📋 Shiur Overview
Argument Flow Summary: The Nature of Pirkei Avos — Humanistic Ethics or Torah Ethics?
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I. Administrative Preamble
Next week (new *zman*), the class will restart the study of the Rambam’s *Shemoneh Perakim* (Eight Chapters) from the beginning, reading the text closely alongside interpretive discussion. Everyone is encouraged to attend from the start.
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II. Foundational Principle: Every Subject Has a Correct Canonical Location
A. Background on the Text
The *Shemoneh Perakim* was written by the Rambam as a preface to his commentary on *Pirkei Avos*. Why *Avos* needs a commentary and why that commentary needs a preface will be addressed later. But first, a more basic foundational point must be established.
B. Core Thesis: The Torah Is Not Monolithic
There are roughly 60–63 *masechtos* in the Mishnah and 24 books in Tanach. Each addresses different aspects of life, different theories, different concerns. One cannot say “the Torah says X” without specifying *which part* of the Torah.
Illustrative examples of the error:
– Claiming “the whole Torah is about Eretz Yisrael” — but *Sefer Mishlei*, written by the wisest man, barely mentions it.
– Claiming “the Torah is all about *halachos* of *korbanos*” — but what about *Iyov*?
– Claiming “the Torah isn’t interested in philosophy” — but *Iyov*, much of *Tehillim*, and other books are explicitly about understanding God.
– Deriving the purpose of human happiness from *Hilchos Tumas Meis* instead of the passages that actually discuss human happiness — like studying *Hilchos Shabbos* from a stray mention of Shabbos in *Masechta Pesachim*.
C. Diagnosis: The Root Cause Is Lack of *Beki’us* (Breadth of Learning)
Most people know only a few *pesukim* or a few *aggados* from the weekly *parsha*, so they cram every topic into those few sources.
Example: Learning about *machlokes* from the story of Korach, when *Mishlei* has explicit verses about it. The *Midrash* brings *Mishlei* to illuminate Korach, assuming the reader already knows *Mishlei* — but most readers encounter the *Mishlei* verse for the first time through the Midrash, inverting the intended direction of reference. People claim to represent “what Chazal say” based on three *aggados* they encountered, without surveying everything Chazal said on the topic.
**[Side Digression: Critique of *Mesilas Yesharim*]**
Many Chareidi Jews derive their entire understanding of the purpose of the world from the *Mesilas Yesharim* — which is a “throwaway *hakdama*” (introductory work) by Ramchal, who treated the subject more complexly in his other *sefarim*. There exists an undelivered *shiur* “deconstructing the *Mesilas Yesharim*” and explaining how much it’s missing. This is acknowledged as a tangent.
D. Restatement of the Principle
You must study each subject in its proper canonical location. Starting from a *midrash* that tangentially touches a topic is fine for *midrashic* purposes but not for genuine understanding. Canonical works provide *organization of thought* — they tell us where to look for what.
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III. Application of the Principle: Where Is the Jewish Book of Ethics?
A. The Question
If you want to study ethics — how to be a good person — you need to find the correct location in the canonical literature.
B. Where Ethics Is *Not*
– Seder Nashim and Nezikin deal with women and damages — legal questions for courts and communal institutions. They don’t teach you how to be a good person in the direct sense.
– Masechta Kesubos is not a guide to *shalom bayis*; it’s for when a marriage has already broken down and the parties are in court.
C. Where Ethics *Is*: Masechta Avos
Aristotle wrote a book of ethics; so did Chazal and so did Tanach (*Mishlei*, etc.). Masechta Avos is literally a work of ethics — it asks the kind of ethical questions one would expect in such a work (visible already by the second or third chapter). Yet people don’t take it seriously as such; they treat it as a collection of stories about *tzaddikim* rather than as a systematic ethical treatise.
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IV. The Nature of Pirkei Avos as an Ethics Text
A. Main Claim
Pirkei Avos is a tractate explicitly about how to live a good life. It addresses real, substantive questions — what is a good life, how to achieve it, what the specifics and generalities are, and what the theory behind it is.
B. Qualification
Pirkei Avos is written mostly in aphorisms and statements, not in argumentative/philosophical style. The Mishnah in general does not argue; that role is supposed to belong to the Talmud.
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V. The Absence of Talmud on Pirkei Avos
A. The Gap
There is no Talmud (Gemara) written on Pirkei Avos — a striking and unexplained gap.
B. Possible Explanations (Speculative)
– It was considered too hard or too serious for the Talmudic method.
– The Talmudic methodology may not be a good match for ethical inquiry.
– It may have been a secret tradition they didn’t want to commit to writing.
– The Talmudic authors may have discussed these topics in scattered digressions elsewhere.
– Ethics may be *more* serious than what the Talmud does in other tractates (e.g., Shabbos), and cannot be handled in the same style.
C. An Ironic Imbalance
There is actually more Talmud on metaphysics (e.g., Masechet Chagigah) than on ethics. The absence of Talmud on Avos does not mean the subject is simple or unimportant — it may mean the opposite.
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VI. The Rambam’s Critique and Project
A. The Rambam’s Core Argument
You cannot claim that tractates like Shabbos deserve extensive commentary while treating Pirkei Avos as self-evident. Ethics is not obvious; it requires serious intellectual work.
B. The Rambam’s Response
He undertook a major project of interpreting Masechet Avos precisely because he took ethical instruction seriously and wanted to teach people how to be good. Various other scholars followed suit with their own commentaries.
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VII. Rav Soloveitchik and the Chofetz Chaim on the Complexity of Ethics
A. Rav Soloveitchik’s Position
Hilchot Deot (laws of character traits) and how to be a good person are genuinely complicated — not simple — and deserve formal halachic treatment.
B. The Chofetz Chaim’s Contribution
– Wrote an entire sefer (*Chofetz Chaim*) on a single middah (character trait): not gossiping. This is framed as a *middah*, not a *mitzvah*.
– Also wrote *Ahavat Chesed*, a halachic work on being a good person.
C. Critique of the Chofetz Chaim’s Approach
He wrote in the style of a strict halachic work, which “kind of misses the point” of ethics. He tended toward *chumrot* (stringencies) to scare people into taking things seriously, and his firm halachic style may not be entirely fair. But at least he engaged with concrete practical cases (e.g., what counts as lashon hara, how much information to share for a shidduch).
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VIII. Ethics as Practical, Not Theoretical
A. The Medical Analogy
Ethics is like medicine — the interesting and important questions are the *practical*, clinical ones, not the abstract theories.
B. Virtue Ethics Framing
Virtue ethics starts and ends in real situations. Being a good person is bigger than any single situation, but you must be able to reason about specific cases. Aristotle’s limitation: the answer “whatever a good person would have done” doesn’t give enough concrete information.
C. Examples of Real Ethical Dilemmas Chazal Engage With
– On Yom Kippur, making up with someone is generally good — but what if making up makes things worse? Should you maintain a cold war or open up?
– How much information to share in a shidduch inquiry?
D. Polemic Against Academic Ethics
An ethics professor may know how many mice lives equal a human life but cannot answer everyday ethical questions. “You’re not a serious person.”
E. Assessment of Chazal’s Work
They did a lot of work on practical ethics. Candidly: “Not very good work in my opinion, but they did a lot of work on that.”
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**[Side Digression: The Neglect of Mishnah in Contemporary Learning]**
In contemporary Jewish learning, Mishnah is largely ignored — treated merely as a prelude to the Gemara, something read casually (“when you’re falling asleep”). Very few people seriously study Mishnah on its own terms today. Neglect does not indicate unimportance — it indicates ignorance. Someone might rightly say: “Your problem is that you read the wrong masechet. You should have been reading Masechet Avos instead of Seder Nezikin.”
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IX. The Counter-Theory: Mussar as Mere Exhortation
A. The View
Many people believe Pirkei Avos contains *mussar*, and mussar is understood as mere exhortation — telling you to be good, which you supposedly already know. Under this view, mussar has no informational content and therefore nothing to study.
B. Attribution
This view is seemingly stated at the beginning of Shemoneh Perakim (Rambam’s introduction to Avos).
C. Rebuttal
This is wrong — mussar does have substantive content. The Rambam himself argues against this opinion later in the same introduction. There is suspected trickery: the Rambam pretends at first that what he’s teaching you is already known, to make you accept it more easily — but actually, “you don’t know any of it.”
D. Is Mishlei Also Just Exhortation?
No, it is not.
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X. The Great *Machlokes*: Two Schools of Interpreting Pirkei Avos
A. Rambam’s Interpretive Methodology
The Rambam wrote a preface to Pirkei Avos in which he explicitly states his methodology: he will interpret Pirkei Avos based on what is true about human nature and therefore what constitutes human perfection. He then apologizes — not for his thoughts being unoriginal, but specifically for drawing on non-Jewish, non-Torah sources (philosophers). His famous defense: “the truth is true no matter who said it,” so there is no problem using such sources.
B. The Two-Part Structure of Pirkei Avos
Pirkei Avos has two distinct components:
1. A narrative/chain of tradition (Moshe received Torah at Sinai, passed it to Yehoshua, etc., down to the Anshei Knesses HaGedolah) — possibly the reason it is called “Pirkei Avos” (chapters of the fathers/forebears).
2. Ethical teachings attributed to each sage in generational order.
The Rambam himself addressed why these two parts appear together (in his Hakdama to Mishnayos).
C. The Traditional Objection (Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura and Others)
A well-known *drosha* (found in Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura and elsewhere) claims that the chain-of-tradition opening exists precisely to prevent the Rambam’s approach. The chain is meant to show that these ethics are not merely humanistic/philosophical truths discoverable by reason, but are transmitted Torah teachings — rooted in revelation, not independent human wisdom.
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XI. The Rambam’s Position: Pirkei Avos as Humanistic Ethics
A. The Core Claim
The content of Pirkei Avos is the same subject matter as Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, Plato’s ethical works, or Muslim ethical philosophy. They all address: What is good for a human being? How should one live? These are truths discoverable by human reason alone — no revelation is needed.
B. Methodological Implication: Where to Study the Subject
Just as understanding a *sugya* in Bava Kamma requires consulting the relevant halachic literature (Choshen Mishpat, etc.), understanding Pirkei Avos properly requires consulting philosophical ethical works, because they discuss the same subject. Books on the same topic are relevant to each other even if they don’t cite one another. Failing to consult those works means not studying the subject correctly. This is why the Rambam’s references in his commentary are mostly Aristotelian, and later commentators in his school similarly reference philosophical ethical literature.
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XII. The Opposing School: Pirkei Avos as Torah Ethics
A. A Different Commentarial Method
A whole school of commentators — Rashi, Rabbeinu Yonah, the Gra, and others — takes a fundamentally different approach. Instead of referencing Aristotle, for every Mishnah in Pirkei Avos they cite pesukim from Tanakh, primarily from:
– Mishlei (Proverbs)
– Koheles (Ecclesiastes)
– Tehillim (Psalms) — noted as being substantially an ethical work, even if not commonly recognized as such
– Sometimes Iyov (Job) and various Midrashim
Their method treats Pirkei Avos as a compilation or commentary on the ethical books of the Bible, not as an independent philosophical treatise.
B. The Underlying Claim: “Torah Ethics” vs. “Human Ethics”
Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura explains that this school holds Pirkei Avos is not about human ethics but about “Torah ethics.” The basic distinction:
– Human ethics = what human beings as such ought to do (discoverable by reason, universal)
– Torah ethics = what Jews specifically must do (rooted in Torah/revelation)
However, this distinction is not clearly explained by Rav Ovadiah or others — “I have no idea” what “Torah ethics” actually means in a rigorous sense. Making sense of this distinction becomes a central argument going forward.
C. Summary Table of the Two Schools
| | Rambam’s School | Rashi/Rabbeinu Yonah/Gra School |
|—|—|—|
| Nature of Pirkei Avos | Humanistic philosophical ethics | Torah-based ethics |
| Reference texts | Aristotle, Plato, Muslim philosophers | Mishlei, Koheles, Tehillim, Midrash |
| Source of authority | Human reason | Revelation/tradition |
| Universality | Universal to all humans | Specific to Jews/Torah |
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**[Side Digression: Jewish Studies and the Problem of Sources]**
A brief exchange about where the Chachamim themselves got their ethical teachings from (i.e., what is the source behind the biblical ethical books?). Jewish studies as typically practiced stops at the Bible — going further back is considered “Bible criticism” and is off-limits in Jewish schools. This creates an intellectual problem: you cannot critically examine your own source of authority, which is why “Jewish studies is such a mess.” The class, however, is “not Jewish studies.”
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XIII. Restating the “Revelatory Ethics” Position
Those who argue that Pirkei Avos should not be read as a book of general/universal ethics hold that it is a specifically Torah book — ethics grounded in divine revelation, analogous to other mitzvos. On this view, the ethical content is qualitatively different from what any human philosopher could derive, because it comes from Sinai.
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**[Side Digression: Did Aristotle “Steal” Jewish Ethics?]**
A student raises the Jewish legend that Aristotle met Shimon HaTzaddik and may have absorbed Torah ethics. This produces a deep irony/problem: if Aristotle stole Jewish ethics, he apparently understood them *better* than the Jews themselves, since his ethical writings are arguably superior. “He’s such a good *ganav* (thief), he stole all the good parts and left us the not-good parts.” There is an explanation for this but it is set aside — the claim is deeply puzzling even on its own terms.
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XIV. The Status of Mishlei and Koheles — What Does “Inspired” Mean?
A. The Conceptual Question
What does it even mean for ethics to be “revelatory”?
B. Mishlei and Koheles Are Not Prophecy
Mishlei and Koheles are classified as *Kisvei HaKodesh* (Holy Writings / “inspired writing” or “canonized writing”), not prophecy. They never claim “God told me this.” Solomon had prophecies and dreams (in Melachim), but his wisdom books simply present things as humanly observed truths. The term *Kisvei HaKodesh* is ambiguous — it may mean no more than “canonized.” These books are the acknowledged main sources for the ethical content of Pirkei Avos (sometimes quoted explicitly).
**[Sub-digression: Ben Sira]**
The book of Ben Sira — the Talmud’s ambivalent treatment of it (accepting good parts, reinterpreting bad parts). The Hebrew original has been recovered. This illustrates the blurry boundary between canonical and non-canonical wisdom literature.
**[Sub-digression: Lemuel ben Massa]**
Mishlei itself incorporates non-Jewish wisdom — citing “Divrei Lemuel Melech” (Proverbs 31), a figure who is apparently not Jewish and not a prophet. The name “El” is also a Canaanite divine name. This undermines the claim that the ethical content of Mishlei is exclusively divine revelation.
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**[Side Digression: Liturgical Non-Use of Kesuvim]**
Mishlei is never read liturgically in the beis medrash. There are no *haftarot* from Kesuvim (unlike Nevi’im). There apparently used to be Shabbos afternoon readings from Kesuvim, but this practice has been lost. This reinforces the point that Kesuvim occupies a lower or different status than prophetic literature.
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XV. The Core Conceptual Problem: What Would “Revelatory Ethics” Even Mean?
It is not clear what it would mean for ethics to be qualitatively different because it is revelatory. Does revelation change the *subject matter* of ethics? This is strongly doubted. A prior shiur (before Yom Kippur) touched on this but the question was not fully resolved.
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XVI. Why Does Avos Begin with the Chain of Tradition? — Competing Interpretations
A. The Question
If Avos is just general ethics, why does it open with the chain of transmission from Sinai (Moshe kibel Torah mi-Sinai…)?
B. Interpretation A (Rambam / Maimonides)
Avos has two separate purposes: (1) establishing the authority of the Sages (the chain of tradition), and (2) teaching ethical wisdom. These are two distinct things placed together, not a claim that the ethics *is* the transmitted Torah content. The Rambam does not connect the two; he treats them as parallel but independent.
C. Interpretation B (The Lecturer’s Own Reading)
The chain of tradition is there because ethics requires knowing the character and authority of the person teaching it. Ethics is traditionally learned from exemplary people. The genealogy tells you *who these sages were* and why you should listen to them — but it does not claim the ethical content itself was revealed at Sinai.
Supporting evidence:
– The very third teaching in Avos lists “Torah, Avodah, and Gemilus Chasadim” as three separate pillars — implying the latter two are *not* Torah mi-Sinai.
– No sage in Avos says “this was revealed to me” — each simply states what seemed ethically important for their generation.
D. Interpretation C (The Revelatory Camp)
The juxtaposition of the Sinai transmission with the ethical teachings implies the ethics *is* part of what was transmitted — a continuation of Sinaitic content.
E. Assessment
This is a case of “literary evidence” — two things placed next to each other that *could* be connected in totally contradictory ways:
– Reading 1: After establishing the Torah tradition, the sages share things that are not Sinaitic (i.e., human ethical wisdom).
– Reading 2: The ethics is the continuation of the Sinaitic tradition.
Neither reading is decisive — there is simply too little textual evidence to settle the question. But the claim that ethics *requires* revelation and is qualitatively different is a “very weird claim” that Avos itself does not support, since no sage in Avos frames their teaching as revelatory.
F. Distinction from Rambam’s View
The lecturer’s reading (the chain establishes *who* the sages are, not that the ethics is halakha) differs from Maimonides, who connects the chain to halakhic authority. Maimonides says the chain is about halakha, and he does not connect the chain to the ethical content. The Mishnah is “very careful” to keep these distinct.
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XVII. The Chain of Transmission in Pirkei Avos — Further Analysis
A. The Unique Attribution Style
Unlike typical Talmudic or Mishnaic texts, Pirkei Avos does not present elaborate chains of transmission (“this person said in the name of that person”). Instead, it simply attributes sayings to individual sages: “This is what he used to say.” The chain of reception (“he received from him, who received from him”) eventually drops away entirely.
Concession: This observation is not a definitive proof of anything — multiple *derashot* could explain the connection between the chain and the ethical content, and they would all be “nice theories and not proof.”
B. What Does the Chain of Tradition Actually Mean?
Option Explored: Pirkei Avos Records Additional Laws/Mitzvos
One could say the Mishnah records laws given at Sinai with many details, and Pirkei Avos simply adds more obligations — some *de’oraita*, some *derabbanan*. Problem: This sounds “weird” and “off.” The Abarbanel raises this: where do these extra mitzvot come from? What is their source? They seem to be “nice things learned from the mitzvot,” but the origin matters.
The Crucial Claim: It Matters Who You Learn Ethics From
Ethics is not like neutral information — it matters enormously *who* teaches it. Ethics is practical, not theoretical. It concerns how human beings live the best life. Someone who lives badly should not be your ethical teacher, because practical knowledge requires learning from *examples*.
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XVIII. Critique of the Rambam’s Position on Universal Ethics — and Its Deeper Nuance
A. The Surface Objection
The Rambam holds that ethical truth can be accepted from anyone, regardless of their identity, as long as it is true. The objection: ethics is not a “true thing” in the way mathematics is. It is about how to live well. Practical disciplines require exemplary practitioners as teachers.
B. What the Rambam Actually Means (More Nuanced Than Commonly Understood)
1. The Rambam is not saying ethical claims are like mathematical propositions where the speaker’s identity is irrelevant.
2. He is saying ethical truths are genuine truths, but knowing them requires being an ethically perfect person. The Rambam says this explicitly multiple times.
3. Practicing ethics definitely requires being a good person.
4. The Rambam genuinely believed Aristotle was a (near-)perfect person ethically, which is why he could learn from him.
C. The Rambam’s Radical Underlying Assumption
There is no distinctly “Jewish” ethical perfection separate from universal human perfection. Jewish laws are meant to make Jews good, and ideally all people should follow them, but the *ideal of goodness itself* is universal. Therefore, if you encounter a perfect gentile, you should follow his example. Most people miss this radical claim embedded in the Rambam’s introduction to Pirkei Avos.
D. Common Misreading: “Accept Science but Not Ethics from Non-Jews”
People say: you can go to a non-Jewish doctor because he provides technical/scientific information, not ethical guidance. This is used to argue one can accept science from gentiles but not ethics. This is a “total misreading.” The Rambam does not draw this distinction because ethics is also a science and is universal. If a gentile is ethically excellent, you should listen to him. Rashi holds the same view, as evidenced by his quoting ethical statements from non-Jewish sources.
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XIX. Can a Pagan Be Ethically Perfect?
A. The Provocative Claim
You can be a pagan — even an idol worshipper — and still be an ethically perfect person. Aristotle worshipped foreign gods, yet the Rambam considered him near-perfect. This parallels a famous medieval Christian debate: Can ethics be learned from pagan sources?
B. Jewish Sources Supporting This
– Chassidei Umos HaOlam (“Righteous Among the Nations”) — the Jewish concept that righteous non-Jews have a share in the world to come.
– Judaism, unlike Christianity, does not require a specific revelation for salvation.
– Biblical examples: Avimelech and Pharaoh — aside from their specific sins, they could have been righteous; Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer says they would have gone to Gan Eden otherwise.
– Avraham Avinu himself worshipped idols initially and was already a perfect person then. He stopped for the sake of his children’s upbringing, not because paganism made him personally imperfect.
**[Sub-digression: Rambam on Chassidei Umos HaOlam]**
A student raises Rambam’s specific definition (requiring acceptance of Mosaic authority). This is dismissed as not reflecting the broader Jewish reality: “Don’t ask me questions from the Rambam — I’m telling you what the reality is.” Rambam’s formulation is called a “weird mistake”; the mainstream Jewish position is that you can be a perfect pagan.
C. The Crucial Implication
Nobody would recommend studying ethics from a morally bad person. Rambam’s recommendation to study Aristotle’s ethics logically requires that Rambam believed:
1. Aristotle was a morally perfect person.
2. There is no essential difference between the perfection of a Jew and the perfection of a non-Jew — only accidental/circumstantial differences (culture, environment making it easier or harder).
Rambam explicitly believed one could be a perfect person as a Muslim, Christian, or pagan — it’s just harder outside the Jewish framework.
D. Closing Principle: You Shouldn’t Learn Even Math from Bad People
Bad people won’t do math well — at minimum because they’ll lie. There are also deeper reasons why moral corruption undermines intellectual work. You definitely shouldn’t learn ethics from bad people — the connection between moral character and ethical insight is even more direct. This reinforces: Rambam’s endorsement of Aristotle’s ethics is simultaneously an endorsement of Aristotle’s moral character.
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**[Side Digression: Bilaam as Exception]**
A student raises the case of Bilaam — the Mishnah states he has no share in the World to Come. This is acknowledged as an exception to the general principle that non-Jews can attain salvation. Judaism does not seriously debate whether salvation exists outside the faith — the basic position is that it does.
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XX. The Unsolved Problem: What Would “Torah Ethics” Even Mean?
A. The Difficulty
If there is only one kind of good human being (the Adam HaRishon model), then it becomes very difficult to understand what a special Torah-based ethics would even mean. What would it mean for something to be good or bad *because of Torah*? Either:
– Torah reveals things we didn’t already know were good/bad, or
– Torah provides structure — but that would make it halacha, not a separate ethical system.
This leads to the precise distinction between halacha and ethics.
B. The Problem of Codifying Ethics into Detailed Law
Aristotle explicitly said you cannot codify ethics into detailed laws. Rambam struggles with this same problem in several places. Halacha is not supposed to be a system of rigid detailed rules — that is a misunderstanding. You can have general principles, but application always requires a living human being (a posek). No law can be applied without human judgment.
C. The Jewish Ethical Conversation and Its Reference Points
– The Jewish ethical conversation does not necessarily have different reference points from the general philosophical one.
– Rambam’s surrounding texts draw heavily on Aristotle and Al-Farabi — non-Jewish thinkers.
– Rashi, by contrast, draws his ethical notes from Chumash, Koheles, Tehillim — internal Jewish sources.
– This difference is explicit on Rambam’s side; Rashi and Rabbeinu Yonah don’t explicitly articulate their methodology in the same way.
– Later thinkers (e.g., Abarbanel, 14th–15th century) begin explicitly claiming both that Jewish ethics has distinct sources and that there is such a thing as “Jewish happiness” — but they never clearly explain what that would mean.
– This creates a kind of paradox: if it could be simply explained, anyone could grasp it, yet it resists straightforward articulation.
– There is believed to be a real theory of Jewish happiness, but the difficulty is acknowledged.
D. Jewish Communal Goods vs. Universal Human Flourishing
Jewish people have particular communal goods (land, language, etc.), but these are incidental, not a fundamentally different kind of human flourishing. This remains a genuine open question — not that there’s no answer, but that the meaning is not yet clear.
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XXI. The “Truth Is Truth” Argument — Stronger and Weaker Versions
A. The Astronomy Analogy (from Kiddush HaChodesh)
In Kiddush HaChodesh (appended to Sefer Zemanim in Mishneh Torah), Rambam states he copied astronomy from Hellenic and Arabic sources. His defense: we rely on proofs, not persons — it doesn’t matter if a non-Jew or even a prophet says it; we follow the proof itself. This seems reasonable for astronomy, which is essentially mathematics — a domain of demonstrable proof.
B. Weaknesses Even in the Astronomy Case
Even in astronomy, trust in persons is unavoidable:
– Rambam himself didn’t do all the calculations; he trusted others, and some of those sources contained errors.
– Most people never verify calculations themselves — they trust astronomers for honesty and competence.
– Honesty is a rare virtue (academic scandals, fake data, etc. are referenced).
So even the “it’s just math” argument is rhetorically stronger than the reality warrants, though there are good reasons to trust well-established science.
C. The Argument Breaks Down for Ethics (The Core Point)
The “trust the proof, not the person” argument definitively does not work for ethics, especially particular/specific ethics. Yet Rambam goes on to endorse very specific Aristotelian ideals about the good life.
Rambam himself knows there are no proofs in ethics in the mathematical sense:
– He calls ethical principles “mefursamot” (famous/well-known things) — not eternal truths.
– Aristotle himself taught: don’t seek mathematical certainty in ethics; the subject matter doesn’t admit it.
Therefore, when Rambam says “listen to Aristotle’s ethics,” he cannot be relying on the “it’s just math” defense. He is actually trusting the man Aristotle — trusting Aristotle as a morally excellent person whose ethical insights are reliable because of his character.
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XXII. “Chochmas Yevanis” — What Greek Wisdom Actually Means
A. The Talmudic Question
The Gemara debates whether one should study Chochma Yevanis (Greek wisdom).
B. Critical Clarification
“Greek wisdom” in the Gemara does not refer to Plato or philosophy.
– The Gemara never heard of Plato.
– Greek schools did not teach Plato — only one obscure school (the Academy) did.
– “Greek wisdom” means attending Greek grammar school, which meant studying Homer — rhetoric, literature, stories.
– Plato is “Chochmas Yisrael — he stole it from Aaron.” Philosophy and science are not culturally Greek; they are universal.
– Homer represents the canonical cultural texts of a civilization — myths, stories of Achilles, etc.
– The real question is about studying a culture’s canonical narratives, not its science or philosophy.
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XXIII. What Schools Actually Do: Culture, Not Philosophy
A. Schools Initiate Into Culture
No school teaches philosophy. Philosophy is inherently anti-school. Even Plato, in the *Republic*, never proposed teaching children philosophy.
Schools initiate children into a culture through:
– Stories (oral or written)
– A canon — a shared body of literature that everyone in the culture knows.
This is what every literary culture has always done: school = initiation into language and canonical texts.
B. The Rambam on Teaching Hebrew / Teaching Tanach
– The Rambam says there is a mitzvah to teach your son Hebrew.
– This does not mean speaking modern Hebrew or going to Ulpan.
– The Rambam himself says: stupidities in Hebrew are still stupidities; smart things in Arabic are still smart. Language per se changes nothing.
– “Teaching Hebrew” means teaching Tanach, because Hebrew simply *is* the language of Tanach and Mishnah.
– The Baraisa says: at age five, teach a child Torah — start with simple pesukim, Hebrew words, the parashah.
– Beis Sefer (“house of the book”) = a place that teaches a book, not how to think. Thinking is for yeshiva.
– Jewish education at the basic level = initiation into the canonical text (Tanach), exactly parallel to Greek schools initiating students into Homer.
C. Modern Analogy
In the United States, the equivalent of Homer is television series and Hollywood. The question “may one study Greek culture?” translates today to: “Are you allowed to watch Hollywood?” Now even Hollywood is fragmented into countless streaming feeds.
D. Why Not Study Greek Myths?
Why would you study Greek myths when you have Jewish myths (Midrashim)? They tell the same stories with different names. But the *names are the difference* — cultural identity matters.
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**[Side Digression: Being “Cultured” and Jewish Integration]**
Rabban Gamliel’s school taught Greek texts. The justification: some Jews need to be cultured — meaning familiar with the surrounding culture — for practical and communal reasons.
– “Cultured” ≠ “wise.” Being cultured means knowing enough about the dominant culture to function and not appear foolish.
– Modern analogy: You need to know enough about the Super Bowl to not look like a *chamor* (donkey/fool) in American society.
– Similarly with dress and appearance: wearing mainstream clothing (perhaps with a kippah) earns basic respect; dressing in distinctly Chassidic garb makes one look like “a weirdo from outer space” to outsiders.
– It is important for some Jews to appear normal — for safety reasons and for deeper, more serious reasons of engagement with the broader world.
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XXIV. Greek Books and the Rishonim’s View
– The Sifrei Minim (foreign books) that Elisha ben Avuya studied = Homer, Greek literature.
– The Rishonim’s position: there is nothing inherently wrong with reading Homer — it’s just stories, like reading a newspaper. It is not the dangerous “Greek wisdom” that the Gemara warns about.
– The real question of “studying foreign languages/wisdom” was always about cultural initiation, not philosophy.
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XXV. Summary of the Central *Machlokes* and Its Implications
The Dispute
There is a machlokes between the Rambam and Rashi about the *pshat* (plain meaning/context) of Pirkei Avos:
– For the Rambam, the context of Pirkei Avos is Aristotle’s Ethics (and similar philosophical works).
– For Rashi, the context is Mishlei and Koheles (biblical wisdom literature).
This is verifiable: reading the two commentaries shows they reference different sources of authority and different intellectual frameworks.
The Unresolved Core Question
The famous argument (repeated extensively in Chassidus, found in Rashi’s introduction, quoted in the Bartenura, and elaborated in the Abarbanel) that the chain of tradition at the beginning of Pirkei Avos establishes these ethical teachings as divinely transmitted rather than humanly derived remains deeply unclear in its implications. What “Torah ethics” as distinct from “human ethics” actually means — whether it is a coherent concept at all — is the central unresolved philosophical question that the class will continue to investigate.
📝 Full Transcript
The Proper Location for Studying Ethics: An Introduction to Rambam’s Eight Chapters on Pirkei Avos
Administrative Introduction
Instructor: Okay, this is a shiur [lesson] on the Eight Chapters of the Holy Rambam [Maimonides]. And it’s Hashem [with God’s help], since we’re starting a new zman [semester/term] next week, we’re going to be redoing the whole thing from the beginning. Since everyone already forgot the beginning, including me. Or me, my kaddachim [students], everyone else. Or maybe it’s not a good kaddachim. Whatever it is, we’re going to be redoing the whole thing. And therefore, you’ll understand what’s going on.
So hopefully everyone that wants to come was listening to this, come over next week and you’ll be able to discover new stuff. We’re going to try to read it, because our class doesn’t read things. We’ll try. Anyways, that’s the first thing. You don’t have to note that in your notes. Okay, actually do you have to tell everyone as you come, because we’re gonna start again and we’re gonna learn pshat [the straightforward meaning], along with not-pshat, of course, and we’re going to know everything at the end.
General Hakdama [Introduction]: The Principle of Studying Subjects in Their Proper Location
Background on the Text
Instructor: Now, the story is like this. So I’m going to give a little hakdama [introduction], which is a more general point. Last time I started this, I gave a different version of this hakdama, but this is going to be the version for today. Hakdama is like this, and it’s based on the Rambam.
So, and I’ll give you some background. This book [the Eight Chapters] was written by the Holy Rambam as a preface to his commentary on Pirkei Avos [Ethics of the Fathers]. And it explains—well we’ll get into it—it explains why it needs a commentary and why the commentary needs a preface. All these things need to be explained. But before that we should realize something more basic, because it’s also explained in the Rambam’s preface, but we should realize something more basic.
The Core Thesis: Every Subject Has a Correct Canonical Location
Instructor: The more basic thing is that everyone knows that there’s a lot of masechtas [tractates] in Shas [the Talmud]—in the Mishnah [the foundational code of Jewish oral law] and the Talmud. There’s many different masechtas, just like there’s many different books in the Bible.
Whenever someone tells you “this is the meaning of the Torah” because the Torah talks about this, you should ask them which masechta of the Torah, because there’s 60 or 63 of them, depending on how you count. And every masechta has its own view of life. Maybe not. Anyway, it talks about a different aspect of life, has a whole different theory, has a whole different story.
Or especially when someone tells you “this is the biblical view of things,” you ask him if he means Koheles [Ecclesiastes], Mishlei [Proverbs], Devarim [Deuteronomy], or Bamidbar [Numbers], or maybe Yehoshua [Joshua], or maybe Shmuel Beis [Second Samuel]. Those are not the same thing. Of course, you could make some coherence out of them. But they, on the surface for sure, talk about different subjects and say different thoughts and are concerned about different things, right?
Illustrative Examples of the Error
Instructor: Like, someone says, “Well, the whole Torah is about the land of Israel.” Ask him how much percentage of Sefer Mishlei [the Book of Proverbs] is about the land of Israel. Written by the wisest man of all time, according to the Torah itself. Doesn’t seem to be very concerned about the land of Israel. That’s just an example.
“Oh, you mean the Chumash [the Five Books of Moses]?” Okay, well, that’s one of the 24 books, or five of them. Not all of them.
And if he tells you the Torah is all about halachos [laws] of korbanos [sacrifices], you ask him if the book of Iyov [Job] is also about that.
And if he tells you the Torah is not interested in philosophy, ask him what the book of Iyov is about. “Oh, we’re not interested in understanding God?” Oh, that’s why there’s about half of the book of Tehillim [Psalms], and the book of Iyov, and some other books talking about that. Right?
“He says, well, most of it is not.” Well, I don’t know. Most of it you study. Maybe not. Maybe that’s not everything.
“He says, well, Mishnayos [the Mishnah], we only learned this in the seder [order].” Okay, very nice. That’s on you.
And he says, “Okay, I have an opinion on the subject of human happiness, because I have a drash [homiletical interpretation] on parsha’s [weekly Torah portion].” Asking what is going on with you. Why don’t you learn the parsha that talks about human happiness? Why are you learning Hilchos Tumas Meis [Laws of Corpse Impurity] to discover human happiness? Maybe it’s connected somehow to human happiness, or human perfection, but how do you know that’s the one?
Like, it’s like studying Hilchos Shabbos [Laws of Sabbath] from one halacha in Pesach [Passover] or Rosh Hashanah [New Year] that talks about Shabbos. That would be a very weird starting point.
Student: Every subject, you’ve got to start from the, what’s called the, yeah, people do that. It does happen.
Instructor: That’s the weirdness. Plural, Shabbos, and Sukkos [Tabernacles].
Student: Yeah, like, I think the weird thing, like, one of the funny things that people do is that they always read things in the wrong place.
Instructor: Like, if there’s a parasha [Torah portion] about putter [possibly “Peter,” firstborn], you start talking about that. “Putter really means, I don’t know, having respect for your parents.” Why do you need to do that? There’s a whole page of the Torah about having respect for your parents. You can just talk about it then.
Diagnosis: The Root Cause Is Lack of Bekius [Breadth of Learning]
Instructor: I think the reason is because most people are maratzim [lecturers/speakers]. They don’t read enough. So they only know like three pesukim [verses] because they have to put everything into those three pesukim.
Like where does the Torah talk about middos [character traits]? “I don’t know. It talks about some story about Korach [Korah’s rebellion]. That’s where you learn the middah [character trait] of machlokes [controversy/strife].” I don’t know. I think there are like many pesukim in the book of Mishlei that explicitly about machlokes. Are there?
Student: Sort of, there are.
Instructor: Yeah, there are. We don’t need to do this. Okay, we have a weekly study, and this week we have to talk about it. Okay, so you do what the Midrash [classical rabbinic commentary] does. You bring the pasuk [verse] from Mishlei to explain Parshas Korach [the Torah portion about Korah]. When all those people look in the Midrash, that’s the first time they’ve met the pasuk in Mishlei. So it’s like the Midrash is saying, “You know this, okay, we’ve started with that, and now you just bring the reference.”
But if you don’t know the reference, so that’s the first very important yesod [foundation]. And the reason most people are very confused is because they don’t learn enough. And they don’t have enough bekius. Therefore, they study most things in the wrong—it’s called the locus classicus, sometimes people call it, for subjects.
The Principle of Proper Location
Instructor: There’s correct locations for everything. It’s very important to have an organized mind, the organized view of the canonical works that we take very seriously. In general, even the Torah, as confused, as not organized a book in the modern sense as it is, does have parts that talk about this subject and parts that talk about that subject.
If you talk about the Torah versus the Mishnah, or the Mishnah itself, they’re all pretty organized—not like a million percent organized, not organized in the way that we want to, but there’s like an area for each subject. And if you want to study a certain subject, you’ve got to study—like you’ve got to start with the pesukim that talk about that, with the Mishnah that talks about that, with the Talmud that talks about that, and so on.
You can’t, like, “Oh we’re learning the pasuk and there’s some story.” Like many times when people say what Chazal [the Sages] say, they mean the three Chazals that, like Aggados [narrative teachings] is there and Rashi [Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, the primary Torah commentator] is in pasuk, because they don’t read the other ones. And like he got an impression of this was the das Torah [Torah perspective] because of those three stories that he read.
Well, how about did you, like Chazal says, did you do a re-study of like all the stories, of all the sayings? Like you claim to take the Chazal so seriously? Did you study everything they said about everything and figure out, like, did he organize the sukkah [possibly “sugya,” the Talmudic topic]? Do you know even the 13 marei mekomos [source references] that you need to know about this? Okay.
Digression: Critique of Mesilas Yesharim
Instructor: Do you know what most Charedi [ultra-Orthodox] people want their source of the entire purpose of the whole world?
Student: Mm-hmm.
Instructor: A little book. A throwaway hakdama. A throwaway hakdama. And then, like, Ramchal [Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto], like, he discussed it in other books, and they, “No, they don’t let me check Ramchal.” It’s not a throwaway, it’s a throwaway book that Ramchal wrote, but yeah, it’s very nice, but it was just a hakdama. Like seriously, how seriously can you take a guy like that? He has other sefarim [books] that he would probably describe a little more complexly, you know?
Student: That’s true. Yeah, that’s another way, one of the un-given shiurim that I have written down somewhere is basically deconstructing the Mesilas Yesharim [Path of the Just], I’m explaining how much it’s missing.
Instructor: But anyway.
Student: You’re on the Chacham [wise person] side.
Instructor: What?
Student: You said the one that is the debate.
Instructor: Yeah, yeah. No, I didn’t say that. I think that it’s lacking a lot. But that’s not my argument for today. I shouldn’t have even said this. It’s just going to annoy people.
Restatement of the Principle
Instructor: Point is that you have to learn, study everything in its correct place. It’s a very useful thing to study things in their correct location. Like you said, you can’t start from a midrash that brings the subject of this into that. It’s a nice thing to do if a midrash has reasons for doing that. But you shouldn’t do that. And I think the real reason people do that usually is because they just don’t know.
Like, “What’s this parasha? The Midrash teaches us lo signov [do not steal].” Okay, very cute, but what about lo signov teaching us lo signov? It’s true. Now the Midrash, I guess I remember. Okay, very cute, but it’s good for a midrash, it’s not good for actually understanding it. Okay.
Now therefore, if you want to know what, or you want to study, since there’s different meanings of what a canonical work is, one of them is that this gives us an organization. Like when we study this in this parasha, not necessarily that we take all the truth about this from that parasha, but we organize our thoughts that way.
Application of the Principle: Where Is the Jewish Book of Ethics?
The Question Posed
Instructor: So if you want to study the subject of ethics, which is what ethics just means, how to be a person, right? So if you want to become a good person, you’ve got to find out the place where—let’s say if you’re a Mishnayis Yid [a Jew who follows the Mishnah], you’re a Yid [Jew] that claims to be based on the halacha, which is Mishnayis. Mishnah is the original code or compendium—I don’t know if it’s a code, but compendium, compilation of all halacha. You’ve got to study the Mishnah.
Where Ethics Is Not
Instructor: And some guy read all of the Mishnah of Nashim [Women] and Nezikin [Damages], which explicitly talks about women and damages, as their translation implies. Why would you expect to be talking about how to become a good person? Of course, part of being a good person is dealing with those things correctly. Not disagreeing with that. But they’re mostly legal questions whose job is for a court or some kind of communal organization to discover, to discuss, to solve. They’re not telling you how to be a good person.
So if you want to know how to be a good person, even in marriage, like if someone says, “You want to know how to have a good shalom bayis [peace in the home], learn masechta Kesubos [tractate on marriage contracts].” No, very bad advice. Don’t do that. Masechta Kesubos is about, it’s for people that already don’t have shalom bayis. It’s when they’re in court already. Like once a guy’s in court, apparently he doesn’t have shalom bayis. Okay, there’s a law, you gotta take care of that situation. That’s what law is for. It’s not for how to get married.
Where Ethics Is: Masechta Avos
Instructor: So, where does it talk about that? Ah, so the Rambam actually doesn’t include some of those thoughts. But anyways, mostly it has to be talking in wherever it talks about how to be a good person. And where’s that? So I’m like, I don’t know. Aristotle wrote a book of ethics. Did the Chazal write a book of ethics? Did the Mikra [the Bible] write a book of ethics? Turns out, both of them did. But weirdly, people don’t know about it. I mean, everyone knows about it, but they don’t take it seriously. They think it’s a book of like, of saying stories about tzaddikim [righteous people].
There’s a Mishnah, one of the six, the masechtos of the Mishnah, it’s called Pirkei Masechta Avos [Ethics of the Fathers], and it’s literally a work of ethics. And it literally asks the kind of ethical questions that we ask, like if you read until the third chapter, you see literally, or the second chapter already, you literally see people
The Nature of Pirkei Avos: Ethics, Practical Wisdom, and the Absence of Talmudic Commentary
The Mystery of Missing Talmudic Commentary on Ethics
Instructor: Maybe it was a secret, they didn’t want to write it down. Maybe the people that wrote the Talmud already didn’t know. They did, but they discussed many of such things in like random areas as their *minigwasp* [unclear term]. I don’t know why, but it definitely deserves a Talmud.
In other words, I think it would be very weird to claim that, oh, *Pesach HaShabbos* [tractate Shabbos] means huge *Pesach* [Passover], with Rashi and Tosafos, with *Pekovos* [unclear]. It’s simple, obvious.
This is one of the things that Rambam [Maimonides] attacks in his *Hakdamah* [introduction] and he says, no, you can’t figure out anything about how to live yet, so obviously you don’t involve with *Kervas* [unclear].
Rav Soloveitchik’s Argument: Ethics Requires Halachic Treatment
This is one of the big arguments of Rav Soloveitchik, by the way. There’s many of his students who have written at length about this, how *Hilchot Middot* [laws of character traits] and how to be a good person are actually very complicated, it’s not simple, and there should be *halachot* [laws] about it.
The Chofetz Chaim’s Response
Chofetz Chaim accepted this criticism and therefore wrote a whole *sefer* [book] about one little *middah* [character trait], which is called, not being a gossiper. It’s a *middah*, it’s not a *mitzvah* [commandment].
So Chofetz Chaim, of course, being a good Litvak that he was, thought that this means that we have to make *halachot* [laws].
Student: Yeah, *Hilchot Deot* [laws of character traits]. Yeah, 6D.
Instructor: Yeah, *Hilchot Deot* talks about it. Yeah, Rambam wrote it.
Student: Rambam wrote it.
Instructor: We’ll get to Rambam in a second, not before that. Just proving you from the head.
But Chofetz Chaim very explicitly, no, he also wrote *Ahavat Chesed* [Love of Kindness], which is a *halachah* [law] of being a good person. Unfortunately, he wrote it in the style of a really halachic work, which is kind of missing the point. But at least does some work of figuring out all the concrete cases.
Ethics as Practical Wisdom: The Clinical Approach
Like, is this *lashon hara* [evil speech/gossip] or is that? Really what practical ethics is supposed to be. It’s not supposed to do hypotheticals. It’s supposed to teach, train you how to not be a gossiper and not be a good person and help your neighbor and things like that.
Student: Explain which kinds of gossiper are allowed and which ones aren’t.
Instructor: Yeah, yeah. Those are serious questions. You take a random guy on the street and you ask him, gossip is bad, right? Too much. Something like that. He says, okay, so can you tell me how much information I should give for a *shidduch* [marriage match]? And he goes like, I never thought of the question.
So you’re not a good person at all. Chofetz Chaim at least thought about it. Very serious.
Student: Did he come up with good answers?
Instructor: You know, it’s a good question. I think this book is also somewhat confusing a lot of *mussar* [ethical instruction]. Like he tries to do a lot of *chumrot* [stringencies] because he’s trying to get you to take things seriously. Also his style of *halachah* [law] was very firm so it’s also like not fair. But in any case, yeah, it’s trying to scare you. But these questions are very serious if you want to do ethics.
Ethics as Medicine: The Practical Questions Matter Most
Remember, ethics is like medicine. The interesting questions are not the theories. The interesting questions are the practical ones. Like in such a case, is this the clinical direction or is it not?
So if someone, if you go to an ethics professor, I mean, it’s not necessarily virtue. Yeah, virtue ethics is all about starting from real situations or ending in real situations. That’s where it exists. Starting and ending, but most of what happens in between.
Being a good person isn’t in this situation, but it’s a bigger thing than that. But if you don’t have an idea of how to even answer this question like this, the Aristotle kind of answer to that is like, it’s when there’s all kind of answer like that is something like, it’s something like whatever a good person would have done in that situation. But that doesn’t give us a lot of information, doesn’t solve anything.
Real Ethical Dilemmas from Chazal
You have to be able to think. They shall be like, think of these kind of questions. I think Chazal [the Sages] did think of these kind of questions and some *mussar* works in general do a very good job of like, it’s not a social enters dilemma. Like you’re supposed to ask me, he love someone, you know, everything *Yom Kippur* [Day of Atonement] or generally it’s a good thing, right, to make up with people. How about if making up makes things worse?
So what should you do? Should you stay in like a cold war or should you like open? Like this is a real serious, like okay, do you know, do you know what to do? Do you even think about it?
Your ethics professor, you know how many mice lives are worth a human life, but you don’t know very simple the question that happens every day. Like what’s going on? You’re not a serious person, right?
So that’s all those are worth the arguments and the time. Chazal did a lot of work on that and others. But not very good work in my opinion, but they did a lot of work on that.
The Status of Pirkei Avos in the Canon
So back to where we were. So there definitely are entire *masechet* [tractates], there’s an entire *masechet* called *Avot* [Fathers/Ethics of the Fathers] which is about how to live a good life. Very explicit.
The fact that there’s no Talmud on it maybe shows that it’s too hard for the Talmud. Maybe the Talmudic methodology is not a good match for it, maybe therefore they couldn’t do it. Maybe it’s more serious than what the Talmud does in *Masechet Shabbos* and it can’t be done in the same style.
Maybe there is actually, on metaphysics, there are actually, there’s more Talmud on metaphysics than there is on ethics, or maybe for other reasons, like *Chagigah* [tractate on festivals and metaphysics] has Talmud that explains all the things. But it’s definitely worthy of that amount of discussion and that amount of being taken seriously. Good? That’s our thing.
The Rambam’s Project: Interpreting Masechet Avot
And therefore, people like the Rambam took this very seriously and said, therefore, since I want to teach ethics, I want to understand how to be a good person, I want people to know how to be a good person, I’m going to try to interpret *Masechet Avot*. It was like a big project that Rambam had.
And some of the students also, people took on this project. I’m interpreting *Masechet Avot*. Some other people did it for books of the *Tanakh* [Hebrew Bible], like different people tried to write commentaries to explain what is the story. Like, how is it teaching you to be a good person? What does it mean?
Now, there’s a very interesting discussion. Now, this is sort of clear. I think it’s mostly obvious. It’s mostly agreed upon that this is about being a good person. I don’t know that many people, I haven’t found anyone disagreeing with it. Do you know of someone that disagrees with this theory of the self?
Student: Maybe those people weren’t reading it in the first place. Like, what could it be about?
The Contemporary Neglect of Mishnah Study
Instructor: This is what gets into the usual snarking about the time. People have a way to like halachicize things enough they can make it to *halachot* [laws] to make it so much so it’s not even ethics.
Student: There is a *Maharal* [Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague], right? I know you’re saying *halachot*, but there is a guy who really makes it enough of *halachot* that it’s really not part of ethics at all anymore.
Instructor: Okay, this is a different question. Like how, I think people do that with *halachot*. That’s how it would be done. You’re right, you’re right. But that’s that, it’s *halachot*. I don’t think, I think the Litvaks can be autistic enough to, I’ve never heard of, I’ve not read any halachic commentary on *Pirkei Avot* obviously. Maybe there exists.
I think, first of all, *Mishnah* [the oral law codified] is, in general, in contemporary, I think you had mentioned it the other night, this is totally ignored. Like, *Mishnah* is just a preparation for the *Gemara* [Talmud] that comes after it. But again, it’s something you reach out this afternoon, you know, when you have falling of sleep.
Student: That’s true. It’s not taken seriously. Yeah. But *Mishnah* does not have to be taken seriously. Is there any people that seriously read the *Mishnah* right now?
Instructor: I know some of them, but yeah. Like, the *Gemara* is probably seriously read the *Mishnah*, but we stopped doing that.
Student: Yeah, we’re just reading about…
Instructor: Yeah, I guess. That’s true. So all those people know each other.
Student: Yeah, it’s not a lot, probably.
Instructor: Okay. That just shows that there’s, it’s weird. There’s some areas of the Jewish canon that were well-trodden in, like people have worked on them a lot, and those are known, and then there’s parts that were not worked on very much, and it just doesn’t mean that they’re not important. It just means that we don’t know them.
Maybe some nobody would come and say, you know your problem? That you read, you did wrong with *masechet* [tractate]. You should have been reading *Masechet Avot* and *Seder Aleph* [first order] and instead you’re reading *Seder Nezikin* [order of damages].
The Counter-Theory: Mussar as Mere Exhortation
Okay, now, so I think that, but I think this is a weird, I think the thing that people don’t realize sometimes is that the counter theory that I talk about here, and I’m not going to repeat that to *Rasha* [unclear] about, that people think that *Avot* has *mussar*, and *mussar* is not the same thing as ethics, because *mussar* is just exhortation, like telling you to be good, which you already know, which Shalom’s claiming also in the beginning of his book.
Although, I’m not very sure that he means that seriously, but many people have taken that seriously and said, oh, so *mussar* is about repeating things that you already know, and therefore…
Student: Is that what *Mishlei* [Proverbs] is too?
Instructor: No, it’s not. I think that it’s wrong, and therefore it doesn’t have any informational content, and there’s nothing to study.
Ibn Sushayn [likely referring to Rambam/Maimonides] himself argues against this opinion, even in the same *Hakdamah* [introduction], so obviously what he says in the beginning, I think there’s some trickery going on there. He’s trying to make you think that what he’s telling you, you already know, but actually you don’t know any of it. It’s more like, oh, whatever. It’s a trick.
Student: Makes you accept it.
Instructor: Yeah, I think so. I worry that it’s so. I’m not sure. But I know that many people have this view of it.
A Serious Dispute About the Nature of Avot
Okay, that would be our counter view, but I’m not talking about that now. So now, what kind of counter view is something like this? Very weirdly. I think everyone knows this word from the Bartenura [Rabbi Ovadiah of Bartenura, commentator on the Mishnah]. The Bartenura quote says it in the beginning of *Pirkei Avot*. But this is an actual *machloket* [dispute], very serious, a very serious…
The Machloikes on the Nature of Pirkei Avos: Rambam’s Philosophical Ethics vs. Torah-Based Ethics
The Counter-View to Rambam’s Methodology
The Fundamental Disagreement About Pirkei Avos
Instructor: It makes you accept it. Yeah, I think so. I’m worried that it’s so. I’m not sure. But I know that many people have this view of it. Okay, that would be our counter view, but I’m not talking about that now.
So now, what kind of counter view is something like this? Very weirdly. I think everyone knows this word from the Bartenura [Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura, 15th-century Italian commentator on the Mishnah]. The Bartenura quote says it in the beginning of Pirkei Avos [Ethics of the Fathers, a tractate of the Mishnah]. But this is an actual machloikes [מחלוקת: dispute, disagreement], very serious, a very serious machloikes, and it needs to be understood.
Rambam’s Preface to Pirkei Avos: The Apology for Non-Original Thought
So the thing is like this. The thing is like this. Rambam [Maimonides, Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, 1138-1204] wrote this preface to Pirkei Avos and he explains his interpretive methodology. He says he’s going to be interpreting Pirkei Avos based on what is the truth or the understanding of what a human being is, and therefore what human perfection is.
And then he explicitly makes an apology for the fact that many of his thoughts are not original. And not only are they not original, but that’s not something you need to apologize for. You should need to apologize for not saying the names of the people you’re quoting from. But the important thing he does is he makes an apology for his thoughts that are not original to him, that he’s basing his interpretation of this on non-Jewish sources, non-kosher sources, remember, right?
And I can read it, we’ll read it next week or sometime. And Rambam goes on and says that this is not a problem because the truth is true no matter who said it. Therefore, there’s no issue with that. That’s how things are supposed to work, right?
Now, two things that you will notice here. You remember Rambam says that? Very famous quote.
Student: [inaudible]
Instructor: Okay, you’ll read it inside, you’ll see. So you’ve got to believe me for now, but anyways.
The Question: What Are the Problems With This Approach?
So now, the question is this, the question is, what are the questions about this? So let me give you one framing and I’ll tell you what’s the bigger problem here. I just want to show you how people were not happy with this.
This was an interesting piece of information. You probably have went to Pirkei Avos shiur [שיעור: class, lecture] in your life. And if you went to the kind of ones that I went to, then you’ve heard of a drosha [דרשה: sermon, homiletical interpretation] that goes like this. You’ve heard of a drosha that goes…
The Two-Part Structure of Pirkei Avos
Pirkei Avos has two parts, kind of interestingly, right? It’s got this part with ethics, which is most of it, you know, at least once you get into like Mishnah Gimel [the third chapter] or something. But it’s got also this beginning part, which is like a narrative of the tradition of, we guess, Torah she’ba’al peh [תורה שבעל פה: the Oral Torah]. That doesn’t exactly say. It’s a narrative of tradition, possibly called Pirkei Avos because of that. It’s like the narrative of Moshe kibbel Torah miSinai u’mesarah l’Yehoshua [משה קיבל תורה מסיני ומסרה ליהושע: Moses received the Torah from Sinai and transmitted it to Joshua], all the way to Anshei Knesses HaGedolah [אנשי כנסת הגדולה: the Men of the Great Assembly], and then start telling us what Anshei Knesses HaGedolah said.
Student: Yeah.
Instructor: And then it continues in the, for at least one or two chapters, it continues in the order of generations, and says each person what were his ethical sayings. And the Rambam himself had to deal with this in his hakdamah [הקדמה: introduction, preface] to Mishnayos, what these two things are doing together. We’ve done some classes on it in the past.
The Traditional Counter-Argument: The Chain of Tradition as Refutation of Rambam
But a specific thought that is said in the Torah, it says in the Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura, I think it says in other places too, is that this is coming to tell us something interesting. In other words, they claim that the reason Mishnah does this is so you should not make the Rambam’s mistake.
Why? Because the Rambam said, what is the content of the ethics? Again, the content of the ethics is ethical things, right? And where do we get the truths of these ethical things? Like what are their source, or we could say something like, what kind of ethics are they?
So the Rambam seems to believe—and we’ll get to make this clear in a second—the Rambam seems to believe that these are humanistic, philosophical—people like to say the word human wisdom, human reason—ethics, because he says these are the same ethics as the philosophers have. If you read the Ethics of Aristotle [Nicomachean Ethics] or some commentaries on it or some other non-traditional, non-Jewish, non-Torah ethical works, it should be saying the same thing as Pirkei Avos, because it’s the same subject.
And that’s the specific way even of that subject. It’s like just things that are, you know, human reason can discover. And therefore the Rambam and many others, you know, bring like sources. Like if you say like what’s their method of interpreting, because Rambam says explicitly: read Aristotle’s ethics, you understand how ethics works, now you’ll see how Pirkei Avos is discussing it.
Now sometimes because there’s something different than Aristotle, then we got a question like: is this a machloikes? Who’s right? Can we make them both say the same thing? All kinds of discussions like that. But the basic assumption behind the Rambam and many, many different commentaries that are walking in his path, is to say that Pirkei Avos is the same kind of work as the Nicomachean Ethics, or Plato’s works on ethics, or some other Muslim guy’s works on ethics. They’re all working about figuring out what is good for a human being, how is it good to live, and their things are basically human reason things. They’re nothing, no revelation needed for them, basically. That’s the basic method. And that’s what Rambam does.
The Opposition to Rambam’s Approach
Now, many Yidden [Jews] were not very happy with this. And you’ll notice, and this I’m reading you from [Rabbi Shmuel ben Yitzchak Abba di Boton], who wrote a book on Pirkei Avos called Lechem Mishneh [לחם משנה: Bread of the Mishnah]. And he, as is custom, goes through in his preface like the general theory of the book and what other people have said about this.
And he says, this was—everyone, he says, let’s look at this. Everyone agrees that Pirkei Avos is about the perfection [of human beings]. He even claims that everyone agrees it’s about these two levels of perfection: character, moralistic perfection, and intellectual perfection, which is an Aristotelian doctrine. But anyways, maybe everyone agrees with that.
But then he said that there’s a machloikes. Rambam and his followers and others said that this is, what he says, things like reasons, things that we could understand from human reason.
The Methodological Implication: Where to Study the Subject
Therefore, in other words—I’m thinking a little better about what this means. What this means is, just like we said before: Every book has a certain location. Where do you study this sugya [סוגיא: Talmudic topic/passage]? Where’s the discussion about this sugya, right? So, if it’s a halacha [הלכה: Jewish law] of nezikin [נזיקין: damages, torts], and then the discussion is in Bava Kamma [בבא קמא: first tractate of Nezikin] and others, in Choshen Mishpat [חושן משפט: section of Shulchan Aruch dealing with civil law], and so on. That’s why, even if you’re studying a sugya in Bava Kamma, you’re not studying Choshen Mishpat, you’re not studying Spanish legal monetary law, or tort law, you’re going to have to open the books that are talking about this, because that’s the discussion, right? You want to understand this, you want to understand the logic behind something, you’re going to probably be looking at a book that talks about the same subject, even if it doesn’t quote and say, “the Mishnah says this,” but it’s talking about the same thing. That would be like the comparisons or to figure out if the logic is correct or not.
In the same way, if the subject of Pirkei Avos is the same subject as Aristotle’s Ethics or Plato’s Ethics or anything like that, then if you want to understand Pirkei Avos, the correct thing to do is to read those books. That’s where you’re going to get the other parts of the story, what other people think about this, are these thoughts correct, are they agreed upon, are there other arguments for different sides, things like that. That’s what you have to do. If you study how eyes work, you’re going to look at all the books that talk about eyes. You don’t have to quote each other to be relevant. And more than that, if you study it without looking at those books, you’re not studying the subject correctly.
That’s what the Rambam did. Therefore, the Rambam’s references in Pirkei Avos are mostly Aristotelian books. And not only his own, but others. Other people have read other ethical works or later ethical works and done similar.
The Alternative School: Pirkei Avos as Commentary on Biblical Ethics
Now, if you’ll notice, if you look in, like, some mefarshim [מפרשים: commentators] on Pirkei Avos, you’ll notice that there’s, like, a whole school of mefarshim that have a different method. I think Rashi [Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, 1040-1105] does this. The Mishnah itself sometimes does this. He quotes Rabbeinu Yonah [Rabbi Yonah of Gerona, c. 1200-1263] doing that, of course, and others. And their commentary on Pirkei Avos, there’s something different.
That comes down to what Pirkei Avos says, and at least Rabbi Abba di Boton understands that that’s based on this other view—which I’m not sure we can even understand, that’s going to be my argument today—but it says that the other view is, and the other mefarshim don’t do that. They don’t explain the reasonings or the Aristotelian comparisons or anything like that. They say Pirkei Avos is some kind of compilation or commentary on the ethical books of the Bible, of the Tanakh [תנ״ך: Hebrew Bible].
So therefore, if you look in Rashi or Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos, most of the time—and the Gra [Vilna Gaon, Rabbi Elijah ben Solomon Zalman, 1720-1797], of course, believes in this methodology very much—they do the same thing. For every Mishnah in Pirkei Avos, they said [it’s found] either in Mishlei [משלי: Proverbs], or in Koheles [קהלת: Ecclesiastes], or in Tehillim [תהלים: Psalms] sometimes. Sometimes in Iyov [איוב: Job], mostly these are the three works. Tehillim, Mishlei, and Koheles are the most ethical works in the Tanakh. You didn’t know that Tehillim is an ethical work, but half of it is basically ethics, or a third, like a big part of it.
So and that’s what they do. And then sometimes it’s different in Midrash [מדרש: rabbinic homiletical literature] that says differently. So that’s their thing.
Student: Where did they… Where did the Chachamim [חכמים: the Sages] get it from?
Instructor: Yeah.
Student: Oh, that’s a question that you’re not supposed to ask in Jewish studies. You know, Jewish studies is the kind of study that stops by the Bible. Otherwise, it’s called Bible criticism and we don’t teach that in the Jewish schools. So, you’ll have to be at the koifes [כופר: heretic] and everything up to the Bible. That’s the law of Jewish studies. That’s why Jewish studies is such a mess, because you can’t actually think about your source of authority.
Anyways, what’s your question?
Student: I revoked my question.
Instructor: This is not Jewish studies, so you could ask that. I think you’re only kicking the can down the road.
Student: Yeah, wait, no wait.
The Distinction Between “Human Ethics” and “Torah Ethics”
Instructor: I’ll tell you what Abba di Boton explains, and I’ll tell you what Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura and others explain. Well, something different. Well, they said that this is based on the thought that Pirkei Avos is not about human ethics.
What is it about? It’s about Torah ethics.
What does this mean? I have no idea. He doesn’t actually explain what it means. He says it’s Torah things. The basic difference is something like this: Torah is things that Jews have to do, and I think this is something that humans have to do. And according to Rabbi [Ovadiah of Bartenura], whoever says this—
[End of Chunk 3]
The Status of Ethics in Pirkei Avos: Revelation vs. Human Wisdom
The Problem of “Revelatory Ethics” and the Status of Wisdom Literature
The Weakness of the Lulav Analogy
Instructor: Lulav works because it’s specifically not about Lulav. That’s the problem when you say that everyone agrees. Nobody thinks that going after that means obviously so. It’s not true even of Lulav, but at least for this most people wouldn’t understand. Okay, it’s like a specifically Jewish thing. But that’s the argument, apparently, of these people, that you should not—the context of Pirkei Avos [Ethics of the Fathers: a tractate of the Mishnah containing ethical teachings] should not be seen as general ethics, it should be seen as the Torah book.
So maybe Aristotle got Torah ethics. Oh, that’s a different question. Wait, we can get to that. That’s another question. But at least this is the argument. Therefore, like, you’ve got to find a different *mekor* [מקור: source], and maybe there’s a *teshuvah* [תשובה: responsum/answer], things like that. That’s what…
Student: Isn’t there a Jewish legend that Aristotle came to be *Shimon HaTzaddik* [שמעון הצדיק: Shimon the Righteous, a High Priest] with Alzheimer’s disease?
Instructor: Yeah, everything is possible. So it perfectly has Jewish ethics on it, so yeah, that one option to do that. You can do that, of course. The problem is that he’s much better than the Jewish ethics. So like, how could it be that the Jews don’t understand anything and he understood everything? He was a really good *ganav* [גנב: thief]. He’s such a good *ganav* he stole all the good parts and he left us the not good parts. I mean, what’s that all about?
I actually have an explanation for that, but that’s a problem, right? There’s something very weird in this, even in this claim. It’s not clear what this claim is supposed to mean, right? I actually could explain what the claim is, but I cannot explain what it’s supposed to mean to break up this.
The Content of Pirkei Avos: Human Affairs, Not Mitzvos
Student: I think breaking up is explicitly about human affairs. I’m sure there’s some parts about *mitzvos* [מצוות: commandments], but very few.
Instructor: So that’s a real good question. There’s even a better question, which is like, even like you said, your question was like, what do we believe actually about the book of Mishlei [משלי: Proverbs]? It’s like, it’s not prophecy. You’re not even supposed to believe that it’s prophecy, right? Something called *Kisvei HaKodesh* [כתבי הקודש: Holy Writings] was translated to something like inspired writing, or canonized writing. It’s not even clear that we’re supposed to believe more than that. Like, what does it even mean?
Student: Someone said, nobody thinks it’s…
Instructor: Because he writes silly stuff.
Student: Well, the Talmud says that we do if he says something good. And the bad things we say, just ignore. The bad things we make a different relation to say that they’re a good thing. That’s a big difference.
Instructor: I’d like to think of reading about Ben Sira [בן סירא: a Jewish wisdom text from the Second Temple period]. It must be a good book if there’s such a discussion. Anyways, maybe we don’t—oh, we do have the original now, I think. Anyways, yeah, there’s like, no, it’s not a story. Yeah, no, there’s actually, I think there’s also the Hebrew one now.
The Fundamental Question: What Does “Revelatory Ethics” Even Mean?
Anyways, so this is the question. What does it mean? What does it even mean? It’s not clear to me what it means. I could give the interpretation. I thought, did I ever give the *shiur* [שיעור: lesson/lecture] about—yeah, I did. Before Yom Kippur [יום כיפור: Day of Atonement], we did a *shiur* about what that might mean in some sense, but not for now. No, we didn’t actually get to that level. But it’s not very clear what it would mean for ethics to be a revelatory thing.
But this is a *chacham* [חכם: wise person/scholar] that says in the healing about the new land basically understands that all these people—and I think he’s right that this is the reason why they have this like—it’s obviously true that the Mishnaic sources are the books of Mishlei and Koheles [קהלת: Ecclesiastes]. It even quotes it sometimes explicitly. It’s not like obviously that’s what the—their canonical books they studied them. But like, you’re saying, obviously, the thing, the subject—I don’t think that means that the subject is a different subject. It does not seem to be a reason to think that.
Evidence from Mishlei Itself: Non-Jewish Wisdom Sources
Even the book of Mishlei itself admits to have been copied in some parts from non-Jewish thinkers. So Lemuel ben Massa [למואל בן משא: King Lemuel, mentioned in Proverbs 31], you ever heard of the guy? He’s not a biblical guy. He’s a *goy* [גוי: non-Jew], obviously.
Student: [inaudible]
Instructor: It says something like that. It says, literally, *divrei Lemuel melech* [דברי למואל מלך: the words of King Lemuel]. Who was that guy? Lemuel was not a Jewish man? You ever heard of the guy?
Student: No, I don’t know.
Instructor: Maybe he happened to have been Jewish. I don’t know. It doesn’t say that he was a *navi* [נביא: prophet] or something. El [אל: God] is also a Canaanite name, a Near Eastern God. Anyways, I don’t know. I’m not sure about that, but I’m just saying, it doesn’t seem to claim to be divinely inspired. He’s definitely not getting it from God. It doesn’t say—there’s no problem. The time of prophecy, he didn’t have any problem to write things in the name of God. He has prophecies, and maybe not just prophecies, at least dreams, in the book of Melachim [מלכים: Kings], but his books called Mishlei and Koheles, they don’t say God told me. They just say this seems to be a good thing.
Okay, you can argue about this. It doesn’t mean that they’re *Kisvei Kodesh* [at] some level of inspiration. But by the way, there’s not *afke mena* [אפקי מנא: it doesn’t matter/there’s no practical difference]. We don’t even read it in *beis medrash* [בית מדרש: house of study] ever, *Kesuvim* [כתובים: Writings, the third section of the Hebrew Bible], Mishlei. Right? On *megillah* [מגילה: scroll], it’s an *afke mena* if you say *bracha* [ברכה: blessing] on *mikra megillah* [מקרא מגילה: reading of the scroll], if you have to write it with a *klaf* [כלף: parchment]. But even the people that have *klafim* [כלפים: parchments] for *Nevi’im* [נביאים: Prophets] don’t have for Mishlei because there’s no use. Never read it. There’s no liturgical readings of the *Kesuvim*. There used to be, apparently, in Shabbos [שבת: Sabbath] afternoon, something, but we don’t have them anymore.
The Deeper Conceptual Problem
So, the *kitzur maaseh* [קיצור מעשה: short version/bottom line] is, that’s a different question, but I think the more deep question is it’s not clear what this would even mean—like what it would even mean to say that this is divine ethics or like revelation ethics versus human ethics. Does it change the subject?
According to the Rambam [רמב״ם: Maimonides] though, why would Avos [אבות: Fathers, referring to Pirkei Avos] start with the whole tradition?
Instructor: For different reasons. Because just like the Rambam’s theory is something—it doesn’t actually ask this question. Rambam just says Avos has two purposes. One is to tell you the tradition for important reasons to know the authority of the *chachamim* [חכמים: sages]. Let’s talk about two things. Part of it is about this, and part of it is about that. That seems to be what Rambam literally says. You could make *shtus* [שטות: nonsense] up, but he doesn’t seem to have this question.
The Chain of Tradition: Multiple Interpretations
And, of course, these are the, like, it’s also the—if I would read it and not come with any, like, agenda, I would think that it’s trying to say the tradition is teaching you the ethics. I don’t think it’s—I don’t think there’s a reason to think that. It’s implied, right? It’s actually, I actually have a—read it, read it. It’s disconnected. You could actually do an opposite reading. You could say something like, and then it says the things that they said that were not Mishnaic. Like, you’d literally be like, well, if you want.
What it does is it organizes, like I said, at least in the beginning, it organizes the thing, because ethics is—this is a very traditional way of thinking about ethics. Ethics is about what perfect, you know, exemplary ethical people say and do. You should not accept ethics from non-exemplary people, like me, and therefore, since we need to know the authority of the people that are telling us this is ethics, it tells us these are the people that are part of the chain of traditions, they’re important, they have authority, and therefore you should listen to what they say about ethics.
But it doesn’t ever make the claim that the ethics is actually part of the Torah that was in Mishnah [at Sinai]. It literally says other things, like literally the third thing it says is that there’s Torah, *Avodah* [עבודה: service/worship], and *Gemilus Chasadim* [גמילות חסדים: acts of loving-kindness]. Okay, maybe Torah is one of them, but then the other three are not Torah, *Mashiach* [משיח: Messiah], and Torah, Mishnah, and so on. It doesn’t actually imply that. I don’t think it implies that. You can make other theories, but it’s a very weak argument to say that that’s the reason why it’s…
Student: I thought it was just—if you read it plainly, it seems like it tries to give you a chronology of what happened, and then where it ends off is where everything begins, right? The next person says.
Instructor: Okay. So it’s just saying that this is a continuation of this tradition of ethics.
Student: No, that doesn’t mean that the content is different, but it does mean that the path…
Instructor: How is it a continuation, though?
Student: It’s at least vouching or claiming to be a continuation.
Instructor: Well, we basically have this guy, Moshe [משה: Moses], who just keeps…
Student: It doesn’t say that. It just gives you the story of the people.
Instructor: Yeah, but I understand. I think this is psychic, the fact that…
Student: You could say whatever. It’s mentioned in sequence also as a transmission, right?
Instructor: Yeah, no, no, it doesn’t say, I think it’s just like—no, it doesn’t. But I don’t know if it’s about another claim, like maybe it’s just overly broad, but I don’t know that it’s wrong. It seems to be coming as the next ethical teaching.
The Problem of Literary Evidence: Underdetermination
These are the kinds of questions where there’s way too little information to say anything certain about. Definitely something so basic, like a very weird claim, to say that ethics is something that needs revelation, and that there’s a different qualitative difference. You’re saying that it’s qualitatively different because it’s revelational?
Student: Yeah, that’s what these people are trying to say.
Instructor: Because all this explicitly says that ethics are not revelational. Nobody says it. You know what I’m saying? Each person is saying what was more relevant for this generation.
Student: Okay, these are different theories.
Instructor: Again, that’s also a theory that we don’t have enough information to say. So it’s not very—there isn’t any—I don’t think you can use this like—this is called literary evidence. Like it says next to these two things say next to each other so they might be connected. Yet it might be connected, but they can be connected. I don’t see any reason to think that the two totally contradictory ways of connecting them are—one is better thought.
Like one way is like your Torah—besides for the Torah there is these things that are not Mishnaic—is as reasonable as I think that the guy that says it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter to tell you that—to tell you that it’s ethics is not need revelation precisely for that, telling you the story. The Torah is Mishnaic. Because Torah means laws that are not humanly derivable. You could say anything like that. It makes just as much sense as the opposite theory.
In other words, there’s not as much evidence in the text for that theory or the other theory. I don’t think any of these theories are decisive. But I don’t think there’s a lot of…
Student: What? It’s just not like the *zayah* [זיה: unclear reference, possibly “thesis” or “proof”].
Instructor: Which is?
Student: Meaning, because you’re trying to be in the *Knesset’s* [כנסת: assembly, possibly referring to Knesset HaGedolah/Great Assembly] role, meaning it doesn’t have this structure.
Instructor: Well, it’s not a *Midrash* [מדרש: rabbinic commentary]. It’s a Mishnah [משנה: the first major written collection of Jewish oral law]. A Mishnah has certain structures. I actually think that it’s just telling you who these *chachamim* were—like if you say ethics you should care about who said it and it’s giving you the genealogy of who they were, like placing them in the story of the tradition. So it’s actually not what Maimonides says.
Student: Yeah, what does Maimonides say?
Instructor: That it’s about *halacha* [הלכה: Jewish law]. It’s not—he doesn’t connect at all these two things. The Mishnah is very careful to…
The Rambam-Rashi Dispute on Pirkei Avot: Universal Ethics vs. Traditional Authority
The Structure and Sources of Pirkei Avot
Student: Which is? Meaning, because Yishan ben Echad from the Knesset is Yisrael, meaning it’s not, it doesn’t have this whole structure. Well, it’s not a Medrash [Midrash: rabbinic homiletical interpretation], it’s a Mishnah [the first major written collection of Jewish oral law]. A Mishnah has certain structures.
Instructor: I actually think that it’s just telling you who these Echadim [individuals/sages] were. If you say ethics, you should care about who said it, and it’s giving you the genealogy of who they were, like placing them in the story of the tradition.
Student: It’s actually not what Maimonides says.
Instructor: Yeah.
Student: What does, Maimonides says that it’s about Halacha [Jewish law]. It’s not, he doesn’t connect at all these two things.
Instructor: The Mishnah is very careful to associate its sources.
Student: Which sources?
Instructor: The sources for its ethical teachings.
Student: No, it just says one guy said. It doesn’t say this guy said in the name of someone else, in the name of someone else. I’m thinking it’s just said things. I just said things. Is there a Tanakhana [a Talmudic sage from the Tannaitic period] in the Sakhat Seves [unclear reference]? There’s no Machlokes [dispute]. I mean, there’s these two stories. Isn’t that one place they say from someone else?
Instructor: What?
Student: Is itself not a typical?
Instructor: No, it’s just saying, this is the guy that used to say that. It’s just placing these sayings in the genealogy that it gives you, in the stories that it begots, that it’s giving you. He received from him and he received from that. And at some point, it stops doing that either. It gives up on that.
The Limits of Proof and the Question of Meaning
Instructor: I don’t think this is a proof. I could give you four other derashot [interpretations] about the connection to these two things, and they’re all going to be nice theories and not proof of anything. That’s number one.
The more important question is what is this even supposed to mean? You could say—actually, there’s something that it might mean—you could say that means something like, again, there’s such a thing called mitzvot [commandments], which are, you know, things that are laws that were given at Sinai or whatever that means, and they have many details. And if you’re Jewish you got to do them, or at least if you live in the Jewish community, you gotta do them. I don’t know if everyone that chooses has to do them.
But anyways, they have details, and you know, the Mishnah is basically the record of those things. And there’s some laws that you didn’t know. Some of them have sources in the Pesach [Passover, or possibly Peshat: plain meaning of text], some of them don’t, but there’s no problem with that, right? Laws. So there’s more halakhot [Jewish laws] that you gotta do. That’s all.
Then you say, well, does that really? Yeah, there’s more mitzvot, mederabanan [of rabbinic origin], mederai [unclear—possibly “of the rabbis”], and that’s sounds weird. Sounds off.
They say, no, it’s like, the Abarbanel [Don Isaac Abarbanel, 15th-century Jewish scholar and commentator] talks about this. What do you mean, some mitzvah, so where is it, where does it say, where does it come from, what’s going on? I don’t know, it’s nice things that were learned from the mitzvot. Okay, what difference does it make where you learn it from? Very not clear.
Ethics and the Importance of the Teacher
Instructor: Of course it makes a big difference, to be clear, I’m not going to do that. Ethics is not something that makes no difference who you learn it from, just how we explain it. So it does make a big difference who you learn it from, but I’m talking about the ideal of it, the ideal of it.
Student: You’re arguing on the Rambam [Maimonides].
Instructor: Yeah, I think the Rambam is saying a very weird argument when he says that ethics should be, could be learned from anyone as long as it’s a truth. Because, yeah, ethics is not a true thing. Ethics is about how human beings have the best life. And if someone has a bad life, you should definitely not learn ethics from them, because ethics is not a theoretical practice, it’s a practical thing. And practical things need to be learned from examples.
So what does it mean by saying it’s the truth? I know—no, that was two years ago or three years ago, there were twenty shiurim [Torah classes/lectures] about that problem. That’s a problem.
The Rambam’s Position on Universal Ethics
Instructor: But I’m talking about that as not that. I think there’s a difference between—that’s a very good question—but I think there’s a difference between literally taking someone as an example for ethics, like learning his ethics. Obviously, the Rambam actually thought that Aristotle was a perfectly ethical person, so that’s the answer, or as close to perfect as he can be, humanly.
But, so he’s actually not only—not unlike what people think the Rambam is saying, this thing can be more radical, but I’ll explain to you why he says that. It makes total sense in the way he thinks. He’s not saying something—we said these things already, and I’m not repeating them very clearly now. He’s not saying something like, these are mathematical arguments. It doesn’t matter if he really says them or someone else.
He’s actually saying these are truths, but they are ethical truths, and in order to know them, you need to be an ethically perfect person. He says this explicitly many times. And in order to practice them, you definitely have to. Practicing them means being a good person. And if you see a good goal [person], you should learn from him and how to be a good person, because there is no such thing as being a good yid [Jew] distinct from being a good person.
Of course, there are Jewish laws that are supposed to make the yidim [Jews] good. They may not necessarily be the same laws that are supposed to make the goyim [non-Jews] good, although all the goyim should be done with the Yiddish [Jewish] laws, of course. But unfortunately, they’re not. And of course, there are some things that are contextual and so on. Things are more complicated than that, but ideally, that’s ideal.
But the same way in ethics has this ideal, and there isn’t a distinct ideal of Jewish perfection as distinct from human perfection. That’s why, if you see a perfect guy, you should follow him. That’s a lot more interesting claim that Rambam makes, or assumes, doesn’t really make it explicitly, but assumes in this introduction. Most people sort of missed it.
The Misreading of Science vs. Ethics
Instructor: I think he’s saying an argument like, people say nowadays, hey, you can go to a doctor because he’s just giving you technical information. He’s not telling you how to live, people saying. Of course, there’s a total misreading of that saying. It doesn’t actually say that at all. I’m not talking about—and it says that they don’t have to know how to do aloha [unclear—possibly halachah], but that’s a different point.
But people interpret that statement out of context to mean that you could accept science from goya [non-Jews], but not ethics. But Rambam actually does not believe there’s such a thing, because ethics is also a science, and ethics is a universal thing. Therefore, if you find a good goya, you should listen to him, too.
Rashi has the same theory, because he quotes a bunch of ethical statements from a bunch of non-Jewish sources, and so on. So this is the really interesting thing.
So now, you have what I’m saying? So he does believe in who you hear the ethics from. He does believe in who you hear it, but there’s such a thing as a perfect goy [non-Jew]. The fact that Aristotle was non-Jewish and lived in ancient Greece and had a bunch of weird ancient Greek men, even a pagan, he worshipped foreign gods, doesn’t make him a non-perfect person. You could be a pagan and a perfect person.
The Medieval Christian Parallel
Instructor: This is, of course, a very famous question, Christian problem, and the medieval Christians had very explicit discussions of this. Could we learn ethics from pagan sources? And generally, many of the schools—remember in the classical world, school is mostly taught Homer, classical works. And anyone that wants to be educated had to know that.
We have in the Talmud also questions like this. Should I learn—by the way, definitely means Homer, not Plato. Whenever the Shmuel ben whatever the guy’s name was asked his uncle or whatever, if he should know Chochmat Yevanis [Greek wisdom], he means should I go to the [school] and study Plato, study Homer. Doesn’t mean Plato.
Plato is Chochmat Yisrael [the wisdom of Israel]. He stole it from Aaron. No, I’m serious. It’s not Chochmat Yevanis. In which way is it Greek?
Student: He’s talking about Homer.
Instructor: Now Homer is obviously Greek. It’s not even giving you mussar [ethical instruction]. It’s giving you stories about Achilles and what’s the guy’s name. It’s giving you the myths, Greek stories. Of course, but this was the Greek education. They supposedly learned some ethics from it, and some heroism from it, and Plato says you learned bad ethics from it, whatever, there’s an argument for how good it is for teaching ethics.
Cultural Education and Canonical Texts
Instructor: But education always means, in every culture, education means learning the—okay, this is, I’m going, all kinds of things, you’re getting lost. Education means knowing the canonical text of a culture.
In the United States, it means knowing a bunch of television series. And this is really the question. Are you allowed to watch Hollywood? Hollywood stands in the place of Homer, for a matter of—now there’s no Hollywood either. There’s 10,000 different Riedel’s feeds on whatever it’s called. But that’s basically the question. That’s where the question will turn.
Studying science and philosophy is not that. Science and philosophy don’t belong to Greeks and don’t belong to anyone. They’re just what they are. So I know this is obvious.
And of course, the answer is, why would you do that? You’ve got Jewish myths. Did you finish all the Midrashim [rabbinic homiletical interpretations] already? They’re the same stories, just with different names. What difference does it make?
Student: But the names are the difference.
Instructor: But why would you do it in Greek?
And so other people said, no, you couldn’t. Gamliel [Rabban Gamliel, first-century rabbinic leader] had a school where they taught the Greek text, because you’ve got to be a cultured guy.
Student: Just for the king, just like him.
Instructor: Yeah, yeah, of course. No, but just for the king just means, by the way, people are confused—that means he was going to for the Jewish [leadership]. It’s true. But it just means you’ve got to have some guys have to be cultured. It’s important to have cultured Jews.
And culture doesn’t mean being smart. Being cultured is not the same as being wise.
Student: The other cultures.
Instructor: Yeah, it just means being—part of being, just like part of being—you’ve got to be, part of being a Jewish guy, to know the Jewish news, more or less, otherwise you’re not a—how do you call it, not a—if you go and work in a [workplace], you’ve got to know something about the Super Bowl. I don’t know how much, but enough to not look like a chamor [donkey/fool]. You’ve never heard of the Super Bowl, you’re a chamor, you’re not a human being. Of course, the guys that did hear about it, but that’s the meaning in America, to be that kind of chamor.
So you gotta be that kind of chamor. So, huh?
Student: No, it’s basic.
Appearance and Cultural Integration
Instructor: And that’s what it means. You have the two-goyish [non-Jewish] hairstyle. Why? Because if you come with a beard and a long neckline, why? They look at you like a chamor. True story. They say, oh, respect your culture. Yeah, respect the chamor’s culture also. But listen, they don’t actually respect you.
You wear a dress like a normal guy, maybe something where you’re a couple, then they look, okay, you’re a guy. Oh, you have these interesting beliefs, whatever, we can deal with that. But if you come dressed like a Chassidisha [Chassidic Jew], they look at you like a weirdo from outer space. It’s how human beings work. And it’s important for some Jews to be normal.
And some Jews should not wear the [traditional garb]. And it’s important. You’ve got to cultivate this important for Jewish safety and for safety reasons, and also for better, more serious reasons.
Clarifying the Central Dispute
Instructor: But let me clarify what I’m up to, because the audience is going to get confused. What we’re saying is, this is very important. And maybe this is going to help you, but let’s try to say it.
What we’re saying is, we’re in this space that we’re saying that there’s a machlokes [dispute], the Rambam and Rashi in the pshat [plain meaning/interpretation] of Pirkei Avot [Ethics of the Fathers]. What is the context of Pirkei Avot?
The context is Aristotle’s Ethics book. The context is the book of Mishlei [Proverbs] and Kohelet [Ecclesiastes]. That’s a fact. You could read the two commentaries and see that they refer to different sources of authority or of—not only of authority, of thoughts, how they interpret this book.
And we said that this very famous argument that’s repeated 10,000 times in Chassidus, Rashi, the Horda [introduction] of Pirkei Avot, which is quoted in the Bartenura [Rabbi Ovadiah ben Abraham of Bertinoro, 15th-century commentator on the Mishnah], but it’s in the Abarbanel here, and I think in other people of that period, the same thought that the reason Pirkei Avot has the tradition, the chain of tradition in the beginning is to tell us that these are—
[End of chunk]
Rambam’s Radical Claim: Why We Must Trust Aristotle’s Character, Not Just His Proofs
The Persistent Problem of “Divine Ethics”
Instructor: Make sense? Now we said we don’t understand very clearly what it would mean for something to be divine ethics. We understand what it would mean for something to be divine mitzvos [mitzvot: commandments]. We don’t understand what it means to be divine in ethics.
If ethics means human happiness, it’s not clear that there’s such thing as Jewish happiness as a person. Of course Jewish people have their things as a people and they have to be happy in their land and in their language and things like that, but those are incidental things. Very nice. But in the sense of there being a different kind of human good, which is a Jewish human good, it’s not very clear what that is supposed to even mean.
I’m not saying that there’s no answer to what it means. I’m just saying it’s not clear what it means. It’s a question. Make sense? Is this clear?
The Jewish Ethical Conversation and Its Reference Points
Now, one more step we added to this, we explained. The Jewish ethical conversation doesn’t have different reference points. Right, I told you. Let me try to explain this later.
So we explained this, so you know it should make sense. We explained that the Rambam [Maimonides], not only did he—like we said, the first proof is that his text, his surrounding text, like the Hakdama [introduction] to Pirkei Avos [Ethics of the Fathers] that he writes, are Aristotle, mostly, some other, he doesn’t give a lot of names, but mostly Aristotle and we said Al-Farabi, different non-Jewish thinkers, versus Rashi [Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki], whose notes are around Chumash [the Five Books of Moses] and Koheles [Ecclesiastes] and Tehillim [Psalms] and so on.
But we explained that this explicitly, at least from the side of the Rambam, it’s not explicit from the side of Rashi and Rabbeinu Yonah [Rabbi Jonah of Gerona]. They don’t explicitly say that they have the other—later people say that for them, but they don’t make it as explicit. I never heard of someone say, explicitly. People act that way, but nobody actually made this claim, at least until people like the Abarbanel [Don Isaac Abarbanel], much later, like people start in the 14th, 15th century, people explicitly start making that claim.
They actually also explicitly start making the claim that such a thing as Jewish happiness. They just never explain what it would mean. Or how hard I’m explaining it, at least. Because it’s hard to explain. Because if it would be explained, then a good kid would understand it. It’s like a paradox.
Right. So there’s a very weird thing going on. I’m not laughing at this. I think there’s a real theory for Jewish happiness, but we’ve got to understand.
Rambam’s Explicit Claim: Listen to Aristotle Because Truth Is Truth
Now, we explained that Rambam famously makes this claim in the Hakdama of Shemoneh Perakim [Eight Chapters, introduction to Pirkei Avos], and we’re going to read this inside at a different time, and the Rambam explicitly makes this claim that you should listen to Aristotelian ethics, although some people might think that Aristotle was not a good guy and whatever. Why? Because it’s true, and the truth is not changed by the people we listen to them.
The Argument Is More Radical Than It Seems
Now, if you want to clarify this argument, you have to understand that the Rambam is making a much more radical argument than it seems. Why? Because there’s one version of the argument, and the Rambam itself gives a version of that version, or something close to that version in a book called Kiddush HaChodesh [Sanctification of the New Moon], which is an appendix to his book called Sefer Zemanim [Book of Seasons] in Mishneh Torah. Then he just added it into part of the book. But originally it was a separate book.
And the second part of it’s not the first part, the astronomical part. And says over there, and then in the end, or at some point, where he says that he copied all this astronomy from Hellenic sources, right, Hellenic and Arabic sources. And he says don’t bother me for this because anything that has proofs is just true. He said something like that. We do not rely on the person who’s saying it but we rely on the proof.
So doesn’t make a difference if I said it. He said this language: it doesn’t make any difference if a non-Jew said it or a prophet said it. We’re not—even when the Prophet says that, if he brings us proof, that’s not him that we’re listening to, we’re listening to his proofs. So it’s not relevant who said it.
Why This Works for Astronomy (Sort Of)
Now this is somewhat true for astronomy, which is just math. Astronomy used to be said like a subset, some subsection of math in some sense, because it’s just calculating when the sun will come and so on, which is somewhat true.
Of course, astronomy can be wrong. And also, of course, Rambam himself didn’t actually calculate all the astronomy that he says. He explicitly says this, that he’s trusted some people for some things, and we actually know who he trusted and the mistakes they made. So even this argument is somewhat weaker than it seems. You’re still trusting people.
Even when you learn math you’re mostly trusting people. Now there’s people trust other astronomers and say that those astronomers were wrong. Of course most people didn’t do the calculations either, but you’re always trusting someone. So you’re trusting him at least for not lying. So you think, oh, he has the virtue of honesty, of truth—that’s a great virtue. You know most people don’t have it. Read about academic scandals and scams and fake papers and fake data and all of that, right?
So, it’s not simple, it’s not trivial to say we rely on astronomers. Of course, you can answer these questions, there’s reasons to trust well-established science, and astronomy is very, very well-established science to some extent, but not as obvious as the Rambam makes it sound. Its rhetoric is a little more than the reality is.
The Argument Breaks Down Completely for Ethics
Secondly, and more importantly, this does not work for ethics, definitely doesn’t work for particular ethics, like specific things, and the Rambam explicitly goes on to talk about very specific ideals of what a good life is, and how it works, and how to deal with the contradictions in it, and takes Aristotle entirely seriously, or more or less agrees with everything he says.
And for that, Rambam himself knows that there’s no such thing as proof in ethics, no such thing as proving what a good life is. Aristotle, right? Rambam calls it mefursamot [famous things or well-known things], not truths. They’re not eternal, they’re not unchanging. They therefore can’t have the amount of proof in the way that math can have, or in the way that metaphysics can have.
Ethics has worse proof than those, and Aristotle already taught us, you should not seek definite proofs in ethics. If you seek mathematical proofs in ethics, you’re being dumb, because it’s the wrong subject matter. The subject matter doesn’t admit such kind of proof, and Rambam knows all of these things.
So when he says, listen to Aristotle’s ethics, he can’t really use the, like, it’s just math or trusting the math. He actually is trusting the man, the man Aristotle, and this means, of course, Aristotle himself might have had some moral failings, and Rambam doesn’t actually think that. He thinks that he was a perfect man, even though, yeah, explicitly says that.
Even though, in the famous letter, even though he was a pagan. I don’t remember, maybe. Even though he was a pagan, Rambam held like many ancient and medieval Christians, that pagans can be good people. Unfortunately, they didn’t know they have the light of Christ, and whatever, Christ is going to take them out of hell also at some point. And other things like that. Christians have this problem.
Jews don’t even have this problem because we don’t believe that you need a specific revelation to go to heaven, right? Famously, Chassidei Umos HaOlam [Righteous Among the Nations], which is another way of saying that pagan, righteous pagans are perfect people, right? Doesn’t mean they don’t worship avodah zarah [idolatry], right?
Digression: Can Pagans Be Righteous?
Student: Which other part? No, the theory is about they have to agree with Moshe [Moses]. Of course not, if it was not the Chassidei Umos HaOlam then they would guide him. They would guide him to Yisrael or something at least. No, specifically not to the Chassidei Umos HaOlam.
Instructor: Don’t ask questions of me from the Rambam. I’m telling you what the reality is. But the Rambam says—
Student: What does the Chassidei Umos HaOlam mean?
Instructor: No, no, wait. What the Rambam says? Yes, he makes a weird mistake. He says he has divine mitzvos [commandments]. No, I don’t care. I don’t care what the Rambam says about the Chassidei Umos HaOlam. He just says the fact.
There is no Jewish, real serious Jewish thought that says that you cannot be a good pagan. Okay? How do I know this? You heard of Avimelech and Pharaoh? Did you hear of them? Very good. There’s nothing wrong with them, besides for them being evil people and stealing people’s wives, otherwise they would have went to Gan Eden [the Garden of Eden/Paradise]. That’s what it says in Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer. Okay?
And they explicitly worship foreign gods. There’s nothing wrong with that for most people, but you could be a good person and be a pagan. Okay? There’s no question about this. There wasn’t a denial that Aristotle was a pagan. He knew that he was. And what he really thought Aristotle was a different question. Maybe he really thought something close to monotheism in Rambam’s reading of the Metaphysics. But he definitely worshipped avodah zarah. It would be an exception.
Student: No, Avraham Avinu [Abraham our forefather] worshipped avodah zarah, remember, in the beginning, and he was a perfect person.
Instructor: Okay, there’s another point for me now, okay? I’m getting out of this subject. Another point, Avraham Avinu and he was already a perfect person then. Okay, now, the reason why Avraham Avinu stopped worshipping avodah zarah was for his children. But for himself, he could be a perfect person without it. And a general pagan culture is not a very good way to raise your kids, that’s true. That’s what the Rambam thinks at least, but it’s not true that you cannot be a perfect pagan.
Now, listen to me, don’t tell me, we’re not Brisk over here, we don’t care about pilpul [sharp Talmudic dialectics], we tell you the reality.
The Core Implication: Rambam Must Believe Aristotle Was Perfect
Now it doesn’t mean that I’ll explain you a different time—it’s not a point you can’t have a she’eilah [question]—everything I’m explaining the things we’re middle of saying something very important.
Well I’m saying something: when Rambam says he should listen to Aristotle in ethics, he means to say Aristotle was a perfect person. Now even that wouldn’t be enough if the Rambam would have believed that there’s such a thing as a perfect Jew that’s different than a perfect goy [non-Jew]. But there’s not a thing.
He describes a way to become a perfect person. He’s already a perfect person. You don’t need to describe possibly many people would have a harder time doing it if they live in Athens, so therefore they should live in Jerusalem. But that’s not an essential argument, that’s an accidental due to human culture and all kinds of variations, all kinds of problems that human beings have, that actually believe that you could be a perfect person as a Muslim, very explicitly, or as a Christian, or as a pagan. It doesn’t matter, it’s just going to be harder for you. This is the reality.
Now, therefore, Rambam must be believing that because otherwise nobody would ever tell you to study ethics from a bad person. It can’t be. I don’t—maybe you can study math from a bad person. Even that, and I don’t want to say it explicitly, bad people won’t do math well. Because they’re going to lie, for as simple as that. There’s deeper reasons, but bad people don’t actually do good math. You shouldn’t learn even math from bad people. You definitely shouldn’t learn ethics from bad people.
The Distinction Between Cultural Initiation and Philosophy: Greek Wisdom, Torah Education, and the Problem of Codifying Ethics
Bilaam as Exception and the Return to Torah-Based Ethics
The Case of Bilaam and Universal Salvation
Student: The other eye is Bilaam.
Instructor: What? The other eye is Bilaam. Bilaam was? He was a bad guy. And Mishnah says that he doesn’t get out of the world, right? All right. He backs him. He could have been out of the world. I don’t know. I don’t know what he was. It’s his culture. How then is it supposed to be except Bilaam? It’s an exception. Why is it an exception? There it says… That’s an eye that Mishnah holds, that… And he’s not. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
There isn’t any serious Jewish discussion of, is there a salvation outside the faith? We basically believe that there is. Now, the important thing is like this. Does this make sense? And this is how we got into this discussion, just to make it very clear, that there is… How are they going to understand the letter of the kamel [קמל: possibly referring to a textual reference] if they go up there and they have no experience learning it? Come on. Tell them to come over.
Refocusing on the Central Question
No, this is what we have to explain something. There’s a difference, right? That’s why we’re in the middle of saying that there’s a difference, right? So, I don’t know how I got, right? What I have to explain is that there’s a difference. I got into this in a side way, but it’s connected to what we’re saying, right?
Because we’re saying that, according to the theory that there’s only one kind of good human being, like Adam and Elisha, according to that theory, don’t look up the realm, you’re confusing yourself, you’re not listening, you’re getting into stupid arguments about if the realm said something or didn’t say that. Does the realm want us to have such arguments? No. So we shouldn’t have.
Now, since there’s only such a thing as a good person, it’s not even clear, definitely from the dharma’s perspective, or from any perspective, it’s hard to understand what it would mean for there to be a special kind of ethics which is based on Torah. What does that even mean? There’s different key things, good or bad, for a human being because of the Torah. What does that mean? Are the things that we didn’t know that they’re good or bad because of the Torah?
It gives a good structure, the same way you said every other different thing.
Student: But wait, that would be good for Allah.
Instructor: See, very good. That would be the precise difference between halakha [הלכה: Jewish law] and think [ethics]. Or you could say even between, even between, no you can’t. Even between, there’s different, you can’t, it’s not even clear that you can make halakha for halakha. And you’re telling me you can’t make halakha for ethics.
The Problem of Codifying Ethics into Law
Like Aristotle explicitly said you can’t. And Ram [Rambam/Maimonides] sort of has to discuss this in some places. Or Ram is this problem. It’s not so simple that you can actually have detailed laws. You probably can’t actually. And halakha is not supposed to be detailed laws. It’s a kind of mistake. You could have general generalities but that’s why you need a business [posek: halakhic decisor] to actually apply laws and there’s no law that can be applied without a living human being.
Wait, I’m telling you something different. I’m telling you is that like you’re saying it’s very important to realize what we’re saying. Very important. I don’t know what I’m telling you. Very important to understand what I’m saying. Listen revelation I got that listen don’t show me we know Rambam’s I don’t care listen you I’m not telling you you can’t have the Oma she [possibly: אומה שלמה, complete nation] about the room being on that product there’s like 16 of them I allow a beginning of what I mean to say now listen I know that mine I could push the back and you’re saying funny things because I say in the Rambam very different I’m thinking the Malik rule is I don’t I’m not even going to answer this. It’s a stupid question. It’s stupid geek what you’re saying now. Sorry. This is not a good geek. There’s other maybe geek that are good. This is a dumb one.
Classroom Management: The Problem of Phones
But I’m not talking about this now because we have to keep on track. But it should look at their phones so look like you’re doing and if you want to look up something you should buy a special tablet that I don’t know is a failure on it that you can look up all the toilet [Torah texts] that you want yeah yeah but all of the phones enough in events once exact that’s this problem this is all good but potentially you didn’t go on it has a show but potentially there is and that means that you ready your minds potentially over there and potential. And therefore, remember.
The Question of Greek Wisdom (Chochma Yevanis)
So, now, like this. Very important is like this. So what we said is that that’s the important focus. You have to make a difference. This is the important thing you have to understand. And to understand the difference between these two things, and in some sense, we’ll understand what it would mean for something to be Greek or Yiddish [Jewish]. That’s what we’re saying.
There is, and there’s still a question, right? There’s a question in the Medrash [מדרש: Midrash], in the Gemara [גמרא: Talmud], if you should learn Chochma Yevanis [חכמה יוונית: Greek wisdom]. Greek wisdom does not refer to Plato. How do I know? Because the Gmoda [Gemara] never heard of Plato.
Greek wisdom refers to—and in the Greek schools nobody studied Plato. It was like one weird school called the Academy which really studied Plato. But generally when the Gmoda we have to assume that when the Gmoda says Greek it means go to the Greek grammar school. That’s called language. Language means studying people say rhetoric but it just means studying Homer.
Student: The one who said, give the pig, give the pig, that’s the one who said, give the pig.
Instructor: Yeah, yeah, that’s a very interesting myth, but it doesn’t talk about plagiarism. I was just talking about something, that’s what I’m trying to explain.
What Schools Actually Teach: Cultural Initiation, Not Philosophy
And there was such a thing in the times of Ghomem [Gemara], and much later, there was such a thing as a school, and a school, just to be clear, like a base of self [beis sefer: בית ספר, house of the book/school], right, a school. A school is like this, in every single culture, this is what a school does. No school teaches philosophy. Philosophies are anti-school. You can’t have a school that teaches philosophy. That’s for me, no, I can’t either there.
A school is not something that you teach, a philosophy is not something you teach kids in school. There’s no question about it. Even Plato didn’t propose that you teach kids in school as philosophy. In the Republic, where he gave this whole educational program, it never said you should teach kids Plato. Kids are taught by stories and basically by being initiated into a culture.
A culture is something that has, at least if it’s a good call [culture], a literary culture. A culture is something that has a certain, like we say a canon, a certain group of stories or of oral stories or of written down stories that everyone knows. That’s what a culture means. Very, very simple.
And in tradition, in every literary culture that ever existed, in other words, the ones that we know, this is what going to school meant. Going to school meant that you were taught, you were initiated into the language, not just the words. Language is the beginning.
The Rambam on Teaching Hebrew
The Rav Amos [possibly: Rambam] says that the mitzvah [מצוה: commandment] of Talmud [תלמוד: here meaning Torah study] is to teach your son Hebrew. And what he’s not trying to say is that you should be a Zionian [Zionist] and speak Hebrew and say, go to the Zion in Hebrew.
Like the Rambam says many times in Mishnah in Torah [Mishneh Torah: Maimonides’ legal code] and in Pesach K’lobos [possibly: פסק הלכות, halakhic rulings], if you say shtisim [שטויות: stupidities/nonsense] in Hebrew, it’s still shtisim, and if you say smart things in Arabic, they’re still smart. The language doesn’t change anything.
So why does the Rambam say there’s a mitzvah of the teachers on Hebrew, it says in the parashah [פרשה: Torah portion] of Mishnah, it’s a mitzvah. What he means to say is that you should teach your son Tanakh [תנ״ך: Hebrew Bible]. Of course, Hebrew is the same thing as Tanakh, because Hebrew just means the language of Tanakh, or the language of the Mishnah [משנה: foundational rabbinic text]. That’s just what it means.
Like it says in the Mishnah, it’s like in the Baraisah [ברייתא: external Mishnaic teaching], your child is five years old, you teach him Torah, Tziva, and Linnemesh [possibly: ציווה ולימדנו, commanded us and taught us]. It just means you start teaching him some Hebrew words. Of course you find a good post [pasuk: פסוק, verse] that’s a simple post that everyone can have. You start teaching him Hebrew words. You initiate him into the parashah of the week, the mikra [מקרא: Scripture reading].
That’s what Pesach Sefer [בית ספר: house of the book/school] is. Pesach Sefer is what every Jewish child is supposed to go to—the house of the book, right? A place where they teach you a book. They don’t teach you how to think. Thinking is for yeshiva [ישיבה: advanced Torah academy]. You teach you a book and that’s what it means to become to have a Jewish education.
Greek Schools and Homer
In the same way there were Greek schools, Hellenistic schools or however you want to call them, were the two of the Greek books. The Sifra Minis [ספרי מינים: books of heretics/sectarians] that Alisha Benavu [Elisha ben Avuya] tried to learn, that just, Zemri Vani [possibly: זמרי ופנחס, Zimri and Pinchas], right, it just means reading Homer.
And the Rishami [Rishonim: ראשונים, early medieval rabbinic authorities] said, nothing wrong with reading Homer. It’s a nice song, nice news. Who cares? Read the newspaper. What’s wrong with reading the newspaper? I don’t know. No, and Shabbos [שבת: Sabbath], nothing. There’s nothing wrong with reading Homer, just stories. But that’s not what it’s—
Technical Interruption: Camera Battery
My thing is going to die, by the way, and you need to put a different battery for it somewhere. I don’t know why it’s starting to die such faster, isn’t it? And now, do you have what I’m saying? There’s another camera that has another battery. You got it? I don’t know where the… I got another battery.
So the question of studying foreign languages, sometimes it’s explicitly expressed that way, studying foreign languages, is and always was about—
Yeah but it’s not my battery at all is the thing like I said I don’t do I have to explain you everything I’ve been having to think about it at all this is like not my start to be maybe don’t don’t be afraid of things I’m not free no I told you take out the battery from that and put it into this I have no idea how to take out batteries I’ll work on it ask ask you know the baby you know like I’m like, I don’t know how I’m going to do this. I’ll figure it out.
So very worried about simple things. You got what I’m saying? So complicated to know simple things over here. On the bottom of it, there’s a little thing thing with the battery, and it comes out, and you can take it. I figured it out. Is there a replacement? No, I told you to put that battery into here. You got to stop it first, I think. At least he probably should.