Halell and Lulav without Mikdash is like the Meshichist Kos Shel Beracha – Transcript

The Secret of the Name: Two Kinds of Jews and Three Categories of Mitzvos

Chapter 1: Introduction – The Central Thesis

Instructor: Yeah, today we’re gonna learn the secret of the name, and the secret is that nobody knows what they’re doing. Like this key, so that was a different discussion.

No, no, no, yes. I’ve also—so yeah, I’ll give you the thought I have and you tell me if I’m totally wrong.

My basic thought is like this. The two kinds of Jews that I know—maybe there’s more, but these are the two that I’m talking about in this minute.

One kind of Jew, as I see—the Chassid didn’t narrate that the demand to—second, I need to do another recording because I don’t trust that one. Okay.

See, the Chassid didn’t narrate that the demand to have a certain—like, if not understanding—some Chassidim, they have a demand to have an understanding, like Chabad sometimes, and some days.

Chapter 2: The Chassidic Approach – Emphasis on Inner Feeling

Instructor: But in general, Chassidim have the demand to understand something of what they’re doing—like to feel, to understand, to feel.

Like, if you’re davening [praying], there should be some kind of feeling associated with it. Like, somehow you should be—I don’t know—inspired, or people call it nowadays, or there should be some kind of movement, like inner movement associated with ritual mitzvos [commandments], okay?

Not reading *b’sheva cholov* [laws regarding cooking with milk], nobody is worried about feeling anything. And also not with *b’sheva cholov*, also with, you know, even some mitzvos like *b’sheva cholov*, I don’t think many people are worried about having any feelings.

But certain mitzvos that are categorized as ritual mitzvos—by ritual I mean *Avodas Hashem* [service of God], right? One of the three *amudim* [pillars]—service of God. Those are mitzvos that Chassidus and Yiddishkeit have narrated. Their basic thing is you have to have some kind of feeling in it.

That’s one kind of Yid [Jew].

Chapter 3: The Litvish Approach – Emphasis on Correct Action

Instructor: And a Litvak is someone who thinks that you have to do everything correctly. You have to do the actions in the correct way. You have to be *yotzei* [fulfill the obligation]. You have to make sure that the action is correct—that it’s with the correct object and the correct time and the correct way and so on, right?

The Example of Prayer

Instructor: Obviously, you could see this in the primary worship, which is called prayer, as *avodah* [service], right? It says Rambam [Maimonides] means prayer.

And what does a Chassid do by prayer? He sings songs, or he reads some Chassidic books before that speak to his soul, and he tries to understand, or he tries to cry, or laugh, or be happy, or do something. There should be some kind of inner movement in his prayer. That’s what a Chassid does—wants to feel, or other things like that.

He says you have to feel *simcha* [joy], right? When you say Hallel [psalms of praise], you have to be so happy that if you would have done it on Rosh Hashanah [Jewish New Year], you would have ruined the whole mood of Rosh Hashanah, right? Right? You heard this from me already, right?

And so on. That’s a Chassid.

And a Litvak, generally, would say that if he says *Krias Shema* [the Shema prayer], he should say all the words, because if you’re in the Arctic and the oasis, it’s better, although you’re so felt that—and that it should be in the right time.

So he mamish [really] doesn’t understand that Chassid who davens in the wrong time. But Chassid has a different emphasis, at least. He’s worried about davening, which he calls davening, which is not just saying the words correctly or doing the action the correct way. He’s worried about something. He understands that there’s a demand that there should be some kind of inner feeling in it.

Summary of the Two Types

Instructor: That’s two kinds of Yidden [Jews]. Do you know these two kinds of Yidden? Yeah? Familiar types. *Stimmt* [correct]?

Chapter 4: Three Categories of Mitzvos

Instructor: And I’ve noticed that there are certain mitzvos, certain ritual activities that we do, that both of these people are sort of happy with, that make sense to them each in their way. There are certain ones that totally don’t make sense to any of them, and they sort of just do it or ignore it or whatever. And there are other ones where everyone is struggling, trying to figure out what’s going on.

That’s what I’ve noticed.

So, *l’mashal* [for example]. Three categories. I hope you can give me *shulm* [forgiveness/credit] for all that.

Category 1: Mitzvos That Work – The Example of Shabbos

Instructor: So, *l’mashal*. *L’mashal*. *L’mashal*.

Let’s say, again, if we use something like keeping Shabbos [the Sabbath], okay? Keeping Shabbos has very basic activities associated with it, like don’t do all the 39 *melachos* [forbidden labors] that you shouldn’t do.

For the most part—of course there’s a lot of *sfeikos* [doubts], a lot of like doubts, maybe this is—maybe not allowed to do this, maybe not allowed to do that—but in the basic sense, I think that every Yid feels—both the Litvak and the Chassid feels—that they do Shabbos.

Nobody’s worried like, “I don’t know, Shabbos went by and it wasn’t different than the whole week,” right? Shabbos is very obviously very different than the weekdays, right?

Obviously Shabbos you rest. So you say rest is not the *ikar* [main point], *chiyuv* [obligation], because it’s only *midrabanan* [rabbinically mandated] to not go to work. But *midoraisa* [from Torah law] is to not take out the fish from the soup, whatever, okay?

But still, even that you can do—you can have some doubts like about some edge cases, so to speak. But you could even not do all of that, but I don’t think any person has a problem with Shabbos. It’s very clear that we do Shabbos, and then we sort of do it, and we—we don’t—nobody goes around saying, “Why? Why do we keep Shabbos?” So you could have questions about a very specific thing, very specific, but it’s something that works, okay? Makes sense?

How Shabbos Works for the Litvak

Instructor: For a Litvak, it works. He learns *Mishnah Berurah* [authoritative halachic code], and he does everything that it says there, and it’s very clear to him that it worked. Like, he doesn’t have like an anxiety that he wasn’t *m’shabbos* [keeping Shabbos]. He could have anxiety that he forgot, that he didn’t know some detail, and things like that, but not like the whole Shabbos doesn’t exist. Make sense? *Maskim* [agree]?

Student: I think there’s tiers in this Litvak, but yes.

Instructor: But even clearly, again—

Student: The Yeshivish Litvak.

Instructor: Yeah, a normal Litvak. There’s someone that can find the OCD for always, for everything.

Student: No, I don’t mean OCD. I mean someone that’s really removed from the—

Instructor: No, a Litvak doesn’t have a *brennan* [burning concern] Shabbos. The thing is Shabbos is not *l’chatchila* [the ideal level]. The Shabbos is that you don’t work on Shabbos, you don’t do any of the *lamed tet melachos* [39 forbidden labors], and it doesn’t—you know what I’m saying?

Even *tzais kiddush* [making kiddush] and all the *mitzvos aseh* [positive commandments] of Shabbos, *zachor* [remember] and *shamor* [guard] and so on.

How Shabbos Works for the Chassid

Instructor: And Chassidus Yid, same thing. Most Chassidus Yidden—maybe this is a great big claim, but I think that most Chassidus Yidden also do Shabbos.

Shabbos you put on a *bekeshe* [traditional Chassidic coat]. If you’re a Chassid, if you’re a Litvak, then you take it down, then *shvach hameis* [the deceased is weak]—your whole Shabbos, because it’s high, it doesn’t count out.

But if you put on your *bekeshe* and you put on your *shtreimel* [traditional Chassidic fur hat]—as we discussed in one of my popular videos—and you have a different kind of meal, like Litvak could serve a *chvai sishvosan*, *b’adishah b’sid*, *chas v’shalom* [God forbid].

But a Chassid, he serves the traditional food, and there’s a certain order to the courses that whatever your *baba* [grandmother] did, and you sing *zemiros* [Sabbath songs], or everyone has like a certain *seder* [order], and there’s a certain like—there’s a meaning to that, like there’s a certain feeling that he feels Shabbos.

What exactly it means? Again, you could be worried that the *nishamas* [souls] work and the *l’chatchila* work, but it more or less works. Makes sense?

That’s something that works.

The Textual Connection

Instructor: Now, not only does it work, it also connects. That’s one thing—it works, so nobody’s walking around after Shabbos, “I don’t know if anything happened.” No, obviously something happened on Shabbos.

Not only does it work, it’s also obviously sort of connected to what it says in the Chumash [Torah]. In the Chumash it says you should not work on Shabbos. Rosh Hashanah says that Shabbos is *kodesh* [holy], it’s holy, it’s the day of Shabbos, *Yom Hashem* [the day of God], it’s a divine day.

And sort of people understand what that means, and the understandings that we have—maybe there’s better understandings to be had and so on—but it’s more or less connected with what it says in the *pasuk* [verse].

That’s an example of something that works.

Category 2: Mitzvos That Don’t Work – The Example of Korbanos

Instructor: An example of something that doesn’t work is very obvious. What are the things that don’t work, that we don’t do at all?

Firstly, there’s things that we just don’t do. Like, what don’t we do at all? Nobody’s helping me.

Student: What do you mean by don’t do?

Instructor: There’s mitzvos that we just don’t do, right?

Student: Oh, same.

Instructor: We don’t do *korbanos* [sacrifices]. We don’t do in the entire *Seder Kodashim* [order of holy things], *Taharos* [laws of purity], right? We don’t do it because we don’t understand it.

If we would have understood it, we would have done it for a long time ago. Why? Nobody understands how to do it.

The Litvak’s Position on Korbanos

Instructor: Even after the Chofetz Chaim [influential 19th-20th century rabbi] said they should learn *Kodashim*, and the Briskers [followers of the Brisk method] think they know *Kodashim*, they still don’t know how to do anything. They just have a lot of *sfeikos*, but nobody even did—can you do one?

Like, did you read—you know, someone asked, there’s like these questions always, like, could you make a *Parah Adumah* [Red Heifer]? Right?

So there’s like, Rabbi Soloveitchik has a note somewhere that says why you can’t. Because there’s ten reasons why you can’t. Because according to this *shita* [opinion], to this—so you have every other understanding of things, but this is even worse than that.

He says he can’t do it, although technically you could do it. You don’t even need to make this, right? Even that excuse doesn’t count. Technically it’s going to—nobody’s stopping you from doing it. And it’s also you could find a red cow. It’s not hard to find, or you could if you don’t find one, you breed one. It’s not that it’s difficult.

And we can do it—a little—I can’t do it because he literally doesn’t know how. There’s enough doubts and enough—I think enough disconnect from the tradition. We don’t really have like—there’s not like a *minhag* [custom]—like you could say a lot of—a lot we don’t know how, but the *minhag* is that we do it this way, so we assume that the *minhag* is reliable enough.

But if you don’t have a *minhag*, and it’s been cut off for a thousand years or so or more, then you literally can’t do it. And this is officially the Litvish *shita*—how we can’t do *korbanos*, even the ones—even theoretical—theoretical ones that we could do, because we don’t know how.

The plain—don’t know which side to open the—like when you were a kid, they told you that you can check the giraffe because you don’t know if it’s too long in the neck. They don’t know where to check this. Something like that, okay? That’s a myth, but something like that happens for many mitzvos.

Officially, it’s not something I imagine, okay?

The Broader Implication

Instructor: And I want to claim—so this is true for the Litvaks. As for example, mitzvos *korbanos* and so on, even if tomorrow Mashiach [Messiah] comes down, as long as some *malach* [angel] doesn’t come to the Litvaks to tell them what the *halacha* [Jewish law] is, they’re not going to do anything because they don’t know how. They tell you this explicitly.

Why don’t they put on *techeiles* [blue thread for tzitzis]? They don’t know.

What do you mean we don’t know? We don’t know. It’s true. I mean, they’re not entirely wrong about this, but I’m just saying there’s an example of mitzvos that we don’t do because we don’t know how.

And I think there’s—

—

*[End of Chunk 1]*

The Chassidish Reason for Not Performing Certain Mitzvos: Emotional Framework vs. Technical Knowledge

The Chassidish Reason: Lack of Emotional-Spiritual Framework

Instructor: Which Rebbe do you make kavannah [intention/focus] to? How does it work? I don’t know which niggun [melody] you sing by Mayim Shelanu [the water-drawing ceremony]? Do you know which niggun you sing by Eglah Arufah [the heifer whose neck is broken]? Do you know which niggun you sing by Parah Adumah [the red heifer]? I don’t know. I don’t think anyone knows.

They don’t do it because they don’t have a niggun for it? Yeah. I don’t know. I’m telling you. Ask him why he doesn’t do it. He won’t be able to tell you the Litvish excuse. He might tell you because Oksirim [wealthy/prominent Jews] are also Litvaks these days for sure. I think what it is.

Student: What’s he going to tell you? He doesn’t even have like a certain…

Instructor: He won’t tell you the Litvish thing. No, I told you, most people will tell you that because the Litvish language is more accessible to talk to with other people about. Like, the Litvish language you can’t really talk to someone. It’s like, I don’t feel it, so what? Feelings don’t really transfer into language very well. But I think that that’s why my claim is not something that someone will really say. I don’t know if people will say this.

The Chassid at Shimshon’s Grave

I’ll give you an example. I met a Chassidishe Yid [Chassidic Jew] who was davening [praying] his heart out by the kever [grave] of Shimshon [Samson]. And I asked him, one second, so I’m like, oh wow, you managed to connect to Shimshon. He’s like, what is Shimshon? Imagine what he was doing. You don’t even—I don’t know. He just had his heart poured out for 20 minutes, and his kvius [fixed practice/location] is Shimshon. That’s what he told me.

Student: No, so I’m saying they don’t, they connect to everything.

Instructor: No, you’re just talking about HaMoritz [unclear reference]. I don’t think they connect to everything. I’m not masking.

The Radziner Techeles Example Revisited

I’ll talk more about this one, but I think, I’ll give you again this silly example of techeles [the blue thread on tzitzis], okay? A little back to techeles. He says, we don’t know exactly, there’s a kashya [question/difficulty] in the Gemara [Talmud] and so on. So as it says, the officially say this, the Radziner [Rebbe] says, why you don’t put on techeles now, okay? And therefore, why? So like the dogmatic way of saying it, if the Radziner said there’s no techeles, that’s like a prophecy. What is it, okay?

Student: So the Radziner can’t challenge it.

Instructor: The Radziner already—yeah, but that’s dumb. Everyone understands that that’s not what it means. I think that what it’s really meaning is like, I don’t know, I put on tzitzis [ritual fringes], I know the kavannah [intention]. Which means he doesn’t know the kavannah either, that guy. But it means like he has a certain, a certain nusach [established way/text], how he says, whatever you say, but he doesn’t know. So why would he do it?

I think that there’s real things going on like this. Of course, nobody will tell you this. It would sound very reformed to say it, but I think that it’s true. That’s the second kind of things, okay?

Korbanos: Neither Side Knows What to Do

The same thing is with korbanos [sacrifices] and so on. You could cry, but it doesn’t really have to do with the korbanos. It’s not true. He’s lying to himself if he tells you that, for the most part, because what do you mean? The Rebbe is going to buy the cup [unclear reference]. You know what? Okay, you know something? Go to the korbanos and tell me if the Chassidishe Yidden [Chassidic Jews] know what to do. Litvaks know what to do at least because it says what to do. And the Chassidim, they also do that and they say, but like, what are you doing? Does anyone know what to do? You don’t see that everyone feels weird over there? Maybe I’m imagining it. I think so. That is my opinion, okay?

Kapparos as the Closest Analogue to Korbanos

I think that the most close thing to korbanos that we do is kapparos [pre-Yom Kippur chicken ritual], and I could see the Rebbe, they tried taking pictures of the Rebbe with the chicken, and it looks weird, like, what’s going on here? Nobody knows what’s going on. The Rebbe doesn’t know what’s going on, the chicken doesn’t know what’s going on, the people don’t know what’s going on, it’s all the same.

Student: That’s how the men say it, though. It’s all the same thing.

Instructor: Okay, that’s the second category of mitzvos, okay?

The Third Category: Mitzvos We Do But Don’t Understand

And the third category are the middle ones, the ones that we do do, but it’s very obvious that we didn’t actually figure out how either how to do them or what to feel when we do them, okay?

Tekias Shofar: Easy to Do, Hard to Understand

I’ll give you an example, okay? Do you do—what do you do by tekias shofar [blowing the shofar]? What’s going on there? Do you do it? Like, it’s easy to do, so no Litvak has a problem with doing it, just do it, okay? But every Chassid has a problem, I think. Like, what’s the deal? I’m glad, that’s the Grosje Tekinim [unclear reference]. Okay, it’s better than the Grosje Tekinim when the baal tokeah [shofar blower] takes together the tekiah [long blast], the shevarim [three medium blasts] and the teruah [nine short blasts]. What are you doing over there? What’s going on? You understand what I’m saying?

Chazaras HaShatz and Na’anu’im: The Random Songs Phenomenon

Like, every Chassid knows what to do by Pesukei D’Zimra [verses of praise] and also knows what to do by Shemoneh Esrei [the standing prayer]. But no Chassidishe Yid knows what to do by chazaras hashatz [repetition of the Amidah]. And the same thing, not only don’t they know what to do when they clap by chazaras hashatz, they also don’t know what to do when they shake their lulav [palm branch]. You know how I know? Do you ever go to a Chassidishe shul when they shake their lulav? Like a Rebbe’s shul? What do they do?

Student: One thing, yeah. They start singing random songs.

Instructor: You know what it is? Whenever someone starts singing a random song, it means he doesn’t know what’s doing. And then the only thing he knows how to do is sing a song, so he sings a song.

Student: I don’t know what to ask him, so tell me.

Instructor: Because I told you, you need to tell me. You can’t be still. I’m just thinking, like, what, I don’t understand it fully, the other two meshudim [unclear – possibly “methods”], you’re masha [unclear], basically, the two of them, the Chassid and the non-Chassid, yeah?

Student: Yeah. And the…

Instructor: Oh, Litvaks don’t know how to do them either.

Student: No, no, no, one second, about—

The Na’anu’im Problem: Seventeen Opinions, No Clear Answer

Instructor: It’s like the shofar is not a good example because it’s too simple. By the way, it looks like doesn’t know how to do it either. There’s Rashi and whatever, what to do with the shofar, and there’s no like real reason. Like, okay, we assume that this is what it means. Nobody really knows what you do with the shofar. Rashi says you don’t know what the shofar is, and we do kapparos. So what does a Litvak do by that kapparos? It’s like how do you do kapparos? It doesn’t really do anything. And because no Litvak knows how to do that. But what I mean to say is that he knows what to do. Like I said, there’s a minhag [custom], so he just does what the minhag is. But he doesn’t understand what he’s doing.

When I say understand, it means like, in the Gemara, if you look in Sukkah, you’ll see there’s 17 different shittos [opinions] of how to do the na’anu’im [lulav shakings]. I think something like that. Like, do you do this, or like that, or like this, or malach [unclear], or maybe, and if you turn this way, or turn that way, and basically nobody knows the answer. Like, there’s not even a way to decide. Like, it’s a Shalmi [unclear – possibly reference to Jerusalem Talmud], this reason and that reason.

Like if you learn a sugya [Talmudic passage] like a normal person, like if you learn—if we learn, you could sort of understand what the Gemara says and what the Rishonim [early medieval commentators] say, and by that you could figure out, okay, there’s a machlokes [dispute], but there’s somewhere to solve the machlokes from, right? Of course you say, okay, but we’re machlokes because every shittah or whatever, but there’s some sugya, there’s something going on. Like you could say, okay, so the idea is, bur [unclear] is something like this, this is the geder [conceptual definition] of bur. According to that, this should be bur. There’s something going on.

I challenge you to find any good shittah. Look in your sefer [book] on the na’anu’im and tell me if you could explain the four shittos. I think there’s four or three shittos. There’s three main shittos and within them there’s six other shittos. Does he have a husband [unclear]? Like why does this guy think that it’s—there can’t be one. Why can’t there be?

Student: Because it’s either it’s this way or it’s this way, okay.

Instructor: It’s not like, why can’t there be? Because it’s, it’s not based on like, not based on anything. So like this big mitzvah of shaking the lulav, one of the—one out of 613 mitzvos, okay? We can get into like an argument of shaking if the na’anu’im is a mitzvah or it’s whatever, but one of the mitzvos, and you don’t even know.

The “Random Songs” Principle: A New Aphorism

See them, you go to see the shul, they just start singing random songs, which means they don’t know what they’re doing. And they shake it besides for shaking it like a baseball bat. Yeah, they also don’t know what they’re doing, could they see random songs. That’s my dad [unclear].

Student: No, by the—by this—

Instructor: Selichos [penitential prayers] also, they know this. They start singing random songs.

Student: When I was asked, I was not seeing random songs like selichos. What is the guy and I’m Ali [unclear]?

Instructor: Oh, oh, see, selichos is something that was recently invented, okay? So I got all right, how all this liquor smell a thousand years, all the whole structure, okay? And the people that still remember the nusach, they know basically what you do. Selichos, this way you cry, this is where you’re quiet, this is where you sit down, this is where you stand up, this is which niggun you sing it.

Okay, very good. Now, nowadays, in 2020, whatever, there are some people that don’t know how to do that. But I don’t know what it means in the Chassidish way, right? You know, you could just do it. It’s just words. But it doesn’t mean anything to them. So what do they do? Sing random songs.

So I have a rule. At least since the times of the Baal Shem Tov [founder of Chassidism], whatever you don’t know how to do a mitzvah, this is my new aphorism: they sing random songs instead, or they sing random songs but while doing it. And since everyone has a song that they like, or you know, every—say they said they’re kind of songs that they like and so on, and that means something to them. But they’re—since I think that I mean, well, there’s a bit your mind wrong stand Dubai’s Vanessa [unclear], since it doesn’t understand how to daven [pray], when as the only stance can witness, you sing random songs.

Emerging Objection

Student: You’re mixing something up. Sorry for stopping you, you’re mixing a tzad [aspect] mitzvah which is—

The Problem of Disconnection Between Mitzvos and Their Performance: The Case of Lulav and Niggunim

The Student’s Defense: Personal Meaning Through Song

Student: No, firstly, all the songs are like Rishal Shida songs. And obviously, Shaykh Nalila was not supposed to be like… So I’m saying, if it was a specific song, like Rabsh, it’s not a specific song. They do have a specific song, and it’s the wrong song, I’m telling you. They do have a specific song, but it’s more than one of Yana’s songs. But why is the Kiddush song not the wrong song? Don’t remind us that it’s the right song, and yet… It’s not a song, it makes sense in my head. It’s not a wrong—I’m not being—it’s a random song and it doesn’t connect. It makes sense, something you say. I am asking that in some sense we don’t know either, but it’s not my point. But at least the Amira of Kiddush we know, it’s a saying, and a saying we don’t just say like trick, we don’t have to get it. So you say it with a [niggun], and the [niggun], everyone according to how they’re understood, that Kiddush came. I understand.

The Instructor’s Core Argument: The Difference Between Siyata D’Mitzvah and Chush

Instructor: But when—one thing I’m for certain is that na’anuim [the shaking of the lulav] is not ashmanesh [is not a verbal recitation]. You’re not standing there. So, what are you doing? Basically, you don’t know what it means. You don’t know how to connect to na’anuim. You don’t know how to connect to Hashem with a niggun. No problem. Why are you holding your lulav of Nabuchadnezzar by the niggun? With the lulav of Sheldig?

It’s like the same guy that by his son’s chasuna [wedding] he also sings the same niggun. You have? Because it’s mitzvos and it’s a big inyan [matter], so it’s a big deveykus [spiritual attachment], so you’re singing the same niggun. No problem. What’s it got to do with the mitzvah that you’re in the Vayikas [performing]?

Why do you have to hold a random karto [lulav]? You’re not dancing with the kal [lulav]. The Evertzua Rebbe is not dancing nish fada kal [not for the lulav] and nish midi kal [not from the lulav]. It’s not my point because the Rav Shisruf of the Shenevaruv said you don’t dance with the kal. It’s said lefnei kal [before the lulav]. Okay, are you dancing lefnei kal? You know, you’re not. You’re dancing in kaparan [in the room]. Lefnei chasidim [before the Chassidim], you’re dancing. It was the kal of Shildi [the lulav of so-and-so].

The Rebbe’s Dance: A Generic Deveykus, Not Mitzvah-Specific

The Rebbe dances the same way by the mitzvah dance as he dances by lechaim ranu [a toast] and as he dances by an kitzvu [another celebration], right? Right? So he’s not doing mitzvotans [mitzvah-specific acts], he’s doing—he has a random—that’s what I’m calling random, random being relative to this thing. There’s nothing wrong, it’s a good thing, his niggun is a good niggun, it’s a kvaldige niggun [a wonderful melody], but it’s nothing to do with, you know what? The inyan [the matter at hand]. It’s no shaychus [no connection], you know what I’m asking?

The King Mashal: You Can’t Declare Malchus with a Random Tune

Like I told someone, I promised you that no king ever would be happy if someone comes in and says, “I want to tell you that you’re the king.” It goes like this. Oh, we know Malchus [kingship]. We know Eilat [casual melody]. They will throw you out. To a king, you come, you’re like, you’re the Malchus. Like they do in GERD. They got it right. You can’t come like Eilat and Malchus. What are you doing?

So the Pterid says that this Lubavitcher, they made this song. He doesn’t understand what Malchus says. He has his own thing that he thinks. And then he says, ah, and this is Malchus. And he sings this song. Right? So it’s fake. You have my argument. That’s my argument. Okay?

Acknowledging the Historical Context and Potential Solutions

Now, I have a whole history lesson to give you for why this is like this. And I also have ways of solving it in my head. But this is the ta’aneh [complaint/critique]. Chavst, kain, it’s dumitz, which is a basic ta’aneh like this.

The Two Kinds of Yidden: A Formal Typology

There’s two kinds of yidin. There might be more, but there’s two kinds of yidin. The halach yidin, you have to make bullet points.

There’s two kinds of yidin:

Halachic Yidden

Halach yidin that are interested in knowing how to do things.

– Some things they know how to do

– Some things they don’t know

– Some things they’re spiked [uncertain about]

– Some things they do know, but they still don’t have any handle on actually knowing how to do it

– There’s no way to know if they’re doing it right

Chassidish Yidden

And there’s chassidish yidn, or I don’t know how you call them, that are interested in feeling something.

– And those yidn also, there’s things that they understand

– Things that they don’t understand

– And things that they do not understand, but do it anyways, and therefore, connected to random things, right?

That’s the basic. The basic nekeda [point].

The Case Study: Shaking Lulav – Nobody Knows What They’re Doing

And one of those things, in my opinion, is shakun li’lif [shaking the lulav]. Nobody knows what they’re doing.

The Two Acts with the Lulav

Okay, what’s my raya [proof]? Because you know that lulav has to do with something. There’s two things that we do with the lulav: Hallel and Hoshanos. Right? We do the na’anuim [shakings] and the hakafos [circlings] with the lulav. Right? Right? Maskim [agreed]?

Neither of these things have any connection with each other. Right? Explain to me: A lulav, when you take it, what does it make you want to do? It makes you want to shake it around and say “Hodu l’Hashem [Give thanks to God]”? Or it makes you want to scream “Hoshana, Hoshana, Hoshana”? Which one? Both? Neither? First this and then that? One of them like this and one of them like that? Two of them like this, two of them like that, two of them like this here? Maybe?

The Arbitrariness Test: No Intuitive Connection

Well, what is going on? If I would tell you to just shake it without the [Hallel], how will you do it? Right? Very weird thing. I just made it up. If I tell you to shake it with by the [Hallel], how will you do it? If I tell you that the Mishna Berura says you should take it by the third time and not by the fourth time, no problem. What is going on with you people? You never say “no problem, this doesn’t make sense, I’m not doing it anyways because I get that.” But nobody seems to even have any idea.

The Kiddush Contrast: When Niggun Does Make Sense

Imagine I would tell you: make Kiddush. You know what, let’s assume that we know what Kiddush is. I don’t think we know, but let’s say that you understand how to make Kiddush. Imagine I would tell you: by Kiddush, you should say—instead of saying—I think you should say first whatever it says, there are three berachos [blessings] that are [recited]. You would just say it, right? Hopefully you would say “I get—I get if someone would say you should say [one of them].” I get any of them. Okay.

But this one, right? But if someone tells you to shake, do this on the right side when you say [one thing], on the left side when you say [another]—but if you tell the opposite, it would make just as much sense. It’s like, what’s going on? You got my kasha [question]? It’s a kasha.

Leaving the Question Open

I’m making you a kapparaab [a problem]. I should just leave you with a kasha, in a sense, because it’s better that way. I think so. It’s a very good kasha.

Side Discussion: The Problem Extends to Hallel Itself

Student: Can I ask you a question? Don’t you say, by Hallel itself, Hoshana?

Instructor: Same kasha. Why is he hanging out with the guy that wrote it? I’m asking him. It’s a good kasha. So what’s with the oylem [world/people] there? You know that there are a bunch of amiratim [sayings], right? There’s a story that already happened. Did you read the thing that you’re saying? Read it, Rebbeinu Shlomo. “Karassi [I called]!” Not “Ani koira [I am calling]!” What’s the matter with you there? It’s Hallel, yeah. Saying a story. “When I was in a tzarah [distress], I called to Hashem, then He answered me,” right? What’s going on with you?

Student: That one isn’t from the past. Maybe it is. Maybe not. I don’t know. Something’s going on with all this stuff.

Instructor: No, it’s a very good lead-up to “Hodu l’Hashem,” right? We’re saying when he was in a tzarah and we’re all in a tzarah, so it’s like—

Student: We’re not in any tzarah.

Instructor: We’re not in any tzarah. It finishes also—what do you mean, that’s time on the nisr [miracle]?

Student: But I’m saying you’re right that on the nisr it’s funny. What’s going on here? Are we in a tzarah? We’re not in a tzarah. It’s fine. But I’m saying if that’s one piece, “Min hametzar [from the straits]” and “Hodu l’Hashem,” “Min hametzar” is the hachana [preparation].

Instructor: No, it’s not the hachana. It’s the story. It’s telling you what happened.

Student: No, no, that’s not what it’s doing. That’s not what it’s doing. Why we’re praising, why we’re thanking God or praising God, or whatever you want to call it, that’s what it’s doing. Read the whole thing, you’ll see. It’s a mess, it happened already.

Instructor: That’s right. That’s exactly what we do. Maybe. Right, so this—right after that, we enact exactly that story.

Student: Not sure that’s what—what’s going on?

Instructor: But that’s a different question. It’s a good question. It’s not such a bad answer. Maybe, maybe not. You have to read “Lefnei Hashem” [the Hallel passage] inside and see if it makes sense of what you’re saying. I’m not sure.

The First Step: Recognizing Our Ignorance

The kitzur [summary] is, I think that we should start recognizing that we don’t know what we’re doing. That’s number one. We don’t know how to do it, and we don’t know why we’re doing it, and we don’t know what it’s supposed to be about. I’m trying.

That’s the first step of teshuvah [repentance]. Oh, we’re not doing teshuvah anymore. I forgot. It’s not a circus. Shana Raba [Hoshanah Rabbah]. Shana Raba. We finally realized that we didn’t know we were doing all circus, so we have to do teshuvah again.

Anyways, you must… This is my problem.

Can One Solution Solve Both Litvak and Chassidish Problems? The Case of the Arizal’s Authority

Can a True Solution Address Both Approaches?

Instructor: One for the Lutzbach, one for the Chassidusheyei [Chassidic approach]? I think so. I think that a true solution would solve both of them. Like I said about Shabbos [the Sabbath], the Chassidushid [Chassid] and the Litvak [Lithuanian-style Orthodox Jew] are talking about the same thing at the end of the day. I think, at least that’s how I, in my head, they don’t really have a machlukah [disagreement] about Shabbos. It’s not like a totally different theory.

Everyone understands what Shabbos is, what it’s for, even what the meaning is. I mean, the meaning says explicitly in the Torah [the Jewish Bible/Law]. But everyone understands what it’s for. You could have a difference in emphasis. Someone is a bit more busy with this part, someone is more busy with that part. But there isn’t a debate about what we’re doing when we’re keeping Shabbos. There isn’t a question.

And in the same way, if you understand the idea of working and the idea of not working, you explain the Chassidish in that, or something. But in the same way, if you would understand what you’re doing with your lulav [palm frond used during Sukkot], then we should be able to solve—I think something like this—we should be able to solve how to actually do it by understanding what it is. I don’t think this is a far-fetched idea.

The Arizal’s Selective Authority: A Case Study

The Pattern of Adoption

Instructor: I’ll give you some background for that, right? So there’s this thing where in certain areas everyone does what the Arizal [Rabbi Isaac Luria, 16th-century Kabbalist] told you to do, like Kabbalah [Jewish mysticism]. All the Chassidim and all the Sephardim [Jews of Spanish/Middle Eastern descent], they shake their lulav according to the order that the Arizal taught them to do. And all the Litvaks don’t. They have minor differences, the whole difference is like chasair [minor], but anyways, they all do differently.

But why? The Chassidim don’t all follow—not everyone at least follows everything the Arizal told you about. The Arizal said that you should make your tefillin [phylacteries] and nobody follows that, right? He said you should make your tefillin and nobody follows that. Right, why not? Such Chassidim of the Arizal. Or they listen to his advice about what you should actually do. It’s hard, right?

The Chassidim, they only do the Rebbe’s [Chassidic leader’s] aveiros [transgressions], the Rebbe’s mitzvos [commandments], let him do, right? This is to eat for davening [praying] and this is also to daven for three hours that nobody does. But I think there’s also a reason why certain things it works very well—the Kabbalah things take over very much, and those are precisely the things that nobody knows what or why they’re doing.

The Problem: Disconnected Symbolic Associations

Instructor: It’s like, if you look in why should you do the [na’anuim, ritual shaking] in this order, the time is something like it’s called so therefore you gotta do it this way and you’re like, come on, seriously, what’s that got to do with the name of lulav? It’s a nice rule, like a weird cloud, it’s a remez [hint], it’s a siman [sign]. But there’s some meaning to shockling [shaking] a lulav. I’m like, I don’t know, tell me why, according to what that is, it has to be this way. And the knurk [scholar] can’t tell you, because he literally doesn’t know.

So the Arizal comes, he says, look, I have a theory, I know what shaking lulav does. According to my theory, the correct way to do it is this way. Everyone’s like, okay, so this guy at least has a reason for what he’s saying that seems to make sense. At least we don’t really understand his reason—we’re not Kabbalah, we didn’t learn his reasoning—but we assume that he’s coming from a place where he understands what this is really for, what it’s doing.

Historical Context of the Na’anuim Directions

Student: Who’s the first person that brings the na’anuim directions?

Instructor: That’s a different—what do you mean which first person?

Student: They’re shining [mentioned], whoever started talking about these things.

Instructor: Yeah, what do you mean? No, up down, yeah, yeah, these are things that they’re shining, meaning not like the Arizal.

Student: No, the Arizal goes all the way back. I mean, all the way back. All the way to the same, like every other halacha [Jewish law].

Instructor: But he was the first person to switch this stuff.

Student: Not entirely. He switched a little. Kinezar [the Knesset HaGedolah, a halachic work] says like the Arizal, whatever, there’s…

Instructor: Kinezar was long time ago.

Student: Yeah, whatever, but…

Instructor: Before the Arizal, or whatever, at the same time, it doesn’t matter.

Student: No, before.

The Arizal’s Advantage: Theory Over Arbitrary Rules

Instructor: My point is, people started asking this question. So the Arizal has this sevara [logical reasoning], why should I do it this way? And so on. It’s not like a Gemara [Talmud]. It’s not like the Arizal goes against a Gemara. He’s going against something that nobody really knows and he comes with his way that he thinks he knows. I’m not saying about the mood, I don’t care, but the point is we always learn about him in other words that if he says—no, but it’s left after that’s the point.

If the Rambam [Maimonides]—I don’t, the Rambam didn’t actually say how to do it but or sort of didn’t say or didn’t get this level of detail—but if the Rambam just, for example, if the Rambam seems to not care, it doesn’t make any difference according to him what to do with, and someone else does care, so usually there’s a law of whoever cares more.

Student: Yeah, why should anyone care?

Instructor: But other people that do care, and they have Shracha Toiris [Torah sources], and their Toiris don’t really connect to what na’anuim is supposed to be. So if someone comes and says, I know what they’re supposed to be, and according to my understanding of what it is, not according to some random Chvez [nonsense], like I told you, like Kalpinesh at the Poina [arbitrary gematria], or Chvez Shvas [seven things], or some random klalim [rules] that you found and some—based on what I understand what it is, it makes total sense to listen to the guy. But the reason you’re listening to this is because you yourself don’t really know. You’re just following this guy that claims to know.

Student: I was a cop and it’s at the point it never explains all the other things whatever everything I don’t get into everything has some reason like this okay right like three times three times three times everything three times.

Instructor: Right? There’s no real three times, I suppose.

Student: Yeah, nobody, it seems like, my point right now is not—not only that you wouldn’t be worried if it would be four times—my point is that even if you do have, you say it’s like, there are most times you put three things on your list for every mitzvah, right? Okay, why do you put seven for twelve for the twelve shevatim [tribes]? And sheikhs, I’ve never met a great guy, but how does it come, why am I putting three rings on my lulav for them? They were standing on a lulav, like sheikhs, there’s no sheikhs.

The Arbitrary Nature of Traditional Explanations

Instructor: When the Arizal does something, I can make a Torah [teaching] for everything. That’s what his point is. And if he would have said he should do three for Aharon, Miriam and Moshe [Aaron, Miriam and Moses], it would also make sense. Three brothers, very important. It’s not, there’s nothing real.

And my more important problem is that it has nothing to do with the lulav. Lulav is, I’m sure someone has come up with a rash [Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki’s commentary] to explain these things. But my point is, the Arizal comes with something much better. He says, look, I’ll explain to you what a lulav is for, and therefore why you should shake it left and right, and up and down, whatever the thing is. And then people are like, okay, this guy knows what he’s talking about. And it actually makes sense.

Problem is that I’m not sure—if you actually learn it then you start realizing that it’s not clear that it really makes sense. But at least that’s what—that’s why it takes over the discourse and these kind of things, because nobody really knows. That’s my basic argument.

Kabbalah’s Legitimate Role in Determining Halacha

The Core Argument

Instructor: And that’s why I think that the Litvak literature thing of things like “yeah, Kabbalah can’t do halacha”—of course it could. What is halacha? Every halacha needs to have a reason for it. If you don’t know what you’re doing, what do you mean it can’t? Of course it could. Why shouldn’t we know Kabbalah? Kabbalah is just a theory of the meaning of things. It’s not random magic.

Student: Yeah, that’s not what I’m saying. I’m saying that it’s more than another shita [opinion]. Because other shitos [opinions] are just randomly saying stuff.

Instructor: No, but the Arizal is only talking about things that Litvaks learned, in other words, the takanos [enactments] have reasons, right? Then he’s right. This is a shita. So if you were to hold, I’m telling you, look, what I’m saying is things that are not proper—you’re doing a ritual. Now this ritual is supposed to bring the rain. I don’t know. It’s supposed to do something. So the guy that knows how to get rain from rituals, you should listen to him. And not to some guy that learned some Posek schema [halachic decisor’s framework] and knows nothing. Makes total sense.

The Question of Verification

Student: He knows how to do it or he knows the reasons why?

Instructor: He knows how based on the reasons.

Student: What happens if he knows how and he can’t show you any reasons?

Instructor: That’s a different question. Then it’s a question of believing this guy. You don’t have to trust him but if you trust him then it makes sense to listen to him. That’s what I’m saying. If you don’t trust him then it’s a lie. But the people say they’re gucci [good]. If someone says I don’t know, I have no reason to believe that this guy knows what he’s talking about at all.

Student: But he doesn’t know why he’s doing it so how do you know he knows what he’s doing?

Instructor: No, there’s two kinds of people again. There’s people that say oh you can’t follow Kabbalah because Kabbalah is nonsense—no problem then, no problem then. People say no, Kabbalah is so holy but you can’t do halacha according to it because halacha has its own rules—that’s not true. Why shouldn’t you do halacha according to what the meaning of things, according to what are you doing your halacha? I’m saying if you don’t know the meaning of things how do you know you’re doing it? You don’t know.

Student: Oh, you follow some guy that told—

Instructor: Okay, fine.

Student: So you don’t know that he’s actually doing it?

Instructor: That who’s doing it?

Student: Oh, he’s saying about bringing the rain.

Instructor: Yeah. Right? Because you mentioned, you said a sentence, you said that you should follow the guy that actually could bring it. Right? In other words, to the master of the master.

Student: No. Right? So I told you, I asked, how do you know that he’s doing it?

Instructor: Oh, you see that it rains, that’s the question.

Student: Oh, that’s it.

Instructor: For those things you don’t have a problem. So you don’t need a reason, you just need the master.

Two Tracks of Authority

Instructor: No, but that is something, that’s one thing, but the other thing—well, you know why. That’s one thing, and the other thing is that if he does have some kind of theory, and generally these things are based on the Kabbalah, but not people that just tell you they bring the rain. Sometimes they do, but most of the time they say that I have a theory.

Now, their theory is not understandable to normal people because it’s based on how rituals work, and how rituals work are not accessible to normal people. No problem. But this guy, he’s an expert. He does know how it works. So why wouldn’t you listen to him? It’s a ritual. It’s literally, what do you think?

Again, unless you’re a real apikores [heretic], you think that everything is mixed, there’s no reason for anything. Then the apikores shouldn’t follow it. But then you can’t even pasken [rule on] any halacha unless it says dirshu [explicitly] already. Because you literally don’t know nothing.

The Mechanics of Mitzvos: Why Expertise in Divine Interaction Matters

The “Ask a God Expert” Argument

Consulting Expertise That Matches the Domain

Instructor: So it’s about doing something to do with God, I don’t know. So you gotta ask a God expert, what’s so complicated? Okay, just like in *Choshen Mishpat* [the section of Jewish law dealing with monetary matters], you ask a guy that understands about *Bava Metzia* [Talmudic tractate on civil law]. When in *Choshen Mishpat*, placating God, you ask a guy that has a language with God. Isn’t that obvious? Who else should you ask?

Oh, you think you’re not talking to God when you daven [pray], but there’s nothing to do, there’s no divine action in it? Okay, so then I don’t know what you think you are doing. It’s just a mitzvah. It’s a *mitzvah tefillah* [commandment to pray]. Then you’re back to the previous problem, that you literally don’t know how to do that mitzvah. That would be the real Litvak problem. Ask him.

Why the Mekubalim Were (and Are) Successful

A Historical-Philosophical Argument

Instructor: This is one of my arguments—this is why I think that one of the big—this is a historical argument but also a very important argument—one of the reasons why the *Mekubalim* [Kabbalists] were so successful and still are is because they actually cared about such things. They were not happy saying “oh it’s a mitzvah to take a lulav, if nobody knows why, and we have to follow the rules based set in *Shulchan Aruch* [Code of Jewish Law] that say in the book nobody knows why either, like there’s no way to know why.” Like why is the *dam* [blood] here *ma’akev* [essential/invalidating] and not the *Achilles’ image* [unclear reference, possibly a specific detail in ritual law]? I’m like, why?

If you have no idea what’s going on—again, there could be some—but you understand what you’re talking about. You understand what I’m saying? Everyone knows. We know what’s working. You can see even if it’s working or not. But you know what I’m talking about. I know what *Choshen Mishpat* is. I know it’s *Choshen Mishpat*. I know it’s *Choshen Mishpat*. I can understand. When I say why, I don’t even mean the level of *ta’am* [reason]. It’s justified to a guy or something. I just think I know what I’m doing.

The Dayan Analogy: Expertise in Mechanics, Not Just Rules

Instructor: If you want to know better, you ask someone that knows more, someone that’s more familiar with business or more familiar with human beings, how they work and their financial dealings, and he’ll help you with your *halachah* [Jewish law]. That’s what basically—that’s what being a *Dayan* [rabbinical judge] is. A *Dayan* is someone like Shmuel *bedini* [in matters of law], someone that deals a lot with these things and knows how they work, knows what makes them tick, and knows the reasonings behind them and so on.

And it’s absurd to think that ritual things are just legal. Like, there’s just one more law and you have to ask someone who’s an expert in law. Like, this is not law. There’s no *Hilchos Tefillah* [Laws of Prayer]. *Tefillah* is a way of getting God to what you want. Okay? That’s the *pshat* [simple meaning]. However it works, I don’t know how it works theologically. So you have to ask someone that knows theology to tell you how to pray.

Ritual Mitzvos and Their Mechanics

Instructor: And if there are other mitzvos which are of the kind of prayer, like ritual mitzvos, like their point—their *Prophetic Amor* [unclear, possibly “the Prophets say”] says that they’re made to make—that’s what I said, they’re made to make rain. That’s what they’re for. So, you gotta ask someone that knows how you take a branch and make it rain through that. Isn’t that who you should ask? Is it so complicated, such a weird thought?

If you think the guy is saying nonsense, no problem, so find some other guy that doesn’t say nonsense. But you’ve got to figure it out, otherwise it doesn’t make any sense.

Critique of the Chassidish “Emotion” Theory

The Theory Stated and Its Obvious Flaws

Instructor: Have you ever seen a *Chassid* who also has a different theory that thinks that there’s no such thing as getting waving around the branch and getting God to make rain or somehow making it rain because of that? He says everything is about having some internal feelings—which is also wrong obviously, right? It can’t be right. Isn’t that obviously wrong theory too, right? A *freidish* [Yiddish: strange/foreign] theory. If there’s a theory, it’s also obviously wrong, correct? It’s as wrong as Litvish theory that everything is legal and you have to ask a legal expert.

Excuse—there is—you have to ask—why *Mekubalim* knows that people have emotions and obviously maybe it’s a *mitzvah* to have some emotion sometimes, but it can’t be that’s why you have to shake a lulav. I promise you it doesn’t make any emotions for anyone. Or even if it does, that can’t be the point of it. There’s better ways to do that. So it’s got to be about doing something. I don’t know what. We’ve got to figure out what it is.

The Redundancy Problem: Same Feeling, Different Mitzvos?

Student: It seems like you do know what because you’re for sure throwing away the other options.

Instructor: Which option?

Student: The emotion option.

Instructor: Yeah, seriously? That’s why there’s on Pesach with matzah and on Sukkos we chuckle a lulav and on Chanukah we light a menorah. All for the same reason.

Student: Do you really believe this for the same reason?

Instructor: Same exact? There’s only three—there’s only three emotions, what?

Student: Yeah, look at this about how many emotions are there?

Instructor: The people that are singing random songs always, okay? And for the—and for the thing they sing basically the same three songs, right? I don’t mean the same literal songs but they’re doing basically the same thing, right?

Student: Oh, you’re going back to that part.

Instructor: No, and now I’m talking about it as a theory. Before I was talking about it that he’s doing it because he doesn’t know. I’m saying that he doesn’t have some kind of theory maybe, and his theory is that everything is about to have a *hergesh* [feeling]—that’s not true. What about how we’re going to two and a half emotions and that’s not a good reason why to shake—shake your lulav just doesn’t make any sense. Make sense to you?

The “Connected” Theory and Its Limitations

Student: I don’t understand this *Sforim* [books]. They don’t realize like of course they have a good thoughts but they don’t realize like every week he says something else means this like I’m sick as it’s understand I’m keeping we fast so they believe that they realize that have a mistake that God loves everyone and I’m sick as we struggle lulav for the same reason hello what’s going on I could have theories to answer this specific question also but I’m just telling you that can I ask you this is not a good theory type of question.

Instructor: When the Rambam [Maimonides] says that all mitzvos are of three categories—of course, okay, of course, of course the Rambam has a similar theory, slightly better one though because he actually does ask this question. He didn’t just say “ah it’s just all about this.” He did try to answer this question.

Student: Yeah, but like all this time I’ve missed is basically built on three options they’re three general things but he does—he does try to explain why he needs all these things that’s what he does of course he does it in great generalities which he himself says but he does he doesn’t just say—

Instructor: Just to be clear, Rambam has more categories than the Chassidish *Sforim*. Even with his saying all of it started at two things, that’s still two things. The Chassidish *Sforim* have only one thing—like to have random emotions, be connected. How do we say now? To be connected. You’re not connected enough by singing this song yesterday, you have to sing another song today.

When you’re talking to lulav, your argument is actually that you’re not even connected—that’s really what you’re arguing. You’re connected but not to the lulav.

Student: Thanks.

Instructor: You’re randomly connected. You’re connected with the *nigun* [melody], it’s a very good thing to sing a *nigun*. It’s a big mitzvah, you know the problem? It’s a big mitzvah to have an *ahavas Hashem* [love of God], it’s a big mitzvah. And if your way of having an *ahavas Hashem* is singing songs, it’s a big mitzvah to sing songs. That’s one mitzvah, *mitzvah* to have an *ahavas Hashem*. What about the mitzvah of *lulav*? It can’t be the same thing. It’s a *Shulchan Aruch*, it’s the same thing twice.

It’s like in yeshivas, everything is Torah. Exactly. I’m asking, it’s a big Torah. I’m not a *chiluk* [distinction] on the value of it. I’m just saying it seems kind of weird to say that on Sukkos we shake lulav for that and on Chanukah we light menorah for that and on Pesach we eat matzah for that and then the Torah says different—it says on Pesach we eat matzah to remember that we had matzah in Mitzrayim [Egypt] and on Sukkos we shake lulav but it doesn’t say in the Torah why but we eat in the sukkah to remember that Hashem did different things—it’s similar you say take push the *pshat* with the *pasuk* [verse] both are *Yetzias Mitzrayim* [Exodus from Egypt] very nice but there’s different—different aspects of this *Yetzias Mitzrayim*.

Different Aspects of the Same General Category

Student: Does it have a big difference?

Instructor: I don’t know, but there’s some difference. I can give you a reason. I can give you an explanation. This is, yeah, the sukkah is a *shefa* [divine bounty/flow], and this is the *b’chipazon* [in haste] it says. Two different things. It’s not the same time. It’s the same *klal* [general category], but it’s not the same *prat* [specific detail]. Right?

So, okay, if you were a *Chassid Sfora* and you want to explain to me what the difference is in the feeling of the sukkah, okay, no problem. Then you’re doing something. I still think it’s wrong theory, but you’re doing something at least.

What Does “Connection” Really Mean?

The Philosophical Exchange

Student: If we talk about this in a backwards way, I think we could explain this a tiny bit better. If we’re talking about it from, would this emotion manifest this *asiya* [action] ever? I don’t know if that’s, yeah, I don’t know if that’s by the theory that everything is about either coming from or going to emotions, yeah, then that would be a good question. I don’t subscribe to that theory at all, so I don’t have that question.

Instructor: No, but that’s what connection really means, right, if you’re connecting to the lulav, what does it mean connecting to the lulav? In other words, that means that the connection is *shayach* [relevant/related] because of what you’re doing, right? So, in other words, it’s a of this feeling that’s supposed to be the correct feeling, right? There’s supposed to be some correct connection, yeah, that manifests itself through this action. Isn’t that like by definition what it means to connect truly?

Student: I’m not sure. Maybe it’s opposite. Maybe it’s the action is supposed to lead you to a certain feeling or something.

Instructor: Coming both ways, okay. But even—but even that would not be—what if it’s all the same feeling all the time then it seems to be superfluous to have so many of them or so many different ones.

Student: I don’t know that part.

Instructor: Yeah, that I got this part of it. I’m just yes.

Student: Yes.

The Impossibility of Reconstructing Practice from Written Rules: Why We Don’t Know What We’re Doing

The Problem with Deriving Specific Mitzvos from General Emotions

Can Love of God Generate Specific Practices?

Student: It could be both ways. Okay. But even that would not be… If it’s all the same feeling all the time, then it seems to be superfluous to have so many of them or so many different ones.

Instructor: No, no, that part, yeah, that I get. This part I get. I’m just saying—

Student: You’re honest?

Instructor: Yeah. But I’m saying, if you ask it on the Chassidim, I think the question should go that way, because that’s what they actually believe.

I don’t know if they believe that. I don’t know anything. When I say Chassidim, it’s like when I say Litvak, it’s some ideal guy that doesn’t actually exist. But I don’t know that they think that it’s what you would do.

The “Avraham Avinu Did Eruv Tavshilin” Problem

Sometimes people say this, like, Avraham Avinu loved God so much, and therefore he did Eruv Tavshilin [a halachic procedure allowing food preparation from Yom Tov for Shabbos]. I don’t think that’s correct. Did you ever hear something like this? I mean, maybe it is correct. I don’t know.

You know, we’re just not smart enough. We don’t have enough to know how that leads you to do—they probably need in some abstract, like general way, that might be true. But you need to add in all the details for it to make any sense. And those details are going to basically be the halacha [Jewish law] in the end.

Like, you’re going to say something like, “I really love Hashem [God] so much, so therefore He wanted to have Shabbos not be the same as Yom Tov [holiday], because Shabbos for some…” And here you’re going to have to explain to me why we have to have—which is going to end up being whatever the explanation for that is. I don’t know what it is.

And then you would say therefore Avraham Avinu wanted the Shabbos to have its own portion. Take one time. That’s what they’re saying. So then they’re not saying anything, because then they’re back saying whatever everyone thought before that. Not any chiddush [novel insight].

Student: What do you mean?

Instructor: You end up like—ask a Litvak, ask a Gemara [Talmud]. Why do you have a Litvak? What is a Gemara saying? Why do we have Eruv Tavshilin? Okay, something with eichon [how]. Okay, we’re all not supposed to be mayachin [preparing] for Shabbos on Yom Tov. Why not? For whatever—there’s five different shittos [opinions], let’s say. And therefore, if we make eruv somehow, that either, whatever, somehow that saves us from this problem, okay? Yeah?

So Avraham Avinu basically understood that. That’s nothing to do with ahavas Hashem [love of God]. That’s plain seichel yashar [straightforward reasoning].

Student: Oh, I thought you were just joking with the word ahavas Hashem.

Instructor: I mean to say, when you know and figure out—

Student: Okay, so then you’re just saying that there’s a reason to doing things and I’ve never understood the reason. Thank you very much.

Instructor: I mean, from the reason, from the right emotions, right?

Student: Not emotion.

Instructor: No emotions going on here. Everything. Seichel is emotions. It’s not only reasons. It’s about the whole gamut of the human condition.

Student: Yeah, but there’s no emotion specifically.

Instructor: If the Chassidim of Shafudim are trying to say something else.

Where the Chassidic Position Skips Steps

The Chassidim are always trying to say that the whole point of the whole Torah is to have specific emotions and everything is just about that. And therefore Avraham Avinu didn’t really need to know halachos ad rabbot [many detailed laws] to do Eruv Tavshilin, because he had the correct emotions and just somehow called him to make Eruv Tavshilin. That’s where they tend to skip steps.

Otherwise, if seichel noma is not telling you anything that you wouldn’t know from the Gemara, of course you could say, Avraham Avinu did Eruv Tavshilin. Why? Because there’s a reason to do Eruv Tavshilin, and if the reason is correct, then it’s correct for Avraham Avinu, it’s like it’s correct for you. That’s like a very tzaddikim [righteous people] kind of Torah. Like, he do mitzvos [commandments] because they make sense. If some people are not smart enough so we have to tell them, correct.

I don’t think this is what I’m saying that I generally try to say something more or less depending on your perspective or something different.

Discussion of the Alter Rebbe’s Position

Student: I thought I saw this in Alter Rebbe’s stuff. I don’t think he says this, or if he would be saying that it would be something so obvious that I don’t know it.

Instructor: Like, feels like I want to—I want them came in like in the chaburah [study group] and told him like I was like I thought about it myself and he like showed me like this without the episode. Maybe it’s just shot [nonsense] but like to me like he wasn’t arguing usually arguing with me a lot but to this like he—maybe that’s his chat and what it says okay but it sounds like brilliant like thank you very much.

What’s the big chiddush? How did I was into emotions? Of course he was into emotions. He’s always entirely into emotions. Of course he was. Then he realized that doesn’t work so well so he tried to move away from that in some ways. But he was very into emotions.

Student: Okay, fine.

Instructor: What’s fine? Fine. So we don’t know. That’s all you have to always know everything. So we don’t know.

The Central Tragic Claim: We Don’t Know What We’re Doing

The State of Our Ignorance

You don’t know why we do the eruv. We don’t know what it’s for. We don’t even know what kind of thing it might be. Just don’t know. You know, we don’t know because of the churban [destruction of the Temple]. I think that’s the first one. Since then we don’t know. That’s what I think. That’s a very sad situation.

Maybe the Mekubalim [Kabbalists] know. Sometimes. And some days. But we don’t know because of this.

Proof from Sefer Nechemiah

How do we know that we don’t know? It says in the pasuk [verse], in Sefer Nechemiah [the Book of Nehemiah]. It says that they read the Torah, they found in the Torah, it says that they should sit—they went and made a sukkah [ritual booth]. Maybe it says also that it is made out of arba minim [four species], depending on how you read the pasuk.

So what do I learn from this? That nobody knew how to do the sukkah. They just found a pasuk. Do you look in the pasuk, do you make a sukkah that says a pasuk? Exactly, it says a version of the pasuk, unless you have a lo kipshita [not simple] interpretation of that pasuk.

It seems to me that the pasuk says it because of this, to tell you that we don’t really know. Like Ezra said, and the first Mishnah, they explicitly said they don’t really know how the Urim v’Tumim [priestly oracle] works, right? Because they don’t have Urim v’Tumim. It doesn’t work, right?

The Urim v’Tumim Problem

He said, “ad she’ya’amod kohen l’Urim v’Tumim” [until a priest arises with Urim v’Tumim]. There’s ad she’ya’amod kohen elim [until a priest arises], right? And that’s why it couldn’t be machria safek [resolve a doubt] if someone has a kohen [priest].

But what he’s saying is, why can’t there be machria safek if someone has a kohen? Because they don’t have Urim v’Tumim. Okay, so they don’t have a magic way. So make up is like, la’alach [perhaps], safek [doubt], l’kula [leniently], l’chumra [stringently], what’s the big deal?

What he’s saying is, I don’t have a way to figure that out, because I don’t know what a kohen is. Maybe I’m even a kohen, but I don’t know how to be a kohen, because a kohen is someone that knows how to talk to the Urim v’Tumim and get answers, right? It’s one of his main jobs.

“Tamechu v’rech alish chasidachot, ezin depo sekatash v’say berachot” [They shall teach Your ordinances to Jacob and Your Torah to Israel]. Like, a kohen is someone that knows how to get answers from God. That’s his job description. How does he do it? The Urim v’Tumim, I guess. All the korbanos [sacrifices] have something to do with this. All the Avodas [service] of the kohen, that’s part of that. Somehow, they know what they’re doing.

And me? I don’t know. I know a Chumash [the Five Books of Moses]. I can open the Torah and I can read what it says and I can try to do what it says. Maybe also as like some Mesorah [tradition] what it means, okay. But he doesn’t know what it means. He doesn’t know how to do it.

The Ammoni and Moavi Example

So I think—and maybe I’m making a weird claim—but I think that when it says that they found in the Torah, and the same thing it says, they found the Torah that you can’t marry an Ammoni or Moavi [Ammonite or Moabite]—but it means they didn’t understand it themselves, right? For now they were casting out the Ammoni and Moavi before, right? And they stopped only because it says in the Torah. Not because they realized is that it’s bad, right?

Very sad situation.

Why the Elders Wept at the Second Temple

That’s why the people that remember the first Beis HaMikdash [Temple] were crying. They said, what’s going on with you people? You don’t have a Beis HaMikdash. You found the blueprint and you just followed it but you don’t like what to do.

The Impossibility of Reconstructing Practice from Written Rules

Modern Depictions of the Beis HaMikdash

Like I tell them about all the pictures that we have nowadays of the Beis HaMikdash that they’re all totally wrong. And I hope that when Moshiach [Messiah] comes nobody follows them. Because it’s like—it’s like someone finding an old menu and like making the whole meal based on it.

You’ve got to know what kind of clothes you wear and what kind of mood you’re in and how you do it. I’m just going to follow the three rules it says. Make sure not to put more than three pieces of salt. And make sure that this cup is before that cup. Okay, thank you very much. But I don’t know nothing from that.

The General Principle

You can’t recreate something. I mean, maybe you could, but that would be the work. But naively, you can’t recreate something from written down rules. It’s impossible to write down.

The Harvard Computer Science Course: The Peanut Butter Sandwich Exercise

Someone would try to write down, like, you know, there’s a famous—did I give you this drusha [discourse] already? This is one of my very important drushas that you should know.

There’s a very famous computer science course in Harvard, I think, that tries to show you how difficult it is to get computers to do things that you want, because computers are golems [automatons]. That’s exactly what you tell them. Now that we have AI, they got even worse, but they don’t even do what you tell them. But basic idea of a computer is that it does exactly what you tell them. It doesn’t understand any context.

Okay, again before yeah—it doesn’t understand any context of what you mean and so on. So everyone assumes that if you’re just so simple just tell them. So he said no problem. I want you to write down the list of instructions for making a peanut butter jelly sandwich.

So everyone takes a pen and paper and writes down how many steps are there. And you write, I’ll make the sandwich. And then he tells Aylan, oh, fine. And then he says, OK, they’ll read or someone says it. I don’t remember if they do it with writing or not. Someone, then he takes someone, he gives them all the ingredients. He tells them, OK, now follow this guy’s instruction.

And most of the time, he ends up with jelly on his head and with a bread. Because like, if you say, make a peanut butter sandwich, how do you write the rules? You say something like, take a bread and put the peanut butter on it. Okay, so he takes the bread, and he takes the jar of peanut butter and puts it on it.

Ah, wait, I forgot to tell you, you’ve got to open the jar, right? I don’t know a person enough to tell this, because he knows. In the tuition, you open the jar, but there’s a computer, I don’t know. Ah, wait, so I open the jar, and now, of course, he puts the whole thing. Oh, wait.

To open a stubborn jar, run warm—you have what I’m saying? You realize that, actually, normal human speech doesn’t articulate everything that is needed to understand. This is like a classic problem, actually, in AI.

But not for now. Point is, right, if you want to actually make everything explicit you end up writing very convoluted instructions. Like what you thought—how many steps do you think there are to make a peanut butter jelly sandwich? Three steps, right? Bread, peanut butter, jelly sandwich. No. Turns out it’s at least 17 steps. Go to the closet. Wait, which closet—

The Tragedy of Lost Context: Why Post-Temple Judaism Is Memorial Reenactment

The Torah Assumes Prior Knowledge — Which We No Longer Have

The Written Text Was Never Self-Sufficient

Instructor: You realize that actually normal human speech doesn’t articulate everything that is needed to understand. This is like a very classic problem actually in AI, but not for now. Point is, right, if you want to actually make everything explicit, you end up writing very convoluted instructions. Like what you thought, how many steps do you think there are to make a peanut butter jelly sandwich? Three steps, right? Bread, peanut butter, jelly, sandwich. No, it turns out it’s at least 17 steps. Go to the closet. Wait, which closet? Open it up. Don’t stand right there when you open it up, because it’s bumping your head. Wait, first move a little back. Perhaps, if they say so many things, unless it’s a robot, it does know nothing.

So what am I saying from this? This is basically how we’re doing mitzvos [commandments], since the times of Ezra and Nehemiah. Because the Torah is impassioned, which people say, why doesn’t the Torah say anything? That’s not how human communication works, divine communication either. You can’t say everything. We say the one thing that you don’t know we say, but you already have the whole world you have to miss me.

You know what does it mean? What is the korban [sacrifice]? You know what is Pesach [Passover]? You know what is Sukkos [the Festival of Tabernacles]? When it all it says the kapores [atonement offering], the camp read, so that it’s giving you a chiddush [novel element]. You would have thought you could take a different brief ways after it’s other. Do I know what it? Now we don’t even know what that is, but assuming to ever learn, listen to my Shabani [at Sinai], understood exactly what it was meaning. And don’t do it for eight days with chivas young [obligation of the young]. Don’t do in the college. I mean, I don’t know how. Just be all these things are explicit, but what does it even mean to do it? It doesn’t say because he assumed that you know those things.

The Tragic Loss: We Used to Know, Now We Don’t

And you used to know it. Now we don’t have it. All we’re left with is — that’s the biggest — people think that it’s a nice thing. It’s a very sad thing. We only have the written down instructions, and we end up like that with that jelly on his head.

And that’s why, since the times of beginning of Bayis Sheini [the Second Temple], nothing is working. It’s like an excuse when we say it on Yom Kippur [the Day of Atonement]. We’re trying to excuse ourselves. We don’t know nothing. We don’t know nothing. We don’t even know how to do the Torah. That’s what I’m saying. Because it’s not…

Student: That’s what I understand from what you’re saying.

Instructor: Yeah, yeah. I’m saying when it’s said in the selichos [penitential prayers], you make it sound like it’s a good thing. It’s a very bad thing. It’s really… Yeah, we say it in…

Student: It’s a good thing. It’s a bad thing.

Instructor: No, no. It’s not what I’m saying. I’m not… We have… That’s the point. And we literally don’t know how to do anything.

Since Bayis Sheini: The Era of Reconstruction

Ezra’s Smart Reconstruction — But Still Reconstruction

So, meanwhile, we’re making things up. That’s what the Chassidim can’t make up their understanding. At least we’re trying to do that. But if you don’t even try to do that and you’re stammering, it’s like they’re going to do all the rules in Imam Shabir [unclear reference] because you don’t know all the rules. It’s not possible that you should know all the rules from what it says.

Al-Qursan [unclear], the Mishnah comes and fills in some things. And then it was like, how could the Mishnah not know how to do the Beis HaMikdash [the Holy Temple]? It was five minutes ago. Well, the Beis HaMikdash didn’t even know. I think it was a thousand years ago. I mean 600 years before the Mishnah, the one where people… Maybe even then they didn’t know, because they were trying to do it over the Zohar [unclear reference], and they forgot how to do it. Who knows?

The point is, we don’t really know. And Ezra HaSofer [Ezra the Scribe] already didn’t know. But Ezra HaSofer was very smart, and he made peshatim [interpretations], and he was mevarer [clarified], and he explained it to everyone. He tried to reconstruct something in the way that it works.

The Serious Question of Reconstruction

And there’s a very serious question to what extent we can do reconstruction, or what that requires. I think that these are very, very serious questions. There must be a way.

The Role of Mishnah and Gemara in the Reconstruction Project

Before the Mishnah: Recipes Without Reasoning

The way of the Zohar [unclear] is a way of the Yiddish [unclear]. Until then, it was more like boom-boom, like recipes, yeah? The Gemara [Talmud] came, and the first thing that gives you reasoning within the words… Sometimes.

So it’s like a very big… It’s a kiddush [sanctification] of writing, it’s a kiddush of instructions.

Student: Yeah, but the Gemara is not instructions. The Gemara is not trying to find out how to do things.

Instructor: Okay, I think the Gemara is trying to tell you… The Mishnah just tells you instructions, understand this in a thousand years because it’s just random.

Student: Do we understand any Gemara by the way?

Instructor: Okay, sure. I’m telling you what. I don’t know, I don’t know. At this point maybe it would have been, but I think that’s what the Gemara is trying to do and giving you like a broad reasoning and then you’ll like get the context. Maybe.

The Skeptical View: Do We Even Understand Gemara?

In other words, I don’t know if the Gemara is trying to do this. I also don’t think that we understand Gemara. How do I know? Because tell me one Gemara where there’s three different peshatim [interpretations] and Rishonim [early medieval commentators] to explain what the Gemara is even saying. You have to just believe them. Okay, you could believe them, but it’s not obvious that one of them is ever right. Sometimes probably all of them are wrong.

Student: That’s true, but I’m saying the chiddush [novelty] of the doing of the Gemara. What did the Gemara do differently than the Mishnah and the Tzikkim [unclear]?

Instructor: I don’t know. The Midrash Elohim [unclear] are doing something similar. It’s not clear. Also, there was always Gemara. It’s not like the people… I do think… I don’t have to say the word Gemara.

The Pessimistic Core: The 300 Forgotten Halachos

There is — this is like very very the very, how do you call it, the very like negative part, the very pessimistic part of my understanding. What you call Gemara is what we call: Osniel ben Kenaz bilpul [through dialectical reasoning] shloish me’os halachos [300 laws] she’nishtakchu b’yemei eivel shel Moshe [that were forgotten during the mourning period for Moses]. Osniel ben Kenaz bilpul. Gemara is referring to this. This is saying that, but it’s true. And nishtakchu [forgotten] means literally that we don’t know, like 300 things that we don’t know what’s going on.

The Necessity of Creative Pilpul

And if you’re smart enough, there’s some way to figure it out. But you have to try to do that. If you limit yourself to what it says, then you can never do that. That’s the whole point of pilpul [dialectical reasoning]. You can’t say, if I don’t have, I only know what it says, then everything else is a subject. Then you don’t know.

If you have enough creativity or enough imagination or whatever, you have to try to be mechayev al ha’emes [obligate yourself to the truth] also. But if you have enough ability to remake things… Yeah, then you might, I’m asking that there is a process to re-kill it, to renew things, to re-enact, to revert, whatever, recreate, like historical recreation, like to do it the way, to figure out what people had in their head.

What Was the Kohen Gadol Actually Thinking?

Like I really want to know what the Kohen Gadol [High Priest], not Bayis Sheini [Second Temple], because I think you didn’t know already, but what the Kohen Gadol have in his head when he did — what was he thinking when he was sending this? What was he doing or what was he thinking when he was taking a, walking around the…

The Hopeful Possibility: Reconstruction Is Possible

I think it’s possible. And that’s the like hopeful, hopeful ending. I think it’s possible. I think that a lot of this work has been done, but we dumb people read that as another like as another recipe book. Like if the — and if the — all these people, like you said, they can write already, like say all these things, and it’s like one more thing you have to follow. Then you obviously don’t understand anything.

Everyone Is Grappling in the Dark

It’s all people trying to somehow grapple in the dark and remember that most of these things originally only worked in the Beis HaMikdash. Rabbeinu Tam [Rabbi Jacob Tam, 12th century French Tosafist] came and said, oh, and so on. And we still don’t know why or what and how it’s supposed to work. How could it even work?

The Lubavitcher Analogy: All Post-Churban Judaism Is Memorial Reenactment

The Provocative Comparison

Like, by the way, you say how, you say that still, what are you talking about? What are you saying? He also said, why do you do that? I was kind of thinking that everything that we do is a little bit like Lubavitchers are doing. Like the Rebbe died, and now when you do kiruv [outreach], so what do you do? And Yom Kippur is sitting down and he’s not saying, remember, and you go to that place and you say, over here the Rebbe used to stand with his machzor [holiday prayer book] and his kittel [white robe worn on Yom Kippur] or whatever and say, I don’t know, what he used to say.

And that’s basically instead of the Rebbe actually doing it. And basically we do the same thing with how, like, yeah, we used to bring a korban [sacrifice] and we would do the kiyum [fulfillment] or we sing it, whatever.

Applied to Yom Kippur: Pretending the Avodah Is Happening

And they said, bring the korban, bring it to the Mizbe’ach [altar]. And now we don’t have that. So we go to shul [synagogue] and we pretend, you know, and we pretend that something has happened. That’s what they’re doing. Like I said. Like I always wondered. Only the Kohen Gadol, not even a few people. Right.

But if we would have the Kohen Gadol, we wouldn’t have to say that either. Now we don’t have that. By the way, only the chazzan [cantor] has to say it. But nowadays the chazzan doesn’t say it loudly and nicely enough so everybody can understand. That’s the chazzan’s fault. That’s not the reason.

Student: Yeah, that’s the reason. Because there are many chazzanim that do say it loudly. Do you know?

Instructor: Yeah, I’m not going to ask this. When the chazzan says it nicely, people start listening. I know this. Everyone, the bell is down. It’s true, right?

Who Is Pretending to Be Whom?

It says the am [people] will go in. We’re pretending to be the am, not the Kohen Gadol. The Kohen Gadol didn’t bow down. Forget it. The chazzan should stand because he’s the Kohen Gadol. And the ulam [congregation] should dig [bow]. Why did the chazzan dig? It says…

Student: What’s the problem? No. Yeah, but we said the whole of avodah [service], though. We’re saying how he used to do, that’s what we’re saying, right?

Instructor: By the way, but this is instead of having the actual avodah. It’s a lot more work. There was one Kohen Gadol, now every shul [synagogue] has to do it. It’s true. But all these shuls together don’t add up to one Kohen Gadol. It’s all shevach HaMaseh [praise of the deed].

Zecher L’Mikdash: “Pretend” as a Technical Category

The Literal Meaning of Zecher

But that’s basically what we’re doing, and we’re doing this for a very long time. It says, we don’t hap [understand], we think that it’s a joke. Rabbeinu Tam was attacking that you should take the lulav [palm branch used on Sukkos] zecher l’Mikdash [in remembrance of the Temple]. Zecher l’Mikdash literally means that. We don’t have a Beis HaMikdash. We’re not actually doing the lulav. We’re doing a new thing called zecher l’Mikdash.

In other words, what are we going to do today? Because we’re going to sit at home and klotz [sit and study/mourn] and be depressed. So we’ll do exactly what I looked at Lubavitchers doing these kind of things. I think exactly what they’re doing. We’re going to give out a Kodesh to Baruch Hu [the Holy One, Blessed be He] with Alt Rebbe [the first Lubavitcher Rebbe] there and pretend that it’s there. It’s mamesh [literally] like that.

Extending the Principle: Lulav, Hallel, Hakafos

We’re going to kez lachem [unclear]. But Yiddishkeit [Judaism] is basically that since the times of the Churban Beis HaMikdash [destruction of the Temple]. We’re going to say Hallel [psalms of praise]. Hallel doesn’t make any sense. We will say — we don’t say it — we’re basically saying we remember that our zeidas [grandfathers/ancestors] used to do that. And we’re imagining how they used to do it. And they used to take a lulav — okay, we’ll pretend to take a lulav. We’ll take it. It’s all pretend.

At least the seven days, maybe the first day is mitzvah [commandment], but the rest of it is pretend, right? Zeidas means pretend, right? Pretend that does. Because we say, and we used to say, we used to go around, there was back [unclear], OK, we’ll go around the bimah [raised platform in synagogue].

The Nature of Ritual Reenactment: Zecher LeMikdash vs. Zecher Yetziat Mitzrayim

The Core Distinction Between Two Types of Remembrance

Student: What are you saying? It’s not a problem. The real Lulav, the real Hallel, isn’t the Beis HaMikdash [the Holy Temple]. And we don’t even know how to do it. We don’t even know how they did it there. We don’t understand the words that can Google such a thing. We’re not reenacting it like by killing you, it’s a Mitzrayim [Egypt]. It’s a Mitzrayim we’re saying, and then Hashem [God] rose from Mitzrayim.

Of course, the time goes on and it becomes old, so we have it every year, but we talk about it in Mitzrayim. Not personally, that was never the point. The point of Mitzrayim was that it should be the dearest. It is not something that we don’t have. We don’t cry. That was the end of Mitzrayim. Move on.

Instructor: No, I understand what I’m saying. Please. No, it’s not just saying this. You should appreciate it. Like, you know, someone got married. So every year by their anniversary, they remember. Remember, there’s nothing sad about it. It’s not like we should have been…

Student: No, but then, you see, that’s my point. When you get married, you can actually have it as a Korban [sacrifice]. You can actually remember that.

Instructor: Exactly. Because it actually happens with people over here.

Student: No, no, I don’t understand. Why not? It happens to our people. It’s the same way of understanding.

Instructor: No, no, no, it actually happens to our people. It’s true. The Beis HaMikdash is fake nowadays. The Zecher LeMikdash [remembrance of the Temple] is fake. The Zecher Yetziat Mitzrayim [remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt] is a real thing.

Student: I don’t understand what you’re saying. The Zecher Yetziat Mitzrayim is fake.

Instructor: The Mikdash [Temple] was not made that when after there’s a Mikdash you should remember it. Yetziat Mitzrayim was made that it should happen once and forever. That’s what it’s for. It’s not for the Eved [slave]. It’s not fake to reenact it. There’s nothing wrong with it. It was always like this. That’s exactly why we do it. So we should remember even next week and next daughter and so on that we went out of Yetziat Mitzrayim.

The Mikdash is not saying it wasn’t a Mikdash. Maybe if you saw one they can make a Torah like this, but that’s not the normal Pesach [Passover].

The Lubavitch Analogy: Reenactment After the Rebbe’s Death

It’s actually saying, the Rebbe is dead, but we can make a Kiddush [sanctification] and the Rebbe will give him a bracha [blessing]. Let’s pretend there is giving a bracha. No Shliach [emissary] would say, let’s give him a bracha. No Shliach. It’s probably the same thing.

Student: It’s not fake. I don’t think the Seder is fake.

Instructor: It’s true that it’s in some sense fake, because we’re back in Galus [exile]. That’s true. That’s why we say, we don’t have a Pesach. We only have half Pesach also. But the basic idea was, even if they were doing a real Korban Zecher [memorial sacrifice] and they were real with the Aini al-Mukma Zecher [I am not standing in the place of remembrance] and everything, there’s no problem.

This is Meshichisten [Messianists], other things, whatever, right, that’s not the life of the Mikdosh?

Student: Yeah, that’s Meshichisten, that’s fake, because Lulav, it’s not like, you can’t do a life of the Mikdosh without the Mikdosh, it’s like you can’t have the Rebbe’s Baruch [blessing] when the Rebbe is dead.

Instructor: Yeah, he’s on Rebbe Chaim. But the man says, for the same reason he needed him, he needed him still, right? It doesn’t work to say it.

Student: So you’re just asking how to be honest?

Instructor: I’m not asking. I’m telling you what he did. He did the best he could. I’m not asking. I think that we forget what it says here. I’m not asking how to say it. I don’t know how to say it.

Student: How do you say it? It’s like…

Instructor: It’s like what? No shyness. That is what you should do if you have a Rebbe. Because what else are you going to do?

Student: It’s not that. It looks retarded.

Instructor: It’s… That looks retarded. So how would you do that?

Student: What do you mean why? Because you have a better plan?

Instructor: Yes, Tikunim [repairs/corrections].

Student: What do you mean Tikunim? Because you are going to be in the house of Lubavitchers?

Instructor: Because you are going to be in the house of Lubavitchers? I’m going to be in the house of Lubavitchers. I’m going to be in the house of Lubavitchers. Hello, why?

Student: That’s not what you’re saying. That’s not what I’m asking. I’m asking you very simple questions. How can you be in the house of Lubavitchers without a Rebbe?

Instructor: No, we did as much as we could, we did as much as we could, by the way that’s very sad too, we do all kinds of, we do, we read about the Korbonos [sacrifices], we do all kinds of things, that’s basically what we’re doing, but we don’t, do we actually do it?

Student: Okay that’s a different point.

The Spectrum of Reenactment: From Normal Practice to Meshichistim

Instructor: There’s a different sheet about if the Lulav costs Geld [money], but I don’t understand your Kashya [question]. I don’t understand your Kashya. I don’t understand everything we do is actually in the Mikdash. Whatever, there’s problems, you know, these stories you already know why.

There’s some things just like you can’t, maybe someone about which will tell you that it makes sense to talk about every Yom Tov [holiday] what the Rebbe used to do that Yom Tov and sometimes it makes sense to even take the Rebbe, sit there, and… but it doesn’t make sense to do the Kos shel Bracha [cup of blessing] because that’s not too much.

We feel it’s crazy and we feel it’s not crazy, but it’s all as sad as that, that’s what I’m trying to say.

Student: They don’t do crazy stuff like that?

Instructor: No, the Meshichistim, the normal people don’t do that, but a lot of the normal people, at least like the Bochurim [yeshiva students], what is, again, the Alte Iden [old Jews], the Gedenk [remembrance], it’s all the same, right? There’s no Meshach [anointed one].

Student: What’s written in the Yeshiva?

Instructor: Look in the Bible, I see it on YouTube. Every little Bible which is written, before Yom Tov says, bring some Alte Iden, to tell them what things have happened, and how things have happened, and how things have happened.

Student: Fine, but the Meshichistim, that’s what I thought you meant the whole time.

Instructor: No, no, no, there’s not such a big, it’s all a, it’s a spectrum, based with the Lulav, then Zogen HaOshanos [saying the Hoshanot prayers], and Zogen, we pretend to say HaOshanos, but we don’t really say HaOshanos, because HaOshanos is, but that’s how it has to be, otherwise it’s time lying, right, no, it’s obvious, and we understand that we’re saying the HaOshanos.

I think that it’s obvious that that’s the pshat [plain meaning] of Hallel that we’re saying. And then the Lulav, again, it was the brown. But it’s still, we’re taking the Lulav and, okay, there’s a different thing that is missing here, which is why I think the Lulav is only for Hallel, but that’s a different sheet.

But the point is that it’s how we’re taking it and we’re saying ke’ilu [as if], it was the brown. We don’t even know, we don’t even know if it’s really a Zecher LeMikdash BiSheni [remembrance of the Second Temple] or not. We don’t know. But this is the point.

Student: So I’m asking, though there are a lot of people who think that they can do it because they are not as good as the other Lubavitchers and the Meshichistim. But there are a lot of people who think that they can do it. What’s the problem?

Instructor: I think that’s one of the reasons why they do it. They say it in a certain way. And therefore you shouldn’t be sad for my whole previous Torahs that I told you nobody knows it. Because this is the comment which we don’t know.

The Baal Shem Tov’s Approach: “Saying It in a Certain Way”

I think Baal Shem Tov [founder of Hasidic Judaism] was very dumb. The whole Baal Shem Tov was saying it in a certain way. It wasn’t a lot of things. It’s a reenactment. It’s a fake. It’s a pretend. And that’s going to work within that.

In the same way we take a Lulav from, we hope maybe when we take the Lulav we’ll find out what a Lulav was. Maybe, maybe somehow we’ll keep the flame alive until who knows until something.

So the master waiting, we’re reading the Torah, this is Barton at the airline where he comes. Can I was the shot, can I was a shot is and I think they’re not only under on the chart my father my side melt decided I’m bummed it out but…

The Radical Claim: The Last Person Who Knew the Pshat

But the last person I know to be a Pshat died before Ezra was born. And something like that. And since then, we’re all…

That’s what I think. That is my answer for today. Maybe tomorrow I’ll have a better answer.

Student: But what was the Pshat then?

Instructor: I don’t know! What do you mean? If I would have known what the Pshat was, I would have been there.

Student: I mean, what was the Pshat then?

Instructor: No, because you’ve said many titles on things that, right, like historical titles, right? Those historical titles are also like bad reenactments, always. That’s the reality. I’m imagining what it should have been.

Student: I’m asking myself, I’m asking myself, I’m asking myself.

The Seed Metaphor: Making Space for What Is Missing

Instructor: I’m asking myself, I’m asking myself. It’s like a giant seed, where I just said, no seed, and you pick that giant seed out, and you say, I’m making space for the seed. I’m making space for the seed, because when you say, what do you mean, the seed is a giant seed? The seed is a giant seed. It’s like an arrow, you can’t see it.

The Limits of Knowledge and the Kavanos of the Arizal: Reenactment, Loss, and Joy

I. The Problem of Historical Reconstruction

Student: No, because you’ve said many Torahs on things that, right, like historical Torahs, right? Those historical Torahs are also like bad reenactments, always. That’s the reality. They’re like, I’m imagining what it should have been. I’m asking, I can’t, I’m not talking about Torahs at all. What’s the group that you guys are going to start? Ein Sof [lit. “without end,” a kabbalistic term for the infinite aspect of God]?

Instructor: It’s a huge Sof [end/limit], but I just said, I’m making space for the Sof. Because when you say, what do you mean, okay but he was of course he is a great—if you’re on a great of either with all the feeling, give all the gesticulation [like] Salanter [Rabbi Yisrael Salanter, founder of the Mussar movement] masters on—but so I’m not being against him but I’m saying that we should realize that there was like I said this, it is like I make it off and I think that everyone’s whatever this I could get into like details of truth and travel see in my writing but the point is we don’t really know that.

I’m with you in the machina [understanding/concept] reenactment in some—that’s not what you’re saying about me. Do you think it’s my house I have to say and the vice I want to use my much more than I suppose back is that my—we don’t know.

Student: How do you know that?

Instructor: I could have had these arguments, but basically we don’t know, and it’s the Yiddish that I’m saying.

II. The Kavana of Lulav: Zecher Beis HaMikdash

Instructor: I’m telling you the Kivuna [direction/intention]. The Kivuna of Lulav [the palm branch taken on Sukkos], at least, I’m actually specific about that. I think that B’yom Rishon [on the first day] is also B’zecher Beis HaMikdash [in remembrance of the Temple]. I mean, it’s obviously true. We know that because we don’t do it on Shabbos, although we should have if it would have been tonight, but whatever.

But, so the first day of Shabbos, the whole day of Shabbos was actually Shabbos, so I was lucky from the first day to the second day. This year, the first day of Shabbos, so we’re back to actually Shabbos only. And, actually Shabbos means, I don’t have any idea what I heard, from one day to the next, from one day to the next, that the Rabanan [Rabbis], when they flee, they can steal the Shabbos. So I didn’t steal the Shabbos.

III. The Baal Shem Tov Parable: Progressive Loss of Practice

Instructor: So if you do a menschmusik [a human/person’s music], you make a Ferchens dem Maaseh [understanding of the story], von der Izsine [from the essence], I think that’s the story, the story that the Izsine someone said that the Zayde [grandfather], they go to a place in the Wald [forest] and make a fire and say a Tefillah [prayer], and they come to their shee, and not that they go to the Wald and make the fire and the Tefillah, not that they have not know how to make the fire and the Tefillah, not that they say the Tefillah and tell the Maaseh [story], and in the West they tell the Maaseh, I forgot to say that part, in the West they tell the Maaseh, Admaa tell the Maaseh [at least tell the story].

That’s what we do, we say Hallel [psalms of praise recited on festivals]. Hallel is, it’s true, we say these words, these words are from the Torah, so it’s just hard to tell them, but what does it mean, how do you do it, how do you do the Hallel, right, we don’t know, nobody knows, we literally don’t know.

IV. Hallel as a Case Study: Reading Instructions as Liturgy

Instructor: We read the Hallel as if I’m all its line the line the line the Siddur [prayer book] the Shabbos omrim [saying on Shabbos] literally like that Shabbos omrim and Shabbos and Shabbos I’m as a creditor you and I like the elevator as a line and tell them why we do that was back I don’t know we don’t know how to actually do it so we do whatever we tried.

I could show you Maamrei Shteklich [statements/passages] now that you see that it’s instructions and we just read the whole thing. Actually, I know this because the Raman [Chazal/the Sages] still tells us that there’s something going on here. It’s not like…

And the time when they sing, when the Rebbe comes, and we sing “Baruch HaBa B’Shem Hashem” [Blessed is he who comes in the name of God], this makes sense. When we sing in Hallel, it doesn’t make any sense. What? When? Where? What are you saying? What? When? Where? What are you saying? What are you saying? He’s giving instructions what to do. So you go and you do it.

A. Hallel Was Call-and-Response

Instructor: Something like that—this is a call and response. “Halleluyah” [Praise God] means someone is saying to the olam [congregation/public] “Halleluyah,” yeah right, was that everyone’s worried that that that’s a flick to sit in there’s a line to it how do we do it on how do you think we could go with the touch what’s the chemical I’m don’t say I don’t know he’s in the going I don’t know look yeah you might be used to out to let him has was attached I’m new I saw him wills van V what’s going on here obviously it’s gonna all I don’t know what I’m talking about.

I’m talking about Yisroel [Israel]. Everyone was standing there. The people were saying, I’m Yisroel. Everyone was saying the same thing. I said, I’m from Bethlehem. Everyone from Bethlehem was saying the same thing. Every time. I don’t know.

Student: And “Yirei Hashem” [those who fear God]?

Instructor: It’s someone. A certain group. They were Yirei Hashem. You want to find out who that group was?

Student: Levi’im [Levites]?

Instructor: No. Levi’im. It doesn’t say. In the other one it says Levi’im. It’s a good question who Yirei Hashem is. But there was some group called Yirei Hashem. The Chassidus [pietistic group] called Yirei Hashem. Whoever it was.

So I know so that’s what it is other stories doesn’t matter but it’s obviously that’s what’s going on right when you’re saying it’s not making Peter making it again the master as I hold over and shine and left she would do in enough esposa as long as given in the shot that’s the new.

V. The Arizal’s Kavanos: For the Beis HaMikdash, Not for Zecher Beis HaMikdash

Instructor: I think that the whole Kavanos Ari [the intentions/kavanos of the Arizal, Rabbi Isaac Luria] is really the Kavanos of Zecher Beis HaMikdash [in the time of the Temple]. What’s my opinion? Because if it would be really different from the three Seder HaKavanos [order of intentions], which is not Zecher Beis HaMikdash, it is. Or you could have that extra Kavanos, the first and the second, which is not you. In the Rosh Hashanah [Jewish New Year] it’s the Psychilic, but there isn’t really.

So the pshata [simple meaning] is, that the Arizal’s kavana is not for the mitzvah that did the Beis HaMikdash but the Arizal’s kavana is a middash [from the Temple] for the Beis HaMikdash. But the Arizal’s kavana is not for the middash for the Beis HaMikdash. But the Arizal’s kavana is a middash for the Beis HaMikdash. It has to be because that’s the Adlocher [the place], right? That’s the Beis HaMikdash.

VI. Closing: Depression and Joy

Instructor: Very depressing shiur [class], go there if it’s your case. That’s a story. It has to be a little bit less B’simchah [with joy]. It’s B’simchah. The reality is I’m B’simchah. I’m in the middle of a dream. I can’t sleep in the dream. I’m still a little bit sleepy. Yeah. Shine. I got to sleep.