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Avrohom Avinu didn’t care for his children – Transcript

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סיכום השיעור 📋

Combined Argument Flow Summary: Why Be Jewish, the Limits of Generational Influence, and the Akeidah as Paradigm

1. Recap of Previous Lecture: “Why Be Jewish?”

This is a continuation (המשך) of last week’s class (delivered in Yiddish). The central question from that session:

Core Question (from “Peter”): Why should one remain Jewish?

Basic Answer Given Last Time: There is no real alternative — you can only be a *Jewish Jew* (יידישע ייד) or a *Gentile-ish Jew* (גוישע ייד). Since being a Gentile-ish Jew is a sad, incoherent existence, you might as well be a Jewish Jew.

2. Leo Strauss’s Framework: “Why We Are Still Jews”

This answer is grounded in Leo Strauss’s lecture *”Why Are We Still Jews,”* which surveys possible “solutions” to the Jewish problem:

Option: Assimilation (Self-Cultural Genocide): Stop being Jewish, speak English, become “normal people.”

Herzl’s Consideration: Herzl even considered mass conversion to Christianity — not because he was crazy, but because he was *logically working through the options*. His intellectual honesty deserves defense: “You’re the weirdo that never considered this option.”

Why Herzl Rejected It: You can’t truly become a non-Jew. You become a *Jewish gentile* — a self-hating, liminal creature. So Herzl concluded one might as well stay Jewish.

3. The Counter-Argument: Multi-Generational Assimilation

A serious objection to the Strauss/Herzl conclusion:

The Objection: Even if the *first generation* of assimilators suffers as awkward “Jewish gentiles,” after several generations (four, five, ten), descendants will forget their Jewish origins entirely. The “Jewish problem” is thereby *solved* for one’s progeny.

Formalized: If you care more about your descendants than yourself, shouldn’t you assimilate now, endure short-term pain, and grant them long-term relief from persecution (Crusades, pogroms, being “Christ-killers,” etc.)?

4. Clarifying the Stakes: Material AND Spiritual Harm

A student raises the historical reality of persecution (Crusades, Nazis, torture, death). Important clarification:

– The harm of being Jewish in a hostile world is not only material (violence, death) but also spiritual/moral — people don’t flourish when they are in a persecuted, degraded position.

– Conversely, “the good life” one gives up by assimilating is not only material comfort but includes moral, intellectual, and spiritual goods — the life of keeping mitzvot, of being morally good in one’s own framework.

5. The Trade-Off Problem

The dilemma sharpened into a general philosophical trade-off question:

Should you ruin your own life (morally, spiritually) so that your great-great-grandchildren avoid a certain set of problems?

– Flipping the scenario to remove emotional bias: Would you tell a persecuted *Christian* to just stop being Christian for the sake of his descendants? Most would say yes — which reveals that resistance to assimilation may stem from emotional attachment rather than rational argument.

– A student agrees with assimilation, and the pushback: “You’re acting very sure of one side because you think agreeing with the *other* side [i.e., staying Jewish] is just bias — but the pro-assimilation side is not obviously correct either.

6. Key Methodological Principle: Reverse Stupidity Is Not Intelligence

6a. The Common Error

Many people, aware of their own bias (religious, nationalist, tribal), overcorrect. They think: “I only believe X because it’s *my* side, so probably X is wrong.” They imagine that by asking “What if I were a Palestinian?” or “What if I were the other side?” they achieve objectivity — a “view from nowhere.”

6b. The Strong Claim

This overcorrection is itself a mistake. Awareness of bias does not automatically yield truth. The Rambam worried about tribal bias, yes — but the *reverse* of tribal bias is not clarity.

6c. Eliezer Yudkowsky’s Principle: “Reverse Stupidity Is Not Intelligence”

Weather Vane Analogy: A *broken* weather vane that consistently points the wrong way is still useful (just reverse it). But most errors are not *systematic reversals* — they are random. So simply inverting your biased position does not land you on the truth.

Humorous Illustrations: “Ask a בעל הבית and do the opposite = דעת תורה”; “Ask a Litvak and do the opposite.”

6d. Philosophical Grounding: The Aristotelian/Pythagorean Principle

Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina* opening (“All happy families are happy in the same way; all unhappy families are unhappy in different ways”) illustrates an Aristotelian idea.

Aristotle’s argument: There are many ways to be bad and few ways to be good — one of his arguments for the doctrine of the mean.

Pythagorean roots: Aristotle attributed this to the Pythagoreans, who associated the One with the good and the Many/varied/unequal with the bad. Even odd numbers (associated with unity) were good, and even numbers (*zugos*, implying duality) were bad.

Core logical point: Because there are many more ways to be wrong than to be right, doing the *opposite* of something stupid is statistically more likely to be *another* stupid thing than the correct thing.

> As Aristotle, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, and Tolstoy all noted: there is only one truth but many ways to be wrong. Inverting one wrong answer doesn’t guarantee you hit the single correct one — it likely just lands you on a *different* wrong answer.

6e. Implication for the Main Argument

The student who says “I’m biased toward Judaism, therefore assimilation is probably right” is committing exactly this error. Recognizing your bias toward staying Jewish does not make the case for assimilation any stronger. The “reversal” strategy does not clarify anything — it doesn’t dissolve the real question; it just assumes the only reason someone holds a position is because of which “side” they’re on. There is a genuine substantive question here, and flipping perspectives doesn’t make it go away. The question must be evaluated on its own merits.

7. Returning to the Core Question: Should One Sacrifice for Distant Descendants?

7a. Restating the Problem

It is not obvious that someone should make their own life worse so that a great-grandchild’s life will be better. Assimilation doesn’t work in one generation — the first generation suffers, and the benefit only accrues to later descendants. This isn’t a uniquely Jewish belief; it’s a general human experience (immigrants commonly say “I’m doing it for my kids”). But doing it for *children* is one thing; doing it for *great-great-grandchildren* is quite another — the moral calculus becomes much less clear.

7b. A Key Sub-Question: Does the Person Become Bad in the Process?

If the person must become a bad person in order for their grandchildren to eventually be “good” (i.e., successfully assimilated), then the sacrifice is probably not justified. This is flagged as a serious consideration, not a settled point.

8. Leo Strauss’s Framing: Why Assimilation Was Even Considered

8a. The “Jewish Problem” Defined

Leo Strauss’s starting point (*hava amina* — the initial assumption to be examined): Jews could assimilate, but since it won’t work in one generation, they shouldn’t. Why assimilation was proposed at all: To solve “the Jewish problem” — that everyone hates the Jews, leading to persecution, abuse, and killing. Even if no physical harm results, being universally hated is itself bad — this is stated as a strong assumption.

8b. A Provocative Claim: Universal Hatred as a Sign Something Is Wrong

If everyone hates you, it’s probably a sign that something is wrong with *you*, not just with everyone else. This challenges the common Jewish self-understanding that “everyone hates us but we’re the best.” This self-understanding isn’t necessarily false, but it should give one pause — it’s not a stable or reasonable default belief.

8c. Student Pushback and the “Reverse” Question

Student: Is the reverse true — if everyone likes you, does that mean you’re good?

Response: Not proof, but it’s a sign. Universal hatred is a sign something is wrong; universal approval isn’t proof of goodness, but it’s not a cause for concern either. Popularity functions as meaningful evidence, not a definitive “measuring tape.”

9. Are Good People Hated? A Socratic Argument

9a. The Core Challenge

Why would genuinely good people — people who make things better — be hated? That’s a strange idea. If you’re truly making things better, who would oppose that?

9b. Addressing Objections

“You’re making it worse for bad people”: But then are you really making things *better* overall? And even punishment is supposed to be *good* for the bad person (reformative), not just harmful.

“Bad people are jealous of good people”: If a good person provokes jealousy, something is wrong with the good person’s approach.

“Bad people hate what’s good for them”: Socrates’ analogy of the doctor — patients almost never hate doctors, even when doctors impose unpleasant requirements (diets, quitting smoking). People may not *listen*, but they don’t *hate* the doctor. This suggests that genuinely beneficial people are not naturally hated.

9c. The “Bad Teacher” Argument

We are far too comfortable with the narrative “we are hated because we are right.” This comfort is suspicious and dangerous. Most people are actually *happy* to be corrected in most domains. If hatred arises, the teacher bears significant responsibility.

> ### Side Digression: Plato’s Republic on Hatred of Philosophers

> Plato argued people hate philosophers because most philosophers they encounter are genuinely bad people — hatred by association, a case of “mistaken object.”

Practical upshot: If you’re making people hate you, you’re failing at teaching. Being right is pointless if you can’t transmit truth. Options:

– Don’t teach until people are ready.

– Find “subversive” methods so people don’t realize you’re challenging them until it’s too late.

– Keep silent rather than provoke hatred that accomplishes nothing.

9d. Conclusion: Hatred as Diagnostic

We are habituated to a “weird idea” — the notion that being right means you should expect universal hatred. This is potentially self-serving nonsense. If the righteous (*tzaddikim*) are hated, the proper response might be *teshuvah* (repentance/self-examination), not self-congratulation. We live in deep ignorance about the good, the true, the beautiful — we navigate by *signs*. Universal opposition is a major sign that something may be wrong.

9e. Student Concession

One shouldn’t necessarily be hated by everybody; one should expect to be liked by most people.

10. The Practical Cost of Being Hated — The Argument for Assimilation Strengthened

10a. Human Flourishing Requires Cooperation

Humans need other humans: for schools, business, marriage, collaboration. Being excluded from society cuts you off from ~90% of human goods.

Concrete historical example: European universities were discovering cures for diseases, but Jews couldn’t enter without converting to Christianity.

The assimilation argument (taken seriously): If staying Jewish means being excluded from contributing to humanity’s progress (e.g., curing cancer), then you’re complicit in that loss. You can’t simply say “they’re the bad guys” — you’re also failing to do good.

10b. The Counter-Argument: It Won’t Work for *You*, Only for Your Descendants

Even if you convert, *you* won’t be accepted — you’ll be labeled a “New Christian” and distrusted (as in the Spanish Inquisition). Only your *great-grandchildren* will be fully accepted (even Hitler’s racial categories acknowledged this cutoff at ~4 generations).

This regenerates the earlier question: How much worse should your life become so that your great-grandchildren can flourish?

11. The Generational Obligation Problem

11a. The “Interesting Loop”

Key insight: The person you’re supposedly saving (the great-great-grandchild) is precisely the person with whom you no longer have a real relationship.

Biblical support: Exodus — God visits the sins of fathers upon children “to the third and fourth generation” (*pokeid avon avot al banim al shileshim v’al ribe’im*).

Rashi’s comment: A father’s compassion (*rachamei av*) extends only about 3–4 generations. Beyond that, the emotional and practical bond dissolves.

11b. Phenomenological Argument About Shared Worlds

You and your children/grandchildren share a century, a world, a life. Great-great-grandchildren live in a fundamentally different world. For practical purposes, your great-great-grandchild is not really “yours” — you don’t share a life with them.

12. Moral Obligations Diminish with Generational Distance

Obligations to descendants are grounded in shared life — actual, lived connection. You have obligations to your children because you share a life with them; the same applies to parents and grandparents. But by the time you reach a great-great-great-grandfather (or great-great-great-grandchild), the connection is effectively nil:

– You don’t share a life, a world, or real experiences with them.

– The genetic/relational share is diluted (e.g., “he only owns 1/128th of me”).

– Therefore, you have no *specific* moral obligation to distant descendants *as your descendants*.

Conclusion: It would be strange to say you should do something specifically so that people you have no real moral connection with will benefit.

12a. Clarification: Not Contractarian but Based on “Order of Love”

The argument is rooted in the idea that moral obligations track closeness — levels of care radiating outward from the self. Being a good person means caring about your children, grandchildren, and perhaps great-grandchildren. Beyond that, care becomes abstract and universal (“citizen of the world”/cosmopolitan), not specifically directed at *your* lineage.

12b. The Universal vs. the Particular Problem

If you care about the world at the cosmopolitan level, the solution to humanity’s problems is universal, not ethnic/familial:

The Jewish problem (Jewish survival) — solved by working on the particular/family level.

The human problem — solved by working on the universal level (e.g., “they should stop killing the Jews”).

You *can* work on the universal level beyond the fourth generation, but you cannot frame it as an obligation *to your children* at that point.

12c. Provocative Implication: The Neighbor vs. the Distant Descendant

> ### Student Challenge and Dialogue

> A student pushes back: Does this mean you should care more about the guy in the next town over than about your great-great-grandchild?

Possibly yes — the person nearby shares more of your actual life and world. Caring about “random guys” is grounded in shared humanity, which is real but abstract. Caring about grandchildren *as grandchildren* (not merely as humans) requires actual shared life — shared family world, real touch, real connection. Sharing a historical period is only minimally interesting (“they interviewed a 106-year-old woman — everything changed”).

Key distinction: “Sharing a world” means sharing the world of a family (real, intimate connection), not merely living in the same time period.

13. The Abraham (*Avraham Avinu*) Model — The Core Positive Argument

13a. Abraham’s Plan

Abraham had a plan — to fix something for the whole world (or at least his family), but the *tool* for executing this plan was his family/nation (a nation being “just a bigger version of family”). The plan required biological children — when Abraham couldn’t have children, the plan was threatened. It doesn’t work without descendants.

13b. The Mechanism: Intergenerational Habituation

Drawing on the previous week’s class:

– When a person habituates good traits, those habits become second nature — described as the *s’char* (reward) of good actions.

This same process operates between generations: children receive their parents’ accumulated habits (good and bad) “for free” — through education, living in the household, and possibly genetics.

– Parents see their own bad habits reflected unselfconsciously in their children (since the parent still views themselves as “choosing,” while the child simply *has* the habit as family custom/*minhag*).

Abraham’s plan was to leverage this intergenerational transmission — to slowly cultivate and inoculate good habits across generations, working with human nature’s biological and social mechanisms.

> ### Side Digression: Why Not Students Instead of Children?

> A student asks: why couldn’t Abraham use students? The *midrash* says students are better than children, but that’s *midrash*, not *pshat* (plain meaning). If you want to work with human nature effectively, you should work as closely to biology as possible. “Yitzchak couldn’t marry the midrash” — i.e., practical reality requires biological family.

13c. General Principle: Social Change Must Work *With* Human Nature

Any revolution that goes against the family is likely to fail or produce unintended consequences. Effective social change uses human nature as it is, not as we wish it to be (invoking Machiavelli: effective politics requires describing human nature realistically). Therefore, the tool of family, biology, and lineage is the most reliable vehicle for long-term moral/social transformation.

14. Abraham’s Crisis: The Plan Falls Apart Without Children

Abraham realized that without children, the entire plan collapses. His turning to God (in Parshat Lekh Lekha) is interpreted not as a prayer request but as a moment of existential reckoning — an acknowledgment (hashash) that the plan is failing. Abraham says: “You promised me reward, but I don’t even have children” — meaning the divinely-ordained plan (go forth, be blessed, have descendants) was not materializing.

Key interpretive move: When the Torah says “God promised him,” this means *that was the plan* — it was supposed to work *naturally*, not through miraculous intervention. Even if God Himself tells you something, relying on magic rather than natural processes is a bad plan. God created nature so that things should work through it. If your plan is “God will override His own nature to save me,” you are operating in a fundamentally flawed way.

> Side note/clarification: This pushes back against a claim made the previous week that the argument was that Abraham “naturalized everything.” That’s not quite the point — rather, one must understand *how God actually works* (through nature). The alternative reading is labeled a drush (homiletical interpretation), not the pshat (plain meaning).

15. Abraham’s Naïve but Necessary Early Optimism

Abraham originally had a naïve view — he believed everything would work out perfectly. This naïveté was *necessary*: had Abraham understood from the start how difficult the process would be, he never would have begun. God then corrected Abraham’s understanding, showing him he had made a basic mistake about how such civilizational processes work.

16. Abraham’s Strategic Relocation

Abraham’s move from Ur Kasdim/Haran to Canaan is explained strategically:

– In Haran, everyone knew him as “the chutzpadik son of Terach” who broke his father’s idols — no one took him seriously.

משנה מקום משנה מזל (change your place, change your fortune) — by relocating, he could reinvent himself.

– In the new place, he introduced himself as the founder of a new religion (“Vayikra sham b’shem Hashem El Olam“).

– He began gaining followers (chasidim).

> ### Side Digression: The Meaning of “Getchke”

> A lengthy humorous tangent about translating the Yiddish word getchke (a diminutive, somewhat contemptuous term for an idol/figurine). “Idol” in English carries too much grandeur — a getchke is something small and ridiculous. “Statue” is also too grandiose. Various suggestions (dolls, statues) are rejected. An anecdote about the Elk Club on Kennedy Blvd is shared. The point: Terach’s idols weren’t grand “idols” — they were pathetic getchkelach.

17. Abraham’s Institutional Infrastructure

The mizbeach (altar) Abraham built is reinterpreted: it wasn’t just a heap of rocks in the desert. A mizbeach is a permanent structure — it represents an entire institutional complex: a yeshiva/academy, a temple/worship center, a hospitality center (like a “Chabad house”). Abraham set up a full civilizational infrastructure for teaching his religion and practicing hachnasas orchim (hospitality).

18. Sodom as Abraham’s Primary Rival (“The Original Misnagdim”)

Sodom is introduced as Abraham’s ideological mirror-opposite — a competing new civilization with a radically different plan:

Abraham’s model: Kindness, hospitality, open outreach at crossroads, teaching religion to all.

Sodom’s model: A Spartan society — no mercy, no compassion for the weak, strict meritocracy, self-sufficiency, ruthlessness (“we drink liberal tears”).

Both were new societies with competing visions for civilization.

18a. The Story of Lot as Illustrating the Rivalry

Lot’s departure from Abraham and settlement in Sodom dramatizes the tension. Lot said “there’s no room for me here” and gravitated toward Sodom, becoming an aristocrat there (yoshev b’sha’ar Sedom). This parallels the bechor (firstborn) dynamic discussed earlier — the ambitious one who breaks away.

18b. The War with Chedorlaomer: Sodom’s Humiliation

Sodom’s great test came when they rebelled against Chedorlaomer (possibly the same adversary Abraham had fled). The Sodomites believed their tough, unforgiving society could defeat this empire — but they couldn’t. Abraham, with only 318 men, succeeded where Sodom failed, saving them only because his nephew Lot happened to be there.

This was Sodom’s greatest humiliation: the rival civilization built on kindness and hospitality proved militarily superior to the one built on ruthlessness.

18c. The King of Sodom’s Diplomatic Bluff

After the rescue, by the laws of war, everything — Sodom’s people, property, women, children — belonged to Abraham as the victor. (Analogy: this is the same logic by which Israel belongs to God after the Exodus.)

The King of Sodom attempted a face-saving diplomatic maneuver: he offered Abraham the property/money if Abraham would return the people. This was a bluff — the king was in no position to “give” anything, since it all already belonged to Abraham by right of conquest. The king was pretending to negotiate from a position of equality to preserve his honor.

Abraham saw through the trick. If the King had said “we are your slaves, do what you will” (unconditional surrender), Abraham would have won outright. But the King had Malkitzedek (the priest) on his side invoking something like “international law,” so Abraham decided to walk away from the whole thing — take nothing — rather than be cast as the beneficiary of a diplomatic arrangement that distorted the truth. He refused to engage, recognizing that accepting anything would allow the King of Sodom to later claim, “אני העשרתי את אברהם” (“I made Abraham rich”) — thus undermining Abraham’s independence and the integrity of his civilizational project. He stipulated only that his allies still receive their share, since he couldn’t impose his own principles on them.

19. Abraham’s Plan Is Failing — The Problem of Succession

The core theological-practical crisis of Abraham’s life:

The original plan: Come to Canaan, establish a righteous family, build strength (he had 318 warriors who defeated the greatest empire of the age), and live as a growing, self-sustaining righteous community.

The plan is bankrupt:

– He has no children of his own (with Sarah).

– Attempts at surrogate succession didn’t work.

Ishmael was “Plan B,” but failed — Ishmael wouldn’t become a *mentch*. Biology matters (50% DNA from the mother — Hagar wasn’t a *tzadeikes*), people have free choice, and Ishmael was sent away with his mother, not raised directly by Abraham.

– The same pattern repeats later with Eisav (Yitzchak’s son).

20. The Core Problem: The Limit of Intergenerational Influence

This is the central philosophical argument:

A person’s real influence on descendants is limited to at most four generations, and practically often only one or two.

– Even the best parent/teacher cannot truly shape great-grandchildren. By that point, the original figure becomes a distant abstraction, not a living influence.

Side Digression: This Applies to Teachers Too

The principle extends beyond family: teachers also face this limit.

– We call Moshe Rabbeinu “our teacher for 10,000 generations” — but what does that actually mean? “I don’t get to talk to him.” There is no such thing as being a real teacher across thousands of years in any straightforward sense.

Sharp contemporary critique: When people say “the Rebbe never died — his Torah is still alive, so it continues forever” — this is a bluff. It works for about one and a half generations. The people who said it also die, never realizing their claim was a “fake false prophecy.” The next generation inherits a *masorah* (tradition) of saying this, and “then we’re all living in a lie.”

– Honest admission: “I don’t actually know that there’s a real solution to this problem.” Each generation probably needs its own living teachers. But there must be *something more* — some strategy the tradition has developed.

21. A New *Pshat* on the Bris Bein HaBesarim (Covenant Between the Parts)

A serious reinterpretation of the Bris Bein HaBesarim (Genesis 15):

God’s message to Abraham: Your plan of living happily ever after in Canaan with children and grandchildren is nonsense — because your great-grandchildren won’t truly remember who Abraham was, or if they do, it will be in “some weird fake way.”

– The plan was never viable. Abraham lived 24–25 years based on it, but it was never real.

God proposes a different plan — one not fully understood, but which *at minimum* means: you cannot rely on saving your great-grandchildren through direct personal influence.

21a. The Meaning of “400 Years” and “Fourth Generation”

– The 400 years of slavery prophesied in the Bris = four cycles of four generations (100 years ≈ the living memory span of one cohort; ×4 = the point where no one remembers the people who remembered the people who remembered the original).

– This maps onto the verse “the fourth generation shall return here” (דור רביעי ישובו הנה) — the same logic that a person’s reach doesn’t extend past the fourth step.

God’s price for the plan that actually works: For precisely those four generations (the span Abraham cannot control), his descendants will experience the exact opposite of his dream — slavery to a foreign nation with total power over his children.

– After that, a cycle will begin that somehow solves the problem of intergenerational transmission.

22. The Central Contradiction Acknowledged

What follows is contrary to the entire lecture’s thesis (that parents shouldn’t over-invest in children because influence fades by the fourth generation). A counter-reading is now introduced:

The real reason Jews don’t assimilate is not Leo Strauss’s tragic mechanism (perpetual outsider status), but rather the belief that by the fourth generation, Mashiach will come.

– The logic: Why not just become a regular nation? Because it won’t last — by the fourth generation, Mashiach arrives. This is what Hashem told Avraham Avinu.

23. The Paradox of Legacy and the Fourth Generation

A paradox:

Your influence/legacy only truly begins to operate (or become necessary) in the fourth generation — precisely when natural parental influence dies out.

– The “negative” version: the problem (assimilation, loss of identity) only truly starts at the fourth generation.

– The “positive” version (stated with admitted uncertainty): Abraham was working on something designed to survive beyond the natural course of human generational influence — something that outlasts the great-grandchild horizon.

– Honest admission: “I don’t have a solution. I’m just making the problem vivid so you can absorb it.”

24. Who Caused Jewish Suffering? — Avraham Avinu

Connecting to a Midrash discussed in a previous shiur (אם לא צורם מכרם):

Avraham Avinu is the “source” who sold the Jews into suffering. He had a choice: his children go to Gehinnom, or they suffer in this world under the nations. He chose the latter.

New layer added: Abraham chose this precisely because of the fourth-generation problem. He was trying to create something that lasts past the fourth generation, where it “starts really working.” The suffering in galus is the cost of that project.

25. The Akeidah as the Key Image

25a. The Problem of Grandparental Merit

On Rosh Hashanah we invoke זכור לנו עקידת יצחק — remember the Akeidah for our sake. But the lecture just established that grandparents don’t matter after a few generations. So why should Abraham’s act thousands of years ago matter to us? This is the same problem restated.

25b. The Rambam’s Interpretation of Nisayon (Moreh Nevuchim III:24)

The Rambam addresses the theological problem that “nisayon” (test) implies God doesn’t know the outcome:

Nisayon doesn’t mean “test” — it means publicization (from the root “nes” = banner/sign). The Akeidah is a famous story from which we learn two things:

1. Prophets are absolutely certain of their prophecy. No normal, good person would kill their son unless utterly certain God commanded it. This establishes the reality of prophecy *for the prophet* (not necessarily for anyone else). Since prophecy is foundational to religion, and Abraham founded religion, this is critical.

2. The seriousness of Ahavas Hashem (love of God). Abraham was old, desperately wanted a child, finally had one, and then was willing to sacrifice him — not in a moment of passion but after three days of deliberation. This shows the depth of love of God, done not for reward but purely for love.

25c. The Rambam’s Strange Claim: We Must Imitate the Akeidah

The Rambam says we follow Abraham’s true opinions and also imitate his actions. The Akeidah is the supreme example. But we don’t literally perform an Akeidah. The whole point is that it wasn’t carried out. So what does “imitating” it mean?

26. The Novel Peshat: Akeidah = Bris Bein HaBesarim

The central interpretive claim:

The Akeidah is essentially the same thing as the Bris Bein HaBesarim (the Covenant Between the Parts, where Abraham was told his descendants would suffer 400 years in exile).

– The Akeidah is a mashal (metaphor/image) for Abraham choosing galus for his children.

Abraham was trying to solve a problem that transcends the four-generation horizon. To create something that survives past the natural decay of parental influence (past the fourth generation), he had to sacrifice the welfare of the first four generations.

– This means: thinking beyond your children requires a willingness to not care about the immediate generations — symbolized by the willingness to slaughter his own son.

Literally: Abraham didn’t slaughter Yitzchak, but he did cause Yitzchak to go into galus, Yaakov to suffer, and ultimately — stated starkly — Abraham caused the six million to be killed by Hitler. That is what the Midrash means.

27. The Synthesis: Akeidah, Mashiach, and Ahavas Hashem

Why did Abraham cause all this suffering? Because he was trying to create something that survives the end of the natural generational process.

– This connects to the end/purpose of prophecy and to the infinite limit of Ahavas Hashem, which is what Mashiach represents.

– The Jewish project aims at something where you don’t care about yourself or even your children — because if you work only within the framework of your children, you won’t survive the fifth generation.

Two ways to frame the same idea:

1. Don’t care about your children because you should care about yourself (the lecture’s earlier thesis).

2. Don’t care about your children because you’re caring about something that transcends all of that — and therefore lasts to the fifth generation and beyond, where salvation comes.

28. The Akeidah Reinterpreted as Mashal (Parable) — Further Development

Abraham did not actually slaughter his son. The real content: Abraham made his descendants go into Mitzrayim (Egypt/slavery). The test is: if you are the kind of people who can survive Mitzrayim, then Abraham’s project — the Abrahamic covenant — can begin to function.

Connection to prior shiur: The Abrahamic project only works if you stop thinking about today and tomorrow — if you can envision beyond the immediate.

28a. “Al Tishlach Yadcha El HaNa’ar” as the Geulah Itself

A new pshat (interpretation):

– The angelic command “Do not stretch out your hand against the boy” (Genesis 22:12) is not merely the cessation of the test — it is the geulah (redemption) already.

– The second angel who speaks represents the redemptive promise: “I will greatly multiply your seed” (כי הרבה ארבה זרעך).

– The moment of being told to stop — the moment of looking up and beyond the sacrifice — is itself the redemptive moment.

29. Blaming the Forefathers — and Their Justification

Half-seriously: “We should blame our forefathers for sticking us in this” — i.e., for committing future generations to a path of suffering and endurance.

Their justification: they believed Moshiach would come after — but not to them personally.

30. The Secret of Moshiach: Beyond One’s Own Lifetime

What is called “the secret” of Moshiach:

– An anecdote: An old Jew came to “the Mordechaim” and asked when Moshiach would come. The answer: “Not in my days, or my children’s, or my grandchildren’s.”

– The principle: Anyone who truly thinks Moshiach will come in his own lifetime has not understood what Moshiach is.

– Moshiach is, by definition, the thing that comes after your grandchild or great-grandchild dies — it is essentially trans-generational, beyond any individual’s horizon.

31. Prophecy and the Right to Sacrifice Future Generations

A student raises a difficulty: How could the Avos (patriarchs) receive a prophecy that seemingly commanded them to sacrifice or endanger their children?

– This is precisely the question of the Akeidas Yitzchak.

Answer (partial): Prophecy itself grants the right. If God commands through prophecy, that prophetic authority overrides normal moral reasoning — “Who gave you the right? Prophecy gave you the right.”

– On the second level of understanding prophecy, there is no full explanation for how it works mechanistically. Prophecy is so overwhelmingly clear to the one who receives it that the prophet has no choice — it presents itself as absolute truth. But the *mechanism* by which this certainty operates remains unexplained.

32. The Akeidah = The Story of Jews Refusing to Assimilate

The Akeidah story is ultimately the story of Jews refusing to assimilate, thereby causing their great-grandchildren either to suffer or to be saved. The only way to work with something that transcends the limitations of a finite process is to work past it — to go beyond it entirely. This is the true meaning of mesiras nefesh (self-sacrifice): not merely risking one life, but transcending the framework of one life, one family, even one generation. The purpose of the Jewish people is not reducible to being “the family” or “the children of” any particular generation.

33. Honest Admission of Irresolution

The lecture closes candidly:

“I don’t have a solution. I just tell you the problem.”

– The mechanism by which Abraham’s project actually works past the fourth generation cannot be explained.

– The Rambam’s answer is that prophecy is so overwhelmingly clear to the prophet that he has no choice — he knows it’s true. But this doesn’t constitute an explanation of *how* it works.

– The status of the question remains: The avos received prophecy that required them to, in effect, sacrifice their children — choosing long-term transcendent purpose over immediate generational welfare. The mechanism by which this actually produces salvation remains unexplained.

Summary of the Complete Argument Arc

1. Why be Jewish? → Because the alternative (being a “Gentile-ish Jew”) is incoherent (Strauss).

2. But multi-generational assimilation? → After enough generations, the problem disappears. Isn’t that worth the short-term cost?

3. Methodological warning: Reverse stupidity is not intelligence — recognizing bias toward Judaism doesn’t make assimilation correct.

4. The cost of being hated: Universal hatred is a diagnostic sign, not a badge of honor. Good people shouldn’t expect to be hated. The “we’re hated because we’re right” narrative is challenged.

5. Moral obligations diminish with generational distance: You share no real life with great-great-grandchildren. Obligations track closeness.

6. Abraham’s plan: Use family/biology as the vehicle for civilizational change through intergenerational habituation.

7. The plan’s crisis: Abraham has no children; surrogates fail; influence is limited to ~4 generations.

8. The Bris Bein HaBesarim: God tells Abraham the plan was never viable as conceived. A new plan requires 400 years of suffering — precisely the span Abraham cannot control.

9. The Akeidah as paradigm: Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac = his willingness to send his descendants into galus. The Akeidah and the Bris are the same event.

10. Mashiach as the trans-generational horizon: Mashiach by definition comes *after* your great-grandchildren die. The Jewish project requires caring about something beyond any individual’s lifetime.

11. Unresolved: The mechanism by which this actually works remains unexplained. The problem is made vivid, not solved.


תמלול מלא 📝

Why Remain Jewish? The Problem of Multi-Generational Assimilation

Chapter 1: Continuation from Last Week – The Basic Answer

Instructor: Okay. Good? Perfect. So like this. First I have to say important המשך [hamshach: continuation] to last week’s shiur [class/lecture], which was really recorded in Yiddish, but you all know Yiddish anyways. And it was like this, and I’m explaining to you also the answer to your question. Remember that you had a question? You had a question that—remember we had a question on Peter—why we should be Jewish and what was the answer that we discussed then. And that it’s that the basic answer is that there’s no other choice, because you can only be a Yiddish [Jewish] Yid or a Goyish [Gentile-ish] Yid, and you might as well be a Yiddish Yid. It’s very sad to be a Goyish Yid, right? Remember? Correct summary?

Then there was a sha’aleh [question] like this, so we could even explain the answer a little better.

Chapter 2: Leo Strauss’s Framework – “Why We Are Still Jews”

Instructor: And we explained, that’s what Leo Strauss said in his article called “Why We Are Still Jews.” There’s a lecture that Leo Strauss gave and it’s called “Why We Are Still Jews.” And he said that there’s a few solutions to the Jewish problem. One of them is genocide, right? Cultural genocide, self-genocide, right? Which is called assimilation, right? Self-cultural genocide. Come on, let’s just stop doing this. Become a normal man. I’ll say it in English: Become normal people.

And the answer to that, the Zionists considered this answer. You know, all the frum [religiously observant] Jews are very weird, because Herzl, he thought of becoming—how about we convert all the Jews to Christianity at one point? And therefore that means that he was really a secret messenger? No, he was going through the logical options and seeing what worked. What’s wrong with that? You’re the weirdo that never considered this option. You should consider it, right?

Then he realized that it’s not a realistic option. Why not? Because you can’t become a goy [non-Jew]. You can become a Jewish goy or a Jewish Jew, however we say it. And that’s very—you said so. Therefore he realized that you have to stay Jewish.

But my point is, that option is not really reasonable.

Chapter 3: The Counter-Argument – Multi-Generational Assimilation

Instructor: But now there’s a question on this. It *is* reasonable, right? Because if you become a goy, and then for one generation you’re going to be a goy shegoy [a gentile who is gentile-ish], a Yiddish goy, sorry, and you’re going to be a very weird creature, a self-hating Jew. And then, after one generation, two generations, three, four, five, at some point your children won’t remember that they had a Jewish grandfather. And that’s all. Well, you have solved the problem.

So anyone that cares more about the children than about himself should do that. True? Am I asking? Makes sense.

Student: Generations.

Instructor: Yeah, let’s say ten. You think it’s a good argument? I want to ask you if you think it’s a good argument. What do you think? You think it’s a good argument?

Student: What’s the goal of the argument?

Instructor: To be Jewish means that you’re the one that killed Christ, and then it’s not a good situation to be. So therefore you’re going to be—you’re going to be hurt and abused.

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: Hurt and abused. And just to be clear, hurt and abused—it’s not only a material problem, it’s also a spiritual problem, right? People don’t do well when they’re… It’s not normal, not a good situation to be in.

So therefore the solution—you could, you know, convert to Christianity, might be one way of assimilating, or maybe you shouldn’t do that, because the goyim [non-Jews] in Europe are not Christian anymore, so you should just convert to cultural Christianity, which is called being OTD [Off The Derech: no longer religiously observant]. You have some times, like what we said in the shiur, where you’re just—you’re okay with the questions, it’s fine.

Student: Yes, okay.

Instructor: The argument, the problem was that we’re most of the time we’re in this predicament. Let’s talk about this predicament. We’ll talk about that story.

Chapter 4: Examining the Trade-Off

Instructor: I’m asking you a question about this argument. Forget about this. We could generalize this question, right? If I’m in a situation where I could make my life not much better, slightly better, but my great-great-grandchildren’s life will be entirely solved a certain problem—so should I do it? Is the correct thing to do that? You think of course. Why?

Student: What do you mean?

Instructor: Explain.

Let’s flip it around with this. We don’t have any emotional attachment to this. Let’s say this Christian guy always gets abused by the Jews or by the Muslims or whatever. Would you tell him, okay, just be an ost-Christian [former Christian], just become an am ha’aretz [ignoramus/common person]. And like this, maybe you’re still going to be like those, a bit hurt here and there. But three generations, you’re a selfless guy, right? You’re interested in… Fuck it, you’re selfish even, right? You’re interested that your children should have a life in this world, your grandchildren. Yeah, of course, everyone tells the other. Meaning, me, the Taryag [613 commandments], with the zecher [memory], with all the Christians. You would say that.

For the Christian guy, sure, right? Just doing this, attached to my Judaism, whatever, so then I have these weird, big-easy thoughts. I don’t think.

Student: Okay, so then, I don’t know. I don’t think.

Instructor: First, to be clear, it’s not a costless thing. If it’s costless, then why not? Not costless, right? There’s a cost to you, right? You’re so sure that you should pay any cost, so your great-great-great-grandchild—wait, takes at least four generations. So your great-great-grandchild should have a better life, and you’re paying any cost, you’ll ruin your life to whichever extent you want because of that. Is that correct? What’s your argument? You’re giving up your life, so you’re great. You’re ruining your life. You’re going to have a really sad, messed up life, also your great-great-grandchild should have a slightly better life. That’s the trade that you just said you should do.

Student: We’re here in a nice school and they were just chillin’ and we’re thinking about things, and but you’re only thinking about that you told me about we say it’s coming through the blocks and murdering all of you and whatever. I think there’s—yes, there’s that thought like, it’s pretty okay to give up on this geshmak [pleasant/enjoyable] life, or what type of sacrifice is it compared to real torture and death and all that? You’re giving up a good life for that.

Instructor: What good life?

Student: Well, it’s a good life now. You’re living a good life. You’re living a…

Instructor: Yeah, now. But then we’re not talking about assimilating. Again, remember that whenever we say good life, we are including morally good, because there isn’t really such a thing as discussing material good without moral good or spiritual good. There’s some moral good or intellectual good or spiritual good that we’re talking about also. That should be a contemplation. There’s a trade-off. It’s slightly less. They never killed someone that was morally good in Aristotle’s world, right? They killed people that were hidden, that kept the Torah of Jesus. In their way, that was their way for being good. You want them to give up. They should be bad. In other words, their great-grandchildren should have a chance at being different, having different problems, basically, right?

You’re acting like you’re very sure. I don’t know. You’re very sure of one side because you think that because you were agreeing with the other side, because if you have negi’us [bias/vested interest], therefore the other side is very clear. It’s not very clear. Not very clear.

Student: No, I’m just defogging it that way.

Instructor: No, you’re not. You’re actually adding fog by doing that.

Student: Okay, how?

Chapter 5: Methodological Principle – Reverse Stupidity Is Not Intelligence

Instructor: This is a whole other sha’aleh. A whole other side. But you should know, you saw this. Shmueli, if someone—there’s an argument that goes like this, a very important argument. It’s written about already in one of my writings that I wrote and sent in the beginning of the year, I think, or last year, when I was trying to make my weekly ma’amar [essay/discourse].

It said like this: Many people think that when they support their own side, so to speak, in religion or nationalism or something like that, where there’s a very clear group side—so they say, well, I’m only agreeing to this because it’s my side, and I’ll accept any bad argument for it, right? I’m not worried about things like this, for example. And therefore they say that probably most of the things that I believe or that I agree with when they’re arguing to this side are just because of that very strong bias that I have towards it.

And they talk about this a lot, about this problem, and they think that talking about this problem a lot and saying “well, what if you would have been a Palestinian, what would you have thought?”—that that gives them clarity of thought, that gives them an unbiased clear view from nowhere, right, from objectivity on the reality. And I think very seriously, very seriously, that that’s not correct.

In other words, because you remember, Eliezer Yudkowsky said, “Reverse stupidity is not intelligence,” right? He said, if there’s a weather vane—you know what’s a weather vane? Let’s get from Eliezer Yudkowsky. Okay, what’s that? A weather vane, like this chicken, this rooster on the top of the house that tells you which way the wind is blowing, right?

But if you have a broken one, it’s still useful. Because broken just means that whatever it says west, it’s really east. And when it says east, it’s really west. So reverse weather vane is really as useful as a correct one. Like that guy that said, “How do you know that’s da’as Torah [Torah knowledge/wisdom]? That’s there, is the opposite of that.” “What about them?” So you ask about the ba’al habayis [homeowner/layperson], and he tells you that, and you do the opposite, right? That’s—or like a Litvak [Lithuanian Jew]. A guy once said, “If I don’t know what to do, yes, let’s fucking do exactly that.”

That would have been true if the world—if reverse stupidity would have been intelligence. The problem is that it doesn’t work like that. Why? Remember what Aristotle said? There’s only one truth, and there’s many, many ways to be wrong. Remember what Tolstoy said, right? There’s one way to be happy and many, many ways to be sad. Remember? Remember?

The Problem of Reverse Stupidity and the Question of Universal Hatred

Chapter 1: The Aristotelian Principle – Many Ways to Be Bad, Few Ways to Be Good

The Literary and Philosophical Foundation

Instructor: Which references am I going to make you know? How is this going to work? All happy families are happy in the same way. All unhappy families are unhappy in different ways. That’s the beginning of Anna Karenina. One of the most famous opening lines in literature. You should know about it.

Anyways, but that’s all based on this basic thought from Aristotle. That there’s many ways to be bad and not many ways to be good. That was one of his arguments for why the good should be the middle way. Remember?

And Aristotle said that this is a Pythagorean thought, because the Pythagoreans said that the one is on the side of the good, and the many and the varied and the unequal and so on, and the even, because odd is one and even is two, so even numbers are the bad ones according to Pythagoras. So those are the side of the bad.

Student: Zygus [zugos: Greek term meaning “yoked” or “paired,” referring to even numbers].

Instructor: Yeah, Zygus. We talked about this. I know. Not with you? Someone? Yeah, Zygus, exactly. Zygus are bad, because Zygus means that there’s two, there’s duality. Duality is bad.

Application: The Reverse Stupidity Problem

Instructor: So because at least there’s at least two ways to be bad there’s never something because of this just to go back because of this when someone says tell you something stupid doing the opposite of that is very like is more likely to be another stupid thing than to be the correct thing stemmed math works out.

Therefore when you say I am biased by believing my side of the story therefore I should be not biased and give a lot of weight at least not saying believing nobody says I’m just gonna believe but I’m gonna give a lot of way to the other side of the story, that has more chances of being stupidity than it has of being truth. Very important, this is true. Think about it and say, I’m not going to argue with you about this because you don’t realize. So I’m telling it to you.

Student: I’m a spectrum, it’s a triangle. I agree, but I don’t think in this instance it’s that way.

Instructor: No, I’m just telling you that you made that argument. Instead of making an actual argument why it’s better, you said, let me give you the opposite story or a different story and when you do whenever someone does that I have to assume that they’re making it more confused instead of more or just as confused instead of clarifying anything because I don’t see how you clarify anything.

I could see there’s a question here what to do and he said well you would have obviously no I would not have obviously there would be the same question or there’s the same question of you didn’t stop anything by reversing the story nothing I get it and you didn’t say what you you didn’t solve there’s a real question and you pretended that it’s not a real question and you said it’s not a real question because if you would have been on the other side you would have said the opposite which is not correct there is a real question and the same real question you didn’t make the real question less.

Sometimes someone is looking at the question the wrong way and you give them an opposite example or something and you see that everyone agrees that one but it’s not true that everyone agrees with that you just made that assumption because you made the very strong assumption that the reason why someone would agree with the other side is because they’re on that side but that’s not correct there’s a real question so reversing which side you’re on doesn’t solve mostly any anything and doesn’t solve anything here either.

Chapter 2: Returning to the Core Question – Sacrifice for Distant Descendants

The Problem Restated

Instructor: So let’s go back to where we are it doesn’t solve anything here either it’s not obvious at all that someone should make their life worse because their great-grandchild that should be better in any way is that very not obvious.

Student: Why is it worse for him?

Instructor: It’s worse that was the question oh we were assuming again we were assuming that it’s worse if you think it’s not worth that’s a different question it’s be better for you too. We’re saying it’s going to be worse for you, but for your great-grandchild you’ll be better. That was the facts of the question that we laid out. That fact wasn’t the question. That fact was just the background fact that we’re assuming for this question to even begin.

We said, you’re going to have a bad life because assimilation doesn’t actually work in one generation. No assimilation does. That’s just how human nature is. I don’t think this is something that Jews believe specifically. Everyone believes that. You know people that go to a different country many often agree that they’re having they’re making life worse for themselves they’re doing I’m doing it for my kids right.

Okay so doing it for your children is one thing but if you’re doing it for your great great grandchildren is another thing and even doing it for your children is not actually as simple as as it seems to be for many reasons which we could talk about if you think if you want to and if I don’t think this is I don’t think this is a simple question if you should.

A Critical Sub-Question: Does One Become Bad in the Process?

Instructor: To me the the first question is such a situation does the person need to become a bad person in order for their grandchildren to be good if he’s actually becoming a bad person then he probably shouldn’t at all I agree they’re just trying to I’m trying I’m trying to think about the question.

Student: Yeah why does it what does it equal you start off with Leo Strauss again let’s go in.

Chapter 3: Leo Strauss’s Framing – The “Jewish Problem”

Why Assimilation Was Considered

Instructor: I was getting to a different question yes right you started with Leo Strauss saying that neutral what you all said, that we could assimilate, but we will not work in one generation, and therefore we shouldn’t. And basically, I don’t remember if he said, but let’s take this story. You’re saying basically, and you shouldn’t.

Now, my question to you is, what is the issue that he said, let’s assimilate? In other words, why is that to have a minute?

Student: Because we’re going to solve the Jewish problem.

Instructor: What’s the Jewish problem?

Student: That everyone hates us.

Instructor: I think that’s basically the problem. And there’s no use. Like, I’m being the guy that everyone hates. It’s not a good situation. That’s what I said. And we get abused, right? We get hurt, we get killed. It’s bad. It’s bad. If everyone just hates us, then nothing ever happens.

Student: No, no, no, no. It means that we get hurt.

Instructor: No, no, it’s bad. It’s bad even if nothing happens. It’s bad. Just to be clear, adding parts of hurt, they’re not going to solve your problem. So then it’s not a sacrifice. In other words, okay, so everyone hates me, fine.

Student: No, it’s not. You think that it’s fine. It’s not fine.

Instructor: It’s not fine. It’s not fine. Why? It’s not fine. I’m making this assumption. I can’t give it. That’s a fourth sheet. It’s not fine. It’s not fine.

The Provocative Claim: Universal Hatred as a Sign

Instructor: By the way, if they hate you, it’s probably because there’s something wrong with you. Let’s be real. Usually people hate something that’s hurting them or somehow something is wrong with you. Why would you be that guy that everyone hates? Something is wrong. It’s a sign that something went wrong, right? Everyone agrees with that.

Student: I think most of the world would hate the philosopher type, but there’s nothing wrong with them.

Instructor: By the way, there is definitely something wrong with them. The first philosopher called Plato or Socrates wrote a book to talking about this problem. Maybe more than one book talking about this problem. He thought it was a problem. Okay?

If you’re if everyone hates you you’re probably not as good as you think you are. Yeah, I think we’re very used to this. We’re way too used to this idea that everyone hates us and we’re the best. I don’t think that’s a reasonable stable stable belief. It might be true. I’m not saying it’s impossible that should be the case, but it should cause you to stop and think.

Testing the Principle: The Reverse Question

Student: Is the reverse true also? If everyone likes you, then you’re good?

Instructor: No, not a proof, but it’s not a reason to be concerned. I mean, maybe if it is, if you have a very perverse thought that everyone is wrong, so if everyone likes you, then again, but that’s again the reverse stupidity problem, right?

Student: It is, but it’s also a little bit showing that that’s not the measuring tape.

Instructor: No, it’s not. Nobody said it is, but it’s a sign.

Student: Is it?

Instructor: Yeah, pretty sure it is. I think that if you think it’s not a sign, there’s something wrong with you.

Student: No. Now you’re saying…

Instructor: No, I’m doing psychological pressure on you. Now you’re saying, like, fuck, how low it is.

Student: No, no, no. I’m talking about…

Instructor: Yeah, it’s not a fact. I’m starting from there. In… Okay, let’s get back to where we were. I have to say a sheet, right? So, I was saying that there’s an assumption that says that…

Chapter 4: Are Good People Hated? A Socratic Argument

The Core Challenge

Instructor: Are good people hated by bad people? Or not usually? No, why should good people be hated? That’s such a weird idea.

Student: You good people are why?

Instructor: No good people means people that make things better right?

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: Okay so if you’re making things better why would anyone be against that?

Student: You’re making it worse for the bad people.

Instructor: So you’re not actually making things better. So you’re not actually making things better are you? You’re making bad people worse. Are you making the bad people worse or better? Things better for them or worse for them? Those are two different questions. Very good. Even punishment is supposed to be good for the bad people, not the bad people.

Student: I can imagine the bad person hating.

Instructor: Yeah, that’s another one of the excuses that you’re saying. I can be jealous. He’s jealous of a good person. He makes everything good around him. I don’t think that’s correct. I think that if a good person makes you jealous, something wrong with the good person.

Student: Would you say that a bad person is someone who hates what might be good for them?

The Doctor Analogy

Instructor: It’s weird, though. Like, because you have to think of the… You remember Zachary’s… Now I’m just repeating Zachary’s kind of arguments. But if you remember, like, patients almost never hate doctors, even when the doctors do things that they hate. Right?

Because doctors are people that try to make you more healthy, which is a kind of good thing. And the doctor might tell you you’ve got to take a… Even if the doctor gets you very annoyed, you have to go on a diet and you have to stop smoking and stop doing all the nonsense that you’re doing and the guy says, thank you very much and then he doesn’t listen. But very few people go around hating doctors besides for our health secretary or whatever. But it’s a very weird… Most people, even he doesn’t like it. He’s just saying, okay, whatever. Right?

So it’s not obviously… We’re very used to very weird ideas. We have to get out of these weird habits of thought. We’re very used to thinking that if you’re right, you should expect everyone to hate you. Why? Why would that? Maybe you’re stupid. What’s going on here?

Conclusion: Challenging the Assumption

Student: No, I don’t think you’re necessarily hated by everybody. I think you should be liked by most people.

Instructor: [Continues to next section]

The Problem of Being Hated: Teaching, Trust, and the Limits of Moral Obligation

Chapter 1: The Doctor Analogy and the Challenge of Trust

Instructor: Exactly. I don’t understand that either. Well, not only by a bad person. I’ll just give you the example of a doctor. Doctors are about making bad people better, by hurtful ways often, by being against you, and nobody hates them. Right.

Student: What I think is different about medicine is that you trust the doctor.

Instructor: So why couldn’t you get the people to trust you? You’re not all that smart after all, are you?

Student: I don’t believe that the truth is closer to their reach than they…

Instructor: You can’t teach?

Student: No, I’d say it’s more in their reach than… Everyone agrees that what health is?

Instructor: I think people trust doctors because they don’t believe that they know the answer.

Student: The issue is that a bad person might think that he knows the answer.

Instructor: I can see somebody hating or despising a certain doctor that he believes is as irresponsible as they have a difference of opinion than him. I think he believes he’s a qualified medical professional.

Student: Okay, so you’re saying that it’s harder to teach.

Instructor: It shouldn’t be impossible.

Student: No, no, no, you have to…

Instructor: That you’re a bad teacher.

Student: Okay.

Instructor: That’s what teaching is, right?

Student: Yeah, but until then you’re hated. Until you write the Shesh [possibly referring to *Shulchan Aruch*, the authoritative code of Jewish law].

Instructor: It should be expected. Maybe you should be hated if you’re doing a bad job at teaching.

Student: Hopefully there are some people who hated Socrates before they met him.

Instructor: Maybe because he was a bad teacher.

Student: Or maybe because they were pattern matching him to bad teachers.

Chapter 2: The Platonic Defense: Hatred by Association

Instructor: This is the argument that Plato actually makes in the *Republic* [Plato’s foundational work on justice and the ideal state]. He said that people hate philosophers because most of the philosophers they meet are actually bad people.

Student: It’s one way that, yeah, one way you can hate somebody by association.

Instructor: Okay, so now that’s not hating me. I’m saying to someone else that you were mistaken for me.

Student: Okay, still a way.

Instructor: And they’re right for hating me in that sense, right? They just have mistaken object, like mistaken…

Student: Okay, but then…

Chapter 3: The Core Challenge: We’re Too Comfortable Being Hated

Instructor: Okay, all I’m getting at is that we’re way too comfortable with the idea that because we’re right, we’re hated. You should not be so comfortable with it. There’s something very weird with that, and I don’t think it’s generally the case. I think that in most cases people are pretty happy for people to correct them and so on if there’s some weird areas in which this is not the case you should figure out why and also you should figure out how to be a better teacher because there’s no point in being right.

Maybe the true—maybe the reason people sometimes hate people who are right is because those people have responsibility to teach them and they’re doing the opposite of teaching them. They’re making them hate them. And their job should be to love them. And you say, well, in between, they’re going to hate them. Of course, in between, don’t teach them. Who asked you to try to teach something impossible? The point of that. Who did you help now? How did you make anything better?

Maybe you should be kept a secret. Maybe you should just close your mouth and wait for the people to be ready. Or maybe you should figure out some weird, subversive way to teach that people don’t realize that you’re against them until it’s too late. I don’t know. These are real questions.

Chapter 4: Hatred as a Diagnostic Sign: The Case for *Teshuvah* [Repentance/Self-Examination]

Instructor: Why is being hated such a bogeyman story? Meaning, in a certain sense, we should do this the other way also. Meaning, if we find out that *tzaddikim* [righteous people] are hated, there’s a good chance that we should just put them in a *shoe* [possibly *cherem*, excommunication, or a colloquial term for isolation/punishment].

Student: Yeah, that’s my argument.

Instructor: Probably, look, we’re living in a world where we don’t know much. We don’t know much about what is good, about what to live, what is true, through what is beautiful, how to live, right? We’re living off signs. You can’t disregard a very major sign, which is, everyone is against you, you should at least take that as a serious argument.

And besides for it being a serious argument that you should think that maybe you’re doing something wrong, it’s also a serious hindrance to making progress in anything, to having a good life, just to be clear. Not only because they’re going to… I mean, also because of that.

Chapter 5: The Practical Cost of Being Hated: Human Flourishing Requires Cooperation

Instructor: Like a big part of human—humans, the way humans work is like cooperation with other humans. And if they’re not going to let you into their schools and not going to do business with you, I’m not going to cooperate with you, we’re not going to marry with you or you’re not going to marry with them, then you’re going to have a harder time doing the kind of human flourishing that humans do. Humans need other humans to live, right?

You can say, well, I’m going to live by myself. Okay, so that means you’re cutting yourself off from 90% of the good of humanity, right?

The Argument for Assimilation: The Cancer Cure Example

Instructor: Like the very concrete way of saying this is: in Europe in our universities we’re discovering the cure for cancer. Unfortunately they don’t accept you into university if you don’t convert to Christianity. Therefore you’re being very nice—good you—by not being a good person and not discovering the cure for cancer, right?

Therefore the answer is you should convert to Christianity. This is the argument for assimilation. It’s a very serious argument. And say, well, they’re the weird bad guys. Okay, so they are, but you’re also a bad guy now. You should be curing cancer and meanwhile you’re fine.

Student: For think of I guess cautious. I mean that’s also a good thing to do maybe that could just do that so why don’t you let them into issue.

Instructor: Same, same problem.

Student: I’m not let it can stay here okay so.

Chapter 6: The Generational Problem: Who Are You Actually Saving?

Instructor: Or this tower that one of the answers were—we were discussing or one of the arguments were discussing was that you cannot do it because this is not gonna work. Might work for your great grandchildren. And therefore we got to a question which is: how much worse should he become in order for your great-grandchildren to be better? You think it’s very obvious that you should become worse, but I don’t think it’s…

Student: But before you just made it clear that it’s not so positive that we’re becoming worse, because we’re the ones that are, let’s say, going against finding cancer.

Instructor: Yeah, yeah, yeah, that’s the problem. But right now you’re not going to—the continuation of that argument would be that your great grandchild will start finding a cure for cancer, not you, because they’re still not going to let you into their university because they’re going to say, yeah, you’re a, how’s it called? You’re a new Christian, right? We don’t really trust the new Christians. Right?

That’s the story of the Spanish Inquisition, right? We don’t trust these guys that converted yesterday in order to get a job in the university. We know exactly why they converted. They’re not buying us, right? Their great-grandchildren we’ll trust because even Hitler agrees that they’re not Jewish anymore. Right?

By the way, how much worse should I make my life to save my great-grandchild from Hitler?

Student: Infinitely worse.

Instructor: Yeah? I don’t know. You can ask… What’s his name? You could ask Bentham [Jeremy Bentham, founder of utilitarianism] to calculate the quality of life years or something and figure out which one gives you more utilitarian points.

Student: Is there a difference between child and great-grandchild?

Instructor: Yes, there’s a difference.

Student: Yeah, there’s a difference, I agree.

Instructor: But we’re assuming that it’s your great-grandchild, very purposely, or very realistically, right? And for the case that we’re considering.

Student: Not going to solve your child’s problems either.

Chapter 7: The Interesting Loop: Obligation and Relationship

Instructor: I think that there’s a very interesting loop here, which is that you’re only going to be able to save the people you don’t have an obligation to anymore.

Student: I’m thinking that this might solve the problem.

Instructor: Why?

Student: Because who is the person you’re planning to save? Precisely the one who has no relationship to you anymore, right?

Biblical and Historical Evidence for Generational Limits

Instructor: What’s the—the Torah says God remembers the father’s sins for three or four generations, right? [*Pokeid avon avot al banim al shileshim v’al ribe’im* – Exodus 34:7] Which is a way of saying grandchildren are great-grandchildren, right? It says, a grandfather doesn’t really care about the great-great-grandchildren. If anyone’s ever had a great-great-grandfather, have you? You should know that.

Do you have a great-great-grandfather?

Student: No?

Instructor: Look around, what? I know some people who have great-great-grandchildren. They don’t really care for them. Okay, it’s way too far from you. It’s like your great-grandchildren’s children. Seriously, you might—you’re 90 by the time it comes around, right? You’re like on the way out, right? They’re on the way in, right? And it’s not like really—it’s not going to work. Yeah, it’s cool. Again, you can get a nice picture out of it. I think I read an article in the Times about it, but not much more, right?

Because that guy is going to grow up in a different world than you. That’s basically the point, right? The point is me and my children, my grandchildren, sometimes my great-grandchildren share a world. We share a century, like we share a life in some sense. My great-great-grandchildren, my great-great-great-grandchildren, we don’t live in the same world. For practical purposes, I’m not his great-grandfather. I’m not his parent.

And even Hitler understood this, right? Remember? That was his rule, more or less.

Student: No, it was something like four or five.

Instructor: In any case, it’s the same idea, right? At some point, you stop.

Student: Exactly. He’s like, I’ll try to kill you.

Chapter 8: Toward a Relational Theory of Moral Obligation

Instructor: Yeah, anyways, you get my point, right? So I think that it would be very… Now, it depends what your theory of moral obligation is, right? But my theory would be based on actual relationships.

Moral Obligations, Generational Distance, and Abraham’s Intergenerational Plan

Chapter 1: The Limits of Familial Obligation and the Biological Foundation of Moral Transmission

The Dilution of Obligation Across Generations

Instructor: You have an obligation to your children precisely because they share a life with you and you’re responsible for them and so on. That’s why you have an obligation to them, right? You should care about your father, your grandfather, and so on and the other way around because you share a life with them. Your great-great-great-grandfather, I don’t know, I have a tzavul [obligation] for my great-great-great-grandfather to do something. So, he doesn’t talk to me. I don’t care. If he left me money, maybe. Otherwise I don’t care. I don’t share any—I don’t have any real obligation to him, right? I have obligation to other people just as much in his generation just as much as I have to him, more or less. I also have so many that get diluted, right? He also only owns 1/128th of me, right? At that point not really interesting.

So therefore I don’t have obligation to him. So now it would be very weird to say you should do something in order that the precise people who you stop having a moral connection with should have a better life.

Clarification: Order of Love, Not Contractarianism

Instructor: I have a very amazing follow-up to this. Not contractarian. I mean, it’s based on the thought that you have obligation to, like closeness, right? Like levels of care, right? Order of love, like our vice president said, right?

Student: Yeah, but these things should, part of them is that these things should come forth from you being a good person, right?

Instructor: Yeah, a good person is someone who cares about his children and his grandchildren and his great-grandchildren. You care about the whole world in some abstract sense or in some real sense. You become a citizen of the world, right, cosmopolitan, but not specifically your grandchildren.

Now, if you care about the world, the solution to the world’s problem is not for the Jews to stop existing. That’s the solution to the Jews’ problems. The solution to the world’s problem is that they should stop killing the Jews. Then you work on a universal level. I agree that you could work on a universal level, on the cosmopolitan level, national level, beyond your fourth generation but not on the your level. It’s not an obligation to your children at this point.

And also, yeah, the one who will come to your funeral you should take care of them. The one who won’t come because they’ll be babies or you’re gonna be dead before they’re at it, before they’re born—why would you help them? Not why you shouldn’t, like you don’t have any specific obligation to them.

The Challenge: Distant Descendants vs. Contemporary Neighbors

Student: Do you have more of an obligation to the guy that lives in the next town over?

Instructor: No, the further you walk from the table, also I have less obligation.

Student: What? You didn’t even hear.

Instructor: Oh. No.

Student: No, do you have less of an obligation to your [great-great-grandchild], than to the guy that lives right now in the next town over?

Instructor: I don’t know.

Student: [Inaudible] figure out different question why—

Instructor: Why? Because as a human however you’re saying it’s like we care about the society around us whatever, right? It would seem that you would follow this argument is that we should care about the guy next door, for sure next door, but the guy, even the next time over, more than your great-great-grandchild.

Student: Possibly. I don’t know. It seems like a weird question, but why are you getting that?

Instructor: Because that’s what follows from your argument.

Student: Okay, and therefore, okay, I don’t know, but I don’t see what’s the problem, and if yes—

Instructor: If no, then I don’t understand the whole thing. If yes, then okay, so you’re saying a very big chiddush [novel insight], that a person should care more about a random guy—

Student: I don’t know for sure but I don’t see what would be a problem for why should I care about a random guy. I don’t think you should care about random guys at all. Why would you care about random guys? You mean fellow humans? Very nice. We share something called humanity. To the extent that that’s relevant I should care about—I don’t—I don’t see red—I don’t know. But me man more when you and you asked me to care about my grandchildren as my grandchildren, not as humans, right?

Instructor: Just told you as humans I have this better plans for solving human racist problems, right? Now we’re selling the Jewish problem, not the human problem, right?

Student: Why not? Of course I do not—so they’re human so we share humanity we do share—

Instructor: You don’t share a life with them, you don’t share a world with them, you don’t share anything with them, in a human way, you have views and you have experiences.

Student: No, no, these are different things. When I say a world, I mean the world of a family, not a world living in the same period. That’s not very interesting, and some little interesting, but not that interesting, I don’t think. There’s real connections, right? There’s real touch. If I’m in a family with someone, I share a life in a very real way. If I share a life in an abstract way we’ll both read the same newspaper on the same day, okay, I guess there’s some connection there. I don’t know how much.

They interviewed like a woman who was like 106 and they asked her like what changed? Everything. Yeah, it’s not the same world. Yeah, everything. What stayed the same?

The thing is I want to get to something. I want to say something interesting thing here. I’m gonna get to somewhere.

Abraham’s Plan: The Intergenerational Transmission Model

Instructor: There’s [a person]—his name was Abraham, heard of him? The last name was Avinu [our father]. And he had a plan, that’s what the Rambam [Maimonides] says at least. He had a plan to do something for who? Who do you want to do something for? I’m not sure either for the whole world or at least for his family. Okay, I’m not sure. I think for the whole world are going to the number [according to the Rambam]. But it entailed working by that with the tool of his family, okay? Or we call it a nation which is just a bigger version of family.

But listen to the story. And then turned out that he wasn’t having any children and he decided for some reason and he thought that not having children destroys the plan. It doesn’t work. It destroys the plan. The way his plan was going to work was by having children.

And since, remember from last week’s class in Boro Park, that just like when a person does, habituates himself, he creates habits in himself which are sometimes said to be the reward of his good actions. They’re not anymore a choice. They’re already the reward. They’re the s’char [reward] already.

In the same way, this happens between generations also, right? If you train your family in a certain way, your children, by receiving your education, not only by age, maybe also by receiving your genes, but probably mostly by living in your house, receive your things that you worked on for free. True?

So parents are very upset at their children, because they show them how all the bad habits that you accumulated they just get for free. The good ones too, but those you’re happy with. They also notice some bad ones that you will pretend that you don’t have because you always see yourself as a person who chooses. So I don’t have the bad habit of always overeating. I am just the guy that happens to be doing that. It turns out that you already have that and your children’s trying you—they’re just doing it not by choice, just by this is what the meaning in our family is, all right?

So this Abraham, his plan was to work with this system, distant part of human nature. And since he identified a whole bunch of issues with human nature and decided he grew up with and so on, he realized he decided it’s going to have these people, this family which will slowly pick and inoculate, right? Habituate habits, good habits in his children. Unfortunately it only works if you have children.

Why Children Rather Than Students?

Student: What about students? Seems like you didn’t really believe in those. It’s a good question why, but I think because if you think of working with human nature you should try to work as closely to biology as possible, I think.

Instructor: You know that everyone thinks that students are better than children. It says in the midrash [rabbinic commentary]. But that’s a matter just—that’s not pshat [the plain meaning], you know. Like, Yitzchak [Isaac] couldn’t marry the midrash. Yeah?

Yeah, if you want to actually work, you should work with biology. It’s always a good idea. As much as you can go and not go against biology, you should. General rule of social change, social revolutions. If your revolution, any time someone says, we’re having a revolution, it’s going to be against the family, that’s probably not going to work. Or it’s going to work, but it’s going to do the opposite than what you think you’re doing and so on.

If you’re having a revolution, we’re going to use every part of human nature the way it is, not the way we think it should be, right? Like Machiavelli said, you can’t be an effective politician if you’re talking about human nature always how it should be, right? You describe your nature as it is and use that. That’s going to probably raise your chances of success. Make sense? Everyone’s masking, okay?

Therefore you should probably use this thing called family, biology, lineage, right? Make sense?

I guess, okay. I thought you all don’t agree with this, but I’m not a patient to figure out to explain to you why you don’t, the way that we don’t agree. So sounds like the way I just told it to you, you agree, so let’s move on.

Abraham’s Plan in Crisis: The Rivalry with Sodom and the Logic of Natural Providence

Chapter 1: Abraham’s Realization: The Plan Without Children Cannot Work

Instructor: So let’s move on. Anyway, since this was the plan, he realized that he doesn’t have children, it’s not going to work. So he came to God, which means what? Speaking to God doesn’t mean, hey, you could solve my problems, how about you solve this one? It means, the truth is, this whole plan is falling apart, right?

And he said to God, but just left look all right he said you’ve promised me reward but that is fake news not happening I don’t even have children God means that was his plan of course I was this plan he’s working his whole life for this I was gonna be his reward right it says lack of over at [לך לך: “go forth” – the opening words of God’s command to Abraham] and you will have children and so on, right?

The Natural vs. Miraculous Understanding of Divine Promise

Meaning he did the Machiavellian problem. What do you mean the problem? When it says that God promised him that, it means that that was the plan, right? It wasn’t the plan magic, God was going to do it, it was going to work naturally, right? If you’re relying on magic, even if God himself tells you, not a good plan. Even God himself made nature so things would work, right? If your plan is God is going to save you from the world he made, you’re working in a very messed up way.

Student: This is because people said last week that I may hope shatav [I may have naturalized] and I’ve only made everything naturalized. I don’t think that’s true. I think you have to understand how God actually works.

Instructor: But chanshan sakre [a different matter] for that drusha [homiletical interpretation]. No, that’s different. That’s a third drusha. A fifth drusha. We’re up to a long list of other drushas.

Abraham’s Crisis: The Inheritance Problem

The point is, he came and he said, this is not working. V’heneh v’embeisi ereshoysi [והנה בן ביתי יורש אותי: “and behold, my steward will inherit me”], right? My student or my manager, whatever exactly it means, he’s going to inherit everything and he’s going to do whatever he wants frankly is not going to be my plan this is not my reward all right so what did Hashem [God] say told him what this means is right or we’re reading it so he thought we thought this plan he realized some told him that he didn’t understand the process correctly he was making a basic mistake.

The Necessity of Naïve Optimism

Now these kind of things work up until this moment he had a very naive one he probably had to have that because if he wouldn’t have had that he would never have started the plants to begin with he really believed that this is all going to work out perfectly live happily ever after going to go and burn humanoids whatever break his father’s uh catch this over there how do you say getch [געטשקע: Yiddish for idol/figurine] in english?

Chapter 2: Digression: The Translation of “Getchke”

Student: Yeah idols getch kisses idols right tell them tell that to someone else.

Instructor: It’s not the same thing. It doesn’t mean the same thing. It’s a bad translation. A gechke. What?

Student: American idol is American gechke?

Instructor: Trachteraan [think about it]. Oh my goodness. What is it called? It’s called a word that has two meanings. Idol is a sense of grandiosity that gechke doesn’t have. Exactly. There’s differences. Idol is a good thing. It sounds better than gechke, for sure. The truth of it weren’t idols. There were a couple of gechke left, you know?

Student: Statues.

Instructor: Statues also so grandiose a gechke is a gechke a statue is a statue it’s not a gechke a gechke a statue not every statue is a gechke that’s true is that like my brother there used to be there used to be the club over there next to my parents house and Kennedy Bilvard [Kennedy Boulevard] and we used to call it the gechke with the big deer the L club [Elk Club] but it’s not a gechke it’s just a statue of a deer no gechke going on there.

Chapter 3: Abraham’s Strategic Plan: Relocation and Reinvention

Instructor: I guess you know he’s going to break the catch kiss that’s a cute mistranslation but it’s not a translation right so the kids said he was gonna do that and then he was gonna start convincing everyone that he’s right and then he’s gonna move away because this is not a good place to raise your children in this hood on place or wherever he came from he caused it they’re a good place they’re up they’re going to go to a new place where nobody knows who he is he’s going to reinvent himself right you can tell everyone who are you and i can say i’m the son of theta i’m saying i’m abraham the founder of the new religion and couldn’t they all laugh at him yeah i know we know we know exactly where you are the kids but the son of data right that’s why you have to move away because you have a new story right who are you ah you’re the magician that broke the yeah and then you had arguments also and i have a plan now you’re going to change the world yeah sure.

Building the New Civilization

That wasn’t that to work. So he went to a new place, and he introduced himself, everyone that says a putzik [a fool/simpleton]. And he introduced himself, I’m the guy creating the new religion. Ah, interesting plan. Started to work, right? He started getting chassidim [followers/disciples]. And, but his real plan was that, like I said in the beginning, his plan wasn’t just to allow the chassidim, the chassidim are needed, you know, to pay for the family. But, I don’t know why. But, his plan, and his plan was to create a family, right?

The Mizbeach: A Permanent Institutional Structure

He happened to have been against that. Who was against that? Avraham. He didn’t want anyone to say, I’ll give him a deal. No, not the misnagdim [opponents]. The day of misnagdim, remember the whole story of Saddam [Sodom]. Saddam was the primary misnagdim of Avraham, right? He came to, there was Nimrod, whoever, I don’t know, whoever, he doesn’t say his name really in the title, whatever the guy was that was against Avraham, he ran away from him, he went to Canaan, right?

Then he went in the canal and he was making his own thing, an eye, and he says exactly the location. He created it in Mezbech [מזבח: altar], right? Mezbech just means, right? What’s in Mezbech? He even showed Mezbech. He would imagine, like, he ran from, like, we find it, he go to Israel, some random box of rocks in the desert in Mezbech. That’s not what it means, right?

Mezbech is a permanent structure. Mezbech means he set up a temple, right? That’s really what it means, right? Mezbech means literally an altar, but he set up, it means there’s a whole culture, Like, he set up his yeshiva [academy], his academy, his temple, his worship center, his Abraham’s hospitality suite, right? Where they did the Echad HaZarchim [הכנסת אורחים: hospitality to guests] and Chabad House. And they taught everyone about Yiddishkeit [Judaism]. Abraham, of course. Right? That’s what he did, right? And that’s who he was.

Chapter 4: Sodom: Abraham’s Ideological Rival

Now, Saddam, they were the exact people that had a different plan for civilization, right? They also had a new city, somehow. They had their own rules. They were like Sparta, you know? They’re going to have their own very successful city. But they had the exact opposite plan. They were there always just to snag them [misnagdim: opponents]. That’s why Lloyd [Lot], that’s the whole story with Lloyd. That’s the drama with him, right?

Lot’s Defection to Sodom

Lloyd said, oh, there’s no room for me here. Okay, you know what? Somehow I ended up in Sadaim [Sodom]. And then it turns out that they needed Avram to save them, which is a very great humiliation, right? Groyser Lloyd [great Lot], Groyser, this is the story of the Ben Rusha [the wicked son], right? Same story, right? Groyser Lloyd was like, look, there’s no room for us. You know something? I’ll expand on my own. But yeah, that’s Sadaim. Go away.

And turns out to become friendly with the king of Sodom obviously he was aristocrat and so on he was Yosef Bashar Sodom [יושב בשער סדום: sitting in the gate of Sodom – indicating a position of authority] and then turns out before that already turns out that they got these great upstarts who got into a fight with Kedarlah Omer [Chedorlaomer] maybe the guy that Abraham was in a fight with too but in any case he was much stronger than them.

Sodom’s Ideology: The Anti-Abraham

And they thought they were going to be able to stand up to him where the new and revised palace we have this great city where we don’t have Rachmaninoffs [compassion], we do everything in a Spartan way, we treat everyone, we make sure to treat everyone by what they deserve, we don’t give, we have Rachmaninoffs on the weak people, we don’t live with, you know, we drink liberal tears, we take care that everyone should be strong and unforgiving, and we’re definitely going to be able to win this guy from the East who thinks that he can own everyone, right, this empire.

Chapter 5: The War with Chedorlaomer: Sodom’s Humiliation

Turns out they couldn’t. Who could? Abraham with his 318 strong army he was able to save Sodom from Kedah [Chedorlaomer] by chance because it happens to be his nephew was there and also Sodom had their greatest moment of humiliation because Avram’s whole plan they were like two competing new societies which were going to make their new plan.

The Two Competing Civilizational Models

Avram’s plan was we’re going to be nice we’re going to create these hospitality centers centers on the ways, on every crossroad. And we’re going to teach people our religion. And Saddam was teaching that their religion, not in the crossroad, in the established cities. And we’re going to do everything over there. And it turns out that Avram saved Saddam. And the king of Saddam was trying to save his honor. He’s pretending to be nice, like giving a favor.

The Laws of War: Everything Belongs to the Victor

And really, now everything, by the laws of war, everything belongs to him. Sodom and his wives and his children and his property belongs to Avram now, right? That’s called matzah mazut ishliyam [מצא מזות שלהם: found their spoils], right? If someone else is attacked by some other king and you save them, who does everything belong to now? To you. Thank you very much. To the Savior. That’s why it belongs to God, right? He saved us from Egypt. Now it belongs to him. Basic logic of war.

The King of Sodom’s Diplomatic Bluff

And this king of Sodom he’s making a peace deal with hafidom like the like the palestinians make what they eat you know let’s make a peace deal you give me all the netfish [נפש: souls/people] all the all the living things all the give me back all my women and children and slaves i’ll be so nice to you i’ll give you the money hello who gave you the women and children to give back to me why should i give them back to you what are you paying me for that that was a bluffer from beginning to end.

And i haven’t realized the trick he’s not interested in fighting with him i haven’t Sadd [Sodom] realized that this was him pretending to save his honor, and he said, Ah!

The Limits of Intergenerational Influence and the Covenant Between the Parts

Chapter 1: The King of Sodom’s Bluff and Avram’s Response

Let’s make a peace deal. You give me all the *yidn ephesh* [living souls], all the living things, give me back all my women and children and slaves. I’ll be so nice to you, I’ll give you the money.

Hello? Who gave you the women and children to give back to me? Why should I give them back to you? What are you paying me for that?

That was a bluff from beginning to end. And Avram realized the trick. He’s not interested in fighting with him, and Avram realized that this was him pretending to save his honor, and say, “Oh, really everything belongs to me, I’m being so nice, I’m giving you some money.”

If he would say, “Everything belongs to you, then we’re your slaves, do whatever you want with us” — unconditional surrender — then Avram would win. But he realized at the end he has this priest on his side, they’re saying, you know, it’s not nice, you can’t just take all their stuff, there’s international law.

So Avram said, forget about it, move on, moving on. Don’t be the guy that made a nice priestry and let me have the money, let me have the property. Take the whole thing. And plats, understand the story?

So that’s not — that’s why it’s not a steer. And that’s why he said, but on the judgment of his friends he can’t be framed, right? His allies, they still have to get whatever they want.

Okay, now moving on.

Chapter 2: Avram’s Failed Plan: The Problem of Succession

And the point is that he realized that this — this was his plan. Now it was not working. The plan wasn’t working at all. He didn’t have any children. If you don’t have children, the plan doesn’t work.

He tried to have with two of the children, didn’t work. Tried to have with Ishmael, that was really his plan B. But obviously, that wasn’t working out very well either. He tried, right? He tried. Hashem told him, right? What does it mean, he told Hashem? Maybe Ishmael and Hashem said no. What does that mean?

He tried teaching Ishmael to be a man. Ishmael doesn’t want to be a man. The theology thing doesn’t work out as well as… Well, it depends on who you are. There’s two — 50% of the person’s DNA is the wife, right? You’ve got to choose your wife wisely. And this Huggard [Hagar] from Egypt wasn’t such a *tzadeikes* [righteous woman]. So, it didn’t work out.

People also have their own choice, but also a lot is to do with the father, right? He’s in the way of Shmuel with his mother, not himself, right? So, it didn’t work out very well.

So, now he’s stuck. His plan is bankrupt, close to bankruptcy. So he realized, or Hashem told him, you didn’t understand how this game is played. You really thought this is going to work. They’re going to get here. You’re going to set up a family. They’re all going to be *tzaddikim v’toirem* [righteous and pure]. And now nobody’s going to have any issues. Then you’re just going to live in this new land. You’re going to be strong, right?

You have an army. You have 318 family within your army, right? Well, stronger than the biggest empire’s army in those times. Nobody had a very big army. And they were courageous and they were young and they were all labor. They were very successful. They’re chased all the way from Khefrem to Damascus, it’s pretty far. In one night. I don’t know how they did it. That’s Khefrem from Sary. It’s a nice… It takes like five hours to drive.

Anyways, so…

Chapter 3: The *Bris Bein HaBesarim* [Covenant Between the Parts]: A New Understanding

In *kitzra maaseh* [in short], Hashem told them… This is called the *Bris Bein HaBesarim* episode. He told them, this doesn’t work out like this. This is not how the reality is. I’ll explain you why.

Instructor: Why? Do you know why? I don’t really know. Do you know?

The reason is because there’s a limit to what you can do with your children. We just explained this limit. There’s a real limit. People’s influence on their children is very limited. There’s a limit in many ways. One of them you found out with Ishmael. You can have the best intentions and then your son just says, “Tati [Father], I’ve got my own plans for life.” That’s one limit. Same story with what?

Student: I’m still upset.

Instructor: What?

Student: That’s your upset?

Instructor: Second limit, but the more important limit that we’re about here.

Student: I thought that’s what I…

Instructor: I thought you were saying?

Student: Yeah, I thought so.

Instructor: And?

Student: That’s not…

Instructor: That wasn’t the…

Student: That’s what I always thought it was.

Instructor: That’s not what’s gonna work.

Student: No, but there’s a bigger problem.

The Four-Generation Limit

Instructor: The bigger problem is, remember that a person’s influence, even if you have a good family, the best one, you’re limited to four generations at most. And that’s in a very good state, right? Most people are limited to one or two generations. You can’t actually teach more than two generations, right? I mean, you can’t influence in a real way, right? You remember this.

By the way, this is true for teachers too, right? Wait, let’s work on something. You can’t — there’s a real problem. I’m giving you a *drash* [sermon/teaching] here. I’m sorry, you could go Burton for this these kind of *drashas*, but this is what I’m doing now. I’m trying to talk about real problems, though. And this is, okay.

Anyways, this is *amshach* [continuation] from my sheet of Paisach [Passover]. If it’s delivered, figure it out. If you have questions, you can call me and we’ll make it work for real. But it’s not working in a real way.

The Problem Extends to Teachers

This is a limitation for teachers also, right? I think there’s — people have great hubris. Like, people have crazy overestimations of what humans are capable of, okay?

What should have been created with our teacher for 10,000 generations? What? There’s no such thing as being a teacher for 10,000 generations. What’s going on? We call this guy that lived 3,000 years our teacher. What does that even mean? There’s no such a thing.

Student: No, Sha [the Rebbe].

Instructor: No, it’s me.

Student: But I don’t get to talk to him.

Instructor: Okay, now there’s a big problem. So why they have this thing — never, it never works when you need it. Like, you ever heard someone using this one that case when it’s useful? It’s not useful. Only you only realize that it’s not — it’s tough.

Student: Yeah, it’s tough to the new cars don’t have it. You don’t have to do that. You just beep a regular beep.

Instructor: Not so that easy again, huh? That’s my home that I click does you park you forget so much, okay.

Anyways, *mashal* [parable/example], show you is point is I have a real question here. A very real question. Very real question. It doesn’t make sense. You know, people say, uh, they never died, but it’s *mazari* [unclear reference] behind this toilet is still alive, therefore it needs to go on forever like this. This is a bluff. You could go on for about one and a half generation like this, you could.

And the sad thing is that people that said this, they also die. So they don’t realize that their plan was always a fake false prophecy. And then the next generation or one and a half generations later are the one stuck. And then we already have a *misogyny* [likely *mesorah*: tradition] that this is what we say, and then we’re all living in a lie. I’m talking about very specific things now, but any case, it’s true, true problem.

Oh, it’s also — I don’t actually know that there’s a real solution to this problem. I actually think that each generation needs to have their own teachers. That’s the true truth. But also, there must be something more than that. At least we’re living in a world that’s helped us solve this problem or somehow thought a strategy with this. But I’m giving you a shot on the *Bris Bein HaBesarim* episode in a very serious shot.

Chapter 4: God’s Message to Avram: The Plan Must Change

So I’ll think like this. So Hashem told Avram, you have to understand that your precise problem, you have to first solve this problem. Your nicely planned of living happily ever after in *Eretz Canaan* [the Land of Canaan] with your children and grandchildren is nonsense. Because think about your great-grandchildren. Will they remember who Abraham was? If they will, they’ll be in some weird, fake way.

So don’t — this is not a good plan. It was never a good plan. I know that you’ve been living for 70 years based on this plan or however long. Going to the Hajj in 20 years. It’s not a real plan. How long was he living based on this plan? 25 years, right? 24 for. This is not a real plan. You got to think of a better plan.

So he said like this, look what I propose. There’s a lot of the imagery in that story and it’s hard to interpret and the *Medrash* [Midrash: rabbinic commentary] has all kinds of ways of reading it, but they’re all trying to read this kind a problem into it. Instead I have a new plan. You’re gonna have to do something that’s better than that. I don’t know what the solution is by the way. I have no idea.

But I do know that what it means it entails not letting people save their great grandchildren. Like the beginning of the sheep it for sure means that.

The Meaning of 400 Years and Four Generations

Today fresh and said look what’s gonna happen. I’ll tell you what’s gonna happen. I’ll tell you know something, let me just give you the price. The price for the what — the plan that is going to work that you didn’t realize now — that has a price. The price is like this: for four generations, or in a different version of the same story said 400 years. 400 years means four times four generations, right? We’re the same structure, right? 100 years is like the amount of people that’s here alive, and then four times that when nobody remembers the people that remember the people that remember that remember the people that remember that remember that remember the people that remember. That’s what the Hashem does, right? Understand?

That’s what 400 years means. Of course, that’s why the *kasha* [question/difficulty] was 400 years. 400 years is a fake *kasha*. The 400 years corresponds to, in the same passage it says, fourth generation, right? *Dor revi yeshuva ha’ina* [the fourth generation shall return here]. Does it say? It’s all working with this logic, that a person’s reach doesn’t extend past the fourth step.

So Hashem said, look, you’re thinking about the stage past that, right? That’s your real — what you’re really trying to get at — precisely the fifth generation is the one the or the fourth generation is when you’re trying to solve. So the price for that is that’s for three generations — for four generations you are going to be the precise opposite of a situation you’re imagining. We’re going to be a slave to a fire nation who’s going to do whatever they want with your children.

And then we’re going to have a cycle that’s going to solve somehow. That was the webcast from last week. But now I’m adding to something very new.

The Akeidah as the Foundation of Jewish Non-Assimilation: Avraham’s Choice to Transcend the Fourth Generation

Chapter 1: The Central Contradiction: A Counter-Thesis Emerges

Instructor: Well, this is contrary to the whole sheet. It’s contrary, exactly. That’s what I’m trying to get at. I’m getting to this. This is contrary to the whole sheet. It’s contrary to the whole sheet.

The way to make it work would be to say something like that the real reason this is the true pathway—the real reason why the Jews don’t assimilate is not because of Leo Strauss’s tragic thing, but because we believe that by the fourth generation *Mashiach* [Messiah] will have come already. Right? Why shouldn’t I assimilate and become a *goy* [non-Jew]? Because it’s not going to work today, okay, but it’s going to work in four generations. No, what do you want? Right? That’s what that’s trying to live in a *mini* [?], and the fourth generation will welcome—this is what it means. This is exactly what it means.

This is exactly—I mean, I’m just to cut—now I’m filling you in on the first part of that. Well, yeah, it only starts in the fourth generation is the negative. Yeah, yeah, you have—I don’t know, I don’t have solution. I’m making—I made it into this whole story so you should swallow it a little bit.

But this is the problem. It only starts in the fourth generation, really. You got it?

Chapter 2: The Problem of Legacy Beyond Natural Influence

And now, this is really—in other words, I think the way to say this, the nice way to say this, which I don’t entirely believe, would be to say that he’s really working on something that is meant to survive the natural course of humans, you know, losing their influence and having great, great grandchildren who they don’t really know.

But I don’t know how to explain that, so I’m just saying that.

But the point would be that now the answer is, who told us to be suffering in these when we’re in those 400 year cycles? The answer is Avraham Avinu [Abraham our forefather].

Chapter 3: Avraham Avinu as the Source of Jewish Suffering

Now you’ll realize something very interesting. This chapter—I didn’t say it, I didn’t even write it, so I have to say it—and you’ll realize, so that’s what we said last week.

The *Midrash* [rabbinic commentary] says: Why are the Jewish people suffering? Because their source sold them out. Who’s our source? Avraham Avinu. Avraham Avinu caused us to suffer. It’s his fault. All his fault. Because he had a choice: either that his children go to *Gehinnom* [purgatory/hell] or that they suffer in this world under the nations, and he chose this one.

We discussed this in the *shiur* [class]. I gave a nice explanation of this matter. But the point is Avraham Avinu chose this life for us.

But now I’m adding it to you: what he chose it—maybe in one life you could have—what he chose was precisely because of this thing that he’s trying to create something that lasts past the fourth generation or that starts really working then.

Now, now I have a new thing, a new thing that I have to tell you. Yeah, I don’t know, I don’t—I’m gonna finish with my part and you’re gonna go to sleep and tell me if you have a better shot.

Chapter 4: The Akeidah and the Problem of Grandparental Merit

Now, what I’m saying is like this. You remember the story of the *Akeidah* [the binding of Isaac] that we read on Rosh Hashanah [the Jewish New Year]? And he says, okay, this—it’s hot and everyone’s like, yeah, it was once an old guy that wanted to shaft his young kid. Okay, what you are for my life? Oh, you were my grandfather? We just discussed grandparents don’t matter, right, after some chance.

What is the story of Avraham being our grandfather? It’s also the same problem, right?

Chapter 5: The Rambam’s Interpretation of Nisayon: Publicization, Not Testing

So I want to tell you the *pshat* [straightforward interpretation]. The Rambam [Maimonides] says like this. The Rambam says: That wasn’t the sign of *Avachar* [?]. Remember, the Rambam has a problem with the sign. The sign seems to mean that God knows something and he finds out. It doesn’t make any sense.

So, therefore, the Rambam says: No, the sign doesn’t mean—the sign means the person, the publicization of something. *Nes* [miracle/sign]. Like, *Melesh* [?] and *Nes*, right? That’s also what *Nes* means. That’s also the answer of all the questions that you people have, that things should be a *Nes*. Of course, they should be a *Nes*.

Now, and what’s—now, therefore, whenever it says in the sign it means that we learn something from a very public story, a very famous story. What do we learn from the story of the *Akeidah*?

Two Lessons from the Akeidah

It says there are two things.

One thing we learn is that prophets are very sure of prophecy, because nobody would be ready to kill their son if he wasn’t very sure that it was God talking to him. He assumes that people aren’t—pretty nice, maybe some people would even forget, but normal people don’t deserve everything. He was a good guy. Remember? Okay, listen, this is the second part of my story. Just see that these two things.

So anyways, it teaches you the prophecy, and since prophecy is foundational to religion, so this is Avraham Avinu was the founder of religion—teaches us that prophecy is very real for the prophet. By the way, that’s where anyone knows—we don’t know that yet. Where the prophet is very real. Okay?

Second thing he tells the teachers off is how serious—I have a *sash* [?], I miss—that’s what it says and describes how hard it was for Avraham Avinu to do that *Akeidah*, and he gave all that away for Avraham Avinu. In this you’ll read it. What he says, he describes—imagine you have to read it. Bring me a—I have to tell you, I like *bias* [?], not the real one. Yeah, this is the one I might ask after my new one. Another one I keep it always here. And you see over there, I’m gonna tell—what I’m almost out.

Chapter 6: Reading from the Rambam: The Seriousness of Ahavas Hashem

So over here it says like this. This solution—which *parsha* [Torah portion] did I say it is? Oh, very good, I was right.

It says like this: But—and he says, starts talking about—suddenly here talk about the *view*—the first thing he said we learn is how much a person should do for *Ahavas Hashem* [love of God], not for—not first hard for *Ahavas Hashem*.

So he says, and then he says it talks about perhaps he said this—how you do—she has any other—Avraham Avinu, it’s like it was correct that this—what should—when it’s that I’m say is correct, does that make it *Edna’s* [?], like it’s plastic. What he’s saying, trying to explain you what the story is really—why it’s—why is the story told about Avraham Avinu?

He says: He started to teach the *yichud* [unity of God], right, after *Shem* [Noah’s son] and prophecy, and to leave—to leave over this opinion, this knowledge always, and to just limit another matter, right, to attract people to him. As it says, and just like we follow his true opinions, his true knowledge, we also follow the things taken from his action. We also—we imitate Avraham’s knowledge and his actions. That’s what the Rambam says.

The *Kol Sheken Zoi Sapula* [all the more so], the *Kal Chayim Ades* [?] of the *Akeidah Tzitzak* [?], which he, by that, he showed the truthness of prophecy and how serious *Ahavas Hashem* is.

The Rambam’s Strange Claim: We Must Imitate the Akeidah

So he’s saying something very weird. We have to imitate the *Akeidah*. Right? Because if the whole logic of the *Akeidah* of an historian is to make something famous, to publicize something, and he says especially, not to stamp someone, not to stamp some random old guy—like he describes earlier how important it was, he wasn’t all, he says.

There was a person that was very old and he really wanted a child and he wanted that he should have a nation out of his descendants, and he has this child that is old and so hard, and he killed him after three days. Not when he was in a passion. That’s what it says, it took three days. You shouldn’t think, he was walking for three days, he had a lot of time to think about it.

So, we learn—and this is what we learn from—because we have to imitate his activities. We learn from his actions just like we learn from his teachings, from his thoughts. What is going on here? Very weird. Do you do the *Akeidah*? What’s going on here? The whole point of the *Akeidah* is that you shouldn’t do it anyways. But what is going on?

Chapter 7: The Speaker’s Novel Interpretation: Akeidah as Bris Bein HaBesarim

So I realize that this is what he means to say. What he means to say is—I don’t know if the noun means to say it, but it’s a snapshot. What he means to say is that that’s what we talk about when we say the *zechus* [merit] of the *Akeidah*. The *zechus* of the *Akeidah* just means—

That means that by doing this *Akeidah*, and really the *Akeidah* is the same thing as the *Bris Bein HaBesarim* [Covenant Between the Parts]. Avraham Avinu teaching, choosing *galus* [exile] for his children—that’s what the *Akeidah* is emotional for or an image for, because Avraham Avinu is saying, and this is what I was telling you for your question:

Avraham Avinu, because of him trying to solve a very serious problem, which transcends the amount of care that you have for your children, because he’s trying to solve it for the fifth generation, right—that required him to not care about the first four generations. It required him to think further than that.

And if I required him to—check his own son—well, he might have not literally shocked the gift, but he did cause—it’s hard to go in *galus*, or Yaakov, or wherever it was. He did cause—not Hitler to kill all the six million Jews—was Avraham Avinu cause that kids to them a *hood* [?] on. That’s what the *Midrash* is.

Why did he call it that? Because he was trying to think past that. He was trying to create something that survives the end of the natural process of parents influencing and creating their children.

Chapter 8: The Connection to Mashiach and the Infinite Limit of Ahavas Hashem

So it’s part—and this is really the end of prophecy. This is what he said. This is what the prophecy of Avraham Avinu, the limit, the infinite limit of *Ahavas Hashem*, which is what the *Mashiach* is supposed to be, which is what the Jewish people are trying to aim at, is the kind of thing that you don’t care about yourself or about your children.

Because if you’re going to work with your children, you’re not going to survive the fifth generation.

So I said that you shouldn’t care about your children because you should care about yourself. Another way of saying it is you shouldn’t care about your children because you’re trying to care about something that transcends all of that, and therefore lasts the five generations. And then in the fifth generation, they get saved.

That’s the *teirutz* [answer] that I have to say. I didn’t solve any problems. I just made the problems very clear.

Chapter 9: The Akeidah as the Story of Jewish Non-Assimilation

And that’s the story of the *Akeidah*. The story of the *Akeidah* is the story of the Jews refusing to assimilate and causing their great-grandchildren to have problems or to be saved.

Cut it to the second level—I don’t explain it. That’s why the *olam* [world/people] said that’s what shows that prophecy is so strong. It seems to be so clear to the person that’s doing it that he doesn’t have any choice. That is the truth.

I don’t have an explanation for how it’s supposed to work. I told you I don’t know. I don’t have an explanation for how it works.

Student: That’s the *tenuos* [?] of your *kasha* [question], that they always receive the prophecy to kill their children.

Instructor: [No clear response recorded]

The Akeidah as Paradigm: Messianic Vision Beyond Generational Horizons

Chapter 1: The Practical Impossibility and the Prophetic Right

Instructor: Practically speaking, there’s no practice. A mom go and shecht [ritually slaughter] their son. No, we didn’t shecht their son. That’s a mashal [parable/paradigmatic model]. That guy is a mashal.

No, I’m saying, so… He made his son go on Mitzrayim [Egypt/slavery]. If you were the kind of people that could survive Mitzrayim, then Avraham Avinu’s [Abraham our forefather’s] thing could start working.

That goes back to our previous, our shiur [Torah lesson] from last year, from last week. It only could start working if you stop thinking about today and tomorrow. If you could envision out this book, if you can — this look up good in the light of issue man.

Yeah, that’s the gala [redemption], right? That’s the next mile of coming. And I think what the next mile of said, “Get out there,” is it after, right?

Anyways, I don’t have solid — the problem just told you that this is seems to be the story of the cadets. It’s hot going to my new chat.

Chapter 2: Blaming the Forefathers and the Messianic Secret

Instructor: I think it’s a very good job and we should blame our forefathers for stucking us in this. And the reason they did it was because they believe that Moshiach [the Messiah] will come after — after that, but not to them.

Sometimes it was — there was an old Yid [Jew] that came to the Mordechaim [likely: a Rebbe or Torah authority], and he asked him, “When she has any come?” [When will Moshiach come?]

He said, “Not in my days or my children or my grandchildren.”

That’s the secret. If anyone really thinks I’m — Moshiach’s gonna come in his days, he didn’t get one shake. His Moshiach is the thing that comes after your grandchild, great-grandchild dies.

Chapter 3: Closing: The Unresolved Problem

Instructor: I don’t have a cell [solution]. No, it’s not — no, I don’t mean that. Okay, I can’t — I don’t have a solution. I’ll just tell you the problem. Maybe, I don’t know.

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