הלכות יסודי התורה פרק ה

Rambam, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 5 – The Mitzvah of Sanctification of God's Name (Kiddush Hashem)

The Structure of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah – Why Does Kiddush Hashem Belong Here?

Speaker 1: Good day. We are learning in the Rambam, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah (Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah), in the Book of Knowledge (Sefer HaMada), the fifth chapter. Here the Rambam teaches about the mitzvah of sanctification of God's Name (kiddush Hashem), which the Rambam counted among the mitzvot of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah — the mitzvah of "v'nikdashti" ("and I shall be sanctified"), of sanctifying God's Name, and "v'lo sechalelu" ("and you shall not profane"), not to profane God's Name.

Would you tell us how this connects with what we've learned until now? What is perhaps the structure of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah?

The Logical Flow – From Love/Fear to Self-Sacrifice

Speaker 2: We can say that the Rambam told us from the outset: to know, to know God. And afterward he explained to us that it is very difficult to know God Himself, but we can know a little about God's creation — both what is called the Account of the Chariot (ma'aseh merkavah), that is the upper creation that is close to Him, the angels, the celestial spheres, the upper worlds. And in the last chapter he explained the types of species that exist in the world, those that are composed of matter and form (chomer v'tzurah), and so forth.

And he concluded that when a person contemplates these things, one arrives at love of God (ahavat Hashem) and fear of God (yirat Hashem). And now he proceeds to the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem. Once we love God, once we fear God, a Jew can already be ready to sanctify God's Name, even to have self-sacrifice (mesirut nefesh).

Kiddush Hashem Belongs to the Subject of God Himself

Speaker 1: That's one way of saying it. But one can think — it's very interesting. Laws of the Foundations of the Torah is called so — the foundations of the Torah. The term "Yesodei HaTorah" can be interpreted as: the fundamental principles.

And in practice, if one looks at the mitzvot he enumerates, or also in the order of the chapters — we don't have here a list of the chapters, in other editions of the Rambam there is a list of the chapters, there is such an index, the Mishneh Torah always has a good list of the chapters where one can see the structure — but we can remember that the first four chapters discuss who God is, basically. As you say, also His creations, but what God is — that is the first foundation of everything.

Which mitzvot are these? The mitzvah of faith (emunah), the mitzvah of God's unity (achdut), the mitzvah of the prohibition of idolatry (avodah zarah), perhaps the fundamental prohibition of idolatry, love and fear (ahavah v'yirah) — these mitzvot.

Afterward, we are here, in the seventh chapter through the tenth chapter he discusses prophecy (nevuah). The Rambam brought this earlier as well — the mitzvah to listen to a prophet and to evaluate his prophecy, that has to do with the... And there he explains the principles that relate to prophecy.

So, all these chapters are principles, not... There is also action, and the action of learning, and the action of love and fear is perhaps an action, but it is more foundations — as one says, the Book of Knowledge.

The exception is the middle two chapters, Chapter 5 and 6, where Chapter 5 discusses, as we are holding here, the laws of kiddush Hashem, and Chapter 6 also discusses a type of desecration of God's Name through erasing God's Name. Chapter 6 is about erasing God's Name.

So, it appears that the Rambam thought — or one way one can think about it is — that the Rambam organized his book according to mitzvot, right? And he wants to... not specifically actions, mitzvot. Mitzvot can also be through speech, also through thought, also through... The Rambam does not hold that every mitzvah must be an action. He says already in Root 9 — I recall that there are mitzvot through thought, etc., which are not actions, or a conduct, or a study, whatever it is, it's not an action.

But I'm saying that the Rambam on one hand wants to bring all the mitzvot, on the other hand he wants to organize them in a logical way. Yes, first one states the foundations, and from the foundations come branches. From this, the Book of Knowledge is the first thing. But on the other hand, he wants to bring here all the mitzvot.

For example, in the Commentary on the Mishnah, how he goes plainly in the logical order — by the principles there are no additional mitzvot suddenly among the principles. There are thirteen principles, and that is more or less — all thirteen principles more or less appear in the Book of Knowledge, some in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah and some in the Laws of Repentance (Hilkhot Teshuvah), one needs to calculate when that is.

But apparently there are indeed mitzvot that the Rambam understood belong to the more basic subject matter. For example, there is one mitzvah of knowing that there is a God — so there are also certain mitzvot that branch out from the very existence of God.

One can say that the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem... There is a mitzvah of observing Shabbat. Observing Shabbat is a kiddush Hashem, everything is... but not directly. It's not that "guard the honor of God, guard the greatness of God" — that's not Shabbat. Shabbat is a remembrance of the act of creation, it's the next level.

Apparently, the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem, also the mitzvah of erasing God's Name almost, is truly the mitzvah of... directly. It's a mitzvah that relates to the subject — in other words: the Rambam said he would organize the mitzvot according to subjects, yes? For example, all mitzvot that have to do with prohibitions — not that he gives an example — there isn't one mitzvah, but all mitzvot that have to do with matters of money, right? All of them belong in the Book of Acquisition (Sefer Kinyan).

So, similarly he says: all mitzvot that have to do with God are in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah. Which mitzvot have to do with God? Kiddush Hashem! That is a mitzvah! To sanctify His Name! It is truly a mitzvah that has to do with God! There aren't many mitzvot that directly have to do with God! This is a mitzvah that has to do with — indeed a practical mitzvah, not just thought, there are laws. But apparently this is an explanation for why this belongs in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah.

Elazar's Explanation – General Rules of the Mitzvot

And one can also see — that here in this, as my brother argued, Elazar, that there are also certain general rules of the mitzvot (klalei hamitzvot) here.

One can ask, I don't know if this is the true explanation, this is Elazar's explanation. But one can argue another explanation that... yes, he saw that he spoke in the Zabna yeshiva there where he challenged — you know, we have the group of... what's it called? Study groups (chaburot). One can discuss and ask questions and answers, he fought a bit in the war of Torah.

He argued there that it could be that here also lies a foundation, like basic things from the general rules of the entire Torah. For example, one of the foundations one needs to know: that the Torah has 613 mitzvot, one needs to know how strongly — which mitzvot require self-sacrifice, how far does each mitzvah go. This is like a... here one knows about all the other mitzvot that are not here, how little they require. It's clear.

Speaker 2: Very good. That also answers what we discussed here a bit earlier, which is that one should go see that apparently — the part of the law is about other mitzvot for which one must give up one's life, and for which one need not — not a matter of kiddush Hashem, but one can say that it is still part of the Foundations of the Torah, because this is a basic thing to know.

Kiddush Hashem as the Ultimate Test of Love and Fear

But two more small points that perhaps one doesn't like, but one can say them. That kiddush Hashem is also the matter of — after this here — love and fear, there is kiddush Hashem. It means this: a person can only give up their life when there is love and fear, but also this is the place where love and fear will be tested the most. Then you will have love and fear — that when one is told to give up one's life, you should give up your life. As the Rambam says here, that a person should think about this — then you know that your love and fear is real.

After Chapter 4, Self-Sacrifice Becomes "Easier"

And just one more small point: that after Chapter 4, it becomes a bit easier to give up one's life, because one has already learned quite a lot up to here — what the Rambam elaborates on regarding all the luminaries and constellations and all of that — you have knowledge (da'at). That is the great thing, with that you are comparable to angels. But here it goes further, even higher — to give up one's life.

Kiddush Hashem as a Branch of Love of God – Yad Peshutah

Speaker 1: Very good. It's already a bit of an easier pill to swallow after Chapter 4. I don't disagree at all, not only do I not disagree, I can even strengthen the point.

But the first thing you said is an explicit Rambam. He doesn't bring it here, it's interesting. I saw on the page — we learn a lot from Rabbi Rabinowitz's commentary Yad Peshutah — he brings that the Rambam in the mitzvah of love of God in the Book of Commandments (Sefer HaMitzvot) says, he brings the Midrash "Listen, O heavens, and I will speak... and He will unify you" — that this is to spread... One sees that the Rambam will bring the same subject here in the matter of kiddush Hashem, that spreading God's Name is also a matter of love of God.

It could be that one actually fulfills even the mitzvah of love of God when one makes a kiddush Hashem — it is also a branch of "to cause His Name to be loved."

Proof for the Eternity of the Soul from Kiddush Hashem

The second thing you say is certainly true. It says — there is a commentator here on the page, we discussed this yesterday I think, in the previous lecture — an anonymous commentator. He says that one of the proofs... There is a question: since one doesn't properly see in the Torah that it should state that the soul doesn't die, the eternity of the soul (nitzchiyut hanefesh) is not stated clearly in the Torah. So he says he has a proof from the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem. Because what is the meaning of a person giving up their life? Why should a person give up their life? It's always that one says: the soul lives forever. That is certain, the point is true.

The Tanya's Foundation – From Self-Sacrifice to Small Tests

But I heard that kiddush Hashem is the prize for love and fear — that the rabbi of the shtetl had a Jew who was cooking with excitement and shouting "This is my God and I will glorify Him, the God of my father and I will exalt Him." How much has he already cost God? Let's see, when it comes to a test, when it comes to a test, then love and fear...

Okay. About this indeed, the Tanya speaks a lot about this: that when a person has a small test, he should remember that he would have been ready — because even a Jew, however simple he is, is ready for self-sacrifice. So then, how great is the small test really?

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Law 1 – All of the House of Israel Are Commanded Regarding Kiddush Hashem

Speaker 1: Okay, let's go further. Begin, read it out loud.

Speaker 2: The Rambam says: The mitzvah of kiddush Hashem — the Rambam says — "All of the House of Israel" (kol beit Yisrael), that means all Jews, it's not only a mitzvah for males, but for males and females, even children apparently, yes — "are commanded regarding the sanctification of this great Name."

"All of the House of Israel" – What Does This Exclude?

Perhaps "all of the House of Israel" comes to exclude the previous law, which was only for the select few (yechidei segulah) who study the Account of the Chariot. One might have thought that only the one who truly understands God — as was discussed earlier — he can give up his life. No, kiddush Hashem every Jew must do.

Discussion: Are Children Included?

Speaker 1: Who says children? You said that. You mean "all of the House of Israel"?

Speaker 2: That's how he interprets it in the Mishnah Berurah — he interprets it so, that "all of the House of Israel," that it is not a mitzvah for a Noahide (ben Noah). A Noahide is only obligated in the three severe transgressions, but in kiddush Hashem it is only all of Israel.

But there were times when during decrees of forced conversion (gezeirot shemad) Jews encouraged their children that they should not fall into the hands of the gentiles...

Speaker 1: Okay, let's not get into the actual discussions of...

Okay, there was a problem with your microphone until now, but it wasn't terrible. I already plugged it in, it was my fault.

Speaker 2: Continue?

Speaker 1: No, the second one, yours. It was going from here, but I... check if not I'll fix it. Check afterward if there's a problem.

Speaker 2: Okay.

Discussion: Children, Self-Sacrifice, and the Prohibition of Murder

Speaker 1: Say the Rambam.

Speaker 2: Okay. "All of the House of Israel" — all Jews... But the Rema did not hold of that approach of killing the children, it can't be.

Speaker 1: No, killing certainly not. They did it through education (chinukh) — they told a child...

Speaker 2: Ah, chinukh. The exact same inquiry.

Speaker 1: Apparently it's not a contradiction, because you have a prohibition of murder (issur retzichah), that you cannot kill yourself — so to tell someone else "kill yourself"...

Speaker 2: Yes, but everyone asks — if the gentile comes and he says, "the law of the land is the law, not tonight sixty with all the children, here you have one Jew who should do..." But killing the children is murder, I don't know that this is permitted.

Speaker 1: Yes, okay, true, that is a prohibition of murder. But to tell the children they should do it themselves is apparently permitted — that is their law.

Speaker 2: No, but I'm asking — it's difficult apparently, because I mean, it's an interesting inquiry, now I understand. But apparently a minor (katan) is not obligated in any mitzvot at all. But realistically it would be very strange if we were to say that the gentile comes to the Jew, the Jewish father, and tells him to do idolatry — should we tell him, of course he will undertake self-sacrifice, but the children can? It doesn't make sense.

Speaker 1: No.

Speaker 2: What's bothering you about this?

Speaker 1: About this one says: that they are not yet obligated.

"This Great Name" – The God of the Previous Chapters

Speaker 2: Okay, anyway. It doesn't say that, this is an inference. "All of the House of Israel are commanded regarding the sanctification of this great Name" — the great...

Speaker 1: Ah, that's good. The great God whom we became a little acquainted with in the last few chapters — the great God — they are commanded regarding the sanctification of His Name, to sanctify.

"As It Is Said: 'And I Shall Be Sanctified Among the Children of Israel'" – Two Aspects

He proceeds to explain what it means to sanctify. As it is said: "And I shall be sanctified among the Children of Israel" (v'nikdashti b'tokh bnei Yisrael).

Speaker 2: "Among the Children of Israel" is a mitzvah — that God should become sanctified among the Children of Israel. And besides the mitzvah, it is a reason — when "and I shall be sanctified," it is for their benefit.

Rambam, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 5 – Kiddush Hashem (Continued)

Inquiry: Are Minors Obligated in Kiddush Hashem?

Speaker 1: Yes, okay, true, that is a transgression of murder. But telling the children they should do it themselves, apparently that would be their law.

Speaker 2: No, but I'm asking, I'm saying, it's a difficulty on this apparently, because I mean, this is an interesting inquiry. Now I understand, but apparently a minor is not obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem, he is not obligated in any mitzvot at all. But on the other hand, it would be very strange if we were to say that the gentile comes to the Jewish father and tells him to do idolatry, should we tell him, of course they will undertake self-sacrifice, but the children can... It doesn't look quite right.

Speaker 1: Yes, but about this one says, that they are not yet obligated. Okay, anyway, it doesn't say that, this is an inference.

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Law 1: All of the House of Israel Are Commanded Regarding Kiddush Hashem

Speaker 1: "All of the House of Israel are commanded regarding the sanctification of this great Name" — so, the great God, the great God whom we became a little acquainted with in the last few chapters, the great God, we are commanded regarding the sanctification of His Name, to sanctify.

He proceeds to explain what it means to sanctify. As it is stated in the verse, "And I shall be sanctified among the Children of Israel" — it is a mitzvah that God should become sanctified among the Children of Israel. And besides the positive commandment (mitzvat aseh) of "and I shall be sanctified," there is a negative commandment (lav), a prohibition, they are warned not to profane it, as it is stated: "And you shall not profane My holy Name."

Novel Point: A Positive and Negative Commandment on the Same Act

What is the meaning of kiddush Hashem and chillul Hashem (desecration of God's Name)? The Rambam says, explaining further, "How so?"

Speaker 2: Yes, apparently the positive commandment and the negative commandment are on the same act, yes?

Speaker 1: When one is obligated in kiddush Hashem, one also fulfills the mitzvah of "and you shall not profane." Conversely, if one makes a chillul Hashem, one does not sanctify, then one transgresses both the negative commandment and does not fulfill the positive commandment.

Novel Point: "V'nikdashti" Means More Than the Simple Reading – Torat Kohanim

This is the teaching from Torat Kohanim, that this is the meaning. Because one could have interpreted it simply according to the plain language of Scripture, meaning "v'nikdashti" (and I shall be sanctified) through honoring Him, through performing His commandments. But Chazal (our Sages) say that it means more than that — it means giving up one's life (mesirut nefesh).

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The General Rule: One Should Transgress Rather Than Be Killed for Other Commandments

Insight: The Rambam Begins with the Rule, Not the Exception

"How so? When a gentile stands" — a gentile who rises up and oppresses, who forces Jews — "to transgress one of all the commandments stated in the Torah, or he will kill him."

The Rambam begins with the laws — interestingly, he does not begin with the interpretation of "v'nikdashti," because "v'nikdashti" means one should indeed allow oneself to be killed. But the Rambam does not begin with allowing oneself to be killed; he begins with the general law. What is the law when a Jew has a choice between a commandment or being killed by a gentile?

The Rambam begins as follows: When a gentile comes and forces a Jew to transgress, the question now is which commandment we are talking about. If it concerns the majority of all the other 613 commandments stated in the Torah, and the choice is either to transgress or be killed, the law is ya'avor — one should rather transgress the prohibition — v'al yehareg, and one should not be killed.

The Meaning of "V'chai Bahem"

Why? "Shene'emar" — because it is stated regarding the commandments, there is a clear verse. The verse states: "asher ya'aseh otam ha'adam v'chai bahem" — the Torah was given to people. What does it say there regarding all the commandments? The commandments are that "asher ya'aseh otam ha'adam" — that a person should perform them — "v'chai bahem" — and live by them — "v'lo she'yamut bahem" — the Almighty does not want people to let themselves be killed over commandments.

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And If He Died and Did Not Transgress — He Bears Guilt for His Own Life

The Rambam says, and not only that — not only should one ideally transgress rather than be killed, but it turns out that one is exempt from letting oneself be killed; rather, the commandment is that one should indeed transgress. Therefore, "v'im met v'lo avar" — if a person did give up his life and did not transgress a minor prohibition — I mean to say, regarding all other prohibitions except those that will be enumerated — "harei zeh mitchayev b'nafsho" — he is in the category of being like a person who kills himself altogether.

Investigation: What Does "Mitchayev B'nafsho" Mean?

After all, it is a great sin to kill oneself. How does the Rambam reckon the prohibition of killing oneself? The Rambam reckons the commandment of guarding one's life (shmirat hanefesh); he says that when one kills oneself, one also transgresses murder. There is a bit of a dispute, but in the simple understanding it is certainly a great sin. It states that he is "mitchayev b'nafsho" — he himself bears the guilt.

Speaker 2: Yes, it's not clear. There are those who learn that it is an offshoot of "lo tirtzach" (you shall not murder), as if killing oneself is a type of that.

Speaker 1: But the language "mitchayev b'nafsho" is... the language "mitchayev b'nafsho," that a person... it could be that "mitchayev b'nafsho" means through the murder of his own soul, yes. It is certainly forbidden to kill oneself. This is not actually killing oneself — he is being killed, he is not committing suicide, because he did not kill himself; the gentile is going to kill him. But "mitchayev b'nafsho" means it is his fault — he did nothing [to prevent it].

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Dispute Among the Rishonim: Whether One May Give Up One's Life for Other Commandments

Speaker 1: The language of the Kesef Mishneh is that the Rambam's position is that it stands as "ya'avor v'al yehareg" — the meaning is that one may not [choose death]; one may only — one must [transgress].

Speaker 2: Yes, but the way Rabbi Yosef Karo phrases it... I mean, we should also learn the next part, because we are getting to the dispute, because the dispute is connected.

Speaker 1: What is the next part?

Speaker 2: If one did transgress idol worship... no, no, there is another matter — two matters — but they are connected.

Speaker 1: Okay. I already know what you're talking about — that dispute regarding the three severe sins (chaga).

Speaker 2: What do you say? But here there is a great dispute, the way his language of the...

Speaker 1: There are Rishonim (early authorities) who learned that if a person wants to be stringent upon himself and allow himself to be killed even for other commandments, the question is whether one may. The Rambam says he is "mitchayev b'nafsho," but other Rishonim — the Ba'al HaTosafot and other Rishonim — say that a person may indeed give up his life even for lesser prohibitions.

"Shleimim v'chen rabbim" — as Rabbi Yosef Karo phrases it — great and many righteous people held that one may. And he cites, in the language of the Kesef Mishneh, that a great person, pious and God-fearing, who sees that the generation is morally lax, may sanctify God's Name and allow himself to be killed even for a minor commandment. What does he say? That for him it is a type of "sh'at hashmad" (time of religious persecution) — one must consider that perhaps this was their basis for permitting it. Also, regarding that matter, it is not so simple.

In any case, the Rambam held not so, and the Rambam also wrote an Igeret HaShmad (Epistle on Forced Conversion) very strongly regarding that era.

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The Three Severe Sins: Idol Worship, Forbidden Relations, and Murder

Speaker 1: Okay, continuing. But this is... this is all other commandments, except. For idol worship — we said that the law of "ya'avor v'al yehareg" applies to other commandments, except for the three commandments: idol worship (avodah zarah), forbidden relations (gilui arayot), and murder (shfichut damim) — killing another person, another Jew.

"Aval shalosh aveirot eilu" — these three sins — "im yomar lo" the gentile "avor al achat meihen o tehareg" — the commandment is "yehareg v'al ya'avor" — and this is the commandment of sanctification of God's Name (kiddush Hashem), that he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress.

Investigation: Is Kiddush Hashem the Reason for All Three?

We will explain. The Rambam... we have another investigation. The Rambam does not say what the commandment of kiddush Hashem is here regarding the three severe sins; he does not say it here — he will say it later. One must understand a bit, because seemingly kiddush Hashem is primarily regarding idol worship; for the other two, it is not clear that it stems from the aspect of kiddush Hashem. But it could also be included — after all, one must consider people.

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Law 2: For His Own Pleasure Versus to Make Him Abandon His Faith

The Distinction: For His Own Pleasure

"B'meh devarim amurim" — when was this meant?

Speaker 2: "B'meh devarim amurim" that for other commandments it is "yehareg v'al ya'avor," right?

Speaker 1: Yes. This is specifically... he said that for all other commandments it is "yehareg v'al ya'avor" — the Rambam states a qualification in this. "B'meh devarim amurim, b'zman she'hagoy mitkaven l'hana'at atzmo" — the gentile does it for his own interest, he wants a Jew to transgress a prohibition.

Discussion: The Rambam's Example — "L'va'alah"

For example, he brings an example — we are not talking here about a married woman, or... or we are talking about... when it is... she is "karka olam" (passive), "karka olam" is what is stated.

Speaker 2: The Rambam with this has already dealt with this matter. It says he sees very narrowly — this is a problem. It never dealt with this matter, but it says clearly that the gentile intends for his own pleasure — he is your funny one.

Speaker 1: He brings this as an example for all other commandments, because he needed to say — this is an additional stringency of forbidden relations. But this is the biggest problem.

Speaker 2: Okay, he means a woman who is not a married woman, who is still forbidden because of... what does "gilui arayot" mean — he also hasn't explained? What is the meaning? He only says "gilui arayot"?

Speaker 1: How does he exclude forbidden relations? Everything is the same level — everything is exactly the same. But it is difficult to say that here the Rambam is hinting at the distinction that the woman is "karka olam." Or what? It is difficult to say such a thing.

Speaker 2: Wait, I understood. A married woman. A married woman. And "ba'ali" (her husband). Not a married woman. Just a woman.

Speaker 1: Which woman is he referring to? Which woman is he referring to? Which woman?

Speaker 2: It once happened that this is how the Rambam's life was. The Rambam makes it that there is a woman, a certain woman.

Speaker 1: I don't think so. It's very funny. It appears here that this is the subject. It is clear. I should have said it more clearly. But it is a change. I cannot construct an example, an actual example, of this — unless it is saying that he means the prohibition of marriage with a gentile.

Speaker 2: That it says dear. It is already funny.

Speaker 1: But the Rambam does not add a Torah-level prohibition. A biblical prohibition.

Speaker 2: No, "derech ishut" — only through the manner of marriage.

Speaker 1: The Rambam explicitly brings it — only "derech ishut" (through marriage). Through coercion, there is no Torah-level prohibition whatsoever.

Speaker 2: One must know — "l'va'alah" can mean through marriage. If it had said "lavo aleha" (to come upon her), but "l'va'alah"? I don't believe the word "l'v'ulatah" appears, and I don't believe there is coercion through marriage here. Sounds more... anyway. You don't know the gentiles.

Speaker 1: Okay, in short.

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"To Make Him Transgress the Commandments Alone" — What Does "Alone" Mean?

Back to the topic. When the gentile has his own intent, it is not a matter of principle. It is not that the gentile wants to test the Jew here. It is not that the gentile wants to test the Jew. In that case, for all commandments, the law is "ya'avor v'al yehareg."

But "l'ha'aviro al hamitzvot bilvad" — if the gentile's sole purpose is "bilvad" (alone) — interestingly, what is the meaning of "bilvad"? Not his primary intention — his sole intention, yes, "bilvad." Then the law is already different.

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Ten Jews — In Public (B'farhesya)

The Law

"V'im hayah b'oto ma'amad asarah mi'Yisrael" — if the gentile wants to make him transgress the commandments, "aval ein sham asarah mi'Yisrael" — then the law remains "ya'avor v'al yehareg." "Aval im anso l'ha'aviro b'asarah mi'Yisrael" — if there are two conditions present: one, that the gentile wants to make him abandon his faith; two, it is in front of ten Jews, or ten Jews will know about it.

Discussion: What Does "Ten Jews" Mean?

Speaker 2: It doesn't necessarily mean that they are standing there.

Speaker 1: I am not innovating great stringencies. I am not innovating great stringencies. I am not my own decisor; I am not in a position to innovate a stringency. "Ten Jews" means that ten Jews are standing there.

Speaker 2: What if he is going to write it in the newspaper? Is that a proof?

Speaker 1: Of course. In terms of publicity.

Speaker 2: No, ten Jews.

Speaker 1: "With ten Jews," like a minyan. By your logic, I could also say Kaddish and send it to the newspaper — would that count as when I pray quietly? That is not according to the law of ten Jews.

Speaker 2: Okay, at least ten Jews. It is hard to say that. If he is going to write it in the newspaper, am I guilty because he is going to write it in the newspaper?

Speaker 1: But the point is that the ten Jews makes it a matter of kiddush Hashem in public (b'farhesya). It is a law, just as the concept of saying Kaddish in public — because it makes it public.

But if a question arises, one should come and ask us, and there is a dispute among us, and it is not clear — one must hear what others say. But the Rambam does not state it very clearly.

Source: Chananyah, Mishael, and Azaryah

But in the simple understanding, the case is that the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvot brings the example of Chananyah, Mishael, and Azaryah, where it was specifically "yehareg" (be killed rather than transgress). In the simple understanding, the case being discussed is when the gentile comes before a congregation of Jews and is going to kill. One can hear such a thing, but it is not so certain.

Speaker 2: What comes next?

Speaker 1: It should not be that every time, this is all that the gentile is going to tell over.

Speaker 2: He is asking you how it can be in private (b'yachid). I don't think it will appear later in the testament. But it doesn't mean...

Rambam, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 5 — Law 2 (Continued): Time of Religious Persecution and the Levels of "Be Killed Rather Than Transgress"

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Chananyah, Mishael, and Azaryah — The Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvot

Speaker 1: But a question has arisen — one should come and ask us — there is a dispute between us and him. It is not clear. One must look more at what others say, and so on. But the Rambam does not state it very clearly.

But the simple meaning is — the case is that the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvot brings the example of Chananyah, Mishael, and Azaryah, where it was specifically "yehareg v'al ya'avor" — the simple meaning is that the case being discussed is when the gentile comes before a congregation of Jews.

Speaker 2: Well, one can hear it that way, but it is not so certain. Because even not in that instance, the question is whether the gentile is going to publicize it. The question is, how can they be in private? I don't think it will appear later in that era.

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"He Intended to Make Him Transgress the Commandments in Public" — What Is the Meaning?

Speaker 1: But what does it mean? If it is a matter of certainty — it is something that a congregation of Israel holds with — but one must understand how they hold with it.

Okay. "Yehareg v'al ya'avor, va'afilu lo nitkaven l'ha'aviro ela al mitzvah mi'sh'ar mitzvot bilvad." Even the Rambam does not mean here — I mean, excuse me — the gentile does not mean here that he is going to declare a general time of religious persecution (sh'at hashmad), that he wants to lead Jews astray. He wants this one commandment; he wants to make one individual transgress.

I had thought that the "lo" simply means — he means to say: then it is "yehareg v'al ya'avor" even for one of the other commandments, unlike the three commandments where it applies even in private.

Speaker 2: No, he is going up to the "lo nitkaven l'ha'aviro."

Speaker 1: I am saying, even when the gentile does not come — when the gentile comes, he wants to uproot all the commandments of the Torah.

Speaker 2: No, no. That is a different matter — that is already going to be "sh'at hashmad."

Speaker 1: No, it doesn't make sense. Because then the next matter is also not clear — what is "sh'at hashmad."

The Novel Point of This Law

Speaker 1: I would have thought simply — he means to say: then it is "yehareg v'al ya'avor." If it is one of the three commandments — idol worship, forbidden relations, murder — it is always "yehareg," even if it is not before ten. The novel point of this law is: if there is intent to make him transgress his faith and it is before ten, then even for one of the other commandments, then too it is "yehareg v'al ya'avor." That is apparently the point.

And the distinction in how he understands this — even if he only intended that one commandment, not that the gentile has a somewhat larger agenda.

Speaker 2: I don't believe — I don't think that is the simple meaning.

Speaker 1: And also, what does a larger agenda mean? Which of the gentiles wants to nullify a few commandments against commandments in Cheftzion? I don't know what. Check history — there were plenty; it happened plenty of times.

Speaker 2: That is "sh'at hashmad." That is because they seized him on matters because it is a time of religious persecution. That is literally an example of "sh'at hashmad." The Rambam brings it up.

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Discussion: The Distinction Between "Intent to Make Him Transgress" and "Sh'at HaShmad"

Speaker 1: "Sh'at hashmad" is yet another level. Even when it is only one commandment, then...

Speaker 2: No, the distinction of "sh'at hashmad" is — here there is a king. Here you are talking about a gentile.

Speaker 1: I don't believe the distinction of "sh'at hashmad" is that he wants all the commandments. One distinction the Rambam brings is that there is a king. Here we are talking about a gentile. The Rambam also says later about derivatives.

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Why Is This Kiddush Hashem? — The Foundation of Self-Sacrifice in Public

Speaker 1: Let us understand for a moment — what is the meaning of this? Why, if the gentile specifically intends — such a gentile has something against the commandment of sha'atnez (mixed fabrics), he seizes Jews and makes them wear sha'atnez — if there are ten Jews present, one gives up one's life for this? What is the meaning of this? What is the point of kiddush Hashem here?

Insight: Kiddush Hashem as a Commandment in Its Own Right

Because here the Jew has an opportunity — this is indeed pure kiddush Hashem in itself, such a commandment in its own right (mitzvah l'atzmo). The essential commandment of sha'atnez has already been overridden by the punishment, by the fear of murder — as we will see later how the Rambam learns it. But here there is a new element: that the person can demonstrate in front of ten Jews how greatly valued the Almighty's commandments are — and that is kiddush Hashem.

Insight: The Element of "Defying the Gentile"

Speaker 2: In this, and specifically to defy the gentile, right? The gentile thinks he is going to take him away from the Almighty's commandments — let him burst! I will let myself be killed.

Speaker 1: Yes, this must be — it is not just incidental. This is what I want to explain: if a person simply has a difficulty, he cannot do this. This is what I want to bring out — this is kiddush Hashem. Because otherwise, there would be no kiddush Hashem even for a simple medical matter, and there would be no distinction between ten Jews or not ten Jews. The entire subject would not be relevant. This demonstration is specifically against the gentile.

Insight: Why Does the Gentile's Intention Matter to Us?

And from this comes the entire matter of the gentile's intention. What do I care what the gentile wants? In practice, there is a test.

Speaker 2: No, a mere test is not kiddush Hashem in this sense.

Speaker 1: Kiddush Hashem (sanctification of God's name) is specifically when the non-Jew wants otherwise. What does he want? He wants to go against the Almighty, he wants to go against the mitzvah – and I specifically want to do it. That is seemingly the definition.

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Halacha 4 – Sha'as HaShmad (Time of Persecution): Definition and Distinctions

The Rambam's Text

Speaker 1: The Rambam continues: "V'chol hadevarim ha'eilu" – the distinction between a proper mitzvah, between all mitzvos and the three severe mitzvos, or the distinction regarding ten Jews – "shelo b'sha'as hashmad. Aval b'sha'as hashmad" – when there is a halacha that even for a minor mitzvah one must give up one's life...

Speaker 2: Oh, when it's meant to force transgression of the faith, right?

Two Distinctions That Fall Away During Sha'as HaShmad

Speaker 1: Then there are two distinctions. What are the two distinctions?

Distinction number one is the distinction regarding the transgression – for all mitzvos, one gives up one's life, yeihareg v'al ya'avor (be killed rather than transgress).

There's also a second thing, if it's a time of persecution.

What Does Sha'as HaShmad Mean?

But during sha'as hashmad, the Rambam says as follows, what does sha'as hashmad mean? "V'hu k'she'ya'amod melech rasha k'Nevuchadnetzar v'chaveirav, v'yigzor shmad al Yisrael, l'vateil dasam, o mitzvah min hamitzvos" – a wicked king will arise, he will decree that he wants to eradicate Jewishness, to nullify the Jewish faith, or he wants to nullify a mitzvah from the Jews.

Novel Point: Not a Specific Case, But a Public Decree

Not a specific case – he wants to make a Jew wear sha'atnez right now – rather, he wants to do something public, he wants to eradicate a mitzvah.

Speaker 2: Then that one mitzvah, yes?

Speaker 1: Then it's yeihareg v'al ya'avor. Then that one mitzvah is also part of the nullification of the faith.

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Discussion: Shmad for Personal Benefit – Dispute Among the Poskim

Speaker 2: One needs to consider whether he has some personal interest. If he has an interest, fine, if he has an interest, that doesn't fall under the category of intent.

Speaker 1: For some reason it's not clear here. He brings from below, that the people below bring that there is a dispute among the poskim (halachic authorities) whether in that case the non-Jew also needs to have intent.

Example: The King of Russia and the Shtreimlech

Speaker 2: What if someone makes a shmad for personal benefit? It's a funny case, right? A shmad means he means you, he doesn't mean you.

Speaker 1: That's a dispute. The Acharonim (later authorities) debated this – the shmad with the king of Russia, who made a decree that everyone is forbidden to wear a shtreimel. Not because he wanted to eradicate Jewishness – he had a personal interest, he himself sold the caps, he didn't want people to wear shtreimlech because of some such reason. Then it's a dispute, it's not clear.

The Clear Case of Sha'as HaShmad

The case he's discussing here is when he specifically wants to eradicate that one mitzvah. Even if he doesn't want to eradicate all mitzvos – he wants Jews to stop performing bris milah – but in order to eradicate it, as part of the nullification of the faith, a minor mitzvah, then it is yeihareg v'al ya'avor.

"Afilu al achas mikol hamitzvos, bein b'farhesya b'soch asarah" – both distinctions fall away – among ten Jews, "bein beino l'vein" the non-Jew – or even if it's just between him and the non-Jewish king.

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Discussion: Is "Beino L'vein HaGoy" During Sha'as HaShmad Also Considered Public?

Speaker 1: One needs to know whether this is also a type of public matter or not, and they debated this.

Speaker 2: You see, when it's perhaps only the king alone with the Jew...

Speaker 1: He's different, or the... does one even need to know that it's a king?

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Discussion: Who Is a "King" for This Law?

Speaker 2: The word "king" – or just a regular non-Jew who is a neighbor who wants to force a Jew to transgress his faith, a Jew who has become assimilated, or just a non-Jew who has a non-Jewish woman?

Speaker 1: Let's understand clearly – that's certainly not it. It's certain that shmad requires a king. It's certain that shmad requires a king.

Speaker 2: Why isn't that the exact case of intending to force transgression of the mitzvah?

Speaker 1: It's not the issue of the law of a king, right?

Speaker 2: A feudal lord who has maybe ten Jews in his town – that should carry the concept of being a king.

Speaker 1: Ah, who is the feudal lord? Because in his town he has power. So how much, how many people, how great does he need to be in order to go from being a plain non-Jew to a king? How precisely?

Speaker 2: A king is a king! Do you want – are you a feudal lord, a king? It could be on your roof!

Speaker 1: He himself has rooms that he seized the – as I was victorious, because he wants to say, it was indeed so in Jewish history.

Speaker 2: Yes, very good, he wants... he wanted to force the kohanim of Israel in the marketplace?

Novel Point: The Distinction Between "Intending to Force Transgression" and Sha'as HaShmad

Speaker 1: But "intending to force transgression of the mitzvos" is already a law from the previous ruling. Here it seems it doesn't add to "intending to force transgression of the mitzvos." It seems to add a new thing, and the new thing is a king.

Speaker 2: A king? I thought it's a matter of public, and an individual.

Speaker 1: No! Public was already discussed earlier!

Speaker 2: No, he wants to show everyone that he has the power to achieve it.

Speaker 1: Ah, very good, very good.

Speaker 2: So one can say another interpretation. I mean, here he has it clear, I'm playing along. Fine, so be it. So one can say differently then. Or one can say that shmad simply means he wants to force the Jews to transgress... he wants to force all of the Jewish people to transgress.

Is the Law from the Perspective of the Non-Jew or from the Perspective of the Jew?

Speaker 1: Then, if so, if there's a king who only cares about the Jews in his city – that means it's not all of the Jewish people. Or is the law from the perspective of the non-Jew, that it needs to be a king? Or is the distinction from the perspective of the Jew, that it needs to be all Jews, or Jews? I don't know. Somewhere there needs to be a distinction, because "intending to force transgression of the mitzvos" is not the distinction. "Intending to force transgression of the mitzvos" is no less important on the same side.

Example of "Intending to Force Transgression" That Is Not Sha'as HaShmad

Consider, for example, an example of intending to force transgression of the mitzvos: a non-Jew has a Jewish worker, he wants to show that the Jew is ready to transgress mitzvos out of loyalty to his employer. This isn't just a test – no, this is to prove that the Jew is ready to transgress mitzvos. That means, he means "build me a hall on Shabbos" – as the Rambam gave an example. And the non-Jew wants to show stubbornly that he can make the Jew drink yayin nesech (wine used for idolatry) and disregard his religion because he is subjugated under me.

But the personal benefit – that is a transgression of a mitzvah, but it's not a sha'as hashmad, and not that he comes with a plan that he's now going to uproot Jewishness from the group of Jews.

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The Rambam's Example: A King Who Rules Supreme

Speaker 2: The Rambam says that he means a king who is a moshel b'kipah (rules supreme) and has all Jews under him.

Speaker 1: Okay, let's know clearly. There are always cases in between that one can argue about, but the two ideal cases are certain: that the first non-Jew – whether for personal benefit, whether it means one non-Jew with one Jew and not a king. And the shmad – at least, the example the Rambam gives is a king and all Jews.

Speaker 2: All Jews. It doesn't say most Jews. "Yisrael." It doesn't say ten Jews.

Speaker 1: Yes. "Yisrael."

Speaker 2: But they say that if one Jew is missing, he can say a greater leniency.

Speaker 1: Sometimes it's a great distinction, because the problem is that he wants to uproot Jewishness. You can't uproot Jewishness from two people.

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Novel Point: "L'vateil Dasam O Mitzvah Min HaMitzvos" – Specifically a Mitzvah, Not a Custom

Speaker 1: The Rambam is precise here about something else, that this is specifically when he wants to nullify a mitzvah from the mitzvos or the faith. Not if he wants to nullify some custom.

"Arkasa D'Mesana" – The Rambam Doesn't Bring It

In any case, here in the Rambam, this is how people have understood it – always remember the expression "arkasa d'mesana" (the strap of a shoe). Arkasa d'mesana itself – there are those who explain it as some custom of the non-Jews, so there's a prohibition of idolatry, or some element of idolatry.

The Rambam says here "l'vateil dasam o mitzvah min hamitzvos." If he wants to change from a tall shtreimel to a small shtreimel – I mean, seemingly that's not included in this Rambam.

The Rambam doesn't bring – it's interesting – the Rambam doesn't bring the expression "arkasa d'mesana" at all.

Speaker 2: Seemingly, as you say, he understood that that refers to some mitzvah.

Speaker 1: Okay.

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Summary: Three Levels in the Rambam

Speaker 2: In the detailed halachos, right? It comes out very clearly that there are three levels, right?

1. There's a simple level of all mitzvos, when it's not to force transgression of the faith – then one transgresses rather than be killed (ya'avor v'al yeihareg).

2. There's a level of the three severe transgressions, where then it's yeihareg v'al ya'avor even in those cases.

3. The second level is one non-Jew who wants to force transgression of the faith – then the law is that in public one gives up one's life.

Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 5 – Laws of Who Acted Correctly or Incorrectly, and the Concept of Coercion

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Recap: The Three Levels of Self-Sacrifice

Speaker 1: Seemingly, as you say, I understood that that means it's someone else's mitzvah.

Okay. Up to here are the detailed halachos. Yes, it comes out very clearly, there are three levels:

1. There's a simple level of all mitzvos when it's not to deliberately provoke – then one transgresses rather than be killed (ya'avor v'al yeihareg).

2. There's a level of the three severe transgressions, where then it's yeihareg v'al ya'avor even in those cases. The second level is, one non-Jew who wants to deliberately force transgression – then the law is, in public one gives up one's life for all mitzvos.

3. The third level is during sha'as hashmad – then even in private one gives up one's life for all mitzvos.

Note About "In Private" During Sha'as HaShmad

But the word "in private" – I'm not sure, because the Rambam says "o bifnei asarah mi'Yisrael, o bifnei hagoyim" (either before ten Jews, or before non-Jews). One needs to know when it's truly in private. That means, for example, let's say, only the king alone with the Jew – that's private, which is even more so, in your own home. It could be that... what's relevant that years later perhaps he'll find out? It could already be a virtual way of killing? One needs to know.

But I mean to bring out that this I am certainly in agreement with you, that the sha'as hashmad is only as a fight between Jews and non-Jews, not a coercion that should be very difficult. Everything here is discussing a type of fight.

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Halacha 5 – The Rambam's Principle: What Happens If One Acted Correctly or Incorrectly

Okay. Now the Rambam continues with the principle. So now he will further say:

Case 1: Ya'avor V'al Yeihareg – And He Transgressed

"Kol mi she'ne'emar bo ya'avor v'al yeihareg, v'avar v'lo neherag – harei zeh over al divrei chachamim." (Anyone about whom it is said "transgress rather than be killed," and he transgressed and was not killed – he has transgressed the words of the Sages.)

Case 2: Ya'avor V'al Yeihareg – And He Let Himself Be Killed

"V'chol mi she'ne'emar bo ya'avor v'al yeihareg, v'neherag v'lo avar – harei zeh mis'chayev b'nafsho." (Anyone about whom it is said "transgress rather than be killed," and he was killed and did not transgress – he is liable for his own life.)

That's a bit of suicide, a bit – he is liable for his own life, he did not perform a mitzvah.

Case 3: Yeihareg V'al Ya'avor – And He Let Himself Be Killed

"V'chol mi she'ne'emar bo yeihareg v'al ya'avor, v'neherag v'lo avar" – he indeed did the right thing, he let himself be killed rather than transgress the sin – "harei zeh kiddesh es Hashem", he fulfilled the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem. "V'im hayah b'asarah mi'Yisrael – harei zeh kiddesh es Hashem b'rabbim." (And if it was before ten Jews – he sanctified God's Name in public.)

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Examples of Kiddush Hashem: Daniel, Chananya Mishael and Azarya, Rabbi Akiva

Like the righteous ones – Daniel who let himself be killed through self-sacrifice, and likewise Chananya, Mishael, and Azarya who gave up their lives not to eat non-kosher food.

Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues were about this – that was in public, but the non-kosher food was perhaps only in private, I don't know. Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues. Very good.

Rabbi Akiva – that's the story in the Gemara that they put him in prison because he was teaching Torah and he didn't stop.

"Harugei Malchus" – The Highest Level

He says: "V'aleihem harugei malchus, she'ein ma'alah al ma'alasam" – there is no greater level.

Seemingly he means the language of the Gemara "she'ein kol briyah yechola la'amod b'mechitzasam" – that they have such a level in Gan Eden (Paradise), or something like that, and the public indeed surrounds – there is no level above their level.

Verses the Rambam Brings

"V'aleihem ne'emar" – about them the verse says: "Ki alecha horagnu kol hayom, nechshavnu k'tzon tivcha" (For Your sake we are killed all day long, we are considered as sheep for slaughter) – the Jews there say the praise that they are so faithful to the Almighty that they let themselves be killed always, at any time, all day they let themselves be killed for the honor of Heaven. "Nechshavnu k'tzon tivcha" – they are considered like sheep that let themselves, they go as sacrifices for the Almighty's kiddush Hashem.

"V'aleihem ne'emar" – and about them David says in Tehillim (Psalms): "Isfu li chasidai, korsei brisi alei zavach" (Gather to Me My pious ones, who made a covenant with Me through sacrifice) – come to Me, My pious ones, you righteous Jews, who make a covenant with the Almighty, a covenant of kiddush Hashem.

Novel Point: Midrash on "Isfu Li Chasidai"

I remember that on this verse "Isfu li chasidai" there is a Midrash that it's not talking about people who were pious from the beginning. It's talking about people about whom we see in Tanach (Scripture) what sins they committed, and as long as they were killed, they are suddenly called "chasidim" (pious ones), because they performed the greatest mitzvah of kiddush Hashem. A great mitzvah, okay.

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Investigation: Two Levels in Kiddush Hashem

Speaker 2: When he says "V'nikdashti b'soch Bnei Yisrael" (And I shall be sanctified among the Children of Israel) – he says not necessarily, the words "b'soch Bnei Yisrael" don't necessarily mean the word "public." "V'nikdashti b'soch Bnei Yisrael" means that you should give up your life.

Speaker 1: But that's the source – what's the problem?

Speaker 2: No, but I'm saying, does kiddush Hashem in public mean the public saying it, and that's the virtue that will be mentioned later? Or within kiddush Hashem itself are there two categories?

Speaker 1: That's the point he brought up earlier. But "b'soch Bnei Yisrael" means in public?

Speaker 2: Yes, yes, certainly. But even if there is a public element, there is still the virtue of "V'nikdashti b'soch Bnei Yisrael" which is one thing, and that is a second thing. There are two levels.

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Halacha 6 – One Who Transgressed: Chillul Hashem (Desecration of God's Name)

And conversely, what about when it's yeihareg v'al ya'avor, and he transgressed and was not killed? He has desecrated God's Name, he has transgressed the prohibition of "V'lo sechalelu es shem kodshi" (And you shall not desecrate My holy Name) – he desecrated the Name of Heaven. And if it was before ten Jews, then there is a chillul Hashem in public – he committed a greater sin of chillul Hashem that was in public.

And also, regarding nullification – by "v'lo sechalelu" there is also a plural language, "v'lo sechalelu es shem kodshi." He goes in the opposite direction of kiddush Hashem – nullification of the positive commandment of kiddush Hashem: he nullified the positive commandment of kiddush Hashem. And he transgressed the negative commandment of chillul Hashem.

Novel Point: A Positive and Negative Commandment on One Act

It's both – as I say, it's both the same act, it's one negative and positive commandment.

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Halacha 6 (Continued) – The Law of Coercion: He Does Not Receive Punishment for the Actual Transgression

The Rambam says, but even so, the halacha is as follows: "Mipnei she'avar b'ones" – after all, even though he didn't let himself give up his life, but in practice the transgression he committed was still under coercion. "Me'achar she'ein malkin oso" – he does not receive lashes, "v'ein tzarich lomar she'ein memisin oso beis din" – the court also cannot give him the death penalty for the transgression he committed. Even killing under coercion – even if it was a yeihareg v'al ya'avor case of murder, and he killed another person, and it was under coercion – "she'ein malkin u'memisin ela l'over birtzono b'eidim v'hasra'ah" – only one who transgresses God's will voluntarily, with witnesses and warning.

Proof #1: One Who Gives His Offspring to Molech

The Rambam brings a proof: "Shene'emar b'nosein mizaro l'Molech" – the prohibition of giving one's offspring to Molech, it says there in the verse, the Almighty states the punishment he will receive. It says there "V'samti ani es panai ba'ish hahu" (And I will set My face against that man), "u'mipi hashmua'ah lamdu" – on this, Chazal (the Sages) say regarding the word "hahu" (that one), that "hahu" requires a person – "hahu" – lo anus v'lo shogeg v'lo mut'eh (not coerced, not inadvertent, and not misled).

The Rambam learns: it says by one who gives his offspring to Molech that there is a punishment, and on this there is a drasha (exegetical derivation) that says "he and not one who is coerced" – that only one who acts deliberately will receive the punishment, and not one who acts under coercion.

Proof #2: Na'arah Me'orasah (Betrothed Maiden – Illicit Relations)

The Rambam says: "U'mah im avodah zarah she'hi chamurah min hakol, ha'oved osah b'ones eino chayav kareis, v'ein tzarich lomar misas beis din... uv'arayos hu omer v'lana'arah lo sa'aseh davar." (And if regarding idolatry, which is the most severe of all, one who worships it under coercion is not liable for kareis [spiritual excision], and it goes without saying not the death penalty... and regarding illicit relations it says "and to the maiden you shall do nothing.")

Even the case where it states "be killed rather than transgress" (yehareg ve'al ya'avor) – this is indeed the Rambam's proof – he has an explicit proof from the Gemara that if one did transgress and did not allow himself to be killed, even though the law was "be killed rather than transgress," he does not receive a regular punishment.

Chiddush: The Rambam's Foundation – Self-Sacrifice is an Extra Obligation

From this one sees clearly – these are indeed the Rambam's two clear proofs, one from the Gemara and one from the verse, or both from a verse, from the exposition on the verse – that one sees that even regarding the mitzvos upon which it explicitly states "be killed rather than transgress," the reverse is true: there is an exemption of duress (ones). From this the Rambam explains that the obligation to sacrifice one's life is, so to speak – it's a bit funny to divide it this way – but the obligation to sacrifice one's life is an extra obligation, and consequently he transgresses that. He only receives lashes for the prohibition of desecration of God's Name (chillul Hashem), but he does not receive lashes for the essential transgression, because he was under duress.

And so it also states clearly regarding a betrothed woman – "and to the maiden you shall do nothing" (ve'lana'arah lo sa'aseh davar) – because she was under duress. And a betrothed woman is also one of the three severe transgressions.

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Dispute Among the Rishonim: Whether Duress Applies to the Three Severe Transgressions

The Rambam's Position

Speaker 1: But with this, the Rambam disagrees with many Rishonim.

Speaker 2: I don't know why you say that Tosafos argues on this. Tosafos is very clear. I don't know where Tosafos argues on this. The holy Kiryas Sefer – I believe he says that Tosafos agrees, that they also say he does not receive lashes.

Other Rishonim

Speaker 1: In any case, Tosafos – let's go further and say what I intend to say, let's hear your point.

Other Rishonim, and so it states in Tosafos in certain places, learn it differently, and they learn that "be killed rather than transgress" means that the exemption of duress does not apply to the three severe transgressions. And if someone did transgress instead of allowing himself to be killed as it states "be killed rather than transgress," he must receive the punishment exactly as if he had done it willingly – that the defense of duress does not apply to the three severe transgressions.

The Kesef Mishneh's Position

Speaker 2: Yes, I don't know if there really is a dispute here. The Ramach distinguishes, he has some proof from the Gemara, but I don't see clearly that they disagree on this. We'll see shortly that the Rambam himself... I don't see clearly that they disagree on this. We'll see...

Perhaps, I don't know, I'm an ignoramus. The Kesef Mishneh says that Tosafos also holds like the Rambam. But he does bring – the Ra'am argues. The Ra'am wrote glosses on the Rambam's discussions, similar to the Ravad, and he argues. And the Kesef Mishneh says about him that he didn't look deeply into the Rambam, so that he shouldn't have complaints against the Rambam, that it's not implied from the Gemara from which the Rambam brings a proof.

Open Point

Speaker 1: Okay, anyway, we'll see shortly that the Rambam himself has a case where there is duress, the Rambam also says that one is punished. We'll see it shortly, that it's not only regarding the non-Jew that the Rambam says this, it's not so clear that then it doesn't count as duress. Okay, I'm jumping around. Okay, but we'll see shortly. Yes.

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Investigation: Why Can't There Be Witnesses and Warning for the Mitzvah of Self-Sacrifice Itself?

Speaker 1: Okay, so the understanding of the Rambam remains that the duress creates a contradiction, but it's not really a contradiction. I want to ask a different question: Why can't there be witnesses and warning (edim ve'hasra'ah) for the mitzvah of self-sacrifice itself?

Speaker 2: Okay, you're saying similar ideas.

Speaker 1: It's an extra mitzvah, there's a new mitzvah of self-sacrifice, and the witnesses and warning... I'm asking you a question: Two witnesses come, two Jewish witnesses, and they say, "You should know that the law here is 'be killed rather than transgress,' and if you transgress you will receive lashes for not fulfilling, for transgressing the negative commandment of 'do not be afraid of any man' (lo saguru mipnei ish)." Why shouldn't they receive lashes?

Answer: Duress Removes the Act

Speaker 2: But it could be that the duress removed the act. The mitzvah is that I should let myself be killed. The essential prohibition, the essential act was removed through duress. Duress is like... when a person does something under duress it's as if he didn't do it.

Counter-Question: If Duress Exempts Everything – Why Is He Transgressing Chillul Hashem?

Speaker 1: I'm asking you a question. The logic you're saying that the distinction is that there are two mitzvos, it's not just that. Seemingly he is also under duress regarding the mitzvah of "and I shall be sanctified" (ve'nikdashti), because duress is a general matter – the Torah exempts duress on everything, also on the ve'nikdashti, on the lashes component.

This is different from what I said earlier – not only does he change it to two mitzvos, but it's also duress on the ve'nikdashti. Why should he receive lashes? He didn't do anything.

So what can you answer me? Why does the Rambam say he transgresses? Why does he say only one set of lashes?

Discussion: Nullifying a Positive Commandment Under Duress?

Speaker 2: If he transgressed, he nullified a positive commandment (mitzvas aseh). With punishment? In the negative? I enter a person's house with punishment?

Speaker 1: Yes, it would have been a positive commandment, there would have been a question. But with punishment, does he waive it when he's in a person's house with punishment?

Speaker 2: He transgresses, transgresses with punishment, yes.

Speaker 1: No, he doesn't transgress with punishment.

Speaker 2: I understand, I understand, I don't know, I don't feel it, it doesn't help. This is – let's split for two minutes, I still hold the same way.

Rambam, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 5 – Continued: Handing Over One Jewish Soul, Illness and Healing Through Prohibition

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End of Discussion: The Concept of "Transgressing" Under Duress

Chavrusa A: Why does the Rambam say he transgresses? Why does he say only one time no punishment? If he was — because he nullified a positive commandment under duress! What can you argue that a person does under duress? He nullified the positive commandment. For that he is not punished. But under duress he did nullify it.

Chavrusa B: About a person who acts under duress, do we say about him "transgressor"? A transgressor under duress, yes?

Chavrusa A: I understand, I understand. It's funny. I don't know. I feel it doesn't help. The fact that we divide it into two mitzvos – there's still something funny here, and it doesn't seem clear to me. It could be that one can... okay, we need to understand better. I feel there's something... but we can move on. Okay.

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Halachah 8 – Women Told "Give Us One of You" / "Give Us One of You or We'll Kill You"

The Rambam's Text – Handing Over One Jewish Soul

Now we're going to learn... okay, up until here is the – until now we've learned the fundamental laws of "be killed rather than transgress." Now we're going to learn additional cases that exist, details in "be killed rather than transgress," or additional cases of self-sacrifice.

There is a halachah as follows. There is such a Rambam: "Women whom non-Jews told, 'Give us one of you and we will defile her'" – we're talking about a married woman, seemingly. The non-Jews tell the group of women: "Give over one of you, we want to defile one of you through a married woman," "and if not, we will defile all of you." So here there's already a new kind of dilemma. Here the dilemma is whether one should make a calculation – otherwise only one transgression should happen rather than multiple transgressions.

But: "Let them all be defiled" – rather let them all be defiled, rather let the non-Jews carry out their threat – "and they shall not hand over to them one Jewish soul." One should not actively hand over a single Jewish soul.

The Principle: "Actively" is a New Category – Not Kiddush Hashem

So here one sees, perhaps the point here is that actively handing someone over is a new matter that one doesn't do, even in the context of self-sacrifice, and even if they threaten them that they will all... This seemingly has nothing to do with the matter of the mitzvah of sanctification of God's Name, rather this is a matter of a Jew not being allowed to actively...

Rather let them all be coerced rather than one of them should act actively. Therefore I say that one can say this is a halachah like a part of the stubbornness principle that the Yerushalmi says – that one doesn't give over actively. This is a part of the sins that they do – they say and they threaten, okay – such sins are also a sanctity that one doesn't hand over actively. Someone is going to do it himself, I want to already be righteous, I want to already be righteous.

Regarding Murder – The Same Law

In any case, the same thing regarding murder: "If non-Jews told them, 'Give us one of you and we will kill him, and if not we will kill all of you'" – if not we will kill all of you – they should all let themselves be killed, because "let them all be killed and they shall not hand over to them one Jewish soul."

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The Exception: Yichaduhu – When They Want a Specific Person

But the Rambam says, this is when it's said in a general way – "one of you, choose one of you." But if they specified him (im yichaduhu lahem) – if the non-Jews say about a specific person, "I want that one," "and they said, 'Give us so-and-so'" – if not, "we will kill all of you."

Seemingly the same thing should apply regarding forbidden relations too? No, no, no – because there is someone liable to death, it states. If he is liable to death, like Sheva ben Bichri – that Sheva ben Bichri was an incident in Tanach where he rebelled against King David, and King David sent Yoav to go against his city, and they all gathered together, until a wise woman came and they convinced themselves to kill Sheva ben Bichri and hand him over. The Gemara learns from this that in such a case it is permitted.

Discussion: What Does "Liable to Death" Mean – Under Jewish Law or Under the Law of the Kingdom?

The case is very interesting, because it was a Jewish king – it's very different from the case – but one derives it from there. But the question is: does "liable to death" (mechuyav misah) mean under Jewish law, or actually liable to death? It's not clear, not clear, because there he was a rebel against the monarchy so he was liable to death. But it could be that the point here is that...

Well, that means... okay – they should hand him over. But they should hand him over – yes, hand him over – but one does not instruct them so ab initio (ein morin lahem ken lechatchilah). Yes, the Rambam says that even so, one doesn't say this, and if they do so they had a valid claim.

The Story of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and Eliyahu HaNavi

The Gemara brings a story that there was by Rabbi Yochanan – there was a man who fled to Lod, they wanted to kill him, he went to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi handed him over to the government. And Eliyahu HaNavi (Elijah the Prophet) used to come to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to learn with him – then he stopped coming.

He had to fast, and he came back. He asked him, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: What does it say in a Mishnah? The entire halachah is a Mishnah in Terumos, if I remember correctly, where it states explicitly that if they specified him like Sheva ben Bichri, it is permitted. He says he needs to be an individual, he sees that he was also liable to death.

You ask well – perhaps he is liable to death even legally, because he is a rebel against the monarchy, so he is indeed liable to death? The Minchas Yitzchak said, very good – it indeed states in the Mishnah: "Is this the teaching of the pious?" (ve'chi mishnas chasidim hi) – is this how the pious act...

One sees that in the Rambam, very interestingly, he took this piece about Eliyahu HaNavi and said that if so, this is the meaning of "one does not instruct them so ab initio" – that one doesn't say such a thing ab initio, because it's still not proper to rule the halachah this way, even though one can understand it, it's justified. A very interesting...

The Distinction Between a General "One of You" and Yichaduhu

Now, but we're certainly talking here about someone liable to death under the law of the idolatrous kingdom, because if he is liable to death under Torah law, then it's obviously a mitzvah – "and you shall eradicate the evil from your midst" (u'viarta ha'ra mi'kirbecha) – one must hand over the evildoer.

Chavrusa B: For an evildoer, yes, under the law of the kingdom. For an evildoer, yes, but not for another person to the kingdom. He's not the evildoer.

Chavrusa A: Should one sacrifice one's life to protect a criminal from receiving his punishment?

We're talking here about someone liable to death by the kingdom. The point is something different. The point is that when they choose one Jew from among the others, it's as if you're going against a group of Jews – you don't want to kill all the Jews at all, but you want one of the Jews. But when they want a specific person, because that person sinned against them in some way, that's a very different category. And you go and hand him over – it's not that you're handing over one of the Jews, that you've abandoned one Jew for the others. You're handing over the Jew whom they're seeking for their reasons, for their law of the kingdom.

Discussion: What Does "One Does Not Instruct Them So Ab Initio" Mean?

And even so the Rambam says one may not. This is not a teaching of the pious, this is not a stringency. But we're not talking exactly about someone with testimony before a court – that's certainly correct. But we're talking here that it's simply a...

Why does he say "one does not instruct them so ab initio"? What, should the judge not tell them the truth that they're allowed, and they should all be killed? This is very hard to understand.

Chavrusa B: No, what he does he is justified in doing, but one doesn't say it that way. The judge doesn't have a foot on information that can save Jews. He doesn't want to tell them, and they should all let themselves be killed – that's a difficult thing.

Chavrusa A: What should be difficult? If they wouldn't have been pious, if they wouldn't have been pious, they wouldn't have sacrificed themselves.

Chavrusa B: Indeed. Here one sees that the judge – did he not tell the secret that they're allowed? That wouldn't have been a secret.

Chavrusa A: The only answer is because the whole thing is not ab initio. It's indeed as Eliyahu HaNavi said to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: You shouldn't have done it. You're allowed to do it, but you shouldn't have done it. Ab initio, a Jew should indeed protect another Jew, even when it's a specific individual situation.

Discussion: "Ab Initio" and "After the Fact" Regarding Life and Death

Chavrusa B: Saying the words "ab initio" (lechatchilah), "after the fact" (bedi'eved) – when the question is about being killed or not – is a very weird context to say "ab initio," "after the fact," because after the fact there's nothing left from being killed.

Chavrusa A: No, by "after the fact" I don't mean it's a weak defense. I mean there is a measure of piety (midas chassidus) and there is the basic law (ikkar ha'din).

Chiddush: The Rambam Holds There Is No Midas Chassidus by Yehareg Ve'al Ya'avor!

Chavrusa B: But the Rambam learned that there is no measure of piety in this matter.

Chavrusa A: Very good, earlier we saw that, now we see that there is. In this case there is. In the case of simply being killed for a mitzvah there isn't, but here one sees that there is murder – he is indeed going and killing him. Which seems to show that here there is indeed.

Chavrusa B: When someone is liable?

Chavrusa A: But if the person is not specifically liable to death and not designated, then yes.

Chavrusa B: Not only that, and even if designated he's not liable.

Chavrusa A: Yes, they kill him, but he's not liable. Then yes, they kill him.

Chavrusa B: Very good, this is an important halachah. There is in the later authorities (Acharonim) – for everything one can find an answer, but this is the halachah as it stands. In other cases yes, but it's not exactly so.

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Halachah 9 – A Sick Person and Healing Through Torah Prohibitions

The Rambam's Text

Now we're going to learn an entirely new matter. "And just as they said regarding duress – so they said regarding illness." There is another type of duress – a duress when a person is sick. He has a way out of the illness through a remedy, but the remedy – he needs to transgress one of the severe prohibitions or one of the commandments in order to perform the remedy.

A person became very ill: "And the doctors said that his cure is through a certain prohibited matter of the Torah – one does it and heals him, for the entire Torah does not come in place of danger. Except for these three transgressions that we mentioned, that if the doctor told him to heal himself through them – he should be killed rather than heal himself through them."

The Distinction Between Duress by a Non-Jew and Illness Regarding Punishment

When one is under duress and heals, then it's different from what was said earlier – that one is called under duress and doesn't receive lashes. But when one goes and uses a remedy to heal oneself, that is indeed – it doesn't mean duress, a different kind of duress. It is indeed an act that he performed, and one does receive punishment – that means seemingly one receives lashes for transgressing the prohibition of idolatry.

And here is the claim of the later authorities (acharonim), that one should not say it is like idolatry (avodah zarah) where there is a claim that one should not transgress even at the cost of death — what punishment is there? A death penalty by Heaven (misah bidei shamayim)? Or a death penalty by the court (misah bidei beis din)? There is an explicit statement in the Gemara that one receives lashes for transgressing the prohibition of idolatry, even in a situation of danger.

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Halacha 10 – The Source for a Sick Person Regarding Idolatry: A New Teaching

"And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul" — Not Kiddush Hashem

But the one thing — wait, think about something. Here, this is after all — one minute, look into it — this is not from the laws of kiddush Hashem (sanctification of God's Name). This halacha is not from kiddush Hashem. Look at how the Rambam says in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, perhaps regarding this: "Even in a situation of mortal danger one does not transgress them, except for idolatry, sexual immorality, and murder" — "And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might."

This is a new teaching — it does not fit into the previous teachings on this topic. Because this is not kiddush Hashem. Kiddush Hashem is against a non-Jew — "And you shall not profane" — but this is a new concept that is derived from the verse "even if He takes your life." Because one must be ready out of love of God and follow the Almighty's commandments... not His commandments per se, but regarding idolatry. This applies only to idolatry.

Novel Insight: Regarding a Sick Person, the "Takes Your Life" Refers to the Almighty Himself

But idolatry is not against love of God. Even the Almighty... who is taking? Not the non-Jew. "Even if He takes your life" — even if the Almighty is taking your life.

Study Partner B: Yes, who is "He"?

Study Partner A: But the commandment is only "takes your life." The warning is the commandment — only "takes your life." In which commandment? The prohibition of idolatry. But who is taking your life? The Almighty made you sick, right? And He said: "I am going to kill you." That means the Almighty is the one who says, right? Who makes one sick? The Almighty says: "I am going to kill you if you don't do idolatry" — you still must love the Almighty.

Study Partner B: "He" means even the situation, the circumstance — "The Lord, He is God."

Study Partner A: What comes to your mind? Is that what it's referring to? That verse? The verse "The Lord, He is God" — what does it refer to? To the Almighty?

The Source for Murder Regarding a Sick Person

It is stated: "And killing a Jewish soul to heal another soul" — so that is regarding the source for idolatry.

What happens when it deals with murder? It is "killing a Jewish soul" — when a person needs to, wants to perform a cure that requires killing another person — "to heal another soul, or to save a person from the hand of an oppressor" — he says, that means here he also brings a source for the previous halacha.

Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 5 – Continuation of Halacha 10, Halacha 11, and Halacha 13

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Halacha 10 (Continued) – Killing a Jewish Soul to Heal Another Soul

Speaker 1: No, this is straightforward with these matters. It is stated: "And killing a Jewish soul to heal another soul"... So, that is regarding the source for idolatry. What happens when it deals with murder? It is "killing a Jewish soul" — when a person needs to, wants to perform a cure that requires killing another person — "to heal another soul, or to save a person from the hand of an oppressor." Very clear.

This also brings a source for the previous halacha — the halacha about the non-Jew who wants to say "kill the other person or I'll kill you." This is not a matter of kiddush Hashem, and also not a matter of public setting. Regarding the original principle: "It is something that reason inclines toward, that one does not destroy one life for another."

Discussion: The Foundation of "Mai Chazis" — Murder Remains Murder

Speaker 1: This is what the Gemara calls "mai chazis d'dama didach sumak tfei" — why is your blood redder? Fine, you shouldn't kill the other person to save yourself.

Speaker 2: Think about how one... that's what reason says.

Speaker 1: Very good. "A matter that reason inclines toward" — "reason inclines" is a way of saying... reason inclines that it means murder.

Speaker 2: Not that one must do it because of reason. Reason says that this constitutes murder.

Speaker 1: No, it inclines that you have no right...

Speaker 2: One can compartmentalize, it must then be about a nice logical argument, but the logical argument will end up being simply murder...

Speaker 1: No, it must then... if one should afterward rely on the singular logical argument? What logical argument? Does the logical argument make it into murder?

Speaker 2: Because the logical argument says there is no justification for killing. In practice, it is a regular murder of killing a person, and sometimes it is discussed as murder.

Speaker 1: What? And why may I not kill a person in order to save myself?

Speaker 2: The logical argument says that this constitutes murder, which is among the most severe transgressions. What works for other matters — for this, the principle that coercion exempts does not help. Not that coercion exempts — it doesn't say that it's not relevant.

Speaker 1: Why may one not kill another Jew even at the cost of being killed oneself?

Speaker 2: Because of the logical argument that says "mai chazis d'dama didach sumak tfei." That is the reason, there is no other reason. The murder is a fact. One knows that murder itself legally remains murder. There is no extra halacha that says the murder... it is the halacha, the halacha is the logical argument. Because here with other prohibitions we are discussing a question.

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Sexual Immorality (Arayos) – The Analogy to Murder

Speaker 1: And what about sexual immorality (arayos)?

Sexual immorality has an analogy (hekesh), a scriptural comparison to murder. And it's not a gezeirah shavah — the verse itself makes the comparison, it's an explicit hekesh. As it says: "For just as a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter" — it speaks there about a rapist, that a rapist is like a murderer. And just as with murder the principle is "be killed rather than transgress" (yehareg v'al ya'avor), so too with sexual immorality one cannot destroy, one cannot save a life through sexual immorality.

Saving your own life — meaning as the Gemara says "mai chazis d'dama didach sumak tfei" — or even with other sick people, if your way of saving them is through committing a prohibition of sexual immorality, it is compared to murder, so just as there one cannot do it, here too one cannot do it. It's not entirely clear how this works, okay.

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Halacha 11 – In the Normal Manner of Benefit / Not in the Normal Manner of Benefit

The Rule: One May Heal with Other Prohibitions

Speaker 1: So the Rambam rules in Chapter 5 of Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah that "one may not heal with other prohibitions except in a life-threatening situation, and when they are used in the normal manner of benefit (k'derech hana'asan)."

The prohibition that one may not heal oneself with all other... only in a case of mortal danger (pikuach nefesh), when it is truly a life-threatening situation, when it's already critical — only in truly dangerous situations may one use prohibited items for healing, and only "when they are used in the normal manner of benefit." This is really just in passing, it doesn't come in so strongly to the topic, but he's already discussing it, it comes along with it.

Examples of "In the Normal Manner of Benefit"

Speaker 1: For example, when we speak of... for example, "one feeds the sick person insects and creeping things" — that is indeed in the normal manner of benefit! Because he's eating! Properly, he eats and he derives pleasure from it. "Or chametz on Passover, or one feeds him on Yom Kippur" — because these are in the normal manner of benefit, because this means eating.

Not in the Normal Manner of Benefit — Permitted Even Without Life-Threatening Danger

Speaker 1: "But not in the normal manner of benefit" — instead using... for example, using prohibited items not in the normal manner of benefit, such as "making a poultice from chametz or from kilayim (mixed species)" — one places it on his body instead of eating it, even chametz or kilayim which is also prohibited for benefit. "Or one gives him to drink things that contain something bitter mixed with prohibited foods" — something that indeed has a food prohibition but is mixed with sharp substances, so one doesn't taste the flavor. These things are permitted even when it is not truly a life-threatening situation, "since there is no pleasure to the palate" — the tongue has no pleasure from it.

So, it is established in this that even without a life-threatening situation it is permitted.

So first of all, within the same structure as before, there are cases that are permitted even without danger.

Discussion: The Distinction Between Benefit and Healing

Speaker 2: Just like, okay, fine. But what is the other case that he made into one? There is no... what is the dependency? I understand that a Jew applies a remedy of chametz because he has benefit from it, but what is the reason why he does it? Because he has benefit? Why is it a remedy?

Speaker 1: Because one may not have benefit from chametz. But that doesn't mean in the normal manner of benefit. Benefit means in the normal manner of benefit.

Speaker 2: Why?

Speaker 1: I'm not sure, I don't know. It could be that the remedy is simply one thing, because of the remedy there is also a benefit.

Speaker 2: A remedy is not a benefit. What's the point?

Speaker 1: No, who told you that? I don't know. A remedy is not... not in the normal manner of benefit. It says so right here. This is not a halacha of piety, of pikuach nefesh. This is a straightforward halacha that not in the normal manner of benefit is permitted with all prohibitions, except for two that we are about to mention.

Exception: Kilei HaKerem and Basar B'Chalav (Mixed Vineyard Species and Meat with Milk)

Speaker 1: "Except for kilei hakerem (mixed vineyard species) and basar b'chalav (meat with milk)" — for other prohibitions, even not in the normal manner of benefit.

Speaker 2: Why does he bring these two?

Speaker 1: I don't know, I'm telling you I don't know. What is the teaching there, that for these two even not in the normal manner of benefit is prohibited?

Speaker 2: It says so in the Gemara. It doesn't say "eating."

Speaker 1: It says so in the Gemara, there is no reason given. So, other prohibitions, even not in the normal manner of benefit. "Therefore" — we may not eat them even not in the normal manner of benefit, "except in a life-threatening situation." In a life-threatening situation certainly, that is also permitted. But without a life-threatening situation, then one may not use these two prohibitions even not in the normal manner of benefit.

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Halacha 12 – Lovesickness (One Who Set His Eyes on a Woman)

Speaker 1: The Rambam continues. He goes back to another halacha on this topic. There is "be killed rather than transgress" regarding the three severe sins, but he is going to state a halacha that is not exactly the three severe sins — it is not actual sexual immorality (gilui arayos), and nevertheless it is prohibited even at the cost of pikuach nefesh. An offshoot of sexual immorality that also requires one to give up one's life.

The Rambam's Ruling

Speaker 1: The Rambam says: "One who set his eyes on a woman and became sick and was on the verge of death" — someone became sick, lovesick, and he literally became ill. Right? He's bedridden, something... lovesick, on the verge of death. "And the doctors said he has no cure until she has relations with him" — the doctors say he will not be healed until she has relations with him.

"Even if she is unmarried" — even if she is an unmarried woman, it is not permitted. Even if she is unmarried, which ostensibly is not a real prohibition of sexual immorality. But "even to speak with her from behind a fence" — even if he doesn't demand to have relations, just he wants to speak with her from behind a fence — "we do not instruct him to do so." We do not rule leniently, we don't let him do it. "Let him die, and we do not instruct him to speak with her from behind a fence" — we literally tell him: you're going to die, die.

Novel Point: The Language "We Do Not Instruct Him"

Speaker 1: It doesn't say he may not — it says we don't tell him. "We do not instruct him" — we don't help him with any...

Discussion: The Reason for This Halacha

Speaker 2: Why? What is the reason for this prohibition? It is seemingly not... in general, one could tell the woman to become betrothed to him. I mean, that is also a prohibition.

Speaker 1: Okay, that's not what we're discussing. The Gemara, I believe the Gemara discusses this, that he specifically wants it in this manner.

Speaker 2: "Let her marry him?" The Gemara asks a question — let her marry him, let him marry her.

Speaker 1: The Gemara says, no, he specifically wants... "Stolen waters are sweet" — he specifically wants it when she is not married to him. Okay.

The Reason: So That the Daughters of Israel Should Not Be Hefker (Ownerless)

Speaker 1: The reason for this prohibition is "so that the daughters of Israel should not be hefker (freely available), and they should not come through such matters to breach the boundaries of sexual immorality." This will open the door to sexual immorality.

Speaker 2: Exactly.

Speaker 1: So, and for this an innocent Jew should die. Okay. Seemingly they also know that he's not actually going to die. It's a somewhat interesting halacha, this one.

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Halacha 13 – Chillul Hashem and Kiddush Hashem Not in the Context of Self-Sacrifice

Introduction: Another Meaning of Kiddush Hashem / Chillul Hashem

Speaker 1: Okay, now we are going to learn that besides this being the primary mitzvah of kiddush Hashem and the opposite of chillul Hashem (desecration of God's Name) — which is about the previous topic of one who intended to be killed — which is also the same halacha, we might not call it kiddush Hashem, or so, yes, I don't know.

The Rambam is going to say two more things that are included in the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem and chillul Hashem. And it appears that the Rambam's principle is that there can be one mitzvah that means more than one thing, and both of them are apparently from the Torah (d'Oraisa) — it's not the understanding that it's rabbinic or something like that.

Another meaning of the concept of kiddush Hashem, and the opposite which is chillul Hashem — that which he is about to say now in the next few halachos. It is a chillul Hashem, and it is a different verse about chillul Hashem. Okay, but it's all one law — he places it within the category of chillul Hashem, but he brings a different verse. One must think about why the verse will say more...

Chillul Hashem: Sinning with Contempt

Speaker 1: Okay. "Anyone who transgresses deliberately, without coercion" — someone transgresses deliberately, meaning he does it with full awareness, with calmness.

Speaker 2: "Deliberately" doesn't mean "willingly, by choice" — not that it's beneath his dignity, he doesn't want to.

Speaker 1: Yes. "Any one of all the commandments stated in the Torah, with contempt (b'sha'at nefesh)" — what does the word "sha'at" mean? I know things that I don't know. Sha'at nefesh, sha'at nefesh, sha'at nefesh. It is disdain. "To anger [God]."

Speaker 2: Okay, I want to make the Almighty angry.

Speaker 1: I know, the word "to anger" here doesn't mean the literal meaning that he does it because he wants to make the Almighty angry. He does it with contempt, he doesn't care. He does it with indifference.

"He has desecrated God's Name. Therefore it says regarding a false oath: 'And you shall profane the Name of your God, I am the Lord.'"

Discussion: Why Specifically a False Oath?

Speaker 2: What does that mean? A false oath is a type of thing of...

Speaker 1: No, seemingly he simply brings a proof that there can be a chillul Hashem that is not the halachos we just learned about "be killed rather than transgress," about self-sacrifice. Here is a chillul Hashem where someone simply commits a sin with contempt. Seemingly that is the proof from a false oath.

Speaker 2: One needs to understand why a false oath is called a dangerous chillul Hashem if it's not... a false oath is not discussed specifically when he does it with contempt. He commits a sin.

Speaker 1: But then he is under coercion (ones).

Speaker 2: But perhaps one can't... one can perhaps... perhaps one cannot make a false oath without contempt. Because the whole point of a false oath is that one says...

Speaker 1: How so? Someone who makes a false oath by mistake, under coercion — how does he do that? He didn't know it was a mistake?

Speaker 2: Then he is under coercion.

Speaker 1: But we're not talking about that, we're talking about intentional transgression.

Speaker 2: Okay.

Chillul Hashem in Public

Speaker 1: "And if he transgressed any of the commandments stated in the Torah in public" — this also means chillul Hashem regarding the public setting, in the presence of many. Just as we discussed earlier, that there is a chillul Hashem regarding the public setting, in the presence of many.

Speaker 2: Very good.

Kiddush Hashem: Refraining from Sin for the Sake of Heaven

Speaker 1: He says, the opposite — kiddush Hashem is also such a case. "And similarly, anyone who refrains from a sin or performs a mitzvah, not because of anything in the world" — not because of any other reason — "not out of fear or dread" — there are no external factors — "and not to seek honor, but because of the Creator, blessed be He" — I care about the honor of the Almighty — "like Joseph the Righteous restraining himself from his master's wife."

The Example: Joseph the Righteous

Speaker 1: She wanted him, and he could have... he could have "gotten away with it," as they say. He could have done it easily, and he held himself back purely because of the honor of the Almighty. We see from this — "this person sanctifies God's Name." Such an act, it is the act of kiddush Hashem.

Observation: Joseph's Act Was in Private

Speaker 1: And if it is in private, it is in private. If it is in public, it is in public. One doesn't say... Interestingly, Joseph's case was not in public. But in public is the more significant one — to seek honor.

Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 5 – Chillul Hashem and Kiddush Hashem Through Conduct

Joseph the Righteous – Chillul Hashem Even in Private

And if it was in public, then it was in public. He doesn't say interestingly – Yosef was not in public. And if in public there is already a matter of seeking honor, on the contrary, he says, presumably with chillul Hashem there is no distinction. What does honor have to do with it? Here, from this he says what Yosef HaTzaddik actually said "vechatasi l'Elokim" (and I would sin against God) – what is the problem? Before the Almighty alone. Meaning, Yosef was alone in Egypt, nobody else was there.

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Second Category of Chillul Hashem – A Person Great in Torah and Renowned for Piety

And after that there is a second matter that is also included in chillul Hashem (desecration of God's name). It is not literally the exact word of chillul Hashem, but it falls within the category of chillul Hashem. "Vehu she'ya'aseh adam gadol baTorah umefursam bachasidut" – a person who is great in Torah and renowned for piety – does "devarim she'habriyot merannenot acharav" because of them, things that people look down upon strongly, they murmur about him because of it. "Merannenot acharav" means that people talk after him, they murmur, they make noise, there becomes a bad reputation about this. About this person people go and talk about him, they don't speak kindly. Even if these things are not a sin, but they are things that are degrading, that cause murmuring – "harei zeh chillel et Hashem" (this person has desecrated God's name).

Why Specifically a Person Great in Torah and Renowned for Piety?

He gives an example – why must the condition be specifically a person great in Torah and renowned for piety? Because people expect him to... because he is on a higher level, people expect of him. This is what he had us say earlier, that many things are previously available precisely based on what people expect. This is certainly according to how people expect. People expect that you are a rabbi, you are a rabbi, you are a pious Jew, you must conduct yourself accordingly. If he conducts himself... if that person himself conducts himself that way, he has no claim on himself, because he is on that level – he is thereby desecrating the Almighty's name. Because he represents the Almighty's people, he represents God to the world. Such a rabbi, such a scholar, who fasts, a righteous person – no problem there. We're talking about a publicly known tzaddik, he is a rosh yeshiva and the like.

Everything According to the Greatness of the Scholar

"Hakol lefi godlo shel chacham" (everything is according to the greatness of the scholar) – it comes out that the greater the scholar – greater means in people's eyes, a Torah scholar, a dignified person, an important person – not only must he do more things, but even if something is not forbidden, if people view it as an ugly thing, he may not do it.

> Insight: This is the reason why there are tzaddikim who wanted to be hidden tzaddikim (tzaddikim nistarim) – to escape this problem of chillul Hashem.

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Examples of Chillul Hashem for a Great Person

a) He Purchases and Does Not Pay Immediately

"Kegon shelokei'ach ve'eino notein demei halekach le'alter" – he is not in the market at all, he doesn't pay on the spot, even though he has money. He takes from a seller on credit, and the seller asks him for the money – like makifin, he pushes them off.

b) He Engages Excessively in Laughter, Eating and Drinking Among Ignorant People

A second type of behavior that brings disrespect – "yarbeh bischok, achilah ushtiyah etzel amei ha'aretz".

c) He Does Not Receive People with a Pleasant Countenance

Even in the clarifications of pleasant dealings with people – he doesn't speak kindly to people, "ve'eino mekablam besever panim yafot" – he doesn't receive people pleasantly.

d) Quarrelsome and Angry

"Ela ba'al ketatah vecha'as" – he conducts himself in a quarrelsome and angry manner.

e) And Similar Matters

All these things constitute chillul Hashem, because he, as he says, represents the Almighty, because he is renowned for piety and Torah. And with this he shows as if, so to speak, the simplest conclusion is that Torah and piety do not refine a person, it doesn't make a person become a better person, and thereby he brings down the honor of Torah and Judaism, the honor of the Almighty.

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Kiddush Hashem Through Conduct – How Does One Actually Make a Kiddush Hashem?

"Vechen, im dikdek hachacham al atzmo" – he says how does one actually make a kiddush Hashem (sanctification of God's name)? If the scholar is meticulous about himself, he is careful, he pays attention.

Speaking Gently with People

"Vehayah diburo benachat im habriyot" – he speaks pleasantly to people.

His Mind is Engaged with Them

"Veda'ato me'urevet imahem" – his mind is engaged with them, meaning he lowers himself to their level.

Receiving Them with a Pleasant Countenance

"Umekablam besever panim yafot" – he receives people pleasantly.

He is Insulted by Them but Does Not Insult Them

"Ve'eino ne'elav mehem ve'eino olvam" – and even when they shame him, he does not shame them back.

> Discussion: What does "ne'elav mehem" mean?

>

> It could be that "ne'elav mehem" means even that he is not the kind of person who knows he doesn't get shamed – he knows he is humble, he is sensitive in front of them.

>

> Perhaps "ne'elav mehem" means exactly regarding da'at – he lowers himself to you, but "eino olvam" – he doesn't say: "So now that I'm on your level, now I can berate you on your level too." No, he lowers himself to a certain extent.

>

> That "ne'elav" means to say as an introduction – that even when he is insulted he does not insult back, which could be that this itself is already being ne'elav. That he shows people: "I am like you, I don't hold myself very great before them." A good drasha.

He Honors Them, Even Those Who Treat His Honor Lightly

"Mechabed lahem" – he shows that he is sensitive, he knows that it bothers me when people bother me. This is to stand firm, to show I am only for you, I am not arrogant. "Mechabed lahem afilu lemeikilim bichvodo" – he honors even those who are lenient with his honor. Very important.

> Digression: The Honor of a Torah Scholar

>

> Later in Hilchot De'ot the Rambam does say about how to maintain one's honor. This is a very tricky matter, because a Torah scholar... he will elaborate. Perhaps. Okay, very good. But here too we see – "yehei beito patu'ach lirvachah" (his house should be open wide) – even here it states that the opposite is also a problem. So it seems you can't use this today. There is a measure of how much one can honor people who are lenient with one's honor.

>

> But "to honor" doesn't mean to chat nicely – he means he should say good morning, be respectful.

He Conducts Business Faithfully

"Nosei venotein be'emunah" – he conducts business faithfully, he behaves properly.

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The Distinction Between "Briyot" and "Amei Ha'aretz"

"Velo yarbeh be'arichut amei ha'aretz vishivatan" – he doesn't sit and spend time with ignorant people, and he doesn't sit at their feasts and their meetings. This is the opposite of what he said earlier, which is a chillul Hashem – eating with ignorant people.

> Discussion: What does "briyot" mean as opposed to "amei ha'aretz"?

>

> Even the amei ha'aretz say: "The rabbi holds himself greater than us" – they don't want him to sit with them at their place. No, not that... it doesn't matter what the amei ha'aretz say, the amei ha'aretz don't matter. All the other people who go to see him, that's... not the amei ha'aretz.

>

> Interesting. Okay. The "briyot" are the normal people. And the amei ha'aretz are not briyot? With regular people one must speak gently, and with amei ha'aretz one must keep distance.

>

> I hear. I don't know. No, I think that even the amei ha'aretz... I think that amei ha'aretz is one category, and amei ha'aretz... because he said there that we're talking about amei ha'aretz that one goes to travel with, yes, sit with them in their gatherings. Here he speaks about briyot – they are respectable people, fine people. Amei ha'aretz are common people, with them it is a disgrace. The normal briyot would not sit with the amei ha'aretz, and when the rabbi sits with the amei ha'aretz it is not fitting. Very good.

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Always Engaged in Torah – A Practical Conduct

"Venimtza tamid osek baTorah, atuf betzitzit, muchtar betefillin, ve'oseh bechol ma'asav lifnim mishurat hadin" – people should see him... a person cannot always be engaged in Torah. But when people see him, he should be – perhaps when the rabbi plays, he should play at home, he shouldn't play in public. When people see him, he should be pleasant and proper in Torah.

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Not to Distance Too Much – The Middle Path

"Vehu shelo yitrachek harbeh" – he must go far from praises and accolades, but he should not go to the extreme end, he should at least remain somewhere close to the middle measure (midah memutza'at).

> Discussion: What does "yitrachek" mean?

>

> They say that "tirchak" also means – "velo yishtomem" means becoming desolate, "yoshev badad veyidom" (he sits alone and is silent) – he should not be alone. This is seemingly the opposite of "yitrachek" – "yitrachek" means to distance oneself a bit from people, not too much.

This comes back to the section beginning with "briyot." He already said this essentially – "ad sheyimtze'u hakol mekalsin oto ve'ohavim oto umit'avim lema'asav" (until everyone praises him and loves him and desires his deeds). Had he wanted to go to one extreme, certain people would indeed have respected him more, but others would have despised him. He should be on the middle path, so that everyone should praise him.

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When He Does This for His Own Honor

When he does this for his own honor seemingly, when he does it for his own honor, it's not good. No, he does it because then there is no distinction. Through this, people see that the pious ones are only engaged in... "Avdi atah Yisrael asher becha etpa'ar" (You are My servant, Israel, in whom I take glory) – a Jew who conducts himself as a servant of God, the Almighty is with him. But what does this mean? He brings out the glory of the Almighty, that the Almighty's people are actually like this, and it is a credit to creation.

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The Broad Scope of Kiddush Hashem – From Self-Sacrifice to Conduct

This is very important. This is very interesting, because this has no connection, it is very far. It is very far from dancing into fire, all the way from dancing into fire for the Almighty, all the way to how one conducts oneself. Everything is included in kiddush Hashem. It's not only the mitzvot that you eat and what you do, it is all included in kiddush Hashem.

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The Severity of Chillul Hashem and Kiddush Hashem

It is also severe – the severity of chillul Hashem and kiddush Hashem presumably also applies to this.

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Source – Gemara Yoma

The Rambam does not bring the language of "yisisu hashamayim vesagel ha'aretz" (the heavens will rejoice and the earth will be glad). But it is the same idea. He brings that the language is from the Braita. The Rambam writes here based on a Gemara in Yoma that says approximately this.