The Dispute Between Iggeret HaKodesh and the Rambam Whether the Sense of Touch is Disgraceful | Eight Chapters, Chapter 4 (Auto Translated) | תמלול וסיכום מתורגם

The Trait of Zeheirus and the Problem of Chush HaMishoosh Cherpah

Introduction: The Philosophers’ Approach to Chush HaMishoosh

Instructor:

A shadow of a light or an eternal shadow, that’s how the metaphors went that they brought. So if so, if the world is as if the Almighty doesn’t know about it, as if the Almighty didn’t make it with conscious choice, then he can understand that there are parts in a person’s body that are a disgrace for a person.

But since the Almighty made it, he holds that this is heresy, because it’s not right to say that… everything is good.

Student:

One minute, one minute. You’re asking a good question. That chush hamishush is cherpah. So… based on the premise that everything is good. So… that’s not settled, I don’t know.

Instructor:

So, I can explain it to you as much as I can, but “so” isn’t right to say. So one must say that the correct approach is to say that when a person performs relations in the proper way, not every way…

Student:

What is the proper way?

Instructor:

He gives… the rest of the book is explaining that. Then it’s okay, then it’s a good thing, and it’s not any language, it’s an elevated matter or a holy matter which is a reference to lofty secrets. In the end it’s even Kabbalah, okay? That’s why, okay?

But now we’re talking about the hashkafah of the Beit Yosef [the worldview of the Beit Yosef, referring to Rabbi Yosef Karo]. In the end, in the very end he never explains why, but simply a plain thing at the end of the work he explains a secret from Kabbalah. But anyway, that’s what it says there.

Clarification: Who Said “Chush HaMishush Cherpah”?

Instructor:

But I want to bring out that the person who argues about chush hamishush cherpah is not the Rambam [Maimonides] and not Aristotle. I don’t know who, but someone else. The same words…

Student:

Again, chush hamishush cherpah lanu isn’t Aristotle? What did Aristotle say?

Instructor:

Aristotle said something almost the same words, the Rambam said somewhere the words, but it doesn’t mean what the person says it means.

Student:

Ah, what does it mean? It has nothing… it has nothing to do with relations, you mean?

Instructor:

No, it does, certainly it means that. It means eating and relations. When he says chush hamishush he doesn’t mean lashon hara [evil speech], it doesn’t mean Yosef’s desire, it means eating and relations.

But cherpah, when he says it’s a cherpah, does it mean that the Almighty made a mistake that He gave people this pleasure? What is he talking about? What is Aristotle saying?

Student:

What is your language?

Instructor:

The Rambam quotes us nothing more. I can tell you exactly what Aristotle says, and what the Rambam brings further from him. The Rambam brings it three-four times, one needs to learn the matters further, but first let’s say what the Rambam’s teacher said.

Aristotle’s Approach: The Trait of Sophrosyne (Zeheirus)

Student:

Who is his teacher?

Student:

The Rambam means…

Student:

Aristotle.

Instructor:

Yes, he went through the topic of the concept of truth itself. Shared truth. Ah.

He went through the topic that you have a good trait, a very important trait, knowledge of each person’s traits is very important, yes? And we don’t even have a good word for this trait, so we’re a bit confused.

But in Greek one of the ways, basic ways that one says a person is a good person, he has the traits of, let’s call it, ‘zeheirus’, okay? Sophrosyne in Greek.

Comparison with Other Traits: Tzaddik, Chacham, Nadiv

Instructor:

That’s what is one of the basic… just like by us there are very basic ways that say a person is a good person, and usually the way is a certain trait. Right? For example, we have… one says about a person he is a tzaddik [righteous person], a tzaddik is a certain trait, it means justice… justice from tzedakah [justice], yes? In English tzaddik is a just man, right?

If you’ll ask me, are all good things included in justice? In a certain way justice, one can, one can translate it into justice, because he does everything right, as it should be, that’s what a tzaddik means. But it’s not truly the right, best comprehensive name, but we tend to use this as a name, because it’s truly very comprehensive. Yes, one can say this, true.

In a certain comprehensive way one speaks this way, and this shows us that the trait of tzedakah is very important.

For us when one says tzaddik it doesn’t mean tzedakah of justice at all, it means something else, it means prishus [asceticism/abstinence]. Okay. Truly it means pious, no difference, we’ve just misused the word ‘tzaddik’ a bit. It means either a great fool, or a great ascetic, or a good person, it can also mean many things, it depends on the context.

Student:

Tzaddik, what we bring a… what does it mean? A nice animal. He must be a fool.

Instructor:

In short, yes, but it can mean many things. It can mean many things, but as we’ve learned that philosophy and inquiry, understanding is, always begins from what people think, and one tries to clarify what we all think. So, it’s known by everyone that this trait is a very good trait, it’s not like you want to bring out, it’s not like one just says, here’s a trait of… I don’t know, the trait of generosity, I don’t know.

One says about a person, he is a nadiv [generous person] also, also a basic way of saying he’s a good person. It’s just that the trait we’re talking about is certainly agreed upon by us. I mean this in Yiddish too, one says it in other ways, how does one say it in Yiddish? He is restrained, I know, he is composed, one says in Yiddish. In Yiddish one says composed, usually it means more or less that. And that’s also good, I say, perhaps we’re talking about the trait of prishus? One says he is composed, perhaps that’s a sort of ascetic.

Student:

He is a yerei shamayim [God-fearing person], a yerei cheit [one who fears sin].

Instructor:

Good, there are many, let’s not get distracted by this. There are many other words. There are more, you can say he is a tzaddik, you can say he is a chacham [wise person], each one has its own, right? And one says, I had another word in my head that one would say as praise, right? And in Chazal [the Talmudic sages] one says that a chacham, chacham is only one of the virtues of a person, but it comes out that it’s a very basic thing, right?

The Basic Nature of the Trait of Self-Control

Instructor:

So, in the same way, one says about a person that he is temperate, that he is, how does one say? Composed, or something like that, it’s a very basic thing, and you can just understand how it’s a basic thing, because in a certain sense, a very basic thing of being a person is one who doesn’t “lust after everything” and every day something else, right?

But now I go back. So, this is agreed upon, we agree that one who is not, one can call it “lustful”, one who is unrestrained, I don’t know how one says, how does one say it in Yiddish?

Student:

In English?

Student:

Disciplined?

Instructor:

No, not disciplined. Yes, but in a broader way. That… yes, no, we’re backwards.

Student:

Civilized, I don’t know.

Instructor:

Right, civilized, but it’s also a very… no, no, I’m not asking. I’m asking people. It’s interesting.

Student:

Stable, not stable.

Instructor:

Okay. What is yes and what isn’t? I just want to say that I’m just coming back to explain the topic of physical disgrace, okay?

The Universal Intuition: Unrestraint in Desires is the Lowest Thing

Instructor:

So, it’s accepted, I brought a proof, I had two shiurim ago a proof, that by all Jews and all gentiles except, again, I don’t know, I don’t know enough gentiles that I can explain this, but when one says a low person, it usually means one who is too strongly engaged in desires of adultery, usually, true? And the other, the opposite, the reverse is an elevated person, or elevated is perhaps already too much, but something like a normal person, true?

So, one sees that one has clearly, a clear matter by people, right? One can talk about proofs from the Torah and so forth, it’s a clear matter by people that to be unguarded, or something like that, is a very bad thing, perhaps the worst thing one can say about a person. Again, in a certain way of thinking, on a scale that I mean to bring out, right?

Comparison with Other Sins: Thief Versus Baal Taavah

Instructor:

One can say that someone is a great thief, okay, he’s also a piece of a person, because to be a thief one needs to be a person. But a coarse person, as you say, or a low fellow, a naval [degenerate], yes? The Ramban [Nachmanides] calls him a naval birshus haTorah [a degenerate within the permission of the Torah]. A naval, what the Ramban says is a baal taavah [one controlled by desires], that’s the lowest thing. That is in a certain sense the worst thing one can say. Again, not in every sense, but in a certain sense that’s the worst thing. And this brings out that people, people view this trait as the worst thing, right?

Proofs from the Zohar and Proverbs

Instructor:

I have another proof, because the Zohar [the foundational work of Kabbalah] says that the only sin that has no teshuvah [repentance] is the sin of arayos [sexual sins], okay? That’s the worst thing. What is the worst thing? When one makes the list of what is the worst thing, therefore one can make an accounting. I’m not saying there are laws of punishment or so, but there is a certain view, a very basic view by people, which says that to be un…

I’m not talking about the Torah, I’m not talking about the Torah that they are moral.

But one will speak in the Torah. I don’t have the strength now for the parables. I just want to… I’m just coming to explain. If we’ll understand what we’re talking about, it’s enough. I bring proofs, someone wants to challenge, let him challenge.

Student:

And he takes someone else’s money, right?

Instructor:

There’s a certain way of saying a thief is also you. I don’t hold, we’re not going in this way, because we want to translate very strongly. But I just want to bring out that the bad trait, we call the whole bad person by the name of the bad trait. We say he is loose, he is unrestrained, he is “ish asher ein ma’tzor lerucho ke’ir perutzah ein chomah” [Proverbs: “A man who has no control over his spirit is like a city broken into without a wall”]. It says in Tehillim [Psalms], in Mishlei [Proverbs] such a verse, yes? It’s such an idea.

Student:

In Mishlei, yes.

Instructor:

“Ish asher ein ma’tzor lerucho” such a verse exists.

Student:

In Mishlei is contempt for the lustful, but yes.

Instructor:

Whatever, in any case in Mishlei.

Student:

Ah, there is, true, there is what to say.

Instructor:

Okay, it’s true that there is what to say. Okay. No, I just want to… So all these things are true. I just want to get to what we’re saying.

The Disgrace of Unrestraint: A Social Perspective

Instructor:

What I want to say is just a very simple thing, that here is a very basic way how one calls a good person, one says he is defined, in a certain way defined, or ascetic, or, again, the word ascetic is a very bad translation, that’s why we have to stop using it, but something around that. And the opposite is a very bad person, a very low person, and perhaps the very worst type of person, okay?

A person whom one should certainly not make a match with. A thief one may make a match with, true? He paid for the deal. But a low fellow doesn’t fit for an important person to honor himself with him, true? A typical, again, a person who is money-hungry. That’s even very low.

Student:

One is ashamed with him.

Instructor:

Cherpah, yes. Very good, one is ashamed, cherpah. With whom is one most ashamed in the family? One catches someone being a thief, or one catches him with such a thing? With that one is most ashamed. Every society, according to which sins are called too grave that one must restrain oneself. Has somewhere where one must restrain oneself from physical desires, one who cannot, who cannot restrain himself. One says properly, he needs to go to the insane asylum, one needs to inject him. One needs to lock him up, right? Every… almost… it’s the worst thing. Certain ones are the most shame, the most… agreed upon. It’s not only a wicked person who brings such an assumption. All… again, wait, wait, wait, wait, I want to say…

Chush HaMishush Cherpah: Aristotle’s Explanation of the Universal Shame

The Universal Shame of Physical Desires

The person whom one should certainly not make a match with. A thief one may make a match with, true? It’s counted among the Jews. But a low fellow, it doesn’t fit for an important person to make a match with him, true? A fool, when someone has no money, that’s simply very low. So… one is ashamed with him. One is ashamed, true? Cherpah [disgrace, shame].

Very good, one is ashamed. Cherpah. With whom is one most ashamed in the family? When one catches someone with theft? Or when one catches him with such a thing? With that one is most ashamed.

In every society, according to which sins are called too grave that one must restrain oneself, has somewhere where one must restrain oneself from physical desires, desire that one cannot, cannot restrain oneself. There are consequences, going down to school, one needs to inject oneself, one needs to lock oneself up, right? Every… almost, it’s the worst thing. In a certain sense, the most shame, the most… agreed upon. It’s not only Aristotle who brings such an assumption.

Methodology: “Amrei Inshi” as the Foundation of Ethics

And all, again, wait, wait, wait, wait, I want to say a simple thing. Let’s say an introduction. There is a premise, Aristotle’s Book of Ethics is very clearly built on the sayings of the world, true? Folk wisdom, when one says in chapter three it says more than once in the Gemara [Talmud], amrei inshi is one of the first sources of ethics, true? What the world says.

Certainly, the world is not precise, one needs to be exact, one needs to clarify what the reason is and why and how, but amrei inshi, that’s how it begins. When the Almighty doesn’t speak Yiddish, someone is born in a jungle somewhere, already, one talks the conversation with him, right? That’s the basic foundation.

Aristotle’s Method: From “Amrei Inshi” to Philosophical Explanation

Now, when you’ll learn Aristotle’s book, you’ll see that the whole time, in every chapter in order, how did the hint go? Speaking with the Rav… what’s his name? You lit it earlier? No, it came, I came, it was lit. Aristotle… one needs to speak with… what’s his name? I don’t remember what his name is. Do you know him? There’s a person, he has a name, the… I’ll send you his number. That’s the person one needs to ask.

Student: Okay.

Instructor: Ask him, he usually helps me. He’s the one I told you about earlier.

Student: Okay.

Instructor: So, does the point make sense? So now, in every, every piece that we’re learning meanwhile in order, it revolves around either beginning from this, or coming to this. That is, either beginning to say, “there is such a knowledge, let’s try to understand it”, or one comes with a certain thought that explains why indeed everyone thinks this way, and one wants to understand how one should indeed think this way, birth pangs, what does this mean? Everyone thinks this way, now we want to understand why.

The Origin of “Chush HaMishush Cherpah”

And now, the sentence “chush hamishush cherpah [the sense of touch is shameful]” came from such a piece that came to explain why the world holds that this is the worst type of thing. It went like this: first we said the whole shiur that we said two weeks ago, that when we speak of zeheirus [caution] and prishus [abstinence], this is a trait that has to do with how a person conducts himself regarding pleasures, what type of pleasures he likes and how many pleasures he likes. This is agreed upon.

Narrowing Down: Which Pleasures Are We Talking About?

First: Not Pleasures of the Soul

But which pleasures exactly we’re talking about, we said that we’re certainly not talking about pleasures of the soul, which is like pleasure from wisdom or pleasure from honor. It has nothing to do with the body, we’re not talking about that.

One doesn’t say about an honor-seeker that he is a low person, he is a coarse fellow. One says other things, one doesn’t say it’s not bad, but not about this trait. It’s an external trait, loving honor too much.

Aristotle’s Explanation of Intemperance: Why Bodily Pleasures are the Lowest Bad Trait

The Fundamental Question: What is a Person?

Instructor:

Right? These are well-known things. What should a person do in this world to be a person? Okay? By the way, the question is what is a person? Jews say that a person is this, “atem kruyim adam” [You are called ‘adam’/human – a verse understood that only Jews are “adam”], the non-Jews say the opposite, “you are not people.” Okay? But…

Student:

Yes, but… yes, I didn’t learn in Yiddish. A person is a good, refined person.

Instructor:

But he says “atem kruyim adam,” he’s still going after that. What is being a person? What is a person? This is already a point of dispute (machloket). But this is the main thing, okay? And therefore (memeilah), the less something is specifically human, I already said that one must understand this well, the less human it is, okay?

Review: The Specific Pleasures That Are Problematic

Instructor:

Now, and therefore, since we already specified earlier that when we speak of not being restrained, we speak very specifically of pleasures of the sense of touch (chush hamishush) that has no contrast (hafkhanah) alongside it, right? We even excluded from this category (biklal zeh) in a certain sense taste, and one must understand this better, but we even excluded from this category, and we certainly excluded from this category all other things like honor (kavod) and like wisdom (chochmah) which only people love, which only people have pleasure in, which we can even call “in the soul of the person” (benefesh ha’adam), it’s not even the body of the person (guf ha’adam), but still sorts of pleasures that the body has, insofar as it is a body (ba’asher hu guf), that he does this like an animal (behemah), this is therefore, now you can understand why people consider the least of people who are not people.

Aristotle’s Explanation: Why Intemperance is the Worst Bad Trait

Instructor:

It’s very obvious, because if you’re not restrained, you’re not orderly (mesudhar) in this matter (nusah), you’re less of a person, because this is a pleasure that people have insofar as they are animals (ba’asher hem behemot) and not insofar as they are people (ba’asher hem anashim). And therefore, to love to eat and to sleep is a beastly thing to do and not a human thing to do. These are the words of (eileh hem divrei) whom? Aristotle, okay?

So Aristotle explained this way why he holds that this is the worst thing, because I have for you a good logical argument (sevara) that says that people don’t love this insofar as they are people, but insofar as they are animals. Right?

What the Rambam Did Not Say: First Limitation

Instructor:

What didn’t he say? What we say very clearly, and one must understand this. What didn’t he say? He didn’t say two things. He didn’t say, I mean that the Rambam (Maimonides) didn’t say, he didn’t say two things, one must look carefully at the words. He didn’t say, I just want to say, he didn’t say, I mean, no no, I mean what the Rambam says in the mussar sefarim (ethical works). He didn’t say two things, he didn’t say that therefore a person should be ashamed of the fact that he loves in the proper manner (ofen) the pleasures, he didn’t say that, right? Right?

True, he didn’t say that, because we’re not speaking now of the question in general (be’ofen klali) whether one should love bodily pleasures (ta’anugei haguf), we’re speaking now of the trait (middah) called abstinence/moderation (prishut), which is the proper amount of loving bodily pleasures, right? He doesn’t touch (nogea) this at all, not in this chapter certainly not, there’s no doubt (safek) that the chapter is not anti-loving bodily pleasures in general, it’s anti-having the bad traits (middot ra’ot) that branch off (mistaef) from this, and he’s explaining why the bad traits are the worst bad traits that people have the most hatred for, because the bad traits have to do with the animalistic part of the person, and therefore when one doesn’t conduct oneself properly one is a wild animal (chayah), when one conducts oneself properly, I already said that one is an animal, right?

The False Conclusion One Can Draw

Instructor:

Right? There’s a certain question, right? There’s a reason why people should think that there’s another conclusion (maskana) here, right? You understand why, right? Because if the problem is, any pleasure of a person that is shared with animals is problematic because of that, which it seems, one can go one step further from what he goes in saying this, it would come out that a person should truly only love wisdom, or perhaps at least honor, not any beastly things, true? So one can say, one can make such an argument based on this logical reasoning.

What the Rambam Did Not Say: Second Limitation

Instructor:

Certainly this is not so at all, the person has finished himself. The person has finished himself, exactly. Certainly this is very dumb, because a part of being a person is to be an animal, true? Yes. Not clear. Okay. Very good.

So here one comes to another question, what is a person? This is certain, we don’t have a clear answer (teshuvah) to this question, and it must be very important when one learns ethics to know about which person one is speaking about. One must know that the person that Aristotle…

Student:

Wait, wait, not in a beastly way.

Instructor:

You must say the language of the Rambam (lashon haRambam), not as you say.

The Language of the Rambam: “Lehutim”

Instructor:

He quotes a language, “And this is his language in the well-known formulation as we said, considered of all material drives as shame and disgrace, because this is what is necessarily obligated, particularly the sense of touch which is a shame for us as Aristotle pointed out, because of it we are lehutim [lustful, excessively desiring] after eating and drinking and approaching women.” He uses the language “lehutim.” And Part 3 Chapter 8 [Moreh Nevuchim, Guide for the Perplexed], he says “lehutim after eating and drinking and approaching women.”

Student:

Yes. Okay.

Instructor:

“And he bound to their purpose that shame which is our great shame, all of us human beings.”

Okay. So here there is a way to read, let’s say clearly, let’s understand, let’s distinguish (mechalek zein) what is dependent (talui) on the question, okay? Because there have become truly other ways.

The Person About Whom We Speak in Ethics

Instructor:

But it’s certain that Aristotle, certainly not in the chapters where we speak of what we call traits (middot), what we call traits of people, how far clear, when one came to speak of intellectual virtues (ma’alot sichliyot), one perhaps spoke of a person insofar as he is intellect (ba’asher hu sechel), and not insofar as he is body and intellect (ba’asher hu guf vesechel). But here where we speak of traits, we speak of the person who is a soul and body (nefesh veguf), at least, or perhaps only a body, but certainly a body and soul. And therefore it’s not true that a person, let’s say clearly, when we say that the pleasures have a person insofar as he is a person, we’re not saying that the ideal person wouldn’t have this. This is a conclusion that the rabbi, I don’t know who, Iggeret HaKodesh [a letter or tract attributed to the Ramban on holiness] made apparently (lech’orah) from this piece, that’s how he read it, but it’s not correct in the true sources (bimkorot emet).

The Rambam in Shemonah Perakim Against Asceticism

Instructor:

It’s Not Correct

It’s not correct, let’s just say, it’s not correct that what he says here is that if he were a perfect person he wouldn’t love these things at all. He’s only saying that why do people look at someone who is too drawn to pleasure, because you’re saying to indulge in this, like the biggest animal, because this is truly animalistic from the outset [lekhatkhila: from the beginning]. If one does it like a person, if one does it correctly, certainly this is the excellent measure [midah metzuyenet: the excellent trait] of it. Don’t say that one wants to go to extremes [kitzoniyut: extremes], because you see very clearly, the entire chapter revolves around the topic [inyan: theme] of extremes, not of not being extreme, right? Or not being extreme, not of good definition [hagdarah: definition], in the middle way [bederekh hamemutza: in the middle path], right?

And he says in other words that one who loves his body too little is also something wrong, right? And Aristotle said that even if there are such people, he doesn’t need to speak of extremes, he has no name for them, right? And the Rambam did speak of such people, he says fools [narim: fools], right? Here apparently comes out a distinction [chiluk: a distinction], right? Very interesting. Didn’t he know about this? Weren’t there such people anymore? So let’s just understand.

I also want to say two things that he doesn’t say, okay? He didn’t say first [kodem: first], I just want to make this a bit clear. We didn’t say, the Rambam certainly not in Shemonah Perakim [Shemonah Perakim: Eight Chapters – the Rambam’s introduction to Pirkei Avot], right? In Shemonah Perakim it also says from the Rambam in the continuation [hemshekh: continuation] of the same chapter, the Rambam says, I mean it says in Shemonah Perakim, I don’t know, I didn’t bring the book [sefer: book] here, I can’t look it up. In Shemonah Perakim it says that there are people who followed the gentiles and separated themselves from the dwellings and from the company of people and from the Nazirites [min hamoshavim umin hakhevrot bnei adam umin hanezirim: from the dwellings and from the company of people and from the Nazirites] and so forth, because they think that God hates the body, and one must torment the body, and the more one goes away from the body the closer one is to God. So says the Rambam, true? And the Rambam says, this is heresy [apikorsut: heresy], this is a gentile approach [shitah: system, approach], this is nonsense, God doesn’t hate the body. Right?

And this seems to be more or less the thing that the Igeret HaKodesh is attacking, which he claims is the approach of the Rambam, right? Right?

So what do you do with saying that there’s a contradiction [stirah: contradiction] in the Rambam? I’m not going into this. I’m saying it doesn’t say in Shemonah Perakim, there’s certainly not such a Rambam, and certainly not in the source [makor: source] where comes the idea of khush hamishush kherpah [khush hamishush kherpah: the sense of touch is a disgrace]. It doesn’t say that khush hamishush kherpah in the sense that a person, people would be better off without that. No, Aristotle in that sense certainly didn’t think so, right?

Although [hagam: although], this is what I made a bit more complicated, right? There is a way to make this more complicated, why? Because apparently such a reasoning comes out.

The Common Opinion and the Complication

Speaker:

This is what the commentators [mefarshim: commentators] did, all of Hasidism [khasidut: Hasidism] came under the influence of the common opinion [omer me’olam: the popular opinion]. The omer me’olam is certainly not that omer me’olam, the world [olam: the world, people], a normal person doesn’t respect a person who has no desire [ta’avah: desire] at all, they don’t hold that he is the ultimate perfection [takhlit hashlimut: the pinnacle of perfection]. But they respect very little a person who can’t control himself. More than they don’t respect one who can’t control himself from making money. Because making money, at least is a person. A person loves making money, with serious people a bit. But you who can’t control yourself from your animalistic part, you’re worse. Understand?

But he’s not saying that you’re worse because you have the animalistic part at all. There’s no connection [shaykhut: connection] at all in this part and the knowledge [yedi’ah: knowledge] that a person shouldn’t be a person who has a body, that he has a nutritional part [khelek hazan: the nutritional part], a body part [khelek haguf: the body-part]. On the contrary, the person is in a body. The Rambam says that the person is an animal, not a sin [aveirah: sin]. You’re even more perfect [shleimut: perfection] that a person shouldn’t be like that.

The Real Problem: Being Too Drawn

Speaker:

It’s only that if you’re only that, you’re stuck in this, you can’t even control yourself [mishtalet zein: control]. Granted [meilah: alright] a person can’t control [shult zein: control], there will be more things later. For example [lemoshal: for example], Aristotle says that granted a person can’t control his fear [pakhad: fear], one can understand him, he doesn’t have enough courage, he’s afraid. One can understand him more. A fear of desecration [yir’ah al hakhilul: fear of profanation]. One can understand him. One doesn’t say he’s perfect [mushlam: perfect], he has a great deficiency [khisaron: deficit], he’s a coward, right? And one can greatly despise him [mezalzel zein: despise]. But one can even look at it a bit as a forced circumstance [ones: a forced circumstance]. It’s not ones, he’s missing something, a trait, it’s an ones, he’s missing courage. But he’s afraid [morah: fear] of something, you’re a human being, you understand him. Okay, he’s a problem, one must educate him [mekhanekh zein: educate], he needs to learn.

Comparison: Cowardice Versus Intemperance

Speaker:

One who can’t overcome himself [mitgaber zein: overcome], right? No one is stopping him, you don’t call him an ones. Yes, the evil inclination [yetzer hara: the evil inclination], but it’s normal, right? But what do you want, what are you, a person or an animal? You only want the animalistic things. People have more complaints [te’anot: complaints] against him, right?

Aristotle says in the same lesson, he gives an explanation why people have more complaints against one who fails [nikhshal: falls] in bodily pleasures than one who fails in courage. Courage is an incredibly important trait for humanity, by the way [agav: by the way] today one doesn’t know about it, but it’s incredibly important, right? Because everyone flees from every war [milkhamah: war] if he doesn’t have courage. It’s a very basic, very basic trait. But with all this [im kol zeh: with all this], there’s a smaller, there’s not a greater punishment from the side [mitzad: from the side] of the war, he’ll get for treason, he’ll be imprisoned, I don’t know what. But people look down less on one who runs away in the critical war than one who doesn’t overcome his inclination [mitgaber al yitzro: overcome his inclination]. In how many ways does every culture say the greatest thing he must overcome is his inclination. True? Why? Because one says, he’s a bit of a pauper [oni: a pauper], we understand him, he doesn’t want it for music. But here you say he wants it yes, and who is he wants? What does he want to be, an animal? So you look at it that he’s the lowest thing, he’s completely a weak thing. Right?

Conclusion: The Context of Aristotle

Speaker:

In any case [al kol panim: in any case], this is the context with Aristotle [the speaker means this is the context by Aristotle], without any doubt [bli shum safek: without any doubt].

Aristotle’s “Disgrace of the Sense of Touch” and the Path to the Contemplative Life

Why Do People Look Down So Much on One Who Can’t Control Himself?

Speaker:

But people look down less on one who runs away from the bonds of war than one who doesn’t overcome his inclination. In any case, this is the greatest thing he must overcome his inclination, true?

Why? Because one says it’s a bit of an ones, we understand him, he doesn’t want it intentionally [bemeizid: intentionally]. But here he says, he wants it yes, and who wants it? What does he want? He wants to be an animal [behemah: animal]. So you look at it that he’s the lowest thing, he’s completely a weak thing, right?

The Context of Aristotle: It’s Not Against Pleasure Itself

In any case, this is the context of Aristotle, without any doubt. And this, everything speaks of one who doesn’t overcome himself. He doesn’t say, it doesn’t speak of the topic that a person would essentially have to live without having the pleasures [ta’anugim: pleasures]. That would be like asking a human not to be human.

To say that he shouldn’t have a body, he shouldn’t have a body that says there should be pleasures, and there’s a need for the pleasures, the body wants the thing, because that’s how it lives. There’s nothing wrong with the body. There’s also nothing wrong for an animal to be an animal, a person is a holy animal.

The Correct Translation of “Kherpat Khush HaMishush”

That is, in this piece it doesn’t say at all that it’s wrong. When he says “kherpah” [kherpah: disgrace, shame], he doesn’t mean “khush hamishush” [khush hamishush: sense of touch], people have translated this, this is the way I would say it, what the Rambam [Rambam: Rambam/Maimonides] quoted a few times. I mean that people have simply mis-translated it.

I don’t mean “khush hamishush”, I mean “kherpat khush hamishush” means, the sin [khet: sin] of khush hamishush itself. I don’t mean khush hamishush itself, I mean the category of khush hamishush. Sins [khata’im: sins] that a person sins because he is drawn [nimshakh: drawn, attracted] after his khush hamishush, after his pleasure of khush hamishush, to be more precise, is more of a disgrace.

“Kherpah” also means, people despise it [mevazeh: despise, look down upon], not that it’s an embarrassment [bushah: embarrassment]. One says one is ashamed with him, it’s a shame such a person, it’s something despised [davar mevuzeh: something despised], as he says there in language [lashon: language, expression], one yells at him, one smiles mockingly [mekhayekh: smiles mockingly] and so forth [vekhadome: and so forth]. But it doesn’t speak of the pleasure itself, it also doesn’t speak of that a person shouldn’t have had this.

Other people hold the least of the person. That’s how I would say it. This is what he means.

Illustration: The Hierarchy of Disgrace

What other things? It’s a disgrace. One who runs away from war is also a shame, but not such a great shame. A murderer [rotze’akh: murderer]? Also not the same, not the same level. No, not the same level. I still see it that way, not the same level. Yes. Yes.

There’s a certain, again, you have to try to see it. I think you could see it in our culture except for a scoundrel within the bounds of Torah [naval birshut haTorah: one who is vile within the bounds of Torah]. But one of the things is that we live in a different culture. A murderer is a very low fellow, but a murderer isn’t… You understand what I’m saying? And often with murder [retzikhah: murder] one can… As you say, if someone got angry, and one can even understand better.

One must investigate [khoker zein: investigate] what is the greater punishment [onesh: punishment], anger [ka’as: anger] or lust [ta’avah: lust, desire]. He speaks about this later. In a certain sense it’s not the worst.

Example from Prison

Nobody gets capital punishment for… That’s because it’s more dangerous for other people. By the way, one does give capital punishment for rape, but one doesn’t want to give.

But the reason is… The concern is like… Okay, let’s… Murder is the example [dugma: example]. Murder is the example for a crime against another. Murder is the example for harming another. I got angry. At the time of the act [bish’at ma’aseh: at the time of the act], for him himself to look he’s the worst. Let’s say in jail, in opinion. One who comes in for murder… Even the inmates look at him… No, and still, when less than a murderer [pakhot merotze’akh: less than a murderer]… The less… Yes, yes, by the way [derekh agav: by the way], they look… By the way, by the way, they look…

No, no. Rabbi Chaim, less than a murderer, even in jail, less than a murderer is a pedophile. As everyone knows. Less than a murderer is one who can’t control himself on his lustful desires and… One hates him very much.

The Rambam’s Approach: Animalism Itself Is Not the Problem

So, I just want to explain [mesaber zein: explain] this, that this is what we’re talking about. This was the thing, and I think we hold this way. And the world hears that this is an animalistic thing. This is an example of one of the only things that remains in America that one holds that this is a bad thing. But how much it’s a bad thing is…

What comes out from this whole thing, what I understand here, is that what the Ramban [Ramban: Ramban/Nachmanides] has, or even the Rambam, the claim that one doesn’t look at the animalism itself as something wrong. You’re saying that one holds that it can’t be. You’re saying that the Rambam’s entire approach [shitah: approach, method] is not that there’s something wrong with the actual animalistic part of the person. It’s the “lo taturu acharei” [lo taturu acharei: “do not follow after” – from Numbers 15:39] or the soul [neshamah: soul] control.

Speaker:

Right, it’s not explaining, it’s not giving you a new theory of being against human pleasure. It’s giving you a theory of why… It’s not… That’s not what the context is. That’s not the context. The context is a theory of why people hate people that are uncontrolled in the topic of pleasures more than they hate other people. They hold morally that it’s worse than one who killed [haragete: killed] someone. That’s what this is about.

But the difficulty is when one goes to the next level… Yes, yes, I still have difficulties. I still need to say the points [nekudot: points]. It’s hard enough to say that these things are simple.

The Jump to the Next Level: Khayei Iyun

Okay, now, I must bring this out, I must bring this out because I must. It’s, do what this, it sounds, and it’s the reason why people talk into the next step, and maybe even the Rambam we learn in that is indicated and so forth.

It’s, the reason why it’s going to the next step, that as I say, the reason is that it depends whose ideal [lekhatkhila: ideally, from the outset] person, of whom one wants it should be a good person. Okay, and this is true, not only Aristotle and not only Aristotle and not only bringing in what one should understand Kabbalah [Kabbalah: Kabbalah, Jewish mysticism], and the Platonist is his approach so, that if one speaks of the worldly person [adam sheba’olam: the worldly person], in Yiddish one calls it sheba’olam like that, the one who must have to do with what we call pleasures, to be a good person in the world [ba’olam: in the world], that person certainly it’s not heaven [shamayim: heaven, spiritual matters], it can’t be, or as in the Ramban, the unique Ramban’s way, it can’t be that God who made the person of the world that there’s such a certain perfection [shleimut: perfection, completeness], it can’t be that that person would be better off when he doesn’t have fine good, most of this speaks of what has a good, that even down, and even down, this speaks it’s the first minimized for a very good, understand like that?

It doesn’t even say here about asceticism [perishut: asceticism] and the Ramban’s stands which have last which one sanctifies it stands not even that, it only says that what should only be the wrong [avel: wrong, injustice] of the topic worse the wrong of other topics, but less to eat, and the topic and in and of itself [mitzad atzmo: in and of itself] understand? Right?

How does there even come in [bikhlal: at all] a way of thinking to minimize the topic in and of itself? Only one who has learned Mishneh Torah Foundations of the Torah [Yesodei HaTorah: Foundations of the Torah – a work by Maimonides] chapter four in the Guide [Moreh Nevukhim: Guide for the Perplexed] in chapter two and he has seen that it’s not at all so simple that the good of a person is at all the person.

The Foundation: Hasagat HaNefesh

Why? For this, you have to believe in something called the apprehension of the soul [hasagat hanefesh: the apprehension/understanding of the soul], okay? Or the separation of the separateness of the human soul, in some sense. It’s not so simple to be, but it’s basically connected with this.

The Rambam’s Approach to Abstinence: Practical Study Versus Metaphysical Extremes

If you believe in a separate, that the intellectual part [chelek hasichli: intellectual part], let’s say, the intellectual part of a person, okay? I can’t make two steps like that. Okay? Aristotle said so. So I will tell you what can be said according to the approach of [lefi shitat: according to the approach of] Aristotle, and what can be said according to the approach of Plato, or the Kabbalists [mekubalim: Kabbalists], or the Rambam also certainly holds this approach, because there’s almost no pious Jew who doesn’t follow Aristotle’s approach in that way.

Two Types of Lives: Chayei Ma’aseh and Chayei Iyun

What we can say is, okay, it’s very good. But we learned earlier that there are pleasures of a person, even pleasures, right? But the point of this isn’t pleasure, rather the point of this is the perfection [shleimut: perfection] of a person that aren’t from his body at all. Like thinking, or primarily like thinking, understanding. Understanding isn’t something that has to do with the body.

So, I’ll make a note [he’arah: note], okay? If someone wants to engage with modern investigations [chakirot: investigations, inquiries] of this, that’s another thing, not our topic. Now, it has nothing to do with the body, right?

Now, if one says, if someone thinks that, so if let’s say someone thinks, let’s say one thing that one can think, that one can start to have a separate soul. And this is stated in book 10 [sefer yud] of the Ethics [Sefer HaMidot] of Aristotle.

If someone thinks that what is truly the best life, and he makes a calculation [cheshbon: calculation, accounting], that the beginning of the calculation is stated in his first book, and the end of the calculation is stated in the tenth book. If someone makes a calculation and he says very well, a perfect person is one who has the character traits [midot: character traits] in the middle, bodily pleasures [ta’anugei haguf: bodily pleasures] according to the proper order [seder: order], nothing wrong with that. But that’s only one type of life.

That other type of life ends at, let’s say, at honor [kavod: honor], let’s say, at political life. But there’s another thing which is called, which is called having a life of understanding in general, right? That if I want to be maximum in my life, and I hold that one has from this more pleasure, more perfection, it’s more correct to say that a person was created for this, and he was created to be a wise person [chacham: wise person], not just to be a good person. To be a wise person, to know everything, yes?

Thinking Is Not Physical

Now, you’ll see, number one, you might need a body for this, because he must be healthy, he can’t be unhealthy, and so on. But bodily pleasures one almost doesn’t need for this, except [chutz: except] to the extent that it helps psychologically for a person, or it becomes apparent to other people who can do this, a physical brain you don’t need to have. You don’t need to have a physical brain. A physical body you need to have.

Let’s not say physical brain, physical brain will only confuse us. One needs a physical brain because it’s only a house, no difference [chiluk: difference]. One doesn’t do it with the brain. Thinking one doesn’t think with the brain, one thinks with the intellect [sekhel: intellect], not with the brain.

Digression: Brain Versus Heart

In general according to Aristotle the brain is an air conditioner. Anyway, one doesn’t think with the brain, okay? I already told you, I’ve met people… This week I saw someone saying that Aristotle said that the heart thinks, and the brain is only a… cools down the body. As it gets too hot, it cools it down.

Plato didn’t say so, Plato did hold, he was the first to hold that the brain thinks. From this there is a dispute [machloket: dispute] between Kabbalah and Nigleh [nigleh: revealed Torah, as opposed to mystical]. I’ve noticed this, in Kabbalah it always says that the soul is in the brain, but in Nigleh it always says that the soul is in the heart.

In any case… or in the breath. Breathing [neshimah: breath]. Not clear, depends what you call. Any case, this is just information [stam yedi’ot: just information] that I don’t want to say further. But the point is, that I saw this week that someone says that he met people where he sees that it’s true that their brain is only an air conditioner. Good, good.

The Practical Consequence: Pleasures Take Time

In short, what am I saying? If thinking one doesn’t think with the body, and the life of thinking, the life of contemplation [chayei iyun: life of contemplation], is much more pleasurable, much more a life of pleasure, much more purposeful [tachlit’dig: purpose, goal] than life in order to be a proper young man, a householder, to be a gentleman, handsome [yefeh to’ar: handsome, of good appearance], and so on, it comes out that first, the main thing that comes out is that it’s a waste of time to get married and to take care of the pleasures. It takes very much time. I know why it takes a lot of time, right?

Another reason [ta’am: reason] that one gives a reason for fasting [ta’anit: fast], that one fasts so that one should have more time to pray during the fast. One shouldn’t ask that it only takes half an hour to eat, yes, but you realize that a whole year one works so that one should be able to eat. A whole day.

Okay, it’s true today that people don’t work directly for food. Seemingly [lekho’rah: seemingly] if it were true that by a fast one saves money on food,

Practical Explanation of Abstinence: Less Eating = More Learning

it would follow that one can work a bit less, because one needs less food, understand? Anyway, that’s the theory. I’m just explaining why, this is a very simple thing. Without believing in anything, you can say, if I want to dedicate my life to thinking, and I hold that this is a better life, then I need to be very restrained in eating and drinking and marital relations, simply because it takes up time and strength and energy and so on. And then I don’t need to say at all that I am a type of thing that I hate the contradiction of the material God forbid, because then there’s only a benefit. It makes very much sense, because the work takes very much time. Everything, sleeping too.

Student: True, sleeping too.

Instructor: True. Sleeping is also a bit for the brain. If one eats too much, one needs to sleep too much. It’s true, it’s all connected.

Proof from the Mishnah in Avot: “Kacha Hi Darkah Shel Torah” – Not “Darkah Shel Adam”

This is, remember, as it says in the Mishnah, “Kacha hi darkah shel Torah” [such is the way of Torah]. It doesn’t say “Kacha hi darkah shel adam” [such is the way of man]. That’s what you realize. The Mishnah, one of the greatest Mishnayot in Avot chapter 6 [Avot perek vav], “Pat b’melach tochal u’mayim b’mesurah tishteh” [bread with salt you shall eat and water by measure you shall drink], doesn’t speak at all about being a good person. It speaks about Torah [Torah].

If Torah, which means that the Rambam [Rambam: Maimonides] explains in Perek Chelek [Perek Chelek: the chapter on the World to Come in the Mishnah commentary], that Torah is not the same thing, one can inherit the World to Come [olam haba: the World to Come] without it. But “mi she’rotzeh lizkot l’ketarah shel Torah” [one who wants to merit the crown of Torah], “mi she’nit’aveh libo lizkot l’ketarah shel Torah u’lekayem mitzvoteha k’ra’ui” [one whose heart desires to merit the crown of Torah and to fulfill its commandments properly], it’s a special type of person who wants to be a Torah person, then he doesn’t need to learn, he’ll live without any breaks, it takes very long to learn, and the few minutes that one has between eating and sleeping is no time. I’ve spoken well.

This is one theory, and one thing, okay? Then the Rambam can say that since, why? Then it’s very similar to what we just said. Since the essence of the person is the intellect [sekhel: intellect], and that which he has bodily pleasures [ta’anugei haguf: bodily pleasures] and body pleasures, which are a problem for the person, almost a problem, then he says that it’s a disgrace [cherpah: disgrace], because the honor [kavod: honor] and the pleasure is to sit and learn, not to eat. The less he eats, the more he’ll be able to learn, that’s all. Right?

Student: Pela Yoetz and others, one can go further with this.

The Second, More Extreme Level: The Soul Lives Beyond the Body

Instructor: If one says that not only this, then Aristotle [Aristotle] builds the two things one on the other. But, if one says that not only this, but… if one says that not only this, but that the intellect lives beyond the body in general, and since it never needed a body, let’s say, that’s a question, you say that one needs the brain to think, but if he doesn’t need the body at all to think, truly, precisely when one lives in a body one needs, but if truly he doesn’t need, then thinking, thinking, he thought much better and he knew much better before he was born and after what he dies, what we call dying, which means truly living, right?

As the Rambam says about Moshe Rabbeinu [Moshe Rabbeinu: Moses our teacher], when he died, what we call dying, then he truly began to live, as the Gemara [Gemara: Talmud] says in Shabbat [tractate Shabbat], tzadikim b’mitatam kruyim chayim [the righteous in their death are called living], right? Then he first began to live, then the point of life is to die, right?

All Senses Become Problematic

And if you believe that the point of life is to die, then you can also say that the sense of touch [chush hamisush: the sense of touch] is a disgrace, and not only the sense of touch, but any… all senses [chushim: senses], you can already say all senses, the sense of smell [chush hare’ach: the sense of smell] too, not specifically the sense of touch is at that point. You can say the sense of touch is the worst, not necessarily, it’s for all, again, the sense of touch is the closest to animality [behemiyut: animality], it’s the furthest from things, but it’s not truly worse than the sense of smell from this standpoint. From this standpoint, the standpoint that says that a person is in general a soul [neshamah: soul] that wouldn’t have needed to be a guest at all in the body, or in jail in the body, or such expressions [leshonot: expressions], and then one can introduce the other, completely other extreme things.

This type of thing you won’t find, you can only find it in the same places where the Rambam speaks of heresy [minut: heresy] and madness [meshuga’at: madness], such types of things. Right? That leads to a very different kind of ethics.

But, even then one already says that the Almighty hates the transgressions [aveirot: transgressions].

Critical Boundary Line: No One Says That the Almighty Made a Mistake

There’s a second thing, what I need to say. Let’s already say that it all comes from the knowledge [yedi’ah: knowledge] of the sense of touch being a disgrace, if one takes it to the whole extreme, and one says that sense, lies, because it’s a disgrace to man [cherpah l’adam: a disgrace to man], that one shouldn’t console the maker God forbid that he was born unfortunately, yes? How does one know this? So then one can also say that all bodily pleasures are just, and the more one becomes absorbed in more body in a person, and as if a person should his whole life be abstinent completely from the body, not from bodily pleasures in general, not to do precisely a commandment [mitzvah: commandment], it should be completely, true?

And according to this approach it’s truly literally an injustice [avelah: injustice] that one has children, because one brings in more people into this terrible jail, one must understand why the Almighty gave such a commandment, necessity of life [tzorekh chiyut: necessity of life], okay, somehow, so that those children should also be able to escape the jail, it’s the pleasure of the escape, as it says in Lubavitcher books [Lubavitcher sefarim: Chabad-Lubavitch books], truly, approximately.

Student: No, they say that the situation is the jail, and the jail is yet to become holy, something similar.

Instructor: Yes, something like that. But in short, this is the Rambam, perhaps he thinks so, but most of the time he doesn’t speak so. Right?

The Iggeret HaKodesh’s Claim Against the Rambam Is Not True

But here I want to add to you another thing, right? Even if one says so, one still doesn’t say what the Iggeret HaKodesh [Iggeret HaKodesh: the Holy Letter, attributed to Ramban] said that Aristotle says, he said that the Rambam says, that the Almighty made a mistake that he made a body, he has something like that, true? Right? Who says that? No one.

Student: I know who says it, by the way.

Instructor: Who?

Student: There are non-Jews who say that, the Gnostics [Gnostics] say that.

Instructor: Notzrim?

Student: Not Notzrim, Gnostics.

Instructor: Notzrim also don’t say.

Student: Gnostics, Gnostics. They were excommunicated [menudeh: excommunicated] for this reason.

Instructor: Not for this reason, no, it’s not important.

Student: No?

Instructor: No. Notzrim still believe in the face of the deed from the body.

Student: I want that it’s very strongly divided.

Instructor: I don’t know it, I don’t have it, just a historical thing.

Discussion: One Can Be an Ascetic Without Saying That the Almighty Is Not Good

Instructor: One can be a full Gerer chasid [Gerer chasid: follower of the Ger Hasidic dynasty] and not believe in this. One can be… yes, yes, one can be quite a great ascetic [parush: ascetic] and… This I tell you.

Student: No, no, that’s the opposite. They had a different interpretation.

Instructor: Okay, I don’t know. I’m only saying that one can be… I want to be precise about this, because you said very sharp things. No one holds. We love to say…

Student: What? Their own ideas.

Instructor: What?

Student: No, no, no. Also because the world is bad.

Instructor: That’s true, something like that, that existing is bad. But, anti-natalism [anti-natalism]. But…

Student: Yes, but that’s different. That’s not so far.

Instructor: Ah, that I say. One can be very much an ascetic without saying that the Almighty is not good.

Metaphysical Foundation: “Ein Davar Notein Ela Mah She’yesh Bo” – The Problem of Causality

I want to explain something to you, because I don’t know what you mean by this righteous person [tzadik: righteous person]. I don’t know who this was. I don’t know what you mean by what he says, because it seems to me that he made a mistake. I can try to explain to you what he says, but in what I mean that he does wrong. I can give you a whole lecture in a moment on a piece.

The Ramak’s Question: “From Where Did Sensation Emerge?”

He says so, he looks at it like this, that if he says… I’m trying to explain what… This has to do with Gnosticism, I’ll try to explain something to you. That you have here a problem, right? You have here a world that receives the problem. The Rambam also speaks of the problem, right?

So is the language in the Ramak [Ramak: Rabbi Moshe Cordovero] in Elimah chapter 3 [Elimah perek gimmel], “ein nirgash [there is no sensory perception], the Almighty is not sensory. Im ken mei’hekhan yatza haregesh [if so, from where did sensation emerge]?” He asks a question [kushya: question].

This is built, let’s understand, this is built on a foundation [yesod: foundation] that nothing makes something that it isn’t. This is a foundation of causality [causality]. It’s not such a…

Student: No, yesh me’ayin [something from nothing].

Instructor: No, yesh me’ayin. Similar, right? No, no. This is a foundation that… one… “ein davar notein ela mah she’yesh bo” [nothing gives except what is in it]. I said such a thing, I changed a version [nusach: version]. Okay?

Today’s scientists don’t believe in this foundation for example [lemashel]. But in any case [al kol panim], this is a metaphysical foundation of causality, which one must think about very well to understand what he means.

The Foundation: The World Must Be Similar to Its Cause

But in any case, there is a foundation that says that a thing doesn’t give out what it doesn’t have in itself. One speaks if it’s a true cause [sibah: cause].

Student: Yes, that’s a parable [mashal: parable] that’s not a good parable, because a person can have, because a person isn’t truly a person, etc., it’s very complicated.

Instructor: All parables that you say, yes, yes, which are very complex. In any case, this is the foundation.

Now, the world must be similar to its cause. The cause must be similar to the world. It can’t be that the cause of something should be completely different from it. We imagine that the Almighty makes the world in a completely different way, and there shouldn’t be any problem, right? We think it’s naturally so, right? Because we are megashemim [corporealists]. We think that the Almighty is like a person, and He made the world.

The Table Analogy: Humans Don’t Truly Create

I make something, and the thing that I make is something that is not me. I make many things that are not me. When I make a table, I didn’t bring forth a table from myself, I didn’t make it from myself, no? So the principle isn’t so simple.

If one imagines that the Almighty is someone who makes a table, then you already have the whole question, right? That is, I make the tzurah [form] of the table.

Student: Very good, that’s true. But then you’re imagining me as not actually creating the table, ’cause I’m not responsible for the matter of the table.

Instructor: I took a ready piece of wood, and I placed upon it my idea of a table, and that’s what actually happened. What happened, existed, or was, doesn’t mean that I did it myself, because it could be that it lies in the sekhel hakolel [universal intellect] which has the idea of table, and I only borrowed it from there. Not the same idea, because when I die the table remains, right? But when, which means that I didn’t truly make the table.

Student: A second person can also borrow it.

Instructor: Very good. When I say that I make a table, it’s simply false. I didn’t make the chomer [matter] of the table nor the tzurah of the table. A ra’ayah [proof]? I tell you, I’ll meet you, I’ll make you a shidduch [match]. In total, I didn’t make any shidduch, it’s two things.

Student: But who made the tzurah of the table?

Instructor: Perhaps the Almighty gave people ideas to make tables, I don’t know. Perhaps the sekhel hapo’el [active intellect] gave tzurot [forms] for every thing.

Student: Where does the world of forms come from?

Instructor: I just want to bring out, there’s a made thought, there’s another chiddush [novel insight], a table is made through something, depending on how you understand it, but certainly not through me, because if it were through me I would be the maker, I would be the yotzer [creator], I would be the borei [creator].

Student: Very good, that means well squeezed.

The Almighty as Reason, Dualism, and the Rambam’s “Chush HaMashos Cherpah”

The Almighty as “Reason” – Not as “Being”

Student: That is, what does the world of forms mean? Tell me what you mean by that.

Instructor: Hello, hello, gentlemen. I just said what you said, in nicer words.

Student: No, you’re saying convoluted words that I don’t want to say.

Instructor: I just want to bring out, gentlemen, who made the thoughts? I want to go back to the watch. So a table is made through something, depending on how you understand it, but certainly not through me. Because if I had made it, I could tell you how I made it.

Student: Watch, good squeeze. I don’t have an answer to that.

Instructor: What’s wrong with saying that it’s a question? I don’t have an answer to that in an immediate sense. It depends, this is actually an existential problem.

Gentlemen, one moment, one moment, one moment, let me go back one small step, because I’m making here a summary of very great things, and I just want to go back so we should understand what we’re talking about, approximately what we’re talking about, okay?

So now, since we understand everything this way, okay, it comes out like this, it comes out that there’s a problem. The Almighty is a thing that, again, we’re looking for an explanation.

Wait, what is that? No, let’s not say it that way. One moment, one moment, this is the most important sentence that I’ve said.

Gentlemen, gentlemen, can anyone explain to me what the Almighty is?

No, I’m not going to do that with a normal person. What I will say is, I can tell you what the Almighty does. I can’t tell you what He is, I can tell you what He does.

The Almighty’s job is to be the reason [reason: cause, explanation] for other things, okay? That’s His job, that’s what He does. What He does in His free time I don’t know. I don’t know what His job is, okay? Shabbos, then we’ll know what the Almighty does in His free time, but the whole week I know what the Almighty does, okay?

The Problem of Change from an Unchanging Source

So now, the point is, now it comes out, there’s an important question here to understand, how to explain this. It becomes a problem here to understand that we’re looking for a reason for things, which is… the truth is, in short, I’ve jumped around in many ways, but the point is, that if the Almighty is a reason for things which He remains, which He is not something that changes, that’s a better way of saying it, not something that changes, then one must understand how things that change came to be, okay?

Because in the ultimate source, initially initially there were never any things that change, and even not what is matter is, no things that change, okay? It comes out that it couldn’t have started that things should change, okay? Approximately so, okay?

Three Theoretical Answers: Dualism, “Unintentionally”, and Gnosticism

So good, there are several answers and ways to reconcile this, but one way would have been, a simple way to reconcile this would have been to say that the Almighty didn’t make this, do you understand? It wasn’t for this, it was always kadmon. Not olam kadmon, this isn’t kadmus ha’olam, this is what the person thinks is kadmus ha’olam, but a certain style of kadmus ha’olam.

A real two principle, a real dualistic theory, which would say that there isn’t one principle for everything, which is a question if this is a good world, because we’re already stuck, we haven’t explained anything, we say that there are two principles, but in any case we see that there are these two things in the world.

So there’s a god who is the root, he makes that all things should fit, he makes that they should fit, right? But here are actually the things that one can make them fit, that he didn’t make, do you understand? And how did the things come? It is nous [nous: intellect, mind], or did they come from some second, some other god who fought with him, which he makes.

Second is a kiyma lan that there’s a theory to say that the Almighty made it unintentionally. But then it’s already back to three gods, right? It’s not a good theory, but the answer is everything is questions on theories.

The Gnostic Approach: The “Rebellious Son”

I just want to say that there’s one fitting theory, I mean one fitting, one theory that one can from this truly say two gods, God forbid. Two gods is a weird word, really two principles, and they’re not subservient one to the other, they’re half subservient, because in practice the job of the… the persons held, I don’t know what the persons, I don’t know, this is so much knowledge, that there’s one principle that says that what he makes is good things, okay?

And afterwards there was a second. It could be that he initially made him, he was rebellious, I don’t know. One can find all the ways how that second one came. Doesn’t really matter. The result is that a second one decided to make bad things, okay?

And for example, the world was made by some second god, who is a real other principle, completely different, not dependent on the first, and he made the body, basically.

Plotinus Against the Gnostics

And about this was the main teaching, which one sees, one looks in the… what does that mean? Plotinus has a very famous essay, “Against the Gnostics” [Against the Gnostics], and its title is against those who say that the world and the one who made the world… because instead of saying that the world is bad and the Almighty made it, because the one who made it means that he is a cause of what he is, right? That which means to be a cause of something.

So, if the world is completely bad, it must be that the one who made it is bad. And you must find why he is bad. Or he was a rebellious son against his father, I don’t know what, he’s such a rebellious OTD [off the derech: off the path] Almighty’s son made the world, do you understand? That’s how there was an explanation there.

And I’m trying to make it more coherent, but this is what serious people actually believed, that the Almighty had a son, and he was OTD, and because of that there’s a world, and our task in the world is to fight with that son and go back to the Almighty. Still very religious, he goes back to the correct god. But…

Student: No, then what did the Almighty make?

Instructor: You see, once there’s… they had something that was rebellious, without permission. Without permission.

Student: I don’t have, I don’t have.

Two Basic Approaches: Monism Versus Dualism

Instructor: I don’t have, because it’s very simple the difference. Again, I’m trying to clarify things very simply. There are only two approaches. Between the two approaches there are 10,000 different variations.

Either there’s one god who made everything, and there remains a question how he made bad things. The answer is, by the way, the answer has to be that they’re not actually bad. There’s no other way to say it. We got confused, and the sins are beneficial to Torah, all kinds of answers. But ultimately, it’s not true that it’s bad. That’s the one way. And I don’t want to say because I don’t want people to do it. But anyway, what it means is very good, whatever, it doesn’t matter.

So about this, a more basic thing would have been that the dispute is only to say if the world is good as it is or the world is not good. That’s enough. How did it become that it’s not good? The moment you say that it’s truly not good, you’re saying that a second one made it. I can say it backwards, it will make much more sense, do you understand?

Right? That’s the other approach. Now, no Jew, I don’t know any Jew who ever held this way, okay? This is very clear. I say one Jew, I’ll bring you a few non-Jews. But I’m talking about a Jew, I don’t know of a Jew.

When people have complaints against other approaches, one says that it’s too close to this, people can be mistaken, but I say that there isn’t one Jew who ever thought that the world is a bad world and our job is to run away because a bad god made it. I don’t know of one Jew who ever thought this way, right? Not that it’s an official Jewish approach, but some crazy heresy that could always be.

And therefore, all those whom one has complaints against that they hold this way, yes, because it sounds like that, it’s close to this, but it’s not truly the approach.

Back to the Ramban / Iggeres HaKodesh: Chasday Crescas’s Error

And therefore, the holy Rabbi Iggeros Kodesh [attributed to the Ramban] meant that what the Rambam is sharply and repeatedly attacking is such a sort of approach. What’s the proof? He connects it with chiddush ha’olam. What does chiddush ha’olam mean? Approximately in his mind, something like this, that chiddush ha’olam, and he’s precise, because chiddush ha’olam means that the Almighty, one god, made the entire world, right?

And therefore he must be ultimately responsible. In between he made the yetzer hara and the klippos, everything can be. But he ultimately made everything, therefore it must be that everything that is good, it must be that there’s a way how to use every thing well. It can’t be that there’s a way that a thing is bad and one must run away from it. He doesn’t say that one can do what one wants, but if it’s good, it must be good.

The Understanding of Kadmus Ha’olam

The approach is, he says that if we would hold kadmus ha’olam, which means that there is as it were some way, that’s how he thought, by the way, the approach of kadmus ha’olam that the Rambam brings for example, doesn’t come to such a place. But the approach of kadmus ha’olam that he imagined is that there’s somehow a way of saying that there’s some thing that is as old as the Almighty, as it were that’s a meaning like the image of the world, the world is in some way side by side, is still so powerful, so first cause, so always was, so by its own power, like the Almighty.

It could be that that a person has lower parts, that’s screaming from that one, that’s not the Almighty’s fault. That’s how Rabbi Chasday Crescas or Ezra or whatever understood.

Therefore he said that if one believes in chiddush ha’olam one can’t say chush hamashos cherpah. But as I explained, I don’t see that the Rambam thought, certainly didn’t think this way, he can still think many other things, but certainly not this. So this seems to be just a confusion in some sense. Do you understand what I’m saying? So it appears in my humble opinion. And if someone can disprove me, I’ll be very happy, but that’s how it looks.

Summary: Three Errors in the Critique of the Rambam

The summary of the matter is very simple. There’s a word called chush hamashos, I’ll say in one minute. There’s a word that says chush hamashos cherpah. The Rav in Iggeres HaKodesh, attributed to the Ramban, says that this word is a heretical word, the Rambam mistakenly, as he says there, mistakenly copied from Aristotle, he didn’t grasp that it’s dependent on kadmus ha’olam.

If you believe in chiddush ha’olam, you can’t say that the Almighty made something that is shameful. This is built on three other errors, the claim, okay?

Error Number One: What Does “Chush HaMashos Cherpah” Mean

Error number one that chush hamashos cherpah means that one should be ashamed of loving bodily pleasures. No, Aristotle said this to explain why when a person sins in bodily pleasures it’s more of a shame than another sort of sin. That’s… that’s what it means.

Student: No, sins, sins he wants to mean here.

Instructor: Okay, okay, wait, wait, let me explain. Go further.

Error Number Two: “Insofar as He is an Animal” Doesn’t Mean the Body is Bad

Second thing is, that even if one will go further with this, and there is actually a reason to go further, because the reasoning that Aristotle added why, is because this is the level not insofar as he is human, this is a level insofar as he is an animal. And if a person doesn’t want to be an animal, apparently he would have had to be at the level of actually not loving this at all.

To this I said, this isn’t important according to the plain meaning of Aristotle, according to the level of speaking about the person, because we’re not always speaking about the person who is also an animal. There’s nothing wrong that a person has a bodily part. It doesn’t say that a person is serving the body.

It’s only in a certain sense true in one of two ways: Either when a person says he is choosing and living, which means he wants to be completely human, a satisfied person, and not an animalistic person, then indeed he is free to be more, he’ll have time to learn.

Summary of the Lecture and Discussion About Physicality and Spirituality

Review of the Main Arguments of the Lecture

The Person as Both Animal and Human Simultaneously

Instructor:

Because this is not insofar as I am human, we love this insofar as animal. And since a person doesn’t want to be an animal, he would apparently have had to be similar to the Rambam and actually not love this at all.

To this we said that this isn’t correct according to the plain meaning of Aristotle, according to the level of speaking about the person, because we’re always speaking about the person who is also an animal. There’s nothing wrong that a person has a bodily part, it doesn’t say that a person should stop having a body.

Two Possible Ways of “Choose and Live”

It’s only in a certain sense true in one of two ways:

Either if a person says that he is choosing and living, which means that he wants to be completely human, a satisfied person, and not an animalistic person, then indeed he is free to be more, he’ll have time to learn.

Or if one wants to speak entirely about hifrad hanefesh, about completely separating the soul, like Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai who wanted to die completely, then he says that he has pleasure that he doesn’t want the world at all. This is against the Torah, but the Ramban… okay, whatever, let’s not get into it.

Argument Against Rav Gabai’s Interpretation

After that we said that even if one were to say this, it’s still not what Rav Gabai says, a kadosh beshem lekadushei chushei hameshutaf, where he says that this has to do with kadmut ha’olam [the question of whether the world is eternal or was created].

What does it mean to say that he holds this way? It means that the god that made, the thing that is responsible for the world, for the lower parts of man, is bad, and therefore one must go away. And since he believes in chiddush ha’olam [that the world was created], that the Almighty made everything with will, it comes out that it must be that the Almighty is guilty of this. And since the Almighty is good, it must be that it is good.

To this we said that this is certainly not what neither Aristotle, nor what the Rambam, nor any Jew has ever thought. Although people say things that perhaps mean, sound similar to this, one can shout at them this way, in a homiletical way one can shout this, but according to the truth no one thought this.

And it’s also not clear that it has to do with chiddush ha’olam and kadmut ha’olam, it’s more a different question whether there is an evil force that is guilty for the chomer [matter] or something like that. In any case, this is not truly an argument against the Rambam, and certainly no one thought this way.

So, good night.

Questions and Discussion

The Gra and Ruach HaKodesh

Student:

What is it that the Gra [the Gaon of Vilna] said that he had ruach hakodesh [the holy spirit, prophetic inspiration]?

Maggid Shiur:

He said the dikdukim [fine distinctions]. For example, the first piece that you started, the whole thing that they say the dikdukim, that a person is a complete part. For example, the first piece that you started, this is what I mean to look at. And this is the topic that you want. They don’t go into the details that he says, but this thought is very maintained. They only like, for example, a different halacha.

Gerrer Chassidim and Their Approach

Student:

Yes, it’s true, they chop properly, especially on the Maharach.

Maggid Shiur:

But the idea is, the Gerrer don’t hold that there are other forces that made the world. I mean, he has many other problems, he has no doubts in anything. He has no problems.

Student:

What do you mean to say? They gave a statement that they have one foot here and one foot in the next world, that one doesn’t do it.

Maggid Shiur:

Well, you don’t have to do it. Why should you have one foot here? They say that your head should be somewhere else. They believe in these things, that what you think is not just a simple thing, but that is what you are. This is a correct thing.

I was at someone’s who was waiting for a shiur. I waited a whole hour. The next tension was about the question of the taste which is the importance. They ask the opponents another problem.

Being Moshel Over Gashmiyut – Control, Not Destruction

Student:

Would a person say that at the end of the day, every physical thing is something you need to be moshel over. Why? But it’s not true that you don’t have any control over it.

Maggid Shiur:

Moshel doesn’t mean destroy, it means control. A king who destroyed a country, and that’s the point, there’s no place that is susceptible.

Student:

Yes, but people often think that any time that you have pleasure from something, the pleasure is overpowering you.

Maggid Shiur:

That’s not true. You can make it so that you should have pleasure.

Student:

It’s always a sign that it’s going out of control.

Maggid Shiur:

There is from below the toilet, that’s the halacha. No, that’s not the same thing. It’s not too good or too bad.

Student:

It’s bad in the sense that it’s a loss of control.

Maggid Shiur:

There’s always a loss of control. But is there always a loss of control? I don’t think.

Student:

It’s a loss of control that the animal part of you is not the human part of you. The human part of you means that you think about it. You are conscious about it.

Maggid Shiur:

And this goes back to my chakira [analytical question], which way I wanted to say this, but it’s dependent on the chakira, it’s true.

Machloket HaPoskim: Eating With Salt or Without Salt

Maggid Shiur:

There is a machloket haposkim [dispute among halachic authorities] what is the halacha lema’aseh [practical halacha], what is better, to eat without salt or with salt. It’s all dependent on the chakira.

Student:

Does he say so, it’s correct, does he say so, he means that it overpowers the animal.

Maggid Shiur:

And I say that this is more animal. The animal also won’t eat too much salt. He also won’t eat too much salt.

Student:

Exactly. There is a verse “kol korbancha takriv melach” [all your offerings you shall bring with salt].

Maggid Shiur:

I hold that the approach is that people should eat with salt. You must eat better, right?

Student:

You’re a big shot, that you don’t need any salt.

Maggid Shiur:

I hold that this is the reason, right?

I hold that the approach is, as I hold that people should eat bread with salt.

Student:

Why does it say in the Gemara that people should eat salt?

Why? One takes the bread and salt when one makes hamotzi [the blessing on bread], why?

Maggid Shiur:

I don’t understand, you’re going to eat the first, what?

Student:

Yes, yes, for the kavod habracha [honor for the blessing]. That you make a blessing, you should eat, you shouldn’t strain yourself to eat. There’s no other reason. I mean, there is according to kabbalah, one wants to rectify the dinim [the harsh judgments] with this. Well, what does it mean, can he?

I mean, I don’t mean to eat after after. But…

Maggid Shiur:

No, no, it says in the Gemara that on the hamotzi one should make with salt, and the reason for this is that it’s an honor for the blessing, that one should eat a tasty piece.

Student:

It’s a small taste to this.

Maggid Shiur:

But because this feels… We learned in Rambam. It’s not only in Chovot HaLevavot [the book “Chovot HaLevavot” – a classic mussar work].

On the contrary, we learned in our Rambam. There are Jews who see many dips on the table, and they look for salt. They say, perhaps there is salt in the dip? If one eats a dip it’s certainly good, because it’s the minimum dip that can be. It’s really not…

I give myself a dip in one of the dips, and it can be good. It’s indeed placed a good thing for the face.

Student:

No, if one has such work, full of the sort of things that don’t come with salt, and you can tolerate it, then you are a mavin [an expert].

End of Shiur – Conversation About Various Topics

Maggid Shiur:

You didn’t sit down for a shiur in my apartment. Did you hear a shiur? You didn’t hear. But at the campaign you heard a shiur when the Rambam is…

Student:

On the contrary, yes. How is the microphone?

Maggid Shiur:

On the contrary. There is one fellow, and one fellow, and one fellow. He is a young man, and he is a young man. They have an eruv to make. Do you know what eruv means? I’ll tell you later what eruv means. So mine, because here it says eruv to make.