The Kalam Proofs for the Creation of the World – The Second, Third, and Fourth Methods | Part I, Chapter 74 (2) | Guide for the Perplexed 176 (Auto Translated)

The Mutakallimun’s Proofs for the Creation of the World — Review of the First and Second Methods

Framework of the Chapter: Summary of the Kalam Proofs

This chapter is the Rambam’s summary of the Kalam’s proofs for the creation of the world. As he declares, his purpose is to give the summary — the general outline of what they say, even though there are many more ways they go into this, giving more elaboration and different expressions and length. He gives what he calls the intention. We read his opening on this matter in which he went over this topic.

The Rambam simply summarizes their arguments so that we can understand, and another thing he does is that he shows in each proof how it is built upon one of their premises that he presented to us in the previous chapter. And we already know that these premises are not so good, so this actually shows us that the proofs are also not so good.

But his topic is not to refute — not now to refute their arguments or to show their problems, although this is implied from how he presents it and how he shows us the things upon which it is built. But he mainly just summarizes them. And this is important so that we know whether they are good or not.

The First Method: Analogy (Analogical Inference)

Presentation of the Argument and Its Problematic Nature

The first method was a very poor method. We spoke about how it is so poor, that it is obvious, strange, how a person even presents this. The first method was by analogy — that’s what the commentators said it is called analogy, or analogical inference. And they say this is a very poor method, because every analogy is not necessary. After all, in order to make an analogy one must prove the comparison between the things between which the analogy is made, and here there is no such proof.

And this is also apparently not based on one of the premises, although there are perhaps premises upon which one could base this analogy between all the bodies in the world. This is not — this proof, as the Rambam presents it at least, does not do this, and therefore it is a very poor proof.

Structure of the Argument: Created and That Which Creates It

The first proof goes to the point that there is one created thing, and from this one can bring proof that all things are created. We know many created things — Reuven is created, in the sense that he was not always Reuven, and he was a baby, and then he grew through the entire sequence of change of a human being.

And so, and we also see, and here is the second stage, which is actually another stage in all these proofs — that not only is he created, but he has a creator other than himself, he has a creator outside of himself. And therefore they compare this to the entire world, that it too is created and it too has a creator other than itself — which are two things.

The Rambam’s Position: Created and Creator Other Than Itself Are the Same Thing

The Rambam said above that actually they are not two things, because created is the same thing as saying creator other than itself, so he argued. And the Rambam said that according to the doctrine of creation of the world one does not really need — that’s what he said, that it is a first intelligible, if I remember, at the end of chapter 71, where he said he would present his own method.

He says that there is a division, either the world is created or it is eternal. If it is created, it undoubtedly has a creator, because it is a first intelligible that something created does not create itself, but rather a creator other than itself. Remember the Rambam, this argument is, this is not an argument — this is an intelligible that seems to the Rambam very basic and as if nothing more is needed here. If something is created, then created things or changed things, changing things, do not change themselves. This is as if obvious to him.

So therefore one does not really need, it is not relevant for him to divide these things into different stages, as Schwarz and others note here.

Understanding the Original Argument of Rav Saadia and Others

Those like Rav Saadia and others who brought this first proof, they did not really say that this is a proof that all things are created. This would be a very strange proof — I see one thing created, so all things are created, what is the connection at all. Their premise, their proof went much further: I see something created, and I see that the created thing does not make itself, and so the entire world which is created because of another reason does not create itself.

The Rambam does quote this as a proof that the world is created because of a kind of analogy that exists according to the opinion of this argument between every body in the world — which is a somewhat strange analogy. I mean, if something very basic is missing here for all opinions, it is somewhat strange why someone would think such a thing.

Connection to the Rambam’s Distinction

And I think this is connected to this matter, it is apparently connected to the fact that according to the Rambam these are not really things that can be cut in two. If something is created, then it has a creator, this is to say the same thing. So if you say that you have proof that all things are created, meaning that the creator of all things is something that is not themselves, then you are actually already making this sharing, this analogy between all the things in the world, that they are all created.

And the Rambam says that this is based on a certain premise that every law, every thing that is found in any body must be in all bodies. And of course, this is not correct, more or less. This is of course not correct, for the simple reason that there is no reason to think that everything is identical.

The Second Method: From a Created Particular to the Creation of the Entire World

Presentation of the Argument

The second method — They also said, they also said (also is always the way the Rambam says to arrive at the next thing) — another thing they said: That if one of the individuals who are born is created, if one particular is created, the proof will demonstrate that the entire world is created.

Of course this sounds, how he begins this, it sounds like similar to the previous thing, that every thing, every particular thing in the world already shows the creation of the world. But this is not really in a direct way.

Methodological Note: From Where Does the Proof Come

I think that all the proofs for the creation of the world, and so too the Rambam’s proofs later for the existence of God, pay much attention to from where the proof comes. That is, if I can look at one tree and see there the creation of the world, then this is a kind of way to God, this is a kind of way to arrive at the truth through everything. And since God is the Creator of the world, or creates the world, or the cause of the world, whatever it may be, then there must be some way that leads from within the world to God. This is actually the logic of why everyone begins this way.

But the proof is not really in such a direct way as the first proof, and so apparently he arranges it this way from the simplest proof — there is a created thing, all things are created — to something of… also begins there is a created thing, but it takes a few, one more stage to arrive at all created things.

Explanation of the Argument: The Chain of Causes

And the explanation of this — he explains how from one created particular we can prove that the entire world is created. So the explanation of this is as follows: Reuven is, that same Reuven that we are always talking about, he did not exist. Previously there was no Reuven. And afterwards, afterwards he existed. And we can see that Reuven did not exist, and afterwards he existed.

Difficulty in the Rambam’s Formulation

And then he says like this, and so the chain of his reasoning goes, and I am somewhat struggling to understand why he writes this in such a way. But he says like this: And if it is impossible for him to exist except from Jacob his father — if we see that it is impossible for Reuven to exist by himself but rather from Jacob who is his father — then behold his father is also created.

This sentence is not logical to me, I don’t know what the Rambam means when he writes it this way. He means to say, if the first Reuven is created, and he has a creator — and he must be created from his father — then so there is an analogy that his father too must be created. But why? Because of some also, because of some general law, that we see that his father too is created, or that there is some general law that says that a thing does not create itself.

But I did not understand why — how he writes this sentence is not logical to me. That is, he writes: if Reuven cannot exist by himself but rather from Jacob, then Jacob too must be created. I did not understand what is written here. I am missing here something basic and simple, or this is simply written in a way…

The Missing Stage in the Argument

Because you are not willing to let me make, I need to make an example of a human being. So the stage is missing here: if Reuven who is a human being and his father is a human being in the same sense, then his father too needs a father. But the stage is missing here.

Why does he write it in a clear way? This is wisdom here, this is not poetry. Why write this in such a strange way? It is written, there is something here, not so clear to me. Apparently he is so emphasizing why the proofs, what the premises upon which, what the proofs are built and so on, there is here some…

And if possible, it is written, but it should be written impossible. I assume, if it is impossible for his father to exist except…

The Second Method (Continued): The Problem of Infinite Regress

The Central Problem: Who Says Jacob is Created?

And behold it will go, this has no end, here comes the proof, yes? If we were to continue this thing, that each one has a father, that his father too is the same kind of thing as created, perhaps he means to say if, yes, there is here the if. Reuven, we know that he did not exist, we saw. We did not see Jacob, perhaps Jacob always existed. But if he did not always exist, then he needs, yes? I think that is the point. We did not really see Jacob, yes? This is after all the whole point, we only see Reuven.

Yes, so how do we know that Jacob is created? We do not, there is no proof for this here. But if Jacob is created, then the same law applies to him as to Reuven. I think that is the point. Indeed the stage is missing here of who says that Jacob did not always exist. Perhaps this is also what we see, but he did not say this, yes? I am just checking if it is written. Impossible. Yes, it is written possible, but it seems to me this is a mistake. I need to write to him.

The Role of the Eleventh Premise — Negation of Infinity in Succession

And if, and so the same thing, the matter is that this continues endlessly. But, and they already assumed, yes? Now, what is the problem that this would be endlessly? One must remember that this is exactly the inquiry, but we spoke about this in Premise 11.

The Aristotelian Answer — Potential Infinity

According to Aristotle this indeed continues endlessly, yes? Aristotle’s answer to the problem of, what is it called, the chicken and the egg is that both, yes? What came first the egg or the chicken? There were always eggs and there were always chickens, yes? This is Aristotle’s answer, Aristotle thinks this is logical.

But, and why? Because this is called, this is exactly what we spoke about in the eleventh premise, this is called potential infinity, because they never exist all at once, and this is not an infinite metaphysical chain, this is only an infinite physical chain, and in short, there is no problem here.

The Mutakallimun’s Position — Infinity in Succession is False

But they assumed, the Kalam already assumed that the existence, of that which has no end, in this way, yes? That is, in this manner of no end, in succession is false, as we explained in the 11th of their premises.

So therefore, if we really know that this type of infinity is false, yes? Impossible, and we know that there is here a chain that each one, that the cause of the last thing is that it itself is a created thing, and it itself needs a creator, and so the same law applies to the second and third stage, and so there is nothing that changes from one to the second, therefore it turns out that the entire world is created.

The Weakness in the Proof — What Was Actually Proven?

How it turns out from this that the entire world is created we still do not know, because this only proves that the things that were created, that we see that they are being created are created, yes? Also something is missing here, because after all the Rambam himself is going to say in other places, but I think this is also this proof, I need to think.

The Problem: What About Things We Did Not See Being Born?

But okay, so Reuven, indeed, we see human beings being born, so apparently they are created, yes? This is called being created, or this is one of the things called being created. I never saw the sun being born, so why should I say that it is created, yes? There is here some deficiency, yes?

It is very nice that from one created thing, it turns out that the entire world is created. What is the point? Because apparently there, yes? After all something is missing here, the commentators also noticed that something is missing here, yes?

Why Can’t There Be a First Eternal Father?

After all it could be that the first father is not created, yes? The fact that this thing does not continue endlessly, this indeed causes me to stop the chain at some place, not created, correct? Very nice. So perhaps this is Reuven, Jacob, Isaac, Abraham, Terah, I don’t know, at some point this arrives at a thing that is indeed not created, what is the problem? Yes?

There are actually ways to solve this thing, as the Rav Shem Tov brought. There are perhaps arguments that one can add here, that would turn this into a true proof that the entire chain began from some created thing.

Summary of the Problem

But apparently what is written here does not really prove this. It only proves that the chain of created things ends, that is all. But it does not prove that there is not at all at the end a created thing, yes, I mean something in the world besides God, yes, that is not created. It did not prove this at all. So all the more so that it did not prove that there are no other things in the world, yes. It only spoke about things that we see that they are created that they need this chain. So this is one problem in this proof.

The Second Formulation of the Proof — From the First Man

The Rambam quotes another way to say the same proof, which also needs to be understood, why two ways are needed to say the same thing. But perhaps this is actually designed to solve my question that now, I don’t know.

Arriving at the First Man — Does This Solve the Problem?

And yes, yes, so the Rambam says, okay, and yes, If you arrived for example at a first man who has no father, who has no father, yes, who has no father, sorry, I am reading in the wrong place, If you arrived for example at a first man, he has no father, yes?

So he says, okay, we arrived at the first man, and he is a man, yes? This word man, the Rambam wrote in Hebrew, so this needs to be emphasized. The intention, he means here the first man, that which is written in the Torah, that he is the first man.

So he says, okay, I arrived at the first thing, and if I know that he is the first man and he has no father, yes? So he is not created, yes? Yes, he is not created in the same manner that Jacob is created or that Reuven is created and Isaac is created.

The Necessary Question — From What Was This Man Made?

But apparently, and he is not, also here a very important stage is missing. So why am I, so this was very nice. I arrived at a first man, I said that the chain must stop, and very nice, and there is the first man, he was the first. And he always existed, not created.

So the Rambam says to him, The question is necessitated from what did this man come to be. Apparently, I don’t know, apparently this is connected to the fact that man, yes, even the first man, apparently he is not the kind of thing that can always be, that can be eternal, primordial, perhaps because he is, what is it called? Perhaps because he is composed of different things, and therefore what composed this, I am not sure.

The New Chain — From Man to Dust to Water

And you will say for example, he arrives, he is going to arrive at the same matter of what we call infinite regress, yes, or actually the impossibility of infinity, but for some reason he begins the discussion again from the first man, and as I say, this is an answer that needs to be asked, needs to be understood.

And you will say for example, yes, so you answer, He was made from the dust, so it is indeed written in the Torah, yes. And it is proper to ask, and then we need to ask, And it is necessitated to ask, yes, actually, proper, here it is written necessitated. And that dust, from what was it, yes? From where did the dust come, yes?

Indeed, people who read the portion of Genesis, where such things are written, and the man came to be from the dust, so one must indeed go back to ask from what was the dust, yes? That is, if you say that the man was not always a man, but came to be from the dust, and dust also was not always, you need to ask.

And he will answer for example from the water, yes? Again, this is also something that is almost written in the portion of Genesis, yes? Yes, because at first there was only water, and then somehow dust came to be. It is not clear that this is written, but something in this style could be written there.

Yes, and he will ask, and those waters from what did they come to be.

The Conclusion — The Two Possibilities

And they said, yes, and they said, yes, said the Kalamists, those who say this proof, that in this way this will go endlessly. Yes, this, every time the Rambam says they said, apparently he means that they only say, but it is not so necessary here, here because indeed it is not clear why I cannot say that the water always existed and that’s it, or that what it was not, the first thing.

The First Possibility — Infinite Regress (Rejected)

But they said that in this way this will go endlessly, and this is false, according to their premise that this type of endlessness is false.

The Second Possibility — Creation Ex Nihilo

Or you will arrive at the end at the existence of a thing after absolute non-existence, and this is the truth, or the other option is, let’s say, they do not say, as I say, say that one must stop at the end at an eternal thing, which is God, they say something else, they say that one must arrive at the end at something that came to be after absolute non-existence, yes? That is, that simply did not exist before this and it came to be, and this is the truth. That is, this is the truth according to their opinion, this is what this proof proves, because the first option is impossible, what happens here, false, yes? False in a logical sense, cannot be.

And with it the question will cease, yes? A thing that came to be after absolute non-existence.

The Gap Between Creation of the World and the Existence of God

The Essential Problem in the Second Proof

Also not a trivial thing, yes? What does it mean to say? Okay, every thing came to be from something else, and then you say, okay, and then from what did the first thing come to be? And you say, no, it did not come to be from anything, it simply came to be. And therefore this stops the problem of infinity, endlessness, this is correct. This saves us from the problem of endlessness, what this does not do, is that it does not tell us who did this.

And indeed for this we will need to say that it has a creator other than itself. The problem is that there is here a problem, because all the creators that we learned from them that they have a creator, were created from a kind of other thing to non-absolute non-existence, yes? In some non-existence, because it was, but not from absolute non-existence, yes? Because after all Reuven was made from his father Jacob and so on, so you say, okay, I saw that everything of this type is made by someone, was created by something that is not itself.

But things of the type that came to be after absolute non-existence, that is that this must begin, yes? It cannot be an infinite chain of things in existence, you really need to ask who told you that the thing of this type, the first thing, needs a creator outside of itself, yes? Yes, this is not written in it.

The Rambam’s Position: Proof for Creation but Not for the Existence of God

And indeed the Rambam in this proof does not now prove that there is a God, yes, he only proves that the world began, yes, this proof apparently does cut this, and they joined chapter 75 to explain that there is a God, although, no, they did not, because the Rambam also at the end of the entire chapter he says that in the Kalam’s system, there is no separate proof for the creation of the world and for the existence of God, yes?

Everything that proves the creation of the world, according to his opinion created, has a maker, who created it with intention, so it is written at the end of the chapter. And it is true that this is also not trivial, I am not sure why he is so certain of this, but the Kalam is certain of this, and the Rambam also apparently agrees with this. I mean, it has a maker who also makes with intention, with consciousness, with choice, all these words that they as if make, give us a God of this type, who creates with will.

The Distinction Between Proof and Solution

It’s not clear how this proof is supposed to work, right? It’s not exactly a proof, it could be an answer, it could be that God who creates the world intentionally solves the question of where the first thing comes from, but that doesn’t mean this is the only way I can describe it, right? It’s not a proof, it’s more, right? There are things there, you understand what I’m saying, right?

There’s something called a proof, where from the difficulty, from the question, from the proof, follows exactly, necessarily, the conclusion, and there’s something that is a solution, right? If there were such an answer, then indeed I would have a solution to my question, but that’s not called a proof, that’s called a possibility.

I don’t really understand this either, and this also needs to be examined and thought about how they thought this resolves it, because it’s not clear.

The Difficulty in the Parallel Between Creation from Matter and Creation Ex Nihilo

But here I see that indeed they didn’t say in a rigorous way that this proves that something created the world, even though they have a simple assumption that something that was made later, the law is absolute, didn’t make itself, for the simple reason that there is, yes, there are in places streets and hearts, and Saadia has the right to say this, because it cannot make itself before it existed, and after it existed it already exists, so there must be something that made it, yes. That’s how Saadia’s assumption goes, and it could be correct, but it could also be that there’s a question here of how do we know this, right?

This is perhaps a kind of logic, but it’s no longer logic that follows from that same seeing of the first thing that was created, right? They began the proof from saying that you see Reuven being born and you see that the whole world is born, because after all he was born from whom, whom, whom, whom, and this cannot be infinite, so there must be something one that was born not from whom, right? That’s essentially the form of this proof, right?

Everything is born from whom and the first thing cannot be born from whom, unless you want this to continue infinitely and that’s impossible. Therefore there must be a first thing that was not born from whom, but God created it intentionally, that would be their answer, but at least here it’s written only it was not born from whom.

And this not born from whom, it’s not clear how you saw this. I mean, you saw this in that the first thing that cannot regress infinitely, but you didn’t see the creator of this, right? Because you only see and know, all the things that we know have a creator, these are things that were born from something, right?

So this becomes a more abstract proof, and then it’s not clear that this is really something we see from father and son, right? God doesn’t create the world in the model that a father creates a son, because a father doesn’t create his son ex nihilo, and God does create the world after absolute complete non-existence, right?

Yes, he notes, Schwarz, he’s right, that this is not absolute non-existence, yes, because every, even a father creates a son from non-existence in that there was no son, but this is called non-absolute non-existence, because it’s from certain matter, but from the father and so on.

Summary of the Second Way

So in any case, this is the second proof, and the Rambam notes that this proof is built on the rejection of infinity of this kind, and therefore, he doesn’t write this, but therefore it’s not a proof of anything, because Aristotle argues precisely about this, that infinity of this kind can exist. Yes.

Okay, so far the second way. This is also still a very general way from very simple phenomena in the world. We need to think much more about whether this is a good proof or not. The Rambam at least doesn’t think this is a decisive proof, yes.

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The Third Way: From the Gathering and Separation of Atoms

Let’s continue to the third way, okay? The third way. So now, the third way is already more advanced, and according to what I’m counting here, all the proofs here are becoming more and more complex.

The Physical Basis: The Theory of Atoms

The third way is already built on something very specific in their physics, which is the matter of substances, and later we’ll talk about accidents, but the substances of the world, which they said the whole world is atoms, that gather and separate, and this is called essentially coming-to-be and passing-away, and from this they want to prove the creation of the world.

The Structure of the Argument

Stage A: Establishing the Facts

So the third way, they said, the substances of the world, right? Meaning the atoms, cannot escape in any way from being either gathered or dispersed, right? There are only two options for atoms, either they are next to each other, or they are not next to each other, right? And therefore, that substances will be gathered from them at one time and separated at another time, right? At certain times, part of the time they are gathered and part of the time they are dispersed.

Yes, this is the fact, there are two things here, also logically there are only two options, two states for substances, either they are next to each other or they are not next to each other. And this is also true, we also see in reality that sometimes they are like this and sometimes they are like this.

Stage B: Negating Nature as an Explanation

And now, and it is clear and revealed, this is obvious, that according to their own nature, meaning from the nature of the atoms, neither gathering alone nor separation alone is appropriate for them. It wouldn’t be correct to say, and this is also another thing we can see, both from this logic and from this empiricism, that there is nothing in the nature of atoms that decrees that they should be gathered or dispersed.

Why? For if their essence and nature decreed that they should be separated alone, if there were something in the nature of the atom that would cause it to be separated, they would never gather, right? Because that’s exactly the point of nature. Something that causes you to be in a certain way, and if it causes you to be in a certain way, then what would separate, what would disperse them?

And likewise the reverse, sorry, the reverse, if their essence, if their nature is to be separated, what would ever gather them? And likewise, if their essence and nature decreed that they should be gathered alone, they would never separate, right? The same thing, because nature would cause it to be gathered, and it would never disperse, and we see that they do disperse. Of course according to the Kalam they don’t really disperse, they’re just created each time, well, I don’t know.

Stage C: The Conclusion — The Need for a Gatherer and Separator

And if, so it comes out, and if separation is not, but, I mean, so therefore, and we see that it’s not really like this, but and if separation is more appropriate for them than gathering, and gathering is not more appropriate than separation, then the fact that some of them are gathered, and some of them are separated, and some of them have conditions changed upon them, sometimes… ah, sorry, so this comes out.

So we know this, so assuming we know this, then he derives from this the proof, right? If here this is always the first stage in the proof. If it’s true that separation is not more appropriate than gathering, and gathering is not more appropriate than separation, and therefore indeed some are gathered, some of the atoms are always together, some are always separated, some change, sometimes they gathered, sometimes they separated, then all this is evidence of their being, meaning, these substances, in need of one who gathers, the gatherer among them, and one who separates, the separator among them, right?

The Central Logic in the Proof

So if they themselves had the property, the nature, to be gathered or to be separated, then indeed this would explain why they are dispersed and gathered. But since we see, we both know and see that this is not true, there is always the option that they be gathered and always that they be dispersed, and indeed sometimes some are like this and some are like this, and we remember that it’s also impossible there to attribute this difference to a difference between…

Continuation of the Discussion: Gathering and Separation of Substances

The Structure of the Argument and Connection to the Second Way

Because this is the same thing, all substances are the same thing, right? So therefore something needs to gather and separate them. Because from themselves they don’t do this, right? Even if they are not created, right?

This is no longer correct. One must understand that this is not really a different proof from the previous proof. Apparently according to the Kalam, what really happens when things are born and live and die — is that substances gather and separate, right? As he said that according to their view there is no coming-to-be and passing-away except gathering and separation. So this is really the same thing, only that they really…

And therefore as I said before, the whole point of these proofs is that we can observe from how the world either appears or really is according to science — that this shows us its creation, the creation of the world and the existence of God, right? Therefore the more you understand the world in a certain way, then from this precise understanding you need to show how from this follows the creation of the world, right?

Although in a logical way, in an abstract way, there is no great difference between the second and third proof, and perhaps also the first — it’s just stages of what I’m saying, yes, the progression of the argument, from the progression of understanding in reality, right? Before this you say, okay, all bodies are created, so you say, all bodies are born, and therefore they are all created anew. And now you advance even more and you explain the same argument in a more precise way.

That is to say, all substances are the same thing, some are gathered — meaning existent as what we call objects and things in the world — some are not, and some change. And therefore the role of the creator is to cause the gathering of what is gathered from them and the separation of what is separated from them. This is what God does, and also He does this all the time, but also they cannot do this alone, and therefore there needs to be, there needs to be God to do this.

The Weakness of the Argument: Lack of Infinite Regress

This is also missing here, right? Really, I think that in order to reach the creation of the world, one always needs to reach the matter of infinite regress, because otherwise someone could say, okay, like Epicurus, who indeed said this, that these substances — which is true, let’s agree perhaps, not like Epicurus that everything is accidental — let’s agree that God gathers and separates them, this is a matter of Providence, this is not a matter of creation, right? It could be that these substances will always exist, right? He didn’t prove here that they won’t always exist.

Unless we perhaps say that their separation is essentially their annihilation, as we didn’t exactly understand in the previous chapter — if the atoms survive, the cancellation of the things they carry was never clear to me. Within this system, and we said that the atoms of the Kalam are abstract things, it’s not clear if they really exist at all, because when they separate then they have no quantity, and therefore it’s not clear what they do have. And we said, and we’ll also see in the next proof, that there is never really a substance without an accident, so we can’t really talk about this. So perhaps that’s the point.

In any case, this is only a proof from this more specific matter, that there is nothing in the nature of the world that gathers and separates the substances — meaning this is the world, the world is the atomic substances — and therefore God must be the one who gathers and separates them.

The Rambam’s Note: Based on the First Premise

And they said this is evidence, again they said, right? As I’m saying, I’m not sure there’s any evidence here at all. They said this is evidence that the world is created.

And the Rambam concludes what I said: Behold it has already become clear to you that the master of this way. Words are missing here literally, I don’t know what’s happening here. Yes, this is in the original. Well, I need to speak with Rabbi Zabul, what’s happening here. I have already made clear to you that the master of this way, I am certain, relied on the first premise from his premises and all that follows from it, right?

Meaning, the master of this way is based on the first premise, which is the existence of atoms, and therefore he needs to accept all that follows from it — meaning, that time is divided into atoms and that there is a void, and all the other conclusions that follow from this. And essentially on this is based this whole matter that God is the one who gathers and separates everything, and therefore the world must be created. Something is missing here.

In any case, and we already spoke that the things that follow from it are absurd, and therefore not such a good proof, because his premises are not good. But the Rambam doesn’t conclude this, he only understands that we will understand this.

Why the Rambam Abbreviates the Presentation of the Proofs

So this is the third way, right? What I’m saying, the Rambam abbreviates here very very much the presentation of these proofs. I think he’s aware of this, meaning he says this precisely because he already told us that if we follow all the premises then we’ll understand how everything is built on these premises and how everything really connects here. So he doesn’t need to conclude, to write to spell out, doesn’t need to write in detail everything I’m saying and there are more things I’m not saying but whoever thinks will see. Meaning I didn’t think here but that’s how it seems.

Here there is only the summary as it were of the proofs in a way that perhaps sharpens what is different in each proof, even though all the proofs in the end, and the Rambam himself is going to say at the end of the chapter that all the proofs are all more or less built on the matter of either the premise of possibility or the premise of eleven — the premise, meaning either the tenth assumption or the tenth assumption of the impossibility of infinity in this way, which is a kind of begging the question, right? Because that’s exactly the question whether there is such a kind of infinity.

But perhaps this is exactly what he wants to see, as he’s going to conclude at the end of the chapter. When you really look at all the assumptions, you’ll see that they all arrive at the same assumptions in the end — essentially they’re all the same proof. But I still think there’s value in this difference, as I’m saying, because there’s a question of where in the world is the proof for the existence of God, or for the creation of the world like this. This is a matter of creation, important from a religious perspective also, yes, also from a philosophical perspective, because perhaps there are arguments that apply to one form of the proof, but not to another form. But this is also important from a religious perspective, because this is the matter of seeking proofs, to see where one sees God in the world, yes.

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The Fourth Way: The Creation of Accidents

The Basic Structure of the Argument

Now, the fourth way — it’s the same thing, it’s a continuation of the same thing, only instead of talking about the gathering and separation of atoms, they talk about the accidents that apply to the atoms.

The fourth way — I think that even in our time there are people who try to use this kind of all these proofs, and this also needs to be investigated.

The fourth way, they said that the whole world is composed of substance and accident, yes, we spoke about this, this is their system, right? The substance for them is atoms, and accident is all the properties of the atoms.

And they also said this, yes, this is one of our premises, no substance among the substances can escape from an accident or accidents. Every substance must always have at least one accident, yes, sometimes more.

The Creation of Accidents

And now all the accidents are created, everyone knows that the accidents are created. How do we know this? A certain principle. Because accidents are changing things, I think that’s the point. We spoke about this in the sixth premise, he says that accidents are created things, yes, because the accident does not persist for two times, right? That’s the whole point of the accident. The truth of the matter of the accident is that it changes, that it never continues for more than one time, so it is created.

The Central Principle: Transferring Creation to the Substance

This will follow, now, and from this it will follow that the substance that bears the created thing will be created. If the accidents are created, then also the substance that bears them is created. Why? There’s a principle here, another principle that isn’t proven here, but perhaps should sound logical independently: because everything that is connected to created things and cannot escape from them is created.

Everything that needs the created thing in order for it to exist, or conversely, it cannot exist without a created thing — it is also created. Why? I have no idea.

This could be exactly the same argument. If the substance is not created, and the accidents are the created things that apply to it, but there’s some assumption here that if it’s connected, if it’s related to the created thing, and it cannot exist without the created thing, right? This is perhaps a bit stronger, right? After all the substance cannot exist without accidents according to how they claimed — it must be created.

I don’t know what the intention is, but it’s like there’s an argument here of transference, that the property of the thing you bear passes to you metaphysically. There’s some proof here. I saw that Shem Tov writes that he thinks this is a very weak reasoning, but apparently there’s some reasoning here that shows this, but I don’t know what the reasoning is.

The Conclusion: The Creation of the Entire World

Therefore, the world in general is created, because the whole world is composed of substance and accidents, so every accident is created and every accident is connected to a substance, so that’s it, so the whole world is created. This is the conclusion.

The Objection to the Fourth Way

So they said this, and then they themselves thought there’s a problem here: And if the objector will say, someone will say, perhaps the substance is not created, and the accidents are created, coming upon it — this was missing, this was not complete, yes.

They said exactly, perhaps this is exactly the matter, perhaps the substance, yes, this is what I asked — they ask them, perhaps the substance is not created, but the accidents come upon it eternally, right? Every day there’s a different accident on the substance and this continues infinitely, what’s the problem?

So they said, no.

Part Two Chapter Seventy-Four: The Rambam’s Critique of the Proofs from Accidents — The Problem of Circular Motion

The Two Assumptions the Mutakallimun Rely Upon

Although it is not hidden from the master of investigation, he counts them. He means, they also admit that this was based on this, and therefore indeed they made all their premises, because they really think this will help them in the proof.

One of them, that what has no end, in the manner of one after another is false. This is the eleventh premise, that this manner of infinity, of without end, is false. This cannot be even separate things that have no, that are not in real causes to each other and so on, but also cannot be.

And secondly, another innovation they accepted, meaning a premise they accepted, the sixth premise one could say, that every accident is created. Not sure this is exactly the sixth assumption, as Schwarz notes, that every accident is created.

The Rambam Specifies: What Does the Opponent Really Claim?

Says the Rambam very well that you think so, but now he specifies: And our opponent, the one who disputes with us here, the adversary, who says the eternity of the world — whoever claims, here it’s written “who says,” because Ibn Tibbon hesitated to say “who says,” but something is written, it’s not exactly written “who says” here in the original. It’s written “who brought,” or claims, it’s not clear how to translate this word. Who holds? No, I don’t know. In any case, whoever… perhaps who teaches, like da’wa, who learns the eternity of the world, has distanced from us the accident from the accidents.

He says, true, most accidents are created, everyone can see, most accidents are their Kalam, that they change. But Aristotle claims that there is one single accident that isn’t really created, and it is circular motion.

Aristotle’s System: Circular Motion as an Eternal Accident

This is essentially the whole matter of Aristotle’s theory on the eternity of the world. He doesn’t say that all things as they are always were. No one ever thought this. After all we can see accidents changing.

But there is one accident that is in his opinion the first accident, the primary, the basic, that is indeed eternal, meaning perpetual. It is always existent, and it never comes to be and never passes away, and it is circular motion. Meaning, the motion of the sphere that goes in a circle, and Aristotle said, motion of this kind can continue forever.

And also the renewal of all our things are also circular, it seems. That Aristotle will think that circular motion is neither coming-to-be nor passing-away. This is exactly what Aristotle thinks. For him, this is the moved. The thing, one could say, motion is an accident in the moved thing, but the moved thing, also to which this motion belongs, is neither coming-to-be nor passing-away, meaning the heavens. The first heaven is the heaven.

Circular Motion in the Sublunar World

But the truth is that not only the heavens, as the Rambam already pointed out to us in chapter ayin, I always forget, in chapter ayin bet, when he gave us the complete picture of the world of the microcosm, he said that also in this sublunar world there is a kind of circular motion in that all things return cyclically. In that human beings are born and die and their matter returns to become human beings and so on, there is also a kind of circular motion, and therefore this can continue forever.

And not, for example, that human beings are constantly accumulating—this is a type of difficulty that we’ll see later. But there were people who asked: every person who dies remains as bones or something, so there cannot be infinite people, because this accumulates and then there will be infinity, and if there’s infinity then there won’t be room left in the world for all the people.

And Aristotle’s answer is that there is circular motion here. This is a kind of… it’s not the same circular motion that is actually the source of all these circular motions of the celestial motion, but he also says that it goes in a circle. True, the people who were born a very long time ago, they have already become the new people, in that the materials change and there’s no problem here.

The Methodological Conclusion: What Should We Argue About?

Says the Rambam, so very good that you brought me this. This is part of their argument’s progression, when you see one case and you infer from it to all other cases. And therefore this matter of equating everything in their atomism is very important for this type of proof. All the proofs until now are built on this type of logic.

But, says the Rambam, remember that this is not correct, and there is no benefit to us in establishing the novelty of other cases which our opponent does not deny their novelty.

Says the Rambam, you need to remember what exactly Aristotle said. This is one of the problems of all those who argue in this manner, and also those who attacked the Kalam the same thing—they always forget what the opponent actually claimed and argue about things he doesn’t dispute at all. And therefore the Rambam invests so much in understanding both the system of the Kalam to convey it accurately, and also Aristotle’s system when he summarizes and notes it accurately, because otherwise it’s not interesting. Most debaters either intentionally or due to weakness of mind don’t know how to do this at all.

Aristotle Admits That Most Cases Are Created

Says the Rambam, remember that our dispute, the one who argues against us doesn’t dispute with you at all that the cases you begin with are created. But he says that they come one after another upon something uncreated in rotation.

True, Aristotle says that human beings are born and die in the aspect of one after another, not in the aspect of infinity which is impossible, in this infinity, and it repeats cyclically.

And so he will say, so this says in a general way even human beings, therefore he will say about this case alone, there is one case alone, which is circular motion, we don’t need to say which circular motion, which is completely eternal, which doesn’t even change in itself, and it is the motion of the sphere, which is uncreated, and it is not of the type of case among the created cases.

The motion of the sphere, says Aristotle, is not created at all, it is always moving in the same manner, never changes.

What We Need to Focus On in the Debate

Behold, that case alone needs to be investigated and its novelty clarified.

Says the Rambam, if you want to argue about the eternity of the world, you need to forget about all the cases that Aristotle admits are created. True, there is a dispute. He thinks that human beings always produce human beings forever, and you dispute that they don’t. But here this is not the debate, because this is exactly the question we need to prove whether it can be. You say it cannot be, okay, he says it can be.

But if you want to speak about a case, you want to prove from this that the cases, we haven’t seen this, you want to prove from a created case that all cases are created, you need to prove or speak about one case alone that is not created, and this is the case of the motion of the sphere. Aristotle says it is not created, you need to prove that the motion of the sphere is created.

The Heavens and the Earth—Two Different Natures

This is related to what Aristotle says later, and the Rambam also agrees, I think he always agrees, that the heavens are not of the same nature as the earth. It’s the same thing.

So if indeed the motion of the sphere is just a type of case, and you say, all the cases I know are created, it seems at least that this case is also created, okay, very good. But Aristotle, part of his entire system is that the heavens operate according to a different nature. The heavens are not moved, they don’t have cases in the same way, precisely for this reason, because the case of motion found in the sphere is not a case that can pass from it. There cannot be a sphere that doesn’t rotate. But therefore indeed it continues always.

Therefore you need to dispute only this matter, you need to forget about the earth, you need to speak about the heavens. Indeed the Rambam in the place where he does make arguments, he argues mainly about Aristotle’s heavens, not about Aristotle’s earth, because he holds that regarding the earth there isn’t really a true dispute.

Clarifying Note: The Relationship Between Circular Motions

But this is the second premise, and there’s something else here that I need to understand better, but I think this is more or less what’s written in this passage.

Why do I say there’s something to understand better? Because indeed there is also a dispute about the circular or quasi-circular motion of the earth, but I think the matter is that Aristotle claims, as the Rambam himself presented in Chapter 72, that all the motions, the cyclical ones of the generations here for example, derive from the more permanent cyclicality of the sphere, which is cyclicality in something that is not generated and corrupted at all, which only has motion of this type.

The things in this world have also circular motion of a certain type, and this is what solves, or this is one of the things that help them to be eternal, but they are not the cause of it. But what enables them, what causes them to have motion and change at all, this is indeed the motion of the sphere, as he explained here, the sphere is the head of the world etc.

Stop Debating the Secondary Matters

And therefore you need to stop debating the secondary matters, which Aristotle admits are secondary. Very good that you say, the things here are changing, Aristotle admits. The question is how they change and what causes them to change. If indeed what causes them to change is eternal and circular motion, then they also…

Part Two Chapter 74 (Continued): Critique of the Argument from Substance and Accident

The General Structure of the Fourth Way

If one must arrive, according to the Kalam’s claim, if one must arrive at something created that began and something and God outside of this who causes this to begin, then indeed it may be that you will infer from this that also the generations in the world do not have circular motion.

But you need to argue about its cause, not about its result, because here indeed you have nothing to debate, nothing to argue about. And you, yes, you make yourself as if there is a rule, all cases are created.

The Internal Argument of the Kalam

He says to him, no, the cases you speak about are indeed created, yes, at least in the limited sense of their case, yes, it may be that their great motion is not created, but the case you see is indeed created, but this derives from an uncreated case.

So you say, no, but all cases are created. What? I don’t understand, this is exactly what you claim, because, I agree that this case needs something else, and this is the something else?

If you have a proof that the sphere needs to be created, then this is interesting. But as long as you don’t have a proof about the sphere, all your proofs are not interesting, because they don’t argue at all with the place where Aristotle brings his eternity, his eternity of the world.

The Three Premises Upon Which the Fourth Way Rests

So this is the second premise that comes to this way, that substance received accident here.

The first was that there are substances and accidents, sorry, the first that this type of infinity cannot be. Of course he also accepted all the premises sorry, we’ll see about this:

1. He accepted that there is no infinity of this type—an infinite causal chain is impossible

2. He also accepted that all accidents are created—and there is no difference between this accident and the accident of earth and the accident of the heavens, one could say

3. And the third premise that this way accepted is that there is no sensible intermediate besides substance and accident—that there is only substance and accident

The Critique from Matter and Form

The Atomistic Assumption

And there is no, yes, this is the entire premise of atomism, or what the Rambam told as the eighth assumption, that there is only substance and accident, yes? That there are also no forms.

That is to say, that individual substance, yes? The atom, not the substance of the Aristotelian type, and what they believed from accident.

The Aristotelian Demonstration

However, if the body is composed of matter and form, not of substance and accident in the way you think, but there is matter and form as in the demonstration of our opponent, yes?

Says the Rambam, you need to remember that according to Aristotle, and not just simply according to Aristotle who says, Aristotle claims there is a demonstration, and the Rambam apparently accepts this, because when he says there is a demonstration, he says, this is correct, the things we see are indeed demonstrably made of matter and form and not of substance and accident.

So first of all your proof falls, not interesting.

The Real Requirement: To Prove the Creation of the First Matter and Form

True that also matter and form, you can ask what caused the matter to combine with the form or something like that, and indeed many, most of our matter and form are also created and are also agreed upon by Aristotle.

But the same thing, as he said about motion regarding the accident a moment ago, it needs to be demonstrated that the first matter and the first form are created and corrupted.

You don’t need to prove to me that the matter and form of specific human beings are created and corrupted, because everyone agrees on this. But you claim that this cannot continue infinitely, for your reason, okay.

So this is what you need to prove, that the first matter, yes? The first prime matter, and the first form, whatever it was, they, the first foundation in the chain of forms is what you need to prove regarding them that they are created and corrupted, perhaps according to Aristotle the first form is the form of the heavens or something above this and so on.

And this is essentially what they don’t do, but this is what you should have done, and then you would have a demonstration of the creation of the world.

Interim Summary: The First Four Ways

Okay, so up to here the fourth way. Okay?

And until now all the proofs are built on, one could say:

– The first premise about the body of the world—its finitude proves creation

– The second about the creation of particulars—like children born from their fathers

– The third from the very gathering and separation of substances—the atoms gather and separate

– The fourth from the combination of substance and accident—all accidents are created

And up to here the assumptions built on the great matter of atomism and the equating of all bodies.

Transition to the Next Ways: Possibility

The fifth and sixth ways are built more on the struggle over the matter of possibility, as we shall see.

So a good place to divide this.