right? And if I show you that it's obvious to everyone, if I show you, for example, he doesn't exactly do this because I don't think this is enough to show you that virtue is a mean. But it right away shows you, if I told you, look, courage, which you think is a good thing already, of course, if you don't think that courage is a good thing, like most people in Lakewood think courage is a bad thing, then you're totally out of the discussion.

But if you think courage is a good thing, you could also see that there's, that means that being a coward is a bad thing, but also that being rash is a bad thing. Being something like too courageous or being irresponsible, right? That's not the same thing as courage. You could see that it's not the same thing and I could show you how, therefore, my best guess, my best bet as getting something that actually explains what kind of a thing courage is is to say that it's the middle of this subject of courage.

Or the same thing with temperance. You have to assume that you already understand. You might have not noticed it, but I have to show you.

Understanding Courage as a Mean

The Problem with Seeing Courage as a Spectrum

I think courage is actually a very good example. Temperance is a more complicated example. There's no spectrum of courage. I mean, you could have a spectrum whether you personally have it or not. Courage itself does not have a spectrum. Courage is courage.

The other way to understand it is spectrum. That's for sure not what we're trying to get at, that there's a spectrum and you should be in the middle. That's what we already went through. There are some mistakes that people have about it. The reason they have these mistakes is because they don't actually realize how we got to this, why we did it. There are other reasons why people get to ideas like golden means. And the golden means is not what I was talking about. I don't know if I gave that to *shiur* [class/lesson] here yet. I did talk about it last week. So I don't keep track. I don't know the golden means.

Courage Between Cowardice and Rashness

But yes, you can see that, for example, we praise courage. Courage is a virtue. And we can also see that running away from everything or not facing any fears, not facing any, I guess fear is the thing that courage is against, or danger maybe, is not courage. We have even a word for it. We call it being a coward.

And we could also see that that doesn't mean that courage is the most of that. This is an important thing. I think that this is intuitive to most people when you talk about courage. You could also see that therefore I should just be the one that jumps into every, that always volunteers to go first in the war. Well, no, you shouldn't always volunteer. Sometimes you're just being stupid.

And then I ask, okay, so therefore what the virtue consists of is not, and we could show that this works in a similar structure for everything. So this would give me a structure for everything. But I could show you that what the virtue of courage consists of is not jumping into facing dangers with equanimity or something like that. That's not what it consists of because if it consisted of that, then you would have to always want the most of it.

Why the Mean Concept Emerges

It's sort of the opposite. The reason why we get this idea of the middle, of the mean as being the correct, is because we assume that you want to be the best. Just the opposite than other people, right? And if what defines courage as a good thing is the courage-ness of it or something like that, then you would want, or in other words, is the facing danger, dangerous-ness of it, then you would always have to be facing the most danger. But you see that it's not correct.

So I could show you very easily, so I ask you, what's the difference between courage and stupidity? And you say, well, stupidity is just too much courage. Well, that sounds, in some sense you could say that. If there's a spectrum of facing danger, then too little is cowardness and too much is rashness or stupidity. I like the word stupidity for this actually. And courage is something in between.

But you understand that this in between is something like a *moshol* [parable/analogy]. It's an analogy. It's not the point that you're in between. The point is that I'm showing you that courage doesn't mean jumping into the most dangerous. Courage means jumping into the correct dangers for the correct reasons, right?

Being courageous for your country maybe when it's in a great danger is a good thing, but being courageous for your lollipop is not a good thing. So it's not about, there's always all of these becauses and whys and hows and amounts, in other words, measures, that make it into a good thing.

What Makes Courage Good

So therefore, what makes courage good is not that it's courageous, that it faces danger, that it's not afraid of danger. What makes it good is that it's the correct kind. Of course, there are many kinds of correctness. Of course, you have courage and temperance and all the rest of the virtues. Because they have specific subjects and there might be, like we discussed last week, there might be specific sciences and specific habits and specific trainings for each of them.

It doesn't mean that just having one of them will give you all of them, although in the most general sense, they are all the same kind of thing. But what it shows you is that this is the kind of thing that it is. Does that make sense? This is, I think, in this sense, this is the first sense in which it is useful, right? In other words, it is a definition that you can understand.

Applying the Same Structure to Temperance

Temperance as a Non-Jewish Virtue

Once I gave you this example, I can show you the same thing with temperance. Say something like temperance is something like, not, what is temperance? Temperance is something that we don't really, especially in Hebrew also, courage I discussed enough, but temperance is the opposite, right? Courage is a noun from virtue. It's a *goyish* [non-Jewish] virtue.

Somebody would even say, read Aristotle and say, the first thing he talks about is courage, where this guy didn't read the same Bible as me. By the way, in the Bible, courage is praised many times. In *Chazal* [the Sages of the Talmud], much less. Or none in the same way. Or at least we don't remember how to read it that way. In *mussar sforim* [ethical/moral literature], there is never a *tzaddik ometz* [righteous courage], is there?

Courage in Jewish Sources

Doesn't *Shlomo* [King Solomon] talk about having enough courage? Actually, the *Shulchan Aruch* [Code of Jewish Law] of *Rav Yosef Karo* starts with the virtue of courage, if you noticed. People don't realize, they think it's about fighting yourself only. They are taught really, right?

That's what *Yehuda ben Teima* says, the first thing he talks about is courage. *הוי עז כנמר וקל כנשר ורץ כצבי וגיבור כארי לעשות רצון אביך שבשמים* [Be bold as a leopard, light as an eagle, swift as a deer, and strong as a lion to do the will of your Father in Heaven]. *Az kanomer* [bold as a leopard] is courage.

And it says in the *Shulchan Aruch*, *לא יבוש מפני המלעיגים בו* [He should not be embarrassed before those who mock him]. That's the virtue of courage. Actually, a very important virtue, but people don't really talk about it enough. Or if they talk about it, they talk about it in funny ways. So courage—

The Mean as Definition of Virtue: Understanding Temperance and Moderation

The Virtue of Courage and Its Misunderstandings

Instructor: People don't realize, they think it's about fighting yourself only. The Torah really, right? That's what Yehuda Ben Teima says, *hevei az kanemer v'kal kaneshera* [be bold as a leopard and light as an eagle]. *Az kanemer* is courage, right? And it says in *Shemonah Perakim* [Eight Chapters - Rambam's ethical treatise], *v'aizehu gibor hakoveish et yitzro* [who is mighty? He who conquers his inclination] - that's the virtue of courage. Actually a very important virtue, but people don't really talk about it enough, or if they talk about it, they talk about it in funny ways. So courage is a great virtue.

And temperance, we think is like a *frum* [religious/observant] virtue, and we think that it means also an extreme. The Rambam is going to go on and on and on about this.

Student: Well, that's why you might not want to talk about it in certain situations. People might take it to mean a messed up idea.

Instructor: No, no, I just need to take another example so we see that it's a general rule, right?

Temperance in Classical Greek Philosophy

But in the olden times in Greece, in Athens, everyone knew that there's four virtues. And two of them are courage and temperance, right? And temperance means something like... By the way, the word temperance, it's sometimes translated as moderation, right? Or in Greek it's *sophrosyne* [σωφροσύνη - Greek term for temperance/moderation], which I don't know what it translates to exactly.

Student: It's a Greek word.

Instructor: *Sophrosyne* or something like that.

Student: Okay.

Instructor: And sometimes you see it written like that in English also. Or moderation, right? Moderation relative to pleasures, specifically. But we can see from that, the way it's taken, anyone in Athens at least would understand that when you say that, you don't mean someone who has no pleasure in his life. What it means is he's moderate relative to pleasure. He's not taking more pleasure all the time. He's not some kind of... How do you call it? I don't know. *Nintan b'ivrit* [it's said in Hebrew], I say. How do you say it in English? Pleasure seeker, too much of a pleasure seeker.

Student: What is that, a hedonist? But we don't really mean that.

Instructor: Yeah, but hedonist is not a good definition. That's why I don't want to use that, because that's really a philosophical stance. Right?

The Common Misunderstanding of Temperance

And we say that, but everyone understands in the same way. I could show you very simply that... I don't mean... Aristotle himself notes that this is something that he has to explain here right away, and you'll see the Rambam also quotes it the same way, or literally the same way. I don't know if I showed you that.

But we don't really realize this so easily, because when I tell you you should be temperate, you should be less of a *baal taavah* [person driven by desires], right? Less of a *freisa* [glutton/excessive eater]. Then you think that what I mean to say is that the virtue is not to be a *baal taavah* at all. And people make this mistake, and there's a reason why they make this mistake, and that's because almost nobody has the problem of being too little *baal taavah*. Even the people that pretend, usually.

Almost nobody has that problem, so it's not like we really have to get people to have more pleasure in life. Actually, I think that nobody does. I think that some people pretend that they have this problem, but it's just a question of ideology, not a real question. And we're not talking about ideology.

Student: You know, I don't know if it's relevant to you at this point. Okay.

The Ideology of Pleasure vs. Reality

Instructor: I have a bunch of friends going around that, you know, the teaching in yeshiva that you shouldn't enjoy life, and gosh, but really you should. And I'm looking at this guy, do you know anyone in yeshiva that doesn't enjoy life? Why are you giving me this *drasha* [sermon]? It's just a question of ideology. Who cares about ideology? Ideology is fake anyways. That's what Marx said, right?

Student: In practice. What I mean to say.

Instructor: What I mean to say is that it's very simple, that all the people going around and saying that, you know, the world is good, you should enjoy your body and your life, and unlike the *frum*, supposed *frum* people who are against this. Do you know any *frum* people that don't actually enjoy their life?

Student: No. People who are just tortured souls regardless.

Instructor: They would find a way to be tortured in every society.

Student: No, that's what I'm saying. They blame it on that, it's not... Yeah. No, but it's not like people like the yeshivish *chinuch* [education] is against enjoying life or like Chasidish *chinuch*.

Instructor: Well, it's true that we talk that way. It's true that we talk against *taavos* [desires/pleasures], but guess what? I have a teacher who's very *frum* and very precious, and he told me he doesn't understand people that give like, you have to give a *drasha* to the Chassidim that they should enjoy themselves more. Like seriously, the *yetzer hara* [evil inclination] does a very good job of teaching everyone to have *taavah* [desire]. He doesn't think he needs help. If you need help, you need help for the moderation part. Like, okay, don't overdo it. Keep your mind with you in some sense.

Like, I meet people that seem to think that really nobody's enjoying life. But I think that the reason is because people over-index on ideology, saying like, we hold that *Olam Hazeh* [this world] is not good. Okay, who cares what you hold? Holding is... it doesn't make any difference what you hold.

Student: Maybe you're saying, some people get tortured about it. But really, how many people really take these things seriously? Like five?

Instructor: I was in yeshiva, in a very *frum* yeshiva. Nobody... everyone enjoyed. Okay, so they have... who cares? So they enjoy their pizza instead of enjoying some fancy restaurant. That's not a big difference.

Student: So what about the literal version of the guys you're talking about? And they're always like, oh, so you took it seriously? Literally? That's weird. Like no one else did.

Instructor: Yeah, like some OTD [Off The Derech - people who left religious observance] people. But they're also pretending, because even their rebbe... I know the guy. I'm talking to this guy that told me this *drasha*. It's very funny. He had to give you a fight against this literature, *Chassanim* [grooms] and other people they teach. And *l'maaseh* [in practice], I know exactly what food he likes and he makes sure to buy it for Shabbos and even for the weekdays. It's not like he's not enjoying his life. Of course, he's trying to control himself. But who is against self-control?

It becomes very funny, and I think that people are over-indexed, and that's why I said over-index on ideology. Like, we hold. Okay, so you hold. That's why even Aristotle says, we don't really need to talk about this problem. We don't even have a name for that person. He makes up a name. He says, let's call him insensitive, but insensitive doesn't really mean this. He's making up a name just so his structure should work, that we have the too much and the too little.

The Rare Case of Insensitivity to Pleasure

Student: Some people are sterilized to certain indulgences.

Instructor: Oh, yeah. Some people are asexual also, supposedly. I don't believe them. Anyways. Maybe they are. Who knows? No, I mean, certain people just... But not because of the *mashgiach* [spiritual supervisor in yeshiva]. Some of them are like that.

Student: Wait. Yeah, but I know certain people that just aren't moved by certain, like...

Instructor: Okay. What's wrong with that? I mean, like... By what? By why they're not moved? I actually don't know those people. I mean, there's some people that are not... They don't have enough... They don't have a very developed emotional life or imaginative life or something. They don't enjoy films or something. Okay.

Student: I don't know. I think my grandfather doesn't enjoy life enough.

Instructor: Doesn't enjoy life enough?

Student: No, he won't turn on the heat in the... But it's funny... Wait, is he a Holocaust survivor? It's funny. He'll literally eat whatever's on sale. That's it.

Instructor: Okay, well, what's the problem with that?

Student: The problem with that is that... Yeah, I don't think it's the same thing. The problem with that... By the way, there is a problem with that. I don't think... That's a different medium. They're annoying to us. That's a separate medium. I don't think it has the same meaning. Probably has to do with poverty and things like that.

Student: No, he gives $5,000 checks to every grandkid on Chanukah. He's very generous.

Instructor: Yeah, but maybe he was brought up... I don't know. I don't remember anything. Let's see. Because he was brought up. It doesn't matter.

Student: No, I think it's an over... It's like a stinginess, no?

Instructor: No. No, he's very generous. He's not being stingy with himself. I think also he's just totally unprioritized at all. And he doesn't realize it, but maybe your grandkids don't want to come over because you just don't turn on the heat. Like, at this point...

Student: No, I know what you mean, but I don't think it's... I don't know. I don't think we could call it over temperance. It's something... Maybe it is, actually. Maybe it is. Okay, but I think usually these kinds of people who had a hard childhood and grew up in poverty and they got used to that you don't really turn on the heat because it costs too much money or something like that.

Student: No, he just... I don't know. Even if that's why. You're just telling me the story of why.

Instructor: Yeah, I'm saying it's not... He's still doing it, I have to tell you. It's complicated reasons for why I get angry. It's not really anger. It's just insufficiency. I get it. It's an action or it's a way of... Could we say that that's bad? You think it's bad?

Student: His grandkids won't come over, so... That's a different problem. That's lack of empathy or something. Okay, maybe you don't turn on the heat, but maybe the other guy needs to do it.

Student: No, he knows you're uncomfortable immediately. He thinks you like it just as much as he does. Why wouldn't you enjoy wearing your winter coat in the house?

Examples of Extreme Asceticism

Instructor: I'm not sure. I remember there was a *tzaddik* [righteous person] that was like this. He was like, he didn't give out cold drinks. There was a guy that I used to invite *bochurim* [yeshiva students] on Shabbos in Yerushalayim and he didn't give cold drinks in the summer because it's *taavos* [desires/pleasures]. He didn't have air conditioning either. So you could have a tea if you wanted.

Student: No, that's not... That's different, right? I'm like, you're a good guy. I'm not sure. He was training us not to have *taavah* [desire]. I'm not sure what was the idea. Not like he drank. He also didn't drink. It's fine. That kind of... Even that person. He didn't enjoy... I don't know. Weird masochism or something.

What Would Deficiency in Pleasure Look Like?

Student: What would it look like? We're also saying everything is relative. What would it look like for someone not to enjoy life? What would it look like for someone to underindulge?

Instructor: No, but we could understand that that kind of person maybe is not... I don't really know. It depends on your picture of the ideal human being. To me, that's not ideal. Maybe I'm wrong. Is there no *kitzvah acharon* [extreme end]? Meaning, is there no harmful degree of this?

Student: Yeah, yeah. Well, harmful degree of insensitivity? Of not enjoying life? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, that's what we're talking about. What would that look like? Maybe these people that we're discussing are actually in that sense. They seem to be missing a certain human... Experience, yeah. A certain part of being human. They seem to be missing... Yeah, they seem to be missing something.

Instructor: Maybe Aristotle would agree with that. Not only Aristotle. Maybe even a Platonist. Even an extreme virtue person, extreme ascetic person could say that they're missing something. Because part of being human is to get that people like... But based on what is this? I'm just making this up because that's what I like. I don't know. I can say about what I like. I think that it's normal to like certain... There's something, I think... There's something... It's not about normal. Something in a conversation with someone who doesn't... You could say it's something rich. Like we talked about someone that has a rich life. Like something like you know the difference between salt and pepper. I don't know, like an extreme example, right?

Student: Yeah. They're both the same, right? They're both sort of sharp and that neighborhood... Yeah, but it's not even one habit. Is that... Specifically either. I find that people who are like this... Sure. First of all, they're not turning on the heat. Second of all, they're reheating the same food for three weeks in a row. And yeah, it's fine. Beef and peas. Yeah, it's all the same habits. I get it. I don't know... I don't know what's so bad about it though.

Student: It's abundance at a table. There's so much beef. It doesn't taste like anything. You're not participating in a pleasurable human experience. Right?

Discussion on Temperance: The Problem of Under-Indulgence

The Difficulty of Identifying Under-Indulgence

Student: Yeah, it's all the same habits. I get it. I don't know what's so bad about it though. It's abundance at the table. There's so much beef.

Instructor: It doesn't taste like anything. You're not participating in a pleasurable human experience.

Student: I just think it seems like a different *mida* [middah: character trait] that you're discussing, not temperance.

Instructor: Why?

Student: It's the exact opposite of a *fresse* [glutton]. We are talking about, I think, yeah exactly. It's someone that, if the *gefilte fish* [traditional Jewish fish dish] isn't—it's too much cooked or too little cooked—and he's not going to eat it at all. He's overdoing it. And someone that, it could be, you know, all these stories that the wife put the tissues instead of the fish in the oven and he ate the tissues. Whatever. Yeah, that's something is wrong with you.

Instructor: Okay, maybe he's—I can understand those stories as a beautiful thing in the sense of the life of the mind. You're so in your mind, you're not living in this world.

Student: Yeah, because it's not your life.

Instructor: Okay, *beseder* [alright]. But as long as you are living in this world, which maybe you shouldn't be—that's a different discussion, right? That's why I think, for example, what I personally think, but this is just my personal opinion, I don't know if it means anything. I would say something like this: if a *Yid* [Jew] is like these stories, he was learning all day and he forgot to put on his shoes or whatever. Okay, so he has a much more pleasurable life because he's contemplating and he doesn't really care about his body. *Beseder*.

That has to do with the questions of contemplative life and so on. But there are some people that don't even do that. He's not contemplating, he's not doing anything. It's not like he's so into Shabbos and he doesn't care if there's food. Okay. He just doesn't care about the food. So then in that sense, on that level, there might be something weird, something wrong with that. But it's hard to say what's wrong with it.

The Problem with Excessive Insensitivity to Pleasure

Student: I think you can figure it out. Is it as bad as the two other practices?

Instructor: The reason why the grandkids don't want to come over is not because they think that they're insensitive, it's just dementia. They feel judged.

Student: No, first of all that. If you get *chas v'shalom* [God forbid], you get takeout, what are you even doing? Why would someone want to do that? They don't understand why someone would want to do that.

Instructor: Yeah, it's abundance.

Student: And the other thing is, yeah, in some sense I think they just don't realize that this is a part of being a human being. To them it's like they don't even understand why. They're sensitive to things that they understand. They're very sensitive people. They're very sensitive to things that you understand, they can understand are worth being sensitive about. This just doesn't occur to them that pleasurable things might be something that you even want or gravitate towards or at least avoid its reduction to a minimum.

Instructor: So you think he doesn't enjoy his beef?

Student: No, he does, but he should be enjoying more.

Instructor: Yeah, if he enjoys it very minimally. Let's put it this way: that beef could look like many things and he doesn't seem to be moved by those changes. But usually these things are very relative, meaning the person who has much more simple food enjoys them, seems the same amount.

Student: Yeah, could be. Would you say that that person would enjoy it—would you say something's interesting if that person enjoys it equally if it's too salty and not salted enough?

Instructor: No, you're not, you're not, right, yeah, I'm saying. You're talking about too salty and not salty enough, and the person's unmoved.

Student: No, no, I'm saying less options essentially, you're saying...

Instructor: No, no, no.

Student: Yeah, a way of saying this would be something like, I saw someone, someone said, there was a *machlokes* [dispute] between two Chassidishe Rebbes or something, if you should put salt on your food or something like that. And I think Rabbi Nachman said that he thinks that someone who doesn't put salt on his food is just like an animal. So cows don't salt their food. You're not being a bigger *tzaddik* [righteous person], you're just being more cow.

That's a way of saying this. Humans are people that do have some judgment about which food is good. Now, if you overdo that, then you're a *fresse*, but if you underdo it, you're a *chamar* [donkey], you're a *chamar*. Just a *chamar*, when you say a *chamar* is a grass—but also a *chamar* is a big food, he eats grass every day, the same grass, right?

The Case of Ketchup: Determining Proper Limits

Instructor: So how do we know the difference? There's this guy in Lakewood who is not alive. He had a whole speech against ketchup. Ketchup's *stam* [just], you don't need it, it's just *stam* for pleasure. Ketchup is *gayva* [pride], go to *gehenom* [hell] if you eat ketchup. Right.

Student: Well, we could also say that ketchup is vulgar, it's this American replacement of whatever. I'm saying you could make such a case.

Instructor: It's an absolute flavor bomb. Whatever you're eating it with, it's just gonna nuke it.

Student: Right, that's a different—that would be a different argument. That would be, but also you could say that's too much, who cares, it tastes good, who cares.

Instructor: Right, you're being too refined already.

The Rarity of Under-Indulgence

Instructor: Okay, so I don't know, it's still true for the most part, again, but really, how many of those people are there? Very rare, I've only seen it once. You see, there's lots of people, but usually it's not. And also I think even those people usually have material conditions that cause this. I don't know many people that are—I don't know many people in my generation that are like this. Yeah, yeah. Do you?

Student: It's only one person I know from all the people I've ever met that suffers from under-indulgence. I know people that try to aim at that. Okay, I'm pro-aiming at that, because we're mostly too big *fressers*. That's what I'm trying to get at, but if you would get to that level, okay, then we'll worry about turning it back or something. Right.

Instructor: I've seen this.

Student: What?

Instructor: I've seen this. Yeah. It happens to be Jews that will have a hard time doing this, because we all have a lot of *seudos* [festive meals]. That's just a great way to just sit around and enjoy the food. It really does the job of making sure that it's better.

Student: So we're all managing to be big enough *fressers*. We shall have too big *fressers*, but we're not too small *fressers*.

Instructor: I think so, yeah. Okay. Yeah, if you go to rural America, I think you could maybe find some of this. Or people that just don't have good food in their whole *shtut* [area]. Yeah. There's no good restaurant in 300 miles. Yeah, and not because they're doing anything better with their lives. They just spend a lot of time being disinterested in food.

Student: I hear. In other words, a lot of people like that are very big *fressers*, because they eat just little garbage.

Instructor: Maybe in some sense it's just some kind of depression or something.

Student: Maybe, yeah. It's depression. It seems like the downside is somewhere else. It seems like the downside would be somewhere else. And then we're... I can understand. Maybe it's empathy, maybe it's some sort of depression.

The Problem of Translating Temperance into Hebrew

Instructor: No, but we're trying to get a—again, remember, what I'm trying to show you, I'm just—this is where I am. I'm just trying to show you that we have this virtue called temperance. We know what it is: moderation. And we don't have a good Yiddish word for it, because Yiddish word for it tends to be the extreme word, like *prishus* [asceticism]. And that you try to translate this as *prishus*, people don't understand.

Or sometimes translated as *zehirus* [carefulness], by the way. *Zehirus* is the Rambam's translation. The Rambam himself translated as *zehirus*. Sometimes *zehirus*, sometimes *yiras chet* [fear of sin]. Weirdly. Temperance is *yiras chet*. *Yiras chet* doesn't mean being afraid of doing an *aveira* [sin]. It means not being too big *fresse*. There's a Rambam himself translated this way.

So we have these three Hebrew words that correspond to the virtue of temperance sometimes in our sources. That it should have been totally misunderstood. Until *zehirus* means being careful. I think that that's wrong. At least in the Rambam, in the Mishnah, I don't know. The *middos* [character traits] of *zehirus* means temperance.

Understanding the Correct Amount of Pleasure

Instructor: And it seems to be easy to understand that temperance is a limit to not being too much of a—taking too much pleasure. Or something about having the correct amount of pleasure. That's how we're trying to get at. And you could see that person that we're describing now who just doesn't get it. He doesn't get that there's such a thing as being in a comfortable temperature. He seems to not get it. That's not what we're talking about.

People would say something else. He doesn't have an *asan* [foundation/nature]. He's just born without—he's a *suras* [eunuch]. He doesn't have a feeling for that kind of pleasure. But I don't think that's the idea. We would say something like he's not having the correct amount of pleasure. He's having too little pleasure. Just that usually we don't really have this problem. And most people don't have this problem. Most people don't have this problem.

Therefore I think it's overrated to talk about it. The Rambam talks about it a lot. But also for different reasons. It's another question. Why does the Rambam talk so much about—against this *prishus*? How many people did the Rambam know that were over *prishus*? I have no idea. You should be very worried about it. Don't be... How many people are fasting too much? Seriously. Who is this person? Three weirdos. The Essenes.

Student: What?

Instructor: Yeah. The Rambam says Christian priests. But also how many priests are there? There are thousands of Christians and a few of them become priests. It's a big thing.

Student: No, there is this thing of the ideology part, right? You think that that's what the ideal is and everyone is falling short.

Instructor: Maybe they have an outsized influence, those people. And whatever downside there is, they don't get those *mailos* [virtues/advantages]. Meaning—the other people also don't? And as much as the ideal people don't get *mailos*, it affects all of them, yes. But the point is if your ideal people are *prushim* [ascetics], they're going to be missing something, right? Because they're not...

The Christian Ideal and Its Consequences

Student: People sometimes make this case. For example, anti-Christian polemics or Jews who are having polemics with Christians make a case something like this. So Christians traditionally, Paul almost explicitly says this, say that the best thing to be is celibate. But we'll give a concession to the normal people and let them be married. And then when they're married they should act with chastity and the correct ways. But they're really—make it afterwards.

Instructor: What?

Student: Make it afterwards. Afterwards, before, whatever. So—but he still has this idea that really you should be totally celibate. And people would make the claim—it's not—I don't know if it's true. People could make a claim like the claim that you're trying to make. That's something like that because of this, there isn't a good Christian ideal of being happily married or being temperately married.

Let's talk about to talk specifically about this thing, because you're—ideal people are not married. And sometimes people say if you go to the priest for advice on marriage, he has no advice to give you. There's actually I saw a priest says the opposite because people—he says people come to you with problems, their girlfriends. Such nonsense. You see right through it. You just guy is never stuck in this nonsense. But I'm not. I'm just get over it, move on.

So it's not entirely always true that if you're out of it, you don't have good advice. But people sometimes say this. *Birchas Shmuel* [Rabbi Baruch Ber Leibowitz's work] was—he's the one. No he's not the same one. He had the similar opinions of I think he was on the side of being moderately pleasures in life. And he said that he doesn't understand the importance of—

[Text appears to end mid-sentence]

The Virtue of Moderation: Asceticism, Human Experience, and the Middle Way

The Problem of Asceticism and Human Understanding

Instructor: Such nonsense. You see right through it. The guy is stuck in this nonsense, but I'm not. I'm just, get over it, move on. So it's not entirely always true that if you're out of it, you don't have good advice, but people sometimes say this.

Reb Pinchus Kuritzer was also—he's the one, no, he's not the same one, but he had similar opinions of, I think he was on the side of being moderate in pleasures in life. And he said that he doesn't understand why people go to the Mezritcher Maggid. The Mezritcher Maggid is a *parush* [פרוש: an ascetic], he's celibate, and you can't talk with such a person. How are you gonna talk to the guy? He's not living in the same world as you.

Student: That's why Shlomo Maimon got divorced.

Instructor: No, no, that's not why. Different reasons. There is such an argument. I don't know how true this is, but people say nowadays maybe something like this, but that's a much broader thing. To talk specifically about this thing of moderation and pleasures, you don't have a mouth for that, and therefore you end up going to the other extreme. I don't know how true this is.

Does Asceticism Affect Other Virtues?

Student: Why wasn't there more? You would imagine that *midos* [מידות: character traits] all affect each other, so it would affect some other thing, and you lose somewhere in other places as well.

Instructor: What do you mean? What do you lose?

Student: Ultimately, it should be that you're going to be lacking in your knowledge as well.

Instructor: Like you were saying before, that if someone eats too little or doesn't know the difference between good food and bad food, then when he does *hachnosas orchim* [הכנסת אורחים: hospitality], he's not going to be a good *machnis oreach* [מכניס אורח: host] either. Something like that. This is the story that we're talking about. Is that what you mean to say?

But that's back to the problem of living in this world, and then you say it's true. So living as a human being in the fleshy world, maybe you want to be a Buddhist, then you should never come out of your monastery. But if you ever come out, then you have to learn what good food and so on is, because otherwise you're going to not be able to deal with people correctly. There's such an argument to be made.

Student: Someone could say something like, if you're an ascetic, then you shouldn't ever be a *dayan* [דיין: judge], because you don't realize how important money is.

Student: Maybe there's something universal that you're missing. Maybe there's something more universal that you're missing.

Instructor: Like what?

Student: I don't know, you won't really understand a human and an animal. There's something universal about a human that you just won't understand, because you don't partake in the human action the way you should.

The Question of Human Experience and Virtue

Instructor: I'm not in that, it's hard for me to say, but it's exactly what you're saying. I don't know, the way a human eats... But this is the question, is the person that we're imagining in some flyover country, *chas v'shalom* [חס ושלום: God forbid], who has never had a good restaurant or anything, is he a better person in any sense?

I'll tell you the opposite argument. The opposite argument is something like this. What's the difference between romance and porn, right? Romance is just a higher level version of the same thing. And there's an argument that the Rambam [Maimonides] himself makes in *Shemona Perakim* [שמונה פרקים: Eight Chapters], and he says that he thinks that people who write poetry about sex are worse than people who just have sex. Because if he'd have had a cushion, he'd have... You know the Rambam? It's just dressing up this very bad thing in some fancy way.

But the opposite argument is no, that if you just have sex, then you're just being an animal. If you give it words, you write some poetry about it, then you're having some kind of human level of it. The same thing can be said for food and for all these things.

Redefining Moderation: Not Distance from Pleasure, But Right Relationship to It

Instructor: And that's where we get this idea that it's not actually... When we talk about temperance or moderation, we're not talking about... We don't think of someone getting as far away from pleasure as possible. We think of someone having pleasure in the right way and not in the wrong way.

And this is what leads us to see... Okay, I'm going to stop here. I don't know what the *halacha* [הלכה: Jewish law] is about all these things. We do see from this very simply... I think if we agree on some level that that's bad, we can see in some sense right away that the virtue of moderation doesn't consist in an extreme in the sense of pleasure. Therefore we have to give it a more abstract definition, right?

And this more abstract definition is going to be shared with the other virtues. Because all virtues are a kind of knowing the correct one between options which are more and less. But we also see from this that the more and less is something like an analogy or something... It's not... We're not saying... It's very clear. We see very clearly that we're not trying to find the correct amount of pleasure and say it's the middle amount. We're trying to understand what moderation is. And we say, I can show you that there's a too much and a too little in that. And therefore you can see that whatever moderation is and therefore whatever most other virtues at least would be, would consist of knowing the correct amount. That's all.

Conclusion: Moderation in All Things, Including Learning

Instructor: That's enough for today. There's a moderation in how long a *shiur* [שיעור: lesson] should be.

I already told you last week that Aristotle explicitly and the Rambam don't believe in moderation in the intellectual virtues. But it's not that we don't act in moderation in them. And I read more than one person saying, and already early people saying that in reality if you see the way we discussed already how Aristotle uses authority versus questioning in general, he does seem to always try to be in the middle even intellectually.

And there's even Aristotle in the beginning of this book says that even how much to learn is something that ethics has to tell you. That politics has to tell you. Which is the same thing as ethics, right? Because the politician, the king will decide—this goes back to our discussion earlier and this is a weird thing that he says if you think that the contemplative life is the highest thing. He says the king will have to decide how many philosophers there's gonna be. It says in the ethics and I think that the Rambam would also agree with that in some sense. It doesn't mean that it's higher to be a king than to be a philosopher but it does seem to mean that in reality in the city the king is going to decide who should be a philosopher or how many philosophers he needs and maybe there's too much and too little in that also. Okay. That's the story.

And also I have to finish... What's his name? Rav Levy ben Avraham. But therefore there's two extremes you can be only a philosopher and only a *ma'amin* [מאמין: believer] and the answer should be in between. That's why you should be more like a philosopher who also is a believer.

Okay. Can I shut up?

Student: Yeah.

Shiur on Chanukah: The Greek Language and the Universal Nature of Torah

Chapter 1: Introduction - The Minhag to Discuss Greek on Chanukah

Instructor:

This is the shiur on Chanukah where we talk about the Yevanim [Greeks], and some people have a minhag—not me, but some people have a minhag—to talk about the Greek language. Because Rav Gamliel [Rabban Gamliel], who was a great Tanna [early rabbinic sage from the Mishnaic period], said that the only language in which you could say the Torah is in Greek.

Remember? That's what he said? They said there is a pasuk [biblical verse] about this, yeah. Who said it? Right? That's the shiur of Tameh [unclear reference]. And that's the famous story of the Talmai Melech [King Ptolemy], who was supposedly the one who ordered the Torah to be written into Greek, known as the Targum Hashivim [Septuagint - the Greek translation of the Torah].

Chapter 2: The Mishnah in Megillah - Torah in Every Language

Instructor:

What is the Targum Hashivim? How is it related to the question of the languages? The Tanna Kamma [first anonymous opinion in the Mishnah] said that all Torahs are written in the Talmud—or at least that's how the Gemara [Talmud] formalizes it. Right, that you could write the Torah in every language.

Why? Remember why? How could you write the Torah in every language? There's something very important here. I have to talk about this. I didn't mean to talk about this Mishnah, but you should know the Mishnah.

Student:

The Mishnah is a language that we all know, right? What is the Mishnah in? The Mishnah that I'm quoting now. Where is it? What is it? Is it a very different language? From the Mishnah? Hello.

Instructor:

It's the Mishnah in Megillah [tractate of the Talmud dealing with the reading of the Megillah/Book of Esther]. Okay, the Mishnah in Megillah. The first part of that... There's a more insight about it. But the Mishnah is the Mishnah in Megillah.

It says, it says—and there's something called Tefillin [phylacteries] and there's something called Mezuzah [parchment scroll affixed to doorposts], which are specific parts of the Torah that we write on our hands and our doors. The Mishnah says they're both the same thing, they both have the same condition, the halachot [Jewish laws] are the same. But there's one difference—there's the Tanna Kamma says it there—there's one difference: for them [Tefillin and Mezuzah] we have to write in Lashon HaKodesh [the Holy Language/Hebrew]. We could write [Sefer Torah] in any language.

In other words, when you go to shul [synagogue], I take up the Sefer Torah [Torah scroll], and they make a whole community entire ritual, and they take out the whole Sefer Torah from the Aron HaKodesh [Holy Ark], and they kiss it. This Torah, you could write in English or in French, or in Spanish, or in Chinese. It doesn't matter. It's the same kodesh [holiness].

And then you say, "Vayehi binsoa ha'aron" [biblical verse recited when the Torah is taken out], and "Bereishit bara Elokim" [In the beginning God created], "Vayered Mitzrayim Yaakov" [And Jacob went down to Egypt], "Vanochem Anochi" [And I will comfort]. Or you say it in Greek, which I don't know how to say even. And the Torah, when you write it in Greek, you also have to write it with the halachot. You have to write it on a klaf [parchment] with all the hilchot Sefer Torah [laws of writing a Torah scroll], and you read it, and you say a bracha [blessing], and so on. Right?

But Tefillin and Mezuzah, you can't, because Tefillin and Mezuzah is like a kemiya [amulet], basically, for a man to wear. I don't know why. I'm just making it up.

So it has to be written in Lashon HaKodesh, in the Jewish language, in Lashon HaKodesh, really. And he said, no, not every language you could write it, only Greek.

Chapter 3: The Gemara's Discussion and Rabbi Yochanan's Ruling

Instructor:

There's a dispute. I'm not going to go into who is that, who holds like that. I'm just telling you what the Gemara says on this. You could look in there and the Gemara will say, see what the Talmud Bavli [Babylonian Talmud] says about this, and so on.

The Megillat Esther [Book of Esther], it seems like—some people say you could write the Megillah in Yevanit [Greek]. Some people say no. And that's where we get the story of Talmai Melech in Masechet Megillah [tractate Megillah]. Okay?

But what's the important thing? What's the important thing? And of course, Rabbi Yochanan said that there's a... Ah, Rabbi Yochanan said the halacha is like the Tanna Kamma. That's where we get our halacha. And Rabbi Yochanan also brought a proof for the Tanna Kamma from a pasuk: "Yaft Elokim l'Yefet v'yishkon b'ahalei Shem" [May God enlarge Yefet, and may he dwell in the tents of Shem - Genesis 9:27].

And the drash [homiletical interpretation]: "Yafyuto shel Yefet" [the beauty of Yefet] means the most beautiful part of Yefet, right? In other words, I don't know what anyone will tell you. Say, the Tanna Kamma says, in conclusion, that the Torah doesn't have a language.

Chapter 4: The Fundamental Principle - Torah Was Given in All Languages

Instructor:

You could write the Torah in any language and it's kosher. Why? This is how the Gemara—I mean, the Gemara, I like this phrasing, although the Gemara in the end says that we can't have a ra'ayah [proof] from animals like this—but the Gemara in Masechet Megillah, in a different place, in Masechet Berachot, in a different place, regarding Tefillah [prayer], it's a machlokes [dispute] whether you could say it in any language. And it says the lashon [language/formulation]: "L'man savar Rabbi, or savar Rabbanan, she'kol haTorah kulah b'chol lashon ne'emrah" [According to the opinion of Rabbi/the Rabbis, that the entire Torah was given in all languages]. Right?

When the Ribbono Shel Olam [Master of the Universe/God] gave the Torah to Moshe Rabbeinu [Moses our teacher], He didn't give it in one language. If someone tells us that Lashon HaKodesh is holy because Hashem [God] gave the Torah to Moshe Rabbeinu in Lashon HaKodesh—who says this? The heilige Ramban [the holy Ramban/Nachmanides]? This is not true, according to this Gemara and according to this Mishnah.

Hashem gave the Torah in all the languages. Why do we have only the Hebrew one? Because we speak Hebrew, so that's the one we kept. But if you'd be a guy that speaks Greek, you would have the Greek Torah. And if you'd be speaking Aramaic, you'd have the Aramaic Torah. And if you'd be speaking Spanish, you'd have the Spanish Torah. Or Latin, you'd have the Latin Torah, and so on. Like in those, right? It's maskana [conclusion].

If you're not asking me, tell me. I need you to tell me. I don't know which Rav says this. A lot of Torahs fall away from this. So that's the broadest shiur.

Chapter 5: What "Torah" Really Means

Instructor:

The broadest shiur is that the Torah—in other words, when we say "Torah," we don't mean the words. The words in this language, in these letters. Because we could say the same words in a different language. We mean the meaning. And if you could write the meaning in any language, it's kosher.

And of course there's a whole longer list in the Mishnah of which sayings, which ritual sayings can be said in any language. Many of them could be, according to the Tanna Kamma, and so on. Which means that you could say Shema [the central prayer declaring God's unity] in every language and you could say Tefillah in every language and so on.

Some things you can't, and go figure out why which is which. I don't have a clear theory, but that's the story, right?

Chapter 6: The Problem of Translation Accuracy

Instructor:

What do we learn from this? That the Torah is, according to the Tanna Kamma, in every language. What's with the problem of accuracy of translation? Very old, famous problem. What about that problem? What about the problem of translation? What about that problem? What does it mean "the Torah b'chol lashon" [Torah in every language]?

If I take a Torah and I write the English version—I have on my shelf two or three or five, I don't know how many English versions of the Torah, each one with a different translation—so which one is the halachically correct one? Basic question.

Student:

Yeah, but the original one has that same problem also, if you don't know what it means.

Instructor:

No, I'm not... Meaning, if your translation is messed up, then your original is also messed up. But at least we have the...

Student:

Translation is another layer.

Instructor:

So, wait. I like what you're saying. So, there's a basic problem. What does it mean, "Torah b'chol lashon"? Okay, but who says this is the Torah? Maybe this is your shot [attempt] of the Torah, your translation of the Torah, which is not going to be perfect. It's not possible to translate 100% accurately. Impossible, as it says in Masechet Megillah. We'll see if you want, if we'll get to that.

And therefore there's a problem here, right? How could we translate? How could you say that the Torah—maybe it's not the Torah?

Student:

So I said, as I am different—for those of you who don't know what it means also, you don't—maybe you don't have the Torah.

Instructor:

What would be the answer to that question? Of course, maybe I don't know what it means, but the actual letters that Moshe Rabbeinu wrote, or whatever, makes the Torah kosher, are there. So at least let's not call this—you don't have to—this is actually how the halacha works.

This thing I'm making, the chiddush [novel insight], that I'm making in the halacha, all right? How do you want to see the difference? I believe in this little—even below you—to back all the big water everyone is, you know, it's a wish not courage them again, all right?

Even if you don't understand—if we would have, if my theory that I just gave you, if I've called it "kol haTorah kulah b'chol lashon," is that literally—this is of course not history, but if theoretically, if my theory, my story would be true literally, and you would literally have 70 versions of the Torah, or as many languages that there are, and you would literally have that one, then you wouldn't have this problem, of course.

But since we don't have it, and therefore it's written in one language, and just to be clear, when the Mishnah says "b'chol lashon" [in every language], it doesn't mean that—right, I mean, some guy went and wrote a version of the Torah in Targum, in English, in Aramaic, right? Like the kosher Targum [proper Aramaic translation].

The Gemara says it's kosher. The Gemara says this example of kosher Targum, right? I write the Torah in Aramaic. We have that Torah. We have it. It's more or less an accurate translation, but of course there's many parts that are not, or that are debatable, right? And of course many people listened to the Torah in that translation for many years that didn't understand a word of the Hebrew.

But in any case, you could say there were only a few when they were—but they did read the Hebrew also, there we go to—then they understood. But if we say—and what's my problem? I'm saying that if you don't understand the text, and some would say, at least there's a Torah—you don't understand it, at least you have it. When it's in English, it's a mockery of that. You should understand, because otherwise you don't have the Torah. If it's—even if you don't understand it, you still have it.

Chapter 7: The Unresolved Tension - Possession vs. Understanding

Student:

It was—I have—do I have it? It's written there.

Instructor:

No, the question means—I feel like we're talking about two things.

Student:

I wrote it anyway, like I wrote it, like it's like I put on Tefillin, right? And you're—it's like—nothing to do with meaning, it's just I wrote it and it's kosher. It's like I made a mitzvah. It doesn't have to have a meaning, it's just a mitzvah, like a mitzvah ma'aseh [action-based commandment].

Instructor:

No, I swear I'm not going to do that.

Chapter 8: The Problem of Understanding in Different Languages

The Septuagint Precedent and the Question of Fulfillment

Instructor: And of course many people listened to the Torah in that translation for many years, but didn't understand the word of the Hebrew. But in any case, you could say they were only yotzei [fulfilled their obligation] when they—but they did read the Hebrew also, they were yotzei then, and then just understood.

But if we say, what's my problem? I'm saying that if you don't understand the text, and some would say, at least Lashon HaKodesh [the Holy Language, Hebrew], you don't have to understand it, at least you have it. When it's in English, it's a ma'akif [required] that you should understand, because otherwise you don't have the ta'ira b'khala [proper fulfillment]. If it's in Lashon HaKodesh, then even if you don't understand it, you still have it. Do I have it? It's written there.

Student Objection: Mitzvah as Action, Not Meaning

Student: Begash me [excuse me]. I feel like we're talking about two separate things. I wrote it as a ta'ira [tefillin]. I wrote it as a ta'ira. It's like I put on a ma'akif [sukkah]. It's like nothing to do with meaning. It's just I wrote it as a ta'ira and it's kushim [valid]. It's like I made a ma'akif on my gag [roof]. It doesn't have to have a meaning. It's just a mitzvah like a mitzvah ma'aseh [action-based commandment].

Instructor: No, we can write it in khallush [?]. Which are you talking about? The idea is to learn the Torah. So that if I don't have a—if I don't have an understanding of these words, then I'm supposed to do the Torah. You're a mazalit [?]. You're a mazalit. I live on so it's like I see it.

By the way, what other nafka minna [practical difference] is there? I mean it's not actually—I see that it's not—and what does [unclear] even mean? Sometimes I say, it's [unclear] and it's [unclear] with it, things like that. What else does it mean?

Student: You're right, we don't understand that anyways, that doesn't help.

Chapter 9: The Critical Question - Does Inaccurate Translation Invalidate Torah?

Two Possible Assumptions Behind the Mishnah

Instructor: But I'm saying so, but now back to my question. If your translation of your written is inaccurate, does that mean that becomes [invalid] Torah? Very important question. Very important question.

It seems like, I don't know the answer, right? It seems like whoever said this Mishnah that said [the law about translation], and said that all of these things, assumed either one of the two things: either that there can be an accurate translation, or accurate enough for any purpose, or that it's not important. As long as you more or less say that point—right, one of these two things. And probably the second thing is the [correct one]. The first one is just very unrealistic or very naive, right?

Alternative Explanation: Confidence in Understanding

Or another way of saying this would be that this earlier Mishnah was written by someone who had enough confidence they understand the Torah—I don't know why I'm saying it earlier, the comment on the [Mishnah]—they had enough confidence that they understand the Torah. Therefore if they would write a translation of it, it would be a hundred percent what it means.

Counter-Evidence: Rav Yosef on Targum Onkelos

Talking English, we know that some [scholar] said, or Rav Yosef said about Targum Onkelos [Aramaic translation by Onkelos], that if not of the Targum, he wouldn't understand the pasuk [verse]. Meaning that he couldn't have written the Targum, right? Because he doesn't know what the pasuk can mean.

But whoever wrote this Mishnah said, I could write a Targum in any language, because I understand the Torah. Just explain me the language and I'll explain you how to say the Torah in that language.

Student: If you took the Targum Onkelos, the correct one, the historically correct one from Onkelos, and you wrote it, then it would be considered...

Instructor: Exactly.

The Tanna's Radical Position: Nothing Special About Hebrew

But the point is, the point is, however you understand it, the point is that according to this Tanna, there's nothing special about the language of the Torah, nothing. All hilchot Torah [laws of Torah] would be the exact same in any language, even if there's a problem with translation.

Chapter 10: The Philosophical Core - Even Perfect Translation Changes the Text

The Thought Experiment

The answer is that he doesn't even think—I'll just be very clear, even if there's an accurate translation, even if it has the correct meaning, meaning, let's say that, like you said, let's say the Tanna Onkelos is from Hashem [God] Himself, Adrabba [on the contrary], Kadosh Baruch Hu [the Holy One, Blessed be He] and so on, and gave us a correct authorized translation of the text—just to be clear, even then it wouldn't be the same exact, right? Everyone knows this, right? Everyone knows that a text still changes in translation.

What Is Lost in Translation

It would have the same meaning, it might have the same meaning, but even that is not entirely accurate. Right? There would be a lot of connotations and a lot of, let's say, cultural things that would change, right?

We call things the names of the Torah because we read the Torah, and therefore, you know, if you're a ganav [thief], you call it a Lavan Rami [Laban the Deceiver], and if you're a tzaddik [righteous person], an Eisav [Esau], and so on. And if they would be called Lavan Ramis, it's a name, not really translatable, but if the guy would be called something else, we would call it different something else.

There's a lot of things, I'm not going to go at this at length, but it's known to everyone, but there's many things in a language, in the material of the language, in the structure of the language, besides for the meaning, and you do lose them when you translate, even in the theoretical impossible 100% accurate translation, right?

The Tanna's Core Principle: Torah Is Thoughts, Not Words

So what we learn from this Mishnah is that the Rav Tanna Kamma [the first Tanna] held that that doesn't matter. The Torah is thoughts, not words.

Chapter 11: Ibn Ezra as the Extreme Version of This View

Ibn Ezra's Principle

The extreme version of this would be what Ibn Ezra [Abraham ibn Ezra, medieval biblical commentator] said, right? Remember what Ibn Ezra—Ibn Ezra said, the Torah writes the ideas and not the words. And this is why he said in the Torah, there's sometimes the same story twice.

Famously, [he] says it's [about] the [Eliezer story], but he talks about other examples too. And it has different words, and that makes no difference, because that means the same thing. For example, that's one example, but there's other examples.

Ibn Ezra's Methodology

He's against people that take the language literally. He says that I could show you in the Chumash [the Five Books of Moses] itself—he has those different examples. I love [the example where] Eliezer tells—says one thing, and when he says the story, and then another thing when he tells the story over, and it means the same thing. It's just a different phrase.

Student: Exactly.

Instructor: And so on. And what's going on? Ibn Ezra says no, this means the same thing and don't worry about it. We don't care about the words.

Implications: Internal "Translation" Within Hebrew

In other words, you could translate it into Hebrew too and it would be the same [valid]. But the words are not important. If someone goes and he says, the Torah is [written in] very complicated language, I'm gonna simplify it, like Tanakh Lam [simplified Bible], whatever. I'm gonna simplify it. I'm gonna write instead of "the miketz [at the end of] Shmoneh Esrei [eighteen]," "the softness," I'm—you know, because nobody knows what miketz means anymore. Still has the same [validity] because who cares? The Torah is ideas.

It's like editing, like this internal [editing] clearly within the same story, right? So that seems to be the shittah [position] of the Tanna. I think it's a pretty defensible opinion. And that's why he didn't even have the problem of accuracy. All these things, the Torah itself doesn't care about that level of material accuracy, because the thought is what's holy, what's important.

Chapter 12: Practical Objection and Response

Does Translation Affect Reality?

Student: [But don't] the ideas that people get from them [affect the reality]?

Instructor: The reality is that it does. But these people, they had enough confidence in what they thought the idea really was, that it wasn't—that they didn't. That's the fact. It has to be like this. Okay?

Historical Evidence: Translations Were Accepted

Anyone, if [they made] a translation and said everyone's going to read the Torah and hear this translation and not going to know the original text, and everyone was fine with this, right? Right? Everyone was fine with this, right?

The Chachamim [Sages] didn't say this is not [acceptable]—either you read Hebrew or you become a goy [non-Jew], because what's [with] these people that not gonna ever hear the Torah, only through some translation? They said no, it's good, right? It's fine with us as long as it's authorized, as long as it's good enough for our purposes, accurate enough for our purposes, right? Okay?

I'm showing [this is a] very important point and people are very confused about this.

Chapter 13: Comparative Religion - Contrasting Views on Sacred Language

The Common Misconception

People think—I think this is a Muslim thing, I don't know who made it up. It's not a Christian thing. The Christians hold like this, that's [their position on] the Bible. [They hold] the same position [as this Tanna]: every language.

The Muslim Position: Text as Sacred

Christian and Muslims—very famously [Muslims] hold that the Quran is only holy, or holy in Arabic, and it doesn't even have any meaning in any other language. They don't even call their translations "translation." They call them "interpretations."

If you buy a Quran, it never says "translation of the Quran." If it's a religious one, no. It's connected to [their theology]. It's connected to this modern [concept]—the work in particular [that] calls it—where it talks about [something]—I'm [thinking] about where it talks about the God's Word, the logos, whatever. It's not going—it has to do with this. In any case, it's—but it's not getting into this. That's time for [another discussion].

The point is they hold that the text, the words, are holy, not the meaning of them. And therefore you have to learn the Arabic. If you don't read in Arabic, you don't understand [it]. Your [obligation is to read it]. This [is their position]. Like I said, if you buy a religious Quran, it's always gonna say "interpretation of the Quran," and it's gonna tell you [you] should read in Arabic, even if you don't understand.

Of course, the Arabic—like it is to say it—because then the [understanding] isn't the point anyways.

Digression: Critique of the Quran's Content

By the way, it's nothing to understand there. Don't tell anyone. Anyways, just a long list of, "you should be good, otherwise you'll burn in hell again." And that's what it says, like, over, throughout 150 chapters or whatever it is. That's basically what it says.

So, a very simplified version, but more or less, that's what it says. So, it makes sense that there's only—if you're saying simple stuff and just repeating them, of course, the only value is in, like, supposed poetry of the Arabic and so on, because it doesn't really say anything.

But anyways, maybe that's the conspiracy theory of why they made up this shittah [position].

The Kuzari's Argument Against Islam

The Kuzari [Sefer HaKuzari by Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi] famously says that the Muslims say that the Quran is eloquence, is evidence of its godliness. And he says, well, sadly, I can't judge that because I don't listen to [understand] Arabic.

He has the Kuzari king say that because, of course, he [Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi] did read Arabic. This is supposed to be an argument against Islam, because if you really have a religion that's supposed to show evidence of its divine origin, it should be accessible to everyone. That's the argument. Very funny argument for the Kuzari to say.

But anyways, this is one of the hidden problems in the Kuzari. And [the] point [is], this is not the [Jewish position].

Chapter 14: Summary of the Two Positions

Position A: Text as Sacred (The Muslim Example)

There was a [view]—like it [exists in Islam]—so [regarding] vows and the [unclear], I'm done [with that topic]. Actions and [unclear]. I can't stop reading the [unclear] interesting anyways.

Anyways, so the important thing is that there's a different, there's a shittah, and for example the Muslims have it on their holy book, which says that the text is what's heilig [holy] and not the meaning, or at least as heilig as the meaning. And according to that, you have to of course have the original text and the original words, not only the original [meaning].

Position B: Meaning as Sacred (This Tanna's View)

That is not the shittah of the heilig Tanna Kamma [the holy first Tanna].

The Superiority of Greek for Torah Translation: Rabban Shimon Gamliel's Position

Chapter 1: Rabban Shimon Gamliel's Distinctive View on Greek Translation

The Specific Authorization of Greek

Instructor: Even according to Rishonim Gimelim, I'm going to talk about it in a second. It says *Belusha Kodesh* [in the Holy Language] and maybe it also doesn't hold its exact words, it's just for some reason these languages. I'm going to talk about it in a second. This is an important theory of the *Kedushat HaTorah* [holiness of the Torah], of the Holy Mishnah, and you should remember it. Because this is also behind whoever said that Midrash of *Beheret* of the *Shiv'im* [Seventy], of course.

To assume that the Torah should be accessible, everyone should be able to understand it because it's very simple and very good and very clear. And maybe it's true that we'll lose some nuance of cultural references. It doesn't matter because that's not the point of the Torah. The point is whatever basic message it has or messages or thousands of *chachmas* [wisdoms] and so on. And you can have that in every language. And therefore, the Torah is holy in any language. It's very universalistic or philosophical understanding of it, unlike many people who seem to think that the whole point of the Torah is that it's a certain language.

Rav Shimon Gamliel had a different *shita* [approach/opinion]. He said like this: even the *Sforim* [books], *Tzohot* [?], *Tziml Mezeh Zizmoideh* [?], of course you can't write in *Yevonit* [Greek] in different language, but even the Sefer Torah you can only write in *Yevonit*. Now why?

Two Theories of the Greek Translation

So there's really two theories of this and I think that both theories differ by different people. Of course, talking about the Torah in Greek is talking about a specific translation, which is probably the one that we have, the Greek translation, although some people have argued that it's not the same one. Probably changed somewhat, but there's very probably, yeah. There's probably little reason to think that we have a totally different one. Of course, the things that we would have quotes from it are not really there, so it's problematic. Or not all of them there. But it's probably the same one, or some version of the same one. Why should you think differently? I don't know.

In any case, the important thing is, and the Jews that had the tradition of reading the Torah in *Yevonit*, they had this one. It's not like they had the same story or version of the same story. There's two, so he's talking about a certain Torah that's written, right? He said this is the authorized translation and not all the ones.

Understanding Rabban Gamliel's Position: Greek Chauvinism

So what's the *pshat* [simple meaning]? How do we understand it? What the [Gemara] is apparently saying is that Rav Shimon Gamliel, he thought he was a Greek chauvinist. He was a Jewish chauvinist, of course, because he was Jewish. But he also was a Greek chauvinist. He said, and we know that on Rav Shimon Gamliel's day he studied Greek. Everyone knows. He said, look, I don't think the Torah would be good in any language. It's not true. Most languages are not very good. Latin, he probably knew some Latin. Latin is a language for, what does it say in the Yerushalmi? Latin is good for something else, remember?

Student: Oh, each one is good for something else.

Instructor: Yeah, there's a Midrash, I saw the Midrash once, each one for poetry, for this, for that. What's Latin there for? There's some for like love, I think Latin is for love, like one of these things, it's a Midrash, I saw this one. Anyway, it says this in *Petish* [?] somewhere, I forget where. Rav Shimon Gamliel said that...

Student: What's Latin for?

Instructor: I forget. I forget. I think it's the *visas* [?].

Student: What are you looking for?

Instructor: I know, this is dumb. I don't know. I'm not finding it in a second. I know where to find it, but it's going to take me too much time.

Student: So no, he's just making stuff up, this guy, the kids here.

Instructor: Not always. I think he doesn't know. Now listen, so I know you have to look also in, what should we call it, in the book, but to get to it, it's going to take me too long to search things now.

The Yerushalmi's Explanation: "They Checked"

But it was like this, right? It could have two meanings. What it means is that, like I'm saying, that Greek was the best translation, the best language in general and therefore the Torah works in Greek. He doesn't think it would work in any other language because other languages are less expressive and therefore they can have a worse *pshat* [understanding] of the Torah. So Greek, the Greek language is the best language of the *Yefet* [Japheth], and *Yavan* [Greece] is of course one of the children of *Yefet*, and therefore is what? Therefore the Greek Torah is the best one.

This is very unlike what you'll hear in any Chanukah tradition, that the Greek is the worst thing. No, Rishon HaGadol [a great early authority] said the Torah can be written only in Greek. He doesn't believe it can be written in other languages, but in Greek it can be written because Greeks have a good language. You can express the Torah perfectly in Greek. Alright? Perfect. *Stimmt* [correct]? That's all. I didn't make this up.

The Yerushalmi says like this on this Mishnah in Megillah: *"Badku mati shel'ayna tori choli li targim"* [They checked which language our Torah can be translated into]. Here, right? *"Badku mati shel'ayna tori choli li targim kol tzarka ele Yevonit"* [They checked which language our Torah can be translated into; they found only Greek]. They checked. They checked with the language. They say *Yevonit* is the language that can be translated Torah.

Of course, then it talks about Aramaic, that maybe you could have an Aramaic out of *Yevonit*. This is where there's different *Rishonim* [early authorities], this is where we get *Targum Onkelos* or not, or it's Aquila and so on, stories. Point is that he held that *Yevonit* is a great language, because Greek is very expressive for some reason. Probably there's a lot of people that do, how do you call it, linguistics, that explain to you why he thinks this. I don't think it's entirely made up. It's true that Greek is a pretty expressive language, at least for the Torah, and it's translatable. *Stimmt*?

Therefore, if you don't understand the word in the Torah, you should look in the Greek, because it has *askim* [authorization] from Rabban Gamliel. And from *shiv'im zekayin* [seventy elders], and whoever those were, but we don't know their names. From Rabban Gamliel we know. He gave *askim*, he said this is the best way to translate the Torah.

Chapter 2: What "Checking Languages" Means

Greek as a Conceptual Fit for Torah

But he's saying something deeper than that, right? He's saying, because again, you remember, every language has its conceptual structure and its grammar and everything, and he's saying that Greek is a good fit for the Torah, right? They *badku* [checked], they checked the Greek is a good fit for the Torah. It works very well in Greek. Greek with the Greek of Homer, right? The Greek with all the systems that the Greeks believe in which are built into their language, in that language the Torah works very well.

Student: As in the amount of words?

Instructor: I don't know if the amount of words, for one word you don't have to use three like with, let's say, English you would...

Student: No, probably not, because who cares about that?

Instructor: So then what, what exactly? English is also a very expressive language.

Student: English is probably the best language now.

Instructor: No, no, I don't think that would be a problem. They're saying that in some languages, who cares it's going to be longer? So it's going to be longer, that's not a problem. That's because it's the opposite.

Student: So Greek is a better language than Hebrew?

Rabban Gamliel Knew What Torah Means

Instructor: You don't know. Again, we read this. *Gam* [also] that they have. Rabban Gamliel didn't think, he doesn't understand, might think this. Rav Shmuel thought he knows what the Torah means. He's just looking for a good way to express it to a translator in a different language, right? You have a problem. You're not going to know the translation. That's your problem. He does know.

Student: That means something inclusive...

Instructor: No, that's not true. That's not what he thinks. He thinks obviously the Torah means—that's a nice theory of some literary theorist who thinks that the text of the Torah is *chol* [ambiguous/open], *haylik* [?]. This is not what Rav Shmuel said in the *Chillik* [?] on *Eriak* [?] line. Why do I have to go there? Listen to me.

Student: Why can't I just talk about the actual...

Instructor: Because he's not saying this. Because Rabban Gamliel said that the Torah is written in every language. Or the *Peshawar* [?] said it can be written in Greek because it's the best language. There's no such a thing as two languages where all the words that have the same range of meaning are translatable one for one. That's impossible. And I don't think that the *Chachamim* [Sages] ever had this problem. They thought the opposite. They thought that they knew what the Torah means and therefore they could translate it.

If the same word means in two different places two different things, so I'll write a different word in both places and it'll be even clearer than the original Torah. Very good, no problem.

Student: You think that sometimes it means both in one place?

Instructor: He obviously didn't think that. He thought that it has a meaning and a definite meaning and it could be retranslated. They checked all the languages, they tried that you say the same thing in three languages, they see that it works better in a certain language. That's the *b'aya* [problem], they give, carries the meaning better. What else could it mean? It carries the meaning better. Not the tricks, not the jokes, the puns. Nobody needs the pun. If you need the pun, then...

Student: No, but I'm saying in every language, if you really understand it, you could use, okay, so you'll end up using three paragraphs, who cares?

The Real Problem: Languages Lacking Adequate Expression

Instructor: That's not the problem. The problem is the opposite. You don't have words at all, or you don't have the correct formula to express a certain thing. You can't say in Yiddish, you know that in Yiddish you can't say most things?

Student: No, no, that's a good example.

Instructor: Because it's a bad language, it has not enough words. If you try to say something, anything complicated in Yiddish, you end up speaking English. That's a true story, it happened to me every week in my *shiur* [class].

Student: Okay, so, and in English also say a lot of Yiddish words.

Instructor: Okay, just ask, but you, I can't, you can't. And that's a good [example], and they thought of this, they thought, and this by the way...

The Linguistic Quality Debate and Competing Views on Translation

Chapter 1: The Reality of Language Quality Differences

Practical Example: Yiddish's Limitations

Instructor: The problem is the opposite. You don't have words at all or you don't have the correct formula to express a certain thing. You can't say in Yiddish. You know that in Yiddish you can't say most things?

Student: No, no.

Instructor: That's a good example. Because it's a bad language. It has not enough words. If you try to say something, anything complicated in Yiddish, you end up speaking English. That's a true story. Happened to me every week in my shiur [Torah class]. So, in English you also say a lot of Yiddish words. Okay, just ads. But you can't. And that's a good example.

The Linguistics Debate on Language Quality

Instructor: And they thought of, by the way, linguistics has a whole debate about this. If you're allowed to say that there are better or worse languages, of course, it's not woke to say. But I read a few, all the anti-woke linguists that I read about this, they all say that it's nonsense. Of course, there's languages that are more complex and more expressive and for certain things. Some languages are better for certain areas and so on. This is a different politic. But the point is that, of course, there's languages that are better and better for certain things than others. What's so difficult to understand?

Chapter 2: Puns and Word-Play Are NOT the Issue

Clarification on Translation Limits

Instructor: Not because of the puns. It's very clear not because of the puns. Puns are never translatable. For example, you can see example of this in the translations the Targum [Aramaic translation]. I don't know what this Targum machine does, but Targum Onkelos [Aramaic translation of the Torah by Onkelos], for example, which the Chachamim [Sages] very much like, just ignores every word play in the Torah. It just does a literal translation of everything, even poetry. Just tries and puts it back in the prose.

And this is because he thought—he obviously didn't think that is even important to get the beauty of the poetry. That was not important to him. It was more important to him to get the meaning. And that's all. That was the *kedushas haTorah* [holiness of the Torah]. And I think that the Greek does something similar. I'm not sure, you have to check how the Greek treats things like this. Good question, I'll find out later. But I know that we should find out later. But the point is that this is definitely how Onkelos thought of it. And he thought that Greek was the best language and therefore the Torah is very well expressed in Greek.

Practical Implications of Rabban Shimon Gamliel's View

Instructor: This means that if in the *emunah* [faith/belief] or if it is in the Torah one thing and the Greek it's *pistis* [Greek: faith], then *pistis* is a very good translation for the concept of *emunah*. Unlike anyone would say, "No, he doesn't have a concept of *emunah*." No, he does. Hashem [God] will set every concept in Greek, maybe not in English. English is very good. And so on. I just said a random word that the Christians like to talk about very much. And so on, right? Every word is all kinds of words that are hard to translate. He has a translation for all of them in Greek.

And this means that us, that we don't understand Hebrew, we could look in the Greek and understand things better, sometimes. That's what advice from Rabban Shimon Gamliel [is]—to understand the Torah, or to connect, to get the real meaning, the real word that we're looking for, the concept that we're looking for. Words are all concepts. There's the *shita* [approach/position] of Rabban Shimon Gamliel.

Chapter 3: The Competing Shittah: Rebbe Yehuda's B'dieved View

Source and Basic Position

Instructor: There's a different *shita*, different *shita*, that's if you say *Yefei Sas Sofer* [uncertain reference]. There's a different *shita* in Rabban Shimon Gamliel, which is the *shita* of—no? There's a different *shita* of Rabban Shimon Gamliel, which is the *shita* of—no? A different *shita* of Rebbe Yehuda says that they were not *mutter* [permitted] only Torah *b'lashon* [in the language of]—*mishum ma'aseh shehayah* [because of what happened]. That sounds like a different *shita*. He sounds not to say that the *Yevonit* [Greek] is so great like Rabban Shimon Gamliel. And there's some *Gedolim* [great scholars] seems to say here.

The B'dieved Interpretation

Instructor: But that about that it's just that there was a story, like the story that said that Talmai HaMelech [King Ptolemy] forced us to translate the Torah. So it's like with the effort because we had to—we had to—we have to keep it safe with him. So we have a *Yevonit Yisrael Torah* [Greek Torah for Israel] and it's like *b'dieved* [after the fact, not ideal], it's *mutter* [permitted]. Okay, we're *mutter b'dieved* [permitted after the fact], but that's all. That's just a *hetter* [permission] for *b'dieved* for the time that was needed.

And maybe it's therefore, it's like grandfathered in. We could use this Torah always, but we can't do any other translations, even of other texts, right? We can't even translate the Tanach [Hebrew Bible] in the Greek. It's not going to work because there's not that *hetter* [permission]. That's a different chapter, totally different reading of the story of the *Targum Hashivim* [Septuagint/Translation of the Seventy], right? Remember?

Student: Very good.

Instructor: You probably also know that there's a totally different *shita* of the story, right? Which is from the—who said that *shita*? Who said that *shita*?

Student: Hmm.

Instructor: You know I'm talking about, right? Who?

Student: No, you don't know?

Instructor: The *Megillas Taanis* [Scroll of Fasts], right? Who said *Adepshat* [uncertain term]?

Student: Yeah, who said *Adepshat*?

Instructor: There you go, that's from *Megillas Taanis*, right? Is that where it's from?

Student: I think so.

Chapter 4: The Third View: Maseches Sofrim's Negative Assessment

Source Identification and Dating

Instructor: So someone, not the [unclear], but [unclear], it's really [unclear], which is, these are much later texts, a long time after the—where is the source? It's very interesting, you have to see something, you have to see this, okay? [Unclear], it says, like this, okay? [Unclear], very different [unclear].

*Maseches Sofrim* [Tractate of Scribes] is not a real *masechta* [tractate], it was written in the times of the *Gaonim* [post-Talmudic rabbinic authorities], who knows when, very late. It's a lot of *minhagim* [customs]. *Maseches Sofrim*, it says, by the way, it says, we don't write the Torah *b'chol lashon* [in any language]. *Asot eksiv ha-shiris* [uncertain phrase], right? *Keshitas*, not *keshitas haTanach* [uncertain phrase], right? Or *keshitas ra-mabdil* [uncertain phrase]. *Mechilik ha-netanohim* [uncertain phrase], right? Why, because it doesn't say Greek either, right?

He doesn't write, not Greek. It's not even in the right. He's more *machmir* [stringent], even though he says we can't write—he literally says he can't write the Torah in any language, right?

The Negative Narrative

Instructor: And there's a story behind the *Chachamim* [Sages] that wrote the Torah to the king of the king, in *Yevonit* [Greek]. And he said to the king of the king, that he said the Torah can be translated into any language. This is very weird, because this is literally the language from the Yerushalmi [Jerusalem Talmud] that said that they checked and they found that we can only be *metagim* [translate] in the Torah *kol tzarkah* [adequately] in Greek, right? And here it says that it was as bad as *yom b'shenasah b'ya'eigel* [the day the Golden Calf was made], that's the *shita* [position] of the *Maseches Sofrim*. And why is that? Because it was not—they could not translate it.

Interpretation and Implications

Instructor: In other words, this person who wrote—who was a much later person than the *Tanaim* [Mishnaic sages], and not that I care about that, but just showing you that there's something different—he held that theoretically maybe it would be nice to translate it, but it's impossible. Impossible. Why is it impossible? Possible maybe because of all these things that he shows, all these things that he shows about all the things that he shows about the differences that they have to change, like this whole thing.

Student: No, where to say which Gemara [Talmud]?

Instructor: There's no such Gemara, Tzadik [righteous one/term of address]. There is not a Gemara in the sixth of *Taanis* [Tractate of Fasts]. There's not such a Gemara. The *Taanis* was made up by someone a long time after the Gemara. That's not how it's done. No, that's not the Gemara. That's not the Gemara. That's what I was thinking. That's what I was thinking. Okay?

There was not a *ta'anis* [fast] on that in the Gemara. There was a *ta'anis* on that in some other book called what? *Maseches Sofrim*, that's what you're saying. *Maseches Sofrim* says that it was very bad because the *Maseches Sofrim* is in the *machloket* [dispute] with the Yerushalmi. If there's a *Maseches Sofrim* in the Yerushalmi, of course the Yerushalmi is right. It's *machmir* [stringent] *tzoi* [uncertain term].

Clarifying the Source: Megillas Taanis

Instructor: *Megillas Taanis* says that you should fast. *Megillas Taanis*, it's not really *Megillas Taanis*. It's probably a later part. Even *Megillas Taanis* has a lot of levels, because you have to look in the [unclear]. [It] says that you should fast on [unclear], and that the world was dark for three days, and therefore people used to fast [unclear]. That's what it says in [unclear]. But not really this. I don't think this is the real [unclear]. I'm pretty sure that this is a list of [unclear]. [Unclear] is a list of happy days. So it's not the same thing. We could look up in whoever wrote about [unclear] and you'll see that book. You could see what's going on about that, okay? Let's push it.

Chapter 5: Why Maseches Sofrim Held Translation Impossible

Two Possible Reasons

Instructor: In any case, whatever you're saying, that's all. Now, what am I saying? This person, whoever wrote [unclear], who explains this, he thinks that either you can't, or he thought like the other, like the Muslim [shita], that the Torah is holy because of its words. By definition impossible to translate because you can't translate a language. It's just a language, it's what it is. Make sense?

It doesn't say anywhere in the Gemara that there's a *ta'anis* [fast] on this, Tzadik. I'm not that kind of person. There's some later in the book. There's a lot of things that it says. *Machazoi* [uncertain term]. There's a lot of places, but it doesn't say in the Gemara. There's no... It was fine. Of course not.

Chapter 6: Reframing the "Changes" in the Septuagint

The Nature of the Changes

Instructor: In any case, even in *Maseches Sofrim*, it doesn't really say that. Maybe this is just an over-interpretation. He just says that it couldn't have been translated and probably because of all these—probably with these means all these things that they were in *Megillah* [Tractate Megillah]. [It] brings all these—but I said they had to change for basically political reasons, right? For basically so [it] can't be misinterpreted and so on.

And it's weird because the *Gedolim* [great scholars], he realized that in the Gemara, even though they made all these changes, that still has to this stuff there because it's because that's what it means, right? But it says *Bereishis bara Elokim* [In the beginning God created]—there might be a reason why it says *Bereishis bara Elokim*, but *Elokim bara Bereishis* [God created in the beginning] means the same thing, right? It just took away one mistake. [Unclear] means [unclear]. It's still the same thing. It's just different words for the same animal, right?

Implications for Translation Theory

Instructor: So there's nothing wrong with these mistranslations. It's not really clear what things. So you think that's how much the meaning means, that you could literally mistranslate it? Obviously. And it's fine. The *Targum Onkelos* does this all the time. And this is, again, an example of a translation that we'll be thinking of.

Chapter 6: The Fundamental Principle of Torah Translation

The Core Claim: Torah Transcends Language

Instructor: They're as literal as can be. But they're still a translation, and they still do all these kind of things. They still fix a lot of things. And sometimes they'll say, okay, maybe I had a different case.

So what do we learn from all of this? We learn from all of this a very important thing. In principle, at least—this is the principle that I'm working with that I last year worked with and I brought you a book on the times a Mishnah that says this—in principle, the Torah can be translated, which means that all the concepts of the Torah can be said in every language, in principle.

It's not true that thoughts belong to a language. Not true. We need to think in a language. Nobody thought without a language. Which means that there isn't one language that one... And there also isn't one correct language that created the world. That's another way of saying it.

There is one, but it's not an alphabet. There are certain correct concepts and wrong concepts. It's not that you can say whatever you want or you can say everything however you want. There isn't a specific alphabet that created the world, of course. Alphabet in the sense of the material alphabet, of course. Nobody really thinks that. Everyone thinks that it's just confused.

The Story of the Rebbe Reb Bunim and the Mekubal

Instructor: I told you the Haile Ge'ech [the Gaon] and the Rebbe Reb Bunim. The Rebbe Reb Bunim said that he found a Mekubal [kabbalist], and the Mekubal told him that there's a lot of secrets in the... There's a big [daled in "echad" and ayin in "shema"]. So the Rebbe Reb Bunim told them, that's very cute, but I have a question for you. So could you explain to me in Polish this thought that you just told me? And if not, obviously they don't understand what you're talking about, because it doesn't stand with *b'chol lashon* [in any language—referring to the halacha that Krias Shema can be recited in any language].

Now, of course, it's not necessarily true that that person had to be able to explain in Polish, because you have to know Polish very well and the Polish philosophical concepts and the way in which to translate—it's very hard to translate accurately from one language to another. It's not a simple thing to do, right?

Student: Yeah, that's just for the... That's not real. I know people say that much advanced enough people say that that's this time you don't need that, that it's nonsense. That's just over. That's way over. That's way over, that's way over, over OCD. It's not... He doesn't end up there.

Instructor: Yeah, but the *kasha* [question/difficulty] doesn't begin. It's not real. The *kasha* doesn't begin. You're saying just access and language is not enough.

Student: Yeah, there were people in the Shevet Efraim [tribe of Ephraim] that didn't know how to say the *shin* [the Hebrew letter shin].

Instructor: Well, therefore what? It doesn't mean that they were not... I mean, the Mishnah says that there's a problem, whatever, because they want to say it correctly, but you're *yotzei* [fulfilled the obligation]. If you don't say it correctly, it's a *bedieved* [after the fact, acceptable though not ideal], not at all wrong. *Kara v'lo dikdek b'osiyoseha yatza* [if one read but was not precise in the letters, he fulfilled his obligation]—that's what it means.

Languages and Their Limitations

The Possibility That Hebrew Is Not Ideal

Instructor: So this is very important, that you could, in principle, say everything in every language. And there's problems with some languages and with some people. Some languages are just not very good.

Of course, it's possible that Hebrew is not a very good language. I want to say this because it has to be a possibility. It's possible. We know that we would have a very hard time expressing ourselves in Biblical Hebrew, or probably would be impossible. You know how we know this? No book since the Bible was written in Biblical Hebrew. And not because nobody knew it—they read the Torah every week. That's because you can't really say what you want to say in it, right?

Even the Mishnah wasn't written in Biblical Hebrew, right? It was written in Mishnaic Hebrew, which is maybe a version of Biblical Hebrew, or maybe a later stage of it, or whatever you want to say, but it was able to express itself only in that, and it has a bunch of Greek loan words and so on. Of course, the Bible also has loan words from other languages.

Mishnaic Hebrew as a Viable Alternative

Instructor: And later, people can't even write... Actually, I do think... It's very interesting. I actually think, for example, that you could express most things in Mishnaic Hebrew still to this day. Most people don't actually write in the language of the Mishnah, but it's not very hard to express yourself in that language if you know how it works.

Now, people have done that, right? So Agnon does that, more or less. And he's pretty good at getting across whatever he's trying to get across. So it is possible. It's also possible to do it in later versions of Hebrew, but those are just stylistic things.

But nobody can do it in the biblical language. Or at least you could do it, but nobody would understand what you're saying. You would not be very successful at expressing yourself. You could probably do it in the way that the Torah is translated into English or into Greek or into any other language you know.

The Paradox of Understanding Torah

Instructor: English is a very good language because it has a lot of words. You can't do it in Hebrew in the language of the *Lashon Kodesh* [Holy Language] and the *Kodesh* of the *Chumash* [the holiness of the Five Books of Moses]. And therefore, we have to translate the Torah into a different language in order to understand it. Because like we said, there's a problem with the original language also. You could say, we're *yotzei*, but we're not trying to just be able to understand it.

Chapter 7: The "Pro-Greek" Chanukah Message

Why Greek Is More Accessible Than Biblical Hebrew

Instructor: So, therefore, this is a counter-Chanukah drasha, counter-anti-Yevanish drasha [counter to anti-Greek sermon]. This is a pro-Yevanish drasha. This is saying that if we translate it into Yevanish [Greek]... Of course, Ancient Greek is not very accessible to us either. It's a little bit more accessible to us than Ancient Hebrew. You know why, right? You don't know why?

Because we speak a language that's somewhat descended from it—not entirely, but somewhat, or at least has a lot of... A lot of what?

Student: We stopped using the language.

Instructor: Which language?

Student: Hebrew.

Instructor: Well, we don't... We know Hebrew. We know a lot about Hebrew. But English has very little to do with Hebrew. It has more to do with Greek—not a lot to do with Greek either, but a little to do with Greek. It belongs to the same family in very wide senses and so on.

The Authorized Greek Translation

Instructor: So, it's better. And we also have a translation, an authorized translation by Rabban Shimon Gamliel of all the 70 sages of the Torah into Greek, which means that also we could use every concept they translated into Greek to identify the Greek concepts.

And the Greeks were much better at explaining their concepts to us than the Torah was, that's for sure. And, of course, people have this funny idea that the Greek philosophers just make up concepts, but they don't. They're just explaining concepts that exist in their language and making it better and clearer.

But the people that we have that are doing the Torah are pretty bad at explaining the basic concepts of the Torah, and the Greeks are doing a much better job at explaining their concepts. And since Rabban Shimon Gamliel said that this is the best language, and it's the best language to express the Torah in, so the best way to understand the Torah is to do what the Holy Rambam [Maimonides] did and read the Greek text—of course translated into Arabic, complicated—and read the Torah through their eyes, because they're saying... Rabban Shimon Gamliel said that they should do this, not that Rambam... And I'm pretty sure... I'm pretty sure... Why? No, those are just... No, thanks.

Chapter 8: The Chachamim Thought in Greek

Evidence from the Sages' Practice

Instructor: Therefore, and not only that, I also think another thing. Since the *Chachamim* [Sages] thought this, or at least some of them thought this, it's probable that a lot of what they're doing is translating into Greek.

And you'll notice that the people that we call *Chachamim*—which are really only one part of the ones that lived in Hellenic period and later in other periods and so on—people living in Rome and Hellenic Palestine and these people are thinking in Greek, many of them, at least the ones that are sophisticated. That doesn't mean that they read Greek philosophy. It doesn't make a difference. Like there's a whole argument about that. But it does mean that they're thinking in Greek often.

The Evidence: They Express Complex Ideas in Greek

Instructor: And you know how I know that, right? Because whenever they want to express themselves something that's complicated, they just say it in Greek. Very often. Right?

Even when they count, they count in Greek. They just say alpha, beta, gamma, and they don't say alef, beis, gimmel.

The Example from the Beis Hamikdash

Instructor: Even in the *Beis Hamikdash* [Holy Temple], in the Holy *Beis Hamikdash*, there were three *krenos* [Greek: containers] of *Trumas Hashkolim* [the half-shekel Temple tax], and there was... and they were labeled alpha, beta, gamma.

And there's like a *shaila* [question]... The *Binyan Yehoshua* [a commentary] says, why did they write alpha, beta, gamma? Alpha, beta, gamma is just alef, beis, gimmel. Like, seriously, it's literally the same letters, or descended from the same letters. Why can't they write alef, beis, gimmel? Because alef, beis, gimmel is so holy, they don't want to use it just for counting.

But this is a nice piece of information. The truth is that they just counted in Greek. It's like we count in English. None of you... One of the signs of what your native language is thinking is how you count in it, right? Because counting is like something we do very automatically.

So, the people in the *Beis Hamikdash* just counted in Greek, and many other things that they explained in Greek. And even when they explain things in Hebrew, which they used, they borrowed... They either... How do you call it? They conjugate Biblical terms into new kinds of words, concepts. They're probably thinking in Greek ways.

The Final Clarification: Concepts Transcend Language

Instructor: The Greek way is... Nothing in Greek way. There's no such thing as Greek ways. It just means that this language is very expressive and the kind of words that it gives you is expressive, and it allows you to explain the Torah better.

Doesn't mean that it's Greek. It's not *chas v'shalom* [God forbid] that they're taking Greek concepts, right? Because the concepts that we said, the Torah *b'chol lashon* [in every language]—the concepts are beyond language. You can't think them without any language because we're humans, we're not angels or whatever, abstract intellects that think without language. But...

The Greek-Jewish Intellectual Tradition: Translation, Shared Wisdom, and the Tibbons' Project

Greek Language as an Expressive Tool, Not Greek Philosophy

Instructor: We just said Greek ways doesn't mean Greek ways. There's no such thing as Greek ways. It just means that this language is very expressive and the kind of words that it gives you is expressive and it allows you to explain the Torah better. Doesn't mean that it's Greek. It's not *chazashon* [their language/their way] that they're taking Greek concepts. Right? Because the concepts that we said, the Torah of *Chazal* [the Sages], the concepts are beyond language.

You can't think them without any language because we're humans, we're not angels or whatever. Abstract intellect, I think, without language. But what we're thinking is not the language, what we're thinking is the thoughts. But we do need good tools to do that for which languages are good, and for which the Greek language is one of the best.

The Value of Comparative Study

And therefore, it seems to me that reading Greek language, and specifically the language, and comparing it to how the *chachamim* [sages] thought, to how the *chachamim* of all generations, and how the Torah itself—but the Torah itself was not in that context, so it's not going to help us much—is extremely helpful to understand both sides of the story which are really the same. They're just trying to explain the same things.

And like I said, the Greek sages were just very much better at explaining themselves. They're not infinitely better, just to be clear. There's some things in which they're worse probably. But for us, mainly because we have the tradition—we don't really have a Jewish tradition or we don't have it as clearly written down or transmitted as we have the Greek wisdom tradition, which is, of course, not so different from the parts of it are just the same.

The Myth of Shared Origins

I don't think the first Greeks—there's some myths, of course, how they literally studied from the Eastern Sages, which basically means the same people that we studied with or from or are. It's not—of course, there's big expanded versions of this myth, but it's not crazy and it's not wrong in the most Protestant where there's like one part of the same tradition. They think you could, if you start reading it, you see that they think in the same way.

Of course, people in China and all over think in similar ways, just because human beings think in certain ways. Maybe there's still kind of subtle differences, but these are the ones that are closer to us, probably.

The Translation Tradition: The Tibbons

And therefore, it's very important, and you'll read, and I have a whole sheet to talk about this, the people that—now we have a tradition of translators, like the Tibbons were the greatest translators, were the most famous, at least, translators of Arabic into Hebrew.

And a lot of what they're doing when they're good, and I have to show you in the fourth chapter of *Shemoneh Perakim* [Eight Chapters] that we're studying now, Rav Shmuel ibn Tibbon explicitly writes this. I read a little later, further today, and he explicitly says this. It's not—I mean, it's also more or less explicitly in other places. But he explicitly has as this project to not only to give you the correct words, like to show you should understand what the Rambam [Maimonides] is meaning when he's translating from Arabic, Arabic, which is translated from Greek, which is so on.

But he also tries to give you, put it back into the context of the language of the Mishnah, of the *chachamim* who lived in *Al-Anik* [possibly: Eretz Yisrael/the Land of Israel], Israel. And he does, sometimes he's probably successful at it, sometimes he might have guessed wrong, because we don't have a very good understanding of how their words work. But *pinti* [possibly: in any case] sometimes does guess correctly. And like we talked about *zehirus* [carefulness/vigilance] and so on, they sometimes do thing to say things that are correct.

Identical Aphorisms Across Traditions

And there's sometimes even literally the same aphorisms or aphorisms from Greek sages and from Jewish sages, and there's no reason to think that these are not literally the same thing. Whether they said it because they stole it from one another or they said it because they thought the same thing doesn't make a big difference.

Remember it says in the Mishnah, *hayom katzar v'hamelacha merubah* [the day is short and the work is great]. You know who said that? Hippocrates. Very famous statement. Literally word for word. Life is long and art is short—life is short and art is long, it can't be more word for word than that, and things like that.

Clarifying "Art" - The Concept of *Techne*

Student: What's the Greek word for art?

Instructor: I forgot, it's the same word, it's not *melocha* [work/craft], *melocha* isn't here. What does it tell us? He's talking about art in the sense of *techne* [τέχνη: craft/skill], by the way, *techne* is the word, and he's thinking of the like medical art because he was a doctor. So I'm not knowing how to be a doctor, that's what he's thinking of. But you see what just happened—it doesn't matter, it's the same.

Student: Narrower than—

Instructor: No, no, no, the translation of the word is art. That's what means. What your art is whatever that depends on what your—what your job is or what you think your—

Student: Doesn't *fach* or artisan—

Instructor: Yes, yes, no, no, I'm not art English. Do you want to say art? I mean the way the Greeks mean it. Not the way the English people mean it. Art not as in fine arts. That's what I meant to say.

Student: What do the Greeks call it?

Instructor: Yes, yes, yes. That's what I meant. That's an example. There are thousands of such examples. I myself noted some examples of this. Because I think we just translated Plato.

The Question of "Stealing" Ideas

Student: What do you mean by stealing? How do you steal it? Steal what?

Instructor: No, it's not stealing. You can't steal it. You're saying it.

Student: Yeah, it's nothing. I'm just saying.

Instructor: There's no reason to think otherwise. And showing that's and we could see details of this and differentiate *shiurim* [classes/lessons].

Stories of the Afterlife and the Nature of Heavenly Judgment: A Talmudic Investigation

Opening: Personal Reflections on Travel and Study

Instructor:

If anyone knows the tarot, they can tell me, but then we'll try to learn a little bit about Aristotle. Today, an interesting thing happened. I was discussing, my wife wants to go on a trip somewhere for an event. And I was saying that I don't have the courage to go to Italy or wherever she wants to go. And my son said, yeah, Tati just wants to take a Rambam [Maimonides] on Aristotle and he's happy. So, it's a good trip.

You know where Aristotle is? 3,000 years ago. A lot more interesting than Italy with a bunch of tourist traps. So, it's very interesting, right? If you want to go to the Colosseum, there should be one more selfie. Make an AI selfie, I'm sure. That's a different Rishir [matter/topic], right? You know that Rishir already, about the past.

The Shaagas Aryeh Story: Friendship with Seforim

Instructor:

Who was here complaining that they don't have friends? Ah, someone's upset with your shop, company they love my friends. I tell, look, I have a lot of friends—not all of them are my friends, but some of them.

You know the story with the Shaagas Aryeh [Rabbi Aryeh Leib ben Asher, 1695-1785, author of *Sha'agas Aryeh*] that the swim shank [bookshelf] fell on him and he said that two people were not michelin [forgiving]. I don't remember the details. Shaagas Aryeh was a sharp lead [sharp scholar], right? He was good like on everyone. He didn't have a problem with making his own chat [arguments/disputes].

And once he was learning at night and the swim shank fell on him, and he said, why did they fall on him? Because he's speaking with all of them. Like one day they got there and they're coming. So he said, he tried to ask them all of them were moichel [forgiving] in his heart for two. And he said, which two are still mad at him? And that's why he still has that—he didn't ever finish a line from that zet [sitting/session] because they're kabdun [holding grudges] of those people.

So anyways, b'goshem [with the Name/thank God], all of our people are moichel. Even if they're not moichel, then b'olem [in the world/in truth] they're moichel, like in all the masses. You have to believe this. Nobody here has a Rebbe that there is a krik [complaint/grudge] to us.

Stories of Reconciliation in the World to Come

Instructor:

You know there is like a Masa [story], this is Tafsir al-Jatayris [unclear reference], there is a Masa with—there are a lot of such stories, like there was a B'yakefem [Rabbi Yaakov Emden], Narben Snaev [Rabbi Yonasan Eibeshitz], just like buried close to each other or something, or someone put them close to each other on the shelf and he said that with each other.

Where did that come from? Where? Apparently, I heard a story that, basically, Rakhwan Magad [the Nadvorna Rebbe], and the only spot to bury him was near Ben Zahim's ship [Rabbi Yonasan Eibeshitz's grave]. And many of you in the town were close enough to ask him what they should do. He said, we can't bury them next to each other. He said, I heard, it was like a legend that goes around, he said, Shah Mubarak [in heaven] is the one who died. Ah, most of them are children. Shall I bury them together?

Really, the point is that it's just a burial fight. That's the point. Interesting.

Okay, this thing was good to me. And then, okay, but there's such legends. There's many more such legends of people that—like, but the name of these legends, like all the legends about—everyone knows that nobody was actually here and came back, like the right?

Student:

Right.

Instructor:

Someone said, whoever said—and the psalm writer said, what do you mean? You went to him only. You thought they're asking that there's no churis [disputes/arguments]? What are you talking about? He said, what do you mean?

The Core Gemara: Rav Yosef's Challenge

Instructor:

So what does this mean? You ever heard from me this gemurah [Gemara: Talmudic text]? Now I have a gemurah I could talk to you. That's this night you finish the gemurah. Very important.

This year there was someone who was by Mishav [unclear] and he said, ah, so you have a pshat [interpretation] in the Torah that makes sense. Why don't you tell it to everyone? So maybe I should try. Everyone thinks it doesn't make sense.

So, it's written in the Gemurah. So, it's written in the Gemurah. So, it's written in the Gemurah. So, Umar Rav [Rav said], Rav was a sheep [sharp scholar], right? Umar Rav, Rav, Rav, Rav, Rav—this is the Rambam about this, right? You know.

Rav Yosef doesn't understand Rav. Rav said that—or I mean, how do you know that Kudus [holiness/the matter] is something that—Rav Yosef means that—no, there's a Rambam here in Makkas [Tractate Makkot] and in Saiten [Sanhedrin] another place that says that we don't call any and Sanhedrin where Paskin's [where they rule on] all the things you have to believe, but that's a different Shemis [matter/topic].

So you understand the question—how do—Rav Yosef had a good question: how do you tell me what to look at? Does whatever they want, or maybe they have—but how do you know?

Abaye's Response

Instructor:

And Abai [Abaye] told him—as Abai was the answer of Yosef Skarsgård [Rav Yosef's student]—told him, so Abai said, wow, this is the first time we know what's going on in Himmel [heaven/shamayim].

Rav Shimon Lavi said there were three things that Ben Shilmata [Beis Din shel Maalah: the Heavenly Court] did, and Ben Shilmata were masking [agreeing with]—famous Rav Shimon Lavi actually Rav Shimon Lavi went to the Himmel, so it's Nishkanai [it's a problem/difficulty].

But Abai didn't think of this problem. Maybe he understood that if she would have walked in him all the same way, he said, we have a—we have a—in other words when I say, I just mean to say that I think that he's correct. The Pusik [pasuk: verse] seems to agree with him.

The Foundational Principle: What These Stories Mean

Instructor:

So what do we learn from this? Very important, very important, important result. And there's also a piece of this, but I'm going to tell you a piece shot [interpretation], for the rationalists to agree.

Everything that we—there's all kinds of stories, the Hasidic stories, you know, the Vilna Goan [Vilna Gaon], you know, the Ming Chiruf [Reb Chaim Elazar Shapiro] said a story: When the Vilna Goan came to Shemayim [heaven], they wanted to put him in Ghanim [Gehinnom: purgatory/hell], because he was a misnagit [opponent of Chassidism]. Ming Chiruf said this story. He was a loser, he was a very rationalist guy.

Until the Torah came, and wrapped itself around him, and said he learned about the Torah, we don't let him put him in Gehenem [Gehinnom]. And that's how he was saved from Gehenem. Because Baruch Hashem [thank God], the building was done. And that saved him for Zavaira [the aveira: sin] of his nagdis [opposition/being a misnaged].

The Chassidic Counter-Story

Instructor:

And, I mean, you know, the Chassidim, the, you know, the Reb Nusn [Reb Noson] had a—Reb Nusn Yusuf [Reb Noson of Breslov] from Breslev. Reb Nusn, yeah? You know? What's the funny?

Ram Nusn said, Ram Nusn had a shver [father-in-law], I forgot his name, Rabbi Chil, I don't know, I don't know his name. Do you know his name? This guy is a snook, I don't know his name. Ram Nusn's shver was a roof [rav: rabbi]. It was a very famous roof. It was a besnaged [misnaged] Litvak.

And the Reb Nachman [Rebbe Nachman of Breslov] told Ram Nusn, you know that your shver is a tzaddik [righteous person]? And he looked at him like, a tzaddik? It's a Litvak. He said, okay, yeah, he does one of Aira [aveira: sin], so he has a besnaged. So he'll get one more patch and get him and more than the other tzaddikim [righteous people]. Like, what's a tzaddik? A tzaddik doesn't get pet [patches/punishments]. A tzaddik also does a virus [aveiros: sins]. So he has one more virus. It doesn't become a tzaddik.

So there's a lot of stories in that story. In any case, one of the stories that's been going on in the 90s is that we see that it's a virus to be a litvak. But, come on, every tzaddik does a virus. It doesn't hassle you. What's so funny?

The Serious Matter of the Cherem

Instructor:

Me, so the same way the villain going to the big provider, you know, like the brother sold Yosef [Joseph], at least that's because of the lighter. While you're laughing at me, you know, made a item [cherem: ban/excommunication]. You know the villain [Vilna Gaon] literally signed a item on a bunch of Jews that you shouldn't marry them, you shouldn't do business with them, hit their dumb mom [hiter dumam: permitted their blood]—like the Baltani [Baal HaTanya: Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi] says it's not a serious provider.

I'm serious now. I'll let her do that. Even if he was right, he had good criticism—not saying all Shabbat shiva [Shabbos teshuvah/unclear], you know—say, tell your shal shida [unclear] that it's the other way around. What's the difference? Make a chayrim [cherem], it's not a moment. Don't let it do such things, to lose a vayre [aveira].

This is the same vayre as Rabban Baravot [Yerovam ben Nevat], the same vayre as Yosef and his brothers, old problems. That's what it's talking about, nothing new. Same problem of Ezra, of the Prishin [Perushim: Pharisees], a lot of people.

Now, whatever—oh, this is going to get us to your shal [question]. Anyways, wait, just wait.

The Epistemological Question Returns

Instructor:

So anyways, back to the story. So I'm trying to explain you something. So what was the point of these stories, all these stories? How did he know? Like if you're a Litvak, like very cute, Khamelos de Shapiro [Reb Chaim Elazar Shapiro] made up a story, like we told him. Oh, he said that about Echeverov's head [Bat Ayin]. Okay, and then we told about Echeverov. It doesn't solve anything.

Let's do a towel over there. Might help. Thank you. That is like this.

In other words, what does it mean? Like just like when it says in the Gemurah, what does—who cares? I understand it means the business is going to come to your bank account and take out the money. Means what?

Defining Dinei Shamayim: Heavenly vs. Earthly Judgment

Instructor:

Means that we think that really, really you're at fault. It's the opposite that people think. Means human reason, even more than, because you know we're limited by procedural considerations, all kind of legal things. But if you ask—if you ask me, you should pay.

Student:

It does great work in torts, by the way.

Instructor:

What?

Student:

It does very good work in torts. That.

Instructor:

Chayav Adin Hashemayim [liable in the judgment of Heaven].

Student:

Oh, because of all the grommas [indirect causation].

Instructor:

You have to draw these lines.

Student:

Yeah.

Instructor:

Second of all, either something over-complicates for it or just under for that. Because it doesn't have this idea of just like—but really, you should.

Student:

So if you want to be Yoitz Yidei Hashemayim [fulfill the judgment of Heaven], you should pay.

Instructor:

Right. Right? If you're El Echid [an ehrliche Yid: an honest Jew], you Chayav Adin Hashemayim. So, right? Rechayav v'din shemayim [liable in the judgment of Heaven]. Very serious thing.

The Core Principle

Instructor:

So how do we know that's dina shemayim [the law of Heaven]? Because shemayim is just a word for what we think is the real truth. In the Olam HaZeh [this world] we're limited. Even if there's a truth, you can't always do it. Sometimes you have to do bad things because they're worth it and so on. But in shemayim, that's where they don't have these problems. They could give you...

Chapter 2: The Limitations of Earthly Justice and the Truth of Shamayim

The Problem of Punishing Tzaddikim

Instructor: The Olam HaZeh [Olam HaZeh: this world, the physical realm] have a problem. You can't really punish tzaddikim [tzaddikim: righteous people]. Hashem [Hashem: God, lit. "The Name"] can only punish the tzaddikim by themselves, but that's a different story.

But we have a problem. If you're a tzaddik [tzaddik: righteous person], you can't—for Talmid Chacham [Talmid Chacham: Torah scholar, lit. "student of a wise person"] sins, we don't give them a niddui [niddui: excommunication, rabbinic ban], because we have to protect the Talmid Chacham and so on. Right?

But we say to Allah [unclear reference, possibly euphemistic], we don't make a niddui against you. It's only making a niddui on Talmid Chacham, but that's different. If you're a Baal HaBayis [Baal HaBayis: householder, layperson], we don't—

I have a theory, I was thinking about this today, that's why—I have a theory about that, why it is. I realize that there's a reason. So if you all get it, I'll send it to you. It's a nice table, this big table.

The Chad Gadya Question and Stories of Shamayim

Instructor: So the Kiddush [Kiddush: sanctification, possibly referring to ritual or ceremony]—this is a laugh. It's kind of—the kids, you don't know. The officer who said, why do we say—why do we say after the Seder [Seder: Passover ritual meal] so the kids are a mess? So how do we know what was in him?

All these stories, all these fantasies, all these myths about someone went to the Himmel [Himmel: heaven, Yiddish] and he saw and so on. What it means to say is that, yeah, in this world we can't say these things. And of course we have to respect the Baal HaGaon [Baal HaGaon: the great Torah scholar, the Gaon] and so on. But really it deserves patch [patch: criticism, correction].

But l'ma'aseh [l'ma'aseh: in practice, actually] it's Talmid Chacham. And that's a true thing. Being a Talmid Chacham is a real thing—it protects you also.

Beit Din shel Matah vs. Beit Din shel Ma'alah

Instructor: How do you say it in Shamayim [Shamayim: heaven]? Same thing when they get murdered. This is a normal thing. All these things that we say—the Beit Din shel Matah [Beit Din shel Matah: the earthly court], the Beit Din shel Ma'alah [Beit Din shel Ma'alah: the heavenly court]. What does it mean, the Beit Din shel Ma'alah?

Sometimes the Beit Din shel Ma'alah—many, often—the Beit Din shel Ma'alah does things that the Beit Din shel Ma'alah does not agree with him [sic: likely means "the Beit Din shel Matah does things the Beit Din shel Ma'alah does not agree with"]. I know many of them. Not only—even the things that something the Beit Din shel Ma'alah shouldn't have done at all. Something they should do, but Beit Din shel Ma'alah does not agree with him.

The Example of Age and Punishment

Instructor: Just like, for example, any time—very important—any time you punish a kid that's between 13 and 20, Beit Din shel Ma'alah says, "Are you crazy? The guy's a little baby." Beit Din shel Ma'alah's only man is from 20.

What does that mean? What does that mean? Does that be real? Well, your Rebbe [Rebbe: rabbi, teacher], the guy came out of his pampers yesterday. Doesn't know anything. Tried to teach him something, maybe.

But in Beit Din shel Ma'alah, maybe that's chinuch [chinuch: education, child-rearing]. Maybe we have some level of legal responsibility from when you're 13. It seems unreasonable to me. But in any case, going to the Jewish law, it's like that in some sense. I'm pretty sure not in all senses, of course, but in some senses.

Everyone knows that it's not all senses, right? Elim k'man d'lesvhu [Aramaic phrase, possibly: "they are like those who are not of sound mind"]. In Choshen Mishpat [Choshen Mishpat: section of Jewish law dealing with civil matters], we don't actually consider 13 to be of age. But in any case, that's another idea of the same idea, right?

The "Good Kind of Shochad" - Necessary Compromises in This World

Instructor: So in the same thing, when I tell you that what's in Himmel, I mean to say the truth. But l'idach [l'idach: on the other hand], in this world, people are limited by all kinds of limitations. And we can't have both, because sometimes we're stuck, and then we have to take shochad [shochad: bribery, bias]. Shochad meaning the good kind of shochad, right?

I have to respect you, because l'ma'aseh you're still my father, or whatever. All kinds of things like that.

The "Rebbe Would Be Modeh" Framework

Instructor: So in the same way, when people say, you know, in Himmel they would make sure. Right? So if someone—or other times, sometimes people, even when people are still alive, or even without the Himmel, they say, you know, if the Rebbe would have seen now, of course he would be modeh [modeh: admit, agree].

He would NOT be modeh. But why wouldn't he be modeh? Because he would be wrong. But of course the Rebbe really is right. The real Rebbe is right. So in Himmel, if you're so sure about the truth—yeah, it's really like that, of course. It wasn't a surprise.

Return to Malkus and Karet

Student: Right, very good. So he's saying—just quickly to push a shot on this—is he saying that he thinks that malkus [malkus: lashes, corporal punishment] is the type of thing that should get rid of karet [karet: spiritual excision, divine punishment], just like b'emes [b'emes: in truth]? That's what it should be?

Instructor: What am I trying to say in this particular remark?

Student: Yeah, it's a question of belief, right?

Instructor: Like, Rambam [Rambam: Maimonides, Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, 1138-1204] reframes all these questions in questions of belief. And then he has a different question: if we use machria [machria: decisive ruling] in questions of belief, maybe you'll add whatever you want. But the question is, what does it mean to say that—what does it mean to say that you're going to—

Just to be clear, nobody ever expected everyone to drop dead at whichever age karet is supposed to kill you. That's not how it really works, ever. So what does it mean?

It means that we believe that—Rambam says this in Moreh Nevuchim [Moreh Nevuchim: Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides' philosophical work]. He talks about the levels of anashim [anashim: people]. It says that averah she'esh v'karet [averah she'esh v'karet: a sin that carries the punishment of karet] means it's an averah [averah: sin, transgression] and we also believe that it's really, really, really big averah. That's what it says.

I'm sorry, it's reading cynical, but if you don't believe me you can bring a Gemara [Gemara: Talmud] and then you'll see. It means it's really bad. This is—you really deserve karet for this. You deserve it. You deserve karet. I'm not doing anything to you, right? It's really funny. It throws you over the roof. It says you're a really, really, really evil guy—not evil, I don't know, out of our community, however you want to call it. And that's all. And then they move on.

But they give you malkus. Now, R' Chananiah [R' Chananiah: Rabbi Chananiah, Talmudic sage] says, if they give you malkus, they give you malkus. And R' Chananiah says, now that they have malkus, that cancels out the karet. There's a whole logic to it, but that's more like a different shitah [shitah: approach, opinion]. As the Mitzvah Shetl [unclear reference] was about this.

Student Question on Aveirot with Malkus

Student: How does that equate to, let's say, an averah that you do get malkus for?

Instructor: No, you get—this averah that have malkus without karet.

Student: No, no, no, right, exactly. Because we don't say that you have karet. The only real difference—that the whole nafka mina l'ma'aseh [nafka mina l'ma'aseh: practical difference] of karet is that it's really, really bad.

Instructor: You're exactly—you deserve karet.

Student: No, but I think we're asking—so the really, really bad one gets malkus, and the really, really not so bad one also gets malkus?

Instructor: Exactly. One deserves karet, and if he wouldn't get malkus he would get karet. He actually would.

Student: What he—

Instructor: I think that he should. I don't know if he would, but he should. Maybe the Aibishter [Aibishter: the Almighty, God, Yiddish]—that's his zechut [zechut: merit], right? That's why you have to teach your daughter Torah, because otherwise she's going to realize that it doesn't really work. You have to know that it's his zechut.

But the ma'aseh [ma'aseh: deed, reality], right? The ma'aseh—you deserve it. For this thing, you deserve it. You can actually die? God has his cheshbonot [cheshbonot: calculations, reckonings]. Like he says, da'at ish l'tumam da'is [da'at ish l'tumam da'is: a person's knowledge is according to their simplicity/integrity, possibly Aramaic phrase].

Every Yid Needs a Rebbe

Instructor: Yeah. So, l'inyan al l'inyan achar [l'inyan al l'inyan achar: from topic to topic, tangentially related] is that the same thing. Every Yid [Yid: Jew] has to have a Rebbe. Every Yid has a lot of Rebbes. Now, all of us have problems with our Rebbes that they don't agree with everything we say. Unfortunately.

That's because they're in Olam HaZeh [Olam HaZeh: this world]. They're limited. But really, the Rebbe in Olam HaBa [Olam HaBa: the World to Come, the afterlife] was modeh.

Personal Story: The Dream Rebbe

Instructor: How did I start saying this? This is full circle, no?

Student: Yeah, but I was saying something about the—I was saying something about something.

Instructor: You don't remember. This was supposed to lead into the question you were saying. The question of?

Student: Okay, this is a ma'aseh [ma'aseh: story, incident].

Instructor: So everyone has to have a Rebbe, and then a little bit of—l'ma'aseh the Rebbe's modeh. I already told you the ma'aseh—I had a Rebbe that came to him in a dream. I asked him something that he hacks against very much, and I do. And he said, "What are you crazy? Of course you should do it."

So I really yelled like that. It doesn't matter. He doesn't have the koach [koach: strength, capacity] to understand.

Student: So, now, a lot of you learned from this.

Instructor: I don't know, I want to say something. Getting to the kasha [kasha: question, difficulty]?

Student: No, you said in the middle you said it's going to be the kasha.

Instructor: I have a question, but why did I—I'm trying to remind myself of a story.

Student: Okay.

The Big Kasha: Why Is Nobody Normal?

Instructor: So, now, I have a big kasha that has important kasha, very important kasha on reality. And if someone—when I was a teretz [teretz: answer, resolution], they could tell me. My kasha—I like all my kashas, it's like a whole shitah [shitah: systematic approach] explaining the kasha, really.

But my kasha is basically: why is nobody normal without being meshuga [meshuga: crazy, Yiddish]? Very simple kasha. I'm going to try to say it without too many names, so it's going to be too much to show now.

In other words, everyone is modeh that the teretz is somewhat in the kasha, if I explain it this way. Everyone is modeh that the world is meshuga, right? Everyone is modeh. In all kinds of ways, but everyone is modeh in some way or another. Anyone, the default is not to be a normal person. Maskeh [maskeh: agreed, understood]? Anyone is maskeh?

Student Pushback: The Well-Adjusted Person

Student: Mushul [mushul: parable, example]?

Instructor: No, there is a gestalt of a well-adjusted person.

Student: Yeah, yeah, that's—

Instructor: No, no, we don't have to define—oh gosh, no, we don't. Because I said, whatever your definition of normal is, nobody is normal.

Student: But to have me in headphones is part of this well-adjusted, maybe you're not going to find—

Instructor: I don't mean that that feels the whole world normal, no. Give me an example of what you mean, please. Give me an example.

Example: The Relativist Definition of Mental Health

Student: One example is that everyone thinks that you should be well-adjusted. The definition of meshuga is whatever everyone else says. That's one example.

Instructor: Very good example. Most people nowadays think—are extremely relativists, and think that the definition of good, of healthy—for example, mentally healthy, spiritually healthy—is whatever you think, whatever you like, or whatever your neighbors like, which still goes back to people's arbitrary preferences. That's what most people actually think.

Some people have a God who is also one of the people that like things. That doesn't save them from their main problem, right?

Student: Thank you.

The Problem of Means Without Ends: Ethics, Efficiency, and Moral Subjectivism

The Insanity of Moral Subjectivism

Instructor: That doesn't save them from the main problem, right? Can you write an article about this?

Student: Yeah, about the one part of it. Just the ethics part, right?

Instructor: Yeah, but the Maskim [those who agree/modern people] think that good means whatever I want. And some people are very religious, so they think that it's not only them, there's also a Gechka [entity/being] called a god that wants things, and good is whatever he wants, or at least also whatever he wants, depends on how frum [religiously observant] he is. Right? That's a shigaon [insanity]. It's crazy. Everyone just thinks that this is the default.

Some weirdos think that there's beauty in the world. There's really objective beauty. Or objective goodness. Or objective health or anything. But everyone agrees: whatever floats your boat.

The "Whatever Floats Your Boat" Fallacy

Instructor: Even boats don't just float arbitrarily. There's good boats and bad boats. But I don't know what this mashul [parable/analogy] is supposed to say. Okay. This is a shigaon gomer [complete insanity]. Whatever floats your boat, it's not true. A lot of things float your boat, but not anything. Float the boat is an exciting question. You gotta make a good boat, man. There's good boats and bad boats. Maskim [agreed], that's one mishigas [craziness].

Okay, another mishigas is that... I'll tell you much... I mean, the other mishigas. Okay, now I'm not going to give you a few... I have a rule that we're not going to give examples because we only end up talking about the examples. We should only talk about examples, but that's another shmiz [nonsense/issue]. Now, wait, I'm going way too fast.

The Rare Exception: Believers in Objective Good

Instructor: So listen, listen, I have a kasha [question/difficulty]. Why is nobody in the ma'al [world] without being meshigah [crazy]? So the mashul, there's a few people, like I mentioned before, last week I gave a different mashul. There's a few people that are not against meshigah. They do think that they somehow live as if there are good things and bad things in the world for real. There are such people. Those people are neo-Nazis, most of them.

The Personal Problem: Finding Good Thinkers Who Turn Out to Be Nazis

Instructor: I know them. Almost all of them think, like, you know, that my Torah is about the Goyim Chasidim [righteous gentiles], right? I have a big problem, that I like a lot of thinkers, a bunch of people that try to explain all kinds of nice things, like, to help me understand the Rambam [Maimonides] and all the tzaddikim [righteous people], because they tell us that Aristotle and Plato weren't totally crazy, they had some points, and then a few weeks later I found out that the guy is literally a Nazi, not even a neo-Nazi. Why? Because he got into the mesorah [tradition] with the mesorah of the goy [gentile].

The "Goy She-Litvak" Problem

Instructor: What's wrong with the guy Litvak? Because Litvak goes with the halacha [Jewish law]. The halacha says, "Esav soneh l'Yaakov" [Esau hates Jacob]. So you have to follow the halacha. I said, yeah, I saw the halacha. Right? Traditional guys, the problem, I'm not saying that the not-traditional goyim is not a different problem. He has a different excuse. I'm just saying that there's a problem here, right? This guy is ready to go. He's a new tyrant now. Goyish and Litvaks.

Student: Goyish and Litvaks.

Instructor: Goyish and Litvaks is definitely universal.

Student: Exactly. Litvaks is a type. It's not a... I'm not talking about any Litvaks.

Instructor: Who's a Litvash goyim?

Student: No, I'm talking about a trad goyim [traditional gentile], really.

Instructor: Traditional goyim are mostly real anti-Semites.

The Definition of Anti-Semite

Instructor: The only thing is, like a different trad guy said that a Yid [Jew] said, what's the definition of anti-Semite? Someone that hates Jews more than is appropriate. Maybe from a dad [their perspective]. So if the guy hates Jews but not more than he needs, then he's not, then I'm out of God, no problem. I can deal with him. It's part of, part of, right? All of ethics is about measure, correct measure. Maybe there's a correct measure of hating Jews. Most Jews are hating them too much, right? But a guy has to do a little less. But the kid said that's the problem.

The Universal Problem: Everyone Has Meshigasen

Instructor: So you understand the problem? And this happens to me every time. Like, I have a lot of criticism of a lot of things. It's going to happen to you with me too. Don't worry. You think that all, like that guy I told you, said that I have a good pshat [interpretation] in the Torah and why not tell it to anyone? Turns out that I also have a lot of craziness. At least according to him, I think that I'm right, probably. But a lot of problems, a lot of mishigasen [craziness], a lot of nonsense, a lot of naughtiness. That's the reality.

The Uman Contradiction Example

Instructor: Every time I find someone, I'm like, wow, this guy, he sent me a video clip, and you see, he's explaining himself well, and he's clear, and he's not beating around the bush, and he's not bluffing us, like some people think it's a big mitzvah [commandment/good deed] to bluff all day, he's not doing a bluffing thing. Very nice, and then I look at his next video, and he's talking about going to Uman for Rosh Hashanah [Jewish New Year], like, sheikh [look], it's a normal event, you have to go to Uman.

You already explained me that let's be real and the Torah doesn't say anything about not eating the heimishe hechsher [traditional/Hasidic kosher certification]. The Torah says you should eat kosher. Pretty sure if you eat kosher you're about to eat. It doesn't say anything about heimishe hechsher. I know that you're pro heimishe hechsher for a different mitzvah, but nish mitzvah kashres [not the commandment of keeping kosher].

And then the next video is like, the heilige Rebbe [holy Rebbe] said if you don't go to Uman you don't have a tikkun [spiritual rectification]. And I'm like, hello, does that say in the Torah? Where do you find that? Actually I know there's more than one person that this applies to. This is very weird. What's going on?

Last Week's Example: The Fundraising Conference

Student: I think your example last week was very good. I don't know if you want to say it. It was very historic from last week.

Instructor: I hate the past.

Student: I think it brought to the point a very good point.

Instructor: I'll tell you the mashul that Eli says, or you can tell it.

Student: Last week I was in a [discussion] about people that are business understand the mashul.

Instructor: Oh, everyone's a business here. Everyone in my shiur [class] has been business. Otherwise, come with the rabbit to me. I'm not a business. Don't worry. Try.

The Conference for "Stealing Money from Rich People"

Instructor: So, last week I said a ma'aseh [story/incident] by the unrecorded shiur that I went to a conference for teaching us how to steal money from rich people, chas v'shalom [God forbid]. You know the Rav [rabbi] said there is good news and bad news. Good news is that there is enough money for all the kimcha d'Pischa [Passover wheat fund/charity]. The bad news is that it's in the wrong people's pockets.

So I was by this conference for all the people whose job it is to get their money from one pocket to the right pocket, from the wrong pocket to the right pocket. And it's an important job. You have to do a correct allocation of capital, you know, one of the important functions of society. But I'm being very vague, right?

Student: Snotting. Fundraising.

Instructor: Okay.

The Core Problem: Means Without Ends

Instructor: So, now, what's the problem with this conference? Like many self-help conferences or whatever you want called they're going to and others what's the big problem with them that they're all evil. Why are they evil? Because they're about means and not about ends, right? Why are they evil? Because, right, you know, this is about social engineering and about social science and about business consulting and all of that, all of these, all of like if you go to this is I told you about goals I talked about goals any self-help person that you go to is going to explain you that there's a way to be efficient you got to have goals and you got to follow them and all of that and you have to achieve your goals and count and smart the stave is smart.

But the note that I've come in of the whole of this is that this is the logic of the reshoim [wicked people]. What I mean is that it's all about how to achieve your goal. It doesn't tell you anything about what your goals should be, right?

The Explicit Moral Neutrality Problem

Instructor: So come to kamtoz [for example] and like very explicitly, everyone, the guy that stood up for example by that camera, the guy stood up, look, I don't care if you're raising money for Lefkowitz, or for Schwarz, or for Satmar, or for Tzahal [IDF], the same rules apply to everyone, right? Wait, what's going on here? Seriously? Nobody actually said that, but there's a subtext that says all of this, right?

What do you mean you don't care? If someone's here raising money for Al-Qaeda, we should throw them out, we shouldn't even teach them the tricks, because it's really evil. What's going on?

The Problem Goes Beyond "Tricks"

Instructor: But there's a real problem because the tricks, not only the tricks, the ethics, the kind of person that you become, a person that teaches you how to be efficient, I'm an efficient person, then like Hannah Arendt, you can be like Eichmann. He's a pretty efficient guy, extremely efficient. Maybe there's some virtue in that itself, but it's, you can be a very efficient Holocaust organizer and you'll be doing your job, you'll be following all Taylor's principles of modern management. I don't understand what the problem is.

Student: You're just in the wrong, you're at the wrong event.

Instructor: I have news for you. There isn't another event.

Student: That's your fault. It's not my fault.

Instructor: No, but you see, there's something evil about this.

Ancient Wisdom: Restricting Dangerous Knowledge

Instructor: You have to imagine that in the olden days, people that actually knew such a skill, if I know this skill, I know a skill, I'm Dale Carnegie, I know this skill, how to get anything out of anyone, the Sanhedrin [ancient Jewish high court] would make a big cherem [excommunication/ban] and only teach this secret to people that are 35 years old and we bring three character witnesses that you're not going to use for bad purposes, right?

Right? Isn't that obvious? These are really powerful tools, right? Manipulation tools, right? You can convince anyone of anything. You're a salesperson, right? We should not allow anyone to become a salesperson. There should be a board, like some kind of control over this. We should teach it only to the really good people, like to the really vetted people that already know that they have good ends, because otherwise, what's going on, right?

Goodhart's Principle: What Gets Measured Becomes the Target

Instructor: And just to be clear, every time, of course everyone says this, right? We said learning tools. It's not really true. It becomes, just like everyone knows about the Goodhart Principle, right? There's something called the Goodhart Principle. Anything measured becomes a target. Right?

Student: Wow, he doesn't talk about it in his course?

Instructor: I don't think he does. He's missing a very important thing, right? Everyone knows. Anything measured becomes the target. The medium becomes the message. Always, right? This is the reality, because like Aristotle taught us, you become what you do.

Aristotelian Conclusion: You Become What You Do

Instructor: You don't become what you believe in, unless belief is a kind of doing, like you say Shema [the central Jewish prayer] twice a day. But you become what you do. If you work on means all day, you're going to become efficient. You're not going to become good.

The Dangers of Efficiency-Based Living: A Critique of Amoral Education

The Fundamental Problem: What Gets Measured Becomes the Target

Instructor: I don't think he does. It's missing a very important thing, right? Everyone knows, anything measured becomes the target. The medium becomes the message. Always, right? This is the reality, because like Aristotle taught us, you become what you do. You don't become what you believe in. Unless belief is a kind of doing, like you say Shema [the central Jewish prayer declaring God's oneness] stole twice a day. But you become what you do, right?

If you work on means all day, working on becoming efficient, you're going to become efficient. You're not going to become good. And you're all day talking about this and you're never talking about becoming good. You're not going to become good.

Actually, they become manipulative and the definition of manipulation is I'm trying to get something from you which is not the good thing itself, is not good and it's not really good for you, right? That's good for me or it's good for some third purpose. That's the definition. It becomes—it's a big problem. This I think it's a really big problem. That's one problem.

The Second Problem: Masking Evil

There's a bigger problem. I didn't ask him that this is the problem. There's something else. He's not masking. Ah, he's not masking.

Student: No, no, I get it now.

Instructor: Ah, he's not masking. This is a real problem. I really think that it's—that's the problem, too.

A Concrete Example: The Ganav [Thief] Story

Instructor: I actually know someone. I have news for you. I know someone. I have dealt in a third-hand way with someone that went to a certain course, the same course that you went to. And mazeh Shai [behold], he stole a million dollars from a Yid [Jew], playing a gambit on a young dollar. I know exactly how. There was a trick, an excuse. He came in and told you, he said, it's a trick—I got to stick a tofes l'baal chov b'makom shechav l'acherim [a legal principle about seizing collateral]. Again, I don't know. I heard once out of the story. Maybe he's not. But sounds like that to me. And just deposited. The guy gave him a check. He deposited it twice. Whatever. Plain. What he did was for sure organized. Maybe he didn't get it. He didn't owe him. He owes him a million dollars. I don't know. The mazeh, that's what happened.

So, and that he, they said, they came to him and said, what do you mean? I went to this course. They taught me how to be very efficient. And he was very into it, like, I'm very good at this, and so on. And if not for that course, it would be less of a ganav [thief]. I hope. Maybe it didn't make a difference. Because all these things turn out to be some horrible people. And it's by design, like, there's a real problem. That's one thing.

Why Efficiency Training Enables Evil

Another thing is that people that have luck do not really be able to—it also lets you pursue it, and not in the pursuit of evil. And not to pursue being a ganav, like you're just pursuing being efficient, right? And having to steal along the way.

Student: I mean he doesn't realize that he's a ganav. He doesn't have to—he doesn't have to confront the fact that he's learning how to be a ganav.

Instructor: Yeah, you're not teaching how to be a ganav. You're teaching you something—a tool. You're teaching you how to pick locks. It's like teaching how to pick locks. I teach you how to pick locks. Are you going to use it to pick the bank or are you going to use it to pick your bubbe's [grandmother's] house when she gets locked out? I don't care. I don't care. I'm not about anything.

Student: Isn't that the worst thing though?

Instructor: What?

Student: Because then—

Instructor: I'm saying exactly. You're an immoral person. So this teaching is an immoral teaching. It really is. I think it's a real problem.

The Immorality of Amoral Teaching

I really think that in some kind of ideal universe, with the correct structure—but the immorality can sneak the 80% evil right into God's noses. I really think that it would be like a really good Plato's, you know, fantasies of—

Student: But this really applies to everything in the whole world.

Instructor: No, wait, wait, wait.

Student: No, one second. Don't sell lighters because if someone's going to come out—

Instructor: No, no, no, no. Wait, wait, this is a nice—no, no, no, don't let anyone drive to the—wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, let's get, let's, let's move it, let's, let's, let's, wait, wait, um, this is all emotional for my kashya [question]. You have to remember, these are all things that everyone here is supposed to agree with.

Student: Yeah, I hear your question, and it's part of the brainwashing that you got from capitalism.

Instructor: Now, um, wait, but you have to remember that, um, you know, let's try to focus, right, I'm trying to get somewhere. If you're not asking what part of that is, you have to talk about that at a different time, because all these things, everyone here agrees with, already. Just giving you guys an example, at least I should tell you an example of, uh, something.

Plato's Ideal: Restricting Dangerous Knowledge

Instructor: So this is one of the examples of how you can't be a mashgiach [supervisor/spiritual guide] without being a ba'al middos [person of good character], how you can't be a menahel [administrator] without a mashgiach. Okay, this is evil.

And in Plato's ideal educational society, all of these tools would be hidden, just like lockpicking. I mean, nowadays also you can learn lockpicking on the internet. But just like creating nuclear weapons, for some tools we have enough sechel [intelligence/common sense] to keep them locked up only for people that we think are already good, right?

This is true, definitely true for management, for human management. Becoming a good rabbi, becoming a good anything. If it's just a good, in the sense of being efficient, of being a good tool, it's really dangerous and should only be taught to people that are very proven themselves to be good. Even after that, many of them are going to use it for evil, but you know, this is why we have all these secrets, all these ideas of secret societies, there's a reason for that. It's not crazy.

Why Efficiency-Based Living Doesn't Work

The Neshama [Soul] Prevents It

Instructor: Now, second problem is, a deeper problem is, that it also doesn't work, in my opinion. It doesn't work. At least if you have a neshama [soul], it doesn't work, baruch Hashem [thank God]. Any that was born with a neshama, in my opinion, doesn't actually—I don't know anyone, it's kind of cute. I know many people, not a lot, not enough, but maybe I know a hundred people. I don't really know any of them that manages their life that way. Any of the good people that I know. I know some people that manage to manage their business that way, also in a much more sporadic way than you think. But I don't know anyone that manages life that way.

A Vort [Torah Insight] on Nistar and Nigleh

It reminded me of—I don't know anyone—a vet someone told me that it says "Hanistrot l'Hashem Elokeinu v'hanigalot lanu ul'vaneinu" [The hidden things belong to the Lord our God, but the revealed things are for us and our children—Deuteronomy 29:28]. And everything in between, it's just l'cha [for you], not the v'necha [and your children], which in between—the Negev [the hidden]—it's not nistar [hidden] and it's not nigleh [revealed], it's probably just for you, don't talk with anybody else.

Student: Yeah.

The New Year's Resolution Test

Instructor: So I have what I'm saying. Do you know anyone that actually—I have a real question. Every self-help book in the world says have a goal and make a New Year—is doing New Year's, make a New Year's resolution. Do you know anyone that actually succeeded with his New Year's resolution? With his goal?

Student: Smart one?

Instructor: Ask Marabai [the Rebbe] what's his name if he knows anyone. I'm sort of very suspicious of this.

Student: No, I'll explain to you why.

Instructor: I don't know anyone that it worked for. It doesn't work for me in that way. In some way, it does work in my opinion. I don't know anyone. If there's someone that it works for him, I think you should stay away from him because they're a psychopath.

The Metaphysical Argument: Humans Are Not Machines

Why Goal-Setting Fails

Instructor: Now, why doesn't it work? Because human beings—things aren't actually the kind of thing, and we're not actually machines, we're not actually efficient causes. Machine and efficient causes, the same definition, literally, metaphysically, are things that only do ends. That's the idea of a human being.

A human being, for anything to make sense, people talk about meaning, you know what meaning is? Meaning means doing something that has a goal. Not a goal, a fake goal, a real goal, right, the end. You call them the same, they're the same word, there's no real difference in the words.

When I say a goal, I mean something that in some sense isn't itself good. But at least you very clearly see how it leads to something that is really good. But even then, what you're going to be doing is the goodness of that thing. So maybe it's secondarily good, I don't think everything is finally good. Even if it's secondarily good, what you're doing is that thing and not something else.

The Gemara's Principle: Do Things for Themselves

Like it says in the Gemara [Talmud], do things for themselves [lishmah]. If what you do is not good, it's only leading to something good, you, as a human being, will not succeed to do it unless you turn yourself into a machine. Most of us have a hard time turning ourselves into machines. Some people are successful at that, and those are the CEOs. But besides for that, most people have a really hard time.

The Crucial Distinction: Service vs. System

Providing for Family vs. Serving Capitalism

Instructor: And even the people that do it well, it's because, for example, there's a very big difference between someone who is in service of capitalism and someone who is in service of providing for his wife and children.

Providing for your wife and children is a very good end. It's not the final end. You don't go to Gan Eden [the Garden of Eden/Paradise] for that. You only go to Gan Eden for what you do with that. But, according to the holy Rambam [Maimonides] at least. But, it's a good thing. In order to do that, I have to get a job, I have to do my job well. No problem. You're doing all this well, it's all part of being a person that's providing for his family, a good father, a good husband, a good part of society. I want to provide a mikvah [ritual bath] for my beis medrash [study hall], whatever it is that you're providing. You're part of that.

The moment that it's separated from that, I think that that's like the definition of evil, definition of becoming a machine, which doesn't have a goal and that's just what evil is, that's a shin dalet [the Hebrew letters that spell "demon/devil"], right?

What "No Meaning" Actually Means

So—meaning the moment that you're not providing and you're what? That you're picking your story, what your story is not, it's not embedded into a bigger story that I'm a good person and I'm providing for my family, for example. I'm just running this system as efficiently as possible. That's what I think.

And therefore I think that people—that's why people complain that they have no meaning. And your zaida [grandfather] doesn't understand what you mean when you say I don't have meaning in my job. You gotta have a job. He does have meaning in his job. His meaning is to come home to his wife and bring her a check. That's a great meaning.

Meaning just means there's a story that ends somewhere. Meaning is not some fancy feeling. I don't know what people think meaning means. But you don't have meaning because your job is set up in a way that you can't really do it if you care about coming home to your wife at night. Many jobs are sort of set up in that way. At least it's very hard.

The Challenge of Modern Work

You have to very—now you can understand why you have to be a meshugah [crazy person]. It's very hard to be a good whatever it is. Yeah, most people in New York City or whatever in the workplace are not—that's not their story of themselves. Many of—most of them—I'm not talking about the high machine, the high legate—and I'm talking about the baal habayis [ordinary working person]. Most of them are not like that and it's set up for people like the language that they talk and the way to, you know, to become successful within any society is to talk their language and to work on their concepts.

Their concepts are machine concepts, not human concepts. And that's why it's very hard to do it for a fewer human being. If you have a neshama left, it's very hard for you to live in that world. And now, this is the mishigas [craziness], the maskim [those who agree].

Defining Neshama [Soul]

Instructor: Ah, so what was I saying?

Student: When you say neshama, what are you referring to?

Instructor: I don't know. Now, I do know, but I'm far enough off my track. So, a neshama is a person that is a human being. That's what a neshama is. He didn't forget. Some people forgot that they're human beings and became machines. That's the difference. A machine doesn't have a neshama either. I mentioned a neshama. And some people don't have a neshama. They're very happy being machines.

I'm pretty sure that nobody that listens to my shiur [Torah class] is happy with that, so I don't have to talk about that person.

Concluding Warning: You Cannot Live This Way

Instructor: So this is a problem. I want to tell you, you can't live like this. I'm telling you, nobody can live like this. If you manage to live for a long time like that, I don't want to know about you.

Chapter 5: The Neshama Problem - Integrity, Success, and the Corruption of Systems

The Neurodivergence Exception

Instructor: There's people that—no, what you're talking about is not that, I don't think. I'm talking about normal people. If you're neurodivergent, then... I think that's not a large part of it. Maybe. I'm not sure. I think that that's a different thing, because I understand that. That's different. That's a person that has a taanug [ta'anug: pleasure, delight], and it's making lists and checkmarks. Different. Someone doesn't like that, right? And then that guy is virtual, making checks, Excel sheets, he really loves it. Okay, it's a different thing. He likes—he's like, some beauty in it. No, I'm serious, there is some beauty in it, like math, like whatever it is, like the boxiness of the world. The world is pretty boxsy. Not true that—I'm not saying you shouldn't be boxsy, you should only be around, that's not the point. But what I'm saying is that this is a problem, and you can't live like this.

No, I forgot—yeah, I'm getting to that part, don't worry. But there's too many people have a lot of questions.

The Conference Experience: Tools Without Belief

In that conference, I was sitting there, and I don't feel comfortable. I need all these tools. I consider myself a good person that's allowed to use all the tools. Maybe I'm wrong. I consider myself that way. But also I feel I don't know how to—I can't use them if I don't believe in them.

See, that's what I mean when I say I have a neshama [neshamah: soul]. A neshama means that me, I have a very hard time submitting to things that I don't believe in. Sometimes I just call it ego, but it's not ego, it's really having a neshama. If you go to someone and this guy says, you know, you have to beg this person, you have to pretend to be below him, because that's how he'll do you a favor—unless you can explain to me how that person really deserves it, or how and somehow there's some virtue in doing this, otherwise I'm just not going to do it.

The Sales Book Principle

Love it. In his book on sales, in the beginning of the book, he basically says, like, chapter one is basically explaining why you have to believe in what you sell, and the two is, let's say you don't believe, how to believe? Okay, yeah, many, most people don't believe. For the matter, then you're not going to get what you want to get.

Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait.

The Central Problem: Neshama and Functionality

Ultimate nut story. We can down the showman, so go on and down the egg. Ah, I know. You see, you see this, but you realize there's something crazy here. We have to solve this problem. My biggest belief is that we could solve this problem. There are nuts. We don't have to be stuck. We don't have to be oifgevafn [given up] and not get anything done because of this. "I have a neshama, therefore I can't work." No, nonsense. You could work, of course. You have to figure out how to, how it's going to work. There is a way. That's my biggest belief, my biggest hope. And I think it's true. There's a way. There's a way. But we have to understand what the way is.

Now, I am very uncomfortable. I can't do that. It's very hard. I just can't do it. In reality, I can't do it. And to the extent I could do it, it's because I'm corrupted. But I think that people that can do it are the good people. That's my opinion.

The Absurdity of Success at the Cost of Humanity

Now, at that thing, I'm telling you a story. Now we have to find a way. This is niche normal. It's not normal that everyone has to become oys a mentsh [cease being a human being] in order to be successful. That's crazy. The only reason I want to be successful is because I want to be a successful human being. Tell me no, be mevater [give up, forgo] for your whole life, right? Just to be clear, for your whole life be mevater on being a human being because let's be real.

Autobiographical Digression: The Yeshiva Years

Yeah, I know. Like, you go—okay, I was a rebellious, I don't know if you call it rebellious, but like, and I used to have, you know, they learn in yeshiva, it learns too slow, too fast, too low, too high, whatever it is, and I used to go to my rabbis, like, what kind of—and none of them ever said anything different. I mean, depending on their mood. But for the most part, you go to people and they understand. They say, look, yeah, you're right.

Some of them are just lying. They don't think I'm right. It's not—hello, get out of my life, you're a liar. But some of them really think that. And then he says, but look. How does it go? There's always a push-off. Like, you know, you're a bachur [yeshiva student], you're in yeshiva. You have to start with yeshiva until you get married and you'll go on kollel [married men's Torah study program] and you'll be able to do whatever you want. So then you go on kollel and they tell you the same thing until I don't know when you're able to actually live. True story.

The Response: Polite Noncompliance

Now, I always told them thank you so much for your advice and then I woke up in the morning and I didn't do it. I wanted to do it, it just didn't work because I have a neshama and I can't.

Critique of the Advisors

If you would try to convince me how this—they're so stupid these people, they think—even the ones that are really like this, okay, they're stuck in the same place. The ones that are just manipulators are really dumb because, again, maybe they're manipulators because they know that this is the best manipulation, but if someone comes to you and says, look, yeah, the system is corrupt. I know the system is corrupt, but look, you want to win, right? Try to win the system. You just corrupted a guy morally. You did the worst thing. There's one guy that at least is not corrupt. He doesn't just want to succeed. He doesn't just want to win anything. No, let's just win. What do you mean?

If you would be sincere, you would say, no, even a better manipulator would try to convince me that the system is correct. Then you should believe in it, okay? Then I can understand. Of course, maybe he knows that there's no good arguments so there's no—he has no way to explain it to me. Then he's stuck. But this is a big problem. Mask him, it doesn't work.

The One Drusha That Made Sense (But Was Also Crazy)

So the kid said there was one yid [Jew] over there that said a drusha [homiletical discourse] that I understood that made sense to me. The only problem is that his drusha was toyt meshuge [completely crazy].

The Content: Schnorring as Mitzvah

That's why one yid stood up over there and besides all the eitzos [advice, strategies] that he said, he also said you should know that it's a mitzvah—it's not a mitzvah to make a lot of money. It's not a mitzvah to fal far di gevirim [fall before the wealthy]. It's not a mitzvah to nothing. A mitzvah is to do it. If this is your job, whatever, whoever you decide that if you're a mitzvah. It's not a mitzvah. Therefore, if you don't make money, if you do make money, if you do succeed, if you don't succeed, it doesn't matter. You should wake up every day, say hineni muchan umzuman [I am ready and prepared], and go do your mitzvah. That's what this guy said.

Why It Resonated

Now, I'm telling you the reality. This guy, I felt goodbye to drusha. Because I know how to do things like that. I know how to do mitzvos [commandments]. By mitzvos, I mean things that are good. Correct things. I know how to correct things. It's hard? Yeah, I know that. Sometimes it's hard to do the good thing. I could work with that. It's difficult. It's hard to do the good thing. We'll work on it. Sometimes we'll succeed. Sometimes we won't succeed. Sometimes we'll be frustrated. But I know how to live with that.

The Alternative: Incomprehensible

Everyone else says, you just have to win. I don't know how to live with that. And they also say it's hard, right? But you have to be mezakeh [purify oneself, work on oneself]. But what does that even mean? I don't know how that looks. Work on yourself to not take yourself seriously, to be a better slave for something else. Like, what? You know, if you freely force me, I'll be forced. No problem. I want to have money. I want a mortgage or whatever. I want to have rent. Pay the rent. I'll go do something for that. I'm nothing. I'm above that. But you're really giving me chizuk [encouragement, strengthening] like to be that? That doesn't make any sense to me.

The Virtue Framework

So this guy is the only drusha that actually made sense. He was talking about a certain virtue. You're a schnorrer [fundraiser, collector]. Go and be a good schnorrer. Believe in... It's not about believing in it. I don't even believe in it. Just do it. It's a mitzvah. It's a mitzvah. It's a mitzvah. Whatever mitzvah it is. Enjoy.

The Problem with the "Good" Drusha

It's not shiny. You must understand that this guy is only a normal drusha. You understand this? Everyone knows how to do that. Everyone knows. Do the correct thing. Who told you this is your tafkid [role, mission]? Maybe someone else. No problem. Today you're doing this.

Now I'm such a—and this guy's drusha was whacked, like seriously. What do you mean my job is to make money? It's not to knock on people's doors and get thrown out. Like, that's not the mitzvah. It's such a weird—it's also nuts, right? It's nuts to do things that don't have a goal. He's also in some way living without a goal, right? Because like, I'm just doing things. What do you mean just doing things? There's—you want to win, right?

Critique of "Hashem Will Provide" Theology

And then, oh, Hashem [God] will send you the money. No, Hashem doesn't send nobody money. I don't know anyone that Hashem sent money. I told you the drusha already, right? I want to tell the drusha: you should rely on Hashem sending you money? Ask him how he's going to send it. What's his post office address? Because I don't know anyone that Hashem sent money yet in my life.

The Grocery Store Anecdote

I know so many people that go around—I listened to last week someone, you know, yeah, I was in the grocery. I went to the grocery. I filled up my cart. I had no idea how to pay and I borrowed money around the register. You could have thought of that before. It's just a low life. Like, oh, der Oybershter hot geholfen [the Almighty helped]. He said, you really don't have what to pay? Okay, and he gave me the money. Because some yid gave you the money. Der Oybershter didn't give you nothing. Der Oybershter didn't give you this. Der Oybershter didn't give you that. No difference.

The Logical Incoherence

What do you mean der Oybershter didn't give you money? He's just drying me a cup. What's it got to do? You have a lot of picture. Your picture of the reality is totally not in sync with how God actually is. Right? You believe in some a-causal world where things have nothing to do with their effects. Of course they do.

Why did you go to the grocery store? Why did you fill up your cart? Why didn't you just sit home and wait for the fridge to fill up? What's going on? Who are you fooling over here? Oh, you have to do that. Okay, you also have to go work. Or maybe your plan is to borrow money from people. No problem. Mucho of people say my life—I like the mucho of people and so on and I don't have patience to work. I'll just say it, tell him all day, wait for people to give me money. No problem. That's your plan for life. Your plan is not Hashem. Hashem can't do it. Not only you're talking nonsense—like, what do you mean Hashem? How is this more Hashem than—

Chapter 6: The Problem of Normal Advice - Why Sensible People Seem Crazy

The Shnorrer Example: Virtue vs. Manipulation

Instructor: Everyone knows that everything is Hashem [God]. People, I think the reason people say it all the time is because they don't really believe in Hashem. So they have to say it all the time. It's like, "I'm doing it for Hashem." What does that even mean?

Because everyone understands what this guy said was total nonsense. That's the only reason they said something normal.

So now here's my kasha [question]: Why can't there be a normal person that can explain to you the virtues of a shnorrer [beggar]? A shnorrer has to—I'll tell you one of the virtues of a shnorrer. Not because it happens to be that it helps you make money also.

If you're a shnorrer, you should brush your shoes. You know why? Because it's not respectful. You go to a person, you ask for money, and you're like, "I'm a shnorrer, so I'm allowed to have ripped shoes." It's not nice, right? People don't like it. It's a small action. That's the virtue of a shnorrer. A shnorrer has to dress the part. You're asking him for tzedakah [charity].

That would be a very reasonable drasha [sermon]. Part of a middos toivos [good character traits]—if there's a correct middah [character trait], a shnorrer has to wear a normal rekel [coat] and he has to make his payos [sidelocks] and comb his beard. Otherwise you come to someone, a guy is just giving you money to get you out of his face because you're ugly. True story, right?

So now, this is the same actual factual advice as the other guy that says, "Look, you're going to go to the gvir [wealthy person]. Look, you have stuff in your phyllin [phylacteries]. You have a special man. He doesn't like people that are chnyokish [slovenly]. Some people do like that's chnyokish, okay, so dress up chnyokish. But go be a normal person, figure it out. It's going to cost money to buy a new rekel, but you're going to make more money, it's worth it." No problem.

That's the manipulative way of saying the drasha. You can say the same as the drasha, as if it's a mitzvah [commandment]. And it's not a mitzvah. Because this is a good—now, is this the final good? No. The end is to give money, and then you've got money to go to yeshiva [Torah academy], and then someone in the yeshiva is going to—somehow it's going to end up in Torah, this money, I don't know how.

But you understand my point? Why is the only normal guy a nutcase?

Student: You don't like speaking well. It's like, one way is to speak well, manipulatively, and one is to speak well because you should present yourself well.

Instructor: Right, exactly.

The Maggid Shiur Example: Proper Preparation

Instructor: My job is to be a maggid shiur [Torah lecturer], and everyone has to do their ma'aseh b'emunah [act of faith]. My ma'aseh b'emunah is to prepare a shiur [Torah lesson], and I don't have to follow the shiur. I don't hold that you have to follow the... but I did prepare a shiur today. It's over here. If you don't believe me, I even have notes. It's not what I said, but you have to appear. It's ma'aseh b'emunah, right?

"Oh no, you have to prepare so people should be impressed." My job is not to impress people. I mean, it's to impress people, but that's just what it is. It's not just, right? If I can impress you in a fake way, I'm doing my job wrongly. If I impress you in the correct way because I did the correct preparation and I got a nice room to impress you, all of that, no problem. That's part of the job, doing it correctly.

Now, why are the only people that even go out of this totally manipulative frame the ones that tell you that God somehow is doing it directly? Do you understand the kasha? It's a very good example of the kasha, and there's many hundreds of other examples. Do you understand the kasha?

Contemporary Examples: Rebbes, TikTok, and Modern Avodah Zarah

Instructor: All the way down to the kasha, why—everyone in ma'aseh [deed/action] is talking about it. What's my other example? Something with the Rebbes. What about the Rebbes? No, the same thing. Is it normal to—this is a good example. That one I a little bit understand. It's easier to explain why.

But is it normal that every person that already understands that you don't have to worship whoever was the idol of the—whoever first guy that was the idol of another guy—is also believing some dead guy in Ukraine? Most of them do. Like Sharikas [reference to Rebbe Nachman of Breslov]. Of course, that's easier to explain.

But is it normal that every teenager has spent like seventy years of their life watching TikTok? Because that's contemporary avodah zarah [idolatry]. The other avodah zarah is that TikTok was created directly, but that's actually true. But the other avodah zarah is that the whole internet was created directly by the Sitra Achra [the Other Side/evil forces], so that we should have nisyonos [tests], bnei yeshivas [yeshiva students], or something.

Now, this guy's a little normal. You have kids, you should put a filter on their phone. No question, on their whatever. Nobody ever argues—I mean, people don't live like that, but that's because they're nuts or they don't have a choice, whatever it is. But their society is nuts.

And the only guy that's normal is like what? You know that the Sklenener Rebbe gave the best drasha by Cedrifield and everyone was laughing at him? Sklenener Rebbe got up—and this was it, twenty years ago almost—got up and said—this is a beautiful thing that he said—"Amen. Amen." He doesn't say "Amen." Amen literally says this so you get your neshama [soul]. Amen. A ba'al hayim [animal] walks bent over. Amen walks upright. So if you walk around like this, you're a ba'al hayim.

Now he said the most normal thing, but what does it mean? Therefore... Hello. You got my problem? Why is it only normal people in this way?

The Well-Adjusted Fallacy

Student: No, but people also do think that there's—back to this well-adjusted thing. I think people do very often think that, okay, so like, you know, well-adjusted person—obviously if you say you shouldn't go on social media at all, you must be—taking thirty minutes a day is when you can do that.

Instructor: No, but that's not really thinking the problem. I think that's a getchke [idol/fetish] of well-adjusted.

Student: Yeah, yeah, like of course, like yeah, exactly, exactly. Everything like I can engage with on perfect terms and like, of course, we can like craft this like perfect human experience that doesn't fall—

Instructor: I agree, I agree with that. That's another mishigas [craziness], right? That's another thing.

Both Sides Are Meshuge: Modern Orthodox vs. Haredi

Instructor: The normal people—you're mad at Modern Orthodox people. Modern Orthodox people are—there's one, but both sides are mishigas. That's what I'm trying to get at. Modern Orthodox people have a different mishigas. They just don't believe in the yetzer hara [evil inclination]. They just don't believe in him. The Haredi people don't believe in the yetzer tov [good inclination]. But both of them are mishigas.

Like you go to—I just re-read because of this thing that I did last week. I re-read some discussion that I had with a lady that wrote a whole book about the correct sex education that we should give our kids. And she basically told him it's the both. It's like, you know, this is a really powerful destructive force, also for good. But she's like, "No, it's like holy and if you do it correctly," yeah, thank you very much. You just missed the problem, right?

This is a thing that is really, really worth—you should respect this shit. Just doesn't have any respect for this yetzer hara. No respect. Like it's really, it could make a whole—it could make a mabul [flood]. No. Chazal v'Shalom [God forbid], we shouldn't be Puritan, we shouldn't teach our kids because then they're going to hate their body, so we should teach them that there's a right—I agreed with the conclusion, but there's just like a certain disconnect with reality. Chazal v'Shalom, whatever. I'm not going to get into the details of this.

But you're right, that's another—she's right in a certain sense. These people are right. He's like normal, very good. The other people are crazy because their solutions don't actually—their solutions don't actually solve the problems. And also they're crazy because they don't believe in the yetzer tov. They don't believe in any kind of derech hamitzvos [the way of the commandments] and all kinds of mishigas that we said last week and so on.

But the other people are also crazy. They're just living in a fantasy universe which is like, maybe it's true in like three blocks of Teaneck for people between thirty and forty or something, but other than that it's not the real world, right?

So what's going on? Why is everyone meshuge? Same question. So you like—the same thing. You meet this guy like, "Yeah, he says that we should go to his—we should become a chossid [follower]." Then you see that the guy is—no, another some other way he's totally missed the boat. I think that started—I'll miss the boat is in that's a good amount of business.

The Rebbe Nachman Connection: Why Can't the Chochom Be Normal?

Instructor: This thing against—against the chochom [wise man] is fucking retarded. Why can you just say it's the same thing? It's the same thing. It's just a formulation. It's true by the theory that I said today, but it's a better question than an answer. In other words, it's not a question, it's like a request more of a request than a question.

Toward an Answer: The Instability of Individual Articulation

Instructor: I think that there is a way to do all of this, at least to some extent. I also do think that you have to be meshuge in reality, unfortunately. Why? Actually, I don't think you have to be meshuge. I don't think we should say that's true—it shouldn't be meshuge.

But I think that there's a reason why everyone that's normal a little is meshuge. And the reason is that in this world, it's very, very hard, at least for one person—maybe, you know, but for one person—it's very hard to make anything, to write anything without tipping over the boat, right?

So, for example, if we're—I mean, I could talk about mass education as one way in which this happens. I think it happens with people by themselves.

Chapter 7: The Necessity of Being "Meshuga" - Creating an Anchor Outside Society

The Fundamental Problem: Going Against Social Reality

So, for example, if we're, I mean, I could talk about like mass education as one way in which this happens. I think it has happened with people by themselves. Myself, if you have to go against the reality, like against the reality of society, it seems to me that it's very hard to do that without some very strong backbone, without some very strong support. And for this reason, I think that... Or alternative social infrastructure. And full social infrastructure, but nobody actually has that. I mean, nobody that I know.

I think that you need like Archimedes' pole. You need something to actually take you out of the default. And that thing is by definition meshuga [crazy/insane].

The Rambam on Leaving Society

This is really with the discussion of the Rambam [Maimonides]. This is really my response to this. The Rambam has the discussion of going in the desert and becoming a desert father or mother and leaving society. And the Rambam is very against it. He says this is not ideal. But he also agrees that it's sometimes needed.

And we have to understand that going to the desert is an aveira [sin]. It's not like the Rambam explicitly expresses it this way. Leaving society is a sin. Why is it a sin? Because the correct way of being a human being is to live within a society. And even more than that, the correct way of living as a human being is to live within your society. That is the correct way, you could say healthy way. But that's the correct way. That's how God made people. That's the nature of humans.

The nature of humans is not to do lech lecha [go forth - Abraham's departure]. That's a very nice romantic drasha [sermon]. The nature of humans is to stay where they are. I don't know, stay where they are. The nature of humans is to live within the society you are. That's the nature of humans.

The Trap: You Cannot Be Good in a Bad Society

Now, this also means that if they're in a bad society, you're going to be bad. You are going to be bad. If anyone tells you they're going to be good in a bad society, like this is the main contention of modern orthodoxy, that's nonsense.

You could be the good person of that society. Every society has an ideal of a good person. You could be a good person relative to that society or not relative, like according to what that society defines as a good person. But you can't be a good person, a really good person. If you agree that whatever the definition of this society for a good person is incomplete at least, you can't really be more than that. You can't. You can't be that.

The American Example

In America, there's something called being a good person. By the way, that includes going to church, so you could switch synagogue for church. It doesn't make a big difference. At least it used to include. I don't know if it still does.

And a modern Orthodox, or a modern anything guy, it doesn't matter, is a guy that does that. No problem. You're a very good American Jew. No problem.

But if you think that being a Jew, the claim of being a Jew is that the whole shtikl Torah [the entire Torah], kol zeh achnes [all this is nothing], being an American good guy, the best guy in America is still not good enough, if you believe that. I don't know if you believe that. I think that as a Jew you have to believe that. You have to, enough to nothing. But you should.

Then, or especially if you believe that, like I seem to believe based on whatever nonsense I read on the Internet. But if you believe that in 2025 there is no such a thing as being a good person in America. America doesn't have an ideal of good people and there are no good people in America. As Americans there are good people. Then you have to believe that, you have to go out of that and then you have to say you have to do a very big bad thing.

The Solution: Embracing the Meshuga

Let's just be against your society. It's a big huge sin. I'm just doing that makes you meshuga. Or there's like good ways of doing it. Not like saying like I have a Rebbe, I have a Torah, this absolute truth. What are you talking about? Since there's no such a thing, you're living on olam hadimyon [fantasy world].

No, this is what you have to say. You have to say look, we are the only people in history to know the truth. In Lakewood, the 30 people that live here, we are the only ones. It was given to us. I don't even know how we discovered it. And just to be clear, not to the Hasidim in Boro Park, not to the guys in Five Towns, not to the guys in Freehold. We got, we try to teach them but it was given to us. The whole complete full truth, 100 percent mezukak [purified], distilled, pure distilled.

Now, that is it. Anything else is nonsense. Even the people that try to go there, they realize themselves that it's nonsense. And because we have one meshuga that came back and said that it's nonsense and it proves to us. And this is the one that we're going to create a whole thing. We're going to teach basically only this. We're not going to teach anything else. We're not going to teach nothing. We're going to teach this. One thing.

We have received for free the extreme absolute truth, including how to tie your shoelaces. It's as true as the existence of God. Everything is absolute truth. And this is going to be what we do. This is all we do. We spend our days and nights saying this. And then if you do that for 70 years, no, if you that whatever, for as long as it takes, the race generation, then less than seven years, only like 10, 15 years, then you end up with people that have a, how do we call it? Like an anchor outside of America.

The Anchor Concept

This is what is needed. This is just the creating of the anchor. It's not the actual good thing, in my opinion, because most people are messed up. It's not the actual good thing. But this is all creating like a separate pole, like the multipolar role that some people are about. Like, you have to have another pole. Otherwise, everything you do, even the Yiddishkeit [Judaism] that you do, is according to the sar [angelic prince] of America.

Remember, there's shiv'im sarim [seventy angelic princes], there's the sar of America. He actually conquered like 15 sarim, and he's 15 of them. And, you know, right? You know their names are also anyways. And the sar of America, he's telling me, oh my pshatim [interpretations] is from him.

If you want to be a little bit outside of that, like not in golus [exile], right? You want, because this golus means you're living within a bad society. You want to not be in golus, you have to have, you have to have a really strong anchor. You have to something to actually give you, you need some place to stand outside of it. How do you stand outside the world? You need a lever long enough, right, to stand outside the world. How do you do that? You have to be meshuga.

I don't know of anyone that succeeds without being meshuga.

Choosing Your Poison: Practical Examples

Therefore, I had a friend that told me that he became a Bianer Chassid [Hasid of the Biana dynasty]. I don't think his family is Biana. He became a Bianer Chassid. So I asked him, I believe him, like, what do you see in the holy Biana that this is like the thing? He'd become a Breslov, a Chabad. I see this guy, he was in all the places. He became a Biana.

So he told me, look, I don't know if this was an excuse, but this is what he said, and it's just a good idea. He said, I looked in Biana, he has some family, of course he's like close to it socially somehow, that's why he's able. He said, look, in Biana there's the least Chassidus. I need a Chassidus, I want to be a Chassidus. I need a place for my children, I need a shul to daven in, a Chassidus shul, and so on. I need to be Chassidus.

I looked around all the Chassidus, where do you have to do the least? In Biana, you have to come every time, every time you have to come to Yerushalayim [Jerusalem], to the Rebbe. I don't think you have to do anything else basically. They don't have what clothes you wear, nothing. Perfect. It's how hard it is for me to travel two days a week a year. I'll travel. I wear the, I get into, what's the name, since we have to be, we should try to, to find the least meshuga thing that can take us out of reality, right?

The Principle: Minimize the Meshuga

So the trick is to find something that's less destructive, right? If you're like, I'm meshuga, I'm going to be in a cult, like I'm going to, we're going to talk all, do everything, whatever. But it's not necessary. I was reading a whole thing about the Amish yesterday. It's not actually necessary to be entirely meshuga. Don't read, because you only need one thing outside. Like you need one point, some anchoring point. You need, exactly, you need some, but it has to be real and somewhere else. It can't be the American version of Judaism, because then it's not anything.

You need something to say: In this, we think entirely different than everyone. And everyone is just brainwashed, nebuch [unfortunately], there's nobody to talk to, it's totally messed up. You need one thing. You need one, for now, Avraham HaIvri [Abraham the Hebrew] is not in a lechatchila [ideal] situation, but since we're in the world of Moshiach [Messiah], you need one thing that is really crazy.

So everyone has to choose their poison, I think. I don't know if this is really a choice that you could make because that's the real, but my ideal would be you have to choose it.

More Examples: Breslov and Lubavitch

That's why Lemush [?], a lot of like these, for example, it's not such a bad poison. I mean sometimes it is, but like, okay I have this one thing, this is what really separates me from everyone. I think that this is Moshiach, that's it.

Something with Lubavitch. Lubavitch has too many meshugaim [crazy people], but they don't need most of them. One or two of them is enough. And this allows them to do a lot of things because they're free. Now you're free. Now maybe I'll decide to do most of the things like everyone else, but I'm free, right?

The Sufficiency of Simply Being Jewish

Student: What about, what did he say?

Instructor: Yeah, yeah, in a very messed up way. It's very the opposite of that. But we have to have something that's different. Something very far. And then we can hold on to that.

I think that just being Jewish is more than enough. That's really what I think. But that only works, that only works for people that realize how crazy it is to be Jewish. If you only talk with Jews your whole life in a serious way, I'm not saying everyone talks with goyim [non-Jews], but like seriously, like if you don't talk about God with Jews, then you don't realize how crazy Jews are. You got to talk about the true things with other people if you could. And then you realize that just being a Jew, like I'm committed to Judaism, this is meshuga. I don't care.

We are the guys that put on the tefillin [phylacteries] twice, two tefillin, twice a day, or whatever, once a day. That's where we are. Why? We're the Parah Adumah [Red Heifer] people. That's all. That's who we are. Now, everything else could make sense. That's why we have that Parah Adumah, because that's like keeping your head above the water. There's still a Parah Adumah. It's saving us. It's going to purify us from all the shtussim [nonsense]. That's the thing.

Student: And he put on, so it doesn't have a ta'am [reason/taste], it can't be a Litvak [Lithuanian-style Jew] though.

Instructor: He doesn't wear the...

Student: Yeah no, at that point Litvak nebuch thinks that that's true.

Chapter 8: The Poshut'e Yid Solution - Jewish Identity as Minimal Meshugaas

The Proposal: Being a Simple Jew as Anchor

Instructor: The film, twice, two films, twice a day, or whatever, once a day. That's where we are. Why? We're the Poshut'e Yid [simple Jew] people. That's all. That's who we are. Now, everything else could make sense. That's why we have to have Poshut'e Yid. Because that's like keeping your head above the water. There's still a Poshut'e Yid. It's saving us. It's going to purify us from all the shtusim [nonsense]. That's the thing.

And the problem is that it doesn't have a ta'am [reason/rationale]. It can't be a Litvak, though, because it doesn't wear the veil that comes with it.

Student: Yeah, no, that's not the point. Litvak nebuch [poor thing] thinks that that's true. If you think that it's true, then...

Instructor: No, but he's meshuga [crazy] for that. It's, again, too much meshuga. You started off that you were going to go on vacation and the masa u'matan [give and take] is an aveirah [sin] and it's multiple days.

Student: Yeah, the main thing is that this is what I think.

The Paradox: This is a Sin, But Necessary

Instructor: You can go much further when you have that... You have to understand that it's wrong. This is all wrong. We shouldn't be meshuga. Even just... Like a masser [informer], like a mesira [informing].

Student: Yeah, even just... Exactly.

Instructor: By the way, it's a great thing. I've tried this thing. I know people have tried this and I've tried this myself in certain things. It's very important. It's a chet [sin]. It's a chet. It's 100% a chet. You're not allowed to do it. If the world would be good or to the extent that the world is good, you're not allowed to. It makes you a bad person. At least in the sense of an unbalanced person which is the definition of bad. It makes you a bad person.

But if you are in a situation where you're trying to bring in some kind of truth, some kind of pole, like a base of reality that is not in this one, you're going to have to do something to get yourself out.

America vs. Russia: The Liberalism Problem

How do you get yourself out of society? It's very hard. In America it's extremely hard because it's such a free society. In Russia it was easy to be a yid [Jew]. People think in America it's hard to be a yid, in Russia it's easy. People think in America it's easy to be a yid, but in Russia it's hard. It's the opposite.

In Russia you just have to make a bris [circumcision] for your son and you're a yid. Because this is like anti-communism, anti-whatever the communist ideal of atheism. In America, no, you make a bris. Everyone has their mishigas [craziness], you have your mishigas. Then you're not a yid.

Student: You're not.

Instructor: Everyone is crazy, we're crazy in this way. You have to have some point that's outside of that. This is why liberalism is like some people said the most dangerous thing for religion that subsumes it. Look we're all crazy, well let's be crazy that way, no problem. Maybe in part of Israel, but in some sense in your mind there has to be something: No, not really. And this is because we need... this is the reality.

The Wedding Example: Empirical Proof

I think this is an empirical explanation. This is why the only people that actually have the courage... like for example, okay, everyone agrees—I don't know if everyone agrees, I don't agree—but most people that I spoke to agree that doesn't make any sense to rent a hall for $30,000 and make a wedding for your son that's 17 or 18, makes no sense. It doesn't deserve it. Then do nothing and didn't even meet his kallah [bride]. That's like why would he get a $30,000 wedding? Everyone agrees. No, just the hall. Otherwise everyone agrees that this is crazy.

It's interesting that the only guy that actually just... you know that it doesn't cost anything to not do it. Actually, you save a lot of money. Nobody's like... it's crazy how little, not even social pressure. People, most social pressure is imagined. I've tried it out, I'm telling you. You could do, you could just do it. Instead of renting a hall, call everyone here and make your wedding. Nobody, people did it in COVID, remember, it was so easy? It just happened. Look, there's no social pressure. The social pressure is overrated. You could just do it. It's your choice.

Student: You're the guy, there's two people left, that's okay. Two mechutanim [in-laws] have to be on the same page. It's so hard to find one more.

Instructor: Everyone agrees that it's meshuga, right? I promise you you can do it. All of these things together are not worth anything.

Society as God: Why People Don't Resist

The reason people, the reason people don't do it, I'm telling you the truth, the only guy that actually does it is a meshugene [crazy person] that worships a dead grave in Ukraine [reference to certain Chassidic practices]. How does it work? Why? Because he actually has something to tell them: I'm not one of these people. I'm really, really, my religion is a different religion. Know that we're whatever. Chassidish doesn't say that, but like really, really, what makes me tick is something else.

Okay, now maybe he also is more than sometimes. He's good. The kallah is making a problem. I'm not saying he's not gonna understand everyone else. I have to understand the reason everyone's does not because they have no... Nothing in the name of which to really go against. You have to remember that society, when people say society, it's not with society. It's their God.

Right? If you say how do I decide how to do anything? How does anyone by the way? It's very hard. Most of the things you delegate to society and you're correct for doing that. That's how the world should work. How do you know how a wedding looks? Oh let's sit down and learn, let's learn and find out. You're crazy. You're not going to find anything out there, right? It sort of says that, yeah that's long, this is red. You're turning me back. But you can't do that.

So what are you going to do, right? You don't really have... or you could say I'm sitting down myself. I think it should be cheaper. By the way, I think it's wrong. I think a wedding should be expensive. I don't think it should be cheap. I'm asking with this whole shtus [nonsense]. But that's a different thing.

But now you understand that there's a real issue because you have no other god. You have no god but what everyone else does. You could complain against your god. Everyone complains against their god. Nobody is happy with their god. That's why he's a god, so he should be able to be against you. Otherwise he'll just be you.

But that's why, if the only way that... if it's true, assuming that it's true that it's crazy, the only way to act in the name of something else is to actually have something else. And you really have to have something else. How would you act in the name of something else if you don't have something else?

This is the basic empirical reason why the only God that actually does something different is the guy with a different God.

Student: Chassidish for me doesn't have a different God, yeah, and he's not my moshel [parable/example].

Instructor: A different middle God, at least.

Student: Yeah, a different malach [angel]. A different tzar [trouble].

Instructor: Chassidish for me is the Chazon [Chazon Ish], and the same for everything. The only people that could resist the internet, or could resist Chassidish because they resist birth control are the people that believe that God himself told them to have a bunch of babies. It doesn't matter. It has to be something different. God never said that, by the way. But it has to be something. Otherwise, you're just going to... You're not going to have what in the name of who to be to be misnaged [opponent]. You have to have something in the name of something to live. And it's the real problem.

And the real yeshua [salvation] is going to be when we make our own everything. But whatever. That's just a fantasy from a shiach [conversation]. But that would be... it's important to have that ideal to realize that it's not an ideal situation to be against society because it's very destructive if you become a sheigetz [non-Jewish boy/derogatory] and also you become even more of a sheigetz because of that because then you lose everything and it's a problem.

The Rambam's Midbar and the Haredi Solution

Student: Just to be clear, when the Rambam [Maimonides] says you should go to the midbar [desert], it means this moshel that you're talking about?

Instructor: The Rambam means literally going to the midbar.

Student: No but it doesn't mean this moshel that you're saying.

Instructor: The Rambam literally means going to the midbar.

Student: Become this like a little weird...

Instructor: No, no, not a weirdo. All Jews have... like the Chazon Ish famously told us about whatever he was understanding, right? Jews have made this collective... not Jews, what's called Orthodox, whatever you want to call them. Haredi [ultra-Orthodox] Jews have made this choice to go in the midbar. The literal desert doesn't make a difference. They actually did this. And it's a big sin that makes them crazy. They're all nuts and they're all evil in some sense because of that. Because you get unbalanced, and when you're unbalanced, a lot of things, everything is open in some sense. But also in that world you don't have a view from anywhere else, right?

Student: Yeah, that's... then it's not even... then it's the opposite, right? You need to have... you need to be a little frei [free/secular]...

Instructor: You're not answering the question.

Student: No, I'm diagnosing the problem.

The Proposed Solution: Least Destructive Mishigas

Instructor: I don't have... the answer is an empirical question. I asked why I can't find any normal Rebbe [rabbi/teacher]. So the Torah says that if it would be normal I wouldn't want to be my Rebbe because normal means evil. So therefore you have to be evil a little bit.

And my solution, my halfway joke solution for today is that you should try to find the least destructive mishigas to save you.

And my proposal is... My proposal is that we should just be Jewish and it's more than enough meshuga. We don't realize how meshuga it is. It's connected to last week's thing. It's more than enough meshuga to just not eat pork. That's meshuga enough. But you should realize that it's meshuga. It's not normal.

Like everyone has their dietary preferences and I have the kosher preference. No. It's not our dietary preference to eat kosher. Okay? It's a meshuga. The Chabadniks [Chabad Chassidim] are good at saying this, right? We don't have... No dietary preference. It's a meshuga.

We believe that our God came 5,000 years ago and ever to a mountain and told us: Please my dear Jews, don't eat pork. Don't ask me why. It doesn't make any sense. I promise you it makes no sense. If anyone tells you that it makes sense, he's lying.

That's what you have to believe. And that's more than enough to be meshuga. Now you could be friends with a goy [non-Jew]. You could do everything. It doesn't matter. It's not going to hurt you because you're already totally out of it. Understand?

Or since in reality maybe it's not enough, so everyone should find some other thing personally that works. But I think that this would be a proposal.

The Practical Problem: Visibility of Jewish Practice

Student: It's so crazy it's actually hard to be friends with a goy.

Instructor: Well because you're meshuga.

Student: Even someone honest with yourself, either can be two-faced because you pretend you don't put on tefillin [phylacteries] in the morning. That's one option. You can't do it. Like being the person who puts on tefillin in the morning, you just can't say it.

Instructor: No, I think the ideal way of saying it is this: like where everyone has their weird things and they have this weird thing. We have too many. You also sit in the room and you also go out. You don't tell them... Oh that's a problem because it's discrimination if only they didn't...

Student: No, no, you can't say it because it's so crazy. I didn't even know at the beginning.

Instructor: What's crazy about davening mincha [afternoon prayer]?

Student: It's pretty, it's pretty...

Instructor: No, it's, it's, it's... nobody does this. We have, we have, I work in a, I work in an entirely, pretty much 80% secular workplace. There's nothing weirder than mincha. Right. That, by the way, if you want to know my... literally you see a bunch of people coming into the conference room. You think it's weird, right?

Let's do it this way, these people literally on their computers, 10 feet away, amud [standing], feet to zeman [time], whispering to the wall, 10 minutes, and come out like nothing happened, nothing happened.

Student: My mincha is in a frum [religiously observant] firm, the partners are frum guys, it's much less of an aveirah [sin].

Instructor: Partners are also frum guys.

Student: No, no, no, but there's not so many going around.

Instructor: It's even worse. You would say if they would believe that they're talking to God, there's one thing, but they're not even talking to God. They're just talking to mincha.

Oh, by the way, if you talk to your kids, this whole thing gets lost. It's very normal to whisper a prayer in the corner. We're not even going slow. It doesn't look like we're taking it seriously at all. We're not even going slow. Out loud everybody. Oh, quiet.

What was that?

Chapter 9: The Paradox of Frumkeit - Choosing Your Meshugaas

The Problem with Private Prayer

Instructor: You would say, if they would believe that they're talking to God, there's one thing, but they're not even talking to God, they're just davening milche [davening: praying; milche: Yiddish for "dairy," here meaning superficially/without substance]!

By the way, see, if you daven b'yechidus [b'yechidus: in private/alone] this whole thing gets lost. It's very normal to whisper a prayer in the corner. When you go into the Kesubah [Kesubah: likely referring to a specific prayer or section], we're not even going slow. We're not even—it doesn't look like we're taking it seriously at all. Out loud everybody! Oh, quiet.

Being Outside Society as the Root of All Evil

But today I'm speaking about this specific kind of ketanus [ketanus: smallness/narrowness] about being outside of society, which is really the root of all evil, because you remember that Shulchan [Shulchan: likely Shulchan Aruch, the Code of Jewish Law], all the maalos hamiddos [maalos hamiddos: character virtues], all the character virtues are really about creating a society that works. That's their end. Then that society has to do something. But that's what it's all about.

Cutting yourself off and calling yourself off society is the worst thing you could do. You deserve death for that.

The Zionist Example: Creating Society from Scratch

Like Zionists have the fantasy of creating society. Problem with their society is it's just a likkut [likkut: collection/gathering] of all the messed-upness that you could find in Russia and in America and in England.

The two, three guys that are really hardcore that come in that don't care at all, right? They don't feel the eyes looking at them and they're doing it anyway, right? These guys have nothing to gain from it. They come in because—if you think that it's normal. And he doesn't understand. He looks like a freak. Me? I go every day. I know. I've been a freak. Yeah, too bad. I'm here. I'm whispering to the wall. You don't like it. I don't know. Yeah, I'm out of my mind. Yeah, it works.

They made some society, and then once they're somewhat successful, all the leeches come and start selling soda cans in Tel Aviv. Like there was a billion soda cans selling in Tel Aviv, hocking whatever. Like, so all the racist things come to mind. It's because like, no, we're trying to make a good society.

Student: Yeah, yeah, no, no, I agree.

Why Zionism is Meshuga

Instructor: In other words, but the reality is, firstly just to be a Zionist is crazy. I don't know if you know that. It still is, I think. Maybe people were reminded that it's a bit meshuga [meshuga: crazy].

Student: Why it's meshuga?

Instructor: I don't know. Because the—I don't care why it's meshuga.

Student: No, ask it. I think it's critical to live in America, be a Zionist. I think that's—

Instructor: No, it's meshuga. I'm not saying it's outside—because there was all this work that went in to try to make it a normal idea, but never really managed to become a normal idea. Like every nation has its place, and you have to go to some Palestinians like, hello. This is weird. Nobody ever did this. It's normal what it is.

I mean, it's only not meshuga like the Free African State. It's not really normal. There's actually no successful people that actually just picked themselves up from one place and went to the other place and claiming that it's their homeland and made a homeland there. Nobody ever did that besides for the Jews.

I'm not saying they're wrong for doing it, I'm just saying they're the only people that ever did that. It's normal when it just is that way, but it's not normal to make it be that way.

Student: Yeah, no, very good.

The Success of Forgetting Zionism

Instructor: As part of the project, that's why there's a Yid [Yid: Jew], I have to stop my video, but there's a Yid that claims that the fact that people are not Zionist in Israel is the biggest success of Zionism. Because we're just here. What do you mean, why are we here? I don't know. My father was here. My grandfather was here. My great-grandfather—I'm not sure. I don't know. I don't remember anymore. But that's it. Zeh ma yesh [Zeh ma yesh: Hebrew for "that's what there is/that's all there is"].

I feel just like the Palestinians—their great-grandfathers, they don't know where they're from. So he says he met the young people, they feel like that, many of them. Just like, he said, oh, we finally became natives. Like, ah, Mazel Tov [Mazel Tov: congratulations]. That's whatever. That's a different tradition.

The Problem with Total Societal Autarky

But yeah, if you want to become—yeah, but it's true. But that's—I don't know, it does seem to me that, I mean, like this ideal of making your full society and take responsibility for everything also seems a little meshuga to me. I don't think that's the correct ideal either. You know what I'm saying? Like you can't be autarky. You can't have moral autarky. It's not going to work either.

Student: Very good.

Instructor: So we're back to this picking our poison of where we want to be meshuga. Make sense?

The Amish Paradox: More Frum, More Frei

I was reading this thing yesterday that the Amish—there's like seven different levels, seven different levels of Amish. And the more frum [frum: religiously observant] ones are actually more frei [frei: secular/non-observant]. Very interesting. Because it's after the modern ones that have more chumros [chumros: stringencies] about driving certain things, not driving cars, certain things. And because then a bunch of modern people came and they said, look, we can't do this, this is crazy, everyone has to believe in God or whatever. And therefore they asked for a bunch of things. And now they're struggling more.

Student: Like in our society, in some sense.

Instructor: Yeah, there's a lot of kullas [kullas: leniencies] from being a chassidishe [chassidishe: Hasidic] yeshiva also. It's not only in chumros. People don't realize that the amount of people think that being a kat [kat: sect] is being machmir [machmir: stringent]. It's not really, right? It lets you do more things underneath it. It lets you—yeah, exactly. You gotta pay a certain thing and—

But that's enough. By the way, it's also too much. A yarmulke [yarmulke: skullcap] is more than enough crazy. You have to wear a yarmulke and a hat and everything. This is just overdone. But you do have to—you understand what I'm saying? Because as long as there's something strong enough—

The Techeles Digression: Ancestral Practice Without Reason

Where are the people that don't wear techeles [techeles: ritual blue thread on tzitzit]? It's not a good example, the Jewish context. Where are the people that do? You know who are the frummest people in Yiddishkeit [Yiddishkeit: Judaism/Jewish practice]? They do a chusn mol [chusn mol: unclear term, possibly related to wedding customs]. They don't do it correctly anyways. They do a mitzvah tanz [mitzvah tanz: traditional Hasidic wedding dance], okay. Everyone knows what that is. They do a mitzvah tanz because their elders did it and they don't know what it is. Oh, it doesn't make sense. I don't know, my Baba [Baba: grandmother/ancestor] did that, I'm going to do it too.

And there's people, right, because they wear the same socks as their Baba, they also like to do the same aveiros [aveiros: sins] as their Baba. If you wear different socks, then okay, then you have to do the mitzvah.

The Satmar Paradox: Most Chumros, Most Americanized

My point is just that it's not correct that the more things you add, the more separated you become from society. It's not actually true in certain ways.

By the way, I've noticed—there's another drasha [drasha: sermon/lecture], but many of the—I'm making a close-up of Not Satmar people—but in certain ways the Satmar people are the most Americanized people there are around. And Not Satmar people are the most Yiddish people there are around. Because Not Satmar shul in some sense is just the hamshach [hamshach: continuation] of the shul in Europe from 10,000 years ago, whatever, however many years ago. And the Yiddish shul is totally American shul.

Satmar is probably like the first one to create actual modern-style American shuls in Lakewood. Okay, go to Satmar Shul 9, the new one. You'll see that they basically bought modern fixtures like this one for their shul.

Student: What's going on with you?

Instructor: No modern Orthodox shul would do that. If they would do that, it would be in a messed-up, a different way. Not in the same way, not with such courage, not like with such familiarity. It's reality.

And that is because there's not anything else—because there's other things making them meshuga. So everyone chooses where to be meshuga. It's not entirely true that the more frum are less—least are less assimilated. Just everyone choosing where to be not assimilated. This dichotomy—

Student: I cover what you're saying.

Instructor: Yeah, this dichotomy used to live in—what's that shul by that weird massive intersection that's a hundred streets coming into it?

Student: The old shul?

Instructor: Yeah, that. Exactly. Now there's nobody there anymore. They modernized like one fixture and you can feel the dissonance for miles.

Student: Yeah, you could see, right?

Instructor: There's no—it's slim. There's no shul in Lakewood that has like the panels on the walls still from how they used to make shuls in the olden times. Everyone is modern. We have chairs and tables that look like this.

Conclusion: The Calibrated Meshugaas

So that's the nekudah [nekudah: point]. But kids, what I'm trying to say is that everyone should try to do meshuga, but not too much meshuga.

Student: That's right.

Ethics and Human Perfection: An Introduction to Choice and the Human Good

I. Introduction: The Topic of Choice

Instructor: I want to do something like this, which is to have a discussion about choice, which some people call free choice or free will. That is what I want to do. Why do I want to do this? Because we are studying this subject of how to become a better good human being, known as ethics. For some reason—you know the reason, I don't know either—so the class is not gonna be about that, the etymology of the word ethics, or why becoming a better person is under the same label as ethics. Well, that's the other way around, right?

Aristotle has a particular [teaching] about the etymology of ethics. I thought you would know it.

Student: Oh no.

Instructor: Okay, okay, so I guess not.

II. Defining Ethics: The Human Good

Instructor: In any case, this is what we're studying. Now, one of the important points to understand the kind, the style of ethics that we're trying to do, right, is that there's a specific focus on this word "human," right? It's very important. We could list 13 different ways in which this makes a difference for what ethics is.

But the description of ethics that we're working from is—and not only, we're working from the description of ethics that the entire tradition of ethics until last week is working from, including every [scholar] that they've ever heard of, even though notwithstanding the great debates between them—has its definition as what is good for, or the good of a human being. Or we could say a human kind of good. Human kind of good.

The General Theory of Good

This works within a very general theory of what good means. Good is the perfection of a thing. For anything, to talk about what is good is to talk about how it is good or what is good for it, although that formulation is a little tricky because it might mean what you think is good, but what is really good for it. That's why I say the good of it instead of what is good for it, but anyways you understand the difference.

But anyways, if good is always good of something, perfect—which we could call perfection of something—the way in which that thing is most fully that thing, or the best version of that thing, the ideal version of that thing, then it follows obviously that the human good, which let's say we call this ethics, study of the human good—although that's not what the word ethics, that's what it means, but we could get back to that if you want—is the study of the human good. Make sense?

Why This Definition Makes Discussion Clearer

What this does for one is it makes life easier for us. No, it makes life easier. It makes the discussion clearer for us, right? Because number one, many of the discussions of how to live, of how is a good way for human beings to live, especially the ones we're used to—which is why the way in which this is useful for us—this starts from something beyond or other than the human good, other than what is good for humans.

III. First Problem: Serving God as the Definition of Good

Instructor: Very often people will say things like, "What is good? What is the good life about according to *Yiddishkeit* [Jewish tradition]?" What do people usually say?

Student: To serve God.

Student: To do *mitzvos* [commandments].

Student: To do God's will.

Instructor: Okay. And what's that got to do with me?

Usually it often leads people to serve God. So what is good for me is that I should be good for someone else, for something else. I mean, that's maybe the good of a certain relation that I have, right? Someone could say like the good—a good child is one who serves his parents correctly. A good slave is one who serves his master correctly. But that is not, as long—assuming that the slave as a human being has some existence besides for his slavery—that can't exhaust everything that it's good about, can be good about him.

So if a human being is something besides serving God—which maybe people will deny, but assuming that there's such a thing as a human being—then serving something greater than you might be a good thing because you have a relation to God. You have some kind of relation to things greater than you. And the correct way, the perfection of that relation, is to serve God correctly. Very nice. But that's not everything that there is to be a good human being, if that makes sense.

Clarifying the Argument

That's one kind of mistake. There would be answers to this. I'm not here to say that you shouldn't serve God. I'm just saying that this can't be like the final definition towards what it offers. If we agree—if we agree to this seemingly very clear and basic understanding of what good is—then you can't stay there.

Student: You could just disagree with that. You could just not—disagree what a human is, to say that, you know, that even doesn't exist.

Instructor: Yeah, right. God didn't create anything when it says in the third [day], "I saw them." That's a lie. He just created a relation to himself. People say this. I'm just clarifying what that would entail.

Student: You could say that.

Instructor: You could also say that. But it also leads to a chase after kinds of good which are not human.

IV. Second Problem: The Litvak-Chasid Debate on Perfection

Instructor: So another thing—and this has to do with the previous point—when people say, "Okay, whoever told you that you should, you're here for your perfection?" Like that's what a *Litvak* [Lithuanian-style Torah scholar] says, right? *Avodas Hashem* [serving God].

I've heard this literal *drusha* [sermon] from Chasidic people: "Litvaks are after their own perfection, like the Rambam [Maimonides]. That's *gashmius* [materialism/physicality], yeah. That's selfish. But Chasidim are about serving God. So they're about someone else's perfection or something."

Are they perfecting God? What? The benches?

Student: The bench, yeah. If you want to buy a bench, I'll say, oh, you need to perfect the bench.

Instructor: Are they a Jewish person?

Student: No, they need a perfect bench?

Instructor: No, they need to perfect the bench. They also perfect benches. There's the opposite. We're saying that the Chabad-niks don't perfect people.

Student: No, they perfect everything else.

Instructor: That's it. Except themselves.

I'm sorry, I really heard this. You're selfish. We learn from the bench and then make the bench something new.

Student: I get that, I get that. But I don't see how that's—

Instructor: I heard it in this context. I feel like that's—

Okay, let's try to—I'm not getting into if you can perfect a bench by sitting and learning. I'm not trying to—I'm trying to say that the idea is to basically do everything—

Student: Non-selfishness.

Instructor: Okay, this is not a class about selfishness.

V. Transition: Why This Matters for Choice

Instructor: But the important thing that I'm saying is—what?

Student: You should have one [another sheet].

Instructor: Now, where is going to be a sheet about—this is going to be a sheet about choice. This whole *shtickl Torah* [piece of Torah learning] is a *hakdama* [introduction] to explain why I care about choice in this context. And if we won't get to it, I mean, it's—no, it's—

Yeah, you can all come in. Hi, hello, hello, welcome. Is Ari coming? We're gonna get more chairs if he comes. Okay, sit down, don't worry.

VI. Restating the Core Problem

Instructor: We're saying that we're looking for the human kind of perfection, of the human good, which is the [true] perfection. Some other people are looking—just don't think in those terms—and they think about some beyond-human, higher, greater-than-human perfection, sometimes called serving God, which is, as we said first, really the perfection of a relation you have with what is greater than you, which is something, but not everything.

And then we said that that also sometimes leads to—I wonder why—but it leads to, or it's connected with, another kind of beyond-human perfection, where, let's say, let's try it out by saying it like this: if the entirety of the human good is exhausted by serving God, that seems to mean that most of the kinds of perfections that humans have or care about are not real, right? Because we said perfection is of the thing. Those things are not real. What is real is whatever pertains to this relationship with what is beyond you, with what is greater than you. And that means that the kinds of things that you're going to be trying to do or the kinds of perfection—

[Chunk ends mid-sentence]

Beyond Human Perfection: Divine Soul, Intellectual Perfection, and the Human Good

Mesirut Nefesh and Chabad Theology

Instructor: So we talk about very heroic perfections, or very, like, *Mesirut nefesh* [self-sacrifice; literally "giving over the soul"] becomes the basic value. *Mesirut nefesh*, and this is a correct description of Chabad theology, for example, *mesirut nefesh* as a term for killing yourself, or not even literally killing yourself, but destroying what you are in service of something greater. *Mesirut nefesh*, literally, becomes a very basic formulation for this kind of work, for this kind of life.

Do these things make sense? It can be argued with, because my connection with these two kinds of ways of going beyond the human good are not entirely accurate. And there's correct ways of saying all of this.

The Divine Soul Concept in Tanya

Just to be very clear, unlike or somewhat unlike what Chabad would have you think, the reason, for example, the reason people like the *Tanya* [foundational Chabad text by Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi] even have the concept of a divine soul as a basic concept in their theory of what it is to be a good human being is only because they're really working within the framework that says that the good is the good of you, of something. And if their good is something very exalted, very high, they need to make the you something very high, very exalted. Otherwise, you could have just said...

Student: So that it's relevant?

Instructor: What?

Student: So that it's relevant?

Instructor: So that it's a good thing for you. All right, so it's relevant to you. Yeah, the word relevant is funny, but yeah.

Student: What this word, they're trying to make the beyond you part of you?

Instructor: Yeah, it entails that really, because there isn't really a way to... I mean, there is a way, but it's in some way going to become part of you. Like we say, your relation to something is still you or yours in some sense. You could, we could argue about who the relation belongs to—a relationship that doesn't belong to anything. It's like who does the fatherhood of the father or the sonhood of the son belong to? Is it more on the part of the father, more on the part of the son? That depends if you're a Platonist or an Aristotelian. But in any case, that's just fancy words for people to think that I'm smart.

But in any case, you need to have something like that being what you are in order for you to be able to even talk about this, be able to do this, for it to be good for you. Otherwise—and I've met actually other people who said didn't understand this—okay, why do we need to talk about someone having a divine soul? Why just tell you I have to do this and this and this? Because there's nothing as "you have to do." You have to do what you are. You have to perfect what you are. This is accepted by everyone, including the *Tanya*.

The Incoherence of Pure Bitul

Therefore, when the *Tanya* talks about *bitul* [self-nullification], about giving away what you are, that's not a really coherent theory. It's something, it's more of an aspirational thing. I don't think it's a really, I don't think technically, scientifically, what he thinks, what he's thinking of is really that.

Student: Yeah, yeah, yeah, I think 100%. I don't think it's going away from this. I think that we need that. I think everyone is based on this.

Beyond Human Perfection and Aristotle's Hierarchy

Instructor: Okay, now, but the more important thing is that there's, this would be a kind of beyond human perfection, kind of beyond human aspiration, and for that reason, in some sense, you could say it entails becoming God, or whatever the source, whatever the higher thing that humans are, becoming an angel or something like that.

And if what you look, what we're interested in is the human kind of good, then that's not what we're interested in. You could of course be interested in that. You could say, and Aristotle even says this when he gets to the next level, Aristotle says this: humans are not the best. Humans are not the best thing. So if you're looking for the best thing, then the human kind of good is not what you should be after.

Knowledge of the Best Things

And the way he speaks about it is speaking of knowledge. Knowledge is about knowing the best things. Knowing what is good for people is not the best knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the human good is not the best knowledge. Therefore, everything pertaining to humans is not the best thing. And what a really good person or someone that has really good knowledge wants to know is the fine things.

That is the step towards the, what we call in our language, the intellectual perfection of the human being. Intellectual perfection of the human being is still considered to be... It's not perfecting what's human about you. It's something that touches the space between these two things. It's perfecting what is, we could sometimes say, this is what's truly human about you in some weird way, but it's perfecting, you could say, what is divine in you, or what is potentially divine, or what is truly human, things like that. Not what is human in normal speak, in normal people's language. There's a big difference between when we say that and when we say this.

Nature, Intellect, and Human Distinctiveness

Student: Well, we tend to think animals live according to nature, and humans don't necessarily live according to nature. And how is that possible? Because they have the intellect. So we think the intellect is something separate from nature. We drive cars. That's because of the intellect.

Instructor: Humans are, in this paradigm, humans are not... Humans have a kind of nature whose perfection works in very much more complex ways than animals, one of them known as intellect. But in a very basic sense, if you, it's not like, I don't think this, like the economy of nature versus intellect, where it really works. It's more that the question is what kind of nature you have.

An animal can be perfect and non-perfect. Human can be perfect and non-perfect. And these are different criteria for what they are, based on what they are. An animal to be a perfect animal doesn't need to drive a car. A human being might need to drive a car to be a perfect human being. Different discussion, if he does or don't, but...

Technology as Natural

Student: So is a car a part of nature?

Instructor: Yeah. Because the human had the potential to develop it. We had a class about this. There's one of the first class in this series was describing how technology is a natural thing, in the very broad sense of nature. Society is natural, according to Aristotle. A city, a city, a human is meant for a city. A human is a city, natural. And different technology is also natural. It's the human nature to use tools and to build up all these elaborate systems and so on.

Student: Yeah, so, so wait, so this is the important, because...

Instructor: But it's unnatural in the sense that it derives its purpose from not from itself, right? Taken by itself, a car doesn't have a, isn't the natural, is an artificial thing. It's an artifact, meaning it's created for someone else. It's a real slave. It doesn't have, its good lives in someone else, or it's for, it's really serving something else. But a human being or all natural things have some kind of standard of their own good in themselves or somehow.

Deferred Discussion: Is-Ought Distinction

Student: I think I interpret it like it's a *das Torah* [authoritative teaching], right? I think human creativity is that they have a is and a ought divide, that an animal may suffer, but it doesn't think of a new possibility. It just goes along with it, or it goes...

Instructor: Okay, wait, wait, we're going to get to all of this a little bit. I have to try, I have to try to get the move forward according to my plan, so I'm not going to argue with that, but I'll get to something, something about this in a little bit. I don't like the is-ought distinction precisely because of this, because that's also how humans, we'll try to get to something more useful than that for right now. Yeah.

Returning to the Human Good: Ethics as Character

Instructor: So that's just one way in which striving for something or looking for something beyond human is a very good thing. And this is a beginning of a solution for a lot of problems that you might have had, including in the Rambam [Maimonides] and including in life and so on.

But we're primarily interested in human good, which is known as ethics or character. Ethics is just character. And precisely the kind of character which is human, the part of you that is most human about you. Okay, that's the thing that we're talking about.

There might be goodness, there's nothing, it's important to remember that there is goodness beyond this. And in a certain sense, and I'm going to just make a sentence of this and move on past that, because that would be a whole series of classes. And if you listen to my classes with Antonio Vargas, you'll learn 500 different *chilukim* [distinctions/arguments] about this.

Religious Perfection vs. Philosophical Ethics

But the main point is, sometimes what we call religious perfection and so on often starts beyond that. Like the Rambam would tell you something like, and Aquinas makes this comment often when he reads the ethics, like yeah, Aristotle says this because he's thinking of the perfection of human being in this world. Religion starts with perfecting human beings so...

Human Perfection: Distinguishing Human from Non-Human Goods

Non-Human Perfections Within Human Beings

Instructor: And there are also non-human perfections, non-human things in a human being. In the sense of, for example, even below that, you could talk about heaviness, or strength, or strength in the material sense, not in the biological sense, right? Like there are strong things like metal, or bones. And human beings have some of that perfection. We need to have—your bone has to be hard in order to live and things like that.

But all of that—or you could be heavy and heaviness has some use, you know, if you want to block a door or something you need the heaviest guy to be the bouncer—and those are not human perfections. Those are things that you could have used a rock for. It happens to be that humans are somewhat made out of rocks, which is what confuses people sometimes. They see someone that's just very heavy and very big and very large, or very small, whatever perfection is.

The Doctrine of the Mean Applied to Physical Attributes

This goes back to our discussion of the middle, right? The biggest thing wouldn't be perfect either. It's very easy to see why perfection is always—I mean, right? But the perfect size human—well, there's already something human because it's going to be relative to what a good human is. But as someone that can, you know, jump the highest or can be the best used as a door post or a door block or something like that, that is not—that is a lower than human perfection, right?

Bodily Perfections: Important but Not Human Virtues

And almost in the same way, most bodily—what we call bodily perfections—are like that, right? Being even being healthy or being strong, like I said, being tall—all of those things are less than human perfection. They're also not what ethics is about.

That's not to say that they're not important, because they're even in some sense more important because they're more basic. You can't start anything if you're not healthy. You can't start anything if you're not the right size and so on. But they're not the human perfections. Does that make sense?

Student: So you're saying the material structure of humans is not human?

Instructor: Now, what decided it to be human—that's not a discussion. But anyways, so this is another thing. And people make this mistake. If the religious people tend to try to be too much over-human, then the materialist secularist people often try to be too much below human, right? And there's the lowest common denominator and things like that. Like, society should at least have everyone be healthy and happy in a material sense, which is—yeah, it's necessary for humans, just like necessary to have—or even lower than animal, like I said. You need minerals and stuff. They have to have the correct ratio and things like chemistry. Chemistry is not yet the animals, right? Although humans need chemistry and your chemical balance or whatever—that is, it's the lower things are a basis. Yeah, they're basically there. You're built up of them. But being perfect in those aspects doesn't really make you a good person.

The Eulogy Criterion: Defining Human Goods

Instructor: Now, just to give a simple definition of what we mean when we say a human good, something humanly good, someone that—I have a simple way that still works, although some people are weirdos even nowadays, especially nowadays. But in general, even nowadays, the kind of things that people say at eulogies [*hesped*: Jewish funeral eulogy]. If you go to a *hesped* and they praise someone or whatever, the kind of things we praise people for—those are the human values, the human virtues, okay? The human goods. Is that a good criteria?

Student: Yeah, well it's trying to describe a life well-lived.

Instructor: Yeah, for the most part. Nobody says he was so heavy, he was so in shape. Even if they say in shape, they mean to say he had the virtue of self-control—he went to the gym every day. Nobody's going to say, well, the guy was like—when he got into a fight he always won. Almost nobody, right?

Student: Even if—yes, it's not—it's meant in the most human way.

Instructor: Yeah, okay, we could say that, but it sounds—but really they're saying—yeah, those things are complicated. I'm saying in general, in general people still understand what things people are really praised for, although we sometimes praise people for other things. I could praise you for having a lot of money in life, but when you're dead usually you don't get praised for that.

Complications: The "Beyond Human" Category

Student: Despite a lot of times they talk about people's passion for sports—

Instructor: Well, it must be because they think that that's part of being a good human being. Now, just like you said—like I said—people who say that ultimately think that that's what a good human being is, even if they don't frame it in this way. And therefore they might make mistakes because they don't understand it that way. I think that ultimately that's what they must be thinking, and that's why I'm not so worried about that, really. People might have weird things to say because they have weird ideas of what a good human being is.

Student: I mean, yeah.

Instructor: Yeah, we could say these things, but everyone understands the difference. There are some things that we praise people when they're alive for, or we don't know if we really mean to praise them—it's more like we flatter them.

Canonical Human Virtues

Student: What about *eved Hashem* [servant of God]?

Instructor: Yeah, for sure, for sure. Maybe the parent, a good friend—things like that, those are canonical human virtues. A good son—unless nobody's a good son. People are more good parents than good sons. But, you know, you can see how that changed, right? Unless you go like *kibbud av* [honoring one's father/parents]—very few people actually have that.

In any case, so these are what human virtues are—things that people get praised for as people. Of course, I can praise you—I could talk about how great it is to be tall. You could reach the higher shelf. It's useful, but that's not a human virtue. It's something of an animal part of human virtue, or useful part, because I need you to reach the highest shelf. But not a human virtue.

Human Vices and the Nature of Blame

Instructor: And now, if you think about something very—one of the things that are basic to this kind of praise—and here's where I get to where I wanted to get—if you will get to something that is basic to this kind of praise or judgment, right? Just a clear damnation or the opposite of praise—the criticism or true damnation or something—would be the kind of human evils, right? Things that we criticize people for in the human sense.

I don't have a good case—when do we do exactly this? On Twitter, I guess, we see who's bad. And I get—this is when we declare our human virtues. When do we declare our human vices? On Twitter.

Student: Someone else's, yeah.

Instructor: Blame—when do we blame people? We do it all the time, right?

Student: Yeah, but sometimes—

Instructor: So I'm looking for a situation where it's obvious that we don't blame you for being too tall or too thin or something like that. We do blame you for human failings, right? We do that all the time, right?

Student: What, yeah.

Instructor: We don't have to wait for the guy's eulogy for this.

Student: Funny.

Distinguishing Human from Below-Human Blame

Instructor: Anyways, yeah. But we understand that very good. But people do that. We say, oh, that's below—that's just not being nice. That's kicking me, right? If you criticize my physical appearance, now I tell you, well, that's below the belt. That's—it's not my fault, right? People do that, but we understand that to not be correct. There's nothing real in that. You're just fighting dirty. Just like you push me, okay? You embarrass me by saying I'm small, I'm ugly, things like that.

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: Make sense?

Student: Yeah. I guess there's two categories. There's physical appearance that you're not responsible for, and there's physical appearance that you are.

Instructor: Yeah, okay, yeah.

Student: And if somebody falls into the physical appearance that you are responsible for, then to the extent that they're—

Instructor: Right, so then they're criticizing your lack of discipline.

Student: How you dress is a human thing.

Instructor: How you dress is a human thing, yeah, let's say. I'm talking about the appearance—you're overweight or underweight or—I don't know.

Student: Yeah, so then we're criticizing your lack of discipline or something like that.

Instructor: But we do understand very clearly the difference. We don't need to say that people forgot about this. People didn't actually forget any of the things. We do know the difference between a human kind of blaming and a non-human kind of blaming, a below-human kind of blaming.

By the way, we could also, if we're using—Aristotle talks about who we blame and who we praise.

Beyond-Human Good and Evil: When Praise and Blame Cease to Function Morally

The Inverse Case: Beyond-Human Evil

When Blame Stops Functioning as Moral Criticism

Those are not the same kind of thing. They're the same kind of thing, but they're not the same thing. Something like that. It works for the opposite also, right? This is another interesting point. You could think in certain contexts that I'm not going to get into. But we also blame or criticize people sometimes for things that are so bad that they stop functioning as a moral blame. They start becoming the description of a monster, right? Without giving you an example. There's a big *makhloket* [מחלוקת: dispute/controversy] about this, and a lot of things. There's also *makhloket* about the previous thing.

You call certain evil people a monster.

Student: Or if that's worse, because then you're exiting the human realm.

Instructor: Yeah, this is not all *makhloket* on the internet. This is all *makhloket*.

Student: Can you give an example?

The Serial Killer Example

Instructor: Yeah, I'll give you an example. Someone that, someone that's like a serial killer who hunts people and eats them. We're against that guy, right? But we're not really against him even, right? He's not a good guy. But is he a bad guy? No, and you call somebody like that sick. You could notice that he's not even a bad guy. We say he's sick. We have this new word. We call him sick, right? But he's not really sick. He's just really evil.

It's not like maybe you could always find, I read a book, I've listened to a podcast about someone that wrote a book to claim that serial killers are just because the air pollution in their city or whatever. But seriously, there were a thousand people in that city, not all of them are serial killers, right? So it has to be something else going on.

You could see that we could, we have this word sick or monster is another word, or you're referring to the person as an animal.

Student: Well, meaning not human.

Instructor: Yeah, this is lower than human, not even a human evil.

Student: Yeah, exactly. It's not even human evil, exactly, because it doesn't seem to be motivated by a normal passion.

Instructor: Exactly. You know, like, I hate this guy, I'm going to kill him.

Student: I think the word Nazi is used that way.

Instructor: Yeah, exactly. That's the example I didn't want to talk about because whenever you say that word, whenever you say that word, Gemini refuses to edit my video. Anyways.

Student: Gemini, I'm not Jewish.

Instructor: They're very from these kind of things.

Student: Which word, Kenji?

Instructor: This box. I don't know, we could try, but I was like, no, I was criticizing them. No, oh no.

The Problem with Extreme Evil as Mussar

Anyways, well seriously, it's also used, also destroys the discussion usually when you say that. But what, right, we said they're animals and things like that, and these are all, sometimes it's not sure that the guy's animal is just the evil person, but at least we understand that we have this category of people that we blame, we say that they're bad, but you can't imagine yourself doing something like that. So again, when we blame that person, it's not functioning as don't be like that. It's more like, this is a description of some subhuman kind of thing. Of course, don't be like that. It's more like be careful of him.

And we could, again, also if we do a Mr. *Haskel* [mussar lesson], it becomes very weird. Don't be like him. That guy killed 6 million Jews, at least you don't bother your sister. It doesn't really connect very well. Basically, it's not realistic, it's not *mussar*, it's not *mussar*. It becomes description of weird things.

Student: So those are very good examples of the inverse still has the same function. You might tell somebody don't do this because this is the same kind of thing that this person—

Instructor: Yeah, exactly, exactly. It could work in the same structural way.

Student: Yeah, we see how far it is—

Instructor: Yeah, you see how far it is from being a human kind of blame or human kind of praise.

Both Extremes: Outside of Society

Another way, we could say this in another way by saying something like, both of these extremes don't belong in a city, are not part of society. The great *tzaddik* [צדיק: righteous person] who's totally flying in the heaven all day, in his mind, is not living with us, not one of us, in the same way as the serial killer is not one of us, he's not living. So both, that's why if you go in the desert you meet two kinds of people: bandits and Breslovers.

Okay, now yeah, monastic lives in the same place where the bandits live because they're both not human, right? Anyways, this is another discussion now.

The Central Question: What Makes Praise and Blame "Human"?

Formulating the Question

But when we talk about blame and praise, you could see very easily that the things, now fast you like what, so what is this thing? What is the criteria for what gets praised in a human way? Specifically in a human way, because that's why I need this word, in a human way. That's why I gave this whole introduction. And what is the thing that is not blamed in a human way? How do we define it? What's one definition that excludes both ends of this spectrum? What is it?

Student: What was fundamentally human?

Instructor: Yeah, what is it that makes the kind of things that we praise as human into human praise? And so on, and vice versa.

Student: Is it the platonic form of human?

Instructor: Well, no, the platonic form, no, part of, an important ingredient at least, I don't know if that's the form, at least, I don't know if it's enough, it's not enough, maybe, but at least one of the important ingredients for a good to be a human good, or an evil to be a human evil, is?

Student: Deliberated action, I would say, I don't know. Pre-meditated action.

Instructor: Right? Or chosen?

Student: Very good.

The Role of Choice

Instructor: Some of these things. Right? Do you agree? If you disagree, you can make your own choice. Something like choice, intention, deliberate action, which is a long word for intention, I think. Pre-meditation.

Student: Pre-meditation, yeah.

Instructor: Right? Whereas these non-human people, if it wasn't choices...

Yeah, at least we don't understand that being the Vilna Gaon has a choice. Maybe he was born that way, maybe after doing a thousand choices that possibility opens up. It's not a normal choice, right? In the same way, I don't have a choice to be a serial killer. It's not something that I choose. It's beyond choice, right?

Application: Physical Appearance and Choice

Or in the same way, that's not the best example of this. Really, when we say something like, when I say you don't blame someone for having a deformed nose, it's why? Because you didn't choose it.

Student: Well, someone chose it.

Instructor: Wait, wait, this is a *shiur* [שיעור: class/lesson] criticizing of this, isn't the same thing, explain. But I don't have patience together that just explain why he was so confused now. But if we'll get to the end you'll see why he was so confused.

There's things, yeah, but forget about for some people, mostly for all people, right? For all people their physical appearance is mostly entirely, we said, but for mostly it's not a choice. Therefore it's not human praise to praise someone as beautiful, although there's a problem, we do praise people as beautiful and we think that that's somewhat good. But we have to explain that. But at least morally we understand that there's nothing wrong with being ugly, right? Is it evil to be ugly? Someone that looks ugly is evil?

Student: I mean he's making everyone uncomfortable by walking into the room.

Instructor: Who?

Student: Yeah but what does he want?

Instructor: But he said—

Student: Not because it was ugly, but that it affected his thought.

Instructor: Oh, okay. Well, that's why he claims that it was compensating. Which is a different fault.

Okay, so we understand this point.

The Distinction Between Choice and Free Will

Terminological Refinement and the Core Criterion for Ethics

A Brief Tangent: Nietzsche's Critique of Socrates

Student: Is it evil to be ugly? Someone that looks ugly is evil? I mean, he's making everyone uncomfortable by walking into the room.

Student: He criticized Socrates for being ugly.

Student: Who?

Student: Nietzsche criticized Socrates.

Student: Yeah, but what was he on?

Student: He criticized Socrates for being ugly.

Instructor: Well, he said that not because he was ugly, but that it affected his thought.

Student: Oh, okay.

Instructor: Well, that's why he claims that he's compensating.

Student: Which is a different fault.

Instructor: Fault, okay.

Moving Beyond "Choice" to More Precise Terminology

So we understand this point that things on shows. Now this is something important because I led you through this whole story to get to the point where we discuss choice, right? And I think that probably a better word than choice is something like you said—deliberate action or decided action, something like that. Something that you decided or wanted, maybe could have done—and other, I don't like that definition so much. You'll see in a second why.

Student: Planned.

Instructor: Planned, yeah. Thought out, or something like that.

Now, why... Animals maybe have plans, but they're instinctual plans, no? Like, I'll collect my acorns and...

Yeah, I'm not so worried about animals at this moment. Like, whenever we talk about what is human, I feel like a very bad way to figure that out is to read animal science books, at least the modern ones. Because it's not really—but I have to understand why it seems to be wrong.

The Human/Nature Praise Distinction Revisited

But when I talk—give you two examples of human praise and what we don't praise humans—you understand, like if I praise you for being beautiful, I'm praising nature for making beautiful things. I'm not praising you as a human being. That's enough for me. And you can ask, forget about peacocks—you know they're also beautiful, no problem.

So who do you praise when you praise a peacock?

Student: Nature.

Instructor: Whoever it is, God who created beautiful peacocks. Not—he doesn't get praised as a "you're a really good peacock," right?

When we praise a human for doing beautiful deeds and we say "you're a really good human," right, you could see the difference without getting into funny complications about do monkeys have laws or things like that.

The Central Criterion: Choice as What Makes Something Human

Now we get to the point that a very important ingredient—if we want to talk about human goods, ethics, virtue—we need one important criteria for this: that it should be something humanly chosen. That's what makes it human, almost. I don't know if this is enough, but—so, like I said, this is part of what makes it human, is that it be something we call chosen, or at least willed.

We could think of a different way to get into this. Does this agree? Does this make sense?

Now, I want to make a very important point, and we'll see if you agree with this, and if not, that's because you didn't come to enough classes yet. No, I'm just saying, if not, then we call it as human, it's ethical, right?

The Free Will Problem—Why the Speaker Never Discusses It

Introduction of the Free Will Concept (Bechirah)

So, now, there's something very important. You probably remember that we have—you've probably in other classes, not in this one, heard about something called, which people nowadays call *bechirah* [free will], or in English, free will. Have you heard of that thing?

Yeah, people have heard of this. I never talk about it, and for a good reason. You've never heard me giving a shit about it. And usually people talk about it, and why do I never talk about it?

Student: Because I don't have *bechirah*, why would I talk about it?

Instructor: No.

Student: You have to choose to talk about it before you talk about it.

Instructor: No.

The Uselessness of the Free Will Discussion

Because people—usually we talk about that in conflict, and the opposite of that would be something like being—what's the opposite of free will?

Student: Determinants.

Instructor: Determinism, yes. But we have this like noun called determinism, or saying you are forced by your necessity, everything, all your actions are necessitated by your circumstances, by whatever it is, you don't have free will, right? And people usually say that—well, what do people say? Why do people care about that? I don't understand why anyone cares about that. Seems to be the most useless loop you can think about in the world. Do you agree with me? If you don't, then why not?

Free will seems to be the most unnecessary conversation to have about the ones that people have, that teenagers like to have. Like, do I have free will? Kind of. If you do and if you don't, what was wrong here? Whatever. It doesn't make—understand something better by thinking about it. Do you understand the truth?

Student: It seems self-refuting.

Instructor: Self—not self-refuting. It doesn't refute itself whichever side you pick. It seems to self-negate the discussion. Like in any case, this seems to be a very confusing discussion that I don't know how to have.

Like you said, if I don't have free will, do I have free will to have this discussion? Free will discussion is impossible to have because once you examine the nature of the mind, you change it. It's impossible. It shifts while you look at it.

Student: That would be another problem.

Instructor: But it's part of the loopiness of it. It seems to be very useless.

Common Motivations for the Free Will Discussion

People usually like to have it either for like theological reasons—like if humans have no free will, why could God punish them? Okay, I don't know. Maybe God doesn't punish them. Like where did—like it's all predetermined. I don't know why—why do people do bad things? For the same reason they get punished. I don't—I never understand why people—anyone would care about this question. And people seem to care about it. It's like talking about it and like, "Ah, but does God know what you will do?" So there's predestination before that. But okay, nice, also like a problem that I don't understand why I don't care about.

So there's something wrong with that. Oh, everyone agrees with me that it's a weird discussion to have.

A Humorous Demonstration

Now, it's interesting. There is no free will, because if you would have had free will, some of you would have said, "No, it's a good discussion." Now, you could have just chosen to say that, right?

Student: Yeah, free will.

Instructor: That's another weird thing with the free will discussions, that it conflicts reality.

Rav Dessler's Observation

This is what Rav Dessler was worried about, and his question is correct. Like he was a good observer of reality. He was never—he had to like 300 years of the destruction of normal philosophy, so he didn't have any resources to talk about it normally. But like notice that nobody has free will.

The Crucial Distinction: Choice vs. Free Will

This is not the one question I want. I want to distinguish what I care about—choice—and I led you through a half hour of discussion about the human good to see why choice is very important. And now wait, very good. Now what I want to show you is this: how far choice is from free will.

Choice—I'm just going to give these two things, these two names, and try to stick with it, stable at least for tonight, because the words are not the main thing. But let's call this "choice" and that "free will."

Choice is very important. If something you don't have a choice about, we all agree, is either beyond or below human—it's not interesting to talk about.

But free will is not that.

Why the Free Will Discussion Fails: The Loop Problem

And I want to give some reasons for why the free will discussion is a waste of time. The first one is what I just said: that it seems to be stuck in its own loop forever, and it seems to be like you might have arguments for both of them, but whichever—both of them seem to be self-contradictory, right?

If I do—just to be very clear, both of them, not only the determinism side is in a loop, also the free will side is in a loop, right? By this very simple way that you said: if everything is determined, then it was already determined if I agree. If I believe that I have free will and the problem of punishment are also things like that—like, am I responsible for myself? Do I deserve anything? Any reward or punishment? It also calls the *achnesha* [?]. It's all part of the same loop. Whoever determines, whatever determines that I sin, determines that the judge gives me a punishment. There's nothing to discuss.

The Problem on the Free Will Side

There's the problem the other way around. You'll notice how weird free will is now. What people think free will is. Because if there's free will, then I can also just choose to believe the arguments or not. And at every level, like, I don't know, everyone's just choosing everything.

Think—everyone is just deciding everything by some magic thing called free will. Then discussions don't make any sense. People really think this, by the way. People like, "I can't prove you anything because that would be going against your free will." That's why God doesn't prove that He exists. Anyone could—that would be going—that's real. Didn't hear this trickle-toed from anyone ever? Why didn't God leave any good proof for His existence anywhere? Because that would be going against free will.

As if you would have it. I don't know. I don't know. I'm just showing you something weird right now. Because the—because like argument—there's—it either arguments prove something to everyone, but you still have to learn them, or they—or you have free will to negate.

The Argument/Free Will Paradox

If the—if free will is the kind of thing that arguments are—know that if it's *yesh me'ayin* [creation from nothing], then it—this doesn't—this is still not a problem, right? What you think free will is, there's not a problem. You could have an argument and not believe it. Let's just move on.

People seem to think this: you can have an argument and not believe in it. But if it is *yesh ma'ayin*—if it's not *yesh me'ayin*, then it's not a problem at all. And there's still free choice somehow, although I have an argument, right?

So both sides—that that whole—that way of justifying—wait, but so that whole way of describing free will is based on this very weird—so that's just to finish. I'm—I'm not going to get into that. Maybe I'm wrong about this, the little thing that I got to know. But the important thing is that kind of free will seems to be an inner side you pick, stuck in a very big loop. And therefore it makes no difference. I don't even have a way to like start, open up the discussion.

The Lack of Philosophical Progress

And it seems to be—we can have like—we can like put down these two statements: "you have free will," "determinism," and talk about them endlessly, but no progress seems to be ever made. As, uh, by, um, what's his name—all right, let's run by, uh, uh, no, the lead that was *nifter* [passed away]—no, yeah. I said this is one of the frustrating things about philosophy. It's definitely not a—yes. So as Alistair MacIntyre and other people have noticed, that this is one of the kind of things in which philosophy makes no progress. You don't even seem to understand each other better. Like there's free will people, there's determinist people, and they're just having endless word games. And it seems to be—there seems to be something weird.

Okay.

Practical Irrelevance and the Rambam's Concern

Now, um, another thing—another very important thing, and this is the more important thing for me—is that it seems to me that—so we'll say—so it's practically relevant, right? For example, that I don't seem to be very interested in something he calls *bechirah*, which people think means free will. I'm not sure. I think sometimes it does, and if it doesn't, we'll have to get into that another time.

But the Rambam seems to be very worried. The Rambam in *Hilchos Teshuvah* [Laws of Repentance] goes on at length about *teshuvah* [repentance], about *bechirah*, and the same thing in *Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah* [Laws of the Foundations of the Torah] and *Perek Ches* [Chapter Eight, referring to *Shemonah Perakim*/Eight Chapters].

The Experiential Critique of Free Will and the Nature of Ethical Action

Challenging the Concept of Free Will

The Ambiguity in Rambam's Position

Student: So that means what? So that means it's not free will, it's a choice.

Instructor: Well, we can see. People read that in both ways. But now, Adam, for example, was interested ethically. He thought that free will is an important thing to believe for ethics to work, for teshuva [repentance] to work, right? I think he's trying to explain what a human is. I think he has, like, there are some people who seem to have this idea, like, maybe it gets back to what you were saying before, like, there's this special thing called free will. It's something, whatever, and it must be true and has different rules. It actually plays with different rules. It's like a belief. Like, you have a question that you can believe in miracles, but God, Hashem [God], how can you call it a miracle and believe it and all that? He doesn't do that. Like, why would it be different than anything else in the world? The realm is just, it's just a description of something that's important, because maybe there's, it's a good way to describe something. But it doesn't act any differently than anything else that exists.

The Psychology Studies Digression

Instructor: Okay, so let me...

Student: There have been studies that not believing in free will will reduce your discipline. But if free will doesn't exist, then that's awful. You just decided for you by something else, right?

Instructor: I get it. I mean, is there... By the way, are there such studies? I don't believe in any such studies anyway. Don't worry. It's like psychology studies means that some guy sent out a questionnaire to 30 bored college students. It doesn't. Nowadays, you just go on... I don't know. Does this still exist? Mechanical surveys. Is Mechanical Turk still a thing? You know Mechanical Turk? We used to do service online, pay a dollar. I don't know if it still works. Many of these services, Google had a service, and Amazon, you could buy a service. But it makes sense in two ways. I'm trying to explain, for instance, do you know this happiness service?

Student: Yeah, I get what you're saying. I get it.

Instructor: I don't say it's not true. Maybe it is true. I'm just saying a study is not helping me much. But I'm trying to understand how is this an important thing?

Why Didn't Rambam Count Free Will Among the Ikkarim?

Now, I want to define something very simple. The kind of free will that you get told, like some people have even asked on the Rambam [Maimonides], why didn't he count it as the 14th Ikkar [fundamental principle of faith] to believe in free will? It seems to me very important. It says explicitly in the Hilchos Teshuva [Laws of Repentance], it's an important principle and it's the foundation of the Torah. It's explicitly in the language of the Hilchos Teshuva, but he didn't count it as one of the things you must believe. And now it's treated as something you must believe, because obviously...

Now, why is it something I must believe? I have a rule, right? You know me. Anything that someone says you must believe, that means it's not true. That means he believes that it's not true, right? Because the truth doesn't have to be believed in. Remember, truth is the things that stay true even when you stop believing in them. I don't believe I'm going to get tired. I get tired anyways. So that's nature. That's reality. I don't believe I'll bump into a wall if I walk straight there. I will anyways. That's called truth. And when someone says you must believe in something, usually it means to say there's something I don't think that's as true as you think. Okay.

The Experiential Challenge: Has Anyone Ever Experienced Free Will?

Of course life is more complicated than this but that's my joke. Now therefore whenever people say you must believe in free will like what do you mean you don't believe in free will I'm like I don't know, look at yourself, do you have free will? Did you ever experience free will? Did anyone ever experience free will? I have never experienced free will.

Student: Yeah, just because I free will I can do it.

Instructor: Well, even if you do do that, it comes... This is something very weird. Nobody ever except... Where does this belief in free will, like what does it even mean? Okay, free will is like an ex-principle. God is just and therefore he couldn't have punished you if it were. No problem. You know something? How do I know? I don't even know how I want to know this. God, do we understand God? Just is like, maybe he doesn't punish you. Maybe you come to heaven and like, surprise, there was no bechira [free choice]. The Baal Shem Tov was right. Whoever, let's say, people say that. Like whoever, whoever is the guy that said that. Surprise, straight to Gan Eden [Paradise], then you go, or to Gehennom [Hell], because it's not free will. Who cares? Whatever. Like you were wasting your time worrying about being good, you know, like maybe, you know, how do we know any of like why do people so sure about things? But that's not it anyways.

Rav Dessler's Theory and Its Problems

The important thing is what? So okay, she believe in it, you don't believe in it, that's very cute, but like who did anyone ever experience it? Do you, like what would it mean for free will to actually exist? There was a Rebbe [rabbi/teacher] that was worried about this and it was looking and he realized that he has this free will at the 14th cigarette of the day, if he should smoke it or not, something like that. And then came up with this whole theory to base everything we call free will on that kind of choice. But I think that he was mistaken about even that. Because that's not what free will is.

Defining What Free Will Would Actually Mean

So let's go back, let's go back up to where we came from, right? So we established, everyone agrees that free will in the sense, let me just say it, in the sense of some kind of very abstract, very free, free in the sense of free floating, right? Disconnected kind of act of the will, like a magic thing that, not because, right? Not because of anything, and it's not free. Because and free will are the opposites, right? Causes are chains. Seder [order] is the chaining of the world, right? Seder is literally a chain of being. No, unchained, right? The free, like, just choosing to do this or that.

Now, I don't know any human being, if someone would have such moments, I would say that he's not... he's a sick person, he's not human. I think I've never had such a moment in my life and I wonder if anyone ever did. Seems to be like a very weird thing. Like okay, now I'm just choosing freely. I don't have any moments of choosing freely and this is what causes all people like do you have bechira?

Testing the Concept with Examples

Okay, so could you be a goy [non-Jew] now? Could you? Obviously not, or maybe theoretically. So we're back in theory world. Theoretically means I could say things not connected with any experience or any reality. But do you have free will to not come to my shiur [class/lecture] today? You could have been lazy and not came, but that wouldn't be an act of free will, that would just be laziness. That's not the same thing, right? That's already an excuse, some slightly less free will at least, right? You could have decided to come. That also wasn't free will, it was because of something, right? Because it's the best shiur in Lakewood, you have to come. You have to, right? Well, it doesn't force you, that's another question, but that's still not free, right?

It seems like nobody ever experiences free will in the way that people believe that it exists. Therefore, unless I'm a tzaddik [righteous person] of this list theory that that's what happens at one moment of choice... I think that that's even that is wrong, but I could talk about that separately, but in general it's not a normal human experience.

Free Will as an Empty Concept

Student: Yeah, because, we'll get to that. I'll try to get that in there. And if I don't, that's because I don't have free will.

Instructor: Now, you see how useless this free will is? It's just a joke that you can put anywhere. It's not even a good joke. Good jokes are the ones that you can put anywhere.

Student: Yeah, determinism is still a conflict of choice, right?

Instructor: Yeah, but that's a nice, weird puzzle for weird people to puzzle about. Who cares? I'm interested in things that are real.

Student: I think both of those sides have some degree of relevance.

Instructor: They're relevant, of course.

What We Actually Experience: Actions That Represent Who We Are

The Real Phenomenon vs. Free Will

Now, let's go back to where I came from. You remember that we came here, we arrived at this discussion of choice because of something very basic, which we all agree on, which we do experience. Unlike free will, which nobody ever experiences, this is something we do experience. We experience when we blame people, when we judge people, which, okay, you could say maybe we're just judging them based on our thing. But we also experience them in ourselves. We experience some of the things we do as being more pertaining to us, more coming from me, from what I am.

You'll notice that that's already something most people will not call free will. It's precisely the thing people call just your habit or something. But when you tell me some things you've done represent what you are, represent who you are, right? They come from who you are. Representation might not be the correct word, but some things, the things that are mostly me, right?

The Levaya Test: What Represents You

What do you want people to talk about by your levaya [funeral]? The things that represent what you are. You might be a stickler that does those things only once a week. Doesn't matter, still the things that you think represent what kind of human being you are. You know, be deluding yourself and so on, but that's what you think at least, right? And not only what's good, of course. You don't want to do the bad things, but ideally, none in your levaya or whatever. You still want to have a correct narrative of what you are. And that would not include... it would include a lot of the things that people say are not free will and will not include a lot of things that are free will, right?

The Ethical Inversion: What Actually Counts

So for example, right, when we said that, you'll notice that this is what's important for us ethically. I'm making a point based on every human being's experience in the free world, in the free will world, that's still which two minutes of light to sleep two minutes a night in the free will world is possible, possibly, possibly possible. But when I'm saying that I praise myself, when I talk about actions that represent myself, that come from me, that are really about me, that I'm trying to become a person like that, right? That's what ethics is about, aiming to become a good person. Though the actions that we, that include in that, the actions that count for that, are the ones that I have chosen, the ones that have something to do with what I am, based on what I think I should be or based on what I already am. They're precisely not the ones that I choose freely. They're almost the opposite. Do you understand what I'm saying? Because I'm drunk around...

Rav Dessler's Example Reconsidered

Like, things that I just... Just so, like, take even Rav Dessler's example, okay? Let's say I'm a guy that eats and drinks and smokes and things like that, and then one time I didn't drink. Everyone agrees that that's easy, in the sense of free will. If free will means easy, like Rav Dessler seems to have thought, then I agree with him. I have that experience too. Like, nothing is stopping me from drinking this seltzer or not drinking it. There's no major, I don't even have a big fight about it. Like, should I drink it, should I not drink it? That's already a complicated case. I just put it down to pick it up. No problem. That's free will. We get called that free will, but that's really something less than free will, something less than choice, right? It's not even choice.

If I sat down and I made myself a plan, I want to reduce my intake of seltzer, therefore I'm going to every night drink one...

Choice as Character: Challenging the "Moment of Free Will" Paradigm

The Inversion of Rav Dessler's Framework

Instructor: That's something that is about me. About me in the sense of what it talks about represents what I am, who I am. And that's precisely what Rav Dessler calls, unfortunately, not free will. Because that's just some habit that you have or some plan that you made or something like that. The act of me taking the cup or not taking the cup that follows from that—what makes that an important thing to me, a human thing to me, is precisely what comes before the moment that he called the moment of free choice. It's precisely the thing where I thought about it, I deliberated about it, I maybe even created myself a habit to do that way. I made myself into the person that does that, and now I'm doing it because I'm that kind of person, because I chose to be that kind of person. That's what choice means.

That's what the kind of things that count for telling you who you are, which is what we're interested in here now, are those things. Does this make sense? Understand what I'm saying?

What I'm trying to say is that if we forget about free will in the abstract sense—justifying God or anything—and we talk about why is it important to us ethically to talk about something like choice, we understand it very obviously. Because, for example, *ones* [coercion] is the biggest example. If someone just used you as a rack and threw you onto someone else, you didn't do that at all. You were functioning as a tool of someone else. That's not me. It doesn't say anything about me, right? It says something about that guy. It says nothing about me, right?

The Spectrum of Actions and Self-Representation

And then there are more complicated cases where I made an accident, and that represents something about me—more like that I'm not a careful person, if the accident was somewhat my fault. But it still doesn't represent me in the most important sense, right?

And then I can talk about something that I do just out of unthinking. Something like I just passed by, I just did it. I think that professor's example is really that. From what I did, in *halacha* [Jewish law] it's called something like *misasek* [an action performed without intention]—I just did it without thinking. People do things without thinking all day, right? I ate three candies, not two candies, not because I have a diet that says we eat three candies. That's not saying anything about me. Why is it not saying anything about me? Because I didn't choose it. It wasn't premeditated. It's not something about me.

In some sense you could say, "He every day eats three candies." Then it becomes something about me, because there's some habit they have, some character that eats a lot of candies. That's something about me. But if it's something done just carelessly, that's not something about me.

What Primarily Represents the Person

What's the primary case of something that says something about me, which is what we care about when we say "choice"? We don't care about some abstractions. We care about what represents what the person is, what is about, what comes from him. It's precisely those things which we've thought about or which we've trained ourselves to be.

The Olympics Analogy: Training vs. Momentary Choice

Someone, just in the physical case, someone who trains himself to be a good runner, and now he's a good runner, we praise him for that. Forget about my previous ethical problems, I'm just using this as an example because it's easy to see. We praise him for being a good runner, right? He wins the Olympics as our champion. And why does he win the Olympics? Obviously we don't say, "Well, you don't deserve it. You just trained well. Now when you're running, you're winning the race. That just follows automatically from you training well."

Well, that's exactly what we're looking for—someone that trains well. It's opposite someone that just takes drugs and doesn't train well. We say, "Yeah, that doesn't count. There was not enough human choice in that. You just took a drug. You used the mechanical way to get yourself to win. You cheated," right?

Why Cheating Disqualifies

Why is that cheating? What's wrong with cheating? Very nice. If the game would be about—we, everyone agrees for some reason that drugging at the games is bad. Unless someone already invented new Olympics which is just the drugging Olympics, but that would be a different Olympics. But the regular Olympics, the one where we reward a kind of human endurance, human training, right? And nobody says, "Well, he just trained that way." Yeah, that's the opposite.

Someone who didn't train—if someone comes and says, "How did you win?" "I used my free will." Even if that would be possible, which it's not, we would still disqualify him. Because we say, "Well, this is not a game of people that use their free will. This is a game of people that actually train and become the kind of person that are an athlete that can win at the Olympic Games."

The Contradiction with Modern Free Will Theory

So you understand something very simple and very obvious, although it's not obvious to you before you came to my class, that there's a case where the Aristotelian or normal people way of thinking is in precise contradiction to what the nowadays free will people say. Because really people say—*Nefesh HaChaim* [a major work of Jewish ethics] says this explicitly, and *Tanya* [foundational text of Chabad Chassidus] says it also actually, and he's also confused, and this is part of his whole community—what do you get *sechar* [reward] on, right?

What you get *sechar* on is, as we discussed last time we had a class, not at this *shiur* [lesson], about what goes on in heaven—that's really about human judgments of the good, right? What do you get *sechar* for? So there's many contemporary books that say you don't get *sechar* for things you do out of habit, because that's just a habit doing it. You only get *sechar* for the moment of overcoming. For the one more time that you learned that you were not habituated to, that's what you get *sechar* for. That is what the conclusion of the free will, the non-existent free will gives you. Or the *mi-pa'am echad* [from one time] theory—we won't get into that. It's connected, those two things. We'll get to chapter 6 and discuss that in that context.

The Aristotelian Response

What Aristotle, what a normal person says is precisely the opposite. What you get the most praise for, the most *kavod* [honor] for, is the thing that you already do, because that's what you are. You don't have to choose yourself every day. You don't have to free will yourself into—if there's even such a thing as free will, which there isn't in that sense.

The person we praise as being a great thinker or a great helper is precisely the person who has chosen. Of course, it starts from choice somewhere, and this gets us into the discussion of where we are. This is really why it's an introduction to where we are, which is how you get into, how you become a good person, how you get a good character. That doesn't happen by itself either.

But the person that we praise mostly is the person who does have that good character. And of course it's not just because he started once to have the good character. He gets chosen. The thing that we praise, the thing that gets *kavod*, is precisely to be a good person who is the kind of person that's chosen. That's the kind of actions that we ascribe mostly to the human *Shabbat* [unclear term—possibly *shayachut*/belonging], to the person doing that as the kind of human being that either represents who we are. That's what we give him a *hesped* [eulogy] for.

The Eulogy Argument

We don't give a *hesped*—you know, by the way, if it would be such a hassle, then most people would be very bad. You know, "Usually he was a good guy, but really we shouldn't talk about that. That was just his habit. The one time he really bothered someone, and therefore he goes to *Gehinnom* [hell] forever." That follows also. No, that doesn't work like that, right? Because that's a mistake. A mistake is less willing, right? Maybe he should have not made that mistake, so he'll get some *onesh* [punishment]. But that's just a mistake. We disqualify mistakes from what represents character, right?

Redefining Choice: A Long-Term Process

So this is the very important conclusion: Choice means this—choice just means what a person, what comes from you as the you, as the person. Choice is not a moment in time. Choice—I mean, the action from choices wasn't in something for a moment in time, but the choice is something that takes more than a second. Opposite: choice is something that has to—if it takes less than a second, then it's not choice. Then it's carelessness.

Of course, many actions take less than a second, and therefore they come automatically from your habit, or just carelessly, or from some *teva* [nature] that you had, and things like that. There's many reasons why people do actions that take a second. But choice is precisely the thing that it's a long-term process.

Now, how actually—since we don't live in long term, we have to get into how it actually works and all the levels, all the stages of that process. But when we praise someone and we say the things we praise are the things that were chosen, we don't mean the things that he sat now and chose, because that's not thinking. That something happens.

How Character Formation Actually Works

What does happen is that you decide to do a long-term thing. And you don't decide—it's not something, by the way, it's also not something inside. That's why the *ba'alei mussar* [practitioners of the Mussar ethical movement] are totally confused, for example, when they talk about *hachlatos* [resolutions] or *kabbalos* [acceptances], right? That's just not how human beings function. Nobody—I mean, again, this just goes back to my discussion last time about goals. Human beings don't function like, "I came by and kept around, they decided I'm gonna be good, and I became good." It's *lo avad* [it doesn't work]. You got to do something different than that.

Never works. How do I know it never works? There's so many books written about how to do it well. And this doesn't work.

What Actually Works: Creating Habits

What works? Creating habits. Those are things that work. How do you create habits? Yes, from very simple things that are easy. I didn't say that that's not how it works, but not from decisions. Decisions are, in the sense of the momentary sense, are totally overrated. They might sometimes happen in emergency cases, but they're not how things work.

The Primary Example: Choosing a Yeshiva

Choice means I chose to go to this yeshiva, and that's a primary example of choice. Would be something like, "I chose to go to this yeshiva, and therefore I became a *talmid chacham* [Torah scholar]." What we're praising is not the moment that he sat—he had maybe a lot of conversations deciding where to go and what to do, but then he did it, and then he did the whole thing out of choice. And that's why he's, you know, he's a student of that yeshiva. That's the kind of guy he is. That's a chosen thing.

It's not like, "Well, you went to yeshiva." "Yeah, but I chose to go to this yeshiva." It's not like someone forced you. It doesn't make a big difference, by the way. Even if your father forced you to go there, still that's who formed your character, and that's what you are. It's more of a chosen thing than the thing that you'd choose in a moment, and it just moves on.

Does that make sense? More helpful? That's my main—

Student Questions and Clarifications

Student: I'm just wondering why the word "choice." I don't know what's being added over things that you spoke on previously. That's the word "choice." I don't know what's adding.

Instructor: That's the actual—there were choices. There's more things to add, but this is the one thing. I'm saying—

Student: Yeah, I hear it. Well, we added the negation. I hear the distinction from this on what people consider free will. I hear that. This is just things we've discussed before.

Instructor: Okay, so you're not more convinced. There's more to talk about what choice is precisely, but I have to finish it within one hour.

Student: [Inaudible question about Rambam and the middle ground through training versus being born with natural dispositions]

The Regression Problem and the Need for Revelation

The Middle Ground and Character Formation

Student: Well, it somewhat is, but that's the practical way of how to get it. What we call chasing that. It's more complicated. I have to talk more about this. The inertia is what I don't understand. The way he says that, it's the opposite. It's not the thing that you always do, right? It's the thing that you do once.

Instructor: All right, I said the opposite. The thing that you always do is the things you choose. Right, so that is... Because you have more *kavana* [intention] on those things. A long-term *kavana*. Right. Not a momentary *kavana*.

Student: This is also inertia there's some inertia in that but what why is that a problem why can't it could work with the middle ground maybe says right a person can be born being totally giving person all the time right you could be born like that so he's always like that right well you people are born in extremes right yeah I don't know if that's that's what he said.

Instructor: No no I know what you mean I'm not sure I don't I don't think it's true that that's something I don't I I know you mean I'm not sure why yeah there's a different problem yeah I know it's the brown but I don't know yeah it is true that it's the middle ground the middle way requires being the kind of the kind of person I agree with that yeah it's It requires being a kind of person that knows how to act in a certain, relative to a certain area in a certain, the correct way. It's not something that you can do. I agree with that. Yeah. And what you said about being born, I don't agree with, but I agree with it. I mean, it's more complicated. That trajectory, right? Yeah. Which is a... I know what you mean. I know the language. I understand what you're talking about, but I'm not going to solve it by looking at the language. There's more problems about this. Yeah. Yeah.

The Beginning of Habit Formation

Student: But to embark on such a habit-forming process or something like that, right? How does that begin?

Instructor: Yeah, it must also begin by the same kind of deliberation. We have to talk more, like Ali says, Lozi is a guy, whatever you want to call him, about precisely what choice is. What I gave you was just why character is what we call choice. More of what we call choice than the momentary kind of choice that people identify with free will. That is very important. I think it's a clarification that I didn't know before I made this share, so I don't know how you would have known it. Maybe you did. Because I was implied in other ones. That's the whole use of it. That choice, what makes, is more, character is closer to choice than the momentary choice that people identify with free will. And that's the kind of choice that actually exists.

And if you want to get into a bunch of things like how do we actually gain character, how do we actually get a certain character, we're exactly the choice in that. That's something we have to clarify more about the process of it. Also things that we know already, but we can clarify them more. And we're exactly what we call choice, and Aristotle distinguishes between choice and wish and will and a whole bunch of other things, opinion. All these things are different.

Student: I understand this distinction of choice as being something that represents your humanity but even embarking on that that's still where I'm stuck and it's where I'm stuck not even just in thought but even in action there's all sorts of things I think that we want to do that I'd like to do or that I think I'd like to do I'd pretend I'd like to do you wish to be that way but you don't do want right right I don't have those habits it's habits that I want to have right alright those are wishes right maybe what's between me and that is knowing but even even to decide to know is not to decide to know even just to begin knowing seems to be its own choice.

Instructor: Yeah.

Student: So has it was the same kind of regression problem.

The Circular Nature of Character Development

Instructor: Yeah there's a regression problem in the whole theory and he's very happy with it like it's a circular and that's how it's supposed to be you choose because of what you are and what you are because of the actions that makes you what you are and there's a whole cycle and therefore like one of the conclusions here is that training that education is what determines what kind of person you'll be and there's no way out of that.

Aristotle quotes Plato like Plato and Aristotle both say things like this that the conclusion from this is that there's no fix for someone who had a bad education, or at least no very good fix, because that's where things start.

Now, who was the first guy? That's a good question. How did your great-great-great-great-great-grandfather start his good or bad education?

The Argument for Prophecy and Revelation

Instructor: That's why we need prophecy. This is for Schneir Berton to explain. Why do we need prophecy? To start the cycle of, like, how did anyone decide to be a good person? This is a true argument for *Torah min HaShamayim* [Torah from Heaven]. I'm not serious. I'm serious about this, by the way.

Rav Saadia Gaon's Position

Instructor: Rav Saadia kind of says it's a jump start well no Rav Saadia has no Rav Saadia says I'm making it even worse Rav Saadia says that we could have arrived at the truth because Rav Saadia is unlike the Rambam for example if this Rambam disagrees with him and Rav Saadia believes in some kind of moral intuition which just shows us what the good is.

Rambam's Disagreement

Instructor: It's not clear Aristotle or the Rambam believe in that they believe that there might be ways to find out truth but there are probably less ways to find out the good. And therefore, we need prophecy. So, not like prophecy is the use, that's like, which says this is what prophecy is useful for. What I was saying is that that's what it's needed for.

This is still not right. You don't have to have the word prophecy, some kind of like, jump, like, beginning point of revelation.

Student: Well, if prophecy is part of the nature, then it works. It works better.

Instructor: It doesn't matter. There still needs to be some beginning point. If we agree that our beginning point is usually our education, and then this has to go back to the first educator and that and this is why just forget about the argument this is why cultures have stories of the first lawgiver every culture has that yeah so long give lost Athens and Moses gave a loss to the Jews and some other guy gave the loss to the I don't know to the Romans whatever I forgot his name and there and so on right and why do we say this because we believe that it's at least very hard it stopped record it's it's at least very hard for a human being to discover the good. It needs to start somewhere. You need to be good already to get discovered. Yeah, right.

For truth, there might be ways out, but for good, it seems very difficult. Unless you're a Socratic, that's at least that, that you could discover the good by inquiry somehow.

The Question of Conscience and Moral Knowledge

Student: That's back to the question. Is conscience a purely...

Instructor: I just said this.

Student: Or is it somewhat reliable?

Instructor: Yeah, the Rambam is a lot more on the side that it's conditioned. You need education to go this way, even though you can figure out... But this is not the question problem that you have. This is just random. The question problem, no, but it solves a separate study that we had about the ability to know the good from knowing what something is and the requirements for moral education as a prerequisite for that.

Student: Well, because you don't know what you are, either.

Instructor: Right, but I'm saying if I would understand the truth of what I am, then I would know the good, right? The problem is for me to know the truth of what I am I need to be I need to start this cycle somewhere which requires education right well maybe no this is that's a problem what you're raising is a problem I think.

Student: In other words if this solves the problem if there's a good argument.

Instructor: No if there's a really good argument for ethics yeah if teleology whatever it would be a really good argument then you can make bad people good by the argument this is what Socrates believes this is the question if if the good can can be taught but seems to be very it seems like all that talk about the need for education is saying that this is not really correct at least not a practice you might need to be good in order to in order to be taught.

Student: No because the poet everyone could recognize arguments even the slave in the in the in the amino everyone could recognize arguments the statement with all geometry thing.

Instructor: Well that's not that's an argument for what your soul already has. So it's opposite. But I mean, does that mean that *Mitzvot She'asei Chumachayev* [rational commandments] implies that you don't need it?

Mitzvot Sichliyot: Rav Saadia vs. Rambam

Instructor: That's what Rav Saadia holds. Rav Saadia holds that. Rambam doesn't agree. Yeah?

Student: Rambam doesn't use that language?

Instructor: No. Who else uses this language? Rav Saadia, sorry, Rambam. Very common phrase, no? *Mitzvot She'asei*, it's Rav Saadia. Rav Saadia came up with it. And Rambam explicitly criticized him for this. And because, yeah.

Student: Who? The mayor? Where is he?

Instructor: Also here. Not in this chapter and later this is only the fourth chapter he explicitly criticizes him for this he said the reason for his where's the full one the reason for his criticism is because he thinks that the things that the society calls are not they're something of which there's no cycle really they're good they're about the good and many times works with the assumption.

Student: A political good, meaning?

Instructor: Yeah, a political good is not knowable and not knowable in the same way as, it's not provable in the same way as like science and philosophy. It's not a demonstration. Because even not killing and so on, like basic morals, are not really, according to the Rambam, are not strictly demonstrable. There's no demonstration for that. This is something that Aristotle says sometimes also and it contradicts the point where there are arguments like like the function argument, and things like that. And this is a problem. OK, anyways, I've just...

The Problem of Choice in Character Development: Shemona Perakim Chapter 8

Opening Remarks: The Need for Structure in Hasidic Gatherings

Instructor:

Obviously I like these Hasidic masses very much, but I’m worried that you’re not going to come if it’s only a Hasidic mass. Like, you have to have a *shiur* [shiur: formal Torah lesson], so you can *shmues* [shmues: informal Torah discussion/conversation] before the *shiur*, after the *shiur*. If there’s no *shiur*, then nobody’s going to show up to tell their stories. So you have to say a *shtickl shiur* [shtickl shiur: a little piece of Torah learning], and then you can *shmues* afterwards. It’s like that.

So I say, yeah, this is his *chumash* [chumash: the Five Books of Moses], nothing with me. Okay.

Introduction: Continuing Shemona Perakim and the Question of Choice

Instructor:

The story is like this. We’re starting *Shemona Perakim* [Shemona Perakim: Maimonides’ “Eight Chapters,” introduction to his commentary on Pirkei Avot] and *Perek Dalet* [Perek Dalet: Chapter Four]. Last week or the last two weeks, we’re discussing this thing, interesting thing called choice, sometimes known in Jewish language as *Bechira* [Bechira: free will/choice].

Now, some people thought that there’s no *shaychus* [shaychus: connection/relevance], but I’ll explain the *shaychus*. And then, according to that, I’ll explain some things about this.

The Framework: Character Virtues and Correct Actions

Instructor:

The *inyan* [inyan: matter/topic] is like this. We’re trying to understand and also hope that this understanding will help us somehow in reality to see if it does. But we’re trying to understand this framework, the framework of becoming a good person, known as the training of character virtues of *middos* [middos: character traits], which are supposed to lead to the correct actions based on them being their intermediate virtues, intermediate actions, and so on.

Now, when you think about this, there’s several questions, at least two questions, practical questions, not theoretical questions, but practical questions that go under the title of choice. What do I mean?

First Question: Free Will — A Theological Problem (Not Our Focus)

The Standard Free Will Problem

Instructor:

There’s one question of choice, which we discussed last week, the question of free will, or as I call it, free floating will, which is like a theological, theoretical question, which is nothing to do specifically with this framework of good *middos*, right?

It’s a question on any system that claims to give you the human good, or to explain what is good, and sometimes specifically exhortations, asking you to be good, and promising reward and punishment for being good, for being good or bad. People understand that to be contingent on some kind of free will, or really we should say some kind of responsibility existing between a person and his activities and his good or bad activities, because otherwise we say it’s not his fault, it’s not his responsibility, and therefore there should be no reward and punishment. But besides for that, there should also be no thing called ethics, right? There should be no exhortation or call to being better, because either I’m good or bad, there’s nothing that’s being there.

Student:

Yes, it’s very good.

Why This Problem is “Dumb”

Instructor:

So that’s what people usually think. And in some sense, chapter 8 in our book talks about that problem. Of course, if you think that this is a question, a theoretical question about free, extreme free will, I call it, or free-floating will versus contrary to determinism, which says that nothing makes a difference, that is a very dumb problem to have, like you say, because maybe that’s all part of it. And in any case, whoever is giving the exhortation doesn’t have free will to change that either. So it doesn’t seem to make any difference.

Also, on the other hand, even if you do have free will, it seems like that doesn’t actually solve the problem, because that kind of free will says that human actions, or at least some of them, the ones that are relevant, because the ones that are relevant are the ones that are said to have free will, are actions that have no reason, because once there’s a reason, then that’s not free will.

And therefore, it seems to me that you can’t really be a good person either. You can just choose things that happen to somehow randomly be good, because a good person, in our sense at least, is someone that makes his goodness make sense, or another more pertinent thing: you can’t give exhortations to becoming good, because that would be giving causes, and if you believe in free will as some kind of absolute thing, then you can’t tell anyone to be good and make them being good by telling them, because what makes them good must be their free choice. Otherwise you took away free will, and then it would be a bad thing for there to be *shaychus* [shaychus: connection/relevance] to the extent that it works. So if that doesn’t work, then it’s useless.

What Rambam May Actually Be Discussing

Instructor:

So that whole discussion we went through this last week and also our class yesterday, and also, I guess, a little in the second half of the class, that discussion is not relevant to us at least. It seems to be important, and we’ll get to chapter 8, we’ll try to figure out why the Rambam really thinks that it is a little bit important. I think the Rambam is not really discussing free will versus determinism, he’s discussing some kind of fatalism, some kind of astrological theories. He’s discussing something different, but I can’t talk about that right now because I don’t know enough.

Second Question: Choice Regarding Character — The Relevant Problem

Why This Question Arises From Our Framework

Instructor:

Well, something is relevant right now and right here. This is more important. And there’s two questions primarily that are very important right now. In other words, a question that is precisely because of the way that we explained what the human kinds of goods are.

We explained that the human kinds of what is a good person, a good human being, is someone who has something we call good *middos* [middos: character traits], but there’s something internal. We call it something like he likes or loves or enjoys doing the good actions, which means the intermediate actions. And this is a stable temperament in him, a stable kind of, what do we call it, like disposition, a stable wanting, it doesn’t change or something stable in him. In other words, it’s almost something that causes him always to act that way, or at least most of the time, otherwise it’s not a *middah* [middah: character trait], otherwise it’s just like some random wish or something.

And that is what being a good person consists of. It’s very important to understand that although actions are in some sense primary in the understanding of this, because what makes the *middah* good is if it leads to correct actions, but what actions is not what the goodness of the human being consists of. What the goodness of human being consists of is this more internal thing that we call having good *middos*, or having good character traits or virtues. Those are virtues. Virtues are excellences of the part of the soul that does these kind of actions. Okay? Does that make sense?

Now, because of this exact understanding of what a good human being is, which not everyone shares, precisely because of that, we have some questions of choice. Okay?

Two Connected Questions

Instructor:

And there’s really two questions. And I think they’re somewhat connected one to the other. But there’s two questions. One is a simple practical question, which is the *Tzemach Tzedek* [Tzemach Tzedek: Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneersohn of Lubavitch, 1789-1866] that we quoted, seems to have to do with it, and the other is a deeper question which goes to the structure of what this thing that we call having good *middos* is even.

The Practical Problem: Control Over What We Like

Instructor:

The first question is that it seems to people often that we don’t have enough control, or easy enough control at least, over what we are in this sense, in the sense of what we like. Many people will say something like this. You can tell me if you think I’m wrong. Many people say something like this.

If you come to Yeshiva and you say to both sides, all of you have to… We want to be good people, right? If you come to Yeshiva, you become better people. Listen to how you’re going to do it. You’re going to read three *blatt Gemara* [blatt Gemara: pages of Talmud] every day and you’re going to come to all the *sedarim* [sedarim: learning sessions] and you’re going to *daven* [daven: pray] three times a day and all these things you’re going to do. People say, okay, we’ll try. Those seem simple.

It seems like you can obviously everyone who this demand is addressed to can do those things. It’s not impossible for most people to learn that amount. It’s not impossible for anyone to come to *shul* [shul: synagogue] three times a day. It’s not impossible to do all these *mitzvos* [mitzvos: commandments]. It’s possible. And of course if you believe it’s impossible because you believe in some theory of deterministic theory then you have a problem maybe, probably not even not really, but it’s possible in our experience. It’s possible we decide to do things like that, I know how to become better. Simple, right?

If I come and tell you, no, this is not enough. That’s all very nice. Maybe you should do it, but not only because of that. A good person is someone who likes to learn. Learning is not a good example. I’m just saying it because everyone here wants to achieve and knows what I’m talking about. Okay? And someone being good is not someone who learns. It’s not enough to learn, you have to like it. That’s what having a *middah* consists of. It’s not enough to be good to your friends, not enough to be nice to your *chaveirim* [chaveirim: friends/companions]. You have to also be the kind of person who is good to his *chaveirim*, which means liking it.

Then people right away say, what? How am I going to do that? How do you become a kind of person? People say things like, I was born this way, or even if you would agree that you’re not stuck with what you were born, people say, okay, but it seems at least very hard. It seems to be weird to talk about choice or free choice in this kind of sense. It’s like you have free choice. It’s a very complicated process. Maybe it’s not even guaranteed to work. It seems to be a very difficult thing.

Why This Is Harder Than “Mitzvot on Feelings”

Instructor:

Even more, I’ll just have to make it clear. This is even more difficult than if I would say people have a problem. How could there be a *mitzvah* [mitzvah: commandment] on feelings, right? You should love God. You should love your neighbor. You should not hate him in your heart. Things like that. People say, what do you mean? What if I do? That’s a small problem relative to this problem. Because you could have access. You could. You have control of your heart a little more than you think, probably.

And anyways, the simple reading of these kind of *mitzvos* is something like, don’t hate them in your heart. You know what it means? It means don’t be the kind of person who smiles to people, but really plans their demise, plans how to denigrate them, to bring them under. That’s what to bring them down, that’s what this is, who that means. Now do you have control over that? Yeah, you do, because I’m like I say, talk about planning. If I talk about feeling in some feeling sense, and so that’s what it means.

Part 2: Addressing Objections and Clarifying the Problem

Addressing the “Mitzvos of the Heart” Objection

The Case of “Lo Tisna B’Lvavecha” (Do Not Hate in Your Heart)

Instructor: Things like that. People say, what do you mean? What if I do? That’s a small problem relative to this problem, right? Because you could have access, you could, you have control of your heart a little more than you think, probably. And anyways, the simple reading of these kinds of mitzvos [commandments] is something like, don’t hate him in your heart, you know, right? You know what it means? It means don’t be the kind of person who smiles to people, but really plans their demise, plans how to integrate them, how you say that in Yiddish, to bury them, to bring them under. That’s what, to bring them down, that’s what l’shech l’zach means.

Now, do you have control over that? Yeah, you do. Like I say, I’m talking about planning, I’m not talking about feeling in some feeling sense. Why do you say l’shech l’zach? That’s what it means, that’s one solution. That’s one solution to the problem. But what it means is that that’s one solution, one solution for that kind of problem. That’s not only what it means. It’s not if you’re selling the value, it doesn’t make it better really. That’s not the point. That’s just one solution. But I’m not saying a shira [song/solution]. I’m just trying to show you that’s actually a simple thing relatively.

The same thing that really means something like, don’t hate God, but come to Shul anyways. Anyways. Understand? But, now I’m demanding something a lot more than that.

Student: Well, it’s kind of the same thing. It leads to it, right? So, it says, and don’t be so nice to the fifth either, right?

Instructor: Yeah, yeah, that’s what I’m saying. It’s not like about getting you to here. It immediately follows up into what we’re proposing, right?

Student: Which is?

Instructor: That you should like to be good to them.

Student: Not really, no. Because it’s talking about a specific kind of problem where people are hypocrites.

Why This Doesn’t Solve the Main Problem

Instructor: He’s not talking about the kind of problem that we have.

Student: How would you address this hypocrite? Not by changing what he’s doing to them?

Instructor: No, like you said, there might be ways to change it. Or just think, don’t be that.

Student: How do you change it?

Instructor: It’s not here to do discussions. But it’s not making a demand on what kind of person you are. That’s not what it’s about. If I give you a demand, you should be that kind of person, which, like you said, it’s a long-term thing. You can’t have a middah [character trait] once. You can’t have a middah one day. It has to be, you have to become, be this kind of person and who loves the right things and hates the right things and is angry in the right amount and things like that for the right reasons and the right times.

And all of that, that seems to be a more, we could say, internal or even less controllable in the sense that we usually think of control. I have control over my hand, but do I have control over what I am, over the type of guy I am? That sounds extreme. Make sense, my question?

The Practical and Theoretical Questions

The Practical Question: How Does One Become Virtuous?

Instructor: And this is why this concept of tichinamidus [character development] seems to at least need some explanation of how it’s going to happen. And even now, this is one thing in the explanation, right? How it’s going to happen, practically. So that’s why I said there’s a practical question. Of course, there’s a practical answer. You people already know what the practical answer is.

But it also then needs a somewhat theoretical explanation of how, by that whole practical process, by we can tell you, okay, I’ll tell you, you have a problem, how you become this kind of guy, right? If I tell you it’s not enough to learn, you have to be a masmid [diligent learner]. Okay, how do you become a masmid? Secret answer. The answer is by learning. You learn enough until you become a masmid. And then you won’t have to learn anymore. You’ll just learn it somewhat, so to speak, automatically, which is another problem that we’ll see, right? But let’s talk first about the first thing, because it’s not automatic. If it’s automatic, it’s a problem.

The Theoretical Problem: The Paradox of Automatic Virtue

Instructor: All right, let’s say even we say this, now there’s still a problem, because it still seems like being the kind of person who likes to learn and therefore learning is not something by choice. You could say, okay, I made the choice to learn every day for five minutes and then I became the kind of guy who likes to learn five minutes every day. Okay, so I might you might say something like you deserve schar [reward] or I deserve praise or I am being a good person right this is really what I’m saying I’m being a good person by doing those like those actions but in what way am I being a good person and everyone understands that being a good person has a condition which is choice because anything this we went through last week very clearly right anything that is forced or even anything that’s not by choice even if it’s not forced, doesn’t count towards being a good person.

So, one necessary condition of something being a good action, something being good as a good person, is that it’s by choice. And if you have an understanding of a good person, which is something very far from what we usually call things that are by choice, like atomic actions, which seems to be where choice and will exist, then it seems to be hard to explain why is that even good. Why is that where we place the goodness of a human being?

The Genetic Analogy

Student: Just to clarify, are you trying to say that basically there’s no difference if it’s like a genetic thing, or you practiced until you got there? Ultimately, at this point, you’re just a guide, so it’s not something that’s of your choice.

Instructor: Yeah, it wouldn’t be that interesting. It wouldn’t be any different at this point. Yeah, you would have the same kind of problem. In other words, if you understand that the guy that already learns is doing it automatically, not by choice, and like you’re saying it’s so analogous to someone that would be born that way, maybe he gets credit for yesterday but for today he doesn’t get any credit. And that seems weird because we just told you our whole story was that this is the state of being the kind of good person and therefore doing good things is the good state, is the ideal state, not the state of getting to there, right? Because that would prioritize being a someone who self-control person, which the first stage is basically, over a virtuous person, which we’re not claiming.

What We Actually Praise

Normal Intuitions About Virtue

Student: I think that’s where your whole thing about people who have much of an option to be the ideal, they obviously respect people who, that’s not what they’re doing.

Instructor: Who are not much of an option?

Student: Yeah, that’s not what they’re doing. They enjoy learning, let’s say, for example.

Instructor: Yeah. Obviously, they’re an ideal person. They’re under no illusion that he’s fighting himself.

Student: I’m not sure. People claim, again, you’re asking about under illusion. The person sleeps up to the wee hours of the night and pushes until it’s a matter of…

Instructor: Yeah, our theory is that, I agree with you, that this thought that being a good person consists of liking the good is what normal people think. But if you think of, I don’t think anyone, I don’t really think anyone disagrees with that, that that’s what everyone thinks. We also praise people for liking the right things. Not only for doing the right things, like the story of Moshe being a ganav [thief], right? We don’t really believe in that story. Everyone believes that it’s better to be a good person than to be a bad person who does good things.

An Illustrative Anecdote

Student: I have a good story that brings up the Shikl Stira [apparent contradiction] that Shulberman walked into this marriage on this long summer Shabbos and said don’t look at his schar [reward], it’s like why not, right, that’s the question.

Restating the Core Problem

Instructor: So now, but you understand my question about choice. There’s both a practical question of like, what do you mean when you tell me that this is what I have to be, this is exactly the thing that I have less direct control all over, that’s one question. And even if you like answer the question by giving me the practical recipe which you all know, it still needs to be explained why precisely the second stage is the one we praise and not the first stage, right?

And if you understand that one important ingredient of praise of what a good person is, that is by choice, right? That’s like necessary. If something is not by choice, then it’s not interesting, ethically. That’s the question. That is a very good question. Make sense? It’s a good question.

Student: Is it a good question?

Instructor: I think it’s a good question. So, you must have asked a good question. Very good.

Methodological Turn: What Is Choice?

Reframing the Question

Instructor: So, I think that in order to answer this question, we need to ask a different question, which is, what is this choice thing even? What are we looking for when we’re looking for something that is by choice? If we understand very clearly what is this thing that we’re looking for, that we’re looking for choice, which is the thing that makes human activities ethically relevant or praiseable and damnable you know then we’ll understand why it will understand in a way that makes this kind of being a more choice like more chosen and another kind of being then will understand what we’re talking about that makes sense the guy that likes to do what what does he like you to do it as a product of choice.

Student: Yes.

Rejecting a Proposed Answer: The Avos and the Yetzer Hara

Instructor: So we could we could try to do with exactly this I’ll try we try to do exactly this and talk a little bit about this and maybe we won’t entirely finish this all the way to the end and hardly solve this question there might be simple things to solve this question I want to…

Student: Maybe, I don’t know. I don’t know anything about the Avos [Patriarchs]. I’m trying to talk about the thing. I don’t know.

Instructor: No, I don’t know. I don’t know.

Student: That the Avos weren’t… They didn’t have the Yetzer Hara [evil inclination].

Instructor: No.

Student: So the more you get the schar [reward], the more you get the Yetzer Hara.

Instructor: And what is the Yetzer Hara?

Student: The Yetzer Hara said that they got to such a stage.

Instructor: Okay.

Student: That they worked themselves up to such a place that they didn’t have the Yetzer Hara.

Instructor: I don’t think that’s the answer. I’m not happy with that answer. I’ll just explain to you why that’s not a good answer. It might be the same problem, but I’ll just explain to you why that answer is not a complete answer.

Beginning the Analysis: What Is Choice?

The Distinction Between Will and Compulsion

Instructor: So I need to try to think what this thing that we call choice is. Very important discussion. I’m going to just repeat the whole stupid toirah [teaching] from Avani Aristotle that tries to explain what choice is, or first explain what it’s not. Then maybe we’ll be able to get to this.

Now, number one is like this, there’s something called will, like, I think this maps very well to what we call Ratzon [will] versus Ones [compulsion] in Halakha [Jewish law].

Part 3: The Conditions for Ethical Choice

The Distinction Between Will (Ratzon) and Force/Ignorance (Ones/Shogeg)

Instructor: So I need to try to think what this thing that we call choice is, okay? Very important discussion. I’m going to just repeat the whole stupid toilet from Avani and Aristotle that tries to explain what choice is, or first explain what it’s not, and then maybe we’ll be able to get to this.

Now number one is like this, there’s something called will, like I think this maps very well what we call ratzon [will/desire] versus ones [force/compulsion] in halacha [Jewish law]. That is one kind of thing. Everyone understands that something that’s by ones, or even b’shogeg [through inadvertence/ignorance], which is some sort of a species of ones in this context, is not morally relevant, not ethically relevant.

What is the opposite of ratzon? Something that either done by force, done by force meaning something that was done to you by someone else, right? Instead of you doing it. This is an important definition. There’s differences that this definition makes that I’m not going to get into. But some, for example, like the extreme example, if someone pushed someone through you onto someone else and hurt them, you say, I didn’t do it at all. Someone did it with me, right? That’s by force. There’s more complicated cases where you’re like, somewhat you did a part of it and the other person did a different part. Okay, that’s called force. That’s not relevant.

There’s another kind of non-will which is called ignorance, right? That’s what we call shogeg usually in halacha. The difference between shogeg and ones is basically the difference between force and ignorance, right? Two ways of how you’re not responsible because you’re lacking will. It’s not a willing action, right?

Shogeg means either I didn’t know what this thing is, right? If I threw a rock at someone, I didn’t know that it’s metal and it’s going to kill him. That’s one kind of shogeg. Another kind of shogeg is I didn’t know the law, which Aristotle doesn’t think is a good shogeg ever, ever, where I forgot.

Student: What?

Instructor: It holds like this, right.

Student: It’s not clear that halacha disagrees.

Instructor: It’s shinkastin with Elizabeth, so we have to think of when that applies. Or, if I didn’t know that it’s the Shabbos [the Sabbath], things like that, those are another kind of shogeg.

Student: Yeah, but there’s some kind of responsibility there, because you have to bring a chatas [sin offering], so obviously there’s some type of responsibility.

Instructor: Very good, very good. But in some, it depends. That’s why there’s shogeg. If you should have known, the shogeg in which you’re responsible is when you have a matter of responsibility where you could have known. Whenever you couldn’t have known, that’s called literally an ones.

All the shogeg that are chayav chatos [obligated in a sin offering] are the ones where you should have known. You should have been more careful. Like, there’s two kinds of shogeg. There’s a shogeg where you didn’t know, and there’s also a shogeg where it’s like you didn’t… It’s also a kind of didn’t know, but something like you didn’t calculate… You forgot that it’s Shabbos.

Student: Right.

Instructor: You should have not forgot that it’s Shabbos. You did not forget that it’s Shabbos. Therefore, if it’s a case where you couldn’t… There was absolutely no way that you’re not considered a shogeg, you could be even found an ones.

I’m just telling you basic definitions to move on from this. Now, there’s something very… That’s the t’nai [condition] of ratzon, the t’nai of being willing. We understand this, okay? The law, for example, is very interested in this definition. Halacha is interested in this one.

The Central Thesis: Choice Requires More Than Will

Now, something very important. Choice is something more than willing. Something very interesting. When we say… When we say… Now, you understand? Something very important. When we say, in order for an action or a kind of thing a person is, which we’re trying to get to, is to be ethically relevant, we need choice. We have to understand that what we mean is something more than being willing versus being an ones.

Two Proofs That Will Alone is Insufficient

What is my ra’ayah [proof]? I have two ra’ayahs. Okay? One is a katan [minor/child] and the second is a mitasek [one who acts without deliberation]. These are our exact ra’ayahs also. I just gave it to you in Hebrew. Okay?

Proof One: The Case of Children

A katan has, obviously, does things willingly. I’m not talking about l’egiyah l’khenach [passive movement] or something like that with a one-year-old baby. Anyone that has children, they obviously do things willingly. There is no question about that. But no system of law punishes children up to a certain age. We can argue on the limits of this. But everyone understands that children, what they do, don’t count legally, don’t count ethically in some sense.

Proof Two: The Case of Mitasek

Another example is something called mitasek.

Student: Why is that?

Instructor: Wait, I’ll try to explain. I’m just showing you that will is not enough. When we say choice we mean something beyond will. It’s not the same thing.

Another example.

Student: Yeah, but I can give you an example of a child, right, that sticks his hand in the oven, but that comes from ignorance.

Instructor: Exactly.

Student: The second time.

Instructor: Exactly, exactly. But when a child does a good or a bad thing, he chose to do it in the sense of having will. You can’t say he was forced. Nobody thinks that children are forced. Even animals, by the way, probably do things willingly in that sense. At least Aristotle thinks so. Aristotle, animals can do or not do things. Nobody is forcing them to do many of the things they do so they have will yes of course they do and then like again a dog not a I don’t know some bugs.

Student: How do they have will? It’s ignorance.

Instructor: They don’t need ignorance. They’re not ignorant. They know a dog knows where he’s going and he decides to go there or not there. Not ignorant of the things that are relevant to him. He might be ignorant in the moral sense because he doesn’t know there’s something as law, but that would be, that’s another level ignorance. I’m talking ignorance in the sense of I don’t, usually that’s the main like primary example of ignorance here is that you don’t know what you’re doing. You don’t know the object or you don’t know like, I didn’t know that my car was on when I ate, something like that, right? And dogs have that.

Okay, so children or animals have will. And it’s not enough.

Another thing which is also easy to see is something, I think something we call halacha mitasek, doing things in some kind of, the translators call it the spur of the moment things. Reflexive is not a good definition for that I think. So it’s different. Something is something I just I don’t know I just moved that cup there. I didn’t choose to do it.

The Chandelier Example: Clarifying the Distinction

I’ll give you my example, good sometimes better examples but then it gets complicated. I’m trying to try to get to the intuition here. If I, if you come into this room because I spent a few hours trying to figure out what a good example to clarify this. If you go this room and you ask me, why is there this chandelier in it? I will tell you I chose it. If you come and ask me, why is that paper vertically and not horizontally? If I tell you I chose it, that sounds very weird. I put it there, nobody forced me to put it there in that way. I was the one that put it in that exact way. But me telling you that I chose it would sound weird. Why would it sound weird? It’s missing something. This word choice means something beyond.

Student: Intentionality?

Instructor: Some kind of intentionality.

Student: Some kind of, I could tell you a few things.

Student: For a purpose.

Instructor: Some kind of purpose. Missing some reason. Like, in other words, choice means a reason. Choice means a reason. There’s a reason I chose this, because I thought it will match the rest of the room. There’s the brown and the white and whatever. Something. And it wasn’t too expensive or too cheap. I could give you an account. I can give you a theory.

Not every choice might be that elaborate. But there’s some, I could give you at least three words of what this would mean. At least, like you said, there’s an intention and means something. It’s towards something. There’s a goal. I need to have a nice room. Therefore, I put this chandelier. There was some kind of deliberation in it. Like, I looked at the 30 different chandeliers that have it on people and I chose the nicest one or whatever. And there is some kind of reasoning in it, right? Why did I choose this? It makes sense. I might be wrong. It’s not something like an intellectual thing. It’s different than…

It’s different than, like, I give you a proof, why do you believe the drama meant this? I’ll give you a proof. I can’t give you a proof for why I chose it. Proof is the wrong category, or argument in the intellectual philosophical sense is the wrong argument. But reasons are correct. There is a reason. And I might have even discussed it with other people. Afterwards, I made a choice. There’s, like, a consultation going on. I asked my wife, what do you think? I asked this guy, what do you think? There is something going on.

Versus when you ask me, why is that paper that way? I can’t blame anyone else. Like in some sense legally if there’d been a violent doing that I’ll say I don’t know I wasn’t thinking.

Student: Well why aren’t you thinking?

Instructor: That wouldn’t, it wouldn’t absolve me from doing some, it would be good and bad in the legal sense probably sometimes it would, right? But we have the difference between like premeditated things and non-premeditated things. But so maybe it would make it like it turn into second-degree for some things for some. Something makes a difference, but it’s definitely not choice.

Why Choice Matters for Ethical Evaluation

In other words, now you can see something very simple already from this example. Why would this be more relevant to the kind of morality I care about? I’m trying to discuss, to explain to you. It would be more relevant precisely because we say that a good person and good activities is not good. We say something interesting, right?

We say something that there could be the same action that can be good, done by a good person, and the bad person can do good things and it doesn’t make him good, right? The right, the self-controlled person, the person who’s under self-control and the good person both do the exact same things. Like the beinoni [intermediate person] and the tzaddik [righteous person] in the Tanya [foundational Chabad text], they both do the exact same actions. That’s just that I don’t know why you’re so confused about explaining it. And they both do the same exact thing but one is a good person and the other one is a person who’s doing good activities. He’s acting as if he’s a good person but he’s not a good person, right?

Now what we mean to say, what do we mean to say about that? That there’s something in the way, there might be also different, but there’s something in which when the good person does it it’s expressive of the kind of person he is. When the bad person does it it’s not expressive of what it is. So this is different. He did it by self-control not by what he is, right? The reason, in other words there’s different reasons for doing it. When a bad person does a good thing he’s doing it because he thinks that it’s good and there’s self-control and so on. When a good person does it, it’s expressive of what he is already, right? Because I’m the kind of person that does these kinds of things.

Choice as Revelatory of Character

What am I telling you here? Now you can already see and I think that I jumped a little bit of a step but you can already see that when I tell the things, what is the difference from things that are done choice and that things are merely done willingly? At least one of the things is that if I tell you okay I chose this, then you know I’m the kind of guy that likes this kind of thing. This is my idea of beauty has something to do with this or my idea of what the purpose of this…

Part 4: Character, Deliberation, and Moral Responsibility

The Insufficiency of “Not Being Forced” – Arbitrary Actions and Moral Significance

The Problem of Arbitrary Actions

Student: It reflects something about me versus how that piece of paper is put down on the desk doesn’t say anything about me unless you say it says that I’m messy or something very general. It doesn’t say anything particular to this action about me. I’m messy, or then it goes back—that’s why I tried to get away—then it goes back, a question: if it’s automatic, does it come from some character trait that I have, right? It doesn’t really come from anything, some difference that’s entirely arbitrary. Can’t blame anyone else, but it doesn’t say anything else about me.

So now, yeah. Just going back to the kids thing, is that what you’re saying, the kids don’t have intentionality?

Instructor: Yeah, kids. So this, I’ll finish, I’m just going to finish one thing.

Redefining Why Choice Matters Morally

So now, when we say that choice is necessary for things to be relevant morally, if you think about it in this way, you’ll realize right away from thinking the difference between willing and choice, you’ll see that what we need is not that there’s something that wasn’t forced, that something else did that. It’s not enough. Because I showed you from these examples, what we mean by that is something—and also not, obviously, the problem of determinism, which would just be a thing that everyone is always forced because nobody ever does anything because the principle is not in him. He’s not the beginning of that action.

But what we’re looking for is a specific way in which an activity is mine. There’s some ba’alus [ownership/responsibility], some ownership of the thing, which is why we’re looking for this thing called choice.

Legal and Ethical Implications: Premeditation and Character

This is why it’s very obvious, right? Everyone understands that we have this category of premeditation, and we have, in law it’s very important to talk about intention—did the person plan it? And we can do something like character witnesses, which show what kind of person is, would he have planned it or something like that. Or even if he did it just out of anger, that doesn’t show so much. That isn’t somehow less bad.

Why is it less bad? It’s only less bad because we understand that what choice is, what makes actions belonging to a human being, is precisely that they come out of the kind of thing he is, the kind of person he is. Does this make sense?

And this is an entirely different definition of why choice is even important in ethics or in judgment—not only important to negate problems of someone else did it. It was important to negate the question: did he do it because of what he is, or did he just do it for some other reason, or for no reason? If you do something for a reason and part of the reason is what you are, then it’s something that shows what you are.

Chapter 6: The Relationship Between Character and Rational Deliberation

Distinguishing Character-Based Action from Pure Rationality

Student: Do we not want to—in this, just to maybe split it out into maybe this is a third category—but we’re not looking for exclusively actions that follow from rational deliberation, right? We’re looking for things that follow from character that was a product of rational deliberation?

Instructor: Well, we’re going to get to that problem. That’s more complicated. The kind of character is not something distinct from rational deliberation, some kind of reason.

The Circularity Objection

Student: So far this sounds very circular to me. In other words, where does it start from? The chicken or the egg, right? When I start doing something, anytime I start doing something, what type of person am I?

Instructor: Yeah, yeah, I’m talking about after.

Student: And then it turns me into that, whatever type of person. It’s circular.

Instructor: That’s not the problem. We’re talking about—I’m just telling you the ideal. The fact that it’s circular, that’s agreed.

Student: No, you’re saying that it tells me what type of person I am.

Instructor: Yes.

Student: So what is that? I thought action makes me a person.

Instructor: That’s true. But we’re saying that the ideal action—I’m just talking about how the ideal action is the one where you’re already a kind of person and you’re doing good things because you’re that kind of person. Not before that. There’s three stages in every—that’s the practical sense.

Actions Against One’s Nature

Student: But I can never do anything without—

Instructor: No, you could. When you’re doing something because you’re forced—

Student: No, that’s not true. Nobody is forced to do anything.

Instructor: And especially it’s obviously possible to do things against your own choice. We have to talk about this. It’s also possible to do things against what you think is good or against what you feel is good. At least that’s how practice works, right? Practice means—there’s not—I didn’t say ever that everything we do comes out of what we are. The opposite.

But those would be the less chosen actions, or the actions less connected to your choice. What you are doesn’t force you to do anything ever. There isn’t even such a thing as what you are in that sense.

Chapter 7: Character Traits as Chosen Dispositions, Not Automatic Forces

What Character Traits Are Not

This is something that we have to understand a lot better. When we say something like people have character traits, those are not force powers. They’re not energies that force you to do things.

What Character Traits Actually Are

What they are is precisely something choosy—I don’t know how you say that—something that has the attribute of choice. It’s actually what they are is almost a choice, choice plus something else, plus actually liking it. But that’s your liking isn’t aligned with your choice, but not habit—habit not in an automatic way.

All the habits that we’re ever talking about are not something that should be understood as an automatic thing. The only thing that is automatic—that it doesn’t mean you don’t become an automatic thing. This is another important thing. I’m again jumping around, I’m just jumping around.

Good Habits Require Thinking, Not Automaticity

But you should be very clear that when we say that a good person is someone that has good habits, we do not mean that he’s a person that does things without thinking. It’s almost the opposite. He does everything with thinking.

Student: Are you saying this is where the intentionality comes in?

Instructor: Yeah, yeah.

Student: How does that tie in with what you were saying before about having intention or purpose or whatever?

Instructor: Yes, because intention means I’m doing something for a reason.

Chapter 8: The Two Senses of “You” in Choice

Simple Willing vs. Complex Choice

So you want it to be two things. You want it to be you with a purpose or intention? “You” just means, you in the simple sense, in the willing sense, is just: I did it, not someone else.

But “you” in the more complex sense is: I did it because of me. Because of me understanding this to be a good thing, which is the kind of person I am. I see the good in certain things. I see how this is good. I’m trained to understand how to act in certain cases. That’s what we mean when we say choice.

Student: But also you’re doing it because it’s what you do.

Instructor: That’s what exactly doing, because it’s what I do, is what it means doing it because I chose it. That’s what choice consists of.

Choice Is Not Contrary to Habit

Student: That’s what I’m asking, I guess, your question also.

Instructor: There’s not—choice is not something—this is precisely what we’re trying to get to here. We could talk—trying to think if I—my four things here.

The choice is not something contrary to doing things automatically. There isn’t really—the understanding that we have here of habit is not really doing things automatically. There is not such an understanding. Maybe they think that it’s not the correct description of the things we call that way.

Chapter 9: Reasons and Character as Unified

Why Premeditated Actions Are More Expressive of Character

When we say, I explained to you, the reason why we’re interested in choice is not only because choice is distinct from willing. What’s interesting in choice is because we’re interested in things done that the person did, unlike something that just—they are not expressive of what he is.

Now the kinds of thoughts, the kinds of reasons that people have are a lot more expressive of what they are than their choices when they don’t have good reasons or their choices when they don’t like what they’re doing. This would be two different levels, but in any case.

The Murder Example: Planned vs. Impulsive

When I say he is the kind of guy that he likes, that he makes—he’s a murderer, right? He planned the murder. And he planned the murder because to him, murder is good. Murder seems good to him. That makes the action a worse kind of action and shows that he’s a worse kind of person than when we say someone murdered someone because he was angry in the moment or just for no reason.

The kind of reasons, the kind of reasons that people have, the kind of intentions they have—which are intentions that are just aiming towards a reason, aiming towards a goal that you have—the kind of reasons that people have is precisely expressed through what kind of people they are. There isn’t two things: the giving reasons and being a kind of person.

Chapter 10: Addressing the Automatic Habit Confusion

The Daily Cigarette Example

Student: I’m still confused. There’s two things going on. There’s the fact that you want it to be a habit, but also you want it to be a habit that isn’t just automatic. I don’t know. I don’t think that really. At a certain time every day, just automatic, not thinking.

Instructor: Those are precisely the things that I just said that we don’t call choice. The paper sideways or—

And again, choice doesn’t have to be every day. That’s another question.

Student: Even though it’s a habit, it’s still not a choice, basically.

Instructor: Well, only in—I don’t think we have to judge activity one by one. We could say, that’s another thing, as I said, if we can jump all the way there and talk about that.

The Proper Unit of Analysis: Life Stories, Not Individual Actions

There’s no reason, because the whole—when we’re talking about judging a person as the kind of person he is, right, we’re going to tell his whole life story, at least a long story. We’re not going to ask about every action. That’s the wrong framing or the wrong—

Student: But what do you think, a person goes out for a cigarette every day at noon?

Instructor: Right. But again, let’s talk about something more simple, right?

Chapter 11: The Chandelier Example – What Makes Choice Humanly Interesting

Returning to a Clearer Example

Can you go back to my example of choosing the kind of something that would make sense to say I chose? You see that this, what?

Student: Stopping to smoke a cigarette.

What’s NOT Interesting About Choice

Instructor: What’s interesting—no, I’m trying to get something. What’s interesting about me saying I chose to buy this chandelier is not that I could have not bought it. There’s something a lot—that’s obviously true, but there’s something a lot more interesting in saying that.

What IS Interesting About Choice

It’s that I chose in the sense that I checked into it, I looked into it, I found the right one, I have my reasons for doing that. And this whole story is what makes my choice of buying a chandelier interesting in a human way, in a way that is, I say, is expressive or has something to do with—

Part 5: Virtue, Practical Wisdom, and the Nature of Ethical Habit

VI. The Paradox of Choice: True Choice as Necessity

A. Inverting the “Could Have Done Otherwise” Criterion

Instructor: I could not have done otherwise. It’s the opposite. If I make a decision, assuming that this is something I can express—that example is not a really ethical example—but assuming that, if you imagine it as an ethical thing, and we say, I made this choice because I have a correct… You could use aesthetics as a place of ethics, right? Because I have the correct vision of beauty, I understand how proportionate things have to be and which colors they have to be and so on. That’s why saying that it’s my choice is interesting. That’s why it makes it part of me. It makes it something that I did, right?

It’s actually not true that I could have done differently. It’s almost the opposite. I couldn’t have done differently. I couldn’t have chosen differently. I could have been forced to do something differently. I could have not chosen differently. If I would do differently, it would be not by choice, because my choice is precisely what comes out of my understanding of how things should be.

B. The Chandelier Illustration

Instructor: If I would have bought an ugly chandelier—assuming that I’m the guy that understands this, right—if I bought an ugly one, you would say, “Well, he didn’t choose it.” For example, right? I’ll tell the same example. If you come here and you see, “Well, why is there that ugly thing?” And I say, “Why? I didn’t choose that. Don’t blame me for it. I didn’t choose it. It’s there by necessity because the air conditioner was there before and we didn’t have the ability to move it.” So therefore, right, you see how that absolves me?

That doesn’t mean I don’t have responsibility. Also doesn’t mean I couldn’t have done differently. I could have done differently, but it doesn’t express my choice. It’s not a choice that I made. Choice is a very positive thing and it’s not the same thing as “he could have done otherwise.” It’s almost the opposite of “he could have done otherwise.” He almost couldn’t have done otherwise. Of course, if he entirely could have done otherwise, it’s more complicated than this, but almost.

C. Clarifying the Relationship

Instructor: Did this help us split these two things? Somewhat. They’re still there. They’re closely connected. Nobody’s arguing. I just have to show you the difference, right? So I just—I want to—it has to follow. What takes place has to follow by virtue of your human participation, human kind of decision, which is by reasons and by understanding of what is good and things like that. So when you develop some *middah* [character trait] or something like that, what we’re saying is that you’re going to do that, but when you do that, it reflects the choice. That’s the point.

Radical Reframing of Middot (Character Traits)

Middot Require Practical Wisdom

Instructor: A *middah* always, all *middot*, this has to do with another class that we did, probably—all *middot* consist almost of, or at least require, something called practical judgment, *phronesis* [Greek: practical wisdom], practical wisdom. A *middah* is not—that’s why we have to keep on getting out of this model that we have. A *middah* has kind of energies that push you to do things. There’s no inkling of that. Having a correct *middah*, it means something like having a good—something, the closest knowledge that I have that people know what it is, means something like having a good aesthetic judgment. I mean, I have an eye for the correct activity, the correct action.

B. The Active Nature of Judgment

Instructor: And even very clearly, you can see very clearly what—no, it’s not true. You can see very clearly how there’s something active all the time. It’s not—someone, right, if you think of this analogy, right? Someone—there’s a person that has a good eye for beauty, right? When he judges something as beautiful, it’s true that he judges this from something you could call it energy if you really want, but it’s not the way that people would understand. It’s true that he was trained to be able to have this. This is not something he was born with, or maybe not necessarily born with. He trained himself by making a bunch of judgments and accepting criticism and however it is that you get trained into having a good eye for beauty. But it’s not the eye that he has sort of pushing him to have that judgment. It’s a judgment that he has right now.

Student: Even habits in this sense then can follow because they’re informed by an ethical perception of a certain…

Instructor: You could see how they’re ethically informed, even if they’re habitually carried out.

Student: Habits are not habitually carried out?

Instructor: Because I have the evaluative—because there’s always—because, not that’s what you’re doing, right? Because, yeah, every habit that we think of is something like, here’s a person that only gets mad in the right times, right? This means something like he has a good eye for identifying the times in which you should be getting angry. It doesn’t mean—it’s very important that all *middot* acquire *phronesis*. It doesn’t mean his boiler of anger is calibrated correctly in his soul. That whole story is a fantasy that you were taught by Disney, I don’t know who. It doesn’t exist. This is like my first class on ethics. People keep on going back to that for some reason. I don’t know why people like that image, like that understanding. There’s no reason to think of it.

C. Ethically Informed Activity

Student: I think it’s how informed, how ethically informed your activities are, even if they’re repeated. They’re repeated, but they’re actively repeated. They’re not passively repeated. It follows from an ethical understanding.

Instructor: Yeah, or a perception almost.

Student: Yes.

Instructor: Because that partially answers the question, right? Things can become easier in a certain sense, but it’s still—right, like I’m a very good painter. You have to understand the habit like this. Word “habit” is extremely confusing for the correct understanding. If the habit is more like, I’m a very good painter, I can habitually paint a beautiful art. I don’t have to think about it. I just come in the morning to a studio and I take out a paint and it’s painted in five minutes. Nobody would say that that means it wasn’t done with skill, right? Skill is art knowledge. Nobody would say, “Well, he’s not really doing it. It’s just his habit doing it.” It doesn’t even make sense. And then it’s the opposite. The more he has the habit, the better artist he is, not the worse artist he is. Then it’s more relevant to praise him for being a good artist.

Of course, you could say there wasn’t a challenge in it. I’m not saying that it’s more—in some sense, if he has a challenging thing, then he’s going to express even more of his art, because now there’s a complicated case. He has to express more of his knowledge of how exactly to paint something. But there’s no way it’s going to be looking like a three-year-old *mishka* [scribble/mess]. It’s not automatic.

Student: Exactly.

VIII. Challenging the Concept of “Automatic” Ethics

A. Questioning the Premise

Instructor: Exactly, but it’s never automatic in the sense that you’re imagining the whole time. And actually, if I—you know people, nobody ever—I don’t know, I don’t even know where people got this idea, now that I’m thinking of this. Where did you get the idea that people have automatic *middot*? Why? What are you people even talking about? The *oved* [one who serves/works] went automatically, what does this even mean? What’s automatic in the sense of—I mean, you could talk about automatic in things that are actually not ethical, like I have a certain tick, like whenever I wake up, I push my ear that way. That’s not relevant. There’s no good or bad in that. That’s something with no thought. But anything that’s ethically relevant, you really have an example of one that’s automatic in any real way?

Student: He’s a *masmid* [diligent scholar], they learned everything.

Instructor: Okay, well in what sense is that automatic? Seems like a very funny description of something. You got what I’m saying?

Student: No, I could—because what is following, like what you said, yeah, without like it going through his clear *hergel* [habit] or his *koach* [power/faculty], his *middas ha-modeh ha-emes* [the character trait of acknowledging truth]?

Instructor: Yeah.

Student: No, meaning, where does that come from?

Instructor: Yeah, I don’t know. Is that so hard to imagine?

Student: To bypass his so-called faculty of choice or his faculty of whatever faculty it is that determines this?

Instructor: Is it so hard to imagine? It doesn’t make sense because *modeh ha-emes* means that I know—doesn’t mean—just to be clear, this has to do with *derech mitzvah* [the way of commandments], right? If *modeh ha-emes* would mean something like I’m like a machine, you press a button and I tell you everything I’m thinking, then you would be correct. But since there’s no *middah* that’s like that, right?

B. Levels of Intentionality

Student: No, but there are levels of intentionality you could have, for example, not for the *middah*, not for an intermediate, right?

Instructor: No, no, no, even if it’s intermediate. For example, if it’s not governed by the rationality of the thing itself but by something else. So as someone tells me every morning when you come in, do this.

Student: Yeah, but that’s not an ethical habit.

Instructor: There’s nothing intermediate about that, right? The intermediate requires knowledge, always requires judgment.

Student: But it’s automatic.

Instructor: Automatic in what way?

Student: Automatic in the sense that—

Instructor: No, waking up at a certain time is not—it doesn’t follow from rational deliberation in any sense.

Student: Oh, it does, but I do it repeatedly.

Instructor: It does, because you need to know when it’s the right time. How do you know when it’s the right time?

Student: Yeah, yeah, so I’m saying it’s…

Instructor: You may have to do it without looking at the clock?

Student: Right, right, so let me…

Instructor: Or maybe you have an internal clock. That doesn’t change anything.

IX. The Light Switch Thought Experiment

A. Setting Up the Distinction

Student: One second, so is there a difference between the person who comes in and hits the light switch every morning because he was told, “By the way, every morning when you come in, hit the light switch,” and the person who turns on the light every day because he wants there to be light in the building?

Instructor: No, I don’t see the difference.

Student: Okay, there’s no difference.

Instructor: The person who turns on the light every day is because he wants there to be light in the building.

Student: No, no, no, let’s say, for example, he’s…

B. Acting as a Machine

Instructor: If he’s—no, of course, in some sense he’d be operating like a machine. Someone could tell him, “Hey, your job, you know, I’m paying you ten dollars a day to get this.” Rich people can be told to act like machines for other people. Then they’re not agents. Then they’re not ethical agents. Then they’re just *karka olam* [ground of the world; inert matter].

C. Degrees and Complications

Student: This idea that things—

Instructor: Yeah, but this idea that things can’t be done—you know, nobody would call that a choice, a hundred percent. But it does mean that things can be done automatically without participation.

Student: Oh, that’s complicated.

Instructor: Only in a relative sense. I’m not saying—but what I’m saying is that there are degrees.

Student: Yeah, but it’s not very interesting.

Instructor: Just to be clear, that’s why the “just following orders” excuse doesn’t work very well, ethically.

Part 6: Automaticity and Ethical Responsibility

The Limits of Automaticity in Human Action

Why “Just Following Orders” Fails as an Ethical Excuse

Instructor: This idea that things can’t be done 100%, but it does mean that things can be done automatically without participation in rational deliberation. Oh, that’s complicated, only in a relative sense. I’m not saying it’s not in a relative sense, but I’m saying it’s that there are degrees.

Student: Yeah, but it’s not very interesting, just to be clear.

Instructor: That’s why the “just following orders” excuse doesn’t work very well. Ethically, it doesn’t work very well, precisely because no action that’s relevant—again, the only extreme case is something like where I throw you onto someone, then I’m really using you as a tool—but everything besides that is going to go through your rational or emotional, even, whatever you want to call it. It doesn’t have to be rational. Again, everything we say rationally, we don’t mean reason in the kind of reason that learns to use. We mean the kind of reason that knows that if you want to go through the door, you have to open the door.

Student: Right, right.

Instructor: There isn’t a possibility for a human being to do that without that, and even in a sense without whatever kind of ethical judgment he has, because people don’t only do things because they think they’re correct. We have to get to this and more. I’m not going to finish it today—what time is it?—but I have to go through his four things that choice is. I’ll see a bunch of nice things.

But to conclude this point: you would, firstly, you would not be able to do anything without some kind of perception at least, which is a kind of judgment. So again, you could say I made a mistake, I have some habit that caused me to perceive things wrongly, and so on, but there’s something there. And also not really possible to go through some kind of choice, because, again, choice in the sense of the deliberative choice, this kind of thing where I aim towards something because I think it’s good.

Now, I might not have two sides, I might not have thought about it for a very long time—all of these things we could talk about, like degrees of choice. I agree. But you can’t really have anything that’s, again, anything that’s ethically relevant. That’s relevant. Now, ethically relevant is another way of saying something that is done through this, how we call it, the desiring soul, right? The part of the soul that wants things. Now, the part of the soul that wants things works by identifying what it thinks is good and doing those things. How are we going to do without that 100%?

The only thing that I would say is, and where I do think it’s interesting, is that by understanding, let’s say, what you’re doing better and improving your understanding of what you’re doing, in some sense you change a little bit, even if you’re doing the same thing. I think eventually you’re not doing the same thing.

Student: Right, right.

Instructor: You’re not doing the same thing 100%, but not doing the same thing because there’s many descriptions of the same thing, and human activities have to do with those descriptions just as they have to do with the physical activity.

Student: Right, right.

The Problem with Calling Actions “Automatic”

Challenging the Concept of Automaticity

Instructor: I’m just saying, because something can be automatic only shows that you have a minimum sense of—I don’t know which things are automatic. What does that mean? Tell me one automatic thing.

Student: So I wouldn’t call it automatic. I would say that there are some actions that follow from a much smaller narrative, right? For example, this is what I do so that someone doesn’t yell at me.

Instructor: Okay, so you could call it something like…

Student: Or not even this way: this is what I do because it works.

Instructor: It’s not automatic. It’s not interesting to say it’s automatic. What’s interesting is to say that you’re only following orders. So the real—in other words, if you want to judge this person, you could say something like… Even that I think is not true.

The Software Program Example

Student: No, I give you a dumb example for this, right? So if you have a program, right, there’s two typically—there’s different ways you can use it, right? But some people understand, “Hey, I click here and I click here and nobody—and everything works,” right? And then there’s a person who actually understands the mechanical function of that program and does this. They both do it habitually, right?

Instructor: I’m not sure what you mean by habitually. That’s what I’m confused about.

Student: Meaning, both of it follows from some sort of rational deliberation, but the way in which they’re doing that habitually is different. One is doing it habitually because they’re producing a certain outcome every time, and another one is doing it because they follow a specific procedure every time.

Instructor: Yeah, I’m not sure I understand, because they might be doing different things—the same people doing the same… Just to be clear, people doing the same physical thing might still be doing different things, right? In the ethical sense, right?

The Bus Stop Analogy: Same Physical Action, Different Ethical Actions

Instructor: Like our example of the people standing by a bus stop. Okay, people standing by the bus stop can all of them are standing by the bus stop, and then that’s the minimal description of what they’re doing. But also, one of them is going to visit his grandmother, another one is on the way to murder two people, and the other one is just checking if the bus comes on time. Those people are not doing the same thing. The ethically correct, ethically relevant, or humanly relevant description of what they’re doing—which is their intention—is not the same at all. Okay? Those are not the same thing.

Now, though, but the difference is not one of choice. It’s not that one of them have less choice. None of them are doing anything automatically. They’re just doing less of anything, right? I’m saying, of course, choice is more interesting when it’s a more complicated story, but none of them are doing anything not by choice.

Redefining What “Automatic” Really Means

The “Because I Did It Yesterday” Critique

Student: Right, but I think what people might mean when they say that someone’s doing something automatically means that it’s following from an adherence to a much less ideally rational place. If someone says something like…

Instructor: I get what you’re saying. Something like what we call automatically would just mean something like someone who the real reason he’s doing something is because he did it yesterday.

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: Like the Kotzker [Kotzker Rebbe] could have said that you shouldn’t do that.

Student: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Instructor: But I sort of think that nobody really says that. This is why I’m anti-Kotzk, because this is just a very weird judgment of people. Nobody doubted him because he doubted him yesterday. It even sounds weird. If you ask the guy, this so-called *mitzvos anashim melumadah* [commandments performed by rote], another guy, and they say, “Why are you putting on *tefillin* [phylacteries] today?” And he said, what did he tell you? “Because I put it on yesterday.”

Who, which normal—no human being would answer this answer. Only the people critical of him say that. They don’t really agree. They’re not into his mind. He’s saying, “Why am I putting on *tefillin*? Because I put on *tefillin*. Of course I do it every day because I put on *tefillin* every day.”

Student: Yeah, but not because he did it yesterday.

Instructor: I’d say more like a less than ideal rational understanding of what he’s doing, right? And he’s doing it for maybe something that is much less ethical than you would…

Student: Well, you could say, again, that’s what I think people mean by automatic.

Why “Automatic” Is a Bad Word

Instructor: It’s not automatic. It’s a very bad word. It’s not expressing what it’s trying to say. It’s not true that the person who puts on *tefillin* like yesterday is doing it automatically. It is true that he’s doing much less. It’s something different.

You could say something like: you’re only putting on *tefillin* like you could eat *tefillin*. Really what you should be doing is putting on *tefillin* *b’chol l’vavcha, b’chol nafsh’cha, b’chol m’odecha* [with all your heart, all your soul, and all your might] to serve God, which is a different action. It expresses itself in the same physical part, but it’s a different action.

But that’s nothing to do with automatic. It can do something else. Automatic would be a weird description for doing something in a minimal way or something like that. It’s usually what people are criticizing, though, what they really want to criticize when they’re saying something’s automatic.

Student: That’s interesting. I hear what you’re saying.

Instructor: Yeah.

Conclusion

Instructor: Okay, we’re done. My life is complete. I could close it, or we’ll get to… We’ll finish more next time. That’s it.

Chassidish vs. Litvish Styles and the Nature of Choice: An Introduction to Internal vs. External Goodness

Opening: Chassidish and Litvish Styles in Art

Instructor: Since this sheet is mostly about bashing Litvaks, just one of our gags that go on. So I saw in Rabbi Tzadon, over there, has a book about some Chagall paintings. You know Chagall? Mark Chagall was a painter?

Student: An artist, no?

Instructor: Yeah, an artist. I used to have his picture of a Jew here. I told my wife this other doesn't work in my new design. We should throw it out. Anyways, and he was a very, I don't know how you call it, imaginative, very like, what's that book? Let's see. It's a blue book. It's called The Kabbalah of Relation.

Student: Oh, this one.

Instructor: You could look at one of his pictures that you see already that his paintings are fantasy. They're not realistic. They're not based on anything in the world. They're based on things that are in the imagination. More abstract, I guess.

Student: So what? More abstract.

Instructor: Yeah, I don't know what it's called, impressionistic, fantasy, something.

Student: Oh, this is odd.

Instructor: Yeah, they're very odd. They're not, some of them are really odd, and some of them are not very odd. Yeah. So you understand what I'm talking about?

Student: Yeah, bring the book.

Instructor: Oh, okay. So it says in this book, Reb Tzalel [Rabbi Bezalel Naor] quotes, I'm saying, that he [Chagall] was comparing himself to another painter, but more, it's a bizarre, with more structure. And he said, ah, so I'm a Chassidismist. He says, paint a little stuff, see them at Litzbach's [Litvak's]. It's a Chassidic painting, and that guy's at Litzbach's. So from here, we see it's very, very Chassidic and Litzbach emotional for him. Like a style. See, it's these Chassidic and Litzbach painting styles. Now, like this.

Introduction to the Topic of Choice

Instructor: Now we're going to learn a little bit about choice. We're going to try. Right, we hear about, I talked about free choice and free will and—

Student: Yeah, yeah.

Instructor: So we're off to continue a little bit. I'll tell you why. And no such thing as free will. I didn't say this is just a thing. I said it's not important. There's a lot to talk about this, but let's talk a little bit. Let's clarify one or two points to be more than enough that make sense.

Why Are We Talking About Choice?

Instructor: So we discussed that why are we talking about free will entirely? No, I'm sorry. Why are we talking about choice, not free will? Okay, why are we talking about choice to begin with? We're talking about it because choice is one of the things that makes what we are into something that we are responsible for. That is the really interesting paradox. I don't know if we said it this way in the last class. I said it in the barback [Yiddish: in the other class] in this way.

Two Approaches: Actions vs. Internal Character

The Actions-Based Approach

Instructor: In other words, there's these two things, okay. We could talk about actions just actions, things that the person does. That's one thing, lit facts [literal facts], right? Let's talk about actions, right?

You read the, for example, I was really, it's very interesting because for example I was reading the level of tattoo muscles insurance [Mesillat Yesharim] and here there's a version with a dialogue in the beginning, you know?

Student: Yeah, that you know that, you know that.

Instructor: Yeah, that black book.

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: The week after [Ramchal/Rav Moshe Chaim Luzzatto] was a Renaissance guy and he was after the Renaissance, but in their times it was fashionable to write dialogues in the manner of Plato and so on, not only to write treatises. And many of his books he wrote in both of these ways. Dialogue form, have you ever—and I recently bought in Judeca Plaza [Judaica Plaza], it's called a dialogue. Well, it's called—

Student: Yeah, that's so weird. I tried, I didn't get very far, but he was a lot more, he's a lot more, he's a Platonist, kind of a Platonist. I found the beginning a bit tedious, so I didn't get too far. Probably the translation is not so nice. It was so, it's hard to translate this kind of English.

Instructor: There's a University of Toronto one.

Student: They had a Hebrew one, I saw.

Instructor: Yeah, I have the Hebrew one. It was done by Mohamed Bialik [Chaim Nachman Bialik] or something.

Student: Yeah.

The Purpose of Dialogue Form

Instructor: So it was a thing to do this dialogue form. And dialogue form is useful at least because it shows you what someone is really up against sometimes. Like who he's trying to argue. Sometimes you write an article and it's not clear who you're fighting with. So in a dialogue, you need to have an opponent.

The best dialogue I saw was Shadal's [Shmuel David Luzzatto's]. Okay.

Student: Yeah, because it's not just strong to be knocked down, it's a full-throated emotional, you know—

Instructor: Yeah, then how do you call it, is like partners in the dialogue, interlocutors, are not very advanced usually. They're not very good representatives of the other side.

Ramchal's Opponent: The Talmudist

Instructor: But in any case, if you use, I will noticing there and with the more reading of that because it's related to all the subjects that we're talking about, but his big thing in the beginning, he is, he's up against something he calls someone he calls a Talmudist. It's a nigleh [revealed Torah/Talmudic] person, a Litvak. And he tells the Litvak that he doesn't know there's naled [hidden/esoteric Torah], right? It's a big thing, which is something we agree with very much, right? But we don't agree with the way Mesillat Yesharim [Mesillat Yesharim] frames it. I'm not, this is not a Mesillat Yesharim bashing class either. We're not here to—I'm just trying to use them to illustrate a point.

So what he's up against over there is very clearly someone who thinks that actions are enough. He's like, what do we have to do in life? Well, we have to do what the law says. And of course, you have to have kavanah [intention], but that's not the major thing. The thing is actions. So it's an externalized version, more like we say sometimes it's making people into machines, which are things that are judged by their products, not by what they are or what they produce. You produce mitzvot [commandments], you're a good guy. You produce aveirot [transgressions], you're a bad guy. That's actions, right?

The Internal Approach and Its Challenges

Instructor: Now, actions for the most part are there. That's the theory of actions. Now contrary to that, there's this theory of something more internal, right? Something we say what you're on the inside, things like that. And now that theory is something that needs a lot of explanation, a lot of differentiation within it. What do we really mean by being something on the inside, what you are, not only what you do? That's something very, I think that's given to very many simplifications and many nonsense that people say and believe based on that, right?

So as an example of clarifying that, we've got a lot of clarification on that point in our discussions of actions and character and middot [character traits], which is not something external but—and I think that there's both kind of mistakes. There's many kinds of mistakes in this.

The Key Distinction: Good Person vs. Self-Controlled Bad Person

Instructor: But to be very clear, when we talk about, when we talk about middot, right, having good middot, we are not talking about some active actions, right? Because the whole point, to make this point very sharp, the whole point of being a good person in our style world, the number [Rambam/Maimonides] world, is that a good person is someone who doesn't necessarily do something different than a bad person who is self-controlled. That's the important difference. There's good people and there's bad people who have self-control.

Student: That sounds very Tanya.

Comparison with Tanya

Instructor: Yes, I agree. I agree, and this is another thing. I think that the Tanya makes some of the mistakes that are placed from the Raman's [Rambam's] point of view. The Tanya agrees very much that it's not enough to do the good things. I think that's why the time—just to be very clear, because he says that in rasha [wicked person] could be someone or a benoni [intermediate person]—

Student: Exactly.

Instructor: So I think that, right, the Tanya breathes into very sharp relief with that statement. Although I'm not, I think that what the Tanya calls that tzadik [righteous person], what he calls eternal, is not the same thing we're calling alternative. The beginning of perek [chapter] says—

Student: Yes, no, just like this. Why does he compare the two though?

Instructor: Yeah, because I'm—and we're going to get the perek and discuss it at some point in the next 20 years. Very case explicitly about this, but it was a hand-in-hand, maaseh [actions] and then middot, all you, me, emunah [faith]. I don't know if that's what I remember.

Student: No, why do you think goes hand-in-hand in there? It says just like you have to be good at middot and this, right?

Instructor: No, no, I know what you mean. I don't think that's what it means, that word, that line. But let's stay here. We'll get to that. Yeah, I don't think, I don't think, I think the second thing is also not, also internal there. I'll explain. In other words, it's still middot, it's not maaseh. Of course there's maaseh that go with the middot, but what he's trying to say about deot [opinions/beliefs] over there means opinions, not middot. Deot over there doesn't mean middot anymore. The change is meaningless.

Student: Oh, really?

Instructor: I think.

Student: I'll have to read it outside.

Instructor: Wait, let me come back.

Tanya's Approach: Agreement and Disagreement

Instructor: In this sense, so yes, to be very clear, in this sense, the Tanya, and I think this is why the Tanya gets into this all. And the Tanya, as the good Litvak, ties himself in the knots by trying to explain this and working it out with the gemaras [Talmudic passages] and so on. And I'm pretty sure that Tanya's gemara is the wrong one for this subject. It's not. It's how they come, but of course, doesn't mean that it's ever. And maybe it means like that in the [Raya Mehemna, a section of the Zohar] that he quotes, another thing that there needs to be research needed.

Broad Agreement Across Traditions

Instructor: But Netanyahu [likely: Ramchal/the author] is trying very hard to establish this thing like Chassidus in the same, in the very broad sense, right? In the very broad sense, Chassidus and Mussar and Kabbalah and philosophy, they all agree with this statement that actions are not enough. They're not only enough, they're not the main thing.

The Unresolved Question

Instructor: But how to spell this out, to spell out what it means, this internal thing, what does that consist of, that is something where people get very confused. And what I want to do today is to give some clarification of that based on Rambam, based on Aristotle's understanding of this. I think that that's the thing. So it seems to me that today that it's a different—

The Nature of Internal Virtue: Character Traits vs. Mere Actions

Completing the Mesillat Yesharim Discussion

Ramchal's Opponent: The "Bad Scholar"

Instructor: So we're saying that it's agreed by... So wait, I was starting to talk about Ms. Schurman [Mesillat Yesharim], I didn't finish my sentence, so let's try to finish that sentence and then get to this one. Ms. Schurman, as an example, is very clearly against someone who will say that, but, for example, he pretends that that person is a scholar, and that his opponent, Luzzatto's opponent, is like a scholar who reads philosophy and science and so on, but of course that scholar is a very bad scholar because he didn't read the Ethics. And he's saying that about his...

Student: Yeah, well he doesn't say this, I'm saying this.

Instructor: He's telling him how, his main point is how there is a wisdom, there is something to be studied in Ethics. That's really Ramchal's point in his hakdamah [introduction], in both versions, but here you see it clearer in the dialogue. Because according to the opinion of the people who are into action, everyone agrees that they need some level of kavanah [intention] or some kind of internal, otherwise it's not you doing it and so on, but they think all that is simple because that's basic. And then his descriptions, like the Chassidim—Ramchal talks about Chassidim—the Chassidim, the pious, the super pious people who are busy all day purifying their internality, like it looks sometimes as if you're wasting your time, what are you even talking about by all your mussar [ethical teachings] and you're just repeating simple stuff over and over, and Luzzatto is trying to answer that charge.

The Baal HaTanya's Position

Student: Well then you have the Baal HaTanya [Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi] who says it's good stuff but it's not ma'akiv [essential/indispensable], you know, it's not...

Instructor: Right, right. So I think that I don't know very well what the Baal HaTanya thinks precisely about this. I have a feeling that he's, at least from my standpoint, also somewhat confused, but I can't really show it right now. But what I think is that we need to distinguish a whole bunch of things in this internal levels of things.

The Core Distinction: Having a Middah vs. Doing the Action

The Philosopher's Internalism

Instructor: So let me—there's one thing that I already said many times. Does Mesillat Yesharim put at the beginning action because it's like zahir [careful observance] is the reason?

Student: Yeah yes, but we have to, I don't know how we understand it.

Instructor: I also think that he misunderstands zahir. There's a lot to talk about. I'm just using that as a way to talk about this thing. I was saying that his opponent is not really a philosopher. He pretends like, oh, we need mussar, we need whatever this story, Kabbalah [Jewish mysticism], whatever it is exactly that he's putting in against that. It's not really true because philosophers are the ones that invented this kind of internalism, and of course they don't—Aristotle at least—doesn't understand it in the way that he understands it. I think there's a big difference here which we have to get to.

What Does It Mean to Have a Middah?

Instructor: For example, one thing that we've talked about many times, maybe we'll be able to make it clear today, is that internal, we say middah [character trait], so what does that mean to have a middah versus to just do the action, right? Someone can do the action not by having it, not by being—right, someone can, for example, act in a courageous way, do a courageous act without being courageous, without having courage.

Student: And what will it be doing it by?

Instructor: Well, by imitation you could say, or doing it by some kind of spur of the moment decision. Remember that a character trait is something that's not spur-of-the-moment, it's something settled that has a more long-term existence in a person. Or you can do it by self-control, right? Like say I'm afraid—well it's not like the courageous person is not afraid, but again to that—but I don't really have this motivation which courage is, but I somehow do, I have it and... okay, we can talk about that separately because self-control is not very complicated, but those are the—that's why maybe when we're talking about now, maybe self-control isn't the best place to split, although it's also split there. But it's more complicated.

Acting Without the Character Trait

Instructor: So we could see people acting, we could say, let's say now, by imitation or by just spur-of-the-moment decisions, which doesn't mean that they're acting from that habit, from that character. He's not a courageous person. He did some courageous things in his life, or he did a courageous thing today. Maybe by doing that many times, he'll become courageous, like that, but he's not courageous yet, right?

The Rambam's Position on Internal vs. External

Instructor: That's the important distinction in the Rambam [Maimonides] between the internal and the external. He doesn't call it internal-external, he just calls it having them in there, not having them in there. This is very important—that he discounts that completely. No, those must come to complete this, right? It's just not a good person. Because the reason, and the reason for this is obvious, right? Because as he says, for example, nobody would call a good person someone who hates being good, right?

The Christian Contrast

Instructor: This is a very Christian thing, because Christians say, if you ask them, how could someone go to hell if they were a righteous person? And they say, well, they could be internally wicked.

Student: So wait, I think that this is a different interpretation of that, in some sense. Because let me—because I think that that's, I mean, what would it mean to be internally wicked, although you're good? I'm not sure.

Instructor: I think that they always say that you have the potential to be wicked, that you're tainted by the original sin. Even if it looks like someone's righteous, they're not really righteous because they're tainted by original sin.

Student: Okay, so then this would be something based off a similar way of thinking, but again the question is, what does this really require? What does it mean to be internally righteous, to be really righteous?

Defining Internal Righteousness

Two Components: Liking It and Having a Stable Disposition

Instructor: Now, like I said, firstly, all it means is to like it. Or to have a stable disposition to do it. Something like, we say, he's that kind of person, not he's a person that did it. The difference between colored people and people of color. Something like that.

The Critical Point: Internal Doesn't Mean Inward-Focused

Instructor: So that's the thing, but one—so now I want to—there's one thing that we already did many times, which is to explain that these internal parts of this, so it's having a middah, having a character trait, having a virtue, right, having a virtue, and we call it a malakah [Arabic-derived term for settled disposition/virtue], which is a translation from Arabic. Having a virtue isn't equal to doing everything correct, it's something more than that, it's being that kind of person. But something very important to notice is that unlike an extreme internal version of this, that does not mean that the internal liking or the internal part of it is turned internally, right? So it's still about something in action. Does this make sense?

The Example of Anavah (Humility)

Humility as Other-Regarding

Instructor: So, for example, we talked about the example of... Which example do we talk about? Like a middah that Chassidim like to talk about, anavah [humility], right? Humility. Humility, and it's mentioned here in the list of middot [character traits]. Humility for Aristotle and for the Rambam is a way of relating to other people. That means speaking to people in the appropriate... with the appropriate level of... How do you call it? Being equal to them, or not putting yourself above them, not looking down at people, in the appropriate amount. Because to some extent you need to match your station in life. If you're a talmid chacham [Torah scholar] there's all these discussions—what is the appropriate level? But like every middah, it's just in the appropriate amount. It's not like to be a shifchah [servant] to everyone, that's not the idea. But that's a different discussion.

The Key Point About Anavah

Instructor: What I'm trying to get at is that anavah, humility, is an other-regarding middah. It's about how you act, it's about how you act, right? It's not about how you feel internally. Of course now there is an internal part, but the internal part is not what I think of myself, it's how I like acting to other people. You get the difference? Most people when you talk about anavah they think that it's internal, totally internally focused, like what I think about myself when I sleep in my bed. Nobody cares—I mean at least for middot.

Middot Are All Other-Regarding

Instructor: Middot are all other-regarding, besides for some, which is complicated, but in general, middot are all other-regarding. In other words, they're all about actions. They're about how you like. Now, the difference between someone who has internal anavah, someone who just acts the part, is that the person who just acts the part doesn't like it, it hurts them to some extent, to be in an equal relationship with other people. It hurts them, or even below them. But how do you like acting equal to people when you internally...

Student: That's a question for...

The Nature of Internal Virtue: Distinguishing True Middot from Fantasy

The Primary Distinction: Middot Are Externally-Focused Even When Internal

That's the number one distinction, and this is a very important distinction, because I don't think you will find, at least for these middot—there are some middot that are, I mean, you could talk about middot between the person and God, or between—we discussed this over here, I think, already, that even a middah like perishut [temperance], which is what people think is a middah about how you relate to yourself, to pleasure, is really about, has a social function. So it's really about how you act. It's not really about how you feel. It's not about how much you like food. It's about you eating in the appropriate amount, and so on. So it's at least an action. There's another level, but it's not our conversation now. What determines the correct amount of liking physical pleasures is what is conducive to society, and not what is—that's a different discussion. There's other levels of this, but that's the meaning over there.

So that's one thing. That would be one important distinction. I don't know what the Tanya thinks. I don't know what Mussar Seforim think—all of these people, all these things are research needed. But what is important is that this internal version of internal internality is not an internally-focused internality. It's still externally focused because what the middah is, is the settled liking of the action. It's not something entirely disconnected from action.

In other words, and what's the big difference is, that it doesn't really make sense—somewhat makes sense, but doesn't make sense as much—to say, "I'm really a good person, but I don't act well. I end up fighting with everyone, but really I love them." Because what do you mean? Why do you fight with them if you like not fighting? But you're saying "I love them"—you mean to say, you don't mean "I love them in my heart," you mean "I don't like fighting with them." And that ain't just a contradiction. Now that happens too, but then it's a real contradiction. It's different, right?

Internal Conflict: Akrasia and the Lack of Self-Control

You'll notice now I can go back to talk about what we call internal conflict, right? Not being self-controlled—in Greek, akrasia [ἀκρασία: lack of self-control], not being self-controlled. Or in Rambam's language—Rambam only has a self-controlled person, but the opposite of that, not a self-controlled person.

Then we can understand something interesting here, that this is not me—this is the important thing—it does not mean acting not in sync with what I feel internally when it's self-focused, right?

The Middah of Friendship: A Case Study

For example, let's talk about something like the correct amount of loving your friends, of being good to your friends, right? Which is the middah of friendship. Friendship is a very important middah, right? We have to be friendly to other people. Middah tovah [good character trait]. Very important. Much neglected.

Now, the middah of friendship—well, the activities of friendship, you know what they are. You hang out with them and you help them and you do business with them and there's levels of that and so on. But what is the internal thing? It's being the kind of person who is a good friend, right? So we could say he likes—there's more to it than liking, there's more to it than liking as we'll get to today or next time—but at least liking.

Now sometimes people say, "I love my friends, but somehow every time I get together we end up fighting, so I end up becoming or being the worst friend, right? I'm not so—" Some people talk about this as the conflict, right, the Tanya's conflict.

Digression: The Tanya's Unique Focus

By the way, the Tanya doesn't talk about other human beings at all. That's one big difference between Tanya and every other Mussar book and so on. They're just focused on internal—the Tanya is only focused on between you and God. He's never focused on human beings. So it's a different discussion.

But the Tanya's version of this is, I think, also similar to this in some sense. Because the Tanya says things like this: "I love God internally, but I end up fighting with him all the time." Well, what does that mean? It's not the same. At least it doesn't—you see that by him, the internal thing, it means something different than what it means here.

False Conflict vs. True Conflict

What it means here is to say that I have someone that would say, "Well, I love my friends"—in other words, when I'm self-regarding, when I'm thinking to myself, I say, "Well, I like them," but then I'm not a friend to them. So you don't have the middah of friendship. You might have some other middah, I don't know, or some other—yes, something else—but the middah of friendship is not something you have.

The middah of friendship is the being a good friend, stably, the somehow automatically—we could say, not a good word, but—being the kind of person who is a good friend, and not having to look up your friendship book, "How to Win Friends"—you don't have to look up that book every time you go out with your friends because you're already that kind of person. That's what having the virtue of friendship is.

And now we could see that the conflict people often talk about is very similar to that weird person that would say, "I like my friends, but I'm not a friend to them." That's not a conflict between the internal and the external in the Aristotelian sense. That's a conflict between some fantasy you have or some other thing—you could find the word for it—and what you really are. It's a different level conflict. Does that make sense? Clear?

When Real Conflict Exists: The Need for Self-Control

If there is a conflict, then now there is conflict like that. There are conflicts. There are people who would say, in some sense, "I am a good friend, but I don't—" Sometimes someone says, "Well, I'm a good friend, but sometimes I get mad easily. And then I don't act like a good friend." That would be a better example of someone having the real conflict, which then he needs self-control.

Before that, you don't even need self-control. You need something else. You need to learn what the middah is at all, or to start having it in some sense.

Student: Saying he could be good at the middah but some outside other middah is conflicting with that something, or right, or somebody something like something like you forget something like—

Instructor: Well, of course part of the middah is not to get mad at your friend. It's another thing. It could be—we are just, I mean, you could call it that way, but it just works. A good friend is not someone who gets mad at his friend all the time. In some sense, maybe. At least not too much.

So you could say something like, "Well, yeah, my problem, my anger problems are getting in the way of my friendship." Now you have, "I am a friend, but I'm somehow not—it's not coming, it's not being actualized correctly." Now you have a problem. It's a different level problem.

You understand the difference between these two versions of internality?

The Fantasy Problem: Those Who Think They Have Virtue But Don't

There's someone who just thinks that he likes his friends because when he thinks by himself that he likes them, but he doesn't actually have any virtue, any internal virtue of friendship. That person for sure goes to hell. Understand? Because it's not—you think I'm saying you're really a bad person who fantasizes himself a good person? This is actually something that happens. People fantasize themselves—the other people, because their fantasies are not about other people, are not about living in the world, they're not about acting in the world, right?

The Talmid Chacham Example

My fantasy is that I'm a big talmid chacham [Torah scholar], because—not talmid chacham, a lamdan [one who learns intensively]—because something like I would have wanted to be the kind of guy that learns a lot or something like that. But I don't. That's not what you could—you can't come and say, "Well, I'm internally a lamdan and just have some external hindrance, something that's blocking me to actualize it." That's not what's going on.

Because someone like that, that's someone who loves to actually learn. But sometimes he gets angry, or sometimes he gets distracted. Then we can talk about that. But you're not someone that loves to learn. You love the idea of being that person. That's another level.

Or my example of friendship would be even clearer. You understand what I'm saying?

So this is important. So that's one important clarification. It's true that these middot are internal.

The Hierarchy of Levels: It Can Always Be Worse

Student: Is there a lower level than that?

Instructor: There's lower levels than everything. You can always go lower. Never be mashiach-ish [messianic/overly optimistic]. It's always worse. It can always be worse. And you can not even have the fantasy, right? That's what I'm saying.

Student: Yeah, it's very nice, but what I'm getting at is this thing—when people say, every year there's a good—

[Chunk ends]

The Social Necessity of Internal Virtue and the High-Trust Society

The Purpose of Internal Virtue: Social Function, Not Pure Spirituality

Student: What is that for?

Instructor: All right, I think it's a real thing. It's a whole different level of discussion. So that's one thing. That's a very important distinction here. What did I say? Something I forgot. Oh, now there are other—

Student: No, just to answer you more clearly.

Instructor: What we're talking about here is that even the internal part we're talking about is still not for yourself. Rambam [Maimonides] would say this clearly in the last chapter—it still affects the quality of the heart. Yes, for example, the clear version of something like this: someone who is—I don't know how you call the correct middah [character trait] regarding others' money, right? Something like the opposite of a thief, right? Or someone—I don't remember what it's called—something like a honest person, this is a just person, a trustworthy person, right?

Now the shelo lishma [not for its own sake] version, or the external version of that, which is he doesn't like it, right? He's just afraid of going to jail, right? That would be someone who does—now he does everything correctly. We call it shelo lishma, does everything correctly. He's trustworthy as long as the police is looking. But since many situations, the police are not looking, or it's hard, right? When there's something that—and social circumstances have many such circumstances. It's not really true that society only cares, can only care about the level of shelo lishma. Because we do need, for social purposes, we also need good people who have what we call a moral backbone, right? They have to be really good. And that means he likes being trustworthy for its own sake, right? He thinks that it's good for him. I mean, he's the trustworthy person, not he's an untrustworthy person who acts within the bounds of society, doesn't want to go to jail, and so on. He's a really good person, and that's the kind of internality that is needed for social work, right?

We don't really want the world where everyone is only acting out of external fears or things like that. We do need, even for social reasons—or the same thing for all methods, I think, at least—because the law is not the only external thing that forces people, right? You know, like honor and you're going to be embarrassed and other things, but it still doesn't cover enough. There's many human situations in which what stands between a bad society and a good society—people talk about high-trust societies. I forgot the sociologist who invented that term, I forgot who, in the 70s, like recently.

High-Trust Societies vs. Low-Trust Societies

There's a concept of high-trust society versus a low-trust society. And the high-trust societies, it's not like it's disconnected from the enforcement of laws and so on, but it's also really an educational thing. At least that's what Aristotle and Plato and all these people would say. It means that people are educated to act mostly in trustworthy ways.

I saw a study once where they say the high-trust societies are the most, the biggest ancient—if you—

Student: Yeah, because—and you've never seen crime in those societies because you're constantly afraid of your life.

Instructor: Certain kinds of crime, except for your life. More like if you have to kill someone, you're probably already past the level of having a high-trust society. But so things like, yeah, people say things like this.

The Tax System Example: America vs. Europe/Israel

Things like in the United States, if you lie—I don't know to what extent it works anymore, but it used to be like this thing in America—the taxes mostly run on the honor system. The IRS believes you when you tell them how much money you make, and they expect you to say the truth. Maybe they don't, but that's—the American ideal is something like this, that they expect you to say the truth. And because they expect you to say the truth, if they catch you lying, they're going to be really, really mad at you.

In a different system, the European system for the most part, if you go to Israel, you'll see they don't expect you to say the truth. And therefore, they don't believe you for what—you can't write anything out of taxes return without a receipt, without the state already knowing about it beforehand, because they're assuming that everyone is lying. And therefore, when someone is caught with a lie, it's like, okay, we'll put you in jail for a month, whatever, move on. In the sense that's something like what you're describing.

But in any case, for my purpose the important thing would be that high-trust society, which is a useful society to live in, even begashmius [in material terms], it's not only like berdokhne [spiritually], it's also pretty useful. It cannot work only by people acting that way. People have to create a certain kind of human being, so we need schools and education. Of course culture educates, the TV educates you and so on, right?

Why Forms and Rules Alone Are Insufficient

Because there's the variety—I think this is one of the reasons at least—because the variety of human situations is so varied that you can't rely on there's a form for everything. There's never going to be a form for everything. Therefore, if you rely on forms, there's always going to be people that find the loopholes. If you rely on people to have their judgment and to be more or less honest, decent people, you will end up with a lot more stable society, something that's a lot more reliable.

The Murder Example: Why We Need People Who Don't Want to Kill

In that way, this internal thing that we're looking for—this is why we don't call a person—for example, last week I talked about murder. Nobody would call someone—even the people that are all about from zachar agra [remembering reward] and the bigger zachar [reward] you have the more schar [reward] you have—none of them would be friends with someone who goes around saying, "You know, really I would be a murderer. I would kill everyone that cuts me off in traffic. I'm scared because—I'm not even—I'm scared. I recognize that it would be bad for me, therefore I overcome my urges to murder everyone."

Don't be that guy's friend, right? He's a bad guy. I mean, he's a bad guy.

Student: Yeah, that's rather—he's a sho'ah bits rise [a completely wicked person]. It's how the key should get the most high of everyone.

Instructor: Well, no, he's a bad guy because he's sick. A normal person, a good person—which means just a person that was well educated, it's not like this is natural, this is something that was worked on for since Hashem came—and has seen and said, it's a whole working on getting people to not want to kill people. It's not enough to get people to recognize that they shouldn't kill people, or to kill everyone that kills other people and have them be scared of killing people. We need people to not want to kill people, because that's the only way that we get less murder in the long run.

Internalist Ethics for Social Purposes

And that is why we say that it's not enough to be externally good—internally good. This is contrary to what you get—that's what you're saying. The other versions are different. Contrary to what you're getting, say this. And in the more extremely internalist versions of ethics where it seems that internalist ethics are antisocial—these are internalist ethics for the purpose of being social. Because what they're about is still the social activity. They're not about—when I say I don't want to murder, I don't mean I have a pure soul. Maybe it's true that it's a pure soul. That's a different discussion. That would be caring about different criteria. But I don't care about, well, my soul is pure, it doesn't want to murder anyone. We could do this interpretation, but that would be a whole different class. What I care about is something like, this guy, you can pretty much rely on him to not murder anyone, unless it will be very important.

Student: For the existentialists, you know, the internal, there's something about the Western ad society, you know, that's—

Instructor: Right, very good. We're going to talk about the existentialists now in a sec. Did we talk about that yet?

Transition: Another Reason for Valuing the Internal

Now, this is one thing. Another thing, which we have to distinguish, is another reason—and that's a more tricky reason. Now, a more tricky thing is to distinguish another reason that you were trying to mention about why people value the internal or something to do with will, volition, wanting, choosing, things like that. And that has to do with an interesting thought, which I don't know how much I could...

The Paradox of Virtue and Choice: What Makes Actions Truly "Mine"?

The Foundational Agreement: Actions Must Come From You

We all agree that something that is not about what comes—we all agree that an action or a habit that doesn't come from you doesn't count as a good human thing, right? This is really why we get this whole discussion of will and choice and all of that, right? That's the first assumption that's agreed on, at the most simple level, by everyone, right?

If someone—let's say, was born is not entirely the correct thing—country, even, for example. Also being forced to do something. If we're forced, that's for sure—that would be one extreme example. Or if it's something entirely natural. Let's say, I'm not sure about this, let's say if something's entirely natural, something like someone who's beautiful, right? Someone's just physically beautiful doesn't get a lot of moral credit for that. It's not a moral thing at all, right? If you can praise him, but you will just be praising God for creating beautiful people. You will not be praising the person as a person.

So this is agreed on. We agree that we need some ingredient, something in the vicinity of choice and will and so on, that makes what I am, what I do, mine—what makes me as a human being, it makes me responsible for it. Otherwise, it doesn't have a moral value. It just might be good. I'm not saying it's bad. It looks like it's not good to be beautiful and tall and all those nice things, but it's not good in the human sense, not good in the virtues, in the human virtue sense. It's good in a different sense.

The Central Question: What Makes Me "Me" Most?

Now there's really a question there. There's really a question of what the human being is, what makes me me most. And here you'll see two almost contrary opinions—not contrary things, one opinion and one correct knowledge.

The Aristotelian Position: Stable Character Over Momentary Choice

One is the thought that we discussed, for example, last time from Aristotle, is that something is more about you, it belongs more to you—and this may be the question I'm asking, that's why I said that there's some kind of paradox here, right? Because we say that something that you do because you have that virtue, because you have that middah [character trait], is more about you than something you do because you chose it in the moment, or because—we don't even call that choice—it's something like spur of the moment, right?

So for example, if someone acts in a—courage is a complicated thing because it has all these emergency situations, which is something that makes it hard to think about. It's something like someone who has the—how do you call it—the middah of being a person that gives, gives, right? What? Generous, yeah. Liberality and generosity, things like that.

Someone who's correctly generous—we would understand that he is—if we're looking, right, you could be generous in all these ways. You could be generous out of forcing yourself to give. You could be generous because I don't know, I was in the mood, something like that. I gave you a million dollars for no reason, and the rest of tomorrow I don't. And I could be too generous also. That's a different discussion.

We say that the person who is stably generous—in other words, he is a generous person, is not only doing generous things—that that is more about him than the one who chooses it.

The Apparent Paradox: Do Automatic Actions Belong Less to Us?

And this is where there's somewhat of a paradox, because we understand that—the paradox here is the question that people often ask, and we discussed here—that if the goal of life is be a good person, good people, we say, sometimes do the good things automatically. Now, language is from these—have virtues follow good actions. They follow in an almost necessary sense. Not really necessary—human beings, not like a table—but it follows somehow, comes out of that automatically. It's not something you have—there's no step in between. That's important. There's no step in between of having the virtue to handling the actions, like they have to choose it afterwards.

Then people ask, "Okay, so then it turns out that those actions are less of you because they become automatic, so to speak," right?

The True Aristotelian Response: What We Are vs. What We Choose in the Moment

Now the true thought, or the opposite thought, which is Aristotle's thought, which is the Rambam's [Maimonides'] thought, is that it's not true. Why? Because what they are looking for is not something that is most determined by your will in the moment and could have been otherwise. That's not what they see as most human in us, as what mostly binds things, makes things ours.

What they think is most human in us is the things that tell us about what we are. Now, in order to be something, you have to have a stable character. Someone who is, when we say, one day a malach [angel], one day a galach [priest/shaven one]—is not anything. So really, that person is not human at all, because he doesn't have any—what we call internal—he doesn't have anything that we can say, "This is him."

But the person that has the stably good characters, or vice versa, his bad characters, that is the person whose actions follow mostly from what he is. And that is something very different from something, for example, that the existentialists, some of them in extreme cases, are after. And also very different from what many people are after nowadays when they say things need to be by choice.

The Test Case: Good Education and Authentic Selfhood

This is, for example, the very clear place where this will make a difference: in the value of things done because you have a good education.

How Education Works

Someone who had a good education, which means that he was taught to like certain things—a good education, of course, education works mostly by external things. It works by promising reward and punishment. It works by getting you to do things. It can't really get you to like something. You have to somehow see that for yourself. You do learn that from someone, but it's very hard to give that to someone automatically, easily. But it's still because of that education that you become a good person.

The Modern Objection: "This Isn't Me, It's Just My Conditioning"

And according—many people nowadays seem to think that that is less about me. So this—"I'm doing this because I was taught to do it. I'm doing this, this is not me because it's not my choice," right?

And when they say it's not my choice, what they don't mean—they don't mean choice in the Aristotelian sense. They don't mean that I don't have, we can say later, a considered opinion, a considered drive towards this, that I think this is the correct way to act, and I like it also, and therefore I choose to act it. That's not what I mean, because that's actually what their education gave you.

If it's a good education, it's not only an external education, right? Education starts with a lo lishma [not for its own sake], but it somehow gets you a lishma [for its own sake] somehow, by some magic. It's a different discussion, right?

The Reality of Educational Formation

If you went—we discussed this many times—if you went through certain systems, you get certain virtues. Not only—you don't only get—it's a very bad—I don't think it ever happens, really. It would be a very weird education where you would stay at the level of reward and punishment. Like the moment a mashgiach [supervisor/spiritual guide] leaves the room, you're left with nothing. That's not really how life works. You are always left with something. Slightly less than what you did for the reward and punishment, but you were left with something about yourself.

Now, of course, everyone agrees that when you're only acting for fear of punishment or for hope of reward, that you're not acting out of yourself. But I'm talking about the next step, right?

Once I went to yeshiva [Torah academy], they got me to learn, I don't know, an hour a week, whatever, how long. When you're afraid, you learn two hours a day. But when you're not afraid, you learn an hour a week. That's the amount of middah they got into you, right?

The Absurdity of Rejecting Educated Character as "Not Me"

Now I'm showing you something very simple. And now, people might think—I don't think anyone really thinks this. I don't think people think it through. But people sometimes would make the claim that, "Okay, the fact that you like to learn, that's just my conditioning. That's just my education. That's not me."