📋 Shiur Overview
Summary of Lecture – Laws of Eruvin Chapter 2
Introduction to the Chapter
This chapter deals with what to do when the eruv doesn’t work — when someone didn’t participate in the eruv. In Chapter 1, we learned that the mitzvah of eruv is because people don’t understand the law of mechitzos (partitions) — they think that reshus hayachid/reshus harabim (private/public domain) depends on who lives there, not on mechitzos. The Sages were concerned that people would forget the entire law of hotza’ah (carrying), therefore they enacted that one must demonstrate that the entire courtyard is one domain through partnership in one meal (bread). Chapter 2 continues with the bedieved (after the fact) situation — bitul reshus (nullification of domain).
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Halacha 1 – A Courtyard Where All Made an Eruv Except One; Bitul Reshus
A courtyard where all made an eruv except one of them who didn’t make an eruv with them — he prohibits them… from carrying out from their houses to the courtyard and from the courtyard to the houses. If this one who didn’t make an eruv nullified to them his courtyard domain only — they are permitted to carry out from their houses to the courtyard, but to his house it is forbidden. And if he nullified to them his house domain and his courtyard domain — all are permitted, and even he is permitted, and he is like a guest among them.
Explanation: When all the courtyard residents made an eruv except for one (whether inadvertently or deliberately), he prohibits everyone from carrying. The solution is bitul reshus — he can nullify his domain. There are two levels: (1) nullifying his courtyard domain alone — then everyone may carry between their houses and the courtyard, but not to his house; (2) nullifying his house domain and courtyard domain — then everyone may carry everywhere, including him, because he becomes like a guest among them.
Insights and Explanations:
1. Two types of domains for each householder in the courtyard: Each person in the courtyard has two domains — (a) his house domain (his private house), (b) his portion in the courtyard (shared domain). One can nullify one or both, and this has different practical implications.
2. The difference between eruv and bitul: Eruv works in both directions — it makes the house and courtyard into one domain. Bitul goes only one way — he gives away his domain to them, but he doesn’t become included in their partnership. Therefore when he nullifies only his courtyard domain, his house remains forbidden to everyone (including himself).
3. Bitul reshus is neither hefker nor kinyan: Bitul reshus is a unique category — not hefker (because it’s always “bitul to them” — to specific people), and not kinyan (because one can do it on Shabbos, whereas a kinyan would not be permitted). It’s a type of “submission” — he gives his domain to them, but it’s not a formal transfer of ownership.
4. Why he may carry when he nullifies both domains: When he nullifies his house and courtyard, he becomes a guest among them — he no longer has any domain of his own, and the rule is a guest doesn’t prohibit. He doesn’t become included in their partnership, rather he becomes “erased” — and therefore he doesn’t prohibit.
5. Plain bitul reshus — minimum interpretation: When someone says simply “I nullify my domain” without specifying, we learn that his courtyard domain is nullified but his house domain is not nullified — we minimize, we don’t put more meaning into his words than necessary. The reasoning: a person more readily nullifies his portion in the courtyard than his own house.
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Halacha – Bitul to Each One Explicitly
One who nullifies domain to the courtyard residents — must nullify to each and every one explicitly, and says “my domain is nullified to you and to you and to you.”
Explanation: One cannot say “I nullify for all the courtyard residents” — one must state each one explicitly.
Insights and Explanations:
1. Why not like zikui (conferring benefit)? With eruv, one can confer benefit for everyone at once, even not in their presence. Why can’t one nullify for “all courtyard residents”? Because bitul is not kinyan and not zikui — bitul is a unique act that goes to each individual. One cannot transfer/nullify to a “group” — only to each person separately.
2. Bitul shows that people take it seriously: Bitul reshus is a very serious matter — people don’t readily nullify their domain. It’s not a simple partnership for a moment.
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Halacha – An Heir Nullifies Domain; Bitul Reshus on Shabbos
An heir nullifies domain even if his testator died on Shabbos, for the heir stands in place of his testator in every matter.
Explanation: If the father died on Shabbos and the son inherited the house, the son can nullify domain on Shabbos.
Insights and Explanations:
1. Bitul can be done on Shabbos: One of the fundamental points of bitul reshus is that it can be done on Shabbos — unlike eruv which can only be made on Erev Shabbos. This is also proof that bitul is not a kinyan, because a kinyan would not be permitted on Shabbos.
2. The rule: One can only nullify what one could have made an eruv for yesterday: In the Gemara there’s a rule that one can only nullify a domain that one could have made an eruv for on Erev Shabbos. The question on the heir: he couldn’t have made an eruv on Erev Shabbos, because it wasn’t his! The answer: The heir stands in the place of his father in every matter — because the father could have made an eruv, and the heir is a continuation of him, we consider that the heir also could have.
3. Inheritance is not like a regular kinyan: The innovation is that an heir inherits even the father’s ability from Erev Shabbos. With inheritance, the house remains with one (the testator), only the heir becomes the testator — he comes in place of his testator. Therefore, if someone would have acquired a house on Shabbos in another way (for example, a kinyan that takes effect on Shabbos), he would not be able to nullify domain. But with an heir, since he comes in place of the testator, the heir also has this power.
4. One inherits a domain, not an eruv: A question: if the father already made an eruv, did he already give away his domain? The answer: The eruv is for the people (he gives them permission to carry), but he doesn’t give away the domain of the house. The heir inherits the domain in the house.
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Halacha – Bitul Reshus on Shabbos Lechatchila
Nullifying domain on Shabbos is permitted lechatchila.
Explanation: One may nullify domain on Shabbos, it’s not forbidden due to buying and selling or kinyan.
Insights: This is a special halacha, not just part of the law of an heir. Don’t think that bitul reshus looks like a kinyan or buying and selling that one may not do on Shabbos — one may do it lechatchila.
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Halacha – Bitul from Many to One — “There is No Large Guest”
If all those who made an eruv nullify their domain to the one who didn’t make an eruv — he is permitted but they are forbidden, for no domain remains for them. And we don’t say they should be like guests with him, for there is no large guest — a guest goes and contracts.
Explanation: When all nullify to one person, only he may carry, but they are all forbidden because they don’t remain with any domain. We can’t say that they should be considered like guests with him.
Insights: The rule is: An individual can be nullified to the many, but the many cannot be nullified to an individual. A group of Jews can accommodate a guest, but not that all become guests with one person.
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Halacha – Two or More Who Didn’t Make an Eruv
If those who didn’t make an eruv were two or more and they nullify their domain to those who made an eruv — the ones who made an eruv are permitted, and those who didn’t make an eruv are forbidden.
Explanation: If two or more people didn’t make an eruv and they nullify their domain to those who made an eruv — those who made an eruv become permitted, but those who didn’t make an eruv remain forbidden.
Insights:
1. The reverse cannot be done: “Those who made an eruv cannot nullify their domain to the two who didn’t make an eruv” — those who made an eruv cannot nullify to the two who didn’t make an eruv, because even if they would do this, it wouldn’t help — “for each one of them prohibits his fellow” — because the two who didn’t make an eruv still prohibit each other.
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Halacha – Bitul in Two Steps Doesn’t Work
And even if one who didn’t make an eruv returned and nullified his domain to the second who didn’t make an eruv — he is forbidden, for at the time those who made an eruv nullified to him, it was forbidden.
Explanation: Even if after those who made an eruv nullified to one of those who didn’t make an eruv, and the second who didn’t make an eruv nullifies to the first — it doesn’t work. Because at the moment when those who made an eruv nullified, it was forbidden (because the second who didn’t make an eruv hadn’t yet nullified), and a bitul that takes effect when it’s forbidden cannot be “fixed” through a second bitul.
Insights:
1. The major rule: Bitul reshus only works when it works in one moment. One cannot make bitul in two stages. If the first step remained forbidden, one cannot make another step to solve it.
2. A question: If several people in the courtyard need to nullify, must they do it simultaneously? Because if one nullifies and it’s still forbidden (because the next one hasn’t yet nullified), one would think it doesn’t help. It’s said that there are righteous ones who thought this way, but others don’t think so — i.e., it doesn’t have to be simultaneous. The difference between this case and the previous case (where it doesn’t work in two steps) isn’t clearly explained — it’s noted that there’s a difference but it requires study.
[Digression: What does “requires study” mean? There’s an old investigation: does “requires study” mean one really needs to study more (an open question), or does it mean a good question that remains standing (let’s move on). There are different approaches about this.]
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Halacha – One Who Made an Eruv Nullifies to One Who Didn’t Make an Eruv
One who made an eruv nullifies his domain to one who didn’t make an eruv — it doesn’t help. But one who didn’t make an eruv nullifies his domain to one who made an eruv — it helps.
Explanation: One who made an eruv cannot nullify to one who didn’t make an eruv. But the reverse — the one who didn’t make an eruv can nullify to the one who did make an eruv.
Insights:
1. A question: We learned earlier that one must nullify to each one explicitly. If the one who didn’t make an eruv nullifies to one who made an eruv, what about the rest of those who made an eruv? How does it help?
2. An answer: This continues from the previous case, where there was more than one person who didn’t make an eruv. Here we’re talking about the last two — one who made an eruv and one who didn’t. The one who didn’t make an eruv can nullify to the one who made an eruv, because there’s only one person left without an eruv, and he’s nullifying to one person, and that one person is still part of the rest (part of the eruv group). But the commentators struggle with this, because it doesn’t fit smoothly with the rule that one must nullify to each one separately. The Rambam perhaps relied on what he already wrote earlier that one must nullify to each and every one — it requires study.
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Halacha – Bitul Reshus from Courtyard to Courtyard (in a Mavoi)
Just as this householder nullifies his domain to that householder in one courtyard, so they nullify from courtyard to courtyard.
Explanation: Just as in one courtyard bitul works when a person nullifies his house, so too a courtyard can nullify to the mavoi. For example, a mavoi with three courtyards — two courtyards can nullify to the third, and it becomes as if there’s only one courtyard in the mavoi.
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Halacha – And They Nullify and Return and Nullify
Two who live in a courtyard and didn’t make an eruv, one of them nullifies his domain to the second… The second carries in his domain that his fellow nullified to him until he does his needs. The second returns and nullifies his domain to the first… and so all the times.
Explanation: Two Jews live in a courtyard without an eruv. One nullifies his domain to the second — the second may now carry. When he’s finished, the second can nullify his domain back to the first, and so on. Each one who carries must be the only householder of the courtyard at that moment.
Insights:
1. This answers the previous question whether one can exchange bitul in the middle of Shabbos — yes, one can. This comes from the Mishnah and Tosafos: they nullify and return and nullify.
2. From one person to one person it cannot be that both carry together — because the one who nullifies no longer has any domain, and the one who receives the bitul is the only householder. Both cannot do their needs together.
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Halacha – Bitul Reshus in a Ruin
And there is bitul reshus in a ruin just as it is in a courtyard.
Explanation: Just as in a courtyard one can nullify domain, so too in a ruin.
Insights: The innovation is that a ruin is not usually a place where people live together like a courtyard. With a courtyard it’s natural that each has a right, but a ruin is more of an innovation — therefore bitul reshus also works there.
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Halacha – Deliberately Carried Out vs. Inadvertently Carried Out
If he deliberately carried out — he prohibits them, for there’s no proof that he stands by his nullification. If he inadvertently carried out — he doesn’t prohibit them, for there’s no proof that he stands by his nullification.
Explanation: Someone nullified his domain. If he carries afterward deliberately (knowingly) — he shows that his bitul wasn’t genuine, and he prohibits the others. But if inadvertently (forgot) — the bitul remains in force, because he holds by his bitul, it was just a mistake.
And these words apply when those to whom he nullified didn’t first take possession. But if they first took possession and carried out, and afterward he returned and carried out — he doesn’t prohibit them, even deliberately he doesn’t prohibit them.
Insights: If the other courtyard residents already first acted on his bitul — they already carried out and showed their chazakah that the courtyard belongs to them — then, even if the one who nullified carries afterward deliberately, he no longer prohibits. They already “grabbed” the domain, and it cannot be taken back.
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Halacha – Bitul Only Works When One Could Have Made an Eruv on Erev Shabbos
Two houses on two sides of the public domain, gentiles surrounded it with a partition on Shabbos — they cannot nullify, since it was impossible for them to make an eruv while it was still day.
Explanation: Two houses on both sides of the public domain. Gentiles made a partition on Shabbos — it becomes a private domain. But they cannot nullify domain, because yesterday (Erev Shabbos) they couldn’t make any eruv (it was still a public domain).
Insights — Fundamental Principle of Bitul: Bitul is a bedieved for eruv — a last resort when the eruv didn’t work, when someone forgot or didn’t want to. But bitul is a law within eruv, not a separate law in itself. If one couldn’t make any eruv at all on Erev Shabbos, we go back to the original enactment of the Sages that it looks like one is carrying in the public domain. Bitul only functions within the framework of eruv.
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Halacha – One of the Courtyard Residents Who Died — Inheritance During Bein Hashmashos
One of the courtyard residents who died, and left his domain to another from the marketplace — if he died while it was still day, this heir prohibits them. If he died on Shabbos — he doesn’t prohibit.
Explanation: One of the courtyard residents dies and leaves his domain to an heir who doesn’t live in the courtyard (from the marketplace). If he died while it was still day (before Shabbos) — the heir prohibits them, because he’s a stranger who has a domain in the courtyard but isn’t part of their eruv. But if he died on Shabbos — the heir doesn’t prohibit, because during bein hashmashos the courtyard was complete — all courtyard residents were part of the eruv. The inheritance that happens on Shabbos doesn’t change the status that existed during bein hashmashos.
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Halacha – One from the Marketplace Who Died — Reverse Case
One from the marketplace who died, and left his domain to one of the courtyard residents — if he died while it was still day, he doesn’t prohibit, for he only prohibits all those who made an eruv. If he died on Shabbos — he prohibits them, until he nullifies to them his testator’s domain or nullifies to them his domain.
Explanation: A stranger (from the marketplace) had a house in the courtyard without an eruv. He dies and leaves it to one of the courtyard residents. If he died while it was still day — the heir (who is already a courtyard resident) inherited it before Shabbos, he’s part of their eruv, so it doesn’t prohibit. But if he died on Shabbos — it’s forbidden, because during bein hashmashos there was still the stranger with his house in the courtyard without an eruv.
Insights: The heir can fix it through bitul — either nullify the domain of the testator (the inherited house), or nullify his own domain. Both options work. The principle is that bein hashmashos determines the status — whatever the situation was then, that remains, even if someone dies in the middle.
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Halacha – Yored Lenichsei Hager (One Who Takes Possession of a Convert’s Property)
A Jew and a convert who live in one mavoi, and the convert died during the day, even though the Jew didn’t take possession of his property until after dark — he prohibits until he nullifies, for he’s fit to inherit him. And if the convert died after dark — even if another Jew took possession of his property, he doesn’t prohibit him, rather his domain is nullified.
Explanation: A convert without heirs dies — his property is ownerless. Whoever grabs first acquires. If he dies on Erev Shabbos while it’s still day, and a second Jew takes possession of his property — he prohibits until he nullifies, because he’s considered like an heir. If the convert dies after dark — even if a second Jew takes possession, he doesn’t prohibit, because at the entrance of Shabbos it was already permitted.
Insights:
1. The yored lenichsei hager is also called an “heir”: Even with a convert’s property, where it’s not true inheritance but ownerless property, the one who takes possession is considered like an heir regarding eruv. He steps in “in place of” the convert, and can nullify domain just like an heir. This comes from the rule “an heir enters in place of his testator in every matter” — the one who takes possession of a convert’s property is treated as if he could already have made an eruv yesterday.
2. Why does he prohibit? Because the convert could have made an eruv yesterday (Erev Shabbos) or actually did make one. The one who takes possession stands in his place. But he himself didn’t make an eruv — therefore he prohibits, until he nullifies.
3. If no one would have taken possession: The courtyard would be like with one person, because the convert’s portion is ownerless — there’s no “resident.” Only when a second Jew comes in and takes possession does it become a problem.
4. After dark — his domain is nullified: Because at the entrance of Shabbos it was already permitted, one cannot become forbidden in the middle of Shabbos. This is the rule: One cannot become forbidden on Shabbos — a new person who comes in on Shabbos doesn’t prohibit, except in the one case of retroactive clarification.
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Halacha – A Jew Living with a Gentile
A Jew who lives with a gentile, or with a ger toshav, in a courtyard — he doesn’t prohibit him, for a gentile’s dwelling is not a dwelling and doesn’t establish a prohibition.
Explanation: One Jew with one gentile in one courtyard — doesn’t need an eruv. A gentile’s dwelling doesn’t count as a dwelling regarding eruvin.
Insights: “A gentile is not a person” regarding eruv — not that a gentile is an animal, but the Jew doesn’t reckon with the gentile’s dwelling. The entire place is like a private domain for the Jew alone.
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Halacha – Two Jews and a Gentile in a Courtyard — Decree That They Not Dwell
Two Jews and a gentile in a courtyard — this one prohibits the other. Not from the basic law but a decree, so that they won’t have gentiles dwell with them, so they won’t learn from his deeds.
Explanation: Two Jews with a gentile — here they made a decree that the gentile’s dwelling should count, so that Jews won’t become comfortable living with gentiles.
Insights:
1. Why not with one Jew and one gentile? The Rambam asks: “And why didn’t they decree with one Jew and one gentile?” He answers: It’s uncommon — because perhaps he’ll fear lest he be alone with him and he’ll kill him — there’s a prohibition of yichud (seclusion) of a Jew with a gentile (concern for murder), so no one will live that way anyway. Only when it’s permitted regarding yichud (two Jews with a gentile), they made the decree regarding eruv.
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Halacha – Eruv and Bitul Reshus Don’t Help in the Presence of a Gentile
Two Jews and a gentile who dwell in one courtyard, and the Jews made an eruv for themselves — they accomplished nothing. They don’t nullify to a gentile, and the gentile doesn’t nullify to them. Or the Jews nullified to each other and became like one individual with the gentile — they accomplished nothing. For eruv doesn’t help in the presence of a gentile, and bitul reshus doesn’t help in the presence of a gentile.
Explanation: No eruv and no bitul reshus helps when a gentile is present. Even if the two Jews nullify one to the other and become like one Jew with a gentile — it doesn’t help, because the enactors didn’t allow any other permissions.
Insights:
1. Why can’t a gentile nullify? Because bitul reshus is a law on Shabbos, a Jewish matter — a gentile doesn’t understand eruv and bitul. It’s not a true bitul reshus with a gentile. Eruv and bitul are a type of “love of Israel” — only Jews understand this.
2. Even becoming like one individual with the gentile doesn’t help: One can’t say that through bitul between the Jews it becomes like one Jew with a gentile (which is permitted) — because the enactment closed all avenues.
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Halacha – Renting from the Gentile — The Permission
One rents from the gentile even on Shabbos, for renting is like bitul reshus. Therefore one rents from the gentile even for less than a perutah’s worth.
Explanation: The practical permission is: one gives the gentile money, one rents his place, and the gentile becomes like a guest. Then it’s considered as if only Jews live there.
Insights:
1. The rental is only a token recognition: The rental from a gentile regarding eruv is not a definite rental but merely a token — it’s only a symbolic acknowledgment, not a true rental with all the laws of buying and selling. Therefore it’s permitted on Shabbos (whereas usually buying and selling is forbidden), and therefore it helps even for less than a perutah’s worth.
2. The Rambam compares it to bitul reshus — just as bitul reshus only works regarding Shabbos (not a real transfer of ownership), so too the rental from a gentile is only a Shabbos mechanism.
3. One Jew can rent for all: Not every Jew needs to go separately to rent from the gentile. One Jew rents, and his domain becomes part of all the Jews’ eruv. One Jew and a hundred many gentiles — even many gentiles, one Jew rents for all.
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Halacha – Who Can Rent on Behalf of the Gentile
The gentile’s wife rents without his knowledge. Even a rental or loan from a Jew upon him.
Explanation: The gentile’s wife can rent without the gentile’s knowledge. Even a Jewish worker/renter of the gentile can rent.
Insights: Because the rental is only a token recognition, we’re lenient that even people who don’t have full rights over the dwelling can rent — they live there, they’re somewhat partners, they run the house, and that’s enough for such a matter. A practical solution: one goes to the Jewish worker in the gentile’s hotel, gives him half a perutah, and he rents the domain — this falls under “renting without his knowledge.”
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Halacha – Borrowing a Place in the Courtyard’s Width
One borrows from the gentile a place in the courtyard’s width… they’ve become partners with him in his domain and he doesn’t prohibit.
Explanation: Instead of renting with money, one can ask to borrow a bit of space in the gentile’s house. Through this one becomes a partner in his domain.
Insights: The mechanism is different: with rental one rents the gentile’s domain for oneself; with borrowing one becomes a partner with the gentile in his domain. Both help.
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Halacha – A Gentile Who Has Many Renters
Since the gentile’s rental or loan is only from the many, only one of them is needed.
Explanation: When a gentile has many renters/borrowers, one only needs to speak with one of them.
Insights: Early Ashkenazic authorities figured out a leniency based on this principle: in a city full of gentiles, one can go to the city ruler (to whom theoretically the entire city belongs), rent from him with a perutah, and thereby the entire city is covered.
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Halacha – Rental on Shabbos When No Eruv Was Made
Two [Jews] and a gentile living in one courtyard [and they didn’t make an eruv] — they rent from the gentile on Shabbos, and afterward one nullifies his domain to his fellow.
Explanation: Two Jews and a gentile in one courtyard without an eruv — one rents from the gentile on Shabbos, then one nullifies domain to the other. The one who nullifies, nullifies either his own domain, or the gentile’s domain that he rented.
Insights: And so if there’s no gentile there on Shabbos — when the gentile isn’t there on Shabbos, one cannot rent at all, so one Jew nullifies to another Jew, and says to him “take.”
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Halacha – A Gentile Who Rented from a Second Gentile
A gentile who rented from a gentile — if he’s not permitted to evict the second gentile until he completes his rental period, they rent from the second gentile who entered in place of the owner. But if he has permission to evict him at any time he wishes, and the second one wasn’t standing — they rent from the first one, and they are permitted.
Explanation: With a long-term lease, one must rent from the renter (second gentile), because he holds the domain. With short-term, when the owner can evict the renter, and the renter isn’t available — one can rent from the first gentile (owner).
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Halacha – Windows Open from a Jew’s House to a Jew’s House
A courtyard where a Jew and gentile live in it, and there were windows open from one Jew’s house to the other — even though it’s permitted to carry out and bring in through the windows, to carry out from house to house through the courtyard is forbidden because of the gentile until he rents.
Explanation: Two Jews who have a window between their houses can make an eruv through the windows, and carry through the windows. But through the courtyard (where the gentile lives) they may not carry without renting from the gentile.
Insights:
1. One shouldn’t argue: because the two Jews already have an eruv through windows, they’ve become “one,” and therefore it’s like one Jew with a gentile (which doesn’t need rental). The Rambam says no — the eruv through windows doesn’t make them so “one” that one could dismiss the rental from the gentile. The reason: the decree not to learn from his deeds (not to live with a gentile) remains in force even when one has a way out through windows.
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Halacha – A Public Desecrator of Shabbos or Idol Worshiper — Like a Gentile
A public desecrator of Shabbos or one who worships idols — he is like a gentile in all his matters, and one doesn’t make an eruv with him and doesn’t nullify domain to him, but one rents from him like from a gentile.
Explanation: A public desecrator of Shabbos or idol worshiper is treated like a gentile in all matters — one cannot make an eruv with him, one cannot nullify domain to him, but one must rent from him like from a gentile.
Insights: This stems from the fact that Shabbos and idolatry are the two most severe transgressions, and a public desecrator of Shabbos is like an idol worshiper (as learned at the end of Laws of Shabbos).
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Halacha – Heretics — Sadducees, Boethusians, Deniers of the Oral Torah
But a heretic from among the heretics who doesn’t worship idols and doesn’t desecrate Shabbos, such as Sadducees and Boethusians and those who deny the Oral Torah — the general rule is anyone who doesn’t acknowledge the mitzvah of eruv — one doesn’t make an eruv with him, but one nullifies domain to him.
Explanation: A Sadducee/Boethusian/denier of the Oral Torah is not like a gentile in all matters. One cannot make an eruv with him (because he doesn’t believe in eruv), but one can nullify domain with him (bitul reshus he understands).
Insights:
1. The Rambam’s rule: A Sadducee is not a gentile. He’s different from a public desecrator of Shabbos. He believes in Torah, just not in the Oral Torah. Therefore one cannot “rent” from him (like from a gentile), but one can make bitul reshus.
2. Why not eruv? Because he doesn’t acknowledge the mitzvah of eruv — he knows about eruv but he doesn’t agree with it. (Unlike a simple weak Jew who doesn’t understand, but acts according to those who understand.)
3. Why yes bitul? Because bitul reshus is a more fundamental mechanism — he nullifies his domain entirely, this isn’t an “enactment” like eruv, but a reality that he’s not there. A Sadducee can understand this and agree.
4. Bitul reshus is fundamentally more basic than eruv: We see throughout the laws that bitul reshus is in a certain sense stronger than eruv — bitul means he’s entirely not there, which is a more complete solution. Although practically eruv is lechatchila, bitul is in a certain sense more fundamental.
5. The Meiri: A Sadducee doesn’t have the leniency of “one Jew” (that with a gentile one doesn’t need rental when only one Jew lives), because the leniency is based on the fact that a Jew doesn’t live with a gentile (because a gentile is suspected of murder), but a Sadducee is not suspected of murder, so one does live with him, and he remains a problem regarding eruv.
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Halacha – Inner and Outer Courtyard — Jew and Gentile
One Jew and one gentile in the inner one, and one Jew in the outer one — or the reverse, a Jew and gentile in the outer one, and a Jew alone in the inner one — he makes for the outer one, they are forbidden regarding the inner one, until these are permitted to these.
Explanation: With two courtyards, one inside the other, where the inner one must pass through the outer one — when a gentile is in one of them, the same laws apply as with one courtyard: the gentile’s presence causes the Jews to prohibit each other. When one must pass through the outer courtyard, it becomes like two Jews and a gentile in one courtyard, because regel hamuteres sham (the foot that’s permitted there) — one must rent from the gentile. But in the inner courtyard alone, where only one Jew lives (with or without a gentile), there is no decree.
📝 Full Transcript
Laws of Eruvin Chapter 2 – Nullification of Domain
Introduction: Review of Chapter 1 and Introduction to the Chapter
Good, we are learning Laws of Eruvin Chapter 2.
Good, we are learning Rambam Laws of Eruvin, the second chapter of Laws of Eruvin, Chapter 2. In the previous chapter we learned what the mitzvah of Laws of Eruvin is, what eruvin is. We learned that essentially one may carry in the courtyard or in the mavoi, because the partitions make it a reshut hayachid (private domain). But since people don’t see it as a reshut hayachid, because people think that yachid, reshut hayachid, reshut harabim (public domain), people don’t know that it has to do with partitions, rather they look at it as where the rabim (many) live is rabim, and where the yachid (individual) lives… if he looks at it that way, that in a courtyard there is also reshut hayachid and reshut harabim, that is to say the reshut hayachid is the house where people live, and the reshut harabim is the shared space, the courtyard, or also in a mavoi.
The Sages didn’t want people to think that way, rather they would forget the entire law of hotza’ah (carrying out), and hotza’ah we know is a very important thing to the Sages, they made so many laws about hotza’ah. So they made a law that one must do something that shows that the entire courtyard is truly one domain, or the entire mavoi is truly one domain. How does one show this? Through the fact that everyone is partners together in one meal. There is a bread in which they are all partners. This we learned in the previous chapter, various laws of how the bread works, which bread is suitable, I mean when one needs bread and when one can use other foods, and so on.
In this chapter we are going to learn what happens when it doesn’t work. There is someone in the courtyard who doesn’t want to, or he can’t, for some reason he doesn’t want to become part of the… the entire group becomes a chasidic fellowship that are partners in a loaf and eat together, and he doesn’t want to. What does one do in such a case? I mean usually it happens by accident, but sometimes it happens deliberately. Anyway, what we are going to learn is that there are two solutions, there are certain solutions that one can do. This can be done for the Jews on Shabbat, I mean, right? One can do, besides the solution of the loaf, which is the enactment of King Solomon, the mitzvah, there are solutions that one can do.
And let us make a note right away, that seemingly, as we learned earlier, one can also be mezakeh (transfer ownership), one person can be mezakeh for everyone. If one person is mezakeh for everyone, seemingly there is no problem, because he is mezakeh even shelo befanav (not in their presence). But most likely they didn’t speak of such a method, it seems that the zekhiyah (acquisition) wasn’t a common thing, it was actually that each person gives a loaf. What happens when someone didn’t give a loaf? So seemingly it can’t become a reshut hayachid. It’s true, solved, most people have already made it so that their house and the courtyard are one, they don’t necessarily live in their own house, rather everyone lives in the same courtyard. But there is one person who is preventing all of them, one who makes his house a reshut hayachid, consequently automatically the courtyard around becomes like a reshut harabim, it already has the concern of eruvin.
Law 1 – A Courtyard Where Everyone Made an Eruv Except One of Them
The Rambam’s Words
The Rambam says as follows: A courtyard where everyone made an eruv, everyone mixed together with the eruv, except one of them who did not make an eruv with them, one person didn’t. Whether deliberately or accidentally, he forgot to send in his little loaf. This person prohibits them, the person prohibits the other members of the courtyard, it becomes a big problem, he prohibits all of them from taking out from their houses to the courtyard, they all may not carry out from their house to the courtyard, because it remains that the courtyard is a shared place for all of them, including for the one who forgot, and the houses are separate. And from the courtyard to the houses.
Nullification of His Courtyard Domain Only
So what can one do? The Rambam says as follows: If this one who did not make an eruv nullified for them the domain of his courtyard only, if the person didn’t make the eruv, so he went and he nullified the domain of his courtyard. He says he is nullifying the right, so to speak, that he has in the courtyard. The courtyard we learned earlier is a shared place for all of them. He says, the right that I have here in the courtyard I am nullifying. He is nullifying it to them, he gives it to them. So they are all now like one household, they are all partners in one loaf. The courtyard remains like an area that belongs to one group of people, which is one group of yachid. One family, and he is batel (nullified), he has no connection to the courtyard, he remains in the courtyard further as if he is a reshut hayachid, that’s fine. These are permitted, they may all carry to take out from their houses to the courtyard, from the courtyard to their houses. But to his house it is forbidden, to his house they may not carry, because his house remains intact. All the others nullified their house to the courtyard, and the courtyard became their partnership. He was not me’arev (made an eruv), he only was mevatel (nullified).**
The Difference Between Mevatel and Me’arev
Mevatel means that he takes away their separateness, their individuality. Me’arev goes both ways. Yes, yes. But mevatel goes only one way. It’s not the same thing. The point is that each person in the courtyard has two domains, he has his house that belongs to him, and also the courtyard, his portion in the courtyard. If he nullified his portion in the courtyard, then the courtyard becomes good for everyone, but to his house no one may carry, not him and not anyone, because his house is still separate.
Nullification of His House Domain and His Courtyard Domain
But if he nullified for them the domain of his house and the domain of his courtyard, if he nullified everything, he said my house and my courtyard are batel, then his house and his courtyard become like the courtyard, which the courtyard belongs to all the other people who were not meshtatef (participated) in the loaf, but were me’arev, all of them are permitted, everyone may carry in, he may also carry, because it’s not his private property.**
They are permitted who did not make an eruv, and behold he nullified for them the domain of his house and courtyard, they may carry everywhere, including in his courtyard, because among themselves they are all me’arev, and he nullified his house, because his house now belongs to them. And behold he nullified for them the domain of his house and his courtyard, he nullified the domain, the separate domain of his house and his courtyard. Consequently, what is now the domain? To whom does his house and courtyard now belong? To all of them, to the rabim, to the members of the courtyard. And even he is permitted, but he may also carry from his house to the courtyard. Why? Because he nullified it, consequently he has no domain, he has no separate domain. And what is he? And behold he is like a guest with them, he is like someone who is a guest at the people of the members of the courtyard. He is not a partner with them, because he didn’t give a loaf, but what happens, what about someone who comes into the courtyard, he doesn’t have his own house in the courtyard, he is only a guest of the members of the courtyard, and the rule is an oreakh (guest) does not prohibit, he becomes an oreakh.**
Plain Nullification of Domain – Minimum Interpretation
So now we learned that there are two types of domains that each person has, and one can nullify one or both. This we know, this is normal. If nullification of domain is plain, someone nullifies his domain, he doesn’t say clearly which domain, because he has the domain of his house, his private domain, and he has the partnership domain in the courtyard. We are told that when someone nullifies domain plainly, his courtyard domain is nullified. Perhaps, we minimize. As if, we don’t put more meaning into his words, we say he only nullified the thing that is easier to nullify, the domain that he has in the courtyard, but the domain of his house is not nullified.
This is the minimum. Because normally a person is easier to nullify his domain in the courtyard than to nullify his house, his house he won’t give away, his domain in the courtyard, okay.
Law Regarding Nullification to Each and Every One Explicitly
The Rambam’s Words
The Rambam, when nullifying domain to the members of the courtyard, someone who does this and he nullifies his domain to the members of the courtyard, he must nullify to each and every one explicitly. And he says my domain is nullified to you and to you and to you. And it’s not simple that he can say I am nullifying my domain to everyone, because who is everyone? There is no everyone. He cannot say to all the members of the courtyard. He must nullify separately, yes, separately to each individual.
Discussion: Why Not Like Zekhiyah?
Why? So it says in the Rambam. Right, but why shouldn’t it help when he says I am nullifying to the members of the courtyard? Because there is no such thing as members of the courtyard. Exactly, nullification is not the same thing as eruv. Nullification means as if, I don’t know what he means, let’s say, as if hefker (ownerless), as if he is makneh (transfers) his portion to the other people. One cannot be makneh to a group of people, one can only be makneh to each individual separately.
So one follows this reasoning. What is difficult to understand? I can also say, I don’t know the reason. It’s yes, being mezakeh one can do for everyone. A person can take a loaf and say – it’s not for everyone, for each one a piece. One can be makneh so that the ten people should acquire it. And here it says that one must say it explicitly. I don’t know if it’s a law in kinyan (acquisition), or if it’s a law in eruv. It’s bitul (nullification), bitul is not kinyan. Bitul is not kinyan and not eruv. It’s a new thing, which is a difficult thing. People don’t do it together. This is seen here.
The Nature of Nullification of Domain
Nullification is not that I am nullifying my domain, that I don’t have any domain. It’s not hefker. It’s not that I am nullifying my domain. Nullification means nullification to… Nullification is he is nullifying to someone. Nullification the language is directional. You are nullifying your domain, I have and I am nullifying. Both have a portion on what they stand. Nullification to them. Always nullification to them. There is no such thing as nullification about them. Always nullification is nullification to them. Why? It goes only one way. It’s not that he becomes batel to him. He becomes batel to them. And the reason why he may carry is only because he becomes a guest, he becomes out. He doesn’t become like, he becomes included with them. He doesn’t become included. It’s nullification is as if he is submitting, I don’t know, he gives his domain to them.
So, it’s a very serious thing. You see that people don’t want to nullify their domain. It’s not a simple thing. They won’t make a partnership for a minute so that one should be able to carry on Shabbat. I don’t know. But that’s the idea as if, that one takes it very seriously. I don’t understand this, but…
Law Regarding an Heir – Nullification of Domain on Shabbat
The Rambam’s Words
Okay, so the Rambam learns. But an heir, someone just inherited a house, nullifying domain, can he nullify a domain even if his testator died on Shabbat? The father died on Shabbat, and he inherited on Shabbat. Can he still then… ah, so you see here that one nullifies and it helps on Shabbat? Exactly. No, I’m going to tell you clearly now. Both saw it yes, because he forgot, that’s the whole problem, he forgot, so he saw it yes. Nullification is, one of the points of nullification is that this can be done on Shabbat. It’s not an eruv which can only be done on erev Shabbat.
Aha, so you also see as if that it’s not a kinyan, it’s not being makneh to other people, because that one wouldn’t be allowed to do on Shabbat. Okay. It’s not simple what it is exactly. It’s such a thing called nullification of domain.
The Rule: An Heir Stands in Place of His Testator for Everything
So, the heir can nullify it on Shabbat. Why? Because the heir stands in place of his testator for everything. The heir immediately receives all the rights that the testator had. And that’s it. He already acquired it, it’s already his, even erev Shabbat it happened automatically.
The meaning of this is as follows, in the Gemara it says that the question is, because there is a rule that one can only nullify something that one could have made an eruv with yesterday. So the question is, the heir couldn’t have nullified yesterday, because it wasn’t his yesterday, he couldn’t have made an eruv yesterday, whatever it wasn’t his. He says, he could have yes, because he is a continuation of his father who could have.
The Law of an Heir — The Power of Nullification from the Testator
So since his father could have, so he today is a continuation of that, but nullifying on Shabbat one may yes. The right is not a question.
Let me explain to you, there is no doubt that an heir is the owner of his inheritance. The novelty is he continues even the father’s ability from erev Shabbat. It’s interesting, it means that an heir is not simply that he receives the house, rather he becomes the father as it were, and the house remains his. It’s different from a regular kinyan that goes from A to B, it remains with A and he becomes A.
If one bought on Shabbat, the house, he goes, it’s not work in the house. He comes in place of his testator, that’s the point. Consequently he can make nullification of domain.
It means that if someone would in another way shehayah makneh (would transfer), the kinyan should be makneh, let’s say if one may, I don’t know, if someone makes a kinyan and says that on Shabbat the kinyan should take effect, and the other acquired, not necessarily that he can nullify. But here, since the law regarding an heir is that the heir comes in place of the testator, since the testator had at the time when one could have made an eruv on Shabbat the right to nullify, he can do it.
Question: But One Doesn’t Inherit an Eruv?
Speaker 1: Do you understand what I’m saying? No, but he comes in place of his testator, I would have had to say that he already has it beforehand. One doesn’t inherit an eruv. One inherits a domain.
But he inherited the house which the testator already gave away the right to everyone in the eruv. The eruv wasn’t given away, the eruv is for the people, the eruv is not for the house. The domain was given away for the house. If I remember it says this soon explicitly.
Nullification of Domain on Shabbat — Permitted Initially
The Rama says, nullifying domain on Shabbat is permitted initially, so one may do it, there is no problem.
Speaker 2: The nullification is part of the law of an heir?
Speaker 1: No, it’s a completely new line. He may do it. No, it connects to the fact that he may, even… Here one speaks for the first time clearly of a case where he died on Shabbat, the testator may he do it on Shabbat. Why? One that he can, because he comes in place of the testator. One to ask may one nullify on Shabbat? No, one may even initially nullify the domain on Shabbat. All the signs until now this is the thing of nullification.
I mean it’s a middle beginning. I mean it’s from the beginning of creation. I mean also that… I don’t know, I mean also that the testator must do it, because the eruv of the father already doesn’t work anyway, even if the father did make an eruv. One must see soon.
What the Rambam wants to say is, you shouldn’t think that it’s something that looks like kinyan or buying and selling that one may not do on Shabbat, one may do it initially on Shabbat.
Right, very good.
Nullification of Domain from Many to an Individual — There is No Large Guest
He says further, what happens like this? “If those who made the eruv nullified their domain to the one who did not make an eruv”. The person who was not me’arev, he also doesn’t want to be mevatel. But others go, they say, “we are all nullifying to him, we don’t have any separate reshut hayachid, everything is yours”. He is permitted. Right. The person to whom they nullified may carry, the line is not alone, rather he lives in the courtyard, so there is only one separate reshut hayachid in the courtyard. But they are forbidden, they are all forbidden, because no domain remained for them.
Why? They don’t remain with any domain. Hey, but didn’t it say earlier that one must remain with a domain? That’s not a problem. Right.
“And we don’t say they should be like guests with him”, we don’t say, let them all be looked at as if indeed the one person has a domain in the courtyard, and all are like guests with him. It doesn’t work that way, because “there is no large guest, guests go and are reduced”. A bunch of guests don’t go to one person. It doesn’t work that one person should have so many guests. On the contrary, a group of Jews can accommodate a guest.
What is the rule? It doesn’t mean that it’s guests, a person can have a courtyard, but it means that in this case one cannot say that the whole group are his guests. It doesn’t go that way. It’s not a logical reasoning that I understand, but that’s what the law says.
Speaker 2: Yes. The point is that an individual can become batel to the many, but the many cannot become batel to an individual.
English Translation
Speaker 1: One can nullify on Shabbos the bitul reshus (nullification of domain), because it’s possible, that’s the point, they want him, just as when he wants to carry they nullify everything for him, so he should be able to carry, and afterwards they will return to what it was. The Tosafos says explicitly that one may not do this.
Okay, let’s continue.
Bitul Reshus — Two or More Who Didn’t Make an Eruv
“If those who didn’t make an eruv were two or more”, until now we’ve been talking about when one person didn’t join in the eruv. But if two people or three people didn’t make an eruv, then, “and they nullify their domain to those who made the eruv”, they nullified their domain to those who did make an eruv, “then those who made the eruv are permitted”, those who made the eruv will be permitted, because they nullified their domain, “and those who didn’t make an eruv”, the people who didn’t make an eruv and they nullified their domain, “are forbidden”, they may not carry from their homes to the courtyard.
But the reverse cannot be done. “But those who made the eruv cannot nullify their domain to two who didn’t make an eruv”, they cannot nullify the domain to the two, because even if they would do this it still wouldn’t help, “because each one of them forbids the other”, because afterwards one of them would have to nullify to the other. That also won’t help.
Bitul in Two Steps — Doesn’t Work
Ah, what happens if it was done this way, and afterwards the last one should nullify, just one to the last one? “And even if one who didn’t make an eruv went back and nullified his domain to the second one who didn’t make an eruv”, it’s still “forbidden”, why? “Because at the time when those who made the eruv nullified to him, he was forbidden”, because when all those who made an eruv nullified to him, at that time it didn’t work, there’s still me and my neighbor who forbid the courtyard, and therefore we cannot carry. That’s the problem.
I don’t know. These are indeed the rules of the laws of bitul. This is a business. We’ll see. I don’t understand. Interesting.
One cannot, the point is, something that must be done in two stages, one cannot do in two stages. That’s the point. Bitul only works when it works in one shot. Two times? No, it doesn’t work anymore.
As you said, as you said that one took into his house, and he nullifies, and afterwards he nullifies the second time, that’s not good.
No, no, he says better. No, he says two stages that don’t work out for the halacha. You must first have each one nullify to the one who didn’t make an eruv, and afterwards it still doesn’t help, because there remain two who didn’t make an eruv. They need extra. One cannot make extra steps. If the previous step remained forbidden, one cannot make another step to solve it. That’s what he’s saying.
Question: Must Several People Nullify at Once?
Speaker 2: So it means that several people in the courtyard need to nullify, must they do it at once?
Speaker 1: No, they don’t need to do it, because it doesn’t work out logically. Yes, they can nullify, they don’t have to do it at once. Each one, he forbids the domain, he forbids the domain. So when one nullifies, it’s still forbidden, because the next person hasn’t yet nullified.
Speaker 2: Which next person?
Speaker 1: Okay, let’s continue.
Speaker 2: Ah, you mean in the previous case.
Speaker 1: Yes, when several people are nullifying, what happens then? Must they nullify at once? Because if when one nullifies it’s still forbidden, the bitul doesn’t help.
Very good. Indeed there are tzaddikim who thought this way. But others don’t think so. Why not? I’m trying to understand some distinction. I don’t know exactly. I feel there’s a distinction, I just don’t know what it is. I don’t know clearly. There’s perhaps a… I don’t know. I don’t know. He brings it perhaps as another problem, I don’t understand what their problem is.
Okay, let’s continue.
Bitul from One to One — One Who Made an Eruv Nullifies to One Who Didn’t Make an Eruv
One who made an eruv nullifies his domain to one who didn’t make an eruv. What does this mean? When we’re talking here about a courtyard where there are only two people? Yes. One who made an eruv cannot nullify to one who didn’t make an eruv. But the reverse, yes. One who didn’t make an eruv nullifies his domain to one who made an eruv.
It can’t be just two people, because with two people there’s no eruv at all. The point is that one person cannot… with an eruv, that means two people who made an eruv, we’ve now learned, can make a bitul for a third person who didn’t make an eruv, and then only they, yes, only the one who makes the eruv becomes permitted.
But one person, one person who made an eruv, cannot nullify to one person who doesn’t have an eruv. And the same thing in reverse, that the one who didn’t make an eruv should nullify domain to the one who did make an eruv. I don’t know why not, but that’s what the Rambam says.
Discussion: What Does “One Who Made an Eruv Nullifies to One Who Didn’t Make an Eruv” Mean?
Speaker 2: He says that this is still talking about the previous case, when there was more than one person who didn’t make an eruv. We’re talking here about the last two people, meaning.
Speaker 1: I don’t understand, before the two people didn’t make an eruv. One who made an eruv… ah, the point is one needs everyone. If there’s an eruv, each one must agree, each one must nullify domain. One doesn’t help.
But the reverse does help, very simple, because there’s only one person left without an eruv, so he nullifies domain to one, and now that one is part of the rest.
Speaker 2: But before we learned that one must nullify to each one, specifically, remember? We learned before, no? Remember that we learned that one must nullify to each one? So what does he mean “one who made an eruv nullifies to one”? There’s only one, there are still ten people. So how does it help?
Speaker 1: He says that it must be that the second one died, tzarich iyun (requires investigation). He’s not the first one struggling with this, other commentators already struggle. Because it says, we learned before that one must nullify to each one. One cannot, not to each one, to each extra one. So what does it mean he nullifies to one in the eruv? He cannot, he must nullify to each one.
There’s a reason for this. The Gemara asks this question, and the Gemara answers he died, then one may. The Rambam should have said, says the Rambam, perhaps the Rambam relied on what I wrote above that one needs to nullify to each and every one, and it requires investigation. All these things that we’ve mixed up, one must say that it requires investigation, one may say that it requires investigation. True? It’s my halacha.
Digression: What Does “Tzarich Iyun” Mean?
Okay, when he says tzarich iyun, he’s saying you be my guest, I’ve struggled, you be my guest. Here there’s an old inquiry, what does tzarich iyun mean? Tzarich iyun means one must investigate, or tzarich iyun means a good question, let’s move on. Here there are other opinions about this. Tzarich iyun, what does tzarich iyun mean?
Bitul Reshus from Courtyard to Courtyard
Okay, now we’re going to learn that bitul doesn’t only work with a house, it also works from a courtyard.
The Rambam says: Just as this homeowner nullifies his domain to this homeowner in one courtyard, so they nullify from courtyard to courtyard.
Just as in one courtyard bitul works that a person nullifies his house, the same thing can also work that a courtyard can nullify to the mavoy. From one courtyard to the next courtyard.
And also, for example a mavoy with three courtyards, two courtyards can nullify to the third courtyard, and it becomes as if there’s only one courtyard in the mavoy. Or one to the second, yes.
And they nullify and go back and nullify.
There’s no limit, just two courtyards can nullify one to the other, and now it means as if both live together in the mavoy.
Ah, now you asked before a question whether one can change the bitul in the middle of Shabbos, the Mishnah says and the Tosafos, they nullify and go back and nullify. You have the three domains.
They Nullify and Go Back and Nullify: Changing Bitul in the Middle of Shabbos
Two who live in a courtyard and didn’t make an eruv. Two Jews live in a courtyard and didn’t make an eruv, now they want to carry on Shabbos. What does one do? One of them nullifies his domain to the second. One nullifies his domain to the second.
When does he use this? When does he nullify his domain to the second? May the second now carry because the first nullified?
We find ourselves saying, the second carries in his domain that his friend nullified to him until he does his needs. That means, that the other’s bitul works until the first one still needs to do his needs, until he still needs to carry. Once he’s finished carrying, he no longer needs to carry, the second goes back and nullifies his domain to the first, and he nullifies to the first his domain that he nullified to him. The second uses it as long as he needs. And so every time, each one who carries, when he carries he must be the only homeowner of that courtyard. He must beforehand ask them to nullify domain to me.
How… he then told him, nullifying domain is simply a statement, he must say I nullify the domain to you. When he says it, until he withdraws, he can carry.
Discussion: Why Can’t Both Carry Together?
Speaker 2: And here one can say, from one person there cannot be a guest for one person, that’s the same thing. If one person nullifies his domain to a second person, only the second can carry, not the first. Because he didn’t need to not have the nullifier…
Speaker 1: Ah, right, because they couldn’t both do their needs together.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 1: Ah, very good.
Bitul Reshus in a Ruin
He says further, And there is bitul reshus in a ruin just as it is in a courtyard. Just as in a courtyard they can both nullify domain, so it will mean that they live in the ruin that is between them.
Discussion: What’s the Innovation of a Ruin?
Speaker 2: What’s the innovation? Did you think that a ruin is different from a courtyard?
Speaker 1: Because a courtyard, naturally, I understand that each one has a right. A ruin is something a bit more of an innovation.
Speaker 2: If that’s their arrangement, but a ruin isn’t usually a place where all people live together.
Speaker 1: But if one makes the bitul one can.
Speaker 2: Okay.
Speaker 1: So this one can learn how he answers what the bitul reshus turns out to be.
Deliberately Took Out vs. Accidentally Took Out: When Bitul Becomes Void
But afterwards… one nullified his domain, and he didn’t forget that he nullified the domain. He didn’t act as he said. He didn’t take seriously the courtyard as ownerless at the time of the bitul, but not later he wakes up and uses it already. So he shows with this that it wasn’t a true bitul.
So, if he deliberately took out, if he took out knowingly, this forbids them, he forbids the other people, they can, the other people may no longer carry in the courtyard. Because there’s no proof that he stands by his bitul, he showed that his bitul wasn’t genuine, he didn’t stand by it.
But accidentally, we’re also talking here in a manner when he cannot be a thief, as we learned before. It’s already in a mavoy, not in a courtyard. He already nullified the entire courtyard. When accidentally he took out, if he simply forgot and carried, not that he went against his bitul reshus, he doesn’t forbid them, because there’s proof he stands by his bitul, he holds by his bitul, it was just a mistake.
The Law When the Others Already Took Possession
The Rambam says, And these words apply when those to whom they nullified didn’t first take possession, they haven’t yet acted on his bitul, they haven’t yet, “and took possession” means they haven’t as it were shown their possession that the courtyard indeed belongs to them, because the other one nullified.
But if they first took possession, there’s the word “and took possession”, there is that they carried out, yes? “And took out”, they made a possession, they acted on his bitul, yes? And afterwards he went back and took out, this doesn’t forbid them, even deliberately it doesn’t forbid them, because they already made, they already grabbed, they cannot grab back as it were, even though the other one isn’t standing by it, we already grabbed, there’s such a kind of law.
Bitul Only Works When One Could Have Made an Eruv on Erev Shabbos
Okay, now we’re going to learn about a partition. We learned before, we learned by hint about this law, and now we’re going to see the law clearly, that a bitul, although bitul is better than, it has an advantage, you can call it a leniency or an advantage over an eruv. An eruv must be made on erev Shabbos, bitul can be made on Shabbos.
But this is on condition that one could already have made an eruv on erev Shabbos, I don’t know exactly the meaning of this condition, but if one cannot, for example we’ll learn, non-Jews made a partition on Shabbos, one cannot make bitul on Shabbos. Can I understand why?
Let’s see, two houses on two sides of a public domain, indeed, now they may not carry because it’s a public domain, and they may only carry if there’s a partition that surrounds the two houses. Non-Jews surrounded it with a partition on Shabbos, non-Jews made a partition on Shabbos, and already, in such a case it becomes a private domain on Shabbos, as we’ve already learned that one can make a partition on Shabbos.
But there’s a problem here, they cannot carry in the partition without an eruv. So what do they want to do? They want now, okay, on Shabbos we’ll nullify. One cannot nullify in such a case.
Since it was impossible for them to make an eruv while it was still day?
Speaker 2: Ah yes, yesterday they couldn’t make an eruv. Can’t they find a solution?
Speaker 1: So, the enactment of the Sages is that after there’s an eruv, then bitul is such a bedieved (after the fact), a last resort when the eruv didn’t work, when one couldn’t make an eruv because one person doesn’t want to, one person forgot, then there’s this solution of bitul. But if one didn’t make an eruv, one goes back to the original enactment of the Sages that it will look like one is carrying in a public domain, because one doesn’t see the… yes.
In short, bitul is such a bedieved solution for eruv. Bitul is a law within eruv, not some separate matter. It’s not a true law in and of itself, so it comes out. Something like that one can say.
Inheritance During Bein Hashmashos: One of the Courtyard Members Died
Now one can learn another law that’s built on the fact that the eruv, or the connection of the people, is established during bein hashmashos (twilight). Whatever the situation was during bein hashmashos, that remains, even if in the middle someone dies and the like. Yes.
So, one of the courtyard members died, and left his domain to another from the marketplace, one of the courtyard members died, he left that one from the marketplace should inherit him. His heir. Marketplace means just someone not from the courtyard, a stranger, no?
Speaker 2: Aha, not someone who isn’t there. His heir, his son, his heir doesn’t live together with him, he lives somewhere else.
Speaker 1: So, if he died while it was still day, he died while it was still day, someone inherited him, this heir is like one of the courtyard members, upon them. He’s not part of them, he doesn’t live there, but he has a domain. Very good. He forbids them.
Why? They cannot say “we are all one family living in one courtyard”, because that’s not so, there’s an heir there who doesn’t belong here.
But him it’s not relevant, one who forbids them doesn’t forbid them. Why? Because they inherited on Shabbos, they learned that inheritance doesn’t happen on Shabbos. True, but by us, when Shabbos came there was a house that belonged to one family, one courtyard member.
One from the Marketplace Died: The Reverse Case
Speaker 2: What’s the reverse? It’s interesting, how is this different from what we learned before, that one inherited on Shabbos? It’s going to be reversed.
Speaker 1: Hello, that’s what we learned before, the next one I mean.
Speaker 2: Aha, I’m a neighbor, yes.
Speaker 1: That before we learned that “one of the courtyard members died”. What happens exactly the reverse? One from the marketplace died, and left his domain to one of the courtyard members.
Speaker 2: Where is his house? In the marketplace.
Speaker 1: His house is in the courtyard.
Speaker 2: Before it was forbidden.
Speaker 1: Now the people think, okay, now… ah, he was an “outsider” who had a house in the courtyard, therefore one couldn’t make an eruv, because one of them didn’t participate. But one of the courtyard members was the heir.
Translation
So it is, “If he died before [Shabbos], it doesn’t prohibit, because it only prohibits all those who are mixed together.” Because when Shabbos came, one of the members of the courtyard had already made an eruv for the house, and he is indeed mixed with them, therefore it is good.
But “one who died from the marketplace” who died already on Shabbos, indeed “it is prohibited to them.” Because now living in this courtyard is a person who didn’t make an eruv.
Speaker 2: Earlier, the “one from the marketplace,” what did they do? I don’t know, perhaps it actually didn’t work. When the “one from the marketplace” was a house in the courtyard that didn’t have an eruv, that wasn’t part of the eruv, it didn’t work.
Speaker 1: So we want to think that it now automatically became permitted, because one of the members of the courtyard who is indeed mixed with them made an eruv. The heir who lived here before was mixed with them, for his house. Now he received a second house.
“It is prohibited to them until he nullifies to them the permission of his inheritance, or until he nullifies to them his permission.” One of the two. Either he should nullify the permission of the inheritance, or he should nullify his permission.
Speaker 2: Why is it prohibited to them? The heir lives in the courtyard. What was the question?
Speaker 1: The person was still alive, and when the person was alive it was Shabbos.
Law: One Who Descends to the Property of a Convert — The Law of Inheritance Regarding Eruv
Speaker 1: It was a business. But yes, one can do it with nullification of permission. The Gemara couldn’t make an eruv yesterday? How could he have made an eruv yesterday?
The answer is, let’s learn the law first. “An heir enters in place of his deceased for everything.” It’s as if he could indeed yesterday. He wasn’t in the category, he didn’t live there. He could indeed if he wanted, but yes.
Speaker 2: Perhaps one cannot there in his portion of the bread, he’s not there.
Speaker 1: I know, I know. I need to know an external law which is the law of one who doesn’t live in the courtyard, and how one makes the eruv.
The Rambam’s Language: A Convert Who Died During the Day
“A Jew and a convert who dwell in one alley, and the convert died during the day, even though another Jew didn’t take possession of his property until it got dark, it prohibits until he nullifies, because it’s fit to be inherited.”
The convert died on Friday during the day, even if another Jew wasn’t in possession of his property — the law is that a convert who dies, whoever wants, whoever is first acquires his property, because he has no heirs. It’s ownerless.
So they say, that even another Jew, even the other Jew, the Jew who was together in the alley, didn’t take possession of the property until it got dark, when he took possession, “it prohibits until he nullifies, because it’s fit to be inherited.”
Explanation of the Law: The One Who Takes Possession of a Convert’s Property Is Like an Heir
In the Gemara essentially, the convert, earlier the convert had an eruv, let’s say. Or didn’t have an eruv? He did have an eruv, let’s say. But now he died. A second Jew came from somewhere else, not from here, and he took possession of the courtyard. Or not the Jew who lives here, in short, a third Jew came. He took possession.
You would have said he’s a new person, he acquired on Shabbos, but Friday was still an eruv that works. They say no, since we learned the law earlier that an heir enters in place of his father, it comes out that he’s like an heir.
In this case he makes it worse, because he’s the person who didn’t make an eruv, so furthermore he takes possession “it prohibits until he nullifies his right as fit for an heir,” he must make a nullification.
Discussion: The Alley and the One Who Takes Possession
Speaker 2: We’re talking about the alley, yes? The question is about the alley.
Speaker 1: In the alley lived a Jew and a convert, and in the alley there was indeed a law that one must make an eruv. One must make an eruv because there are two Jews living there, a Jew and a convert, two residents.
There was one who took possession, that means he grabbed half the alley, not the Jew who was there together with him, but a second Jew from outside came in and he grabbed half the alley. So he “prohibits until he nullifies as fit for an heir,” yes, that means also an heir.
Speaker 2: If he wouldn’t have been an heir, he couldn’t have prohibited.
Speaker 1: That’s actually correct. If there wouldn’t have been another heir, it would automatically…
Speaker 2: Ah, it would have been ownerless?
Speaker 1: That means, it would have been for now only like one person, perhaps for a short time. He can nullify, just as an heir can nullify. That means, if there wouldn’t have been an heir, he couldn’t have.
Speaker 2: No, I’m saying, if a second one who takes possession of property wouldn’t have come, but apparently the Jew could have, because you’re saying there’s one person in the alley, the other is nullified, it’s ownerless.
Speaker 1: But now a second one came. The novelty is only that one who descends to the property of a convert is also called an heir, even though it’s not inheritance, it’s something like ownerless so to speak, it’s also called with the law of inheritance, and therefore he can also make a nullification since he’s called so to speak in place of the convert who could have made an eruv yesterday or actually made an eruv. Yes?
If the Convert Died After Dark
“And if the convert died after dark, even if another Jew took possession of his property, it doesn’t prohibit him, rather his permission is nullified.”
If the convert died only after it already got dark, there’s no difference. Even if another Jew took possession, grabbed and made possession of the property of the convert who died, “it doesn’t prohibit him,” he doesn’t prohibit the other Jew, that means he doesn’t say that he’s now the owner of the permission, “rather his permission is nullified,” because on Friday it was permitted, because the Jews there had perhaps an eruv among themselves, it remains with the permission.
Discussion: Nullification of Permission of One Standing and the Law of an Heir
Speaker 2: But that’s only the nullification of permission of one standing, which was indeed such a case. What happens with every heir?
Speaker 1: What do you mean with every heir? We learned, all eruvs that were on Friday, I mean, remain good even if the person dies. The question is only when a new person comes on Shabbos, then it’s a problem. Agreed?
Speaker 2: I don’t understand clearly what you’re saying.
Speaker 1: The question, I told you earlier, all these laws go with this. “From when does Shabbos prohibit him.” The only way that it’s relevant that it’s prohibited is when on Shabbos there’s a new person in the domain who didn’t make an eruv. But normally, as long as that person isn’t there, it doesn’t bother us. Once Shabbos comes and there’s an eruv, the eruv remains the whole Shabbos, and it doesn’t matter what happens in the middle of Shabbos. One cannot become prohibited on Shabbos, except in the one case of retroactive revelation. That’s how I understand it.
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Law: A Jew Who Dwells with a Gentile — A Gentile’s Dwelling Is Not a Dwelling
Until now we learned laws of two Jews, or a convert. Now we’re going to learn about a gentile. What does one do when a gentile lives with a Jew in one courtyard? Okay.
The Rambam’s Language
“A Jew who dwells with a gentile, or with a resident alien in a courtyard, doesn’t prohibit him. Because a gentile’s dwelling is not a dwelling, and it doesn’t establish a prohibition.”
So, one Jew with one gentile don’t need an eruv. A gentile is not a person.
Explanation: Why a Gentile’s Dwelling Is Not a Dwelling
The point is because the Jew doesn’t reckon with this. Not that a gentile is an animal, whether he’s an animal, not an animal, that’s an inquiry in itself. The point is that a Jew who lives with a gentile, the Jew doesn’t reckon as if that one is a Jew, and there’s no… like the whole place is a private domain. Doesn’t need an eruv. There aren’t two residents.
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Law: Two Jews and a Gentile — A Decree That Gentiles Should Not Dwell with Them
But, there’s a special law. If now, more than two Jews together with a gentile. Two Jews with a gentile, “this one prohibits the other.”
The Rambam’s Language
Why? Says the Rambam, why? Not from the basic law, like the enactment of King Solomon, because a gentile’s dwelling is not a dwelling. But essentially one should have done so, the two Jews should make an eruv between themselves, and the third is the gentile, who is indeed like a gentile. But not so.
Why? This is a decree. Why? “So that gentiles should not dwell with them,” that Jews shouldn’t make themselves comfortable to live together with gentiles, so that a gentile shouldn’t live with them, “so they shouldn’t learn from his deeds,” they shouldn’t learn from him.
They made a law that a Jew may not bring a gentile into a Jewish neighborhood.
Discussion: Why Not with One Jew and One Gentile?
Speaker 2: You ask, one Jew and one gentile is permitted?
Speaker 1: The Rambam asks, “And why didn’t they decree with one Jew and one gentile?” It’s the same thing.
Says the Rambam, because this is a minor matter, the thing is indeed something uncommon. Why? “Perhaps he’ll be afraid perhaps he’ll be alone with him and he’ll kill him.” There’s indeed a prohibition, we always have fear that a gentile with a Jew, one Jew and one gentile, there’s indeed a concern of seclusion. So it’s therefore prohibited to be secluded with a gentile, so there’s already a prohibition of seclusion of a Jew with a gentile lest he kill him. We don’t need to make the law here in the eruv.
But then when with the law of seclusion it’s permitted, we made the prohibition with the eruv, so that they shouldn’t dwell with them.
Very good.
—
Law: Eruv and Nullification of Permission Don’t Help in the Place of a Gentile
Now, what happens? So what are we going to do? Yes? There’s a problem. A gentile, we said it’s prohibited. Very good. One can’t make an eruv. A gentile can’t make an eruv. So what must one do?
The Rambam’s Language: Eruv and Nullification Don’t Help
“Two Jews and a gentile who dwell in one courtyard, and the Jews made an eruv for themselves, they accomplished nothing.”
The two Jews made an eruv, they accomplished nothing. They didn’t accomplish anything, because the courtyard is still a public domain. This is the decree of a public domain. Very good. It makes it back into a public domain. It makes it back into a decree of a public domain.
“Neither do they nullify to the gentile.” What happens if the two Jews nullified their permission to the gentile? “Or he nullified to them,” the gentile nullified his permission to the Jew. “Or the Jews nullified to each other and became like one with the gentile.” Ah, one Jew alone the decree falls away, because with seclusion we first made the decree.
“They accomplished nothing,” one accomplished nothing. You try to outsmart, it doesn’t let itself.
Explanation: Why Doesn’t Nullification of Permission Help?
Why? “Because eruv doesn’t help in the place of a gentile, and nullification of permission doesn’t help in the place of a gentile.” A gentile doesn’t understand eruv, a gentile doesn’t understand to join together with another Jew, and he also doesn’t understand to nullify himself to a second Jew.
Because the nullification of permission is indeed a law in Shabbos. And it’s not a true nullification of permission, and one may not make an eruv or nullification. It’s not a gentile thing, but Jews understand eruv and nullification. It’s a kind of love of Israel, there’s a Jew… okay, one can’t mean Torah.
“The enactors,” that there shouldn’t be any other permission, “unless he rents and nullifies his permission.”
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Law: Renting Permission from the Gentile — The Permission
What can one indeed do with a gentile? A gentile one needs actually money, he talks indeed to everyone. Nullification is hard to understand, but come with a few dollars and rent the place from him.
Explanation of the Law: The Gentile Becomes Like a Guest
And what happens then, there’s a gentile who rented the place, “and made the gentile as if a guest with him.” The gentile is a guest, and a guest may have his things, because he’s a guest.
So the gentile may be, but the problem is, how can you say that only Jews live here? Ah, the gentile is a guest of ours.
One Jew and a Hundred Gentiles
Speaker 2: One Jew and a hundred many gentiles. What does the problem mean that many people can’t be such for one person can’t fear many gentiles. Aha.
Speaker 1: From the gentile, and mine means it now the Jew’s permission? Mine can make an eruv with the Jews, and automatically the permission that you rent from the gentile becomes a part, like all of them become permitted, and with one each which the need can with a gentile, not each one extra needs to go and rent from the gentile.
Very good. One must think that it’s not a false arrangement, but yes they’re going to give money to the gentile, okay they’re going to give money, but they want to receive from this a right to be able to carry in the eruv.
Very good.
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Law: Inner and Outer Courtyard — Jew and Gentile
What happens if a… and now we can learn another way which means still a Jew lives a gentile also, they don’t live completely in the same domain, but one is under the other, yes. Imagine a creation, one in front of the other. Now to come to the innermost one must go through the outside one.
The Rambam’s Language
“One Jew and one gentile dwelling in the inner,” in the innermost lives one Jew and one gentile, one Jew and one gentile, living in the innermost “and one Jew in the outer,” a Jew is the outer one, that means the innermost, which is the Jew and the gentile, must always go through the outer courtyard.
Or the opposite, “that the Jew and the gentile are in the outer courtyard, and a Jew alone in the inner.” So it is, “he makes for the outer,” the outer, the Jew or the Jew and the gentile who are in the outer, “they are prohibited on the inner, until they rent from each other.”
Why? Because just like in one courtyard
Law 2: Inner and Outer Courtyard with Gentile and Jew
“And one Jew in his courtyard, one Jew is in the outer.”
Speaker 1: Aha.
Speaker 2: That means that the innermost which is the Jew and the gentile must always go through the outer courtyard, courtyard. Or, or the opposite, “that there was a Jew and gentile in the outer, and one Jew in the inner. So it is, this one prohibits on the outer,” the outer, the Jew or the Jews, the gentile are in the outer, they prohibit on the outer, “until he rents from the gentile.”
Speaker 1: Why? Why?
Speaker 2: Because just like with one, it means like one, one courtyard. In the two… in the outer courtyard live two Jews and one gentile. Even though it’s two external courtyards, but in order to come to the courtyard he must walk through, so furthermore he must come that the courtyard should be his, the foot of two Jews and a gentile are there, so on the outer one must rent. But the inner with the inner, in the inner lives indeed only one Jew and one gentile, here indeed also isn’t the decree, or one Jew, no difference.
Details of the Laws of Renting from the Gentile
Now one can learn the details of renting from the gentiles, since the whole reason is not to live with the gentiles, it’s a leniency, for this a leniency from the gentile. Yes, normally one may not make any business transaction on Shabbos, one may not go rent something on Shabbos, but they permitted “renting from a gentile even on Shabbos,” one may go…
Speaker 1: It’s indeed not a deal with money. One can make aside?
Speaker 2: Yes. One can discuss a rental with a gentile even on Shabbos, “because rental is like nullification of permission.” The rental that one speaks of there, is not a rental that it is truly with all the laws of business transaction, or one rents it and it goes with all the laws like normal rental, this is a small thing, “that it’s not a definite rental,” not a true rental, “but merely a recognition,” it’s only a recognition.
Speaker 1: Aha.
Speaker 2: It’s a recognition, like something like nullification of permission, like nullification of permission you understand that this is regarding Shabbos, here also the rental works for Shabbos, therefore one may rent on Shabbos, which means not business transaction on Shabbos. Correct.
Speaker 1: Therefore?
Speaker 2: “Therefore, one rents from the gentile even for less than a perutah’s worth.” Normally what is the custom to rent is less than a perutah’s worth, but since it’s only a matter of a recognition, one can do it even for less than a perutah’s worth.
Who Can Rent from the Gentile
Speaker 1: And not only that?
Speaker 2: Not only that, but even people who don’t normally have the right to rent a place, can rent. “The wife of the gentile rents with her consent,” the wife of a gentile can rent “without his consent.” Therefore? Therefore “rental or loan,” though they don’t truly have the right, but some right they have. They live there, they’re somewhat partners, a bit of partners. They run the house. Enough for a principle it’s enough. “She rents without his consent.”
“Even rental or loan from a Jew upon it,” even he’s a Jew. One goes to the Jewish worker of the hotel of the gentile, and one tells him, one gives him half a perutah, and one tells him he should transfer, he should rent the permission. So it goes into “rents without his consent.”
Borrowing a Place in the Courtyard Street
Here’s another strategy that can be done, one doesn’t even need to rent with money, one can borrow a space. Sho’el min hagoy makom berechov hechatzer, he borrows from him a piece of space in his house. Since he agreed to it, he lent it to him, harei nishtatefu imo birshuto, he has become a partner in his domain, ve’eino maskir shelo mida’atah. Ah, but then he goes and rents the piece for himself alone. Now who is one? I let him begin. Okay, now I rent it. Interesting.
A Gentile Who Has Many Renters
Hoil vehagoy ein sechirus o hasha’alah shelo ela min harabim, a gentile has many rentals or borrowings from the public, so furthermore, ein tzarich ela echad mehem, one doesn’t need to speak with everyone, one is enough.
And on this, al gabei zeh, the Rishonim of Ashkenaz devised another leniency, that if one lives in an entire city of gentiles, one can go to the moshel ha’ir (city ruler) to whom the entire city theoretically belongs, and say that one has rented from him with a perutah the entire city, and consequently the entire city, even if it’s full of gentiles… Okay.
Law 3: Renting on Shabbos When No Eruv Was Made
Shnayim asar ilan vegoy hadarim bechatzer achat, and they didn’t make an eruv. So the law is that one may not… it doesn’t help to be mevatel one’s domain. But they can do everything on Shabbos, sochrin min hagoy beShabbos, and afterwards one is mevatel his domain to the other. But he’s speaking here in a case where they didn’t make an eruv. And what does one do? They rent from a gentile on Shabbos, and how can one carry afterwards? So each one when he needs to carry, the other one is mevatel the domain for him so that he can carry, so it becomes like one domain. Indeed the gentile has already rented, and the Jew will be mevatel, he will be mevatel his own and he will be mevatel the gentile’s that he rented. Yes, it’s permitted.
Vechen im ein sham goy beShabbos, and there’s no one from whom to rent now, mevatel Yisrael leYisrael acher, veyomar lo tol. Fine news.
Law 4: A Gentile Who Rented from a Second Gentile
Now one needs to know what if one gentile rented a domain of a courtyard for a second gentile, truly rented, not a fake rental. Goy zeh sachar migoy, so it’s like this, im eino rashai lehotzi et hagoy hasheni ad sheyashlim zman sechirusto, meaning he’s not just a simple renter like a hotel, he can throw him out, but if it’s a long term rental, that the first gentile cannot evict the second gentile until his lease ends, from whom must one rent? One must rent there from the second one, one cannot rent then from the first, because the first doesn’t hold the domain. Sochran min hagoy hasheni shenichnas tachat habe’alim.
Aval im yesh reshut lehotzi et hagoy hasocher mimenu bechol eis sheyirtzeh, if they don’t have a lease, he rents to him short term, and technically the first gentile can evict the renting gentile, then, im lo hayah hasheni omed, the second one isn’t available, he’s not there, they went and they rented from the first gentile, veharei hen mutarim, it’s also permitted, such a rental also helps. Okay.
Law 5: Windows Open from a Jewish House to a Jewish House
Now one can learn another detail in the law. It’s the same law, but since they bring the law of windows, which isn’t, yes? Let’s see. Chatzer sheYisrael vegoy sheruyim bah, but the courtyard that requires an eruv, vehayah chalonot petuchin mibeit Yisrael lazeh, and there are windows that go across, one doesn’t need the gentile, the windows go directly from the Jew to the Jew, why is the eruv through windows? One can make an eruv through the window, one doesn’t need to make an eruv that goes through the door, one can go through the window too. One will learn later many details about this.
Af al pi shemutar lehotzi ulehachnis derech hachalonot, and that through the windows one views it as if it’s one house, right, he’s entered into the domain, aval lehotzi mibayit lebayit derech chatzer asur mipnei hagoy ad sheyiskor. Don’t say, the two people have an eruv, their eruv doesn’t disturb the gentile, why? Because it goes through windows, the gentile doesn’t have access to the windows. But it doesn’t tell me so far that the two should become like one, that one shouldn’t need to rent from the gentile. Why? Because the gentile doesn’t understand eruvin, for him there are still two Jews. No, because Chazal said the reason, that one shouldn’t live together with a gentile, even if one has a way out.
Discussion: Why Doesn’t the Eruv Through Windows Help?
Speaker 1: You don’t understand again, won’t there be no gentile there? Here he has through windows. Say, what if they may only carry through windows?
Speaker 2: Exactly. One can make an eruv through windows. If there are two people who have a window from one to the other, and he doesn’t want to make an eruv with the third Jew who lives there, they can make an eruv just between themselves, and they may carry through windows, but in the courtyard they may not, because the courtyard belongs to the third one also.
Speaker 1: Ah, he thinks that because the third one is a gentile, they may not even go through windows?
Speaker 2: He thinks that because he already made an eruv, now there’s only one Jew. One Jew doesn’t need, doesn’t need rental from the gentile.
Speaker 1: Ah, it remains for you now like only one Jew and one gentile, because the two Jews became one?
Speaker 2: No, but it doesn’t become one, that’s the point, it doesn’t help.
Law 6: One Who Desecrates Shabbos Publicly and Worships Idols
Until now we’ve learned about all sorts of people, about Jews, about heirs, about converts, about gentiles. Now we’re going to learn about an apikoros (heretic). What is this – a Jew who is like a gentile? And we learned at the end of Hilchos Shabbos that a mechalel Shabbos (Sabbath desecrator) is like an oved avodah zarah (idol worshiper), so he’s like a gentile. A mechalel Shabbos befarhesya (public Sabbath desecrator) is like an oved avodah zarah.
Speaker 1: No, it’s not as severe as avodah zarah.
Speaker 2: Ah, yes, we learned there that Shabbos and avodah zarah are the two most severe transgressions. We learned there that there are two ways how a Jew becomes like a gentile. And now we’re going to speak halachah lema’aseh (practical law).
A mechalel Shabbos befarhesya, o shehu oved avodah zarah, harei hu kegoy lechol devarav, ve’ein me’arvin imo, ve’ein mevatlim lo reshut, ela sochrin mimenu kegoy. Yes, good. This is a way how to fix him. One shouts “Shabbos” after him, and locks him in. But this is a gentile.
Law 7: Minim – Tzedokim and Baisusim and Those Who Deny the Oral Torah
Aval hamin min haminim she’eino oved avodah zarah ve’eino mechalel Shabbos, but from the minim (sectarians) who have opinions, he believes in Torah, but he doesn’t believe in eruv, kegon Tzedokim uBaisusim, vehakofrim baTorah shebe’al peh, klalo shel davar, kol mi she’eino modeh bemitzvos eruv.
Speaker 1: That means, he’s not a Jew?
Speaker 2: This is the principle in Rambam that a Tzedoki doesn’t mean kegoy lechol devarav. Although he doesn’t acknowledge eruv, he doesn’t believe in the Oral Torah, but he’s not a gentile. He’s not like a Jew who is a mechalel Shabbos befarhesya, who is an oved avodah zarah. What is the law with him? He speaks to us about him in 4:2. Yes. The Klelos Shel David also says that what the minim and Tzedokim and Baisusim he’s speaking about here, regarding the law he’s speaking about here is that he doesn’t believe in the mitzvah of eruv. Anyone who doesn’t believe in the eruv, then he’s not me’arev with the eruv, he doesn’t want to become mixed together with the eruv. He doesn’t believe in the concept of eruv. For a merchant when he’s not one a gentile, not a gentile, you see, how to rent from him one cannot, because there’s no community to rent the whole. But what can one do? Bitul reshut (nullification of domain), you see, bitul a min understands. A Jewish min is subject to bitul, you see indeed that it’s…
Speaker 1: Because the one who doesn’t acknowledge eruv, usually he also didn’t believe in such a fake bitul, he didn’t believe that he’s a straight person.
Speaker 2: No, no, no, he’s not a straight person. Here it appears that he doesn’t believe in eruv, but he does believe in bitul reshut. He also has such a thing, mevatel reshut, one must correctly write, one must come to a compromise with him.
Speaker 1: No, no, no, a Tzedoki is not a non-Jew, a Tzedoki is just one who doesn’t believe in eruv.
Discussion: Bitul Reshut Versus Eruv
Speaker 1: No, one sees here, I know that lema’aseh it appears that eruv is more lechatchilah (ideal) than bitul, but one also sees throughout the laws that it’s built on the fact that essentially bitul is better than an eruv. Bitul means that he’s completely not there. It’s a bit more final, not what you’re saying.
Speaker 2: He says there what, “vechayim me’iri Yisrael echad chashuv kazeh”, he says there, he says there that a Tzedoki doesn’t help the leniency of one, because one is only a gentile, because a Jew doesn’t live with a gentile. But a Tzedoki is not suspected of murder. Consequently, he only has a problem that he can’t make an eruv, consequently one must make bitul with the Tzedoki. Perhaps indeed, perhaps the Tzedoki won’t want to make bitul, one will need to evict him. But now we’re speaking about what one can work out.
Right, what one sees here is that with one Jew, a simple weak Jew, with eruv it helps, one is me’arev with other Jews. But one who has opinions against the Torah, one must be mevatel to him. Yes, because he doesn’t believe in the eruv itself. He doesn’t believe in the Torah.
Speaker 1: Yes, yes. Need to know if it’s because he’s a bit of an apikoros in the Torah?
Speaker 2: No, he says here that the issue is because he is eino modeh be’eruv. That means, one who doesn’t understand eruv, is whatever, he does it on behalf of those who do understand. But one who knows, but he doesn’t agree with it. Okay. Until here both sides.