📋 Shiur Overview
Summary of Shiur – Pardes Rimonim, Sha’ar 1, Chapter 9
The Main Question of Chapter 9: Is One Who Denies the Sefirot a Heretic?
Chapter 9 of Sha’ar 1 in Pardes Rimonim addresses the inquiry: im hamachish hasfirot yikra kofer – is one who denies the Sefirot called a heretic? The Ramak’s answer is essentially “no,” but it’s more complicated than a simple no.
Why Is the Question Itself a Strange Question?
After the previous chapters (especially the last chapter where it stated “al derech hachakira” – that for faith to be correct one must know the existence of the Sefirot) – he now comes to ask whether one who denies this is a heretic. This is a peculiar question:
Imagine: an author writes a book of sodot haTorah. On the cover it says “sod,” it’s learned only with restrictions, he himself calls it Kabbalah, sodot haTorah, not nigleh haTorah. And then he asks: whoever doesn’t believe in my secret – is he a heretic? This is truly a strange question. When has such a question ever been asked about a nigleh sugya? No one asks: “Whoever doesn’t believe in the laws of kam leih derabba minei – is he a heretic?” Technically the answer should be yes (because one must believe in the entire Torah), but no one poses such a question about a regular sugya in Bava Kama. The great novelty is that such a question is asked at all – because it makes Kabbalah not just a deep wisdom for yechidei segulah, but a basic foundation of faith, like the ikkarim themselves.
[Side note: Historically this is a bit funny – most generations of Jews didn’t know there were ten Sefirot. It’s a hava amina that requires a certain historical awareness.]
The Background: The Concept of Ikkarei Emunah
The Rambam’s Approach
The Rambam introduced the concept of ikkarei emunah – that there are specific things a Jew must believe, and whoever denies them is excluded from the community. This itself is a novelty of the Rambam, as the Chatam Sofer, the Ibn Ezra, and Rabbi Yaakov Emden all noted.
The Rambam holds that there is a list of specific beliefs a Jew must hold. This means that not every verse is equally important to believe. For example: “Shema Yisrael” one is obligated to believe, but “va’achot Lotan Timna” – if someone holds that Lotan’s sister wasn’t Timna but Rivka, he’s a strange creature, he’s perhaps wrong, but he’s not a heretic. Because one must believe that the Torah is holy, but not necessarily that every single verse means exactly its literal content.
[Side note: It’s mentioned that Rav Yosef Dan elaborates in his books on the historical point of how Kabbalah developed to become something that requires belief. The Ramban, who is perhaps the first to write Kabbalah publicly, never said that whoever doesn’t believe in his Kabbalah is a heretic. He did say that the Ibn Ezra made an error because he mocks Chazal, but he doesn’t call him a heretic.]
The Mekubalim’s Approach (and the Chatam Sofer)
The Chatam Sofer brings in a responsum regarding ikkarei hadat that the Mekubalim disagree with the entire concept of ikkarei hadat. Their approach is: one must believe in the entire Torah – every word of Torah is names, every word has holiness. There is no distinction between one verse and another. As R’ Menachem Mendel says: where does it say in your Torah that believing in the Almighty is more important than not putting on tefillin on Shabbat? Both are Torah min haShamayim, both are equally important. Your investigations that make distinctions – there are no distinctions.
The Ramak himself, when he returns to the question (at the end of this chapter), also says about the Mekubalim: there are no special ikkarim – everything is an ikkar. One must believe everything that is written.
The Nafka Mina – A Leniency That Emerges from the Mekubalim’s Approach
From the Mekubalim’s approach emerges also a leniency: if everything is equally important, then a person who has a great difficulty – for example he doesn’t understand the explanation of “arba’ah avot nezikin” in Tosafot – he’s not an apikorus, he’s a great scholar with a question, he can remain at “tzarich iyun.” But – and this is the point – if one says that regarding emunah it’s different, that there one may not have a “tzarich iyun” (for example: why is there only one God and not two? – “tzarich iyun”?!) – then one is making a distinction between verses, which is exactly what the Mekubalim don’t want to do. Every matter in Torah one must understand, and if one doesn’t understand, one remains at tzarich iyun – this is not heresy.
According to the Rambam, however, there is a great distinction – regarding yesodot ha’emunah one cannot remain at a “tzarich iyun,” there it’s a fundamental problem. The Ramak, however, does have a hierarchy – he holds that there are things one must believe, and therefore doesn’t fall into this problem.
Kabbalah as Basic Emunah in a Kabbalah Community
For people living in a Kabbalah community, this became the basic thing: “What are Jews? Jews believe in ten Sefirot.” It’s taught to children, just as one teaches “leshem yichud Kudsha Brich Hu uShechintei” – the child doesn’t understand, but later he will understand. But if someone comes into a Chassidic shul and says “I don’t believe in yichud Kudsha Brich Hu uShechintei” – a Chassidic rebbe will not let him in.
The Ramak, however, lived in the real world – he knew people who held differently, people who had thirteen Sefirot (that’s the previous chapter), or people who didn’t hold of Sefirot at all.
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The Ramak’s Answer: Two Types of People
The Ramak distinguishes between two types of people who have errors:
Type 1: One Who Doesn’t Know – “Lo yada bahem klal”
This is a person who has never heard of Kabbalah. Not because he denies it – but because “lo nitgalu lo sha’arei or,” he wasn’t taught. This person the Ramak calls not a heretic – he doesn’t know what it is. This is not the concept of “tinok shenishba” – he means simple Jews who haven’t learned Kabbalah.
Type 2: One Who Is “Bemeizid” – A Deliberate Heretic
This is someone who hears what one wants to tell him, and he still remains with his position – he denies lehach’is, deliberately. This person the Ramak does call a heretic.
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The Proof from the Rambam-Raavad Dispute Regarding Hagshama
The Ramak brings a proof from the well-known dispute:
The Rambam holds: whoever believes that the Almighty is a body – is a min.
The Raavad disagrees and says: “Why does he call this one a min? Many great and good people followed this thought, based on what they saw in the verses and even more from what they saw in the aggadot that confuse the mind.”
The Ramak’s Analysis of the Raavad
The Ramak cannot believe that the Raavad himself held that the Almighty is a body. This is clear from the language “aggadot hameshavshot et hada’at” – the Raavad calls this meshavesh, which proves that he holds this is an error. He says “gedolim vetovim” – but he agrees that they were wrong. They followed peshuto shel mikra (where it says that the Almighty has, as it were, a body) and aggadot.
[Side note: The Raavad dares to write about aggadot even more than the Rambam dares in Mishneh Torah – he calls them “aggadot hameshavshot et hada’at”. He was a sharp person who said what he thought.]
The Ramak’s Novelty: The Dispute Is About Shogeg
The Ramak reframes the nature of the Rambam-Raavad dispute. He makes it not a dispute about whether hagshama is an error (both agree yes), but a dispute about shogeg vs. meizid:
– The Rambam holds: even a shogeg – one who believes innocently that the Almighty is a body – is a min.
– The Raavad holds (according to the Ramak’s interpretation): a shogeg, one who innocently fell into this error – is not a min. Only one who is bemeizid, deliberately denying – he is a min.
The Ramak applies the same principle to Kabbalah: one who doesn’t know about Sefirot is like a shogeg – he’s not a heretic. But one who hears and still denies deliberately – he is a heretic.
The Raavad’s Position According to the Ramak – Explained
The Ramak explains the Raavad’s position: there is a Jew who “in all his matters serves God, and walks in the ways of Torah with innocence,” and only “because of his limited knowledge believes in corporeality” — such a person is not a min, he is mistaken, “and his intention is not to do evil.” But whoever has already recognized the Creator, one has already opened for him “the gates of introduction to the negation of corporeality,” and he does not acknowledge the truth, and he turns away his face — such a person is certainly a min even according to the Raavad.
A Question on the Ramak’s Understanding
Who was ever such a person that one explained to him that the Almighty is not a body, and he says deliberately “yes, He has a body”? This is not a natural situation. People who believe differently typically have a different reasoning, a different book they read, a different theory — they’re not “turning away their face” deliberately. The Ramak perhaps has too much in his mind the concept of deliberate heresy — that someone knows the truth and denies it intentionally. But both the Rambam and the Raavad speak more of innocent people who believe what they think is true.
[Side note: “Gilui hakdamot” doesn’t just mean that one explained to him — it means that one showed him, brought a Chumash, said everything — and he still holds to his beliefs. But this is not as impressive as an explanation.]
The Ramak’s Conclusion Regarding Hagshama
Such a person who believes in hagshama is a min — but he’s a min like a gentile (like a Christian who believes that the Almighty became a person), not like a Jewish min.
[Side note: The Ramban held that what Christians say — that the Almighty became a person — is absurd, but the Christian has his own way of explaining it, and the Ramban doesn’t consider him a min in the same sense.]
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Three Separate Questions in the Sugya of Hagshama
Question 1: Does the Almighty Have a Body
This itself can be made complicated. There are reports in the name of the Raavad (in Sefer Ma’arechot Elokut) that when speaking of the Almighty with tefillin and the like, one means the kavod nivra — Metatron, or something like Sefirot. This way one can say that the Almighty “does have a body” but not He Himself literally. Another approach is that the Almighty has a body “in a certain sense” — playing with words. But the Ramak assumes that the Raavad is certainly in agreement that simply the Almighty is not a body.
Question 2: Is One Who Says the Almighty Has a Body a **Min**
Even if one agrees that the Almighty doesn’t have a body, there remains another question: is one who thinks otherwise a min. “Min” is not the same as “he is wrong”. There are people who are wrong but not minim. For example, if someone thinks there are seven heavens and someone says no — neither is a min. A min is only regarding the most important matters. Many Jews argue: the Rambam is right that the Almighty is not a body — but it’s not so important that one should become a min from it.
The Ramak doesn’t speak of the second question at all — for him it’s obvious that it’s important enough to be a min. He’s entirely on the Rambam’s side.
The Raavad’s Proof from “Gedolim Vetovim Mimenu”
The Raavad’s proof is: there are gedolim vetovim who believed this way. But the Rambam would say: “Gedolim vetovim? Minim!” — that’s exactly the question itself.
[Side note: The Kotzker Rebbe’s parable — the Rambam with his ruling stretched out a whole bench of beautiful Jews from Gan Eden into Gehinnom. The Raavad comes and says no — they were sent back.]
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The True Distinction Between Rambam and Raavad
The distinction is not whether the Almighty has a body (both say no), and not whether such a person is wrong (both say yes). The distinction is:
– The Rambam holds that in the ideal shleimut ha’adam / perfection of a Jew, knowing God (including negation of corporeality) is very fundamental. Without such knowledge something essential is missing. Therefore he is a min — not because he’s a bad person, but because he lacks the most important knowledge.
– The Raavad holds that such a person is still “gedolim vetovim” — he has a good excuse, he’s a shogeg, he’s not a min.
But the Rambam agrees that there is an excuse of shogeg — he doesn’t say such a person goes to Gehinnom. He only means to say that it’s very important and one cannot remain agnostic. When he writes “min,” he doesn’t mean to rule on all Jews until the end of all generations — he means that one must change what one thinks.
[Side note: What people bring as proof that the Rambam doesn’t agree with the Raavad’s claim of shogeg — this is not true. The Rambam certainly agrees that there is an excuse of shogeg. How can there not be an excuse when the Torah itself writes language of corporeality? When someone learned simple peshat? But — says the Rambam — today there is already Targum Onkelos, today there is already Moreh Nevuchim, one has already been taught in cheder that the Almighty doesn’t have a body. So after the Rambam has incorporated into the curriculum of every Jew that the Almighty doesn’t have a body — now whoever believes otherwise, is something funny.]
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What Does “Kefirah” Mean Anyway?
One must divide the question “is something kefirah”:
1. It can mean: the matter is very important to be a person, to be a Jew — a practical importance.
2. It can mean: it’s truth — an intellectual truth. But most people are not blessed to express what the truth is — and this is not relevant to them, only to scholars.
When someone thinks that π is three or four, he’s not a heretic — he’s a fool, he hasn’t learned, one cannot have complaints against him. The entire discussion about kefirah is only relevant to education — mass education, what one teaches people. When one hasn’t taught him, one cannot have a complaint. When one has taught him and he doesn’t believe — then one asks why. If he says “but I’m a scholar and I hold differently” — that’s a special situation, the scholar has his own approach. The question of a leader/educator doesn’t speak of that scholar, but of the simple person who was taught and must believe.
Novelties in Emunah — The Danger
If someone makes his own approach in shorshei emunah, even though he was taught differently — this happens every day. People make novelties, a new peshat, a new sugya. Can one make novelties in emunah? Yes, with true foundations. But this is exactly the danger — this has always been the question about Chassidut, Kabbalah: “one may not learn from this, one may not touch the matter, it’s very dangerous.”
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The Ramak’s Ruling — He Goes Like the Raavad
The Ramak appears to rule like the Raavad. His approach goes like this:
– According to the Rambam certainly whoever doesn’t believe in Sefirot is a min — because the Rambam doesn’t hold of this “heter of error” (the Raavad’s leniency that a shogeg is not a min).
– Even according to the Raavad who is lenient — the Ramak holds that one who is a meizid (he knows and doesn’t believe) is a min.
[Side note: A question is raised — does heresy have any connection at all to the distinction of meizid and shogeg? How does the Ramak view this connection?]
The Simple Jew Who Doesn’t Know About Sefirot
The Ramak has an interesting assumption: that all Jews believe in echad hapashut. In truth, most Jews believe in “atzmuto umahuto” — “yes, I believe in one God” — but don’t know about Sefirot. The Ramak says clearly: if someone is a simple Jew and believes only in echad hapashut, he is certainly not a heretic, not a heretic in principle, nothing.
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The Proof from Chinuch — “Lo Matzinu”
The Ramak brings a good proof: if Sefirot were an ikkar emunah, one would have to teach a boy when educating him for mitzvot. Mah shelo matzinu ken — we don’t find that this is taught.
This is the funny catch (paradox) that the Ramak’s entire chapter is built on:
– On one hand: the Mekubalim want to say that Sefirot are ikkarei emunah — Judaism stands on this, and whoever doesn’t believe after being taught is a heretic.
– On the other hand: no one teaches it! On the contrary — one says it should be kept secret: “ve’ein mosrin devarim elu ela latznu’im.”
Mah she’ein ken the ikkar emunah — existence of Hashem, His unity, Torah min haShamayim, prophecy of Moshe, and most ikkarei hadat (interesting that he says “most”) — one teaches immediately, the moment a boy can speak, “kra imo,” one educates and reveals peshuto shel devarim.
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The Rambam’s Novelty Regarding Ikkarim in Chinuch
This itself — that one must teach ikkarei emunah — is a novelty of the Rambam. In the Mishnah/Gemara it says one teaches a boy Torah, but it doesn’t say one teaches him ikkarei emunah.
Proof from converts: In Yevamot it says what one teaches a convert: “A convert who comes to convert, we inform him of some light commandments and some stringent ones” — but it says nothing at all about there being one God and not two, not even about idolatry! The Rambam however, when he brings the law in Hilchot Gerim chapter 14, adds on his own: “we inform him of ikkarei hadat” — which doesn’t appear in the source. This clearly proves that the Rambam innovated the matter of teaching ikkarei emunah.
The Ramak, like most Mekubalim, is a student of the Rambam in this way, and he thinks accordingly.
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The Baraita in Masechet Sukkah — “Yodea Ledaber”
The Ramak brings a very beautiful proof from a well-known Baraita in Masechet Sukkah (42a), where there’s a list of each mitzvah when one begins to educate a child:
> “A child who knows how to speak — his father teaches him Torah.”
When must one begin teaching Torah? From when he can speak. This means: Torah is a language. Education is language. One teaches a person a language — what is a father, what is a mother, what is everything — and for Jews the language is Torah.
[Side note: In every culture there is a “basic book” — in Greece they learned Homer with all children, that was the book of the culture. For Jews this is the Chumash. One learns literally to speak the language. All Jewish concepts, words, expressions — come from Torah. “Vayomer” — “and he said” — this is Yiddish after all.]
[Side note: Breslovers will be entirely right that one must say the Torah, not just learn. Learning is still a higher level — Talmud — when one is older. But first one must speak, it must be language.]
It says not “mi shemevin” one teaches him Torah — but “when he can speak.” Torah is something one speaks.
What Does One Teach? — “Torah Tziva Lanu Moshe” and “Shema Yisrael”
The Gemara asks: what is “Torah” that one teaches a three-year-old who can speak? The Gemara answers: “Torah tziva lanu Moshe morasha kehilat Yaakov” and “Shema Yisrael Hashem Elokeinu Hashem echad.” One teaches something to say — one says Torah. One teaches children the verses, a few more verses that are today in the siddur.
[Side note: It’s mentioned that in practice most bochurim don’t know the thirteen ikkarim. In girls’ schools there’s a subject “Yahadut” where this is taught, but for boys it’s not official. The Rambam certainly thought one must teach the ikkarim — that’s why he compiled them.]
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The Ramak’s Interpretation of “Torah Tziva Lanu Moshe” and “Shema Yisrael”
The Ramak asks: why specifically these two verses? He answers: because these are the two ikkarei hada’at, the main foundations of faith.
“Shema Yisrael” — Existence of Hashem and Hashgacha
“Shema Yisrael” contains the principle of existence of Hashem and that He supervises. “Elokeinu” — our God — means hashgacha pratit, not just general providence. The name Havaya in its writing means “haya hoveh veyihiyeh,” “mehave kol hahavayot” — His existence is necessary from the perspective of the entire world. The name Adnut means that He is “master of all worlds, upper and lower.” From this comes hashgacha klalit, but “Elokeinu” goes further — He is our God, supervising in detail over us.
[Side note: The Ramak didn’t precisely understand the concept “mechuyav hametziyut.” He thought it means that one is obligated to say there is a God, that there is a world. In truth “mechuyav hametziyut” (necessary existence) means that the Almighty could not have not existed — He is necessary existence. The Ramak didn’t learn logic as it should be, and this is a basic deficiency in his knowledge. He makes this error several times.]
“Hashem Echad” — What Does Unity Mean?
The Ramak goes with the interpretation of the Rishonim that “Hashem echad” means that the Almighty Himself is one — He is a simple (simple) existence, not composed of parts. The Gemara says that when saying “echad” one must have in mind that the Almighty is king above, below, and in the four directions. The Rambam (Yesodei HaTorah chapter 1) brings from this a proof that the Almighty is not a body — because a body cannot be in two places at once. A body can be very large, but each piece of body is in a different place. A thing that has no body is entirely in all places. This is the Rambam’s reasoning, and the Ramak says this is the intention of “Hashem echad” in Kriat Shema.
A Long Discussion: The Simple Meaning of “Echad” Versus the Philosophical Meaning
[Side note — a broad discussion:]
The simple meaning of “Hashem echad” in Chazal was: there is only one God — excluding two gods. “Echad” means “yachid” — the only God. Therefore the Gemara calls Kriat Shema “kabbalat ol malchut shamayim” — because if there is only one God, He is the king over the entire world. “Shema Yisrael” is even said in the verses of kingship. This is the old, original peshat.
The new peshat — which comes from the Muslim philosophers and is accepted by Rishonim like Chovot HaLevavot — is that “echad” means that the Almighty is simple (simple), unified, not composed of parts. This is a novelty — a completely new understanding of unity that speaks not only of how many gods there are, but of the nature (nature/essence) of God Himself.
The sages spoke of the conduct of Hashem — that one Creator runs the entire world — not of the essence of God. As the Rambam himself says: Chazal speak of “His wonders,” not of “His existence.” The question “what is the Almighty?” — what is His nature — is not even a question that the Gemara addresses.
Aristotle already explained that the word “one” has different meanings: one as a number (one apple, two apples), and one as simplicity (not composed). The Ramak speaks of the second meaning.
The Ramak brings another interpretation: “echad lo ke’echad imanu” — the Almighty’s unity is not like our “one.” “Echad imanu” means an individual, a “one” in number — there are still others. The Almighty is not an individual in that way. The Ramak says he will explain this further in Sha’ar Atzmut VeKelim, chapter 5.
“Kabbalat Ol Malchut Shamayim” vs. “Kabbalat Ol Mitzvot”
Malchut shamayim does not mean that I take upon myself to do the Almighty’s will — that is kabbalat ol mitzvot, which is the second paragraph (as it says in the Mishnah: first kabbalat malchut, then kabbalat mitzvot). Malchut shamayim means only: the Almighty runs the entire world, all sides of the world, He is the only ruler — excluding the gentile approach that different gods rule over different parts of the world (one over the sea, one over the land, etc.).
“Torah Tziva Lanu Moshe” — Torah MiShamayim, Prophecy, Reward and Punishment
The second verse — “Torah tziva lanu Moshe morasha kehilat Yaakov” — contains the principles of Torah min haShamayim, prophecy, prophecy of Moshe. This is simple: “Torah tziva lanu Moshe” — Moshe who was a prophet gave us the Torah.
What about reward and punishment? The Ramak thinks that “morasha kehilat Yaakov” hints at reward and punishment — that the Almighty is good to the Jews when they follow the Torah. Perhaps he means: to give the Torah is itself a benefit, so that one should have the reward and benefit from the Torah.
The Ramak’s Answer to His Own Question
The Ramak asks: how can a small child understand such deep principles? He answers: now, when he is small, he only says it. But when he gets older, he will need to think what it means. “Veshelo aviv” — he should ask his father: what does “Hashem echad” mean? And one will explain to him.
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The Path of Chinuch in Emunah — How One Educates Children
The Ramak brings an approach in education: one teaches small children simple things — “Torah tziva lanu Moshe,” “Shema Yisrael” — without explaining what it means. This is the first step. Afterward, when the child gets older, “yatchil leshotet machshavto me’at me’at” — he begins to think, and “veyish’al aviv uzkenav ta’am be’inyanam” — he asks his father and elders what it means. Then one explains to him “penima me’at me’at lefi sichlo kesheyigdal” — little by little, according to his intellect as he grows.
This is a very good method: first the child hears words without understanding, afterward he becomes curious, afterward he asks, and then he learns. This is how real education works. A person can only learn something he is curious about. And how does one become curious? Through having already said many times things one didn’t understand — like for example, a child says the entire siddur, he doesn’t know what is “parim hanisrafim,” whether it’s different from “piturei haketoret,” whether it’s different from “oz vechedva bimkomo” — it’s all one long recitation. Afterward one tells him: “you daven so long, you don’t know what’s going on here?” — and he becomes curious, and he tries to understand.
[Side note: An example is brought of how people remember later that they always said it before, and only later do they understand — for example, “you knew that on Yom Kippur one offers par panim? It’s actually in the Chumash, Acharei Mot” — such things come out through having said it before many times.]
The Ramak has brought here a beautiful Torah — an interpretation in the Gemara (Sukkah 42a) about education — which is practically a good source for the method that one teaches children simple things first without explanation.
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The Distinction: Existence of the Ikkar vs. Sefirot HaElyonot
All this is “regarding the existence of the ikkar” — the basic principles of faith (Hashem echad, etc.). Mah she’ein ken in Sefirot haElyonot — this one does not teach to children. On the contrary: “ma’aleh velo yigalu, ela latznu’im yechidim shebador.” This was once; today, it’s noted, one does say it to children. But the Ramak speaks of Chazal’s times — in the Gemara Sefirot are not explicitly explained, only perhaps hinted at in one or two places.
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The Ramak’s Ruling: One Who Doesn’t Know About Sefirot Is **Not** a Heretic
The Ramak rules clearly: one who doesn’t know about Sefirot is not a heretic and not a min. He’s not any part of heresy. What is he? The Ramak describes him with the words: “a land that has not merited to see lights in its days, and has not tasted the sweetness of Torah and the pleasant gathering of its scholars, and behold he died without wisdom and did not see goodness.” He’s a great pity — he lives in a dark world, he hasn’t tasted the sweetness of Torah — but he’s a kosher servant of Hashem.
[Side note: It’s noted that not specifically Sefirot, but some understanding of divinity a person must have. One can also through the Rambam come to such understanding, which is “basically Sefirot anyway.” One who thinks that the Almighty sits on a chair and tells Jews to blow shofar — pity, “lo ra’ah me’orot miyamav.” But even a little Chassidic understanding, a little Sefirot, gives a brighter life.]
[Side note: It’s asked — why doesn’t one teach everyone Sefirot
[Side note: It’s asked — why doesn’t one teach everyone Sefirot so they should be calm? The answer is that one cannot teach people by force. The Chatam Sofer said it’s not possible — one takes the first Sefirah and makes from it “another thing one must believe.” The Ramak says one doesn’t have to believe it — and this is a good thing, because this way it remains an awakening, not a compulsion.]
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The Second Type: One Who Does Know About Sefirot But Doesn’t Believe
Afterward the Ramak brings the second type of person: one who does know about Sefirot, but “denied them because of their bad character, for they were accustomed to external wisdoms, and from their explanations doubts arose for them.” He heard about Sefirot, but he doesn’t believe in them because he learned philosophy, and from this doubts came to him.
The Ramak’s approach here is very “pious”: he dismisses the person’s arguments because they come from “external wisdoms.” But this is not fair — one cannot dismiss an argument just because the person also learns gentile books. One must be able to explain to the one who learns external wisdoms what one has to say.
[Side note: The Ramak here disagrees with the “Or Neherav,” with his teacher R’ Shlomo Alkabetz, with the entire group — they were all in this pious approach: “you look at gentile books, it’s not a way.” But one must be able to answer the person who learns these books, not just dismiss him.]
[Side note: It’s mentioned that R’ Yehuda Aryeh of Modena (about twenty years later) extensively took the Ramak’s chapter in his book, and he noted that the logic doesn’t make sense. He knew people who knew the Ramak personally, and he speaks about the Ramak’s personality.]
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The Ramak’s Argument: Why the Second Type **Is** a Heretic
The Ramak says: even if one doesn’t call him “kofer” or “min” in the classic sense — because he does believe in the unity of Hashem and in the principles of divinity — nevertheless he is a denier of the interpretation of Torah she’be’al peh. The Rambam writes (Hilchot Teshuva chapter 3 halacha 8) that there is a type of heretic who denies the interpretation of Torah she’be’al peh. And because the Sefirot are (according to the Ramak) part of Torah she’be’al peh, one who denies them — denies Torah she’be’al peh.
But this is circular logic. One must first prove that Sefirot are Torah she’be’al peh, and only then can one say that whoever denies them denies Torah she’be’al peh. The Ramak has until now not brought a single piece of Gemara where Sefirot appear explicitly. This is like saying: “The Rebbe had gilui Eliyahu — because the Rebbe himself said so.” It’s regrettable that the Ramak didn’t notice the logical problem.
—
The Ramak’s Clear Distinction Between the Two Types of People
The Ramak makes a clear distinction:
1. The first type — a simple Jew who simply hasn’t learned, he doesn’t know about Sefirot, he’s an innocent Jew. About him the Ramak says: he is not a heretic. “Lo her’ahu haMakom” — the Almighty didn’t show him. One has no complaints against him. He’s a kosher servant of Hashem, just a pity who hasn’t tasted the flavor of Torah.
2. The second type — one who does know about Sefirot, but denies them — about him the Ramak has complaints. He is stricter on the one who knows and denies, than on the one who doesn’t know at all.
[Side note: It’s noted that from both sides — both the Mekubalim and the anti-Mekubalim — it’s very difficult for most people, even great people, to imagine how the other came to his way of thinking. Most people imagine that the other is just a heretic because he’s bad — but this is not always the truth. It’s also noted that the Kabbalah world often has no humility — when someone asks innocently or half-innocently, they attack him, instead of lowering themselves to him.]
—
The Argument of “Torah She’be’al Peh” — Further Discussion
How can one say that something is “Torah she’be’al peh” if no one heard of it until recently? This doesn’t make sense. One cannot simply claim that something is Torah she’be’al peh just because one says so.
The Practical Approach: Kefirah as Halacha-Talk, Not Truth-Talk
An important novelty: perhaps one can understand the Ramak that the entire discussion of emunah and kefirah is only a halacha-talk, not a talk about truth. That is, it’s not about what is absolutely correct, but what one must teach people — it’s a discussion about education and guidance.
The Rambam’s approach is also like this — he said that whoever believes differently is a min, and this “succeeded” for him as a method of education. But for the Kabbalah people it didn’t succeed, and for the questions (the philosophical difficulties) it also didn’t succeed.
The Distinction Between “Simple Faith” and “Knowledge/Investigation”
A fundamental distinction:
– Simple faith — repeating what one heard from a rebbe, without one’s own understanding.
– Investigation/knowledge — what the Rishonim called actual understanding through learning and investigation.
One who is “bar hachi” — who can learn and understand on his own — for him the entire discussion of kefirah and emunah is not relevant in the same way. He doesn’t want to know if he’s called an apikorus — he wants to know what the truth is. If he understands, he takes what he understands; if he doesn’t understand, he says “tzarich iyun” — and this is a legitimate position.
For Whom Is the Kefirah-Talk Relevant?
The entire question is only relevant for people who don’t understand on their own — people who don’t have any “actual knowledge.” For them the rule is: if you went to the “right cheder” (with the right rebbe) and you don’t understand — this is normal, you’re not a heretic. But if you went to two cheders — with one rebbe you heard this way, with a second differently — and the “bottom line” is that you believe both, that is the problem.
The Ramak thus speaks not of one who actually learned Zohar and has a question. He speaks of one who simply heard from one rebbe this way and from a second rebbe differently — and he follows the “wrong” rebbe.
The Ramak’s Actual Argument on the Level of Tradition
Because the sages of Israel, most of them, believe in Kabbalah — one cannot be a Jew and say that a basic thing that the sages of Israel believe is not true. But this is only on the level of tradition. On the level of understanding — one doesn’t go at all according to what people say, but according to what one understands.
[Side note: It’s noted that this itself is a great question — whether this is a correct thing to do. It’s “very funny” to say that someone is “denying the interpretation of Torah” when the interpretation of Torah itself says that most people don’t understand it.]
—
The Ramak’s Relationship to the Rambam
An important question: The Ramak surely knew that the Rambam doesn’t believe in Sefirot — he’s not a fool, he’s not ignorant. What did the Ramak think about this?
The Ramak’s answer about the Rambam is: “lo ra’u me’orot meyameihem” — the Rambam simply didn’t see the light of Kabbalah. The Ramak did not mean that the Rambam knew about Sefirot and denied it — he meant that the Rambam pitifully didn’t know it.
A proof of this: in other places, like in Shiur Koma, the Ramak speaks about ta’amei hamitzvot. He doesn’t bring the Rambam’s name explicitly, but he says: “those who give reasons — why does one blow shofar? Just a person, this is a reason to blow shofar? You’re doing me a favor! Pity, you say pity, this is my Judaism — shofar is to do teshuva, some horn.” The Ramak says: you need to understand that shofar awakens the upper mercies — this is the true reason.
The Ramak thus understood that the Rambam is “pity” — he had respect for what the Rambam did know, but he held that the Rambam was an “ignoramus” regarding Sefirot. But — and this is the key — the Ramak certainly didn’t hold that the Rambam is a heretic. This cannot be! Somewhere in between one must understand how this fits together.
—
The Ramak’s Second Argument: Without Sefirot One Falls Into Heresy
Afterward the Ramak brings another argument, which goes back to the previous chapter:
“Milvad asher eleh lo” — besides all this, “yosef al chatato pesha” — one who denies Sefirot has another problem:
“Ki hamachish hasfirot yimashech el hakefirah” — whoever denies Sefirot is drawn to heresy. Why? Because one will ask him the same question that was asked in the previous chapter: if the echad hapashut (God as absolute unity) doesn’t change — how can He supervise things that change? And if He is one — how can He supervise different things that have multiplicity (plurality)? “Ki yechayev ribui kayadu’a”.
The Ramak says this is “yadu’a” — but in truth it’s not so simple, because the Rambam clearly believed in both things (unity of Hashem and hashgacha) and he did not hold that it’s a contradiction. But the Ramak holds that the only way to solve the problem is with Sefirot, as he explained in the previous chapter.
Therefore the Ramak says: “Veyucrach leha’amin basfirot, ve’im lav yichfor chas veshalom ka’asher ta’u rabim, vesodam ka’asher peratnu, vekinyanim elu ein retzoni leha’alotam bichtav” — one must believe in Sefirot, because otherwise one will God forbid become a heretic, as many have indeed erred — and their approaches he doesn’t want to write down.
Whom Does the Ramak Mean?
The Ramak speaks here of a specific group: Averroists (students of Ibn Rushd). There was a group of Jews, particularly in Italy in his time, who were inclined toward the philosophical approaches. They did not believe in hashgacha pratit, perhaps also in eternity of the world — all these things are connected in their theory.
[Side note: The Ramak speaks not of the Ralbag — although the Ralbag also didn’t believe in hashgacha pratit in the usual way. The Ramak speaks of later people, “acharonim,” who lived closer to his time.]
The Ramak’s Conclusion
“Al korchach” — either he will believe in Sefirot, or he will become a heretic — because this is what happened with people who didn’t have the vessel of Sefirot to answer the philosophical difficulties.
Critique of the Argument
This second argument is also “not such a good argument, but a slightly better argument” than the first. The opponent says: he has an answer to the question, it’s not so difficult at all, he doesn’t understand the whole thing — everything is “mitzideinu” (from our side, not from God’s side).
Another point: the deniers (those who denied Sefirot) perhaps don’t hold something so different from what the Ramak holds — it’s possible that the distinction is only in the name “Sefirot”, not in the thing itself.
—
R’ Leibel Madina’s Answer to the Ramak’s Question
R’ Leibel Madina is very angry at the Ramak’s question and says he doesn’t understand at all what’s difficult. His answer is that this is all “mitzideinu” — a parable that the Mekubalim themselves use: a person climbs up to a building, the building doesn’t get closer to him, he gets closer to the building. So too with hashgacha: when a person is closer to the Almighty he has more hashgacha, but the Almighty doesn’t change. Madina means that this is essentially what everyone believes — also the Mekubalim. The distinction is only that Mekubalim call it “Sefirot” and have a language for it. The Ramak’s argument, however, is that people who don’t have the language of Sefirot, become through this lack actually heretics — and this was true in practice.
—
Kavvanat HaTefillah Without Sefirot — An Error
The Ramak goes further with a sharper argument, this time not about kefirah but about kavvanat hattefillah. He speaks of early Rishonim who said: “I don’t engage in Kabbalah, I just want to have intention in prayer to the Master of the Treasuries.” This is known from the responsum of the Rashba, where Mekubalim gave a parable: the king has various treasuries, one cannot simply give to the king directly, one must say “send for that treasury.”
The Ramak says: even if you’re not a heretic, you’re certainly mistaken. Why? Because if a person wants to pray to the Ein Sof in its essence without Sefirot, he’s stuck in a contradiction: the Ein Sof hapashut is simple, it’s not subject to changes. It cannot change from din to rachamim, it cannot be affected by prayer. If you say yes it changes — you’re a heretic in the other direction (corporealizing). The Almighty can only “answer” prayers in the manner of His existence in Sefirot, which are the essence of His providence — through them there is hashgacha, through them there is change from din to rachamim.
[Side note: This sounds like something the Rambam himself would agree to. It’s not clear why the Ramak is so sure that people who don’t learn Sefirot don’t know this. But it’s true that there are “funny Rambamists” who don’t grasp it, and think that prayer doesn’t work — or conversely, think that the Almighty changes.]
The Ramak warns however: “ve’al yitchakam hame’ayen liknot toch devarenu inyan netina nechutzah” — don’t think that you already understand the matter of influence and hashgacha from what he said here. He will explain everything at length in Sha’ar HaOrot VeHaKelim. Here he only wanted to make the main point: a person is compelled to believe in Sefirot.
—
Sefirot as “Razin DeMeheimanuta” — Two Interpretations
The Zohar calls Sefirot “meheimanuta” — faith. The Tanya and others say that “razin demeheimanuta” means that one cannot understand Sefirot, one can only believe in them. But this is the opposite of the true peshat. The entire point of Sefirot is that one should be able to understand. They use “emunah” in the sense of knowledge of divinity. If you only believe in Ein Sof (without Sefirot), you cannot understand anything.
The main novelty: if you only believe in Ein Sof, you don’t believe in a God. You have a “name” without any “Elokeinu.” The Sefirot are what make Him “Elokeinu” — not that they are separate, but they make the “Elokeinu.” Our faith is in the Almighty through His Sefirot, not in the Almighty in His essence. Even the Ein Sof itself we only know through the Sefirot — because we wouldn’t have known about anything without the world. This is why the Sefirot had to be revealed. Therefore a Jew is compelled to believe in Sefirot.
—
The Novelty of Kabbalah — Not That Sefirot Exist, But How One Speaks About Them
Theoretically everyone believes in Sefirot — everyone believes that one speaks of the Almighty’s actions. The novelty of Kabbalah is that one calls them “Elokim,” that when one speaks to the Almighty one speaks to them — of the Almighty with them, not of them separately.
A possible question: perhaps Mekubalim give too many names to things that shouldn’t have names, and thereby make it a “reality” that is perhaps not legitimate? This is exactly the question of Sha’ar HaAtzilut VeHaKelim — to what extent can one truly call it a reality. But practically, making things a reality is the only way people understand things. As long as it remains abstract — like “relationship to creation” — it’s very difficult to speak about it.
—
Three Types of People in Prayer
There are three types of people:
1. People who don’t really pray — they don’t pray to the Almighty, they pray to “a graven image.”
2. Most simple Jews — they say that the echad pashut changes. This is essentially what they believe, but they are corporealizing. (The Ramak doesn’t say it so clearly, but this is what happens. According to the Ramaz they are minim.)
3. People who are in the Rambam’s path — they grasp the unity of the simple, and therefore they don’t truly pray. They perhaps say the words, but they have no essential understanding of what prayer means. The Rambam says in Moreh Nevuchim that when a person prays he becomes a slightly better person — but this is not prayer, the word “tefillah” has no true meaning with this.
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The Mekubal’s Answer — Sefirot Give Prayer a Language
The Mekubal has an answer: we give a name to the thing. We pray with the Sefirot. The Sefirot can be angry at you, and they can not be angry, and I make it so they won’t be angry. Through this — the Almighty Himself doesn’t get angry, but the actions of Hashem do. This makes prayer make sense. Mekubalim make service of Hashem have words. And when they say further that the Almighty Himself made it this way — because the Almighty wants it to make sense.
—
The “Simple Jew” — Who Is He Really?
The simple Jew has few words in his mind, and he essentially does the same thing — but he’s mistaken. If he thinks too much, he has a problem. The Ramak says he’s “mistaken.” But simple Jews who are truly simple — no one has any complaint against them.
The complaint is against the “super-wise simple Jew” — one who says “I’m a simple Jew” but he’s not. He’s a person who went to yeshiva, he understands a bit, he has questions — and he hides behind “simplicity.” This is a lie. The Ramak speaks of “ha’omer ein ela ba’alei otzarot” — not of one who didn’t think of the question, but of one who knows about the question and avoids it.
—
The Main Moral of the Story
The Almighty made you such a type of person that you can only ignite yourself to pray if you understand — if you make a connection between Sefirot, if you have understanding. This is your path of service. Intellect is a great gift that the Almighty gives, and one must use it — not become arrogant from it, but also not throw it away. Every theory is complicated, even “simplicity” is complicated.
Certainly, the Almighty can without Sefirot — He speaks with simple Jews without Sefirot, He even speaks with heretics. But you are not your grandmother. If you’re a person who went to yeshiva and understood a bit of what you were taught — you’re not a simple Jew, and your obligation is to understand clearly.
—
Joy in One’s Portion in Understanding Divinity — And the Balance Between Humility and Gratitude
Heresy Against the Goodness of the Almighty
To say that the knowledge of Sefirot is worth nothing, or that it doesn’t matter — this is heresy against the goodness of the Almighty. The Almighty gives a person a great benefit when He gives him the ability to understand divinity. Every thing can be ruined, and every thing can also be used for craziness — but this is the path of service itself: to use it correctly.
The “Middle Class” in Chassidut and Kabbalah
There is the situation of the “middle” Chassid — not the greatest philosopher, not the simplest Jew — who learns a bit of Chassidut, a bit of Kabbalah. The person says: “I have basic Sefirot, I understand, I make myself very small, my davening works – very good.” But the answer is: no, you need more. Not because you’re not good enough, but because the Almighty gave you more ability.
Why Did the Almighty Make the World So Complicated?
The Almighty Himself is simple (pashut), but the creation — the reality — is complicated. Why? “Kach ratza” — so He wanted. The Almighty wanted that the wise should also have what to do. The smart people — “smart people” — their mind runs like the world actually is, they grasp how complicated everything is, and for them it’s harder to live. But for them one also holds — there is a solution: the Torah, the Kabbalah, the wisdom — this is the solution for smart people. It helps.
Joy With One’s Own Understanding
The main point: one should be very happy with what one understands. The Almighty made me with a certain intellect — I use it, appropriately, further. My Judaism, my service of Hashem, my humanity — it’s perfect. And I’m happy with it.
There are true Mekubalim — people who truly understand, who come to understandings, perhaps even ruach hakodesh. May they have their good fortune. I understand as I understand, and I’m very satisfied with it.
The Problem of Arrogance — And the Right Balance
Question: Do you think you’re better than another because you understand divinity?
Answer: My prayers work better because I understand. Why shouldn’t I think this? This is true. One who knows there are ten Sefirot, and he understands a bit what it means — yes, his service is better. Why is this hard to believe? It’s true!
But — one must learn with humility. Not that one shouldn’t rejoice, but that one shouldn’t think one is greater than the other. The distinction is:
– Considering oneself very great with one’s own understanding — yes, this is correct.
– Considering oneself greater than the other — this is just a problem, arrogance.
Knowing vs. Going Through
When one looked up to people throughout the generations, one did not look up to someone because he knew more. One looked up for going through a lot, for working on oneself. An understanding of knowledge is very nice, but there are greater things — the shattering into pieces, the long work of breaking oneself.
“The Perfect Is the Enemy of the Good”
Always “the perfect is the enemy of the good.” There are higher levels — people who receive ruach hakodesh, to whom Eliyahu comes. But most people don’t think they’ll get there. One who stays at his level — he is entirely right. He should be very happy with his understanding, even if it’s a “foolish” understanding relative to higher levels. Only one must know: there is much more. Of course — but this doesn’t make what one has not valuable.
—
End of Shiur.
📝 Full Transcript
Pardes Rimonim, Gate 1 Chapter 9: Is One Who Denies the Sefirot a Heretic?
Introduction: The Strange Question
Instructor:
Oops, yes. We’re learning halachot… what do you mean it’s not halachot? Pardes Rimonim, Gate 1 Chapter 9. What’s going on here for a good year?
And what does this chapter say? The inquiry whether one who denies the Sefirot should be called a heretic. The answer is, of course, no, don’t worry. His answer is a bit more complicated than that, but… yes, he says so.
The continuation is, it’s very interesting that such a question occurred to him. It’s a really funny question. After what was discussed in the previous chapters that one must believe, that it’s necessary that there are ten Sefirot. He most likely means the last chapter that we learned about, which stood as it were in the manner of inquiry, that is, in the manner that the faith should be correct, one must know the existence of the Sefirot. So he says it’s worthwhile to ask a question whether one who denies is called a heretic. This is a little bit a funny question, because he’s going to say this himself, right? He’s going to say this himself. It makes very… I’ll say why it’s a very funny question. A strange funny question, because… I don’t remember if he says this. He says it… yes, he says it, he says it yes.
The first, I mean, I want to throw out why the question is funny. He’s going to say this in the answer. The question is strangely funny, because imagine a Jew writes a book of secrets. He says, “This is the secret of the Torah.” It says on the cover “Secret,” one only learns it to whomever I don’t know what. He calls this… ah, that’s the question. Doesn’t it say in the introduction that this is a book of Kabbalah, of the secrets of the Torah, not of the revealed Torah? Afterwards, whoever doesn’t believe in my secret is a heretic. I don’t even know about it. What does the topic of heresy have to do with it?
Faith is, the Rambam came up with the idea, let’s say, perhaps the Mishnah, one can learn a whole inquiry about this, they once learned at great length. He came up with an idea that there are things that a Jew must believe, if not he’s called a heretic. Okay. You come with new Torah teachings, afterwards you have an inquiry whether one is a heretic if one doesn’t believe it. What?
Certainly he says that this is Moshe Rabbeinu, it was a secret. It can’t be that… it’s already the Sefer Yetzirah, and the Sefer Yetzirah obligates belief. I mean that one is obligated to believe, if one is obligated to believe every piece of Torah. The holy Zohar. I agree. That’s his perspective.
Student:
No, I agree that… well, so… it’s a bit funny. Do you understand why I say it’s funny? I understand what you’re saying, but I also understand that very many people will agree with him, even people who don’t know any Kabbalah.
Instructor:
I’ll once ask a question: someone who doesn’t believe in the laws of kam leih d’rabbah minei zachar? It’s a funny question to ask. It could be technically, the answer must be yes. I agree. Let’s not say that most Jews will say, most normal Hasidic Jews. What does it mean? You already believe in the Gemara. The Gemara is kam leih d’rabbah minei. Someone comes and he says, I hold that someone who desecrates Shabbat on Yom Kippur does receive both punishments. He’s not a funny person. He tells me, I don’t know about this, I don’t know about this. This is certain, he’s going to talk about this, he’s going to enter into the inquiries of knowledge and error.
But it’s funny, I want to try to understand the question beforehand, why would a person fall to ask such a question? We’re learning Bava Kamma, and everyone who learns Bava Kamma comes out with a clear thing. This is what Moshe Rabbeinu said, so is the law of damages. Very good. And whoever denies is a heretic? Relevance, who denies? Who will be a heretic? Ah, ah, so you must arrive at a new thing.
The Historical Development of Kabbalah as Faith
That Kabbalah has, at some point, Rabbi Yosef Dan elaborates in the teachings in several of his books. One must arrive at very interesting… I mean that it’s appropriate at this point to note that… that at some point, a mekubal certainly didn’t start that way. For example, the Ramban, who is perhaps the first person who wrote Kabbalah explicitly or publicly, didn’t say that whoever doesn’t believe in it is a heretic. He did say various such things, that for example Ibn Ezra is a heretic, because he makes fun of Chazal, he doesn’t understand that they don’t mean what he meant, they mean he is disparaging the Sages, he never calls him a heretic God forbid. There is such as the religious fight with this piece. That could be. But the Ramban never fell to say that whoever doesn’t believe, even whoever doesn’t believe in it. Whoever doesn’t believe in the true way is a heretic? Whoever doesn’t believe in the Midrash is a heretic? It enters a bit into the question. The relevance is, certainly, an honest person believes in everything that’s in the Torah. There are people who were confused about things, it’s not a nice thing, it’s a funny thing.
The Concept of Principles of Faith: Rambam Versus the Kabbalists
At some point something became a thing that Judaism has a certain theology, a certain idea of God, a certain thing. And it’s not just that there are people who delve deeply and they know the true foundations, like every sugya, but if it’s a thing that this is like the principle of faith. It’s not just, there is the concept of principle of faith, which itself is a concept that the Rambam basically invented, as the holy Chatam Sofer and the holy Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra and the holy Rabbi Yaakov Emden all said.
Student:
I only say this because you say that the historical truth, the Rambam invented the concept of principles of faith, and…
Instructor:
Yes, but not in the sense. On this itself, the Kabbalists, as the Chatam Sofer brings in his responsum on the principles of religion, that the Kabbalists disagree with the concept of principles of religion.
Student:
Or the Ramak not. Because you see, he holds of the concept, he only disagrees what it is.
Instructor:
No no, there’s a difference, because the idea of principles of religion is something closed.
Student:
That they agree with the idea, no, I mean that I won’t say, they agree that there is a truth that the Torah is not only what one must do, it’s also what one must know, one hundred percent. Every kabbalist and everyone agrees with this point, only the Lithuanians and the maskilim don’t hold so.
Instructor:
But afterwards there is the second level. That one must know and it’s very important, that I agree, that one is completely in agreement from the Rambam. Afterwards there is the thing of the public Rambam, this is like the political Rambam, who says that therefore there is such as Judaism consists, or one of the important things that Judaism consists of is a certain list of knowledge that a Jew must know, a Jew must believe, and whoever denies that he’s left the community, he’s a greater shaygetz than just. This is a novelty of the Rambam, and the Chatam Sofer says that one doesn’t agree, one must believe in the entire Torah.
He catches however with kol hamosif gorei’a, one says that one must believe in the entire Torah. So there’s a question on faith, that it’s a question on Rashi and Tosafot. I don’t know what one does I do, requires investigation.
Student:
None of them agree to this, the Chatam Sofer apparently. I mean that yes, he brings it from another. That there are certain foundations of… there are more important than other things.
Instructor:
Yes, true. But still, if I remember the Chatam Sofer will say another, if I remember he means the otherwise, I mean, it’s perhaps a responsum of the otherwise about this. What he says the point. They agree that there are more important things. On the contrary. There’s a dispute about what the principles are.
Student:
No, no, no. The Kabbalists, the Ramak himself, and always when he comes back to the question, he says so from the Kabbalists. One says that there is no principle, there is everything, one must believe everything that’s in front. That’s his principle. That’s his principle.
Instructor:
No, no, no, there is such, there is and there is kol hamosif gorei’a, maybe it’s not the correct conceptualization, but what I mean to say is, if a kabbalist, what the Ramak says, and what the Ramak says in another place, and also in this chapter, in the end that will be his answer, I mean that in the end he arrives at this. That you say a Jew must believe in the Torah, what does a Jew mean? A Jew is one who believes in the Torah. Which parts in the Torah must one principally believe? Funny Rambam says that this verse is important to believe, that verse, it’s important to believe in all verses of the Torah.
A kabbalist says, no, the Torah has essentially a holiness. Every word of Torah is names. Therefore, that itself is a principle, that the whole matter is names.
Student:
True, true. But there is only one principle. You can call it like the principle of Torah from Heaven, even that’s not…
The Practical Difference: What Is the Distinction?
Instructor:
But I’ll tell you the practical difference, the enormous practical difference is like this, according to the Rambam there are many verses. People don’t grasp this, but this is what the Rambam means, therefore the Kabbalists are in disagreement, precisely about this. What does the Rambam say, someone doesn’t believe in the verse “and Lotan’s sister was Timna,” and he doesn’t believe in it. He holds that Lotan’s sister was Rivkah, not Timna. He holds differently, he’s not a heretic. That’s the Rambam. He’s a strange creature, he’s perhaps wrong, they’ll perhaps yell at him to even make him a situation, because he’s not a heretic. Because one doesn’t have to believe in that verse, one must believe that it’s holy, and one doesn’t have to believe that it’s true. So, this comes out from the Rambam, that not, I couldn’t say that there are principles. It must be…
Student:
No, it doesn’t say in the Rambam one must believe every verse. It says in the Rambam, go know why. He talks some talk about writing a lie. There’s no problem at all. Make me truthful. This I’ll bring out, if the Shema Yisrael was obligated to believe this, and “and Lotan’s sister was Timna” is not obligated to believe. The Rambam says yes, very strongly that whoever believes…
Instructor:
No, no. I say, I know that this is like a low-fall in the Rambam, because the Rambam says that one must believe the entire Torah is holy, but it can’t be that if so one must believe every verse equally. If someone has some… he has an interpretation, “and Lotan’s sister was Timna” is a gematria. It doesn’t mean Lotan, there was no Lotan, there was no Timna, everything means to say that… the obstacles which is the language of Timna is the…
Student:
Ah, exactly, that doesn’t work. That’s the whole point. It has to be that. It has to be that. It has to be that. Literally that on some level, again, within some extent on some level. One can say which interpretations this is. I mean that one can even doubt according to the principle.
Instructor:
Kabbalists learn literally in the Rambam. Certainly he learns literally. That the Rambam didn’t mean to say that one verse is not meant. He meant to say… as you learn the entire Torah and you believe in the entire Torah, you’ll grasp that there are certain things that the Torah wants you to arrive at more. The sister not Timna wanted to bring you to grasp… everyone agrees with this. The Kabbalists certainly agree. I agree. But still, it comes out according to… I agree, I don’t know, but the Kabbalists hold truly so, the Chatam Sofer lays it down. But the Kabbalists lay it down more that it’s the same opposite. If one goes with this, as the Rebbe… it comes truly from the Rebbe Baal, the books, I mean that he has… that there is no opposite, but Reb Menachem Mendel disagrees exactly on this. He says, where does it say in your Torah that you believe that the Almighty is more important than putting on tefillin on Shabbat? Not putting on tefillin on Shabbat for example, it doesn’t say. Both are Torah from Heaven, both are exactly as important. That’s your Torah, your inquiries, that say there’s a difference, there’s no difference at all.
The Leniency That Comes Out From This
And what I say that from this also comes out a leniency. That a person, if someone has a great requires investigation, you ask him, what is the interpretation of the four categories of damages? He says, I don’t understand the Tosafot. Why does it say here four and four? He doesn’t understand. How is he a heretic? No, he’s a great scholar, he has a question, he can remain at requires investigation. I say, he doesn’t understand why there is only one God and not two requires investigation? He doesn’t understand, every thing one must understand.
The Ramak’s Answer: Two Types of People Who Have Errors in Kabbalah
Continuation: The Question of Hierarchy in Torah
Not putting on tefillin on Shabbat for example, it doesn’t say, both are Torah from Heaven, both are exactly as important, these are your teachings, your inquiries to say that there’s a difference, there’s no difference at all.
And what I say that from this also comes out a leniency, that a person, if someone has a great requires investigation, you ask him what is the interpretation of the four categories of damages, I don’t understand the Torah, the matter, why does he say exactly four? He doesn’t understand, what is he a heretic? No, he’s a great scholar and he has a question, he can remain at a requires investigation. So too he doesn’t understand why there is only one God and not two, requires investigation, he doesn’t understand, every thing one must understand. According to the Rambam this is a great difference, here you can’t remain, or here is at least a greater problem, you know, one can’t, here remains a greater problem with a requires investigation, there not.
If you say that a kabbalist who says yes, I have a different faith, I believe that every piece of Torah is, again, it has to do with this, certainly, Kabbalah is an entire system of hints, but if you understand anything about the idea of divinity, then you can’t believe that everything is equal, there’s no such thing, but this I say, it comes out that one can argue about a thing, he has no idea what the word God means at all, and he doesn’t have just the word, he’s truly an am ha’aretz, so such a person yes, certainly he has a doubt.
Okay, I say theoretically, one can complicate this if one wants strongly, but I mean just an example of this, it’s truly a funny example, but theoretically, theoretically it comes out that one can have doubts about everything, you know, understandably, one must understand everything, one hundred percent, that’s the mitzvah to understand the entire Torah, you say there are more important parts, I agree there are more important parts, that’s not even the topic.
What I only say is, that if everything is such as there is no hierarchy with the internality of Torah, then there are no principles. The Ramak doesn’t look like he goes with this, at least not in his question, because he does have a hierarchy. And not only is there a hierarchy, there is a hierarchy of such as things that one must acknowledge and one must acknowledge, one must believe.
Someone will come into shul and he says, I disagree with the laws of the four guardians, I hold only three. He’s not a heretic, perhaps he is a heretic, but not, one doesn’t throw him, not from this one doesn’t throw him out not everyone. Someone says he doesn’t believe in Kabbalah, they are in doubt. This is basically the question. There is an inquiry, an inquiry of the Ramak, whether he is a heretic. And this is a big novelty. He certainly wouldn’t have understood the question. He wouldn’t have even fallen the question why one must believe in resurrection of the dead. I mean yes, one must believe in Torah principles, one didn’t have the list already of principles.
That is, let’s say so, it could be that it becomes such as a question whether this is like the basic thing that one must say for everyone. There is another meaning of principles. This is the basic story. What are Jews? Jews believe in ten Sefirot. Yes, what something? And to what the Ramak is away the understanding is that knowledge you have as afterwards, he enters into inquiries. But this is how Kabbalah changes from such as a study for deep for secrets of the Torah, it remains that, but there is also such as the externality of it, the basic story of it, which becomes such as certainly a Jew believes in the ten Sefirot. Do you already believe in the ten Sefirot? What are you a gentile? So think the Kabbalists, no?
I’m still holding by the question, I’m not holding by the answer. Most people don’t know that they need to know there was a Creator (Bore). What does “there was a Creator” mean? That’s going to be before there was a Creator. And if you don’t understand, you don’t actually believe in God, so consequently you don’t have Torah. He’s going to get to that, not yet, he’s going to get to that. But that’s going to be part of his answer. But still, just as there are things, in every system of belief there are things that young people don’t know, but fathers already need to know. Or we even say it, maybe we say it to the young people, they don’t understand it, but we teach it to say anyway, when he gets older he’ll understand, if he goes into chinuch (education).
I’m quite certain that the mekubalim (kabbalists) teach their young people that there are ten sefirot (divine emanations). Not just mekubalim, the Chassidim, we know this, truly. We teach it. What does it mean? And do you know what it means that there is indeed one Creator? It means what we tell him. Later we’ll understand, “leshem yichud Kudsha Brich Hu u’Shechintei” (for the sake of unifying the Holy One and His Presence). What does it mean? We teach it to the children, truly. But if someone comes to shul, “I don’t believe in yichud Kudsha Brich Hu u’Shechintei.” He’s certain that a Chassidic rebbe won’t let him into his shul.
After that, the Ramak (Rabbi Moshe Cordovero) was actually more honest than him, he tries to explain, is it really so? Now look at the opposite, the Ramak comes here to make, shouldn’t make with him, because he begins with a question, it’s obvious that a Jew is one who believes in ten sefirot, what is there someone who doesn’t believe? What is he, a heretic (kofer)? Is he just a fool? That’s an inquiry (chakirah). Yes, of course he believes in the Almighty. What? That’s the thing, okay.
In short, let’s learn his answer. Perhaps the answer is better than the question. I’m just explaining that the question has to do with the fact that Kabbalah, and by the people who are living in a Kabbalah community, it’s certainly so, that it became as if this is the basic thing. I mean it’s all somewhat funny, that is, one needs to have a certain lack of awareness like from history to know… It was certainly, most generations of Jews didn’t know that there are ten sefirot, something that one goes without another Torah, or one doesn’t need any questions, they laid… It’s very funny to say, some kind of hava amina (initial assumption). Okay, true, true, but that’s exactly it.
So that’s a certain theory, I have another theory, I don’t understand. He’s speaking certainly, okay, but he’s certainly speaking about certain people. The Ramak actually lived in the real world, and there were people there like I know, Rav Modin, or I don’t know if he was roughly a bit after him, but in his times there were other people, Delmedigo, whatever, whatever you want. That’s what he’s going to get to. Someone who has a sefirah that has thirteen sefirot, that’s the previous chapter. Ah, you have errors (te’utim), but I already know that. I don’t want to say that someone has no sefirah at all. He says that no, God is everything, can one not speak about Him? I don’t want to. Good, let’s see. And let’s say his answer.
Type 1: The One Who Doesn’t Know – “Lo Yada Bahem Klal”
He says thus, says the Ramak thus the answer:
> There are two types of people who have errors in this. One, there is someone who knows, “lo yada bahem klal” (didn’t know about them at all), he simply hasn’t heard, not because, it’s an interesting way how he lays it down, not because “sham yitgalu lo ta’alumot chachmei hakabbalah chas v’shalom” (God forbid the secrets of the kabbalistic sages should be revealed to him), if one tells him he’ll deny it, God forbid, as if the person that there are such people who are denying, one told them so he’s denying, rather “lirgel bahem” (to be accustomed to them), one didn’t learn, “lo nitgalu lo sha’arei or” (the gates of light weren’t revealed to him), poor thing, he lives with the windows closed.
The person, says the Ramak, I don’t know any heretic, I don’t want any denier, you don’t know what this is, one didn’t teach him. That’s, okay, he doesn’t mean tinokot shenishbu (children captured among gentiles), you get it, he means simply learning Jews, he doesn’t know.
The Proof from the Dispute of Rambam and Raavad
And he brings an interesting proof, I mean also, it’s an interesting understanding, he brings a proof that even the topic of siluk hagashmiyut (removal of corporeality) is from the most simple, yes, from the Ein Sof he means from the Almighty. Says the Rambam that whoever believes that the Almighty is a body, “Hashem echad hapashut” (God is one and simple), is a body, is a heretic (min), and the Raavad (Rabbi Avraham ben David) disagrees, and the Raavad says “v’lamah kara lazeh min, v’kamah gedolim v’tovim mimenu halchu bazo hamachshava, lefi mah she’ra’u bamikra’ot v’yoter mimah she’ra’u b’divrei ha’agadot hameshabshot et hade’ot” (and why did he call this one a heretic, and how many great and good people greater than him went with this thought, according to what they saw in the verses and more than what they saw in the words of the aggadot that confuse the minds).
It comes out that the Raavad disagrees with the Rambam who says that whoever says that the Almighty is a body is a heretic. Now the Ramak comes with such an interesting coming with the Raavad. The Ramak couldn’t believe that the Raavad actually believed that someone who holds that the Almighty is specifically a body is a heretic, he’s not a heretic, he’s a complete Jew. Can’t be. He says, “ein ra’ui lachshov” (it’s not proper to think). There’s a great dispute about the plain meaning of the Raavad. It’s certainly truly yes proper to think. Let’s see.
Says the Ramak, one can’t believe that the Raavad holds that he’s not a heretic, certainly someone who makes the Almighty corporeal is a heretic. What does that mean? So, there are three different questions how the Ramak is collapsing.
There’s one question, did the Raavad hold that the Almighty is a body? No, certainly the Raavad held that the Almighty is not a body. True, he says “agadot hameshabshot et hade’at” (aggadot that confuse the mind). It could be that the Raavad was a mekubal, he had a certain answer, but that the Almighty actually simply has that He’s a body, he certainly didn’t hold. Yes, the Raavad also held that… no, that’s what they mean the inference. “Gedolim v’tovim halchu bazo hamachshava” (great and good people went with this thought), but the Raavad agrees that they were wrong in great and good. Right? Because he says, “lefi mah she’ra’u bamikra’ot” (according to what they saw in the verses), that they went with the plain meaning of Scripture. The plain meaning of Scripture says that the Almighty has a body.
And not only that, there are more aggadot, and the Raavad calls them in sharp language “agadot hameshabshot et hade’at” (aggadot that confuse the mind). As was the Raavad’s way, he was a sharp Jew. I’m a great friend of his. I very much love Jews who say what they think. I very much hate the nice Jews who don’t say what they think.
And the Raavad says that people learn poor things aggadot, and it’s meshabesh et hade’at (confuses the mind). Understandably, someone who knows the true plain meaning of the aggadah, he doesn’t say that aggadot are meshabesh et hade’at, rather they’re meshabesh et hade’at for people. In a certain sense, he even dares to write even more than the Rambam dares to write about aggadot in his book Mishneh Torah. It comes out that the Raavad certainly holds that the Almighty is not a body. I mean that’s clear. But the Raavad disagrees with the Rambam who says that he’s a heretic.
The Ramak’s Innovation: The Dispute is About Shogeg (Unintentional Error)
Now, the Ramak holds that there’s another level that the Raavad agrees with the Rambam. The Ramak thinks that the Raavad can’t hold that someone who specifically… The Ramak has the interesting idea that there’s like a specific heretic. I don’t need to figure out if he is, but that’s a kofer lehach’is (deliberate heretic). Says the Ramak, someone who is b’meizid (intentional), that’s what the Ramak switches the dispute of Rambam and Raavad from the question of whether there’s a law, like whether one is obligated to know that the Almighty is a body, whether it’s a holy thing, whether whoever specifically denies is a heretic. And the Ramak makes the whole Raavad for us into the topic of shogeg (unintentional error). Understand? He has an excuse, he’s innocently a heretic, he’s innocently a min. Yes, he says so.
Type 2: The One Who is B’meizid – A Specific Heretic
But there are certainly people who have a different belief than us. Let’s… what do you mean? There are certainly Christian people who they’ve already heard these things and they still believe. Already a practical difference for specifically. He hears what we want to say, and he’s kept all his own belief. Right. People say they kept their own. Yes. Let’s carry out. Look, let’s read what he should.
The Ramak on Gashmut Hashem (God’s Corporeality) — Continuation: The Dispute of Rambam and Raavad and the Question of “Min”
The Raavad’s Position According to the Ramak
That is, he has an excuse, he’s innocently a heretic. He’s innocently a min. Yes, he says so.
But there are certainly people who have a different belief than us. What do you mean? There are certainly Christian people who they’ve already heard these things and they still believe, not out of any intentional sin specifically. He hears what we have to say, and he’s kept all his piece of belief. People say…
Let’s read what he says. Says the Ramak thus, according to what it appears from the Rambam, by the way, I don’t agree that the Rambam holds this way either. According to what it appears from the Rambam, the Rambam holds that someone who says “if he will be a corporeal being he is a min,” even if his error is “mita’am shelo hurgal b’limud chochmat Elokut, v’lamad peshutei hamikra’ot v’hamidrashim, v’lo yarad le’omkam lehavin inyanam k’tzuratam” (because he wasn’t accustomed to studying divine wisdom, and learned the simple verses and midrashim, and didn’t descend to their depths to understand their matters in their form). It appears, the Raavad holds so. That doesn’t say in the Rambam, by the way. People think it says in Moreh Nevuchim (Guide for the Perplexed), it’s not true. It says, but it doesn’t mean what it says, in my opinion. But the Ramak understood that the Rambam holds that even someone who goes with the aggadot and verses is a min.
But on this says the Raavad, no! “That a Jew in all his matters”, the Raavad lays down such a Jew, yes? There is a Jew “b’chol inyanav oved et HaKel, v’holech b’darchei haTorah b’temimut, uva’avur kotzer yedi’ato ya’amin b’gashmiyut” (in all his matters serves God, and walks in the ways of the Torah innocently, and because of his limited knowledge believes in corporeality). He’s not a min, he’s mistaken, but not a min, “v’ein kavanato lehara” (and his intention is not to do evil). But “hamakir et Boro, shegillu lo sha’arei hahakdama b’vitul hagashmiyut, v’eino modeh ba’emet um’avot panav, v’omer sheHaKel geshem, zehu vadai min l’da’at haRaavad” (the one who recognizes his Creator, to whom the gates of introduction in the nullification of corporeality were revealed, and he doesn’t admit the truth and distorts his face, and says that God is corporeal, this one is certainly a min according to the Raavad’s opinion).
A Question on the Ramak’s Learning
I don’t have another way how this means. Who was ever such a person who distorted his face and said that the Almighty is a body? It doesn’t make sense to me, this. Who? He says that he’s a Christian. He also holds some fancy theory, what do I know.
That says the Ramak, we certainly hold that he’s a min, but he’s a min because he’s a gentile. Not what he’s a gentile? Because he believes that the Almighty was corporeal. Because he goes to a cloister, not to shul. One can’t go to a cloister. The Ramban says this, that what you mean, that the worst thing that the Christians say is that the Almighty became a person, but… he means to say there that it’s absurd, he means to ask it, he doesn’t mean that there is such a min. He has a way how he explains himself, he doesn’t hold him a min. You tell me that this is indeed a min.
I don’t know, I feel like the Ramak has too much in his head the idea of davka (specifically) in heresy. The Rambam certainly, not the Rambam and not the Raavad look at it this way. The Rambam and the Raavad look much more at innocent people. People believe more or less what they think is true. The Ramak has some imagination, I don’t mean that he means your case. Someone who was explained to that the Almighty doesn’t have a body, and he says “I don’t admit it, the Almighty does have a body.” Why should there be such a person? He has another way, he has another sort of madness, he has some funny theory, he says, “by the way, the Almighty can become…” whatever. It’s not everything. They say, “no, I read another book.” So, he read a book, did he understand that… in short…
Ah, so, he gets another thing. Gilui hakdamot (revelation of introductions) doesn’t mean that he understood. It means, one told him that he should trust the honest Jews, and he doesn’t trust them. One explained it to him. If one showed him, one brought him a Chumash, one didn’t explain to him, one said everything. He still holds with his beliefs. I don’t know. Not very impressed. Not very impressed.
Three Separate Questions in the Sugya (Topic)
There’s one thing, there will be three disputes, three sorts of things. There’s one question whether the Almighty is a body. Let’s say by the three, one question whether the Almighty is a body. Question number 1.
Question 1: Does the Almighty Have a Body
The question can be made very complicated. One can say that the Raavad also holds that the Almighty is a body, because the Raavad believed roughly like the mekubalim, that there are traditions in the name of the Raavad in Sefer Ma’arechot Elokut, that he said that it says by the Almighty He puts on tefillin at night, he means to say the kavod nivra (created glory), the Metatron sefirot basically, or something like sefirot. So the Almighty does have a body, but it’s not Him Himself, some such Torah. Another one can say that the Raavad holds that the Almighty does have a body in a certain sense, in a certain sense. And get them into playing with words, but that’s one thing.
Question 2: Is One Who Says the Almighty Has a Body a Min
The second question is, let’s say, the Ramak certainly assumes that the Raavad admits, certainly an answer regarding you, that it’s simple that the Almighty is not a body. Okay. The second question is, whether someone who says, let’s already completely agree that the Almighty doesn’t have a body, can still be a question, whether the one who holds that not is a min. Whether he’s wrong is not the question, whether he’s a min. A min is some sort of… min means that if this is a certain exclusion from the category, something that’s not so important to know, you don’t know enough, even a mistake, it doesn’t matter, it doesn’t count, it doesn’t help. Let’s say, that’s one of the implications, it’s not necessarily so, it could be.
But anyway, being a min is not the same thing as being wrong. There are people who are wrong who are not heretics. In other words, if someone thinks that there’s a dispute how many heavens there are, I don’t know, one says there are seven, one says there are nine, neither one is a min, by either of them. Why? It’s very important. There are seven angels, each heaven has certain angels, the whole world changes, the religion will be different according to how many heavens there are, okay? But one doesn’t need to be a min. A min is only on the most important thing, and this is not the most important thing.
That’s apparently the claim of many Jews, not just the Raavad. I don’t know if the Raavad claimed this, he doesn’t say clearly what he claims. But certainly many Jews who claim, the Rambam is very good that the Almighty is not a body, no problem. He becomes that it’s important. It’s not important. It’s as important as the question, like you say, whether there are ten sefirot or thirteen sefirot. It’s perhaps important, very important, if you would understand it’s very important, but it’s not so important that one should become a min.
The Ramak Doesn’t Speak of That Claim
That can be another claim. The Ramak doesn’t speak at all of that claim, he doesn’t speak about this. For him it’s simple that it must be important. He’s completely on the Rambam’s side that it’s very important. It could be that the Raavad says, certainly it’s important, but not so important that one is a min.
What is the Raavad’s proof from the “gedolim v’tovim mimenu” (great and good people greater than him)? The Raavad thinks, yes, who is a good Jew? The Rambam would have said, gedolim v’tovim? Heretics! That’s exactly the inquiry!
Questioner: Isn’t he speaking about certain great people that he reckoned with them?
Lecturer: One speaks about them. The Rambam, do you know the story that they threw them out of Gehinnom (Hell)? The Kotzker Rebbe said that the Rambam ruled that whoever says that the Almighty is a min, one stretched out a whole bunch of nice Jews from Gan Eden (Paradise) into Gehinnom. Comes the Raavad and says no, they sent them back. He gets out the frail, the parable, the more pious. I don’t know exactly if the scholars are counted their Torahs exactly which beliefs Ashkenazim amen or not, but… well, the Rambam says clearly… yes, so very good, so there… so wait, so right very good, so let’s hold clear the head.
The True Distinction Between Rambam and Raavad
This is chunk 3 of 7 of a Jewish religious lecture (shiur). I need to translate from Hebrew/Yiddish to English, maintaining the conversational tone, structure, and transliterating Hebrew/Aramaic terms appropriately.
Let me work through this systematically, section by section:
The text discusses the Rambam’s and Raavad’s positions on corporeality of God, the concept of kefirah (heresy), the difference between shogeg (unintentional error) and mezid (intentional), and then moves into a discussion about the Ramak’s position on the Sefirot and what constitutes essential beliefs in Judaism.
Key terms to transliterate:
– Rambam, Raavad, Ramak (names)
– teshuva, hashkafa, kefirah, apikorus, min
– shogeg, mezid, oneis
– Sefirot, Eser Sefirot
– Torah min Hashamayim
– ikkarim, ikrei emunah
– ger/gerim
– Shema Yisrael
– Targum Onkelos
– Moreh Nevuchim
– cheder
– mekubalim
– etc.
I’ll maintain the conversational, lecture-style tone with rhetorical questions and asides.
Let me proceed with the translation:
We’re holding by the second time, by the second topic, from one of those who says that certainly the Ribbono Shel Olam (Master of the Universe) doesn’t have a body, but it’s not so important. One can be a fine Jew and believe that the Ribbono Shel Olam has a body. The Rambam would just… here the Rambam… I mean that the Rambam… the Rambam doesn’t agree. The Rambam doesn’t hold that one can end up being a good Jew and believe in a corporeal God, rather that if one has an excuse, it can be an oneis (unavoidable circumstance), a shogeg (unintentional error). One cannot be a good Jew if one knows that the Ribbono Shel Olam has a body.
Regarding this, the Rambam argues that the Raavad admits that if he does it deliberately, not as part of being a good Jew, if he says so, he’s certainly an apikorus (heretic). In other words, now, I can say, I would have thought that the Rambam knew that there are great Jews, gedolim and good people, who think they’re going to write about his [view]. It’s a story, I mean. What would the Rambam have said, that they’re going to Gehinnom (purgatory)? No, he doesn’t mean to say that.
The Rambam’s True Intention
What the Rambam says is, I truly want people to change what they think, because I do hold that it’s important. When he writes that it’s a min (heretic), he doesn’t mean to rule on the Jews who throughout all generations no one goes, the Ribbono Shel Olam will take care of that, that’s not the Rambam’s problem. He only means to say that it’s very important and one cannot remain indifferent.
And the Rambam himself says, and perhaps what the world brings means it’s a proof for the shitah (position) of Rav Chaim, he’s unfortunately an apikorus, as the Ramak learns that the Rambam doesn’t agree with the claim of shogeg of the Raavad. It’s not true, the Rambam certainly agrees. How can you have an argument that the Torah itself writes that the Ribbono Shel Olam has a body? Can you have an argument that someone learned simple peshat (straightforward interpretation)?
Rabbim (many) say, today there’s already Targum Onkelos, today there’s already Moreh Nevuchim (Guide for the Perplexed), one has already learned in cheder that the Ribbono Shel Olam doesn’t have a body. So if you’re still making a mistake, why? Where did you get the mistake from? In other words, apart from creating this by saying, because Moshe Rabbeinu said that everyone who serves avodah zarah (idolatry) is a rasha (wicked person)… because you won’t accept that you’re going to be a rasha. If you simply grew up that way, in that sense I mean it’s true what the Kotzker Rebbe said.
That is, after the Rambam incorporated into the curriculum of every Jew that the Ribbono Shel Olam doesn’t have a body, now whoever believes differently is indeed somewhat suspicious regarding his Judaism, he wasn’t in cheder, he wasn’t taught Targum Onkelos that everything is “yekara d’Hashem” (the glory of God), what’s going on with you? Ah, you’re an am ha’aretz (ignoramus), you’re going somewhere, you’re a suspicious person, I don’t believe in nine times nine, basically, it’s really that sort of thing.
But before that, the Raavad spoke about people who, let’s say before that, who learned midrashim that look different. The Raavad agrees that one should change the Raavad. The whole question of the Rambam and Raavad is, how to look at the past, there isn’t even a disagreement. I don’t mean whether the Rambam disagrees that if there’s someone who is a fine Jew, on the contrary, I’m saying the opposite of the Rambam. The Rambam’s position is that one cannot have any mistake at once, but he says it’s sad.
The Essential Difference: Human Perfection
The Rambam holds that there is indeed a difference, that in the Rambam’s theory of the ideal perfection of a person or perfection of a Jew, it’s very strongly lacking to know the Ribbono Shel Olam. For the Raavad it’s not so important. He’s still gedolim and good people. The Rambam says yes, he’s gedolim and good people, he has a good answer. I’m not saying the Rambam is very strongly disparaging of him, objectively, because he’s barely a person, he doesn’t know whether the Ribbono Shel Olam doesn’t have a body. That I mean is the difference.
Anyway, it’s certainly, most people know nothing at all. One must divide the question a bit. Again, what does this question mean? If something is kefirah (heresy). It can mean that the thing is very important for being a person, for being a Jew. That can be one thing. It can mean that it’s truth. Now, the true intellectual theories, and most people aren’t blessed to express what the truth is. It’s not relevant, it’s only relevant to the chachamim (sages), it’s certainly not relevant to the question of whether he’s a kofer (heretic), he’s a kofer, he didn’t learn such and such…
Kefirah, Shogeg and Mezid — The Question of Belief in Sefirot
The Difference Between Error and Heresy
Someone thinks that π is three, or four — is he a kofer? He’s a fool, he didn’t learn, what should one do? I can’t have any complaints. And this conversation about what’s called kefirah is only relevant to chinuch (education) — mass education, education of the world. What do they teach that it’s kefirah?
One can say on this there’s truly a dispute between Rambam and Raavad. It could be that the Raavad wouldn’t have written an ikkar (principle) about corporeal God, because it’s not so important to him. And the Rambam did include it, and the Ramak agrees that it’s included, and the Ramak also wants to include the Eser Sefirot (Ten Sefirot) in that list more or less.
And here one can speak about the question of the difference. I just want to arrive at the difference, that there’s someone who wasn’t taught — he wasn’t taught, I can’t have any complaint. He was taught — why don’t you believe, you were taught? He says: eh, but I’m a chacham. No problem, there’s a chacham, you know that you hold differently.
The question of a leader/educator doesn’t speak about that chacham at all. The question only speaks about — why don’t you believe, you learned in cheder? Do I agree? Ah, no, why should we believe? Because it’s such an important thing, you must believe because you were taught.
Innovations in Belief — The Danger
If you make your own shitah in emunah (belief)… if someone makes his own shitah in the foundations of emunah, okay, even though you were taught differently — it happens every day. Okay, not different from most. He turns a bit. He can already not, but he makes a different peshat, a new peshat, a new peshat, a new sugya (Talmudic topic). That one makes chiddushim (novel interpretations), can’t one make chiddushim in emunah?
That’s the thing — he can make true chiddushim. Yes. Who is this? It’s the danger of emunah. This has always been the question, Chassidus… one may not learn from this. One may not touch the thing, it’s very dangerous.
The Ramak’s Shitah — He Goes Like the Raavad
Okay, so the Ramak says this, what does he say, it’s still a great chutzpah (audacity) from the mekubalim (kabbalists), they come with something that no one saw before, and say that whoever must learn this, and whoever doesn’t believe after learning is a kofer — it’s still a davar muzar (strange thing).
So anyway, when he says, says the Ramak, wants to believe in Sefirot, I’ll say the same distinction, that’s what the Ramak wants to arrive at. He looks like he rules like the Raavad. That’s basically his… He says, all the more so according to the Rambam he’s a min. Do you hear? The Ramak goes like this: according to the Rambam certainly whoever doesn’t believe in Sefirot is a min. Because the Rambam doesn’t hold of the heter (permission) of error.
I hold that the Rambam yes, but the Ramak looks at it that the Rambam doesn’t hold. But even the Raavad who is lenient, I also hold that someone who is a mezid (intentional) is a min.
This is the question: does minus (heresy) have anything to do with the topic of mezid and shogeg at all? How does the Ramak look at it? That’s what I wanted to clarify a bit more.
The Simple Jew Who Doesn’t Know About Sefirot
So one can say regarding the Sefirot. Certainly, someone doesn’t know, and he believes in Echad HaPashut (the Simple One), like all Jews. The Ramak has a very interesting assumption that all Jews believe in Echad HaPashut. The reality is that most Jews believe in Atzmuto U’Mahuto (His Essence and Being), what a person knows of Echad HaPashut — “yes, I believe in one God.”
Anyway, but this the Ramak says: if someone is a simple Jew and he only believes in Echad HaPashut, certainly he’s not a kofer, he’s not a kofer in principle, nothing.
The Proof from Chinuch — “Lo Matzinu”
And he brings a good proof. He says: if it weren’t so, one would have had to teach when one educates a boy for mitzvot, one should teach him the mitzvah. What we don’t find so. Ah, we already find, but… it’s not really. One doesn’t teach, when one learns after the first Sefirah, it basically doesn’t come out. One must also grasp it through extra learning, one learns extra books, no? It’s strange.
No, but in my cheder, I teach all my children, I try to fix the Ramak’s problem. Come in, I remember one rebbe perhaps once said, he asked him what it means, he said that there’s something called Eser Sefirot, I didn’t know exactly. He didn’t know. Something like one doesn’t speak about this, no one knows, he didn’t come across it, no one knows. He even asked a Jew who comes across many situations. There are ten aspects.
The Ramak says lo matzinu, no it’s true. That is, the Ramak is noticing this exact dialectic that they want to play with. On one hand, they want to say that what they say is the fundamental principles of emunah, not just some secret that isn’t urgent and nothing. Judaism stands on this. The fact is, today no one teaches it. Something is strange.
The Ramak’s entire chapter here is built on this strangeness. And I have a way that when one learns to grasp what’s strange, not just what the answer is.
What Do We Teach Children? — The Rambam’s Innovation
But this he says, comes exactly lo matzinu, he doesn’t see that on the contrary, one says that one should keep it, and we don’t transmit these things except to the modest ones, which is not so regarding the fundamental belief in God’s existence and His unity and Torah from Heaven and the prophecy of Moshe, and most of the principles of religion — interesting “most” — one immediately teaches them, the moment a boy can speak, call with him — an interesting expression — one teaches him an educator and he reveals the simple meaning of things.
He brings an interesting proof, it’s very interesting, I mean this is an innovation of the Ramak, perhaps he took it from somewhere. He brings an interesting proof, that this itself is an innovation of the Rambam, yes? In other words, in the Mishnah it says, he’ll bring. In the Gemara it says that one teaches a boy Torah, it doesn’t say that one teaches him fundamental principles of emunah.
Certainly, a boy learns somehow, as you say, when does one teach the boy the principles? Today I was in some school, they said yes, that their school is careful, one teaches all the girls the meaning of the thirteen principles. I mean, I myself didn’t learn it, I don’t remember. Perhaps yes, that a rebbe made a situation of it? I don’t remember. I remember, I came to yeshiva, I asked bochurim (students) if they know the thirteen principles, and most didn’t know. I knew because I looked and I used to say the whole siddur, so it was at the end.
In first grade do they make a situation? Ah, because the girls have such a subject called Judaism, and there one learns this thing. Yes? Somewhere there, not officially. One doesn’t learn Rashi, Gemara, one learns something like…
The Rambam certainly thought that one must teach the principles to a boy, that’s why he made it apparently. Here on the contrary, Rav Natan argues that the Rambam didn’t mean anything but this. He asks many questions how it can be, he says, no, the Rambam means, he makes a program for chinuch, he must make something that he teaches children.
The Proof from Converts
The Rambam also says regarding converts one sees very clearly, the Rambam in Hilchot Geirus (Laws of Conversion), and there in Yevamot I think, yes, it says what one teaches a ger (convert): A convert who comes to convert, we inform him of some light commandments and some stringent ones, something like that. But it doesn’t say anything about that there’s one God and not two, nothing. Obviously, one teaches, not even avodah zarah.
And the Rambam, when he brings the halachah in chapter 14, says: We inform him of the fundamental principles of religion. He adds himself, it doesn’t say in the source. So you see very clearly that the Rambam innovated this.
And the Ramak however is a… okay, in this way certainly the Ramak, as you say, most mekubalim, the Ramak is a student of the Rambam, and he goes to think this way.
The Baraita in Masechet Sukkah — “Yodea Ledaber”
And he brings a very interesting proof, I’m sure the early authorities already brought this proof for him, a very beautiful proof from the baraita in Sukkah, a very famous baraita in Masechet Sukkah, where it says… where? Many times you know, like by Ezra’s… ah, yes, basically emet atah hu, the eight truths. He’ll already have to make a new shitah, there are eight principles, eight times it says emet, something six seven eight times.
Ah, Shema Yisrael, it’s certain that this is the principle. This is like the most important verses. For sure, for sure. No one disagrees that this has basic things. It’s not a matter of its exact order. What’s certain is Shema Yisrael, why did the sage say that one must be killed for the unity of Heaven? It’s important.
Torah is a Language
He brings a very beautiful interpretation, that in the baraita that says there a list of every mitzvah when one obligates to educate, it says like this, regarding the great one, it’s a baraita, it says like this: The child when he learns yodea ledaber (knows how to speak) his father teaches him Torah. It’s very beautiful, when must one begin to learn Torah? From when one can speak. That is, that’s what’s called grammar school, yes? A boy, a child, when does one begin to learn? What is chinuch? What does more chinuch mean?
More chinuch is language. One teaches a person a language. How does one teach a language? Yes, this means daddy, this means mommy, this you can still by you, this still stands yodea ledaber. Usually in every culture one teaches the small children already, the basic book of the culture, like in Greece they used to learn Homer with all children, that was the book. They used it to learn everything, but that’s the meaning, one learns the meaning to speak the language.
How does one say in Yiddish something strange, a toleh eretz al blimah (suspends the earth on nothing)? I don’t know, it’s a verse somewhere. We speak the language, the concepts, the words, from the Chumash, from the Torah. So when is the measure? It doesn’t say “one who understands” one teaches him Torah, when he can speak. Torah is something we speak.
People think midrashim don’t make sense. The midrash is a way of speaking, that’s the language, there’s only one language. How many words do we have in lashon hakodesh (the holy tongue)? I don’t know. But how many concepts are there? As many verses as there are in the Tanach. Okay, otherwise there’s Mishnah with other things, all expressions. That’s the basic thing, the measure, people think.
Breslovers will be completely right that one must say the Torah, not just learn. Learning is another thing, there’s in this a higher level. When one is older one already learns, it’s Talmud. But one must speak, it must be language. One must be able to say a curse, “May God strike you with madness and blindness and confusion of heart.” Why are these verses? Where is it taken from? I mean, this is the curse that befalls a Jew. “And you shall grope at noon as the blind gropes in darkness and you shall not prosper in your ways and you shall be only oppressed and robbed all the days.” Whatever, it goes on and on, like curses. It must befall, we must have it a bit, we already think it too much when we learn.
Anyway, that’s my interpretation of “yodea ledaber.” What? But Yiddish basically, what’s the Yiddish translation of Chumash basically? “Vayomer,” and he said.
What Do We Teach? — “Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe” and “Shema Yisrael”
So anyway, in the Gemara, the Ramak doesn’t really learn this way, because he learns yes that it has a meaning. It says there “his father teaches him Torah”. The Gemara asks, what does Torah mean? He says, can I learn some Torah with a three-year-old boy because he can speak? The Gemara says, yes, what Torah does he teach him? “Torah tzivah lanu Moshe” (Moshe commanded us the Torah) and “Shema Yisrael”.
He says, one teaches something to say, one says Torah. Yes, one indeed teaches the children the verses, a few more verses that are today in the siddur. Says the Rebbe from Kasher, I thought the…
The Ramak’s Interpretation of “Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe” and “Shema Yisrael” — What We Teach a Three-Year-Old Child
The Ramak’s Shitah in Understanding the Gemara
Translation
Anyway, the Ramak doesn’t learn exactly that way, because he does learn that it has a meaning. It says there “avid veyada ledaber aviv melamdo Torah” (when he can speak, his father teaches him Torah). The Gemara asks, what does Torah mean? What can he teach him Torah when he’s a three-year-old boy just because he can speak? The Gemara says, yes, he teaches him “Torah tziva lanu Moshe” (the Torah that Moses commanded us) and “Shema Yisrael” (Hear O Israel). He says, teach him to say it. He says Torah. Yes, we actually do teach children these verses, and a few other verses that are in the siddur today.
The Ramak says, why did they choose these things? Because these are the two main principles of knowledge, the majority of aspects of knowledge.
“Shema Yisrael” — God’s Existence, Providence, and Unity
“Shema Yisrael” means the existence of God, and He supervises, that is “Elokeinu” (our God), even individual providence, “Elokeinu”, our God. And he elaborates a bit, because “metziyuto mechuyav mitzad kol ha’olam kulo” (His existence is necessary from the entire world), that is “haya hoveh veyihiyeh” (was, is, and will be), “mehave kol hahavayot” (brings all existence into being), that’s what the four-letter Name means in its writing. And He is also “ribono shel kol olamim ve’elyonim vetachtonim” (Master of all worlds, upper and lower), that is Lordship, that’s how we say it. And from this aspect there is also general providence, but besides that there is “Elokeinu”, our God.
Note: The Ramak’s Error in Understanding “Mechuyav HaMetziyut”
Did you know? “Shema Yisrael Hashem existence…” Yes, whatever. The Ramak didn’t know what mechuyav hametziyut means. He thought that mechuyav hametziyut means that it’s necessary to say that there is a God, that there is a world. It doesn’t mean that. He makes this mistake many times, for some reason. Somehow we’ve said it here. Yes, mechuyav hametziyut means that God is necessary existence, He couldn’t not exist. But the Ramak complicated the matter too much. He didn’t know this. Yes, he didn’t learn any logic properly. No, it’s very sad, because it means he’s missing basic knowledge and the keys. He talks about the whole thing. He still talks about the sefirot with things. No, he admits that “echad” (one) is simply the first knowledge. It’s very sad. Anyway, I can answer it, but it’s very sad.
“Elokeinu” — Individual Providence
Anyway, He is also the God, the leader of everything, and also our God. That means our God, supervising us individually. You see that supervising means more like… He doesn’t mean that He’s in control, he means that He’s a caretaker of “Hashem echad” (God is one), He’s there, He’s one.
“Hashem Echad” — The Gemara’s Intent and the Rambam’s Interpretation
It already says in the Gemara that… A person must, he says, he must have in mind that God is King above, below, and in the four directions. And here he brings the Rambam’s little Torah in chapter 1, that from this we know that it means He is not a body, because a body cannot be in different places at once. The Rambam brought this proof in Sodei Torah chapter 1. One must write here that God is not a body.
Discussion: The Simple Meaning of “Echad” Versus the Philosophical Meaning
Although, of course, that’s in your sense. The Gemara didn’t mean that. The Gemara didn’t know at all about the fact that God is not a body, certainly not that this is what unity means. This is a novelty from the Chovot HaLevavot, from the Rishonim who invented a new meaning of “Hashem echad,” and they say that “echad” means that God is simple, that He is one, He is unified.
The simple meaning, “echad” means that there is only one of them, one God. And this means that there isn’t another one. If there are two gods, there’s one in heaven, one on earth, one in this direction, one in that direction. Because there is one, He is the only one in heaven and earth. That’s the meaning in the Gemara.
But the Rama [Ramak] goes with the interpretation of the Rishonim that God Himself is one. And if so, what does “above and below” come in? He learns, like the Rambam learned, that He is one in heaven and on earth, otherwise He would be neither in heaven nor on earth. Or He is in both, because He is not in a body, but He is in control or in unity. So, whatever that means.
The Rambam’s Proof: “Et Shamayim Ve’et Aretz Ani Malei”
So, what the Rambam says, “et shamayim ve’et aretz ani malei” (I fill heaven and earth), is a proof that God is not a body, because a body cannot be in two places. A body can be very large, you understand? A body can be in two places. A large body is in many places, but each piece of body is in a different place. Any part is any in one place. A non-bodily being is entirely in all places. That’s the reasoning.
And the Rama [Ramak] says that this is the meaning of “Hashem echad,” all these new intentions in Kriat Shema that one must have in mind. Understand? Do you agree?
Discussion: Did the Gemara Know This Philosophical Interpretation?
I agree, they say that the Gemara’s interpretation was like this. Yes, because the Gemara says clearly that “Hashem echad” is kingship. This is in the merit of the Rishonim. “Shema Yisrael” is said in the verses of kingship. Why does he say it with kingship? Because the Gemara understood, “echad” means unique, “echad” means the only God, so He is the King over the entire world. They don’t know this, this was their interpretation of the unity of God.
Student: I didn’t say that the garden said.
Maggid Shiur: Okay, that could be that it might be. Still, it could be. That, again, the word body is already an abstraction. True, but I’m saying that the meaning of unity wasn’t the meaning of one body, not that He is a simple thing. I don’t know if they knew about this.
Why can’t we be happy that, thank God, we know things about God that even the Amoraim didn’t know?
Student: Yes, yes, but God forbid they knew.
Maggid Shiur: I don’t know, a body, a body… No, no, no one has the one. By the way, even children don’t have the one. No one means it. That’s wrong, that’s already an error. God has two hands, four hands. Obviously it’s all higher matters. That’s clear, I mean everyone agrees.
I agree. I’m just saying that the concept of unity is a novelty, it’s a tremendous novelty from the Muslim, basically, philosophers who invented the interpretation that unity means He is one, not that there is only one. There are other interpretations, other interpretations. It’s not a Hebrew meaning. On the contrary, I’m saying this because one must also know the other meaning. I mean, the simple meaning, if you don’t understand, you don’t understand what comes in…
“Kabalat Ol Malchut Shamayim” — What Does It Mean?
The Gemara calls it accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven. The Rambam is, like American translates it. The Rambam says, no, it’s okay, something different. I had some Torah about this, I don’t remember.
The Gemara calls Shema Yisrael, we accept the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, it doesn’t mean belief in God’s existence. What do you need to know? The Rambam says but you from I don’t know. Kingdom of Heaven means that the one God who runs the entire world. Not, like idolatry says that there are two, the leaders, whatever, something like that. That’s what he means.
That means that I accept His supreme Lordship, like the Byzantines that the Chassidim are. I don’t mean that either. Like you know the Torah, Rabbi Yishmael today says that they don’t accept God over the four corners of the world but not over him.
But it’s true, the intention of Kriat Shema is not to accept upon oneself. That is accepting the yoke of mitzvot. That’s because that’s a second paragraph, it says in the Mishnah. Kingdom of Heaven means that God runs the entire world, all sides of the world. Obviously, I’m going to do myself, but not that I therefore will do His will, that’s already mitzvot, that’s a new thing. I accepted His kingship, I accepted His commandments.
So what do you see from the word kingship? Kingship means God runs the entire world. There is only one. Unity means the one God runs the entire world. To exclude the gentiles who say that two gods each run… How does the Greek thing go? He runs the dry land, he is the seas, and he is the desert, whatever.
It has nothing to do with the new interpretation that God is a simple thing. No, it’s not the same thing. It could be, the one who… It could have been a composite thing, it could have been a composite thing. “Echad” to exclude two, perhaps there are two of them, perhaps there are two of them, perhaps He is composite. You can say that theologically, if He were composite, there would be two of the…
But the problem, I’m not saying it’s a contradiction, I’m saying they’re different acceptances. I don’t know if it’s a contradiction, certainly both are true. I don’t know if the two things are even connected, because this talks about God’s conduct.
Chazal Speak of Conduct, Not of Essence
You must remember that the Sages… The Rambam says that they don’t speak of God’s existence but of His wonders. The Sages were much more careful about this than the Rambam. But even when they say “Hashem echad,” they don’t mean God Himself. They only mean that there is one Creator who runs the entire world. They don’t speak of what He is. What is the essence? What is the nature of God? It’s not a question that the Gemara discusses at all.
Here it is indeed relevant. The nature of God is a certain negation. He is not two things. He is not composed of two things like a body. It’s a whole new thing. We’re talking, actually about this there is only one for the entire world. There is a Creator. Everything is… God didn’t explain anything. But not what God is. It doesn’t come in at all. About this… He is God. He is God. He is God. He doesn’t even know what you want.
I agree. It’s not such a thing that you’re talking about is very funny. I agree. I agree that He’s not such a God. He is God. He is God. He is God. He knows yes what it means.
“Echad Lo K’echad Imanu”
Okay, that’s one interpretation of “echad.” Another interpretation is “echad lo k’echad imanu” (one not like our one). I’m not sure what he means. Like he says that he’s going to explain in Sha’ar Atzamut HaKel [Essence and Vessels] in chapter 5, there he talks about something about… “lo k’echad imanu” means that… What is that? “Echad imanu” means simply one where there is another one, a one in number, which means an individual. God is not an individual.
On one hand, it’s not so different from what he just said, “echad hapashut” (the simple one). Perhaps it means something else a bit. Yes, “echad imuni” is the different… Aristotle said that there are a bunch of meanings of the word one. One like one apple. They mean, I count one apple, two apples. They’re not talking about that now. They’re talking, again, about the simplicity of God. Perhaps he means something else, yes. Anyway.
“Torah Tziva Lanu Moshe” — Torah from Heaven, Prophecy, Reward and Punishment
Okay, in short, okay, because this I don’t know what we learn from children. Okay, when that’s the matter, then they didn’t divide properly. Then one must make another paragraph.
When we teach “Shema Yisrael” which we teach children, we teach them all the principles of the Rambam. Afterward, “Torah tziva lanu Moshe” (the Torah that Moses commanded us). Certainly it says Torah from Heaven, prophecy, the prophecy of Moses. It’s obvious, “Torah tziva lanu Moshe,” who was a prophet, and reward and punishment regarding the congregation of Jacob.
Why? I don’t know any connection. How does it connect? It says in the Torah. But perhaps “morasha kehilat Yaakov” (heritage of the congregation of Jacob)? That means that God is good to the Jews for following the Torah? But, it’s clear to me.
So we have the Ramak thought that “morasha kehilat Yaakov” hints at reward and punishment. I don’t know how. Do you know how? The Torah is reward and punishment. The Torah says that if you do the Torah, it will be good. Something like that. I don’t know. What could be the word “kehilat Yaakov”? Yes, I don’t know. Hashem desires for His righteousness Israel, how I want… He perhaps means to say that giving the Torah will make people better so they will have the reward, the benefit from the Torah.
The Ramak’s Answer: When the Child Gets Older He Will Ask
In short, you see that he gave him the two mitzvot. Why? “Kshetachil hashotet machshavto milat eleh” (when he begins to think about these words). He says, ah, the Rama [Ramak] asked my question, he only says it for a small boy who understands it. He says, yes, when he gets a bit older, he will begin to think what it means. “Veyish’al aviv uzkeno ta’am be’inyanam” (and he will ask his father and elders the reason for these matters). He will ask him what does it mean, what does “Hashem echad” mean? They will explain to him bit by bit, “penima me’at me’at lefi sichlo ksheyigdal” (inwardly little by little according to his intellect as he grows).
This is a very good educational approach. First, you hear the opinion, that’s how real education goes. People think it can go differently. First we teach, “Torah tziva lanu Moshe morasha kehilat Yaakov,” ten sefirot, whatever. Then the boy asks, Daddy, what does it mean? Ah, what do you want what does it mean I’ll explain to you? If not, the question will begin. You understand?
If people, yes, I have like that, it’s still what we teach children to say the entire siddur, has no idea what is “pitum haketoret,” whether it’s different from “pitum haketoret,” whether it’s different from “oz vechedva bimkomo,” has no idea, it’s all one long recitation. And then you tell him, you boy, you pray so long, you don’t know what’s going on here? Ah, he becomes curious, and he tries to understand.
It’s a bit of a funny methodology, but if you think about it, actually it works. A person can only learn something that he’s curious about. Why do you want to be curious? Why did I become curious about understanding anything? When they told me so many things, then when I don’t understand what’s going on. Ah, he’ll understand it, he’ll think, but I present to you, if they didn’t explain anything to me, yes, they’ll go somewhat curious, and move on.
It works quite well, that you tell children plain things without explaining to them. When they get older, if they are of understanding, they begin to ask, Daddy, why are they Jews? Ah, why are they Jews? What is why? Very good, I’m already on a path. It’s true somewhat of a taste of much knowledge. It’s more like simple faith. You tell him, “Torah tziva…” Little boy, can you speak? Say after me, “Shema Yisrael Hashem Elokeinu Hashem echad.” Say it at night, say it in the morning.
Then, when a boy begins to ask you, Daddy, why do we say such a whole thing after “Shema Yisrael”? What does it mean? Who is the Israel? Who is the Shema? Ah! I thought that you say “pitum haketoret,” I remembered that actually, I didn’t really go through Kodashim, but you know the basic laws. Because we say it here sometimes, and you help him learn, and you remember it, and you come to that person. There are such kinds of things, I remember so, I remember so, I remember so, I remember we became one case. What is the “pitum haketoret” that we’re talking about? Ah, did you know that on Yom Kippur we offer an inner offering? Ah, it actually says in the Chumash, in Acharei Mot, do you remember that too? Yes.
The Ramak’s Source from the Gemara
Anyway, the Ramak says, until here, the Ramak you see that he could have held back from saying a nice Torah that occurred to him as an interpretation in the Gemara Sukkot, doesn’t come into the book at all, but it’s a very nice Torah in practice. It’s a good source, if you’re looking for a source, how do we see that we must teach it? It was a nice source.
Student: What?
Maggid Shiur: I mean that it’s a nice source. Ah, the blow was a thorn, he learned many people, he turned about this.
The Distinction: The Existence of the Principle Versus the Upper Sefirot
Now, this is regarding the existence of the principle. “Mah she’ein ken bisfirot ha’elyonot” (which is not so regarding the upper sefirot), we don’t teach children, “ela adrabah, ma’aleh velo yagallin ela litznu’im yechidim shebador” (rather on the contrary, we elevate and reveal only to the modest individuals of the generation). This was once today, now they say yes to children. But in short, that’s the law, yes?
Student: Ah, he’s talking about Chazal, very good, he agrees that today’s times are different.
Maggid Shiur: He means Chazal, he goes into the Gemara, in the Gemara the Sefiros are not explained, only one or two Gemaras perhaps have special hints. It can’t be. If one becomes a heretic, then whoever doesn’t know about the Sefiros, it’s certain that he’s not a heretic, and not a mekatzetz bineti’os (one who cuts the plantings).
The Ramak’s Ruling: One Who Doesn’t Know About Sefiros Is Not a Heretic
However, listen to what is true? Very important. You need to know the Ramak’s ruling. Rabbosai, the ruling of the Ramak, one must say it for all Jews. People think that the Ramak says that one is a heretic, and the next section he goes on about who is a heretic. But one who doesn’t know about the Sefiros is not a heretic, is nothing. You know what he is? “A person who has not merited to see light in his days, and has not tasted the sweetness of Torah and the pleasantness of its words, and behold he died without wisdom and did not see goodness”. He’s a great nebach, he lives in a dark world, but he’s not a heretic, he’s a G-d-fearing Jew. Yes.
I’m actually, not specifically Sefiros, one needs to have some understanding in Godliness. I mean, here I’m a bit different from the Ramak, because I think one can speak better Rambam than the Ramak learned, and it’s basically Sefiros anyway. But of course, one who, nebach, thinks that the Almighty sits on a chair and tells Jews to blow shofar on Rosh Hashanah, and he says, nebach, rachmana litzlan, lo ra’ah me’oros mimav. Even if he believes a little bit in the Sefiros, just a little bit a Chassidic Jew, it’s already a different, brighter life.
Now, the Ramak is, like, everyone identifies a little bit, like, the specific theory that he believes in with the whole thing. Okay, one can learn a bit differently, that’s certain.
Student: Hey, I’ll ask a question, why don’t they teach these things so they should be calm?
Maggid Shiur: One can’t teach it. People need to come to this themselves. The Chasam Sofer said that it’s not possible. They took the first Sefirah, they made from it also a burden, another thing that one must believe. Okay, the Ramak says one doesn’t have to believe it. That’s a good thing, because this way it’s some awakening. If one must believe it, it’s terrible. Yes.
The Second Type: One Who Does Know About Sefiros But Doesn’t Believe
Anyway, afterwards he says further, afterwards, this is the first type of person who simply hasn’t learned, he’s simply a simple Jew, he doesn’t know any Sefiros, he doesn’t understand. You tell him, he doesn’t understand, he doesn’t know.
Afterwards there are other people, the second type, this is certainly something strange that he says. These are those who do know, “and they deny it because of their bad character, for they are accustomed to external wisdoms, and from their explanations doubts were born in them”.
Student: Can you explain what the point is here?
Maggid Shiur: I don’t know. There’s someone who has indeed heard about Sefiros, but he doesn’t believe in it because he learned philosophy. So, he means to say that he has a claim, he sees that it doesn’t fit him. But because it comes from external wisdoms… The Ramak had a very pious way of speaking in his times. “Ah, you learn from a gentile book. Can you answer my gentile book? Or can you only chop?” I don’t know what he wants.
The Ramak’s Problematic Logic
The Ramak says this, look what he says, and the second sentence is even more illogical, unfortunately. I thought I was the first who thinks it’s strange, but certainly, in the generation of the Ramak they already wrote about him that this doesn’t make any sense. Rabbi Yehuda Aryeh of Modena took this chapter at length in his… ah, about twenty years later, whatever. He knew people who knew him. He brings… he talks about the Ramak’s personality. He was into external wisdoms, Yosefke, and because of that he didn’t grasp Kabbalah. That could be, but you can’t say about him that he’s a heretic. It’s a bad character.
Let’s not say it’s a bad character, he learns external wisdoms. It’s not a problem, those are other sins. No, you understand, it’s something not fair. It’s a wisdom of the person who learns by the way. It’s true that it’s not a way to deal with redemption upon him, but it’s also true that people who learn external wisdoms speak very much to the point, which gives a certain normalcy to a person. One can’t dismiss it, one can’t say, “Ah, it’s not a way to these things.”
He’s in dispute, he’s very much in dispute with the Or Neriv, with his teacher Rabbi Shlomo Alkabetz, with the whole group, and they were all in the pious style, “Ah, you look at gentile books, it’s not a way.” Let’s see if you can explain to the one who learns the gentile books what you have to say. And that was still an interesting thing, as others tried.
Truth, truth, truth, that the Almighty Himself laid Himself down, the Almighty Himself came down. One needs to have humility. By the way, truth, everyone needs humility. But the Mekubalim don’t have humility, because they chop on someone who asks, often people ask innocently, or half innocently, and the Almighty lowered Himself for this. Okay, why am I chopping on the Mekubalim?
The Ramak’s Claim: He Denies the Oral Torah
The Ramak says, but afterwards he says another such thing, “and these, if they are not called heretics or sectarians” — but now there’s a problem, let’s not say that he learns external wisdoms, not because of that will he become a heretic, right? He says, “if they are not called heretics or sectarians”, maybe he doesn’t call them heretics or sectarians, that means he goes with the Rambam’s division that there are sectarians who don’t believe in the principles of Godliness, he says, “for they believe in all matters of Godliness”, he does believe in the unity of Hashem, all these things that he just said that one teaches children, that Jew does believe. And what can one claim?
The Ramak says this, why are they heretics? “They deny the interpretation of the Oral Torah”. Because it says in the Rambam that there’s a type of heretic who denies an interpretation in the interpretation of the Torah in Chapter 3, Law 8 of the Laws of Repentance, he denies the words of Chazal.
And what he says, this is of course, this is nonsense, because first one needs to prove that there is indeed an Oral Torah, he says this, and anyone who denied something about Sefiros, denied this very thing, he says that the Zohar wasn’t written by Chazal and the like. So, proof is needed, as it says in the holy books. He’ll say, “Yes, this is exactly like the Rebbe had a revelation of Elijah, because the Rebbe himself said it.” It’s exactly that level of logic, and it’s very sad that the Ramak didn’t realize that, I am sorry to say.
Discussion: How to Understand the Ramak’s Position
Student: No, I don’t agree with you. I’m more inclined to kindness. It’s very hard for people to grasp their basic. I read his entire book “Ari Nohem”, where he tries to argue even more than previous people who don’t argue Kabbalah. It’s very hard for most people to imagine how they came to such thinking. From both sides, the anti-Mekubalim, it’s very hard. Most people, even very great people, they imagine that the other is just a heretic because he’s bad. Maybe he is bad. He says he’s a sectarian. Because what is Oral Torah? Where is there Oral Torah? What does it say about Sefiros? The Ramak hasn’t brought until now even one piece of Gemara where it says Sefiros. This is nonsense. I have an interpretation. Everyone has an interpretation. No problem, everyone has an interpretation. This is already when someone says… This goes properly to conclude in this chapter. Someone who believes that the Almighty is not related to people, and all these things are just something such… we need to learn how the mind works, is nebach a sectarian. He has no heresy. The previous thing is all fine, but a sectarian he’s not.
Maggid Shiur: The Ramak makes clear here a distinction. No, you’re talking about the innocent Jews. Whoever is innocent, the Ramak says, is not a heretic, and only “the Place didn’t show him”. That I agree with. But one doesn’t become a heretic from him. You want to connect two things, but you want to connect the two things. The Ramak makes clear a distinction. The Ramak was a bit more… he’s a bit more stringent than you.
Student: You’re saying that what he is “the Place didn’t show him” makes him a heretic?
Maggid Shiur: In some sense. He tried to be clear. He’ll say no to them. There’s someone who, nebach, grew up this way, and he’s a whole Jew. He has no complaints against him. There’s someone who he… basically, he has complaints against the one who does know.
The Ramak on Heresy Regarding Sefiros — Continuation: The Weakness of the “Oral Torah” Argument, and the Ramak’s Relationship to the Rambam
The Problem with the “Oral Torah” Argument
Student: Ah, the rascal has already learned. What do you want? He learned. What’s going on? He didn’t become aware of your time.
Maggid Shiur: Ah, he should buy into Oral Torah. Why? Because I have a little thing that I say is Oral Torah, and no one heard of it twenty minutes ago, but one should believe that it’s Oral Torah. That doesn’t make sense.
Student: Hey, sorry. This is the next argument he makes more your argument that you want to make. He had no idea? He thought that everyone always was… he was innocent when someone was such a sage who wrote such a book…
Maggid Shiur: Yes, there are very many such people, it’s not the first. I’m trying to understand my opponent.
Student: So you say, I think… I understand.
Maggid Shiur: No, no, directly is… I think that you… the problem with you…
Student: No! Look, we could say, the way that they explained before, no one should explain this, if one wants to strongly explain this.
Maggid Shiur: No, people need to know this. People use this. Halachically, they are wrong. They are plain wrong. Their logic doesn’t make a drop of sense, and therefore it’s one hundred percent wrong.
Heresy as Halacha-Talk, Not Truth-Talk
But I need to say this, because there are many Jews who don’t believe in Kabbalah, and one needs to bring them in. You can understand that I can’t teach them Kabbalah, you should say they’re heretics because they don’t believe. That’s not a way. That’s not a way, it’s only a way of teaching.
I am sorry to say, the Rambam feels that a way of teaching people, that the goal is only a barrier, tells him whoever believes differently, it’s a sectarian. It actually succeeded for him, but for the Kabbalists it didn’t succeed. But for the questions it didn’t succeed.
Student: I can yes, the other claims yes, nebach, you mean nebach, that I’ll agree with.
Maggid Shiur: But the Oral Torah doesn’t work.
The True Way to Understand the Ramak
What one can indeed say, if what makes sense, is what I said earlier, that the whole discussion, I can make such an approach. Perhaps the Ramak, I would understand this, not certain, but it could be. They said that the whole discussion of faith and heresy is only a halachic discussion, and not a discussion about truth. The one who is capable of understanding himself, what goes… by the way, if someone comes who understands himself, he can learn himself, he doesn’t want to know if he’s a heretic, he wants to know what the truth is, he doesn’t care, he’s called still a heretic.
How could the Maggid have written this way? Someone says heretic. Okay, if you hold that he said that he doesn’t believe that he’s a heretic, I’m still a heretic, do me off, it still goes on. What is this argument? It’s not an argument.
Ah, if it means I’m wrong, I need to be careful what I’m wrong about. There’s heresy, and laws of heresy, if there’s such a thing, according to the Rambam there’s such a thing, it’s one hundred percent only about what one teaches people. That means, it’s about the future. It’s not, anyone who has, what we call not simple faith, not faith that the Rishonim used to call investigation or knowledge, versus tradition, repeating.
The discussion of heresy and faith is not relevant, because he understands, and if he doesn’t understand, he says it requires investigation. One can remain with certain things, this I believe in the aspect of simple faith, it requires investigation. But then it’s further not relevant whether one must believe or one must not believe. If one has already taught, by default, you take what one has already taught.
For Whom Is the Heresy-Discussion Relevant?
So the whole question here is about the people who don’t understand, the people who don’t have any actual knowledge. And he says, you see that he says, if someone went to the right cheder, and he doesn’t understand, he doesn’t understand. That’s normal. If someone went to cheder, but he also went to the wrong cheder, he’s the total, both he believes. This is mine perhaps one can learn this way.
He’s not talking about someone who has actually learned and he doesn’t understand the Zohar, he has a question. He’s talking about someone who he has simply heard from the Rebbe this way, and from a second Rebbe he heard differently. The Rebbes lied, did it go to another Rebbe? We are Jews, we need to go to our Rebbes. Do you understand what I’m saying?
Why Indeed Someone Who Doesn’t Believe in Kabbalah Is a Heretic?
Like the Ramak himself, as I said about the Ramak himself would have said that the whole reason why I can only truly claim that a simple Jew why he doesn’t believe that the Almighty doesn’t have a body, is because he would have had to believe in 613 commandments. Why must he believe in 613 commandments? Why must he not believe in 613 commandments? He believes anyway.
So, the Ramak is in trouble in this world, in the world you can say something that… that I don’t know, on this too I disagree, but it makes sense what he says, within the world of believing what they tell you, that if the sage… this is true. That is, do you understand what I’m saying?
Why indeed, let’s say it wouldn’t have been the whole thing, why indeed someone who doesn’t believe in Kabbalah is a heretic? Because the sages of Israel, all of them, most of them, lately believe in Kabbalah. You can’t tell any Jew and say a basic thing that his sages of Israel believe in this is not true. Why? Because this is all in the nature of tradition and the level of tradition. And the level of understanding, I go generally what people say. You know this way?
Student: Don’t agree.
Maggid Shiur: Question of questions. But this itself is a big question whether it’s a right thing to do. That is, I think because of the previous thing, it makes it complicated.
The Problem with the Ramak’s Position
Because it’s very strange to me to say that someone denies the interpretation of the Torah, when the interpretation of the Torah itself says that most people don’t understand it. And the source itself knows that even after learning passages from rabbis, most people go, not everyone will understand what he says. He says it explicitly. Here is a greater detail. He knows what he’s doing, and he’s doing it on purpose, because the one who made the bottom of heresy did it for the presence.
Perhaps he means that it’s the simple scribe, that he’s a heretic, Rabbi Dagla and Uster, and Uster and Uster and Uster. He says, look, we know that this is the right measure. Okay, sorry for you, you have nebach a bad sign, it’s a failure. If you don’t know, you should know that I’m against you, I hold that you have a very wrong faith, one can actually call it heresy.
Yes, but the problem is, the problem is, the problem is, another argument, which is also not such a good argument, but it’s a bit of a better argument. He says, “besides that he has”, besides this, he has another “adding to his sin transgression”, besides what he doesn’t believe in the words of Chazal.
The Ramak’s Relationship to the Rambam
But the Ramak knew that the Rambam doesn’t believe in Sefiros, he’s not a robot, he’s not dead dumb. What did he think? Lo ra’u me’oros mimehem, this is what he answers about the Rambam. He thought that the Rambam knew about Sefiros? No, no, no.
Intent in Prayer and the Necessity of Belief in Sefirot
The Medinah’s Answer to the Ramak’s Question
So says the Ramak. He says the same thing, okay, again, on this piece too there is — what does he say? — the Medinah is very bothered. He says he has an answer to the question, it’s not difficult at all, he doesn’t understand the whole thing, everything is from our side.
Yes, yes. His answer is also not so far from… the sad thing is that the mekubalim don’t hold something so different from what he holds, it’s just they call it sefirot. I saw, the aspect… what do you say? Again, the Medinah, Rabbi Leibel Medinah, says that he doesn’t understand the question. It’s just a parable (mashal), as he perhaps gives a parable, and the parable is one that mekubalim themselves use. He says, the great question that the Ramak makes, “davar zeh yit’orer echad hadarshenim haketanim” (this matter would occur to one of the minor preachers), with a parable that a person climbs up, he climbs up to a building, the building doesn’t get closer to me, you get closer to the building. What is the whole question? How does Hashem supervise? I mean that a person is closer to Hashem, he has more hashgachah (providence), something like that. Not such a great question at all, the whole question isn’t difficult.
And this is basically what the mekubalim also believe, the mekubalim also hold that Hashem doesn’t change. They say simply, there are levels in creation, you can call them sefirot, regarding which it means that Hashem yes — they spoke last week, here there is a distinction. But the basic answer to the basic question is the same answer according to almost everyone. But the Ramak speaks of specific people, who because they don’t have any language to speak about this, this is almost implied from what they said, they actually become heretics (kofrim). This is actually a true story. Very nice.
The Ramak’s Sharp Claim About Kavanah in Prayer
Now the Ramak comes and says even sharper from the side of the mekubalim. He’s not speaking now about heresy (kefirah), he’s speaking about kavanah in prayer (kavanah hatefilah). Someone says, “eineni osek bakabbalah” (I don’t engage in kabbalah) — he means the early Rishonim, right? — “ve’eino rotzeh lechavein bitefilotav ela leba’al ha’otzarot, ka’asher chashvu rabim” (and he doesn’t want to have intent in his prayers except to the Master of the Treasuries, as many thought), there were many great and good people who said this, yes? It’s known the responsum of the Rashba brings, that one says what this means, and mekubalim gave a parable there that the king has different treasuries, and you can’t just give to the king, it doesn’t work, there’s a system, you have to tell him, send for that treasury. He says, what happens, I have to speak to the master of the treasuries.
Says the Ramak, you are making an error, perhaps you’re not a heretic, but an error you certainly are. Why? Because one cannot. “she’im yavo adam le’ovdo be’erech bechinat atzmuto bizulat bechinat sefirotav, nimtza mesalek tefilato mikol vechol, ki ein sof hapashut be’erech bechinat atzmuto pashut, ve’eino ba’al shinuyim.” (If a person comes to serve Him in terms of His essence without the aspect of His sefirot, he removes his prayer entirely, for the Infinite Simple One in terms of His essence is simple, and is not subject to changes.) It’s not true. You say that the Echad Hapashut (Simple One) changes, so, yes he is a heretic in the other way. He cannot change from din (judgment) to rachamim (mercy), or be affected from will to will through prayer. “Im lo” (if not), that means not from His side, but “be’erech metzi’uto” (in terms of His existence), He Himself, “bifrat tzu vos er iz in di sefirot, shehem mahut hashgachato, ve’al yadam tihyeh hashgachah bizulato, ve’al yadam yesh shinuy midin lerachamim.” (specifically what He is in the sefirot, which are the essence of His providence, and through them there is providence in what is other than Him, and through them there is change from judgment to mercy.)
How, what I’m saying, this is something basically something the Rambam would say no to. I don’t know why the Ramak is so sure that people who don’t learn sefirot don’t know it. But again, it’s true that there are funny Rambamists who don’t grasp for some reason, and actually think that prayer doesn’t work. Or conversely, he says, ah, Hashem changes. Hashem doesn’t change. So in short, therefore one who has intent in prayer according to the simple meaning is in error. Did you know?
Ah, but says the Ramak, ah, I’ve already said too many secrets here, don’t think you understand what I’m talking about. “Ve’al yitchakam hame’ayen liknot toch devarenu inyan netinah nechutzah le’ofen inyan hashefa’im vehashgachah.” (And let not the reader be clever to acquire from our words the matter of necessary giving regarding the manner of influences and providence.) You shouldn’t now understand what I said, “ki hitchakmut kazot lo to’elet” (for such cleverness is of no use), and better not think about this. We will explain everything at length in Sha’ar HaOrot VehaKeilim, there is the place where we will speak about this.
The Necessity of Belief in Sefirot
He just wanted to say that the bottom line is that a person is obligated to believe in sefirot. Why? You see, maybe this is the thing he takes more seriously, because the previous Torah from Torah section 280 perhaps grasped that you say it’s not such a good Torah, I don’t mean. But he says yes that you have no choice, “she’i efshar leha’amin pinot haTorah ela bahem” (that it’s impossible to believe the corners of the Torah except through them), retzoni lomar al yadam (I mean through them).
Here he says a very cute thing. That is, we have here two senses in which one cannot believe in the Torah except through the sefirot. One, if someone doesn’t know about sefirot, he gets stuck in the dilemmas and he has no answer. It comes out that the sefirot is what we believe, what we believe with.
The sefirot themselves, the reality, that not only the knowledge I have about sefirot helps me believe, but that there are sefirot about which one can speak of “bechinato ve’erko lisefirotav shehi hashgachato” (His aspect and relation to His sefirot which is His providence), this is what makes people able to believe in Hashem who runs the world and who has providence and so on, and who hears prayers. About this the Zohar called sefirot “da emunah” (this is faith), right? Meheimnuta. There are some funny teachings about this, but the literal reason is, as it explicitly states in the Tikkunei Zohar, that the sefirot are what enables faith. The existence of the sefirot makes it possible to believe in God.
Therefore, our faith is not in Hashem, but in Hashem through His sefirot, not in Hashem in terms of His essence, because that exists, and they have faith in that too, but even that we only know through the sefirot, because we wouldn’t have known anything without the world. This is why the sefirot had to be revealed.
Discussion: The True Meaning of “Razin Dimeheimnuta”
Student: Yes, yes, certainly. The Tanya and other funny people say that sefirot are called razin dimeheimnuta (secrets of faith) because one cannot understand them, one can only believe in them.
Maggid Shiur: It’s just the opposite. The whole point of sefirot is that one should be able to understand. They’re just using emunah in the sense of knowledge of God. Certainly.
Student: If you believe in Ein Sof, you can’t understand anything.
Maggid Shiur: Right. So, and it’s true. If you only believe in Ein Sof, you don’t believe in a God. You don’t have an Elokeinu, you have a name without Elokeinu, however you want to say it. So the sefirot, they are Elokeinu, they make the Elokeinu, they make Him be Elokeinu. They don’t make themselves, they’re not separate, they make Elokeinu. About this a Jew is obligated to believe in sefirot.
The Innovation of Kabbalah: Sefirot as a Reality
Student: This is the innovation (chiddush) of kabbalah. Actually everyone believes in sefirot in such a thing.
Maggid Shiur: Theoretically everyone believes that one speaks of Hashem’s actions (pe’ulot).
Student: That one calls them Elokim, that when one speaks to Hashem one speaks to them…
Maggid Shiur: One speaks of them and to them. Of Hashem with them, not of them separately, yes.
Student: But maybe the mekubalim are just a little bit giving too much names to things that are not supposed to have names.
Maggid Shiur: That’s exactly the question of Sha’ar HaAtzilut VehaKeilim, where he says that one must look there to what level one can truly call it, make it like a reality. But practically, making things a reality is the only way we understand things. That’s again back to the concept of what one cannot understand. As long as it’s very abstract, like the relation to creation, it’s very hard to talk about, it’s very hard to get. I think.
Three Types of People in Prayer
The reality is, that there are only two types or three types of people. There are people who don’t pray, and when they pray they don’t pray to Hashem, they pray to an idol. There are people, this is most Jews, simple Jews who say that the Echad Pashut changes, this is basically what they believe, but they are corporealists (mujashim). The Ramak doesn’t say it so clearly, but this is basically what happens. Those who pray to the Echad Pashut are corporealists. According to the Ramaz they are heretics (minim), but it’s fine.
No, kabbalah exists to answer those people, really. Because the mekubalim don’t want to be just people for whom it already works, they want to understand what they’re doing. Just as the whole point is to understand what one does. There are people who are in Rambam and they grasped, as you say, they grasp the unity of the Simple One (achdut hapashut), and therefore they don’t really pray. They perhaps say the words, but they have no substance, they have no understanding of what it means.
But he said, yes, what does the Rambam say? What does the Rambam say? The Rambam says in Moreh Nevuchim, that when a person prays he becomes a slightly better person, and then it comes out, it’s not davening. The word tefilah has no meaning in it. And the mekubal has an answer, that what you say… let’s give a name for this, let’s give a name for this thing. And now it makes sense, we pray with the sefirot. The sefirot can be angry at you, and they can not be angry, and I make them not be angry. Through this, Hashem is the one who doesn’t get angry, but the actions of Hashem (pe’ulot Hashem), not Hashem Himself. But then it makes sense. They’re just making service of Hashem (avodat Hashem) have words, basically.
And when they say further that Hashem Himself made it so, because Hashem wants it to make sense. And the simple Jew has very few words in his mind, and he does exactly the same thing, which is that he errs. If he thinks too much, the problem is… the Ramak tells you that he is in error (to’eh). Simple Jews are in error. The problem is that there’s nothing wrong to be in error.
The “Simple Jew” — Who Is He Really?
Okay, I don’t know, there are two kinds of simple Jews. When you say simple Jew, you don’t mean a simple Jew anymore, because you are so far from a simple Jew, that you can’t even imagine what would be a simple Jew. A simple Jew, if he is truly a simple Jew, you’re right, no one has a complaint that it’s a simple, actual simple Jew. What one has a complaint about is the super-wise simple Jew. Understand? Someone says, come, I have a turn, he says I’m a simple Jew. What is a liar? You’re not a simple Jew. Because he is actually that. He is actually a simple Jew.
I’m talking about the wise ones (chachamim). All these wise ones, he speaks of the… the “omer ein ela ba’alei otzarot” (one who says there is only the masters of treasuries), he’s not speaking of one who didn’t occur to him the question. That one is okay. He was a bit interested. I mean that a great part of this is to begin to be happy with the fact that they’re not simple Jews. They need to have simplicity and straightforwardness (temimut upeshitut) about this too. Temimut upeshitut doesn’t mean, “Ah, wisdom, complicated things, thank you very much, you know what? I’m a simple Jew!” You’re not!
Hashem made you to be the kind of person who can only ignite to pray if you make a question between this sefirah and that sefirah, or whatever, this is the end of the whole matter, this is from all the matter, this is also complicated. Any, every theory is complicated. And this is your job. Your job is to understand clearly according to… you shouldn’t think this is the whole thing. Hashem is greater than you. Hashem can speak with simple Jews too, He can speak with heretics (apikorsim) even, He has no problem with all these problems you have, He doesn’t. But this is the Elokim who didn’t rest before.
But Hashem made you, and made you that you want to be the kind of person who needs to have understanding (haskalah). That’s how I think about myself and my friends. And the mekubalim, all of them think about there, and they’re very proud of it. Yes, one can become arrogant (ba’al ga’avah), “Ah, I’m the great enlightened one (maskil).” And I understand, one must work on the traits (middot) of patience (erech apayim). This is heresy within the place (kefirah betoch hamakom). Intellect (sekhel) is a great good that Hashem gives to a person. Every thing can be ruined, can be used for evil, become crazy. And this is your path of service (derech avodah).
Joy in One’s Portion in Understanding Godliness – The Balance Between Humility and Gratitude
Denial of Hashem’s Kindness
Instructor:
But to say this is denial of Hashem’s kindness (kefira b’tovato shel Makom). It’s such a great kindness that Hashem gives to a person. Everything can be ruined and can be used to go crazy. And this is your path of service (derech ha’avodah).
I understand, certainly, Hashem can do without the sefirot. Hashem can do everything without sefirot. What do I mean? He speaks with my grandmother without sefirot. It’s perfect. But I’m not my grandmother.
The “Middle Class” in Chassidus and Kabbalah
And I mean that, again, you go back to the question of most people – anyone who was in yeshiva and he saw a little bit what they taught there, is not a simple Jew. I’ve spoken with simple Jews my whole life. I gave talks in the minyan shiur about the middle class in Chassidus. Of course, you’re not the biggest philosopher. Everything in between, so you learn middle Chassidic books, and middle Kabbalah.
I want to say a point, because people – I don’t know, today’s Kabbalah scene is ever more complicated. So in the end there’s still something in between, and I don’t know what you are or aren’t. I have basic sefirot, I get it, I understand, I make myself very small. You daven, it must work, very good.
No, you need even more. You know what, I’m a simple Jew, I’m a good plain sefirot person, just say it like that. You don’t need now any… I have a whole thing with all kinds of orot, ruach, everything I understand. But that’s not for people that have that need. He’s a scholar (lamdan), he wants to be a scholar in this thing. It’s a bit of pride (gaavah). First one must understand the simplicity (peshitus).
Why Did Hashem Make the World So Complicated?
Yes, my thing is that one should be very happy, one should be a super wise person. Hashem made me super wise, I try to use it, in measure, whatever, further, hints, drives, it’s lacking for me, okay, I’m pretty good.
Why did Hashem make the world so complicated? Hashem could have made the world more simple, He wanted that the wise people also have what to do, right? Why indeed did Hashem make everything so complicated? Reality is indeed very complicated, right? It’s not simple. Hashem is simple, but reality is complicated. Why? Reality I mean the Creation (briah). Why?
I don’t know, it’s kind of a joke. I don’t know like that, “so He willed” (kach ratza). The way He wants the smart people… Stops, the smart people are the ones whose mind runs the way the world is in that way. Yes, the smart people have a problem. They grasp how complicated things are, and it’s much harder to live that way. They’re very good people. For them one also holds. There’s a solution. There’s already a solution here for the clever people. It helps.
Joy With One’s Own Understanding
I’ve recently – I’m becoming much more. I always used to think this. I hold Torah with wisdom and… And one is indeed worthy, one isn’t… like stupid questions (chakirot) that people have. They don’t understand. It’s so simple. I have the ability (kosher) to understand this. And so goes my humanity, my Judaism, my service of Hashem (avodat Hashem), whatever you want. And it’s perfect. And I’m so happy with it.
And they have something, and they also have the Torah. I truly stand on that level (madreigah). There are real mekubalim. Okay. The real ones, and the wise ones, the real mekubalim, those who truly understand. May they have their portion (yehei lahem ashrei chelkam), I understand as I understand, I’m very happy with it.
The Problem of Pride – And the Right Balance
Discussion: Are You Better Because You Understand?
Student:
So you think you’re better than another because you understand Godliness (Elokut)?
Instructor:
Yes, I think I’m very happy with it. I can imagine that I would have been someone who doesn’t understand, and I think that my prayers (tefilot) work better because I understand. Why shouldn’t I think that?
Student:
The other person?
Instructor:
Well, try it, I’m not in conflict with the other person. Hashem is greater than that too. But people have such… Really, you can’t believe. It’s hard for people to believe that someone who knows that there are ten sefirot, and he understands a bit, he learns a bit, and he knows what it means, that he is the… his work is better, and they should give him a kvittel. Why is it hard to believe? It’s true! The other person doesn’t understand, you understand!
Student:
You’re saying the other person has something else?
Instructor:
Well, try it. An understanding (hasagah) of knowledge is very nice, but there’s something even greater. Could be, no problem, you know what? I’m a simple Jew, I know. Whoever has other understandings, let him be satisfied with his understandings.
I can agree with you why the Jew says he’s satisfied with this, because he says, okay, you can paint nicely, you can read nicely, learn, okay, it’s a talent. And you can paint nicely is something nothing.
Student:
No, it’s a talent, but you don’t think you’re more than another.
Instructor:
Again, this is a topic of pride (gaavah). I agree that one must be careful with humility (anavah). But not about this, not that it’s a joy in one’s portion (simcha b’chelko). What have become more confused about why. The problem is to truly break oneself with hard work (avodah) that breaks the pride.
There’s something, now it’s already a level of understanding vessels (hasagat keilim), but this, yes, it’s a good thing, everything’s fine, I have no problem. Look at it this way, look at it this way I mean. No problem, whoever has held by that level, let him think that way. Yes, it’s very nice, but not that I make a… not that this is the… Maybe, perhaps it makes…
Knowing vs. Going Through
When people looked up to people throughout the generations (doros), they didn’t look up to someone because he knew more. They looked up for going through a lot, for working oneself out. The one who knows more is truly important.
I don’t know what people look up to, who looks up, nobody knows. There’s such a thing, people know that there are certain people who come to certain understandings and prophecy (nevuah) and things, because they went through certain things, and they came to a place. Maybe, maybe, but. It could be, I don’t know, but I’m not interested that this… I think that one must… Okay.
“The perfect is the enemy of the good”
One must be happy with one’s portion (sameach b’chelko). One must be much more excited about what one knows yes. What one doesn’t know, whoever knows that, he’ll also be happy. I said he shouldn’t be happy, because he doesn’t have other Torah. But the one who doesn’t know that, or he knows yes, he holds other things that are more attractive. So that’s such a portion, and he should be very happy with it, he should hold himself very great with it. Not greater than the other person, but very great. Greater than the other person is just a problem, he should hold himself very great with it.
Always the good, the perfect is the enemy of the good. There are greater levels. There’s a problem when one will have the nerve to reach those levels, one will receive some divine spirit (ruach hakodesh). Elijah will come and tell us…
Student:
They think?
Instructor:
My experiences, most people don’t think.
Student:
They think?
Instructor:
Okay. He knows, I’m not talking talk. He can indeed. He can indeed much more than other people. Okay. It’s truly true to smash oneself on little pieces. It comes out that way, it was a long work.
So I think that that person is completely right. But there’s still much more, how great he holds himself, how great he holds himself the foolish person you’re talking about, is he right. But the portion of wickedness in him about foolishness, how happy he is with his foolish understanding is he right. But there’s still much more, of course.
Conclusion
Okay, enough, until here… until here a shiur, I don’t know. What’s the story here? I don’t understand what’s going on here.