📋 Shiur Overview
Summary of the Philosophical Lecture: Quality of Desires, Holiness, and Self-Understanding
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A. Opening – A Call to Teshuva (Repentance)
Whoever disagrees with the approach being presented here should do teshuva. A false hashkafa (mistaken worldview) is equivalent to an aveira (sin) – because if one has a false understanding, one must correct it just as one does teshuva for a chet (transgression). The Rambam is the source: anyone who has an error naturally wants to stop with that error.
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B. The Main Error: All Physical Desires Are “One Thing”
The Error Stated
People have a basic, unfounded simple belief (without sources) about desires:
> People believe that all physical pleasures (ta’anugei haguf) are fundamentally one thing – that there is only quantity (more or less), but no true qualitative distinctions between different types of desires.
We are speaking only about ta’anugei haguf (eating, marital relations), not ta’anugei hanefesh (honor, spiritual joy).
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C. First Proof Against This Error – The Reality of Diversity
In reality there are thousands of distinctions in food desires alone:
– Sweet / bitter / spicy / not spicy
– Crunchy / soft
– Burnt / not burnt
– Beef / chicken / lamb / lettuce
– Each person has different preferences, and even the same person wants to change from day to day.
The grocery store mashal (parable): A grocery sells ten thousand different foods – this alone proves that it’s not all the same thing. When the “mashgiach/rebbe” speaks about food desires, he treats it all as one category – but this doesn’t match reality.
Counter-Argument and Response
Kushya (question): Perhaps the distinction is only in quantity (more/less desire), not in quality? Candy is just a *stronger* desire than bread, but fundamentally the same?
Answer: It is indeed quality, not just quantity. The pleasure from fatty meat is different (not just “more”) than the pleasure from chicken. The drugs example: If all pleasures were one thing, one could sell an injection instead of foods – but drugs don’t give the same pleasure as eating, which proves that it’s qualitatively different.
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D. The Main Proof – From the Torah Itself
The Torah Makes Quality Distinctions, Not Quantity Distinctions
– The Rambam calls “Sefer Kedusha” the section that includes Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot and Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah – two separate categories of physical abstinence.
> [Side digression]: The Rambam has a particular reason why he calls it this, but that’s a discussion for another time about the names of the books.
– The Ramban and most Rishonim agree that the Torah’s laws about eating and arayot (forbidden relations) are fundamentally laws about ta’anug haguf.
The Critical Point
The Torah never says how much one should eat (quantity). Instead, it makes distinctions between types – this food is permitted, that one is forbidden. Pork isn’t forbidden because it’s a “greater desire” – it’s forbidden because it’s a particular type of thing. The only exception of quantity limitation is Yom Kippur (not eating at all).
Conclusion: Kedusha in Torah is not about having less pleasure, but about which pleasures yes and which not. This proves that according to the Torah, the distinction in desires is a distinction of quality, not just quantity.
> [Side digression: Zolel vesobeh]: “Zolel vesobeh” is indeed a prohibition about quantity. Answer: The Rambam counts it as a specific mitzvah (learned from ben sorer umoreh), but it remains that most Torah laws about eating don’t speak about quantity.
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E. The Dispute Between Rashi and Ramban on “Kedoshim Tihyu”
Rashi’s Approach
– “Kedoshim tihyu” = “Perushim tihyu” = separated from arayot and transgressions.
– “Kol makom she’ata motzei geder ervah ata motzei kedusha.”
– Kedusha means: not doing the specific transgressions (issurei bi’ah, ma’achalot asurot).
– Source: Sifra.
Ramban’s Approach
– “Perishut” doesn’t mean only refraining from arayot.
– It means a broader measure of abstinence – a general measure that is mentioned “bechol makom baTalmud.”
Critique of the Ramban’s Philological Claim
The Ramban’s assertion that “bechol makom baTalmud” the word “parush” is used in his sense is weak:
– A nazir is called “parush atzmo min hayayin” – but he is also called a chotei.
– The Mishna has a list of seven types of perushim that Chazal did not like.
– “Bechol makom baTalmud” is suspicious – one must always ask who, where, how.
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F. Main Critique of the Ramban’s Foundation: “Hitira HaTorah”
The Ramban’s entire reasoning is based on the idea that “the Torah permitted bi’at ish ve’ishto” and “meat and wine” – and therefore one must add abstinence afterward. But this is factually not true:
Regarding Bi’at Ish Ve’ishto:
– Two weeks a month niddah/counting
– Not during the day (Gemara)
– Not during veset
– Not Tisha B’Av
– Shulchan Aruch’s many restrictions
– Conclusion: “This is not a heter” – it’s an extremely restricted thing.
Regarding Meat and Wine:
– Only with shechita
– “Ki yirchak” – meat only when far from the Beit HaMikdash
– Derech eretz: meat only at night
– Conclusion: Here too “permitted” is very limited.
The Ramban’s entire premise (“the Torah permitted, therefore one must add abstinence afterward”) is “totally wrong,” because the Torah itself is already extremely restrictive. The Rambam understood this – that it’s all one thing, not two separate layers.
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G. The Ramban’s “Naval Birshut HaTorah” – Analysis and Critique
The Ramban’s Claim
The Ramban claims that according to halacha a person can be a ba’al ta’avah – he can be “immersed in his wife’s lewdness,” take many wives, be a “drunkard of wine and glutton of meat,” and speak “obscenities” – all within the halachic framework. Therefore one needs “kedoshim tihyu” as a general rule to close this loophole.
Critique of Each Point:
1) “Zimat ishto” – Incoherent:
The words “immersed in his wife’s lewdness” are incoherent – “zimah” and “ishto” don’t go together. In the Torah “zimah” appears only with arayot (mother-in-law, daughter, etc.), never with one’s own wife. Compare with the Kotzker Rebbe’s saying that “lo tin’af” means “with his wife” – which also makes no sense.
2) “Sobeh yayin vezolel basar” – Not such a loophole:
The Rambam says there is an explicit prohibition de’oraita to be a “zolel vesobeh”. If so, it’s not even permitted according to halacha.
3) Nivul peh – No clear prohibition de’oraita:
The Torah doesn’t state explicitly that one may not speak obscenities. It’s only midrashim and drashot. The Rambam himself shows that the Torah’s language is pure, but it’s not a formal prohibition.
> [Side digression: Nivul peh with eishet ish]: A discussion whether nivul peh with an eishet ish falls under “lo tikrevu legalot ervah” – the Rambam says “kerivah” is de’oraita, but whether nivul peh is “kerivah” remains unclear. With one’s own wife it’s not a prohibition at all, only a “middat tov.”
The Fundamental Difference Between the Ramban Here and Elsewhere
The Ramban says in other places (Chol HaMoed, Shabbat, Yom Tov) that the Torah cannot write out every detail, therefore it gives general rules and the Chachamim work them out. This is understandable – it’s a limitation of law-writing.
But here with “kedoshim tihyu” it’s different: The Ramban doesn’t say that just a few edge cases are missing. He says that an entire category is missing – that one can be a “naval” (= ba’al ta’avah, filthy person) within halacha. This is a much broader claim.
> [Side digression: The Ramban’s approach to arayot]: The Ramban holds that arayot are not intrinsically bad – only for Jews in Eretz Yisrael. He sees issurei arayot as “gezirat hakatuv” to distance oneself, not because they are morally corrupt. (See Ramban Parashat Acharei Mot.)
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H. The Ramban’s Practical Definition of “Kedoshim Tihyu” – And Critique
“Yima’et Bamishgal” – Minimize Marital Relations
The Ramban gives a specific definition: after there are clear prohibitions (arayot), one must also minimize what is permitted – less in quantity.
Proof from Chazal: Talmidei chachamim should not be found with their wives like roosters.
Critique: The proof speaks only of talmidei chachamim, not every person – so it’s a proof to the contrary. If according to the Ramban “kedoshim tihyu” is de’oraita, it should apply to everyone.
Problem with “yima’et”: “Less” is not a clear boundary – less than what? There’s no measure. Takkanat Ezra (immersion for relations) was made as a “burden” to minimize – but this is an indirect boundary, not a direct one.
The Boundary: Quantity as a Standard
With marital relations: With one’s own wife it is ideally a mitzvah (peru urevu, onah), but after fulfilling the obligations, each additional relation is only a reshut. The Ramban’s rule: “Lo yishtamesh ela kefi hatzorech lekiyum hamitzvah mimenu” – one should not use relations more than one is obligated. This is also ruled by the Rambam in Hilchot De’ot and the Shulchan Aruch: “Kol bi’ah she’einah lekiyum periyah ureviyah o lekiyum onah – harei zo aveirah”** – a transgression de’oraita of “kedoshim tihyu.”
> [Note]: Laws of onah also apply to women.
Minimizing Drinking – Wine
The Ramban brings a second category: minimize wine drinking.
– Proof: A nazir is called “kadosh” in the Torah – because he abstains from wine.
– (There is a dispute among Tannaim whether a nazir is kadosh or chotei, but the Ramban rules that he is kadosh, like the simple meaning of the verse.)
– Another proof: The stories of Noach and Lot – which show what happens when one drinks too much wine.
– But: The Ramban doesn’t say how much less one should drink – the measure is unclear.
Tumah and Tahara – A Third Category
The Ramban adds: one should guard against tumah, even if one is not a kohen and there’s no halachic prohibition.
– Proof: The nazir is called kadosh also because he avoids tumat met.
– This is what the Gemara calls “perushim” – people who conduct chulin betahara.
Strong question: The Ramban’s entire foundation was that “kedoshim tihyu” comes to fill a gap in the Torah – that one can be a “naval birshut haTorah” through desires. But tumah and tahara have nothing to do with desires! It’s not bad to be tamei – one just may not enter the Beit HaMikdash or eat kodashim. This is a completely new category that doesn’t fit the original claim.
> [Side digression: What does “perishut” mean for the Rambam?] Rav Yitzchak Shilat (disagreeing with Rav Tzvi Yosef Kook) says: One should not translate “perishut” for the Rambam like for the Ramban, because the Rambam understands perishut as tumah and tahara, not as abstaining from desires. R’ Shmuel ibn Tibbon translated “perishut” as “zehirut” – a strange translation, but the Rambam indeed means something different than the Ramban. To understand why the Rambam holds that tahara is relevant, one must look in Moreh Nevuchim about the reasons for tumah and tahara.
Guarding One’s Speech – Another Category
The Ramban adds: “Veyishmor piv uleshono” – one should guard against:
– Ribui achilah hagasah (eating too much – again a quantity measure)
– Merov divrei havalim (too much idle talk)
– The highest level: like Rabbi Chiya who said “shelo asiach sicha beteilah miyamai” – not just no obscenities, but no idle talk at all.
Summary: Perishut for the Ramban is a “Davar Shebikamut”
The Ramban’s perishut is entirely a matter of quantity (proportion/measure) – not a qualitatively different essence, but less of what is permitted. There can be levels in this.
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I. The Ramban’s Approach That Rabbinic Laws Can Be De’oraita
The Ramban explains that takkanot Chazal (like mayim rishonim, mayim acharonim) are also included in “vehitkadishtem” – de’oraita.
Question: The Ramban holds that something can be both derabbanan and de’oraita at the same time – which is very difficult to understand. The Rambam would never agree with such an approach. This remains an open question.
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J. The Ramban’s “Perat Uchlal” Model – And Strong Critique
The Ramban’s Foundation
The Torah gives details (specific prohibitions) and then a general principle, for example:
– After “lo tignov” comes “lo tisa’u ish be’amito”
– After melachot Shabbat comes “tishbot”
Critique
A) With arayot: In what way is “kedoshim tihyu” a general rule of wife, daughter, granddaughter, father’s wife, etc.? The details are specific relationships, not gradations of a principle. It’s a big assumption that they are connected.
B) With Shabbat: The Ramban’s “tishbot” means a prohibition of heavy labor (dragging heavy things, bringing in a treasure, etc.) – which is a separate de’oraita prohibition according to the Ramban. But melachot have nothing to do with “heavy” – melachot are specific categories of work, not a measure of difficulty. So “tishbot” is not a general rule of melachot, but a separate prohibition. No one before the Ramban knew that this is de’oraita.
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K. The Ramban’s Basic Assumption: Everything Is Only Quantity – An Unprecedented Innovation
The Ramban Could Not Imagine Any Other Standard
The Ramban could not imagine any other standard for good and bad with ta’anugei haguf except quantity (the amount). He sets up a scale of levels:
– The ideal parush – does relations only for the sake of mitzvah, without pleasure (like Rabbi Eliezer).
– A person who has a bit more pleasure.
– A person who does forbidden relations.
But – the Ramban holds that the distinction between them is only quantitative, not essential. Sleeping with a sister and sleeping with a wife is the same desire – just with different “inches” closer or further.
The Innovation: Perishut Is a Mitzvah De’oraita – Unprecedented
The Ramban invented something no one before him said: that there is a obligation de’oraita to be a parush.
– Yes, there were perushim in the Gemara.
– But no one said that perishut is a mitzvah de’oraita.
– No one said there is a lacuna (gap) in halacha – that the Torah which deals with which one may and which not, forgot the basic matter of “less.”
“Less” and “Not Your Sister” Are Two Different Topics
“Less” and “not your sister” is not the same thing – they are two different topics. The Torah says explicitly: with the sister is zimah, with the wife is good. This is a qualitative distinction, not just quantity.
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L. The Parable of Kosher French Fries and Pork
Have you ever noticed that people who eat a lot of kosher French fries end up eating pork? – This is the Ramban’s logic: it’s the same desire, therefore more quantity leads to transgression. But the Torah never said to eat less kosher! – This is proof that the Torah doesn’t hold that eating kosher and eating treif is “the same desire.”
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M. The Ramban’s Argument: “Tzaddik Tish’ah Sha’arei Heiter”
The Ramban’s position:
– One must abstain from 9 gates of permission in order not to reach the one gate of prohibition.
– Because otherwise there’s nothing else to stop me – if not perishut, what should stop a person from transgression?
Answer: Yirat Shamayim can stop a person at the boundary, without perishut.
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N. Proof from Arayot – Desire for Males vs. Females
A strong proof against the Ramban: The Gemara says “kol hanishnof bi’ah” – it’s all the same bi’ah. But in reality we don’t see that people who are more ba’alei ta’avah with women are also more ba’alei ta’avah with men or with relatives. This proves that it’s not one general desire.
> [Note]: The extreme case (a “sick person” who does it with everyone and everything) is set aside – that’s an illness, not a normal person, and we’re not talking about that.
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O. The Main Principle: Each Desire Is a Separate Desire
There is no “general desire” – no single category that includes all desires:
– Parable of eating: Potato chips feels different from potato kugel, even though both are from potatoes. One rarely has a desire for both simultaneously.
– Parable of drinking: Brandy is not the same desire as liqueur, even though both are alcohol.
– The nefesh hata’avah has 25,000 parts – the one who likes potato chips is not the same part that likes kugel.
Confrontation with Students – “Ko’ach Hanefesh” Debate
Students argue that all desires stem from the same ko’ach hanefesh. Answer:
– “Who invented this ko’ach hanefesh?” – This is a theory, not a proven reality.
– The feelings are factually different – spiritual pleasures feel nothing like physical pleasures.
– Bring a proof! – A proof is demanded that all desires are fundamentally one.
Confrontation with “Attraction = Gravity”
A student compares sexual attraction to gravity (both are “attraction”). This is good poetry, but no connection – one can’t connect two things just because they’re called by the same word.
The Words Argument – “Language Is Poor”
On the claim that “both are called ta’avah, so it must be the same”:
– The dictionary isn’t big enough – one would need to make new words.
– We already have separate words: “hungry” vs. “thirsty” – but that’s the deficiency, not the desire.
– “I crave kugel” vs. “I crave a cigarette” – these are different desires, not one thing.
> [Side note]: Whether a cigarette or a phone is a “ta’avah” in the halachic sense – that’s a separate lecture.
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P. Abstractions Are Not Physical
We convince ourselves that certain abstractions (like “ta’avah”) are still physical things. On the lowest level – an elephant that impregnates, food that strengthens – yes, that’s physical. But when we speak of ta’avah as a spiritual thing, something one can feel and talk about – it doesn’t feel the same.
Concrete example: Even desire for relations, which one can actually feel in the body – feels different depending on with whom. It’s not “all the same.” One can give an elephant a physical reaction, one can do artificial insemination – but that’s not the desire. The desire is something else, something deeper, and each desire is separate.
Every Abstraction Is “False” – But That’s Not Special
Every abstraction is false – like every other abstraction. The kugel from Sunday and the kugel from Monday – even if it’s “the same kugel” – it’s different because the people are different, the time is different. Ice cream before eating and ice cream after eating are two different desires – not semantics, in reality.
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Q. The Ramban’s Question Is Built on a “Phony Assumption”
The Ramban’s question (that one can fulfill all 613 mitzvot and still be a “naval birshut haTorah”) is built on the false assumption that all desires are fundamentally one thing. And the Torah doesn’t say this.
> [Side digression – The joke of “family, love, and philosophy”]: A young man goes on a date and is told to talk about three things – family, love, and philosophy. He asks: “Do you have a brother?” – No. “Do you like noodles?” – No. “If you had a brother, would he like noodles?” – That’s philosophy. The nimshal: Mixing “love of noodles” with “love of a person” as one general rule – but this is a foolish abstraction that loses the true distinction.
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R. General Rules Are Not Metaphysics – But Ethics (Usefulness)
When denying general rules, we’re speaking not metaphysics – but ethics. The principle: *”All models are false, some models are useful.”* General rules about kochot hanefesh are useful if they help one become a better person – like a mechanic needs to know that a car has an engine, transmission, electrical system – not because that’s “the truth” but because it’s useful for diagnostics.
The Ramban’s Framing Is “Extremely Messed Up” – Two Claims
First claim: If one says that one can fulfill all mitzvot and still be a scoundrel – something is fundamentally false. The Torah has an entire Sefer HaKedusha, Yoreh De’ah, laws about the kitchen and bedroom – this is exactly about this! How can one say that all these laws are “waste of time”?
Second claim: The Ramban’s rule (“have fewer desires”) is much less useful than people think. It gives no practical guidance – “don’t eat the last piece of kugel” – but it lacks the deeper content.
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S. The Main Theory: Tikkun Hanefesh Through Thought
The Central Principle
What it means to be a person is a “davar hanitfas bemachshava” – one can grasp it only through understanding, not just through doing. One needs a theory, a comprehension, in one’s “active memory” (RAM), in order to be able to work on tikkun hanefesh. Therefore the learning part is important – not just for practice. If your understanding of desires is too simple (everything is “one thing”), you cannot effectively work on yourself.
Critique of the Simplistic / Binary Model of Desires
If one thinks that desires are just a simple, binary, quantitative thing (more/less, yes/no), then:
– First – the model is false (wrong)
– Second, and worse – the model is not useful: it gives nothing one can work on, it doesn’t put into your perception the kind of thing that can become better
Consequences of the False Model – “War Instead of Peace”
Most people with the simplistic model don’t believe in tikkun hamidot – they only believe in war against the yetzer hara “until the coming of Mashiach.” This is the approach of most Chassidic books, with good reason: because the structure of the neshama as they see it doesn’t allow more. One cannot win – one can only do “genocide” against the nefesh habehemit (as in Tanya). One cannot educate the nefesh habehemit.
> [Side digression: “Itkafya” / “Ithapcha” in Tanya]: The Tanya’s concept of “ithapcha” – one takes the same desire and puts in a good thought – but in what way is this still “the same desire”? This is unclear.
> [Side digression: Practical results]: A student asks: When a person has a problem with Shabbat desecration, doesn’t it make it worse to tell him “pleasure is gone”? Answer: We’re not trying here to get practical results – this is education, not the topic. Practical results simply aren’t achieved through the usual methods, because we’re working on “birds of eternal service” – and on a “generation of eternal service” one can only work through teshuva and precious remedies (according to the Gemara). There is indeed a suggestion that works – but first one must clear away the world’s error.
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T. Freudian Materialism – The Deeper Error
The error is identified as a materialistic fantasy in the spirit of Sigmund Freud:
– Everything a person wants is reduced to one thing: pleasure = sense of touch = “buttons that are pressed”
– No distinction between head and body, higher and lower
– All distinctions between types of pleasure are “fake” according to this model
– The Ramban also held this way (not just Freud)
Absurd Consequences of This Reductivism
In Chassidut it was said that scratching one’s finger = pgam habrit = eishet ish – all “the same desire.” But:
– In Torah there is a clear distinction (betulah = prohibition of aseh, eishet ish = capital punishment, scratching = not even a transgression)
– In reality it’s against psychology, against feelings
– It’s a “weirdly materialistic reduction” that makes all diverse feelings equal
> [Side digression: Chovot Halevavot]: The Chovot Halevavot thinks like the Ramban: “minhag haheiter” (the custom of permission) is a transgression – i.e. even permitted pleasure can be a problem if one does too much.
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U. The Positive Proposal – Taste Can Change
If one understands that reality is not so reduced, one can educate the body/soul to love the right things. People change their taste all the time through education and life experience.
The Main Example: Marriage as Tikkun Hata’avot
– Marriage is the Gemara’s answer to desire problems.
– When a man loves his wife (also in a physical sense, as the Gemara in Kiddushin requires), then this trains his ko’ach hata’avah.
– It is not true that the pleasure with his wife is “the same thing” as with another – it’s a specific attraction.
– According to the Gemara: Every time a married man is aroused by another woman, he truly wants his own wife – that is his true desire.
Why the Materialistic Model Destroys the Tikkun of Marriage
If one thinks that everything is “buttons that are pressed”, then:
– Marriage cannot help – because loving your wife is “the same thing” as any other pleasure, just permitted
– One doesn’t know that there exists such a thing as a specific love for one’s own wife that is qualitatively different
– Therefore the false model makes everything worse
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V. Key Principle: “How One Understands Oneself, So One Becomes”
The Convergence of Self-Understanding and Self-Reality
The way one understands one’s own nefesh is what one actually becomes, because on this one builds oneself. Whoever thinks that a person is a “very physical thing” with simple buttons – he actually becomes such a person. What one thinks determines what one is.
This Is Not Relativism
One cannot say: “To each his own perception” – for you it’s true, for others not. It’s not true even for that person who holds that a person is only a physical creation. A low self-perception is not just a legitimate alternative opinion, but an error that requires correction.
The Argument-Plus:
1. Premise A: How a person understands himself = what he actually is (self-understanding is constitutive, not just descriptive)
2. Premise B: Therefore a “dispute” between approaches is not just a theoretical distinction – it’s a distinction in the reality of the person himself
3. But – critical turn: This does not mean that every perception is equally legitimate (“to each his own perception”)
4. Conclusion: A low self-perception is a true error – not just a subjective opinion – and the person must do teshuva, that is, elevate himself to a more correct perception of what a person is.
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W. Final Conclusion of the Entire Lecture
The lecture has established a complete argument:
The popular “mussar talk” approach – which treats all physical desires as one undifferentiated category, with the only standard being quantity (more/less) – is an error on three levels:
1. According to reality (grocery store, different desires, arayot vs. wife) – it’s factually not true that all desires are one.
2. According to the Torah (quality distinctions in halacha, Sefer Kedusha, distinctions between types not quantities) – the Torah itself makes qualitative distinctions, not quantitative ones.
3. According to usefulness (the model is not useful for tikkun hanefesh, it destroys the tikkun of marriage, it leads to war instead of peace) – the simplistic model gives no tools to work on oneself.
The correct approach: Each desire is a separate desire with its own quality. The way to tikkun is through understanding (machshava, “RAM”), through educating the taste to love the right things (as marriage trains the ko’ach hata’avah), and through recognizing that how one understands oneself, so one actually becomes – and therefore one must do teshuva from a false, reductivistic self-perception.
📝 Full Transcript
Physical Desires: Quality or Quantity? – The Fundamental Error in Understanding Pleasures
Opening: A Call to Teshuva
Maggid Shiur:
Ah, okay, rabbosai (gentlemen), we should ask for such a topic, whoever disagrees with me should do teshuva (repentance).
What is the difference between having a wrong opinion, a wrong understanding of something, and committing a sin? It’s the same thing, it’s a sin of knowledge. Whoever has an error must do teshuva. Very simple. When the Rambam (Maimonides) says that one doesn’t return with teshuva, because everyone who has an error wants to stop being with errors and do teshuva, to learn better.
So, the error is like this, the error… no, let’s not speak so directly. But the error is that yes, there is an error, a very basic error that people have. It could even be that the error is justified, but one must do teshuva about it. About this I say that one must do teshuva.
The Fundamental Error: Desires Are Treated as One Thing
What is the error? The error is, and I think that the error has no sources at all, it’s just foolish talk that people have, nobody knows why, it’s foolish simple belief. The error is that when one speaks about ta’avot (desires/lusts), or about ta’anug (pleasure), the pleasure of ta’avot, I mean, it’s really weird, ta’anug is the thing that the ta’avah is for, right? It’s the same thing. When we say the words ta’avot and ta’anugim (pleasures), right? Ta’avah means that I want to have a certain ta’anug. So, when I say ta’avot and ta’anugim it’s the same thing.
And we said that we’re speaking about physical pleasures, ta’anugei haguf (physical pleasures), not ta’anugei hanefesh (spiritual/soul pleasures), which includes kavod (honor) and other things, higher things than kavod. In any case, we’re speaking about ta’anugei haguf.
And people have somehow convinced themselves for some reason that there is only one type of ta’anug haguf, it’s all the same thing. Let’s say there are two types, there’s eating and there’s tashmish (marital relations), so, two things, two types of little pieces of body that one can touch and it makes some pleasure, and that’s all. But fundamentally, all types of things that one does with this are the same thing. The same type of pleasure, right? There’s no difference whether a person eats sweet things or bitter things, both are ta’avat achilah (desire for eating) exactly the same, right?
Student:
One is sweet and one is bitter.
Maggid Shiur:
Different types, but there’s no difference regarding the topic of what type of ta’avah it is, right? From something there is a ta’avah.
The Reality of Thousands of Distinctions in Ta’avat Achilah
What does it make? I want to try to understand my parable too, think about this parable. And let me explain why this is foolish belief. Think about it, it’s very foolish belief, right?
There are people who like sweet foods, there are people who specifically like bitter foods, there are people who like spicy foods, there are people who like non-spicy foods, and so on kaha’i gavna (in this manner) and thousands more, there are people who like crunchy, there are people who don’t like crunchy, there are people who like burnt and not burnt, and so on thousands more distinctions that one can enumerate from this and more in the matter of ta’avat achilah, one can explain, right?
There is the pleasure of chazeret (horseradish/lettuce), and there is the ta’avah of basar bakar (beef), and there is basar of (poultry) and basar keves (lamb), it’s not all the same thing. There are thousands of distinctions that go into the grocery and they buy ten thousand different foods.
The Grocery Store Parable
And you’re telling me that it’s an interesting thing that the rav, yes, the mashgiach, the rebbe who speaks about ta’avat achilah, he means them all as one. In reality there are thousands of types of pleasures, not all taste the same, they don’t have the same type of pleasure, it’s a different type. There are people who specifically like this, and there are people who like not that.
But when we speak about the problem, let’s say, there is a certain problem of ta’avat achilah, or too much of it, according to what the Rambam would say, or in general how other people would say, one doesn’t speak, the whole thing is not relevant. The store, the grocery that sells one ten thousand different things, he knows one thing regarding what we’re saying. Not only does the grocery know this thing, but the holy Torah knows this thing, right?
Student:
Why?
Maggid Shiur:
Why does it know this thing? I don’t understand.
Student:
There is a difference in foods, a candy is more of a ta’avah than…
Maggid Shiur:
A greater ta’avah than milk and blood. I mean to say that working on the ta’avah, on how much it’s relevant to matters of Judaism, of humanity, to be less of a ba’al ta’avah (one who is controlled by desires), all these distinctions are completely irrelevant.
Quantity or Quality? – The Critical Question
And you know very well, there’s no difference what, as you say, it’s only a kamah (quantity), there’s only more and less, perhaps. There’s only more and less, there is such a category, but it’s not relevant, that’s the reality, in reality, everyone who is a ba’al ta’avah is a ba’al ta’avah, and by him there are very many distinctions. There’s a day he likes this, a day he likes that, or which people like this and which people like that, or in general the same person can’t eat only one food, he needs to switch, he needs a little this, a little that.
All these distinctions make no difference regarding philosophy, regarding the science, the understanding of what the ta’avah of a person’s body means, and consequently also not regarding mussar (ethics), regarding what is good, no difference at all.
Someone who likes bitter things is less of a ba’al ta’avah? Is that what people think? No. Why do you present it as a diet? Because you’re accustomed to the modern world.
I want to ask you something. Mete’amim (one who tastes/savors), mete’amim already stands. It’s a sin to… I want to ask you, not only… they mean to say like desserts, like a person understands that a person eats a meal, and then it’s different than one who sits and eats chocolate. What is the difference? What is the difference? What, is there a difference? One minute. As he said, but… let’s say, let’s say, there’s only kamah, there’s no eichut (quality). Could be, could be.
But the foundation is only there, it’s all the same thing, there’s only how much, there’s no quality at all, it’s not relevant. The fact that the world is full of quality, different types of quality of pleasures, is all irrelevant.
What does it mean? A person has a stronger ta’avah and more pleasure when he eats a piece of fatty meat than he eats a piece of chicken? So what does it mean? It’s only more? Is it different or is it more? It’s quality. It’s different. It’s different, not that it’s better. If you say it’s more, what does it make more? It’s more ta’avah, it’s more enjoyment.
Student:
He likes the opposite, that’s a second dispute.
Maggid Shiur:
Whatever, I’ll give you an example. Someone likes chocolate. For him there’s a greater ta’avah for chocolate than kugel.
The Drugs Example: Proof That It’s Quality, Not Quantity
I want to ask you, is the holy Torah… first of all, do you agree that in practice, the grocery is being foolish? Why? Because ta’avot are all one. One likes this, one likes exactly that. Whatever. That is wrong, that’s not how it is. Each one there is more quality and there is less. More quantity. But in reality, one can be exactly as great, one is exactly as…
So what we distinguish is what I said. I’ll tell you what the error is. Do you agree with me? I’m speaking with those who agree with me. Okay, I already know what to say. There is an error. If someone… let me… this is a question that you ask… this is the question you’re talking about.
If someone really likes water with black bread, is he exactly as much a ba’al ta’avah as one who eats thick steak. Because ta’avah, shem ta’avah (the category/name of desire), achat hi (it is one). There’s only one shem ta’avah. Only by each individual, exactly bemikreh (by chance), it falls by this one that he likes this, nobody knows why. This one likes this, that one likes that. Someone who likes black bread and water, he has in this a great ta’avah. I’ve seen this by various people who can’t stand not to have that granola.
Student:
No, but that’s not one. No, I worked it out that he likes this? That’s worked out.
Maggid Shiur:
Someone asked, after my shiur or before my shiur? I just said the error. If someone has already heard two shiurim from me, I don’t think he thinks this way. I’m speaking here to those who haven’t yet heard three shiurim from me. I can simply hear a person, a Hasidic Jew say such a sermon. Right? Yes. Very good.
And according to this sermon, I want to challenge the sermon, it’s a very fine sermon. First of all, what comes out is that the store is being foolish. It’s truly a fantasy, not even a fantasy, he sold so many different types of foods, and all are basically the same thing. If he could buy some injection that gives a person the pleasure of eating, he would have to sell that instead of all these foods. Right? That’s what comes out.
Student:
A person who does that too, they take drugs.
Maggid Shiur:
And the drugs give the same type of pleasure as eating? It’s the same thing? Very good, it’s not the same. Okay, it’s not the same. Wait, it’s not the same. But it’s not the same. It’s not the same.
The Torah’s Proof: Quality Distinctions in Hilchot Kedusha
So now, and I just want to explain better, a bit deeper, right? But first of all, I say that the store is being foolish, or the Torah also makes the face as if it’s time, right? And in the store one assumes that there is a difference of which type of ta’avot, and the maggid shiur says that there’s no difference, everything is shem ta’avah achat (one category of desire). Not only is the store in disagreement with the maggid shiur, but also the holy Torah disagrees with him, right?
Because in the Torah there is a whole section that is called, I don’t know, the Rambam calls it Sefer Kedushah (the Book of Holiness in Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah), there is included hilchot isurei maachalot (laws of forbidden foods), forbidden foods, and isurei bi’ah (forbidden sexual relations), two things that the Rambam calls kedushah (holiness), yes? The matter of perishut (abstinence/separation). Not only the Rambam, there are other interpretations of what is called kedushah, but that’s a different discussion, we’ll go learn another time about the names.
But in any case, there is a whole hilchot, and it speaks about the topic of perishut, which the Rambam also, and the Ramban (Nachmanides), all agree, I don’t mean all, but most Jews agree, that what the Torah says hilchot of what to eat and what to… with whom to marry, and what is all hilchot ta’anug haguf, that’s basically what it’s about, and the Torah is full of distinctions, right?
It doesn’t say, the Torah could have, if the Torah wanted your kedushah, the Torah would have said: every Jew should eat up to two pounds a day, I don’t know, make some limit, make something, speak about the amount, whatever, speak about the amount. The main thing is the quantity, right? Not to like eating a little less, or eating a little less eating.
Instead, the Torah comes, and there is – not one mitzvah of the Torah says that one should eat in quantity more than how much one needs, not one. Except for those that say that on Yom Kippur one may not eat – there is a mitzvah that one may not eat a whole day of the year. Except for that, what does the Torah say? In details, which yes and which not.
Nobody says that pig is a greater ta’avah than cattle. The Torah is a holy Torah, does it say that pig is a greater ta’avah? A worse ta’avah, not a greater, a worse.
Student:
Wait, wait, a worse.
Maggid Shiur:
Very good. The holy Torah… what does a worse ta’avah mean? “Ve’anshei kodesh tihyun li uvasar basadeh treifah lo tochelu” [And you shall be holy people to Me, and you shall not eat meat torn in the field (Exodus 22:30)]. The holy Torah says that one is holy through not eating pig, and the holy Rashi said that one is holy through not sleeping with one’s sister. So says the holy Rashi at the beginning of Parshat Kedoshim, and so says the holy Torah in Parshat Kedoshim also there forbidden foods and also there forbidden sexual relations.
In kedushah it has something to do with the same topic of perishut. And the question is, how does perishut become called ta’anug? The Torah has a good and bad about this topic, and the good and bad has nothing to do with quantity. It says, a bad ta’avah is pig, a good ta’avah is meat that is slaughtered with all the laws of shechitah. The Torah is not a matter of quantity, it’s a matter of quality.
Question About Ta’avah
Student:
Why does the Torah speak about ta’avah? Perhaps all the reasons why it’s not so connected to do with ta’avah.
Maggid Shiur:
I told you, because you forget our definition of ta’avah and shiur zero about this, that ta’avah is the hilchot, the good and bad, relating to ta’anugei haguf (bodily pleasures), of hilchot achilah, hilchot bi’ah. That’s what when I speak ta’avah, I speak – my first definition was what should be the hilchot, what should be the good and bad in the topic of ta’anugei haguf. Right?
And the Torah speaks obviously a category of the topic of ta’anugei haguf. It’s very clear that there is a category of the topic of ta’anugei haguf in the holy Torah, and the Torah doesn’t say more and less. It says this yes and this no, and today yes and today no. Everything can be, but it speaks about the same thing.
I think that the Rambam didn’t hold that it’s a different thing, the Rambam did hold that it’s the same thing. But in the same shiur I think it’s a very difficult shiur.
The Torah Doesn’t Speak About Quantity
I’ll tell you an interesting fact, that the holy Torah never says that one should like more or less, eat more or less, or what you want more or less, on a certain day. It does speak about this, and it doesn’t say so. That’s the reality.
Student:
Now, zolel vesoveh (glutton and drunkard) is what? One specific time.
Maggid Shiur:
Zolel vesoveh, it says that one shouldn’t eat such a thing, no?
Student:
True, true, true, true. Yes, it says in Rambam, true.
Maggid Shiur:
But zolel vesoveh is not a matter of a prohibition, zolel vesoveh is a count. The Rambam counts it as a mitzvah. Yes? It’s a mitzvah to gorge, according to the Rambam. Yes. You learn from ben sorer umoreh (the rebellious son). And what the Gemara says that “derosh vekabel sachar” (expound and receive reward), I have a mitzvah. No, the azharah (warning) in it, not the ben sorer itself. The azharah. There is an azharah, from that azharah, on that prohibition one says that.
Student:
No, no, no. Okay, that speaks about his successes and his portions, whatever you want to say.
Maggid Shiur:
But the Rambam… that’s correct. But there’s still most things are about how much, okay? And why am I telling you this? I just want to show you, I’m jumping a bit, because I still have conversations I wanted that I really want. But I want to tell you that the holy Ramban had a difficult question, okay? Very interesting.
Student:
Hello? What’s your point?
The Dispute Between Rashi and Ramban on “Kedoshim Tihiyu”
Maggid Shiur:
I want to – the holy Ramban, Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman, had a difficult question, a wondrous question and truly a wonder about the Torah. I don’t know what he thought as an answer to his question. I mean, I know what he thought as an answer, but it’s a very weak answer. I mean that there’s something more basic that’s wrong.
The holy Ramban wrote a book called “Perush HaRamban Al HaTorah,” and there he says in Parshas Kedoshim, I don’t know if you know what the language of the Ramban is? Should we say his language, or can I tell you the thing.
Student:
Okay, the holy Ramban says like this.
Rashi’s Explanation: Separation from Forbidden Relations
Maggid Shiur:
In the holy Chumash it says, I’ll now tell you the dispute between Rashi and Ramban, yes? Where am I here? Parshas Vayikra, ah, Parshas Kedoshim, yes?
Student:
Perhaps you’re speaking diburim?
Maggid Shiur:
No wait, no, you come here. The Torah says in the verse, “Kedoshim tihiyu” [You shall be holy (Leviticus 19:2)]. What does Rashi say? “Hevu perushim min ha’arayos umin ha’aveirah” [be separated from forbidden sexual relations and from sin]. That means, Rashi learned that the explanation of “Kedoshim tihiyu” is “Perushim tihiyu,” you should be separated.
Perishus has to do usually with being separated from bodily pleasures, therefore from arayos, which are the sins of bodily pleasures, and “shekol makom she’atah motzei geder ervah atah motzei kedushah” [wherever you find a fence around sexual prohibitions, you find holiness]. Kedushah has especially to do with geder ervah, not committing sins of arayos. So says the holy Rashi.
Student:
Sins of arayos?
Maggid Shiur:
No, geder ervah, arayos. Yes, which sins? The sort of bodily pleasures, the sort of relations, forbidden relations, the relations that are wrong. Yes, good, so says Rashi. Forbidden relations, whatever relations are bad, not to do them is called being holy. So says the holy Rashi, and so he brings, it’s brought from the Sifra [the halakhic midrash on Leviticus].
Ramban’s Explanation: Separation as a Character Trait
The holy Ramban says, he doesn’t agree. “Ein haPerishus hazo lifrosh min ha’arayos kidivrei haRav” [this separation is not to separate from forbidden relations as the Rav (Rashi) says]. Perishus is not that, “ela shehaPerishus hi hamuzkeres bechol makom baTalmud, sheba’aleha nikra’im perushim” [rather, separation is that which is mentioned everywhere in the Talmud, whose practitioners are called perushim (separated ones)].
Critique of the Ramban’s Philological Claim
The Rambam claims, by the way, it’s not true what he says. The Rambam claims, not true, God forbid, I’m saying about the holy Rambam that it’s not true. A lot of times, whenever you read someone saying, “It says in Chazal” [our Sages of blessed memory], you have to start to become suspicious. As soon as, Chazal, place, who said it, how did he say it. “Bechol makom baTalmud” is suspicious. “Bechol makom baTalmud,” every time in the Talmud, you can do a search, “yesh sham midah sheba’aleha nikra’im perushim,” that those who have this character trait are called a parush. So says the holy Rambam.
It’s not correct, and at least not obvious, that there’s such a person called parush in the Gemara who is a parush in this way. You can look it up, do a search on parush in the Gemara, you’ll see that it’s not at all a simple matter.
Student:
In the Gemara is a nazir [Nazirite] called a parush?
Maggid Shiur:
Yes, where does it say? The Gemara says, “parush atzmo min hayayin” [separated himself from wine], and he’s called a chotei [sinner]. Is he parush atzmo or shehizir atzmo [that he made himself a Nazirite]? One must look.
There’s a thing called perushim in the Mishnah, and the Mishnah also has a list of seven perushim that they don’t like. First of all, it’s not at all so simple. I’m just saying that it’s not simple. The Rambam looked with certain glasses and it was simple. All nice stories. Maybe yes and maybe no. Everything can be.
But the Rambam says that it says. The Rambam has here a philological claim, that when the midrash says, “Kedoshim tihiyu – perushim tihiyu,” the midrash translates “kedoshim” as “perushim,” this doesn’t mean what Rashi meant, “perushim min ha’aveiros, min ha’arayos,” but rather it means some sort of character trait called perishus. Okay? So he says indeed.
And so the Rambam says that he knows Talmud, and in the Talmud it indeed says that there’s such a concept of perishus, of a character trait called perishus. And he brings some proofs from the Rambam which are bad proofs, just to be very clear. And you’ll already see it. Why? The Rambam claims, not from the… from the Talmud. The Rambam says, “bechol makom baTalmud,” and he brings proofs. The, at least the pieces of Talmud that he brings are not proofs to his words, in my humble opinion. It’s been said, I looked in the commentators, I already saw someone already asked this question.
The Ramban’s Foundation: “The Torah Permitted”
Nu, the Rambam explains. Okay, I want to focus on this Rambam, because it’s very important. It’s one of the foundational pieces of Ramban in Judaism, and I disagree with it. I mean that it’s totally wrong. Not God forbid I with the holy Ramban.
The Ramban says like this: What is perishus? The concept, yes? What is the thing that we call perishus? The Ramban says like this: “Ki haTorah hizhirah ba’arayos uvema’achalim ha’asurim” [for the Torah warned about forbidden relations and forbidden foods]. The Torah permitted, forbade, yes? Further, behold the arayos and forbidden foods, certain things the Torah forbade.
But, he says, the Almighty, the Torah permitted “habi’ah ish ve’ishto” [relations between a man and his wife]. Relations with man and his wife, “kol davar sheyirtzeh la’asos be’ishto ya’aseh” [whatever he wants to do with his wife, he may do]. In short, relations between man and his wife are completely permitted.
Critique: Relations Between Man and Wife Are Not “Completely Permitted”
I mean, completely? Two weeks a month? I don’t know how the Ramban forgot about this. Tzaros ayin. Completely, yes? The Torah permitted relations between man and wife? And the Shulchan Aruch says not at night, not in the morning, not at night, I don’t know when. In short, again, he says that the Torah permitted. And the Gemara says that one may not be intimate during the day [meshamesh bayom – have relations during the day]. There’s a Gemara.
Hello, I’m telling you, I’m not asking you now halachah lema’aseh what a person does. I’m telling you that when the Ramban says that the Torah permitted, it’s not so very much in practice. Two weeks a month is not a great permission, okay? In short, I don’t know from where he got the idea that the Torah permitted. I don’t see what’s permitted. I’m telling you what the Ramban says. The Ramban said this, okay? The language that I’m saying is exactly the language of the Ramban.
One may not have relations not today because she’s a niddah [menstruant woman], not yesterday because it’s a doubtful niddah, not the day after tomorrow because it’s a veses [expected time of menstruation], not today because it’s daytime, and not tomorrow because it’s Tishah B’Av [the Ninth of Av, a fast day], and not Shavuos because he’s busy eating. Okay, this is not true. In short, this is not a permission. This is not permitted, it’s not a permission of man with his wife.
It’s very far from it. This is for real. The Rambam says this. The Rambam says, we learned in Rambam chapter 4, that we see here that the Torah is extreme about this matter. Even the laws already. I didn’t talk about this. The Ramban seems to not realize that, and I have a theory about why. Okay? That it’s not at all true that the Torah permits relations between man and wife with a great limitation. Yes.
Critique: Meat and Wine Are Also Not “Completely Permitted”
“Ve’od ba’achilas habasar vehayayin” [and also regarding eating meat and wine]. The Torah also permitted meat and wine to eat. By the way, this is also not entirely accurate, right? Not Rosh Hashanah. On Rosh Hashanah they didn’t allow eating. Even on Rosh Hashanah they didn’t allow eating meat and wine, because of and why this. “Ki yirchak ki yirchak” [“when it is far from you” (Deuteronomy 12:21)]. Learn the Torah. “Ki lo suchal le’echol basar ela bishchitah” [for you may not eat meat except through ritual slaughter]. Only eat only with because the main thing should be the bread, and not eat meat.
This is what Rashi says on “lo tit’aveh” [“you shall not desire”]. He says two things: derech eretz that at night one should eat meat, not during the day. Okay, that’s derech eretz. But just like that, gorging on meat was normal. According to the simple meaning of Scripture, according to halachah, one may gorge on meat. It doesn’t say exactly the halachah, okay?
The Ramban’s Question: A Lustful Person Can Remain Within Halachah
Okay. Yes. The Ramban says like this: “Ve’im ken, yimatzei ba’al ta’avah makom lehisgader bo” [and if so, a lustful person will find room to wallow]…
The Ramban’s Concept of “Naval Birshus HaTorah” – Analysis and Critique
The Ramban’s Claim: A Lustful Person Has Room Within Halachah
Maggid Shiur:
Because the main thing should be the bread [lechem], and not eat meat [basar], as it says in Parshas Va’eschanan, it says two things: derech eretz [proper conduct], and at night one should eat meat, not during the day. Okay, that’s derech eretz. What I want to say, gorging on meat was normal, according to the simple reading of Scripture [al pi peshutos hamikra], according to Jewish law [al pi halachah] one may gorge on meat. It doesn’t say exactly the halachah, okay?
Yes, the Ramban [Nachmanides] says like this, “ve’im ken yimatzei ba’al ta’avah makom lihiyos shatuv bezimas ishto” [and if so, a lustful person will find room to be immersed in lewdness with his wife]. The Ramban says, if so, a lustful person [ba’al ta’avah] has room. So says the Ramban, I mean that it’s totally wrong.
Student:
Listen, you’re jumping a line, let me read.
Critique of “Zimas Ishto” – Incoherent Words
Maggid Shiur:
A lustful person has room, according to halachah a lustful person has room, “lihiyos shatuv bezimas ishto” [to be immersed in lewdness with his wife]. First of all, the words are incoherent. There’s no such thing as being immersed in lewdness with his wife. Zimah [lewdness] with his wife [ishto] are not words that go together. I don’t know what the Ramban is talking about here. I know exactly what he means to say, it makes as much sense as the Kotzker Rebbe [Kotzker Rebbe] who said that “lo tin’af” [do not commit adultery] means with his wife, I say [be’ishto amri]. Hello, what is a normal person? “Lo tin’af” doesn’t mean with his wife. I know it’s the same concept, and it doesn’t make sense.
I’ll explain it to you. I can explain to you, I can tell you an exact definition today of opinions. But I’m just giving you that it doesn’t really make sense. In the Torah [Torah] it doesn’t say “zimas ishto.” “Zimah hi” [it is lewdness] is said about one who takes his mother-in-law [choseneto], I remember. “Zimah hi” doesn’t say about… “Zimah hi” about a daughter [bas], I don’t remember one of the forbidden relations [arayos], which is zimah, which is chesed [kindness], and which is cherpah [disgrace], I don’t remember which of the three. The Gemara [Gemara: Talmud]… It never says in the Torah such a thing as “zimas ishto.” The Ramban assumes that there’s a sort of pleasure [ta’anug] called zimah. We’ll soon talk about this. I just want to read through the Ramban.
The Ramban’s Examples: Many Wives, Wine Drinker, Meat Glutton
Maggid Shiur:
“O nosei nashim harbeh” [or marrying many women], one may have many wives according to the Torah, true? Not only that, one can have more than one wife. Okay, so one can solve the problem of niddah [menstrual impurity], if one wants strongly. Okay.
Okay, “velihiyos besov’ei yayin uvezolalei basar” [and to be among wine drinkers and meat gluttons]. We talked that the Rambam [Rambam: Maimonides]… that’s false, as you said. The Rambam says that there’s an explicit biblical prohibition [mefuresheh lav de’oraisa] to be a meat glutton and wine drinker [soveh basar vezoleil yayin]. Whatever exactly meat glutton and wine drinker means, it’s a biblical prohibition [issur de’oraisa] to do. The Ramban didn’t know about this, I don’t know. I need to look what he says in Ki Seitzei [Deuteronomy 21:10-25:19].
Student:
Ah good, but… simply called?
Maggid Shiur:
I’m saying that here when the Rambam says that according to halachah one may, there are a lot of assumptions here, it’s not at all clear that according to halachah one may.
Obscene Speech – No Clear Biblical Prohibition
Maggid Shiur:
And not only that, “yedaber kirtzono bechol hanivalos” [he will speak as he wishes all obscenities], one may speak obscene speech [nivul peh]? It doesn’t say in the Torah. In the Torah it doesn’t say that one may not speak obscene speech. How does it say at all?
Student:
Nowhere.
Maggid Shiur:
It’s a midrash [midrash], yes. But which prohibition is to speak obscene speech? “Kirtzono bechol hanivalos”?
Student:
The language has no obscenities… ah, the Rambam says, the Torah itself doesn’t speak obscene speech, okay, we’ll say.
Maggid Shiur:
One can learn it from the Torah, it doesn’t say in the Torah as “al tedabri nivalos” [do not speak obscenities]. “Develes, defichul, ha’achsiyos, besurich” [unclear reference to biblical verses].
Student:
Yes yes, these are nice homiletical interpretations [drashos]. It could be it means this, it could be it doesn’t mean this, the simple meaning [peshutos] means to say things that one won’t fulfill, such things. But okay…
Maggid Shiur:
One can take. I’m saying it’s drashos, but it’s not a prohibition, true? Obscene speech is a very bad thing that – it’s not a biblical prohibition, it’s a good character trait [midas tov]. And so is the Rambam. Here we agree [maskim] with the Rambam, we haven’t found any prohibition to speak… It says “kedaber achas hanivalos tedaber” [you will speak like one of the disgraceful women], it doesn’t mean this.
Anyways, in short, one may speak obscene speech.
Student:
Okay.
Discussion: Obscene Speech with Another Man’s Wife – “Lo Sikrevu”?
Maggid Shiur:
By the way, further, with someone else’s wife it’s forbidden, “lo sikrevu” [do not come close] in the Torah. One’s own wife is a commandment [mitzvah]. So when is the prohibition? With friends, just nonsense [stam shtuyos].
I ask you a question: Speaking obscene speech with another’s wife is a prohibition of “lo sikrevu” from the Torah? The Rambam says “lo sikrevu legalos ervah” [do not come close to uncover nakedness], the Rambam says that this is biblical, it’s the closeness [kerivah]. Closeness includes obscene speech? Closeness is not support, it’s biblical, the Rambam says it’s biblical. It’s biblical, it’s biblical, it’s biblical.
Student:
Sounds reasonable to me.
Maggid Shiur:
You don’t understand this? Yes, nu…
Student:
No, no, closeness, closeness, the Rambam says that closeness, closeness biblical, it’s biblical. It writes “lo sikrevu,” one learns… one also learns closeness is forbidden.
Maggid Shiur:
Whatever, one is so without another half.
Student:
Not at a Shas Mincha [afternoon Talmud study session], one needs this…
Maggid Shiur:
No, it’s not a nice thing, not chassidish, but it’s not a prohibition. Is that the prohibition? With an eishes ish [married woman] nivul peh [foul speech]? One minute. Shelo bish’as [not at the time of]… No, no, no, the Rambam doesn’t speak… I know. Okay, al kol panim [in any case], one should be careful to understand that it’s not a prohibition of naval birshus haTorah [a scoundrel within the permission of the Torah], okay, no problem. Perhaps it’s a pasuk [verse], perhaps it’s a midrash, perhaps it’s completely mutar [permitted], perhaps it’s completely… This I’m saying, if it’s with another person it’s a prohibition, if it’s… This is a geder perati [particular boundary], it’s not so hard to understand, it’s not a chiddush [novelty], it’s a boundary, it’s not so hard to understand the boundary. Perhaps it’s in the proofs, perhaps rabbis, okay, let’s debate, it’s not a big nafka minah [practical difference]. If it’s with his own wife, but it’s perhaps permitted, he says that shelo letzoreich tashmish [not for the purpose of marital relations]…
Student:
Very good, a boundary doesn’t have to be a prohibition, it’s already musar [ethics], it’s already perishus [abstinence]. But this doesn’t say that.
The Ramban’s Loophole Argument – Fundamental Critique
Maggid Shiur:
I’m saying, the Ramban is looking… The Ramban perhaps has a matter… I’m mesupack [uncertain], by the way. The Ramban sounds… I just want to describe, so perhaps says a head, I don’t know. Listen, the Ramban… The Mishnah means to say a… Okay, no luck. The Ramban says that there’s a loophole in the Torah, that’s what he’s describing to you, and I’m telling you that it’s not clear that it’s such a loophole. The Ramban sounds like the Torah states certain things, but it doesn’t state all the things, vehinei yihiyeh naval birshus haTorah [and behold he will be a scoundrel within the permission of the Torah], rabboseinu dorshin mikra [our rabbis expound from Scripture]. What does a naval mean for a good year? From where did the Ramban take the idea of a naval? What does a naval mean at all? Remember I gave another lecture against the concept of naval birshus haTorah, that it brings all kinds of vileness?
The Ramban is out for a justification. He says, “Ribbono shel Olam [Master of the Universe], come listen, he’s a Jew who believes in the Torah, and the Torah states this is permitted and this is not permitted, you say, but we do everything the Torah permits and we’re a shaygetz [scoundrel]. What? By whom, are you smarter than Moshe Rabbeinu [Moses our teacher]? What’s going on here?” Very funny. The Ramban doesn’t say this, you’re saying it very well, you’re presenting the Ramban’s shitah [approach] very well. The Ramban, at least in two other places, says such an idea. The Ramban in general has such an idea, and I’m very mesupack about that idea. I think that it’s also… It’s a clarification, I know, people love it very much, and I and the Rambam don’t love it.
Student:
And is this already the Rambam’s Moreh Nevuchim [Guide for the Perplexed]? Yes.
The Ramban’s Source – From the Rambam Misinterpreted
Maggid Shiur:
No, the Ramban took the idea from the Rambam and misinterpreted the Rambam. There’s another lecture on Hilchos Shabbos perek chof daled [Laws of Sabbath chapter 24] or somewhere, on what the Rambam was. Yes, we’ve already heard the lecture, one should make sure to speak about it. There’s a lecture on what the Rambam speaks about menuchah [rest], the Ramban’s idea comes directly from the Rambam, he said the opposite of the Rambam, so it was clear to me that the Ramban wouldn’t have thought that way, but this is, I don’t remember if I said it here in that lecture. Al kol panim, it’s true, I just want to mevarrer zein [clarify], I’m not sure that this is the same.
Distinction Between the Ramban Here and in Other Places (Shabbos/Yom Tov)
Maggid Shiur:
The Ramban indeed, both what you say about Yom Tov [Jewish holiday], and in shevisas Shabbos [Sabbath rest], and in I don’t know where else, I remember another dugma [example], he says a similar thing, that the Torah, the halachah is chaseirah [lacking], because the halachah states certain peratim [details], and there remain many cases where one can be mistaken, because the exact case isn’t stated. So says the Ramban, so says the Ramban in where does it say what you’re saying about Yom Tov? I don’t remember. There where that verse is stated? But it doesn’t say this here, I just want to say, it doesn’t say this here. The Ramban doesn’t say here, let’s just bring out something, the Ramban doesn’t say here that kedoshim tihiyu [you shall be holy] is similar to this, it sounds to me a bit different. It’s a gezeirah shavah [textual analogy], it sounds very similar, but it’s not similar. Because he doesn’t say that the problem is that the Torah can’t state the shi’ur [measure] of kedoshim tihiyu. He says a completely different thing, this fails much more.
When someone says, when the Ramban says that the Torah doesn’t state, I don’t know how one should shoves zein [rest] on Chol HaMoed [intermediate days of festivals], and the chachamim [sages] mefareish geven [interpreted] it, because one can’t state enough klalim [rules], it’s talui [dependent] on all kinds of situations, and the Torah doesn’t want to be berachah levatala ketanah [a minor blessing in vain], hilchos shevisa beChol HaMoed [laws of resting on Chol HaMoed]. So says the Ramban, yes, he brings it on Yom Tov, but he also says it on Shabbos in a certain way, and so on, on Yom Tov. So this I understand, that there’s a limitation, that this has to do with a very basic thing, that the law can’t speak in every case, memeilah [consequently] one must give general things.
By the way, it becomes a kushya [question], why are there all these details? The Ramban didn’t answer that question at all, right? There’s a whole discussion, because like Chol HaMoed, the Torah didn’t state anything at all, and one must understand on one’s own very well what to do and what not to do. So by the way, Shabbos he also says that the Torah said nothing, but let’s say that there’s such a mesorah [tradition] that says the thirty-nine melachos [prohibited labors], why does this fail? True, it becomes harder the opposite if one thinks about that problem. Okay.
But here he doesn’t say this, he doesn’t say that the Torah can’t state exactly how much perishus each person should have, memeilah he left it open kelali [general]. Because what, because the Ramban says that a whole category is missing, and by the way, by Shabbos shevus it’s also true what the Ramban says regarding this, according to the Ramban it’s true that there’s a Torah-level obligation from that, isn’t it? That is, aside from, let’s skip the nosa [topic] of Shabbos, because it will just get into too much complications.
What I mean to say is, he doesn’t say that it’s simply a problem because one can’t state any shi’ur of kedoshim tihiyu, it’s devarim she’ein lahem shi’ur [things that have no measure]. Like what you said as an example, one can’t state every commercial thing that will ever be, the Torah says in general terms, be a person. On this the Torah could also say, the Torah could have said in general terms. According to the Ramban the Torah did say. What would have been without the mitzvah of kedoshim tihiyu? Right? Something very basic would have been missing.
What’s Missing? The Ramban’s Definition of “Naval”
Maggid Shiur:
What’s missing? That one can be a naval, and the sense of naval by him means a ba’al ta’avah [one controlled by desire]. Right? Naval here means ba’al ta’avah. One can debate the word naval from where it comes, but when he says here naval he means like a naval per [literally a scoundrel], right? A filthy person, which means exactly one who eats too much and does too much intercourse, not adultery, too much zivug [marital relations]. That’s the meaning of a naval. True? So a whole thing is missing. It’s not that certain fuzzy cases are missing that aren’t stated in the Torah. A whole thing is missing. All the laws of forbidden relations one can do this way. Can one…
The Ramban’s Approach in Forbidden Relations
Student:
What?
Maggid Shiur:
Says the Ramban, listen, says the Ramban, ulefichach ba hakasuv bazeh [therefore the verse comes regarding this], look what he does, therefore the verse comes regarding this, achar shefeirat ha’issurim she’asar osam legamrei [after detailing the prohibitions that He forbade completely], look, after He forbade things that are completely forbidden. Why are they completely forbidden? I don’t know, it’s not related to perishus according to the Ramban. Simply gezeiras hakasuv [a decree of Scripture], leharchik oscha min ha’arayos [to distance you from forbidden relations]. This fits with the Ramban’s interpretation in forbidden relations, that all these forbidden relations aren’t truly bad, but in Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel] it’s bad, but for Jews it’s bad. The Ramban doesn’t hold that forbidden relations are bad. Right? It’s magic. Yes? Look in ta’am arayos [reason for forbidden relations] in Parshas Acharei Mos [Leviticus 16-18], there are a few Rambans on this.
The Ramban’s Practical Definition: “Yema’et Bemishgal”
Maggid Shiur:
So, but after one has forbidden things that are forbidden, vetzivah bedavar kelali shenihiyeh perushim min hamutaros [and He commanded in a general matter that we should be abstinent from permitted things]. But what does this mean? He says, yema’et bemishgal [he should minimize in intercourse]. There’s a specific definition. Have less intercourse, reduce. Right? This is a general mitzvah to have less in quantity. After there are things that are permitted and things that are not permitted, one must have less in quantity. And he brings a ra’ayah [proof], ke’inyan she’amru shelo yis’anu talmidei chachamim [like the matter they said that Torah scholars should not fast], betzumos uv’ta’aniyos gormim [in fasts and afflictions they cause]. This is a proof lehefech [to the contrary], because it says talmidei chachamim [Torah scholars], it doesn’t say everyone. But the Ramban’s proof is that the proof is not from Torah scholars. True?
Student:
But what?
Maggid Shiur:
Yema’et is a category. Yes, less. Less what? The Torah scholars don’t have a boundary, it just says one must go to mikveh [ritual bath]. He doesn’t have a boundary, less. This was made so it should be a tircha [burden], memeilah. It doesn’t say there’s a boundary, but mai dehu [at least] there is indeed a boundary.
The Ramban’s Approach in “Kedoshim Tihiyu” – Quantity as the Standard of Holiness
The Proof from “Talmidei Chachamim Metzuyim” – A Question on the Ramban
Instructor:
And he brings a proof: “ke’inyan she’amru shelo talmidei chachamim metzuyim etzel neshosihem ketarnegolim” [like the matter that they said that Torah scholars should not be found with their wives like roosters]. This is a proof to the contrary, because it says Torah scholars, it doesn’t say everyone. According to the Ramban it’s a Torah-level obligation, so a Torah-level obligation is not for Torah scholars, true?
But what? A good question, he says it has a boundary? Yes, less. The Torah scholars being found also doesn’t have a boundary, it doesn’t say he must go to mikveh, it doesn’t say any boundary. Less. It was made so it should be a middle path. It doesn’t say it has a boundary.
The Boundary of Quantity
But I would say it does have a boundary, the boundary is quantity. I’m telling you it’s a very important boundary here, it’s a certain quantity, because even your wife, your wife is initially, ideally, a mitzvah, perhaps, I don’t know if it’s a mitzvah, but at least permitted, according to the Ramban it’s only a mitzvah if one isn’t fulfilling procreation or the mitzvah of conjugal rights, then it’s not a mitzvah. So it’s permitted and not hungry, it’s not a mitzvah. It’s just a permission that he’s speaking about there.
But, yes, because the Torah scholars being found speaks about after fulfilling conjugal obligations, true? All these things that the Ramban brings he means that he’s speaking when one has already fulfilled the commandment of conjugal rights, there’s no mitzvah, it’s a permission, yes? Then he reduces, how much?
The Ramban’s Clear Measure
The Ramban says, by the way, he says, you want to know how much? “velo yishtamesh bo” [and he should not use it], he shouldn’t use the, I guess he means to say not engage in relations, I don’t know exactly his language, but this is what it says, “lo yishtamesh ela kefi hatzoreich lekiyum hamitzvah mimenu” [he should not use it except according to the need for fulfilling the commandment from it]. And this is how the Rambam rules in Hilchos De’os [Laws of Character Traits] and the Shulchan Aruch [Code of Jewish Law].
Anything that is more, he shouldn’t use marital relations, that’s what he means, he shouldn’t engage in relations except as much as he’s obligated. Anything, this is a very clear boundary, “kol bi’ah she’einah lo lekiyum periyah ureviyah” [every act of relations that is not for fulfilling procreation] – which one who hasn’t yet fulfilled procreation must have relations at every conjugal time, so it says in the Rambam – “o lekiyum onah shechayav bah” [or for fulfilling the conjugal obligation he is obligated in], or more than the conjugal obligation, each person according to his greatness and wisdom, “harei zo aveirah” [this is a transgression]. He transgresses kedoshim tihiyu, it’s a Torah-level transgression.
He doesn’t say “with fulfilling the commandment,” the Ramban doesn’t say “only if he wants more,” “only if he has a strong desire.” Yes, yes, okay, this is the laws of conjugal rights. Whatever the laws of conjugal rights, by the way, is indeed a mitzvah of kedoshim tihiyu. What do you think, only for men?
The Laws of Conjugal Rights Apply to Women Too
Okay, the whole thing what you just said, that one only brings by women the mitzvah, so says the Ramban that the mitzvah is that one may not do more than one is obligated to do, according to the need for fulfilling the commandment. So the measure is more than necessary. And you’re right that conjugal rights is a passive need. Okay, the rabbis ask, what’s not so different from three things, other laws where there’s a passive definition. So be it, not I but there are stated clear definitions, I don’t know, it’s not so hard to figure out. Okay.
The Second Category: Reducing Wine Drinking
Not I but, in the Mishnah it says, we’re speaking of the Baraita [Tannaitic teaching], “veyakdeish atzmo min hayayin bemi’ut” [and he should sanctify himself from wine by reducing], he should sanctify himself from wine, by drinking less wine. Like the Torah, as the verse calls the Nazirite holy. Yes, of course, there’s a dispute among the Tannaim, but the Ramban ruled, the simple reading of the verse says holy, he’s right. It doesn’t say sinner about one who drinks wine, yes, sinner is only stated if he became impure and he had corpse impurity.
Proofs from Noah and Lot
“veyizkor hara’os hanizkoros mimenu baTorah beNoach uv’Lot” [and remember the evils mentioned about it in the Torah regarding Noah and Lot], says the Ramban, in the Torah it’s clearly stated that one may not drink too much wine. Those incidents, not in a law, but in an incident, like Noah and Lot, you see what happened. What happened? By the way, what happened when one drinks too much wine? Like what happened to Noah and Lot. True, this is a huge topic for Sotah [suspected adulteress], true. “veyazir atzmo min hayayin” [and he should separate himself from wine]. Very good.
The Third Category: Purity and Impurity
And likewise, afterwards he doesn’t say only eating, “yifrosh” [he should separate], there’s another second thing, drinking less wine, he has a proof from the verse. He doesn’t say how much less, a Nazirite doesn’t drink any wine at all by the way, so that seems to be the measure. I don’t know.
Translation
“and likewise he should separate himself from impurity even though he is not a descendant of Aaron,” says the Ramban, not only that, he should be careful from becoming impure, even though there is no prohibition in the Torah to become impure. About this it says in the Gemara, “the Rabbis decreed impurity upon the am ha’aretz,” Perushim (Pharisees/those who separate themselves) are such people who conduct themselves with non-sacred food in ritual purity, yes, they eat, they conduct themselves regarding impurity and purity even when not required.
And about this he also has a proof from the Torah, because a Nazirite is called holy, why? He separates himself from corpse impurity. Now, as the Ramban attributes, when away from desires, right? It’s a completely new thing. By the way, this is the only thing that is explicitly called Perushim in the Gemara. Now, this is what the Ramban says, the Ramban in the Mishnah in tractate Nedarim “a fence for separation,” says the Ramban, it means to say, one who is very careful about impurity and purity.
Digression: Separation According to the Rambam Versus the Ramban
And about this our friend, Rabbi Yitzchak Shilat, tells us that they don’t agree with Rabbi Tzvi Yosef Kook, who said that one should translate the word according to the understanding of separation, because the Rambam doesn’t hold that way. The Rambam translated “carefulness,” they learned, they have no proof from the Rambam, because Rabbi Shmuel ibn Tibbon (medieval translator) translated “carefulness.” But it means “carefulness” is a funny translation, he wanted to rewrite separation. Right? Actually because “carefulness” is a mystical translation, but separation one cannot, because the Rambam says that separation means impurity and purity, and according to the Rambam this has nothing to do with desires. That’s certain.
Why is there even a concept of separation in purity? One must look in the Guide for the Perplexed where he speaks about the reasons for impurity and purity, and one can figure out something. Okay?
Critique: Impurity and Purity Don’t Fit into the Ramban’s Own Framework
And so, so this is also holiness. “You shall be holy” means that one should conduct oneself regarding impurity and purity. Really? Our master the Ramban, what are you telling me? “You shall be holy” says that one should avoid the deeds of Israel, with a positive commandment? What does he want to go for here? One goes to too few funerals? To too few cemeteries? The Vilna Gaon said so. The Vilna Gaon said… look, it’s certain, the moment he says this, I know that the Ramban isn’t speaking now about desires.
His problem was that there’s a deficiency in the Torah that one can be steeped in licentiousness, one can be impure. The Ramban says that it’s a deficiency in the Torah that one may be impure. One may be impure, one may not go into the Temple, not eat any holy foods, nothing comes from being impure. This isn’t bad, it’s not at all wrong. A person who is this is all of the types that we call today separation. Separation means to say, be careful what you do, you don’t step into a cemetery.
“Turn from Evil and Do Good” – The Ramban’s Own Connection
By the way, the Ramban himself connects “turn from evil and do good.” So what I told you earlier that it’s not the same is false. He says the explanation, and he says that the Ramban himself connects both “turn from evil and do good” and also “cessation from Shabbat work.” Although we see that the things are different. So what do I do? Anyway, you catch that here comes support for him. So what? Wait, wait, I’m going to come, I’m going to return to fortune/destiny. I’m going to try to make, we’re learning now the Ramban internally, okay?
The Fourth Category: Guarding One’s Speech
Afterwards he says, that is, another thing which is a matter of holiness, “and he should guard his mouth and tongue,” he should overcome himself. Two things prevent all this, “through excessive coarse eating,” too much eating, again, this is an amount here, excess, “and from excessive idle talk,” not eating, not speaking words, as it says “regarding bear and carcass.” Okay?
“And he should sanctify himself in this until he reaches separation,” what does separation mean? “As Rabbi Chiya said,” I remember if I remember that he brings it about Rav, “I have not engaged in idle conversation in my days,” not speaking even once any idle conversation, this is the separation of not only not speaking obscene speech, but generally not speaking. Okay?
Conclusion: Separation is a Matter of Quantity
So in short, the Ramban’s separation is a matter of quantity, this is very clear. It’s a matter of quantity, there can be levels in this, and perhaps this is…
So in other words, the Torah, I mean the Torah, this is both, but the Torah, the halacha, which the Ramban also admits that it’s very difficult to say the measures, and the Rabbis gave measures on certain things, also on this they gave measures, for example final washing of hands which he brings, and other such things. But the… no, but the Ramban says that this is not a general principle, let’s say that it’s better, right? And afterwards it fits better, it’s a matter, it’s a better reason afterwards from what we see.
Rabbinic Enactments as Torah-Level
And the Ramban explains that in this are all the rabbinic enactments which he says, so says the Ramban, it says “and you shall sanctify yourselves,” initial washing of hands, final washing, this is all also included in the entire commandments of rabbinic commandments. The Ramban doesn’t have the problem that something should be both rabbinic and Torah-level at the same time, don’t ask me how this is supposed to work. The Rambam would definitely never agree with such a thing, almost never. And… the main difficulty and the difficulty remains in place. The Ramban holds that a rabbinic fence is a true Torah-level decree. Eh, what does rabbinic mean? Don’t ask me. Well, a good question.
The Ramban’s “Particular and General” Model – And Strong Critique Upon It
In any case, and he says, he explains… yes, in short, let’s… there’s too many topics getting stuck in the same plane. The point is, the Ramban actually explains that this is the way of the Torah to make particular and general, just as after “you shall not steal” it says “you shall not deceive one another,” and after “work” it says “you shall rest,” which this is a Torah-level prohibition.
Critique: The Connections Don’t Fit
But to be clear, the connections of the holy Ramban himself don’t make sense, as I said earlier, because when one speaks of “you shall not deceive one another” there isn’t any general principle, let’s understand, if one will be correct that the Torah stands on certain prohibitions and the Torah adds fines, this is not particular and general. The two things have nothing to do with each other. Because there’s no connection at all.
I understand what you’re saying, I understand very well that “You shall be holy” is a general principle of “you shall not steal.” Because it’s “you shall not steal,” it’s something wrong. “You shall not steal” is not good because it is so, and there’s a lot about how one transgresses “you shall not steal.” “You shall not steal,” “you shall not oppress,” “you shall not deceive,” all kinds of things. Okay, if you transgress in another way, it’s also good in general.
The Specific Question on Forbidden Relations
But in which way is “You shall be holy” a general principle of… of his wife, of his daughter, and his daughter’s daughter, and his son’s daughter, and his wife’s wife, and whatever, his wife’s daughter, and so on and so forth. How are the two things connected at all? There’s some assumption here, right? It’s not at all the same.
Yes, if one looks only at fines, then he’s right, right?
The Question on “You Shall Rest”
And by the way, if you want to say regarding the prohibited labors, it totally doesn’t make sense. Because when the Ramban says “you shall rest,” he means to do exertion, dragging, doing things that are very difficult. It’s forbidden because it’s… it says “you shall rest.” What does the Ramban say? It’s Torah-level, according to the Ramban. Not rabbinic Shabbat prohibitions. Rabbinic Shabbat prohibitions that the Gemara… this is the “you shall rest” that actually comes from the language of rabbinic Shabbat prohibitions. According to the Ramban it’s not that. That is boundaries, distancings from the prohibited labors. But “you shall rest” is an extra prohibition.
It says in the Gemara that it’s a prohibition. The Gemara has a prohibition of carrying very heavy things on Shabbat, bringing in a storehouse, I don’t know what various things. Running can be that there’s a related prohibition. There’s a verse, “finding your needs.” Whatever. But in any case, there’s a prohibition in the Gemara, there’s a prohibition of doing heavy things. According to the Ramban it’s Torah-level. Eh, no one knew before the Ramban that it’s Torah-level, but according to the Ramban it’s a proper Torah-level prohibition, because it says “you shall rest.”
Prohibited Labors Have Nothing to Do with Heavy
And this is not a particular of prohibited labors, just to be clear. Prohibited labors are not a bit heavy. Prohibited labors have nothing to do with heavy. Prohibited labors is to do prohibited labors. The Ramban certainly didn’t understand that way. But back to… you are making so many assumptions to fit everything into this picture, and it’s not such a nice picture.
Summary: The Ramban’s Entire System is Built on Quantity
Let us return to our matter, what I mean is, okay, one can learn a few more times the Ramban and see. One can still properly today. He says many things that not all agree with each other. What let’s see is, that let’s speak away the topic of separation from bodily pleasures. It appears that the Ramban couldn’t imagine any thing that says what is good and what is bad, except for the amount.
The Ramban’s Innovation of “Quantity” in Forbidden Relations and Desire – An Analysis and Critique
The Ramban’s Basic Assumption: Everything is Only a Question of Quantity
Instructor:
There’s no hint at all in the entire Ramban, except for one thing which is called quantity. About this the Ramban thinks, that here, let’s say, that there are levels. There’s a person who is completely abstinent, his ideal abstinent is one who doesn’t do marital relations except for the sake of fulfilling the commandment, and even then he doesn’t enjoy himself, like Rabbi Eliezer and so on. This is the perfection of abstinence. There’s one who enjoys himself a bit more, there’s one who does such enjoyment that is completely forbidden, like forbidden sexual relations.
But it’s not truly different from the perspective of wickedness, from the perspective of the general principle, right? What he calls here the general principle, true? It’s a general principle and specific detail, this is the wickedness, the badness. What is wrong with sleeping with one’s sister? It’s wrong to generally sleep, it’s wrong generally to have marital relations.
I wasn’t here the first three minutes, and one argues the whole time about quantity. Perhaps a sister you’ll also say that it’s quantity? It’s quantity. It’s two inches closer to you. A cousin…
No, in the Ramban, wait, wait, it’s not quantity, the Torah doesn’t stand on quantity.
The Ramban’s Innovation: Separation as a Torah-Level Obligation
About this the Ramban is strong, the Ramban invented something that nobody before him knew, that there’s an obligation which is called to be abstinent. Let’s be honest, well, I mean that the Ramban says something very novel and very weird, right?
People were abstinent, people were… it’s not heresy. People were abstinent, let’s already say that there were abstinent people in the Talmud. None of the abstinent people said that it’s a Biblical commandment to be abstinent, true? And certainly didn’t say, and certainly, you certainly can’t find any hint in the Gemara, one can, they certainly didn’t say, let’s say, let’s assume that they certainly didn’t say, they certainly didn’t say that there’s a lacuna, there’s a hole in the halacha, halacha which is so occupied in saying which one may yes and which one may not, that it’s forgotten the basic thing of less.
Of course, technically every thing that one may not is a bit less, I agree. But this is like a different thing, right? There’s no connection, it’s absolutely not at all related. It’s two different topics, less and not your sister is not the same thing.
The Rambam’s System vs. The Ramban
A whole bit less, I agree. That seems to be how the Rambam (Maimonides) is imagining it here, although there’s other reasons.
Student:
You’re right that here there’s an absolute permission, what you want. It’s not hard, it’s very easy. Multiple forbidden relations one may not too much, and with a married woman one may not at all. But the slave one may not at all, one may Torah-wise you can bring in, it’s not at all difficult. The Rambam should be able to write, you can Torah-wise write. What’s the problem? It’s very clear. There’s an obligatory prohibition, the Rambam is very clear.
Instructor:
I don’t understand what you want, I don’t understand what you want. I don’t agree with you, and you can say that you don’t agree with me. You’re not permitting to forbid, you’re permitting to permit. It’s not a prohibition, it’s not a prohibition, it’s not a prohibition.
Okay, once you say it’s forbidden, then you’re not saying it’s fully forbidden. You’re saying so much, you’re saying a measure. What’s the problem? Measures is a thing that’s foreign to the Torah? There are no measures, there are no measures. I don’t understand.
Student:
The conjugal frequency of Torah scholars is a measure, from Sabbath to Sabbath.
Instructor:
Yes, but this is a measure that the Torah made. The oath, a bit of pleasure of the World to Come. I told you before the lesson. Exactly. Here the Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law) rules literally this. And the Shulchan Aruch also rules like the Rambam, that more than this is the prohibition of the prohibition of “You shall be holy,” positive prohibition, whatever you want to call it, positive commandment.
Ah, well, the Shulchan Aruch doesn’t bring this, that more means more than appropriate. This is the meaning, there’s a measure, it’s not a complicated thing. The Rambam doesn’t say this, he says yes, but you don’t want to agree.
The Torah’s Qualitative Distinctions
It says in the Torah, “You shall be holy.” Well, I ask you, why does one need all these other things?
Again, again, again, let’s understand, let’s understand, it’s not in the same category. Let’s understand what they’re saying, okay? What I’m saying is a very clear thing. What I’m saying is, that the Rambam doesn’t look like he assumes that there’s such a thing to speak about at all. If you speak about the majority of desire, if there are other reasons for forbidden relations, according to Kabbalah, according to esoteric teaching, we’re not speaking now.
If you speak about the topic that he calls, the opposite of this is called a scoundrel according to the Ramban, or in the Tosafot on Tractate Shevuot he’s called a true abstinent person, there’s no way of speaking about this, only more and less. So says the holy Rambam.
There’s no consideration, there’s no discretionary judgment that says this sort is permitted, that sort forbidden. There’s only more and less, and the entire scale that he has is by all topics, whether by speech, whether by wine, whether by everything, the sum total of perfection should have been completely zero, but let’s say that one must educate oneself to this, he doesn’t say exactly the entire thing that you put in, one must go…
Desires: Are They All the Same Thing? – A Philosophical Investigation
I have a minute, what the Torah says, with the sister it’s zimah [sexual immorality] and with the wife it’s good. This is stated in the Chumash [the Five Books of Moses]. Why? I don’t know, we’ll talk about that. But this is what the Torah actually says. It’s not more and less, it’s different. It’s different.
The Parable of Kosher French Fries and Pork
Just like the grocer holds. The grocer also holds, going back to my example, the grocer also holds that pickles with meat are not the same desire.
The Ramban comes with a chiddush, both of these things are all desire, and therefore one must eat less. There’s one who likes pickles more, one who likes meat more, these are already all pratim [details] in the quantity, which thing the quantity is chal [applies to]. But basically there is only quantity.
And therefore, he thinks that there’s a big lach [hole] in the Torah bli mitzvat “lo taturu” [without the commandment “You shall not stray”], and not only in this, because according to the Ramban there is indeed a mitzvah of “lo taturu”, according to Rashi, right? According to Rashi there isn’t the mitzvah of “lo taturu”, the Ramban also says that Rashi isn’t right about this. There’s a big hole in the Chumash, because the Chumash lets you be a naval. Right?
If you would imagine even the concept of ichut [quality], this argument would make no sense. The Torah doesn’t let one be a naval. You want to say that one must still take shemirat hadin [guarding the law], there are still things that one can, that’s a different problem. Because the Ramban lays it down clearly that there is a problem.
The Ramban’s Biological Claim About Desire
You can do with your wife the same, in other words, the Ramban makes such a claim, okay? There’s like, there’s a philosophical or a psychological, I don’t know what to say, biological claim. The biological claim is that the hana’ah [pleasure] that a person has from sleeping with his wife is the same exact hana’ah that he has from sleeping with his sister, or with another eishet ish [married woman]. So says the Ramban.
And a person must have a certain middah [character trait] called perishut, the same middah. Now, you’ll say, let’s not talk about middot [character traits], the Ramban never talks about middot, he doesn’t talk about this, I have no ra’ayah [proof]. I once learned that the Ramban, it took him a few months to grasp what a middah means. So perhaps the Ramban didn’t know what this means. Okay? Does he tell us, does he say it somewhere? He doesn’t say it in the hakdamah to Shemonah Perakim [Introduction to Eight Chapters], certainly not. He was born to leave him alone.
But let’s say it’s true, okay, let’s say we understand that this is a thing like a middah, it’s the same middah that makes the person, the same exact middah that makes a person not sleep with another’s wife, makes him sleep less with his wife. The same exact middah. And in halachah there’s a chiluk [distinction], this means klal [general principle], this means prat [specific detail], this is an issur befeirush [explicit prohibition], this is an issur just so, he’ll be medayek [be precise] about this. But it’s the same exact middah. In other words, the same exact thing.
The Chovot HaLevavot and “Minhag HaHeiter”
And not, about this the Chovot HaLevavot [Duties of the Heart] says, yes, “minhag haheiter” [the practice of permissibility] is an aveirah [sin]. Have you ever heard? Can you make sense of this? I’m not saying you can’t make sense. The Chovot HaLevavot thinks like the Rambam.
If a person eats way too much, have you ever seen a person, have you noticed that people who eat a lot of French fries, kosher French fries, end up eating chazer [pork]? True? It’s the same ta’avah, true? Why must one be mitgaber [overcome oneself] to eat treifot [non-kosher food]? Some middah called kovesh et yitzro [subduing one’s inclination]. I don’t know what kind of middah one must be mitgaber to be a parush. True?
Someone who just doesn’t eat any treifot is a very small parush. Someone who is the opposite, it’s the same exact thing, there’s no difference at all.
Student:
I didn’t say, I said that someone who wants to say that perishut is a geder [fence] for arayot, as you say, that someone who eats a lot, he’ll end up eating chazer. That’s not true, that’s not one hundred percent true.
Instructor:
I haven’t yet said what is true, I only said that this is a certain hanachah [assumption] about the equality of the two hana’ot, the hana’ah from a restaurant and the hana’ah from the Torah HaKedoshah [the holy Torah]. I just want to make clear, it’s the hana’ah from the two things. Okay? In the Torah one sees that there’s a huge chiluk.
Did the Torah tell us to eat less kosher [kosher food]? Never. Why? Because one will then eat treifah? But I’m afraid you think it doesn’t make sense.
The Question of Yirat Shamayim and Middot
Student:
What do you mean? I can be a presser [glutton], and I can stop exactly at the boundary. What will stop me at the boundary?
Instructor:
Okay, yirat shamayim [fear of Heaven].
Student:
Yirat shamayim, that’s an avodah on middot tovot [good character traits], one must have the right middah. But when the middah must be the middah of not eating, so therefore we must be parush with tzaddik tish’ah sha’arei heiter [righteous with nine gates of permissibility], so we shouldn’t arrive at one sha’ar issur [one gate of prohibition], because otherwise there isn’t something else that will stop me.
Instructor:
That’s what the Ramban says, that’s what the Ramban basically says, right? Correct? Ad kan divrei mekadshi, va’ani omer [thus far the words of the holy one, and I say], I don’t know. The Ramban says, and this doesn’t make any sense, okay? So why doesn’t it make any sense? Because I know people, and you’re right that there’s a peshat [simple explanation], I’m not saying it never makes sense. I’ll tell you more in lamdut [in learning].
Critique of the Ramban’s Assumption About the Equality of Desires
What we say in lamdut is, that it’s not true, there’s no reason at all to think, you know what? Let’s say like this, you have been machlit [you have decided] that there’s a category of ta’avah. I’m a machchish [denier], by me there’s no such thing. You told me there’s such a category. You have been machlit that there’s such a thing called, you have a ra’ayah. What is your ra’ayah? What is the ra’ayah that everything has really only the same ta’avah, and everything has with nashim [women] the same ta’avah? What is the ra’ayah? Ra’ayah ladavar [proof for the matter]… yes?
Student:
That’s what you hold? You have a ra’ayah for this?
Instructor:
The Ramban says, by the way, the Ramban says this befeirush [explicitly], okay? Lema’an tzafoto harbeh et hata’avah [in order to greatly increase the desire], says the Ramban, okay, I’m cholek [I disagree] on this. I’m not simply cholek, again, there’s some cases in which it’s true, but it’s more not true than true, okay?
There are people who love women so much, and there are people who love men so much too, did you know such a reality? So says the Ramban. It’s the same thing, it’s a chiluk with whom one does it. There are people who have beteva [by nature] more like this, beteva more like this, but lema’aseh [in practice] everything is one shem ta’avah achat hi [one name, it is one desire].
Student:
They don’t say, they don’t agree? They don’t agree? They don’t agree? They say it’s very different?
Instructor:
Test, it could be that it’s very different, but there’s such a thing called, there are people who love people. I have no love to speak divrei Torah [words of Torah], chas veshalom [God forbid]. I ask you a question, the Ramban literally says the argument, that if a person will be a great mitmid [diligent student], somewhere there’s a sublimation, he’s a modern person.
Student:
No, one doesn’t see that afterwards.
Instructor:
No, not. That’s a very funny way of looking at it, right? And you say, of course, if someone holds that any things for a person that he loves will do, there’s no thing of tov vera [good and evil] at all, then that’s also permitted. But that’s a philosophy that you say. I… the Ramban… that’s a philosophy. We’re not talking philosophy. We’re talking now about pleasure.
Desires: Are They All the Same Thing? – A Philosophical Investigation
The Ramban’s Argument and Reality
Maggid Shiur:
I ask you a question. The Ramban literally says the argument, that if a person will be a great ba’al ta’avah [master of desire/lustful person], I – again, somewhere there’s such a metziut [reality] – in a modern person, in a certain… no, one doesn’t see that. No, not. That’s a very funny way of looking at it, right?
And I’m speaking, certainly, if someone holds that any thing that a person loves, let him do, there’s no such thing as tov vera [good and evil] at all, then that’s also mutar [permitted]. But that’s a philosophy that you say. The Ramban, that’s a philosophy. We’re not talking about philosophy, we’re talking now about pleasure.
I know people, baruch Hashem, they’re ba’alei ta’avah, I don’t know, let’s say, I don’t know them, chas veshalom [God forbid], all Jews are kedoshim utehorim [holy and pure]. But I know quite fine people who are less parush [abstemious/restrained] and more parush. No, I have never yet seen, that the one who is less parush should bete’ut [by mistake] or bemezid [deliberately], certainly not, eat chazer [pork]. I have only seen, I can say, that someone who goes around in very many restaurants and is not makpid [careful] on hechsher [kosher certification], do me a favor, but that’s not what we’re talking about, true? That’s kodem [first of all].
But that’s still when it is indeed the same, because the treifene [non-kosher] meat doesn’t taste so different from the kosher meat. How different can chazer be from a ku [cow]? I mean the behemot [animals], I mean, it’s not so different, let’s say, it’s not distinguished differently. And one can taste everything today as kosher, one can buy false others.
The Ra’ayah from Arayot [sexual prohibitions]: Ta’avah to Zecharim [males] Against Nekevot [females]
Maggid Shiur:
But if you find, if it should happen with another ta’avah [desire], which most people think even more with ta’avot that it’s all the same thing, right? There’s no difference at all with whom one does it, how one does it, it’s all the same thing. As the Gemara [Talmud] says, “kol hanishnof bi’ah” [any breathing/panting is intercourse], right? It’s the same ta’avah, exactly, right?
Why doesn’t one actually see that the people who do more ta’avot with women, also do it with men more? One doesn’t see it, I’m ready to say. It doesn’t fit with logic, one doesn’t see it. With kerovim [relatives]? Also not. The Gemara states indeed that there’s no ta’avah. This already stands in the Gemara like us. Almost not. Yes, there’s no ta’avah.
Again, you can always find a very extreme – again, the choleh [sick person] that we’re not talking about him, we’re not talking at the table about any cholim [sick people]. Someone who is a choleh, he has such a strong ta’avah, he does it with everyone, with a table, with a bench, with his wife, with his sister, with his mother, with a tree, with a person – we’re not talking about that person. Yes?
Student:
What? In the Gemara it says that a goy [non-Jew] pulls like that.
Maggid Shiur:
Yes, very good. A goy from the times of the Gemara. Aren’t you talking about that twisted person? Regarding us he’s twisted. Perhaps in that in certain tekufot [time periods] that was normal. I don’t know.
A normal person there’s no way at all how one arrived from one to the other. And not that there’s no way because he’s very afraid because it’s very woe. Because each one of us understands that it’s a… no, not ethically, not because he’s an ethical philosopher. Because it’s a different ta’avah.
The Main Principle: Each Ta’avah is Unique
Maggid Shiur:
I’m machchish [deny] the whole thing. A whole truth that I found in the same ever [limb/organ], I don’t know. I don’t believe in the guf, I don’t know anymore. I hold that the guf is tzarich iyun [requires investigation] if it exists. The neshamah [soul] certainly exists, because they talk the whole time.
So, one needs a ra’ayah [proof]. I hold that one needs a ra’ayah to say that all ta’avot are the same. I have no ra’ayah at all for this. Not any ra’ayah from my feeling.
The Parable of Eating: Potato Chips Against Potato Kugel
Maggid Shiur:
We feel potato chips very different from potato kugel. Even though both are made from potatoes, it’s a peleh [wonder]. But it’s completely a different ta’avah. That most days I have no ta’avah for potato chips. Or the opposite, I don’t know anymore, whatever. Even I only have a ta’avah for one of them, not for both.
It happens very rarely that one eats very much potato kugel and very much potato chips with the same ta’avah. It’s completely a different thing. Here I turn, I hold that there are different, a person’s nefesh [soul] has very many of them.
I was told nefesh hata’avah [the soul of desire], the nefesh hata’avah has 25,000. The one who loves potato chips is not the same as the one who loves potato kugel. Bring me a ra’ayah that it’s the same. Do you have a ra’ayah? And the one who loves zecharim is not the same as the one who loves nekevot. Not at all the same.
Discussion: The “Koach HaNefesh” [power of the soul] Theory
Student:
I said. You’re asking me what I said. Bring me a ra’ayah.
Maggid Shiur:
I said no ra’ayah. I said that I have no ra’ayah. Bring me a ra’ayah from reality. Bring me a ra’ayah that there’s a klal ta’avah, that’s a category. How does it go into the category? Have you seen it? I don’t know. I mean seriously.
And they’re all very sure that they felt it, they didn’t feel it. We feel exactly the opposite. It feels very different one ta’avah from the other ta’avah. Even in the same nosa [subject]. Even when both go into the same mouth.
The Parable of Drinking: Brandy Against Liqueur
Maggid Shiur:
It feels completely different. Brandy is not the same ta’avah as liqueur. I don’t understand. Even though both are alcohol. I have a different ta’avah. I’m talking about reality. I don’t know any level. Ta’avah, the level of ta’avah, the level of having a cheshek [desire]. Why? From where did you take this klal? There’s a hedonism, I sit and I eat, I gorge, I dance, I sleep with people.
But then remember, remember that’s also whoever loves to daven [pray] is a hedonist in that sense. Could be. We already decided in a previous shiur, there’s no reason to think that. You’re again making a klal that you never saw.
There’s a shiur how many klalim one can make with chamishah hachushim [the five senses] and still say that this is the peirush [explanation] in a mikra [Biblical verse], and whoever says otherwise says a chiddush [novel interpretation]. It’s the opposite, you’re making a klal.
The “Attraction = Gravity” Comparison
Maggid Shiur:
I also hold, you know what? You know what else? You know that the attraction of people between zecharim and nekevot is the same as gravity. It’s the same thing, things that pull each other. True? It seems that it’s the same thing. You understand that… yes, it’s good poetry, but it has no shayachut [connection].
Student:
Why not? It makes sense.
Maggid Shiur:
Why do I mean it’s true? It doesn’t have… it doesn’t have… it has less things in common. It doesn’t have… it has less things in common.
Student:
Be’ofen perati [in a particular way], I’ll come back to you on this. Be’ofen perati it’s different, because this talks about people and that talks about everything. But be’ofen klali [in a general way] it’s the same. It’s a koach of attraction in the world, and gravity with sexual attraction is the same thing.
Maggid Shiur:
The first thing, to count two things… okay, and eating kugel and eating potato chips is on two different planes. What is the shayachut between the two things? From where did you find the shayachut between them? They go into the same mouth? Because they’re two things that one talks about, so talking is the same thing? It doesn’t make sense.
Student:
They both come from the same koach hanefesh [power of the soul].
Maggid Shiur:
Who invented the koach hanefesh? There’s no such koach hanefesh. Koach hanefesh is a theory that we say based on what we see. True? What is the edut [testimony/evidence] for the koach hanefesh? How did you see it?
Student:
Very good, it’s a logical reasoning (sevara), true, and you can only see it with intellect (b’sechel). It’s not a feeling.
Maggid Shiur:
The feeling is different. The feeling is also different. I don’t know that the feeling is the same.
Student:
The foundation (yesod) of the feeling is the same?
Maggid Shiur:
Not at all. The feeling, I’ll tell you very clearly, because if someone asks the question (kashya) about spiritual pleasures (ta’anugim ruchaniyim), I also have pleasure (hana’ah) from physical pleasures (ta’anugim gashmiyim) and spiritual pleasures, they don’t feel different in any way? Not at all in particular. Complete nonsense (shtuyot) with this noodles business. They don’t feel the same. There’s nothing similar in their feeling.
And not only that, when the same… no, no, I’m saying it’s not. Finished. I’m saying the opposite, that they’re not the same. I agree (maskím) that you can call both ta’avah (desire), just as you can call attraction both attraction. It’s even similar, I’m not saying it’s similar.
Discussion: Maimonides (Rambam) and the Relationship of Desires
Student:
So what? What did the Rambam compare?
Maggid Shiur:
Let’s… not exactly, I don’t want to go into a distinction (chiluk) now. Very good. I don’t agree with you on this. I’m just saying that you understand that even according to the Rambam this is not literally (k’pshuto) and not the same way. True?
Student:
No, no. Not literally doesn’t mean that…
Maggid Shiur:
In short (kitzur), you need proof, okay? I also need proof that loving French fries is the same as loving kugel. I need proof, I haven’t yet found any proof. A list, I’m not ready to think that this is the simple meaning (pshat). You’re saying this is the general rule (klal). I don’t see what the general rule is that’s similar to both.
The Physical Level: Nutrients and Function
Maggid Shiur:
If you’ll say in physicality (b’gashmiyut), in the sense that both give nutrients to the body, I’ll agree. But I’m not talking about that, right? Both can bring children, or you can’t have children, but anyway you can bring children. I agree, on that I agree, but it’s not relevant (nogei’a).
Because we’re talking earlier that just as we talk about the nutritive soul (nefesh hazon), those who need that, that works with an injection too. That has nothing to do with desires (ta’avot), right? You can do artificial insemination, what’s it called, and it works just as well. So around to do (la’asot) works just as well. So the definition of having children, or that eating should make vitality (chiyut) for a person, that’s not the desire. The desire is something else, right? So no problem, it’s the same in that sense.
But we’re not talking about the desire, we’re talking about the part of desire within it (chelek hata’avah shebo). You can call it soul (nefesh), I don’t have another word for it. The part of the soul within it (chelek hanefesh shebo). Who convinced you that the same part of the soul loves kugel and loves Rabbi Akiva Eiger? Based on what? Not Rabbi Akiva Eiger, kugel with pickles.
Desire and Lack/Deficiency (Machsor)
Student:
If there’s a reason (sibah) why a person has a desire…
Maggid Shiur:
Those are theories, and in practice (l’ma’aseh) it’s not true, right? People have desires even when they don’t need to eat. And we’re talking about that one.
I want first truly to bring out what the Rambam says. And other proofs. But I don’t disagree (machlok) that this is the point from the standpoint of nature, from the standpoint of God who made it. But we’re talking about what it is, right? What is it? I don’t see why you should think it’s the same thing, that the desire is the same as that desire. What’s the proof? What’s the source (makor) to think it’s the same?
Student:
But it proves still that…
Maggid Shiur:
Again, prima facie, on the face of it (al hapanim), on the face of it, you have to first show that it feels the same at least. I don’t know, that’s not true.
The Words-Argument: Language and Categories
Student:
Yes, yes, and that… no, the same words is almost never proof, not on this level.
Maggid Shiur:
Why would we have too few words? In general, the dictionary isn’t big enough. I hold that you simply need to make new words all the time. Every day that you say a shiur you say two things (dinim) and you say it’s the same word. Yes, because we would have needed… the language is poor.
Hunger, Thirst, and Other Desires
Student:
By the way, we have other names for other parts, by the way. It’s not at all true what you’re saying that we don’t have other names. Here you say you’re thirsty, here you say you’re hungry. A tremendous (morah’dik) distinction (chiluk).
Maggid Shiur:
That’s not the desire within it (ta’avah shebo). That’s the deficiency (machsor)! That’s the deficiency! That’s the deficiency! That’s not the desire. Hunger means… by the way, you’re right, let’s not talk about the physical level of hunger, but I crave a piece of kugel, I crave hunger, I crave thirst, and a third person craves alcohol, and a fourth person craves a cigarette, and you have to be precise (medayek zayn) whether it’s actually the desire according to the rules we’re learning.
In any case (al kol panim), these are different desires, and it’s called… it’s not the same thing. There’s no reason to guess that it’s the same thing.
Is a Cigarette a Desire?
Student:
A cigarette is a desire?
Maggid Shiur:
No, they learned that it’s not clear, you have to be precise. But, don’t get me away on that. No, no, I have about this another shiur to speak entirely. And I’ll give you another shiur. No, also a telephone is a desire. Not now, nu.
Conclusion: The Assumptions (Hafshtot) That We Talk Ourselves Into
Maggid Shiur:
And we understand what I’m trying to confuse. What I’m trying to confuse is that we’re very certain about certain assumptions (hafshtot), and we talk ourselves into thinking that the assumptions are still in physicality (b’gashmiyut), and they’re definitely not in physicality, in the sense that you can give a person a pill and he should have a, he should become aroused (nitkasheh veren), or in the sense that you can put in him a piece of seed/sperm (zera) and he should have a baby, or a piece of appendix.
Desires, Rules, and the Usefulness of Assumptions in Character Work (Avodat HaMidot)
Assumptions Are Not Physical – And They’re Not All the Same
Instructor: He already agrees to another approach. No, also buying phones is a desire. Not every noise.
What I understand that I’m trying to confuse, what I’m trying to confuse is, that we’re very certain about certain abstractions (hafshtot), and we talk ourselves into thinking that the abstractions are still in physicality. And they’re definitely not in physicality, unless you’re talking about at the very low level, in the sense in which you can give a person a pill and he should become pregnant (nit’aber veren), or, yes, or in the sense that you can put in him a piece of seed/sperm (zera) and he’ll have a baby, or a piece of food and he’ll become strong. I’m not talking about that. If you’re talking about the desire (ta’avah) which is a spirit (ruach), meaning spirituality (ruchaniyut), it’s something that I can talk about, I can feel it or talk about it, it doesn’t feel the same.
Even the desire, let’s say it deeper, okay? Let’s say that desire, sexual desire (ta’avat zivug), you can literally feel it in the blood, it raises up some organ/limb (ever) in the body, it rises up. But it feels different depending on whom it rises up for. Different contexts, it doesn’t feel the same. I don’t know, where do you get the idea that it’s all the same? People talk all the time about the distinctions (chilukim). You can go to every book in the store that talks about this, it will tell you that there are all kinds of sorts and all kinds, it depends on who it is, it depends on so many things.
Let’s assume, it’s an abstraction (hafshtah) like every abstraction that exists, and and it’s false. False. It’s not different from every abstraction that exists. The kugel from Sunday and the kugel from Sunday and the kugel from the Sunday after, the difference (chiluk) is only the time. The kugel from Sunday is again the same thing. If it’s the same thing, first of all, no. It’s certain that Shabbat and Sunday is not the same. It’s certain that Shabbat and Sunday is not the same. From Sunday to Monday there’s also a difference between Sunday and Monday.
No, it’s both the same kugel. The people are different. If the people are different, it’s actually different. The kugel that you eat, the ice that you eat before the meal and the ice that you eat after the meal are two different desires, although it’s both ice. Not semantics, in reality. What do you feel? Do you feel the same? I haven’t talked about feelings, but you have to start somewhere. A part that is a feeling, I don’t have feelings, I don’t have arousal, I don’t have attraction. It’s different. We’ve talked ourselves into it, they put into our heads from somewhere, I don’t know from where, some false assumption (hanacha) exists, that it’s the same, and then questions (kushyot) begin to be asked. It’s not the same, it’s different.
The Ramban’s Question and the False Assumption of “One Linguistic Source”
Instructor: I don’t know where it came from. You told me that the Ramban (Nachmanides) asks a good question. Which question? You told me that the true Ramban asks what is a question. Very good. The Ramban’s question is based on the false assumption that there is one source/root for all uses of a term (ein lashon makor), okay? And the Torah doesn’t say that.
Parable: The Joke of “Family, Love, and Philosophy”
Instructor: I can ask something I want to tell you. My father used to say this joke, he used to tell an old joke. Every time one of my children went on a meeting (beshurut – meeting a potential marriage match), he always asked us, the young man (bachur), what should he talk about with the girl? He said, you talk about three things: you talk about family (mishpacha), love (libeh), and philosophy. Love, you talk about family, love, and philosophy.
So the young man goes to the family… no, you talk about family. The young man didn’t know what to talk about. He says, you talk about the three things: family, love – you talk about romance, you know – and philosophy. You know, something that has a worldview (hashkafa). So the young man goes into the meeting, he comes out a minute later. What happened? What did you ask? What did you talk about? He said, I talked about all three. I asked, “Do you have a brother?” She said, “No.” So I went to love. “Do you like noodles?” She said, “No.” So I asked, “If you had a brother, would he like noodles?” That’s philosophy.
No, I ask, what do you learn from this parable (mashal)? What? Yes, what do you learn from the joke? I want to know if the parable… I understand that… no, I want to know… I want to tell you something. Okay, because in this thing they say that the love of noodles and the love of love is basically… we all say, we say that basically something was made such that every time you use love on something that’s not us, it’s one thing. I understand that it’s foolish, yes? That it’s a certain foolish thinking of… it’s, you have a brother, and you talk about family, meaning there’s no family, and you want to talk like my brother is older, or younger than the one who has more wisdom (chochmah), and you can say, it’s a good philosophy, but not what was meant.
Nu, I just want to say, that you’re saying the rules (klalim) of things…
Rules Are Not Metaphysics – But Ethics (Usefulness)
Instructor: Of course, whenever I deny rules (klalim), just to be very clear, when I deny rules, I’m not talking metaphysics, not in this shiur, not for metaphysics.
Student: Both.
Instructor: It’s only for ethics. What I mean to say is, that I hold that it’s less useful. Ethics means, just to be clear, and according to most modern scientists, at least pragmatism and so on, the concepts, or you can even say the levels of categories, the levels of rules that we choose to speak about, that we choose to model, is what is useful for us to achieve certain purposes. Right? Everything in the world can be modeled on very many levels. Let’s say…
Student: What?
Instructor: No, not exactly. I’m saying that a model, all models are false, some models are useful, right? Remember that slogan? A model, and I’m saying a rule, when we talk about faculties of the soul (kochot hanefesh), just as we learned the introduction (hakdamah) of Aristotle, we learned an introduction to this, that when we talk about faculties of the soul regarding (l’gabei) ethics, we’re not talking about laws of Kabbalah/mysticism (hilchot kabbalah). Whether there are indeed the faculties, whether there aren’t, that’s asked in another question in another shiur. Certainly I hold that there’s some connection, but what we want to know is, whether it’s useful to talk, whether it’s worthwhile to become a better person, right, to talk about this, right?
Parable: The Mechanic and the Car
Instructor: For example (l’mashal), like all my parables (meshalim), it’s a very basic thing, if I want to fix my car, I need to know certain concepts/understandings (hasagot) about the car. I must at least know that a car has an engine with a transmission with an, I don’t know what, electric system. And the rule is important, because I need to check whether it’s a problem of the transmission or of the electric system or of the fuel line, I don’t know what three systems there are. It could be that the concepts are the wrong concepts to understand how a car works or something like that, I don’t know. For diagnostics it’s a good concept, okay?
The same thing, when we talk that there are rules regarding ethics/character development (l’inyenei mussar), regarding the soul (l’inyenei hanefesh), in this context, mainly we mean that it’s useful to talk about this, and it’s useful to become, you become a better person from thinking this rule. If you think about this rule by way of example (b’derech mashal), it is indeed interesting.
Arguments Against the Ramban’s Framing
Instructor: When the Ramban spoke, I mean that the Ramban’s framing is extremely messed up, and messes people up, and everyone cries here for days on end. It doesn’t help me at all, let’s say if you want to know that it’s true, that this is a force of attraction… I also hold that it’s true that this is a force of attraction which is the same when the moon (levanah) revolves around the world and when people love other people. I also hold that it’s true. But if you’re talking, you’re trying to explain (mevaer zayn) at a wedding (chasunah), or at finding a match (shidduch), or at loving, as he says, you’re playing with the wrong level to channel it, it doesn’t address the issue, a war that the same in the moon is the same, very good.
For example when the Rebbe says all the time like this in matters of character refinement (refiyut hanefesh), like when a person with him should eat, whether yes goes into things, or refinement says spread it something is wrong, and uses the address when a person doesn’t understand what is really right and what is really wrong. Nu, okay. There are two interesting ones. And the Rebbe uses already the beaver, you don’t understand anything! What do I understand better? What does understand here mean, that I can do something, I can only some vision/understanding (chozeh) on the outside. What do I do with mixing all these things into one kugel in one pot? Okay. What do I do with this?
First Argument: It Makes the Torah’s Laws a “Waste of Time”
Instructor: Actually, I make everything worse. I’ll tell you why. because you end up not understanding. First of all (kodem kol), if you were a Jew, and you say that the highest, you stop understanding the whole Torah truly, and the whole Torah says that this is the desire (ta’avah) yes and that desire no, and by you everything is quantitative (kamut). So, the whole Torah seems to be some sort of waste of time. Regarding the topic of… they tell you that all these ethical teachers (ba’alei mussar) very explicitly (b’feirush), I don’t know what is Rabbeinu Yonah and the Ramban, they bring all these things, they say that you can fulfill (mekayem zayn) all 613 commandments (taryag mitzvot), okay, except according to the Ramban’s interpretation on the commandment of “you shall be holy” (kedoshim tihiyu), and be a complete scoundrel (sheygets gamur).
There’s something very weird about saying this. Not only in the sense that I have to believe that the Torah makes you a better person or something, in the sense that the Torah actually does have what to say about hanhaga [conduct/behavior]. It’s not true, there isn’t a Sefer HaKedusha [Book of Holiness] in the Rambam [Maimonides]? There isn’t a Yoreh De’ah [section of Jewish law]? The entire Jewish kitchen and the Jewish bedroom is full of halachos [Jewish laws], and you say waste of time, you could do all these halachos and be a scoundrel. Something is wrong here, the halachos are exactly about this, right? This is one argument that I have.
Second Argument: It’s Less Useful Than People Claim
Instructor: The second argument that I have… not that I have it, I mean, yes, let’s say I have it. The second argument is that it seems to be a lot less useful than people pretend that it is. In other words, have less ta’avos [desires]. Okay, so, first of all, what does that even mean? I’m not saying it doesn’t tell me any practical thing to do. Practically, it’s the last piece of kugel, don’t eat it. I don’t know, maybe it means something.
The Main Theory: Tikkun HaNefesh Through Thought
Instructor: What I’m saying is that it doesn’t give you what to do, is because, remember, that a basic theory that I have here in all these shiurim [lectures] is that there is some to’eles [benefit] from understanding general principles in the subject of ethics, right? It’s not only lemaaseh [for practical action]. If it were only lemaaseh, there wouldn’t be a single shiur, because the shiur can’t accomplish anything, right? Why do we claim that there is indeed a chelek halimud [part of study]? There are technical theories and hesbarim [explanations] and different shitos [approaches] about this.
But what we claim is such an interesting thing, that the nefesh [soul], let’s say the… what it means to be a person, is a davar hanitfas bemachshava [something grasped through thought], right? A davar hanitfas, you can grasp it, but you can’t grasp it through doing. Through doing you maintain it, but it’s a davar hanitfas bemachshava. Through understanding a certain theory of it, a certain havana [understanding] of it, and not just the theory, you have to work it out in life and so on, you grasp it.
Like, a machshava [thought], a tefisa [grasp/conception], a hasaga [intellectual attainment], you grasp it in a certain way. Therefore, if you want to be metaken [repair/fix] your nefesh, if you want to become a better person, the thing you work on must be in your head, in your RAM, in your active memory, so that you can work on it. Therefore, this is my theory. Good? The theory is built on many things, but this is my theory. And remember the theory, it’s a theory. Right? And therefore, if you think, this is to understand, but therefore, if you think that all there is to the ta’avos of a person,
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The Model of the Soul Determines What Can Be Accomplished
The Practical Principle – “Active Memory” Theory
And therefore, if you want to be metaken your nefesh, if you want to become a better person, the thing you work on must be in your head, in your RAM, in your active memory, so that you can work on it. This is my theory. The theory is built on many things, but this is my theory. And you can argue with the theory, it’s a theory. Right?
Critique of the Simplistic/Binary Model of Ta’avos
And therefore, if you think, but, if you think that all there is to the ta’avos [desires] of a person is this, like, very simple, binary thing, number thing, a little more, a little less, or completely not at all, and wanted to give, didn’t want to give, I don’t know what kind of things, then, you have, first of all, you have a wrong model, but the worst thing is not that you have a wrong model, you have a less useful model, because I can do almost nothing with this.
And not only that, then there’s nothing you can do, the model doesn’t give you, first of all because it’s wrong, but also the model doesn’t give you anything to work on. It doesn’t give you, it doesn’t put into your head, into your tefisa [conception] that you now have about what a person is, such a kind of thing that can actually become better.
It can’t become better, regarding this most people who have this model don’t actually believe in tikkun hamiddos [character refinement], right? They only believe in war, right? They don’t believe in peace, right? They believe in “lenetzach netzachim charbecha” [your sword forever and ever], right? You’ll fight with the yetzer hara [evil inclination] ad bi’as hamashiach [until the coming of the Messiah], that’s what most Chassidic sefarim [books] that speak about this subject believe, for a good reason, because the structure that they see of the soul doesn’t allow for anything else.
You can’t win, you can only do genocide, you can only kill the nefesh habehemis [animal soul], as it says in Tanya. You can’t teach it anything, right? You can, they go, you can kill it. Can you teach it something? No, you can’t teach it, right?
Critique of “Iskafya”/”Is’hap’cha” in Tanya
“Iskafya” [subjugation], “is’hap’cha” [transformation], yes, but what does that mean? What does that mean? “Iskafya” is “is’hap’cha”. What does that mean? “Is’hap’cha” simply, you take the same ta’avah [desire] and you put in a good machshava [thought]. Ribbono shel Olam [Master of the Universe], in what way is this the same ta’avah? I’m so confused. You forgot to mention the whole thing. I don’t know what the Tanya means. I don’t know, he explains what he means. Okay, why does he say words and mekomos [sources]? He can talk about the reality, and he speaks from the claims.
Interaction with a Student – Practical Results
Student: Very good. When I say nehei, I only mean a mashal [parable] so it should be understood. I mean that it makes worse.
Maggid Shiur: What makes worse?
Student: When a person has a problem with chillul Shabbos [desecration of the Sabbath], and I go tell him hana’ah yatza [the pleasure has left].
Maggid Shiur: No, no. That’s chinuch [education], I’m not talking about that. You remember that we’re not trying to get a practical result. Practical results, by the way, practical results are not obtained. This must be clear, practical results are not obtained in this way, for the most part. You don’t get any practical results. We can go in with people and check. Because this is a different chakirah [investigation], a different claim.
And I hold that a major reason why you don’t get practical results is because we’re working on tzipporim shel avodas olam [birds of idol worship]. And dor shel avodas olam [generation of idol worship] is one klal [principle], as it says in the Gemara [Talmud], you can’t fix a dor shel avodas olam except with teshuva [repentance] and with all kinds of precious teruos [remedies]. It’s not so simple. You make a palm tree come out. It’s not so simple. You can’t make a dor shel avodas olam. So first of all, this doesn’t work.
Second, you forget that I have a proposal that does work, leda’ati [in my opinion]. All these reshoyos [objections] are actually just good for making room for a proposal that does work. But first I’m hacking away at what doesn’t work, because I said that the world has a mistake, and an opinion to say that every shittah [approach] that the world has is a mistake. I have to say what the mistake is. And the mistake is this.
The Freudian Materialism – The Deeper Error
Another thing is, I can tell you another way of explaining, that this is, certainly it’s a fantasy, so it’s not actually this, but the fantasy is very materialistic, right? It’s assumed like R’ Sigmund Freud said, what holds by a person? What he wants to have. That’s the whole thing. Right?
What is a person? One simple thing you have to rub him out. There’s no chiluk [distinction] in his head and his body, and his higher part of his body and his lower part of his body – everything is the same thing. This is what a person wants. There’s only one thing called pleasure, and pleasure means to him chush hamisush [sense of touch], yes? Some button on the person’s body that likes what touches them. And that’s what people like.
And everything else that you do, what you say you like by this one, you like that by that one, you do beheter [permissibly], you do be-issur [prohibitedly], all these chilukim are fake, right? In the sense of psychology they’re fake, right? This is what R’ Freud explained for the Jews. Not only R’ Freud said so, but the Ramban [Nachmanides] held so, right? All these chilukim are kind of fake.
Therefore, of course yes you can trick yes. I can my own moach [mind] can trick me, I can even change my kavanos [intentions], I made chozek [strength]. What does it help that you say you shouldn’t think of a woman and not go into a woman? Because it’s a way of, as I said in another shiur about tzedakah [charity], it’s a way of going indirect, and it helps for a person. You tell him, this way, this way have less. Like the Rambam [Maimonides] says about arayos [forbidden relations], so somehow this is a trick to make less, let it be so.
But fundamentally, you’re still saying that there’s only one very simple and materialistic thing in human desires, and desires have to do with touching a body, I’m not even talking yet about something more moral in this, which is all buttons that you press.
Absurd Consequences of This Reductivism
In other words, theoretically it’s the same ta’avah to… how do you say it… ad kedei kach [to such an extent], in Chassidus they said that scratching your finger is the same ta’avah as pegam habris [sexual sin]. And pegam habris is the same ta’avah as eishes ish [married woman]. It’s normal, right?
In the Torah it says there’s a chiluk, right? That a besulah [virgin] is issur aseh [positive prohibition], and eishes ish is a chiyuv misah [capital punishment], and scratching your finger isn’t even a mitzvah [commandment], it’s not even an aveirah [sin], right?
But in your head, because you’re such a materialist, because you think everything is buttons that you press, everything is the same thing. I can go back against the Torah, but it’s also against reality. And not only is it against reality, but it’s in the sense of assuming a very weirdly… yes, it’s against psychology, it’s against feelings. It’s a very weirdly materialistic theory that makes a reduction. It reduces all things that people feel are so diverse, everyone likes something different, and likes specifically this and is disgusted by that, Freud tells him, “Eh, you’re not disgusted, you mean to say that by your button they press this way.”
You understand? Why do I want to mean to say? Maybe I don’t mean to say? Why do I have to believe that I mean to say? People believe it because we have an assumption that says everything must be buttons that you press. Everything is everything under one good.
The Positive Proposal – Taste Can Change
The reality is not so, and not only if we hold that the reality is not so, we’ll be able to actually teach our body to like, our body or our soul, to like things, to like the correct things. It’s not so complicated, just as people change their taste all the time, and just as people through education acquire taste in certain things, which shouldn’t be the right question, and the other things you have to talk about this.
Al kol panim [in any case], as we can see, without getting into the complication of taste and sense and what I asked today, in any sense, it’s pretty obvious that life experience and certain trainings actually do teach your taste.
The Main Example: Marriage as Tikkun HaTa’avos
Like, lemashol [for example], a Jew who has a chasunah [wedding], does he stop, at least in a major way, if he has a good chasunah, if he loves his wife, if he doesn’t love his wife, not only love his wife, if he has bevchinas gufniyus [in a physical sense], right? Because “harchek min haki’ur” [distance yourself from ugliness] it says in the Gemara he is mekayem [fulfilling], he must be nimshach [attracted] to the wife, not just love like a chaver [friend]. Right? Mefuresheh [explicit] Gemara in Kiddushin.
Yes, if he loves his wife, he’s attracted to her, then that’s trained, that has taught his koach hata’avah [power of desire]. Let’s say there’s simply a beis hakoach hata’avah [seat of the power of desire], no chiluk. The ta’avah, the ahavah [love], is bichlal hamitzvah [included in the commandment]. And let’s say even if it’s not a mitzvah, it doesn’t make a difference, it’s a good thing, right?
And now, the person, he has actually been metaken [repaired] his entire koach hameshichah [power of attraction]. Understood, it remains, there’s enough for many times. But at least the part that went into his wife, now, it’s not true that when he goes to his wife he has the same ta’anug [pleasure] that he would have had with another or with himself. It’s not true at all. You can try to see that it’s not the same thing.
And this is the teirutz [answer]. Therefore the Gemara says that having a chasunah is the tikkun [repair] for all these things. The main teirutz, right? When all bachurim [young men] who ask the kushya [question] what should one do about ta’avos, the teirutz is to have a chasunah. That’s what everyone tells you, but that’s what it says in the holy Torah. Right? You can have a chasunah earlier, that’s already peratim [details], but the teirutz ultimately is this, right?
Question: Why Does Marriage Help?
And what does that mean? People ask a kushya, right? I’ve already once repeated the kushya, that it doesn’t help him. Makes it even worse according to the cheshbonos [calculations], right? If he’s a bachur he’s a parush [abstinent], he has nothing to do with the whole subject. If he’s a married man and he’s not a parush, he takes it the ta’avah, becomes more, ah, why should he be a parush?
Answer: Specific Attraction, Not Generic Pleasure
So, now I say no. If you think only on the level of the body, only on the materialistic level, like a woman must think, then you’re right, it means it only makes worse. But if you understand that there’s here a taste, there’s here a meshichah [attraction], you can call it ruchniyus [spirituality], but a specific meshichah that we spoke about last week, that he wants the woman.
Now, not only that, but as Chazal [our Sages], so it says in the Gemara befeirush [explicitly], that not only that, but every woman that he sees in the street, every time that he becomes nis’orer [aroused], he truly wants his wife. That’s how he truly thinks. Right? Does it say so in the Gemara? And what will he do? What? How did you find the Gemara? It says in the Gemara, you look it up, you can find it in the Gemara. It says befeirush in the Gemara.
Because this is simply besevara [logically], right? This is simply. Let’s turn the kushya [question]. A bachur is not allowed to turn with women, like a married man, why? Because another woman, the other woman he doesn’t love that other woman, it’s a strange woman, he doesn’t love. Then he’s not allowed, it’s not mutar [permitted]. If he can, it’s no question, he shouldn’t be close.
But just a woman that he doesn’t know, he has a chelek’l, then his body is the koach [power], but his body is the koach belongs to his wife. He remembers that he loves his wife, not he remembers that he loves to join the buttons that you press. So it says in the holy Gemara, and so is also the metzi’us [reality].
And therefore, except if he doesn’t love the wife, then the whole ma’aseh [story] begins, and if… whatever, he holds that it’s an issur [prohibition] to love, certainly.
Why the Materialistic Model Destroys the Tikkun of Marriage
So, you understand… well, wait, wait, you understand how doing everything the same makes things worse? Because now, the basic takanos chachamim (rabbinic enactments) and takanos haTorah (Torah enactments) of marriage can’t help this person. Because he doesn’t know that there is such a thing as loving one’s own wife, which is not the same thing as loving to have a certain pleasure from the sense of touch, which happens to be chal (applicable) to one’s own wife, because then it’s permitted, and what luck (mazal) that he has a wife, or whatever you want to do be-heter (permissibly). Right?
That’s my basic ta’anah (argument), and that’s it. And if you don’t agree (maskim), then argue with me.
Key Principle: “How One Understands Oneself, So One Becomes”
You understand why I say I don’t agree? Because the way one understands oneself is what one actually is. According to how one understands one’s own nefesh (soul), so one actually becomes, because on that one builds oneself. Right?
So if someone doesn’t agree (maskim), he actually isn’t. Right? The one who thinks that a person is a davar gufni me’od (very physical thing) and very simple and basically what one eats, he is actually such a person. It has to do with what one thinks, and one actually becomes such.
Self-Understanding and Reality: The True Nature of Man
The Identity Between Self-Understanding and Self-Reality
Instructor:
I don’t even understand why you want to say they don’t agree (maskim), because the way one understands oneself is what one actually is. And according to how one understands one’s own nefesh (soul), so one actually becomes, because on that one builds oneself. Right?
So if someone doesn’t agree (maskim), he actually isn’t, right? The one who considers that a person is a davar gufni me’od (a very physical/bodily thing), and very simple and basically what one eats, he is actually such a person. It has to do with what one thinks, and he actually becomes such a person, and he actually is.
The Rejection of Relativism: Why It’s Not “To Each His Own Perception”
Instructor:
So if someone comes and argues that it’s so, it’s not relevant for me to say, I know, to each his own perception (ein tefisah do tefisah), for you it’s actually true, you understand? But for other people it’s not true.
And my argument is, it’s not true even for that person, and he needs to do teshuvah (repentance/return).