The Preponderance of Existence over Non-Existence – The Sixth Way | Part I Chapter 74 (4) | Guide for the Perplexed 178 (Auto Translated)

The Sixth Way to Prove the Creation of the World — The Proof of Determination over Existence Itself

Introduction: The Structural Complexity in the Proofs of the Mutakallimun

We are studying here the sixth way. The Rambam in Chapter 74 reminds us of the seven proofs of the Mutakallimun for the creation of the world. We have already discussed that there is a very great complexity in all these proofs, because it appears that…

What complexity? The complexity is in a much more fundamental way for understanding this inquiry into the creation of the world. The Mutakallimun constantly prove the existence of God from the creation of the world — if the world is created, then it has a creator, like that. And this is as if a first principle; they don’t even think it needs proof. At least according to how the Rambam presents it, it appears at the end of the chapter he simply says this is a first principle. It’s simple. There were those who engaged in Kalam — also in Chovot HaLevavot I saw that one of the books I read about this, it’s by Davidson or by Wolfson, they discuss that there is a debate about this — but in Chovot HaLevavot it is indeed written that there is a kind of proof for this, that if the world is created it has a creator.

But in any case, that the world is created is another way of saying it did not create itself, so it has a creator and that is God. This is more or less how the structure of their proofs works. And because of this, many of the proofs they say are proofs for the creation of the world — what they need to prove is not that there is a God, what they need to prove is that the world is not the eternal thing, because then it seems to them they don’t need God, which is itself somewhat problematic. But their proofs are very often proofs that seem to me at least to be proofs for the existence of God, and for them this is the same thing as proofs for the creation of the world.

The Paradoxical Reversal in the Order of Proof

So it appears in this proof when they speak about all of existence, about the world itself, about the universe, and they say they are proving that it is created. And how do they prove that it is created? Apparently in this proof they prove that it is created by the fact that it needs a God to create it. So this comes out somewhat backwards, yes? Completely backwards from what their own order should be — that one needs to prove from the world that it is created, and then prove that there is a God.

But because their God is precisely the creator of the world, it apparently turns out that one can also prove it backwards. One can prove that there is a God, meaning that there is a creator, or what he will call in this proof — the determiner. And therefore if this is the kind of thing that needs a determiner, then it is the kind of thing that began. This is my introduction, and another introduction to all this study that I don’t understand.

Reminder: The Fifth Way — The Proof of Choice over the Attributes of the World

We learned that the fifth proof was the proof of choice. The proof that because we say all the things in the world could have been otherwise, we need to give a reason for how it is this way and not otherwise. And this thing, the only answer that can be for such a thing is God — the God who chooses and wills that it be this way.

And we learned in the previous proof, in the fifth way, that the Rambam told it like this, that he wrote: “And this, direct your thought”. And this is literally — I saw in my reading about this — this is literally a copy of the language of, I forgot who, one of the Kalam scholars, who describes it in exactly this way. Who says: “Think, direct your thought to the world itself, or to any part you wish of its parts”. Meaning, you can think about the entire world, or about one specific part of it, and say: this passes, it can be this way and can be otherwise, and therefore God is the one who makes it be this way and not otherwise.

And already there the Rambam gave us several ways, gave an example of the flower and of the sun — how the flower, how there are all kinds of types of flowers and what causes each flower to be this type of flower, and also what causes the entire world to be as it is, etc. So apparently in the previous proof it was a kind of: the entire world has a certain attribute, has a certain size and certain time, etc. And according to what one can imagine at least — there is the concept of the gate of transference — one can think, meaning according to their view if one can think it would do, if one can think then it can be otherwise. And God is the one who specifies it to be in this way.

The Sixth Way — Determination over Existence Itself, Not over Its Attributes

Now the proof, the sixth way, which is where we are today, is precisely the matter of using this option in essence, but it comes out according to them somewhat differently, according to the Rambam not differently. Yes, meaning, the sixth way is entirely, according to how the Rambam presents it, and it appears he has a dispute about this, whoever presented the sixth way — and the sixth way is entirely the proof of determination, of choice, not about a specific detail of the world, or in other words, also not about the entire world in a certain attribute.

It’s not that one looks at the entire universe and says: the entire universe could be larger or smaller or something like that, and from the fact that it is this size or this color or something, it follows that there is a God. Rather he says: “The entire universe can be or not be”. And because it can be or not be, it needs something that will choose that it be.

So this is a kind of different proof, and this according to their claim proves that the world came into being by choice — which is the same thing as the creation of the world in this entire discussion.

The Philosophical Innovation: Speaking of Existence as an Attribute

And it must be emphasized that this is like an innovation. This entire concept of speaking about existence, about the world being, existing, present, existing, and separate from speaking about it existing in a certain way — this is a development.

Aristotle: Philosophy Does Not Deal with Being Itself

Aristotle, in all of Aristotle’s discussions, there is no philosophy at all that deals with being itself. Aristotle claims almost explicitly, or perhaps explicitly, that philosophy cannot deal with being. And this is indeed an argument of the Neo-Platonists and others against him, that therefore his explanations are never sufficient.

Because Aristotle claims: when philosophy begins, meaning, the understanding of the world, the intelligibles of the world begin from the fact that there is something, and we say predication — what is about something, we say something about something — and then we can ask why the something is in this way, or if it’s a changing thing, we can also ask how it came to be such a thing. So therefore Aristotle’s physics begins from change, it cannot go beyond that. And also his ontology always begins from things that are something — it’s something that has an attribute.

A thing that is not an attribute, meaning, to deal with existence itself and relate to it as a possible thing, as something one can think about — whether it is and why it should be at all — this is not something that the classical philosophy of Aristotle contains at all.

Avicenna: Introducing Existence into Philosophical Discourse

What is he called? Avicenna (Ibn Sina) is the one who, also from Aristotle’s words, but there is debate whether he is a true Aristotelian. Meaning, but Avicenna is the one who introduced into the discourse the discussion of existence as something one can speak about with two sides.

There is indeed philosophical depth here, that it’s not certain this works. This goes back to Parmenides, who said that being is and non-being is not. And if we say that non-being absolutely is not, then it’s not clear that one can speak about the thing being, one can discuss and speak or conceive the being, its existence.

Meaning, every time we discuss something we discuss two sides — it is or it is not, or it exists or it doesn’t exist. So we as if look at something and say whether it exists or doesn’t exist. But there is an enormous problem here, because a non-existent thing is not something. So what is the non-existent thing? There is a very basic difficulty in speaking about the attribute of existence, because existence is not an attribute.

Avicenna innovates — he at least speaks about existence, about being in a kind of way as if it is a kind of attribute. And indeed he needs to ask himself, and he does ask himself: whose attribute is this? This is indeed a question. It could be not only a question in thought how to think about this and how to grasp this, but also a question in reality.

Aristotle’s Philosophy Does Not Conceive of Non-Being

Therefore, Aristotle’s philosophy does not really conceive of not being. The non-being is simply not — what are we talking about actually. But Avicenna does, he very specifically spoke about being as if as a kind of attribute. And therefore he not only spoke about being as a kind of attribute, this thing is whether it exists or has the attribute of existence or not the attribute of existence — although certainly this is not the same kind of attribute as what we call descriptive attributes.

The Rambam: The Distinction between God’s Existence and the Existence of Created Things

The Rambam himself, he had a chapter about this, before this, above, that spoke about the existence of God. We say about Him that He exists, or the Rambam there distinguished between God and other things. He said: “God does not have an attribute of existence, but all other things do have an attribute of existence”. Because they can be, so there is something that as if their ability, their possibility to be or not to be, is as if what receives the specification.

The Fifth Proof: Determination of Existence over Non-Existence

From Physical Proofs to Metaphysical Proof

The previous proof still spoke in normal physical language. There are things, the entire world, the sun, the flower, it doesn’t matter — they exist in a certain attribute. And we conceive, at least according to the method of the ancients, that one can conceive — yes, Aristotle also disputes this, but according to their view that there is this transference — one can conceive that they can indeed be otherwise. And then we seek a cause: who causes it to be otherwise? And we say: God causes it to be otherwise.

But here, this proof, uses this patent of Avicenna. The Rambam is quite a devotee of this patent, yes? His proof for the existence of God, essentially the proof — one of his best proofs, and the one he likes most — and also the definition of God, goes through this concept that one can speak about attributes of existence, yes?

Necessary Existent — The Definition of God

We know his words: “Necessary Existent” (mechuyav hametziyut). This is a kind of existence that He has. We speak about existence itself, not about how He exists, but about existence itself. And we say: there are several types of existence. What is called today in English modality, perhaps also in Hebrew modality of existence — meaning, types. Existence itself can be divided into different types of existence, and then we discuss what type of existence the world has, what type of existence God has, etc. And on the basis of this philosophical development, which is a very specific development of Avicenna, this proof works, okay?

The New Proponent and the Preferred Way

So here we read. The Rambam says like this: “One of the later ones thought” — meaning, one of the later Kalam scholars. We remember his history that he gave, that there are the early Kalam scholars, who are the essence of Kalam, and afterwards later ones, who not all of them know exactly why Kalam is not good, etc. But in any case, one of the later ones — even Schwarz doesn’t indicate who he means, I need to check who exactly he means. But he thought — I think someone later than Avicenna. Meaning, it could be al-Ghazali, he has arguments of this type, etc. There is a question whether the Rambam considers al-Ghazali among the Mutakallimun or not, I don’t know.

In any case, so he thought like this: that he found a very good way, a very good proof way, better than any way that preceded it. So someone said: I have the best proof, it is better than all the previous ways.

Why? Precisely because of the difficulty of the previous ways we learned. The previous ways are all built on certain physical assumptions — either the proof of possibility, meaning the assumption of possibility, or the assumption of impossibility of an infinite chain. Of things that both these assumptions are questionable, they already knew this. At least one needs to prove all the Kalamistic physics for them, and it’s somewhat unfortunate that the assumption of God’s existence would depend on a physical thing. We all want it to depend on a metaphysical thing, on something more general than this.

So indeed, one of the later ones claimed he found a much better way.

Determination of Existence over Non-Existence

“And it is the proof of determination of existence over non-existence”. So he says: I will speak about the concept of determination, about that same concept of the previous proof, but not the determination of a certain type of thing over other types, but rather “determination of existence over non-existence” — which is something completely different. So he claimed.

And the Rambam quotes for us how his proof actually works.

The Three Types of Existence

So he says like this: “The world is possible in existence for every person”. He says: every person, meaning whoever argues with him. “For if it were necessary in existence, it would be the Divinity. And we will indeed speak with one who affirms the existence of the Divinity and says the eternity of the world”.

This is a kind of proof according to your method. Meaning, this takes the assumptions of the opponent.

And one must preface here — we had in chapters 51-8 and so on, these questions of whether God exists and what, precisely the attribute of existence. But he says like this: we learned that there are three types of existence. Meaning, if we can discuss existence itself, there are several types.

Impossible Existent

There are things that cannot be, what are called “impossible existent” (nimna hametziyut) — not impossible of attribute, impossible existent. It cannot exist, a kind of — perhaps paradoxes, contradictions in definition — cannot exist in reality. This is called impossible.

And this is how Avicenna describes it: to think about its essence, meaning its existence, the type of thing it is, necessitates that it not exist. This is the way to say impossible existent.

Necessary Existent

There is the complete opposite of this thing, which we call “necessary existent” (mechuyav hametziyut). Necessary existent is a thing that from the type of thing it is, it must be. Or in another way we say: its existence and its essence are the same thing.

Meaning, the essence of most things — we will get to the third category — there is an essence of things that because of what they are, meaning they are a true contradiction, so because of what they are they cannot be. So there cannot be a question about their existence, because they cannot be. There are things that because of what they are must be. So if you understand — meaning, if there is such a thing, then it already exists.

Possible Existent

And there is the third thing in the middle, which is “possible existent” (efshari hametziyut) — the possible things. The things that you understand from them. A tall person — there is not, within the understanding of what it is to be a tall person, it doesn’t say there will be such a person. It could be that such a person can only be, but doesn’t have to be. And sometimes he exists.

And we add here another innovation: that this word “necessary existent” is the definition of God. This is an innovation. Saadia Gaon already claimed this is written in the book of Exodus, “I will be what I will be” (Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh) and so on. But this is an innovation of Avicenna on the definition of God, more or less — that this is the thing that from what it is must be. Therefore it can begin the entire chain of being and so on, but this is essentially a definition of God.

The Structure of the Argument: The World as Possible Existent

So this argument says, this proponent says like this: you philosophers, those who say the eternity of the world, admit that the world is possible in existence. There is discussion about this — after all the Rambam is going to somewhat deny this — but so he claims. After all you admit, and this is essentially the entire debate.

After all the entire debate here about the eternity of the world is not a debate about the existence of God. Everyone admits there is a God. The question is whether the world was created in time or not.

So therefore this proponent claims: you after all agree that the world is only possible in existence, possible in existence for every person — meaning, whoever I am, there is no debate about this here.

Why Must the World Be Possible in Existence?

It is certainly not impossible in existence, because it exists. It is certainly not necessary in existence, because necessary in existence is God. If it is necessary in existence, then the world is God. And this — you after all claim that you believe in God.

There could be such a discussion. There could be some Spinoza who will say that the world itself is the necessary existent, or the totality of the world or something like that, and then indeed there is no God outside the world. But this is not a position — no one has such a position here. We are not dealing here with such a position. We are dealing here with a position of “one who affirms the existence of the Divinity and says the eternity of the world”. He says: there is a God, meaning there is a difference, and this is essentially the main difference.

The Main Difference between God and the World

The main difference between God and the world is that the world doesn’t have to be. You understand what a world is, you don’t understand that there needs to be such a thing. You understand that there is a God, you understand that there needs to be such a thing — there is no other possibility.

So the world is possible in existence. After all you admit this.

The Definition of the Possible and the Need for a Determining Cause

So now he continues. He says: okay. “And the possible, every thing that is possible, is that it is possible that it be found and possible that it not be found”. Possible that it be found and possible that it not be found — this is precisely the point of the possible.

If there is a cause that proves that something, that necessitates that something be found — here he innovates something. He says that possible is a thing, so this proponent claims: possible is a thing that can be and can not be.

So it comes out like this…

The Rambam’s Critique of Avicenna’s Proof from “Possible Existent”

The Structure of Avicenna’s Proof — Continuation and Completion

The Conclusion of the Argument: The Necessity of an External Determiner

So it comes out like this — it comes out that if there is a cause that necessitates that it be, then it is not possible in existence. Existence, so he claims. So he understood that possible in existence means that it is exactly equal, yes, this is what he continues: “that existence is not more fitting in it than non-existence”. Because if there is something that causes it to be more fitting, yes, that it needs to be, that there is a cause that it be and not be non-existence — then precisely it comes out that it is not possible in existence, it is necessary in existence.

Yes, so he says: if you admit that the world is possible in existence, then you admit that there cannot be any cause that the world be found. Yes? Yes, and after all it is found, yes. And then his next line goes: “And after all it is found”. If — so if, yes, if it is found, yes, then so he writes the proof: “If this possible existent is found” — so if this thing that is possible in existence is indeed found — “then if the equivalence of the judgment of existence and the knowledge of evil” — but after all according to the judgment, yes, according to the theory, it is equal, there is nothing that can necessitate it to be or not to be. “Then it is the proof of a determiner, who determined or determined its existence and by its knowledge”.

So there needs to be an external cause to the world — this is precisely what he seeks to prove. There needs to be something completely external to the world that makes it determined that it exist. This is the claim of — so this is the claim of this righteous one.

The Connection to the Creation of the World

And after all this precisely proves what he calls the creation of the world — meaning that God determined that the world exist. And this he claims from the definition of the world as possible in existence, and therefore there cannot be any cause that gives it to exist, except God who decided that it exist.

But one can say this also without it appearing, right? One can say this without it always having been. If it always was, but there is someone who will do this. Yes, problem. The problem — this is a problem. But you say that in the end somehow the fear of the world, what does this have to do with someone making the quiet?

The Connection between Determination and Temporality

I think like this, I think this is supposed to be — that this doesn’t necessitate that it began in time, that this is precisely the creation of the world. It could be that God always determined that it be, but I think what he means is something like this:

He claims that possible in existence, and the Rambam himself is going to emphasize this later — he claims that possible in existence needs to be a thing that has no cause to exist. And he understands, and apparently this is indeed how those who believed in the eternity of the world understood, that the eternity of the world says that God is a cause that the world be. Meaning, there is a cause, and it needs to be, yes? Not that God decided — here we spoke about this.

The Difference between Creation of the World and Eternity of the World

The main difference between creation of the world and eternity of the world, in some sense — for them this was really connected with the idea of whether it began in time. Because a thing that began in time must be that it really cannot be, and it also completely doesn’t exist.

The Aristotelian Assumption: Necessity and Eternity

Apparently because there is an Aristotelian assumption that anything that can be, that can not be in a manner — against the background of eternal time — this possibility must be actualized, something like that. They didn’t really think that something could be eternal, but could simply not be. This was, at least we hear about them just words: if it is always, then it must be. For them necessity and eternity are almost the same thing. One can indeed debate whether this is correct, but I think Aristotle himself thinks this way.

The Contradiction that Ibn Sina Points Out

So he argues, yes, so he argues that if you agree that the world can not be, then you cannot say — and this is what he argues, he argues that they are contradictory. They claim that it can not be, and God, yes, they also agree that God causes it to be. But they claim that He must, yes, this is how they always say here, at least in this discussion of the nine premises: God must cause the world to be, yes, God is the cause of the world, but He is a necessary cause of the world, not a volitional cause, yes?

And against this he argues, from the fact that they also know that the world is possible in existence. And if it is possible in existence, then what causes it to actually be? This is exactly his argument.

The Rambam’s Response to the Proof

Initial Assessment: “Quite Sufficient”

So the Rambam is going to say that exactly this, that there is an error here. The Rambam says like this, and this is the way, quite sufficient, that is to say, this is a very good way.

It’s not clear — if I translated well enough — it says here “muqani” or something like that, and Schwartz argues in his note that muqani is an adjective for a rhetorical proof, yes. So Ramon argues that this sounds very good, I see that… yes, it’s very convincing, yes, it could be should have been… I’m not sure what Ibn Tibbon means by “sufficient,” but after all he translates that the moderns — Schwartz and also Pines who translated here — “very convincing.”

Note on Ibn Tibbon and Technical Vocabulary

So that is to say that this should — we already spoke about this that Ibn Tibbon is not careful with the technical words of types of proofs, which is apparently indeed his oversight many times. In the philosophical Arabic of the Rambam there is a vocabulary that expresses exactly how good each proof is, because if there is ra’aya and proof burhan — burhan is a demonstrative proof, ra’aya is a dalil, and here we have a third word, or something like that, which is apparently a term for ra’aya, not even ra’aya, yes, what is convincing, rhetoric, yes.

So Ibn Tibbon, I’m not sure what he meant by “sufficient,” but he at least missed this in many places, and perhaps here too. So the Rambam argues — he’s not arguing that this is a good proof. I thought he meant that it’s a good proof, “sufficient,” perhaps that’s how Ibn Tibbon understood, that it’s sufficient to say. Indeed, if it were a good proof, then we wouldn’t need another proof, and the Rambam has a proof that is similar, yes? Just without the word “determination.” That is, Ibn Sina’s proof is about possibility of existence.

The Essential Critique: Merely Changing Words

But the Rambam explains like this: this way is a section from the section of the previous unity. He says very nicely — insofar as we acknowledge the idea of determination, which the Rambam himself told us above that there is something to it, there are things in this matter of determination — so correct, very nice, or you can include this in that same list of parts of the world or lightness of the world or the very existence of the world, which one can speak about them that they need determination. The specification.

The Rambam says: you simply changed words. Rather he changed the word “specifier” with “determiner” — it’s the same thing. It’s the same thing, specifier and determiner are the same thing. And he changed the attributes of the existent with the existence of the existent itself, yes, so all this I have prefaced. He changed instead of attributes, yes, descriptions of existence — and this was the found.

But the Rambam says: okay, so to what extent does this proof actually work? To the extent that the previous proof works?

The Central Error: Misunderstanding “Possible in Existence”

But the Rambam argues — he misled us. The author of this proof misled us, or erred — it could be that he’s not misleading us, he simply doesn’t know himself. Regarding, he said, he says, the world is possible in existence.

He says: your proof, this proof is entirely built on the words “the world is possible in existence.” He says: you didn’t understand this phrase. You thought that this phrase says exactly what you understand as possible, yes? That is, this transfer.

But the truth is — what happened now? Where are the matters? But the truth is that this is not correct. Let’s see what happens if I put this. No. Wait, I’ll show what I need to do.

Okay, so he erred in this concept of necessary in existence.

Ibn Sina’s Distinction Between “Possible in Existence in Itself” and “Necessary in Existence Through Its Cause”

The Problem with the Concept “Possible in Existence”

What is the meaning? And the Mutakallimun say like this, because the word — what you call possible in existence, and what the premise-makers, the people of premises say necessary in existence, possible in existence — it’s the same word but a different meaning.

Because our opponent who believes in the eternity of the world will apply the name of possible when he says the world is possible in existence to the aspect of the matter which the speaker applies to it. As we will explain, and they reference here Part 2 Chapter 1 in the third speculation, where he speaks about this proof. There the third speculation is Ibn Sina’s proof on the concept of the eternity of the world.

In any case, all the commentators here, on the place, on the page, argue that the intention is like this. Ibn Sina, this is what he said. He said, and this statement indeed illustrates the difficulty in all this modal discourse of possible in existence and necessary in existence.

Ibn Sina’s Position

Ibn Sina said that after all he believes in the eternity of the world and he thinks there is a cause for the world to be, yes? And if there is a cause for the world to be, then as we will see at length in the second part, it’s very difficult that there is a cause for the world to be only at a certain time. Because the world, the very existence of the world, doesn’t seem like the kind of thing that works, that temporal existence works for it. But okay, this is a side matter for now.

But he understands the relationship between God and the world as a necessary relationship, yes? He calls it will, but there are still discussions what will means and so on, but let’s at least speak about it like this now.

And then he says like this: I say that the world is possible in existence, and therefore everything that is possible in existence indeed needs something to begin it, to bring it into being, and therefore we need God who is necessary in existence. But on the other hand, I say that the world must be, yes?

The Solution: Distinction Between “In Itself” and “Through Its Cause”

That is, Ibn Sina explicitly does not say, as the Kalam interpreted, that there is not, that the law of existence is equal to the law of non-existence. He doesn’t say such a thing at all. He says that the world must be. So he says, so why do I even call the world possible in existence? After all my entire proof for the existence of God is built on the idea of possible in existence.

So he simply says, because there is a difference between saying possible in existence in itself and saying possible in existence through its cause, yes? That is, or necessary in existence.

So he says like this, and this is his style, he says: The world is possible in existence in itself and necessary in existence through its cause.

So indeed now, that is, in the reality where the world has a cause, where there is God, then if there is God the world is necessary in existence. That is, this is exactly what the Kalam said, that you after all admit that the world is possible in existence for otherwise it would be God. So exactly on this matter Ibn Sina disagrees.

He says, no, the world is necessary in existence because there is God. So what’s the difference, why isn’t the world God? Exactly because it is necessary in existence only through its cause and not in itself.

The Meaning of the Distinction

So there is here a different interpretation of the concept possible in existence or necessary in existence. Possible in existence can be possible in existence only in itself, in terms of, that is, as we said, in terms of the essence of the world. That if you understand what the world is, you still don’t know that it exists. If you understand the essence of God, you know that He exists.

But even if you understand the essence of God, you know that the world exists. It could be, I’m not sure if this is exactly correct, but in any case, after there is a world and God, then it must be so, then there must be a world indeed. There must be a world, and that the world is possible in existence doesn’t at all necessitate that there could be no world. Yes, there must be a world. Only that the world is still possible in existence in itself, even though now that it has a cause, it is indeed, it is necessary in existence.

The Conclusion

So this is the first thing, he says why you simply erred, your proof, which you think is a proof according to the view of believers in eternity, it doesn’t work, because they don’t think like you about the concept of possible, yes? Rather the words, in order to really delve into this, to investigate it, requires much study, but these are the words of the debate here.

The Second Difficulty: The Problem with the Concept of “Determination” Regarding the Existence of the World

And he continues, and I think the second difficulty is also a continuation of the same contradiction, the same discussion here.

The Rambam says further, more than this, that their statement that the world needs a determiner, to determine its existence over its non-existence, there is here a place of very great doubt. It’s not at all so simple to apply the concept of determination to the existence of the world.

The Rambam says thus, this is what he does, he applied the concept of determination, which the Rambam admits that if there is something where there is no reason for it to be thus or not otherwise, it indeed needs to be determined also on this. But it’s not simple to do this. Why?

The Parable of Copper: How the Concept of Determination Works

Because determination and specification will indeed be found in one existent that receives each of two contraries or each of two alternatives equally, yes? We spoke about this that there are contraries and there are alternatives. Contraries are things that the more cold there is the less heat there is and so on, and alternatives are just, different colors that don’t contradict each other, yes, they’re not opposites, they’re different things.

And then the Rambam says, the concept of determination works when you have for example one matter or one form, doesn’t matter, one thing, one substance, that receives contraries, different attributes, different accidents, and then it will be said after, and it will be said, and it will be said, yes, so we say, after we found in the attribute that is dependent and didn’t find in the other attribute, it is the proof of an intentional agent, yes, this is exactly the type of proof they say here, yes.

If we, and for example, as if you said, for example, that this is copper, yes, if we have copper matter, it is not in receiving the form of a vessel more than it is in receiving the form of a lamp. Copper, in terms of what it is copper, it is copper matter, it can be a vessel and it can be a lamp, there is nothing that gives it to be a lamp.

And therefore, and when we found it a lamp or a vessel, because we find copper that is not just copper, it is copper in the form of a lamp, we knew necessarily that a specifier and intender intended one of these two passing things, yes? So the copper in itself, and this is exactly specification, this is someone else from outside, or another agent from outside, who chose, who specified this copper to be either a vessel or a lamp.

For, and the Rambam explains that it has already been established that the copper exists, we know that the copper exists, and we know that these two passing things, yes? these two possibilities attributed to it, are absent from it before the determination of the determiner, before there is a determiner, then it has neither, it is neither vessel nor lamp. So we indeed need, we’re looking for an explanation. The copper won’t explain this, so we need an agent from outside who will choose that it be a vessel or a lamp.

Why This Doesn’t Work Regarding the World

However, so he says, now the Rambam says something very very important. When we discuss, I’ll try to say my words and then read. When we discuss the world, if it is necessary in existence, the Rambam says, this is exactly the debate whether the world needs a determiner.

That is, whoever says that the world is necessary in existence, says that the world is not similar to copper that received the form of a vessel, but to copper itself for example. Let’s say, if the copper itself were the first matter, as he knows.

He says that the world cannot not be, yes? This is exactly the argument. Why can it not not be? Because of God, doesn’t matter, this is another discussion. But not in itself, but through something else, doesn’t matter. But in the end, the world itself cannot not be. Exactly according to the view of eternity. There is a cause that necessitates that the world be. This cause can be outside the world, this is not the problem now, yes?

But it’s not an agent, it doesn’t need to be similar to a vessel, where we say, not only does it have a cause outside of it, but it also has a choosing cause, yes? A volitional cause. Because after all there is also not, there is no cause at all, this is not of the vessel. When we find copper in the form of a vessel we don’t say there is some metaphysical cause, some very magical cause that necessitates there how this copper will be in this form. There isn’t, it indeed can be otherwise and therefore because there is so much optionality here, here there are so many options, so it indeed needs a chooser who will determine that it be copper.

Begging the Question

But the discussion about the eternity of the world is not a discussion after we know this and we say why the world is thus. After all this is exactly the discussion, whether the world is like the copper of a vessel or whether it is like one plus one equals two which must be even though there can be a cause outside it.

So the Rambam says you use the fact that the world needs a determiner to prove that it is created — you simply assume what is to be proved.

So this is exactly our question. Whoever argues for the eternity of the world argues that there is a cause for the world to be and there is an eternal cause, and therefore doesn’t need to determine of the type that you request.

The Rambam’s Language

And this is what he says: And indeed then the existent thing that is disputed whether its existence is such that it will not depart or move or exists after non-existence — yes, the thing the world that exists, everyone knows it exists, but this is exactly the dispute whether it exists after non-existence or whether it exists in a manner that will not move or depart, it always was and always will be — this matter cannot be conceived in it in any way, we cannot at all ask this question about it, and it will not be said who determined its existence over its non-existence except after the acknowledgment that it exists after non-existence.

If you say that it is glorious, and then he says, okay, there is this thing which is the world, it can be glorious and it can exist, we found that it exists, who will determine that it be existent? Very nice. And this is the matter that is disputed, this is exactly the thing we are debating.

Opening to a New Point: The Logical Possibility of Thinking the World Does Not Exist

The Rambam says, okay, he has a solution, and it could be that this is the reason he indeed thought thus. And if we take existence, after all the Rambam says, and here enters a very important point, the Rambam says like this: after all everyone admits that we can think that the world does not exist, this is very easy…

The Central Claim of the Kalam: The Existence of the World as a Question

We found that it exists, who determined that it be existent? Very nice. And this is the matter that is disputed. This is exactly the thing we are debating. And they say to them okay, he has a solution. And it could be that this is the reason he indeed thought thus.

The Basic Assumption of the Kalam: The Possibility of Thinking About the World’s Non-Existence

And if we take existence, yes? After all Amon says, here enters a very important point. Amon said thus, after all everyone admits that we can think that the world does not exist. This is very easy. Perhaps it’s very easy to imagine, but it’s very easy. After all it doesn’t sound, it doesn’t seem to us a contradiction in definition. Yes. And the Kalam indeed thinks, so if, the Rambam says very nicely, if being able to think that something doesn’t exist is sufficient, that we would need a cause for it to exist, then he would be correct.

The First Critique: Return to the Tenth Premise — Imagination Versus Intellect

But we remember that this is exactly the tenth assumption. That is, this is exactly the debate.

Aristotle’s Position: Imagination Is Not a Criterion for Possibility

Aristotle argues that the things we decide whether one can think about something, we cannot use our imagination for this. That is, if we can picture, we cannot picture contradictory things, but we can picture many impossible things. We can picture that the heavens will be above below and the earth will be below, but this is not possible according to Aristotle.

And this is exactly his argument against the Kalam that they use the criterion of imagination and not of intellect, and we dealt with this in the previous chapter.

Application of the Critique to the Current Proof

So it turns out when this that you say that one can think the existence and unity of the world, very nice, we have already returned to the tenth premise itself, and it is the establishment of imaginations and thoughts, not the establishment of existents and intelligibles.

It’s clear that the Rambam doesn’t think this is a decisive argument, because it’s not clear that there is an intelligible that says the world cannot not be, but at least you’re arguing with someone, you need to convince him, not yourself.

The Opponent’s Response: Distinction Between Possibility in Itself and Possibility Through Its Cause

Because the opponent who believes in the eternity of the world will see that our imagination of non-existence is like our imagination of every impossibility that is not known to fall in imagination — it could be that this is an error or what, yes?

This is exactly the debate. Apparently he argues clearly that one can imagine that there is no world but one cannot think this because there is a cause that there is a world and if you think this you are mistaken and you are imagining.

Okay. I, I will correct this. Okay.

The Second Critique: Begging the Question — What Is a “Possible World”?

So the Rambam essentially argues here that the Kalam simply errs. This proof simply, that is he doesn’t err that there is here an introduction to a proof, but errs if he thinks that this is supposed to convince one who believes in the eternity of the world that it is a created world.

Possibility in Itself Versus Necessity Through Its Cause

Because first of all what he calls a possible world he doesn’t mean that it’s possible in your sense, he means only that it’s possible in itself, he has no problem that it be possible in itself and necessary through its cause.

The Debate About the Nature of the World Itself

And second, that the whole idea of saying the world needs a determiner and therefore needs to determine its existence over non-existence, is already an analogy to all other things that are things and we know they can be thus and thus and therefore need determination, this is exactly begging the question because this is exactly the debate whether the world is this kind of thing that can be or cannot be or whether it is not this kind of thing.

A Note of Caution: Distinction Between Refutation and Non-Persuasion

And the Rambam immediately says, he as it were apologizes, he says, and the intention is not to refute their statements, we are not now engaged in refuting the Kalam’s proof, it could be that they have a point.

Methodological Principle: Self-Persuasion Versus Persuading the Opponent

He’s only doing, yes, this is very nice, the work, all his work that he does throughout these chapters. He says that it’s very important that you understand when you’re convincing yourself and when you’re convincing your opponent, yes?

Evaluating the Proof: Is It Really Superior?

And indeed I have shown you that this way, which they think is a way other than what preceded, is not the truth, yes?

The Claim of the Proof’s Superiority

All the advantage of this proof, of whoever invented it said that it’s better than everything written, this is exactly because he thought that this proof is a metaphysical proof, that it doesn’t need all the Kalam physics, which is indeed what they argue about.

Rejecting the Claim of Superiority

The Rambam says, no. Look in the end, you’ll see that this is exactly based on your idea that the world is this kind of thing that needs determination. And if you, and not only this, but perhaps also based on the tenth premise, which says, how do I know? Because I think. Okay, and it’s not the truth that this is a better proof.

Class Discussion: Does the Proof Work According to the Kalam’s System?

What? But their law, what they, but according to their system it does work, if they don’t go and transgress their law. According to their system it works, just as the previous proof works. But whoever doesn’t agree with their system, then it doesn’t work for them.

Yes, yes, but the idea of the proof is to prove to one who doesn’t agree, not to one who does agree.

But its law is as what precedes it, I think it should be, I suppose, this is the known transfer.

The Conclusion: The Status of This Proof Is as Its Predecessors

So he says, correct, there’s no problem. The Rambam claims that this is simply an application, perhaps it’s better to apply it to the world as a whole rather than to a particular detail. Certain particulars can have reasons for things already within the world, okay?

The Basic Metaphysical Debate

He doesn’t say no, but ultimately in form, the Rambam because of this arrived at the tenth speculation. Metaphysically there is also a debate here. That is, metaphysically, I don’t know anthropology, but metaphysically, in the sense of the entire world, he says that this is precisely the debate between the eternity of the world and the theory of creation, whether the entire world has a necessary cause, and if it has a necessary cause, then you cannot say why there is no cause at all, right?

Yes, that’s exactly the point, it has a cause.

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So this concludes the discussion of this proof.