The Proof for the Existence of the Creator from the Selection Among Possibilities – The Fifth Way | Part I, Chapter 74 (3) | Guide for the Perplexed 177 (Auto Translated)

Chapter 70: The Mutakallimun’s Proofs for the Creation of the World — The Fifth Way: The Way of Particularization

Introduction: The Structure of the Proof for God’s Existence

Good, shalom. We are studying here today, I hope this will work here. If not, then we’ll broadcast with something else.

We are studying here Chapter 70, which is Maimonides’ summary of the Kalam’s proofs for the creation of the world. We spoke about this, and this is really something I still need to understand a great deal — all these things need to be understood a great deal — but here we arrive at something very important and fundamental.

The Four Fundamental Questions

Fundamentally we spoke about the fact that the Kalam establishes the main proof — we are seeking a proof according to their view, for them they are really seeking a proof for this, but Maimonides distinguishes between these questions. But they are seeking a proof for what they call the creation of the world, and within this they include the matter of God’s existence.

This needs to be emphasized, because there is here a bit more than what we had until now. That is, I am only sharpening something a bit more than what we sharpened until now.

We spoke about the fact that there is here an issue of four encounters, four things for which we are seeking proofs, demonstrations:

The first thing is God’s existence.

The second and third are the necessary attributes of this God essentially, the definitions of what this God is — that He is one and that He is not a body. This is the second and third.

And the fourth is the creation of the world.

This is how Maimonides already told us in Chapter 71, that these are the four questions we are discussing. And we spoke about the fact that there is, as it were, a dispute about this order, this is how Maimonides presents it.

The Starting Point: Proof from the World

And something needs to be prefaced, somewhat like this, I think. Essentially all theology, rational theology — the Kalam is a type of rational theology — seeks proof.

The first thing, and perhaps the last, that theology of this type needs to do, is to bring proof for God’s existence. This is the most fundamental, most basic thing of religion.

Now, we already spoke in Chapter 72 and in the introduction: they prove this existence from the existence of the world. We cannot begin from God and prove that there is a God. If we began there, then we would not need a proof — as if the matter of proof is to prove from the world.

And therefore this is agreed upon, this is what Maimonides said is agreed upon, apparently by everyone, that for the proof one needs to begin from knowledge of the world. The question is of course what kind of world, what is the world.

Therefore Maimonides gave us certain things apparently agreed upon about the world in Chapter 72 — that was the investigation there, what he is essentially trying to do there.

Two Ways of Proof: From the World’s Eternity or From Its Creation

But fundamentally, generally, those who sought to prove God’s existence in Maimonides’ world — in this Jewish-Muslim theology that we know — they began from one of two assumptions:

Either the world is eternal, and then there is a certain type of proofs for God’s existence specifically from the world’s eternity.

Or the world is created, and then there is a certain other type of proofs for God’s existence.

Maimonides sweeps away this division intentionally, but this is how they generally say it.

The Proof from the World’s Eternity

Aristotle’s proofs for example for God’s existence derive, or at least those of the Muslims who copied Aristotle, are based on the world’s eternity. And this is how Maimonides himself writes later and before this. They are based on what kind of world we have — an eternal world, and an eternal world cannot be without a God of a certain type, and therefore this proves that there is a God.

This is how the proof works, this is also how Maimonides himself, or the proofs that he copies in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, as he himself writes here, they are built in this way. And so also at the beginning of Part Two. The world’s eternity, and this is a proof that works in a certain way.

We of course first need to show that the world is eternal in this way, and to Aristotle it seemed that he had proofs for this, and afterwards, from this nature of the world, we prove the nature of God, God’s existence, what kind of God there is essentially as well.

The Proof from the Creation of the World

The Kalam, of course, the Kalam disagrees with the matter of the world’s eternity. It seems to me very problematic to believe in the world’s eternity, for reasons that we still need to arrive at and understand later in the chapter, in Part Two, mainly that I am not at all speaking about what the problem is with this.

But the Kalam, now we are dealing essentially with proving God’s existence, the Kalam always proves God’s existence from the creation of the world.

The Identification Between the Creation of the World and God’s Existence

And there is here something very subtle that I am saying, there is something I do not understand. They connect these two questions together, completely. They say: if the world is created, this is the same thing as proving that it has a God who created it.

Because created is something that began, and this is as it were an assumption that almost does not even need to be detailed, that a thing that began has a temporal beginning, so there is someone who began it. And generally they even add: someone who began it with will, who decided to begin it, and this is God.

So their God is, what we call the Creator of the world, the one who creates the world — this is the main attribute of their God.

Even that they say that God is not a body, He is one — all these things, apparently, according to this system, they are a bit more, less important. We already spoke about this, that the importance of these things is much more according to the system that begins from the world’s eternity, because the world’s eternity really proves this, and this is essentially almost all that God adds — not all, He is the cause of the world, but He gives us the cause of this type that He is God, the eternal cause, that is the non-corporeal and the one — this is what this takes.

Whereas according to the system of the creation of the world, God is more or less the other side of — if we can show that the world is created, already on that same side we have shown that there is a God. We do not need to show anything else.

Their God is much more connected to what they prove about the world than according to the second system, which is also very connected but in a different way. This is what needs to be understood. And this needs to be investigated.

A Critical Note: Is This Assumption Trivial?

For example, in our day this simple assumption is much less accepted. The cosmology accepted by scientists in our day is more or less of the creation of the world, that is, that the world has a temporal beginning — not the world’s eternity, certainly, from an American perspective certainly not — and it is not clear to them that this proves that there is a God.

So what was very simple to the Kalam, that if we prove the creation of the world, then we do not need to speak at all about the question whether the world has some God — this is a type of simple assumption, a thing does not make itself, a thing does not begin itself. Maimonides does not even copy these points, because this is so basic for them. This is essentially not such a basic thing, apparently. So one needs to think about this point.

The Proofs from the Creation of the World

Good, so this was only an introduction in order to understand what type of proofs we are doing here. The proofs are from the creation of the world, and creation — the title of this chapter is proofs — proofs of the Mutakallimun for the world being created. They are not proofs that the world has a God, because for them this is exactly the same thing. To say that the world is created is to say that there is a God who created it.

And therefore any way that you find in which the world is created is a way — as if this is the function of God — this is a way of saying what God is. The first proof is that things are created and therefore the entire world. So they are only seeking proofs of a created world. They are not seeking proofs that there is a God — this is the same thing for them.

Review of the Previous Proofs (1-4)

We had a first proof that there are created things, and this means that all things are created.

A second proof, that there is a chain of created things that cannot go to infinity, and therefore there is a creator, there is someone who began the chain.

There is a third proof from the fact that the atomic substances that compose the world are not necessarily as they are, and therefore there must be something that gives them their how-ness.

The fourth proof that the substance and the accidents are created and therefore the substance must be created. This was the fourth proof, I think we already read all these proofs, so we spoke about this.

Maimonides of course, one of the things he does is to show in all these proofs that they — and this is exactly what, they do not deny this, this is exactly what they say — Maimonides constantly tries to draw our attention to the fact that these proofs depend on physics, and if their physics is not proven, as he claimed in the previous chapter, and it is even absurd, then these proofs are not so good either.

The Fifth Way: The Way of Particularization

Now we arrive at one of the most fundamental things in this type of proofs, and this is the fifth way. The fifth way by which they prove the creation of the world.

I am reading here from Ibn Tibbon’s translation, and it is the way of particularization (takhayyud) — particularization. We will see in another moment what the meaning of the word particularization is here.

The Special Status of This Proof

Maimonides says thus: This way they choose greatly — they greatly choose this way. This is one of the most beloved ways for the Kalam, this is perhaps their most successful proof for God’s existence, and this also shows us very precisely what is the type of God, what kind of thing is this God that they show us.

The Basis: The Tenth Premise — Possibility

And Maimonides explains, and its meaning returns, the meaning of this proof, to what I explained to you in their tenth premise. This is more or less — this proof is more or less that the tenth premise proves God’s existence.

We do not remember, the tenth premise is what we call possibility — possibility, that is, that all the things in the world, and the entire world, and every detail in it etc., there is no necessary reason that it should be thus and not otherwise, but every thing, we will claim that it is possible to imagine, but they think that it is possible to think that it will be in another way. And therefore this is their premise, this is the tenth premise.

The Structure of the Argument

The fifth proof says: okay, and if so, what makes it be in a certain way? The answer: God’s choice, God’s will. This is the only answer, because their physics does not allow any other answer. Why are things thus and not otherwise, for there cannot be a reason, because all things are possible.

So God is the one who particularizes — particularizes, the translation of the word particularizes here is something

The Meaning of the Concept “Particularizes”

That is, particularizes is, He particularizes one option from among a million, perhaps infinite options that could be, this is the translation of the word particularizes. Not sure why, as if one needs to think what is the word to particularize here, but this is the point.

Description of the Proof by Maimonides

And Maimonides shows, describes to us the proof, and this is that he directs in his thought to the world itself, yes? So he directs in thought, he really describes to you how a person presents the proof to you. You think, yes? Direct in your thought, yes? to intend, yes? To direct is to intend. You turn your thought to the entire world, yes? The world itself. Or, you do not need to, this is the principle. You can also think about any part of it that you wish, any specific part of the world that you want.

And say, and think, say about this world, or about this part of the world. This is possible, yes, possible is the word that says contingent, that it should be as it is, in its quality and measure, and these accidents that exist in it, and in this time and place what exists in it, yes? The entire world can be as large as it is or smaller, or older or newer, yes? At another time or in another place, it is not clear what it means that the entire world will be in another place, but for all the things in the world it is easy to think about them thus.

The Accidents as Particularizers

And it can be, in all these accidents, yes? The accidents are what particularize, yes? This is now we understand, yes? To particularize is what distinguishes, yes? What distinguishes one thing from another, according to their view, is the accidents, yes? This is what has a certain size, has a certain color, has a certain place, has a certain time and so on. These are the particularizations of things, yes?

For the particularizations of things are not because of their nature or something like that, this keeps jumping, I do not know why. This is not because of their nature, because my computer today is possessed like the Kalam, that there is no reason that one line should be connected to the second line, it keeps jumping on me, we will fix this later. In any case, this is very un-Aristotelian the AI that is doing things here.

There Is No Necessity for the Existing Particularization

In any case, that the entire world is after all something that has qualities, has accidents, it is at a certain time, it is of a certain size, and of a certain color etc., there is nothing that necessitates that it should be exactly thus and not otherwise, and it is possible, or a certain part of it, and it is possible that it should be larger, imagine, it is possible that it could be larger or smaller, or in the exchange of this quality, every quality which is every accident essentially that exists, you can think that it will be in another way, or in such accidents, or it will exist before the time of its existence or after it, if the world was created five thousand and something years ago, there is nothing that gives us a reason that this should be specifically at such a time, not nine years earlier, not specifically 5786. Indeed, when thinking thus, then there cannot be a reason for such a thing. Or after it, or in other than this place, the sun could be below and the earth above and so on such things.

The Conclusion: Particularization Proves a Particularizer

If so, their particularization, that they are particularized, distinguished in one quality or in measure or in place or in one of the accidents and in a particular time, every thing, with the possibility of all their alternatives, if this is, that is, despite the fact that it is possible that it should be in any other way, at any other time, in any other color, in any other size, is a proof of one who particularizes, who chose one of these two possible things. This really proves to us, this is what leads us to the point of God’s will or God’s choice.

The Divine Will as the Answer to the Question of Particularization

This is perhaps the most important thing, because this is exactly what their God does. For every thing can be thus, there is no explanation, there cannot be an explanation, there cannot be an explanation that explains why something is thus and not thus. So what, what kind, nevertheless, if we assume, and here essentially the new atheists argue, they say, okay, so there is no explanation, so there is no explanation, let us go to sleep.

If you still, and there is here really a type of paradox, but if you still believe in a type of principle of the explicability of the world, as if not willing to arrive, even though the Kalam itself gives up on this at a higher level, at the level of details, yes, at the level of nature. But if you still assume, yes, something that the later ones call the principle of sufficient reason, yes, things that there must be a reason why they are thus and not otherwise, there must be at least a type of answer to this question, why is the world at this time and not at a time one day earlier, yes? Or a thousand days earlier, or a thousand years earlier, why not?

The Analogy from Human Will

And we, and the Kalam, I am adding here many words that are not written here, but this is how I spoke about this recently, I thought about this. So the Kalam answers this question, if in a way that we, here we are answering like the Kalam, yes? For example, this is how I am now adding, if we see a person who does a certain thing, yes? Yes, a person is exactly the primary case of possibility, yes? He can be thus, the person can do, I can get up at 6 in the morning, and can get up at 7 in the morning, and can get up at 8 in the morning, there is no necessity, yes? It could be that I have good reasons or less, but let us say that between 6 and 6 and one minute, there is generally no good reason that I should get up specifically at this time.

And when we ask a question of this type, generally we answer it with will and choice, yes? We say, why did Yitzhak get up at six and a minute and not at six and a half minute? Because he wanted to. This is a type of satisfactory answer to this type of questions that otherwise have no other answer, yes? If the minute and one, minute and a half is exactly the same thing as the minute, then why did I really get up then? Because I wanted to.

Application of the Analogy to the Entire World

And this is the type of answer that they answer to all the things of the world. For if the world or one detail of the world is particularized, it is chosen, it is specifically in such a way, despite the fact that there is not, there cannot be a reason that explains to us, yes? If you were to say, why do you get up at six and not at eleven in the morning? Because I have work. Okay, so you have an answer, because of work. But if the whole matter, all these answers cannot be, because of their physics that does not allow this, then the only answer is what we answer about people, for example, when we have no answer.

Why do you take this one and not that one? Both are equal, they are like the two goats of Yom Kippur, equal in appearance and size and stature, which is exactly the quality of the substances of the Kalam, yes, they are exactly equal, equal every atom is equal to every other atom in the universe, so one must choose between them, and one must choose that the world, there must be a choice, and this choice that is necessary to be in the world, so that the world will be, because the world is not in all possibilities at once, the world is always in this way and not in another way, that is it is particularized, yes, this is God, this is the Creator. It is a proof of a particularizer, who chooses, who willed one of these two possible things, yes? So this is the matter.

From Particularization to Creation: The Connection Between Particularization and the Creation of the World

And Maimonides says, if so, the need of the world itself, yes? That the world itself, yes, the entire world, he means, or any part of its parts needs a particularizer, is a proof of its being created. What is the proof, if it is particularized, that it is created? Yes, there is here after all a question, a question is hidden here.

The Difficulty: Why Not Eternity?

For it could be that the world exists exactly as it is, it was always thus forever, in an eternal way it was thus. And the answer is that for this itself there is no answer, why it should be eternal and not begin at a certain time, yes? And we do not believe in answers in nature, in things that are supposed to answer this question. So it must be, if it is eternal, it could be that it is eternal essentially. In this case it is not eternal.

There is here a question, what is the meaning, how do they know that it is eternal? I do not know. I think there is here a question, a good question. As if, a question that Maimonides himself, in Part Two it seems that there are complications of this type. It is not clear why they, as if, yes it is clear because of all kinds of metaphysical assumptions, but if we are saying here in a very simple way, we are saying, the world is of this type, and it must be in this way, it does not have to be, for there is no necessity, there is no reason, so it must be that it was chosen, that it was willed, this will, that we call God’s will, is what chooses that it should be thus and not otherwise.

The Identity of All Names of Divine Action

And here Maimonides tries to answer what I said. He says that there is no difference between your saying particularizer or maker or creator or originator or one who creates or one who understands, all of them mean one matter. Maimonides says, if you think thus, yes? If you think in an atomistic way, in a way that all things, everything is possible, there must always be a will that makes things be in a certain way and not in another way, then this is exactly what you mean when you say creator, or when you say maker, or when you say agent, or when you say originator, or when you say one who creates, when you say one who understands, that is one who understands that it must be thus, yes?

All these words in the end, fundamentally, yes, if you say, the foundation of all this is this atomistic picture, everything means the same thing exactly. The meaning is, the divine will, this will, we call it divine will, this will decides, yes, chooses that it should be thus. It decides that it begins in time, this is all we have here. We do not have, all these other words that we say about God, that He acts, that He is thus that He is thus

Many Sections: Applications of the Principle of Particularization

This word particularizes, particularizes the possibility, yes, this is exactly, this is all that this can be, there is not even another thing that this is the meaning of this. Okay? Let us see if I can fix this. Do not know, no, it is not helping me for now. Okay. So this is the proof.

Now let us finish what he says about this, yes? Maimonides says thus, where am I? The fifth way, and they make, yes? And they make for this way, yes.

Now, the Rambam says, I have explained to you the foundation, I think this is now more or less understood to us, what this means. And the Rambam says, I have explained to you the foundation, the foundation of foundations of this point. And you will now understand that it is possible to say the same idea in a thousand and one ways. And they made many branches to this path, right? There are many branches, many details, many offshoots of exactly the same idea, general and particular, right? One can speak in a general way about the entire world, one can speak in a particular way about a specific detail.

At the General Level: The Structure of the World

Until they say, for example, they say, the earth being under the water is no more fitting than its being above the water, right? This is exactly the example that Aristotle really thinks he has a reason for, right? Aristotle explained that there are four elements, and the earth must be under the water, its nature, to be in this place and so on. But they say, they agree that this is the nature, right? Everyone agrees that this is how the world looks, that generally, that is, the element of water is above the element of earth, above the water. They say, everything is atoms, so why does it matter? There is no reason, and the answer is God, right? The will of God.

And the same thing, and the sun being round is no more necessary than if it were square or triangular. Again, this is something that Aristotle thinks there is a good reason why the sun is round. It must be round, because the circular form is the most perfect, circular motion is the most perfect, there is some thing, right? Even in our science, in our science there is an answer to the question why the sun is round, right? It’s not that it says, it could be, it could be, yes, it could be if there were a different sun, yes, but if we say, it could be a sun, even in form, any form.

So they say, it could be, okay, why? Because the relation of these attributes, all the attributes to the bodies possessing the attributes, is one relation, right, the relation between this attribute, round or triangular, to the body, to the substance upon which it is borne, is always the same relation, there is no essential connection between the atom of the sun, or the million atoms that they are made of and the circular form. And if so, who particularized the sun? And this attribute.

At the Particular Level: The Variety of Flowers

And so they will examine all parts of the world. Yes, exactly, so now he spoke about the entire world, he spoke about something very general, about the earth, the water above the earth. He spoke about the form of the sun and he will give us another more particular example.

Until when they see flowers of different appearances, they will see, there are several types of flowers, right? There are red flowers, there are white ones, there are green ones and so on. Then they will wonder and this proof will be strengthened in their view, right? They say, look, yes, this is really, they illustrate this almost to children, they say, look how many types of flowers there are. If there were some one form of flower that a flower must be of this type, then all flowers must be the same thing. But behold, flowers are a million, there are a million and one types of flowers. What causes a flower of this type to be like this and a flower of that type to be like that? Ah, the answer is, it is divine will.

They will say, behold this is one earth and one water, right? For, you say, as it were there is also a difficulty here against the Aristotelian scientists who have explanations for these types of things, right? All flowers grow from water and earth, right? They are all the same thing. Why is this flower green and that one red? And they have no possibility of giving an answer, except that it is by a particularizer, right? The particularizer who chooses between these options, that the flower should be red or green, is what causes, and that particularizer is God, right? Because this is what we said, he prepared for us at the end of the previous section, that for them the word God is identical, and creator, maker, governor, supervisor, it doesn’t matter what word you give it, in the end the intention is exactly the same meaning, the particularizer who chooses between these options, between these possibilities, right? Not theoretical options, right? Real options, of course there is nothing, there is no law, there is no rule in nature that causes it to be thus and not otherwise.

From the Particular to the General: The Creation of the World

If so, and so, so they say, and here they arrive at the creation of the entire world, right? They say, we have now spoken about one flower, but think about the entire world, there is no reason that it should be, even the world in its entirety has certain attributes, right? For example that it began at a certain time, it doesn’t matter when that time is, it will always be a certain time, and there cannot be a reason for this kind of thing. Or further, it could be the existence of the world itself, there is no reason that it should exist and not exist, we will speak about this in the sixth proof. But the Rambam claims that this will also be a particular case, a particular instance of the same kind of intelligent power.

If so, the entire world needs someone who will particularize all of it and each of its parts in one of the particulars. Everything needs someone who will choose, who will particularize it from among the other possibilities.

The Dependence of the Proof on the Tenth Premise

And all of this, says the Rambam, you are right, and all of this is necessitated by accepting the tenth premise. If one accepts the tenth premise, then this is indeed the conclusion. And here the Rambam means, because I told you that the tenth premise is nonsense, then this proof is nonsense.

The Rambam’s Complex Relationship to the Proof

But the Rambam says, remember that this is not so simple, already there he told us, the Rambam, he has a very complex relationship to this concept of particularization, because for him this is really the central question. The central question is whether there are necessary causes for things, whether the world has necessity at all or whether it has only freedom as it were of divine will.

The Rambam says, if what I told you that this is all based on the tenth premise, is joined with one who thinks about the eternity of the world, he will not disagree with us about particularization. The Rambam says about us, here the Rambam now speaks about us, about us, we, both we and also the Mutakallimun believe in the creation of the world, because this is the plain meaning of the Torah. The Rambam says it is possible to understand, to believe also in the eternity of the world, and not to disagree that there are things that could be otherwise.

And as I will explain later, he notes what he will explain later, in the end this is in my view the best of the paths, and I have an opinion about it, you will hear, I have an opinion, I have a view, a position, regarding this proof, and I will not yet explain it.

The Rambam’s Independent View: Application to the Celestial System

More or less what he means is that what he writes, some point there in chapter nineteen, that the Rambam claims that Aristotelian science gives good reasons for all the organs below the lunar sphere, and he is very unconvinced by the explanations that Aristotle gives for the celestial system, for the stars and the spheres, and the Rambam tries at least to claim, at least so it is written there, that he really thinks that the proof of this type works on the stars, because Aristotle and no one will be able to give a reason why there is exactly, because there is some certain number of stars, right? It is a certain number, not infinite. And there is no reason that can be given why it is exactly this number and not that number, except divine will. And therefore the Rambam, at least so it is written there, claims that this is a good proof for the creation of the world.

Conceptual Clarification: Creation of the World = A World That Has a Particularizer

And the creation of the world, yes, and here you hear me, right? The camera went. And one must remember that the creation of the world here, the meaning is a world that has a particularizer, right? This is more or less the same meaning, and this is also something that needs a bit more, as I said, it is not clear what contradicts the idea that there is a particularizer, and he particularizes it continuously or eternally.

But the truth is that when we say the eternity of the world and the creation of the world, at least for the Rambam in all this discussion, we mainly mean exactly this point of possibility. That is, it doesn’t matter, why was it even important to everyone, to the Rambam also, as well, why would it even be important for the Rambam for possibility and for there to be a demonstrated proof of the creation of the world? The answer is because possibility was important to him and he explains this in Part II, chapter twenty-four, and other places.

Exactly this point was important to him and therefore if we can show in some sense, the Rambam certainly says that it is a great delusion to say this about the entire world that there cannot be any reason for anything, but if we succeed in showing at least about some small part of the world perhaps, about some one thing we will succeed in showing that it has no reason, that it is truly arbitrary and therefore the Rambam concludes, again, today we also don’t agree with this, that this means there is a particularizer who chooses and wills this, this will indeed prove everything that needs to be proved, that is, God of this type who wills and chooses.

Summary

This is what I have to say about this fifth proof today. I have left many fundamental questions, but this is what is written here.