📋 Shiur Overview
Argument Flow Summary – Erev Shavuos Shiur: Shemonah Perakim, Virtues, Mitzvos, and the Nature of Torah
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1. Opening & Framing
This is an Erev Shavuos shiur continuing the study of the *Shemonah Perakim* (Rambam’s Eight Chapters), with a connection to *Matan Torah* (the giving of the Torah) since the holiday is approaching.
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2. [Side Digression: Fundraising Appeal & “Im Ein Kemach Ein Torah”]
The annual pre-Shavuos fundraising campaign for the Beis Medrash is introduced. The Mishnah *”Im ein kemach ein Torah”* (“If there is no flour/sustenance, there is no Torah”) is cited, but the common habit of citing a Mishnah to prove something self-evidently true is critiqued — you don’t need a Mishnah to know that institutions need money.
The Mishnah’s actual chiddush (novelty): It presents a *paradox* — “If no flour, no Torah; if no Torah, no flour” — a circular, mutually dependent relationship, not a trivially obvious claim.
New pshat (interpretation) “al pi derech ha’emes”: There is a cycle — the more you understand Torah, the more you give/raise money; the more you invest (money, time, effort), the more you understand. In this world, *”tzun ma g’doshen”* — you get what you pay for. Investment and return are reciprocal, whether the effort comes before or after the result.
Practical update: nearly $200K raised, goal is $360K to fund staff for the coming year.
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3. Return to Main Subject: The Eight Chapters and the Study of Virtues
The class has been studying the *Shemonah Perakim*, described as a summary/shortening of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, mediated through Abu Nasr (al-Farabi), whom the Rambam greatly admired. The semester’s task: go through the list of virtues and discuss each one.
[Side Digression: Translation of “Virtues”]
The difficulty of translating the concept is discussed. In a prior class with a colleague named Antonio, several options were considered:
– “Powers” — rejected as inadequate.
– “Greatnesses” — the Rambam’s own term: *ma’alos* (literally “elevations” or “greatnesses”).
– “Virtues” — the standard English word, but nobody really knows what it means; it carries misleading moral/economic connotations.
In Aristotle’s and Plato’s framework, a virtue is the perfection of a thing — though “perfection” is itself a poorly understood word. No single word suffices without explanation. The goal of choosing a word is either to provide a better entry point or a better way to discuss the concept afterward.
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4. Two Main Topics Announced for the Shiur
Topic 1: The Virtue of Generosity (*Nedivus*)
– Rambam’s term: *nedivus* (generosity).
– Like every virtue, it has two opposite extremes (the Aristotelian mean):
– Kamtzonus (stinginess) — giving too little.
– Pazronus (wastefulness/extravagance) — giving too much.
– To be defined, explored, and discussed in terms of what the Rambam says about it.
Topic 2: How *Mitzvos* (Commandments/Laws) Relate to Virtues
This is framed as even more important.
Translation of *mitzvos*:
– Rambam translates *mitzvos* as laws.
– Martin Buber, as a Kantian, objected to “laws” (*Gesetz*) because it implies mere obedience to a lawgiver. He preferred *Gebot* (“commandments” or “given things”).
– This is a post-Kantian debate and is set aside: “We’re people who never heard of Kant yet.”
Critical clarification — What is a law?
A law is not defined by the fact that a lawgiver gives it. The lawgiver communicates the law, enforces it, etc., but that is not the *essence* or the *reason* for the law. Most post-Kantian Jews mistakenly think a law = something imposed by a lawgiver.
Preliminary distinction between law and virtue:
A virtue is the thing that the mitzvah works on. The mitzvah is the instrument; the virtue is the target/substance being shaped. This distinction comes from the end of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*.
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5. What Is a Law (Mitzvah)? — The Core Distinction
5a. Initial Answers and Refinements
Several answers are offered: a law has a lawgiver; a law is an act you do because it’s correct; a law directs your actions. But the key distinction: a virtue is the thing the mitzvah is working on — the mitzvah is the instrument, the virtue is the target.
5b. Aristotle’s Foundational Claim: Laws Exist Because Most People Are Not Good
The end of Aristotle’s *Ethics* states that since most people are not good, laws are necessary. If everyone were already good, there would be no need for laws.
5c. Illustration: Ibn Ezra on the Torah Given in India
[Extended illustrative digression, directly supporting the main argument]
Ibn Ezra observed from his visit to India:
– The Indians don’t steal.
– They don’t eat animals (or at least not cows).
He concluded: If the Torah had been given in India, Parshas Mishpatim (theft, restitution, civil law) would not exist, because those laws address problems the Indians don’t have. Similarly, laws of Shechita wouldn’t exist because they don’t eat cows.
Student objection: Maybe they would have a *mitzvah* to eat cows (perhaps eating cows accomplishes a virtue they lack). This is acknowledged as important but deferred — it leads to a different discussion.
5d. What a Mitzvah Is vs. What People Today Think It Is
Two common modern understandings of mitzvah:
1. “The right thing to do” — the ultimate good.
2. “What God commanded” — a commandment (*milshon tzivui*).
For most contemporary people, these collapse into one: the good = what God commanded.
But this misses the essential nature of a mitzvah. The key feature: a mitzvah is something that has to be *told* to you. This is precisely what distinguishes a law from a virtue:
– A virtue is internal knowledge of how to act.
– A law is an external directive needed by those who lack that knowledge.
5e. The Ideal Person Doesn’t Need Laws
Drawing on Aristotle, Plato, the Rambam, Ibn Ezra, and the story of Moshe Rabbeinu and the angels, a consensus among ancient and medieval thinkers emerges: the ideal, perfected person does not need laws because they already know what to do through their virtues.
– Ibn Ezra’s Indians: they know others’ property is theirs, so they don’t steal, so they don’t need “Don’t steal.”
– Plato’s Republic: The ideal city would have fewer laws than other cities, because (*mi mah nafshach*):
– If you’re a good person, you don’t need detailed laws.
– If you’re a bad person, laws don’t help you anyway (you won’t listen unless constantly punished, which is unrealistic).
[Brief sub-discussion: The Rambam’s Shemonah Perakim on the “sick” person]
Someone who is “sick” (morally deficient) doesn’t know they’re sick, but you can teach them why they’re sick, and then they can become virtuous. You can’t just teach a sick person to be virtuous directly — you teach them *why* they’re sick, and then they can heal themselves.
Another suggestion: tell people Moshe Rabbeinu brought laws from God with threats of Gehinnom. Response: this doesn’t work for truly bad people — every *ba’al mussar* knows the Torah doesn’t help a truly bad person. It helps mediocre people who wouldn’t otherwise listen. But the real argument is about too many detailed laws vs. laws that make people into good people — two fundamentally different kinds of legislation.
5f. The Contradiction Between Two Theories of Law
A contradiction is highlighted between:
– The modern view: A mitzvah is an eternal, sacred divine command (e.g., “Lo Tignov” is a *heilige mitzvah* and you can’t remove it from the Torah).
– The Ibn Ezra / classical view: If people already don’t steal, the commandment “Don’t steal” is unnecessary — it would be a waste of ink and good stone (*bal tashchis!*).
5g. Definition of Torah/Mitzvah as “Teacher” / “Guide”
Torah (from *hora’ah*) means teacher/guide/director. A law is fundamentally a teacher. A teacher is needed only by those who don’t yet know everything themselves. The goal of a teacher (and thus of law) is to make yourself unnecessary — to teach the student to think and act independently rather than merely follow instructions.
5h. Historical Agreement and Disagreement
– Rishonim (early authorities): Ibn Ezra and “basically all the Rishonim” held this view — laws are for people who need them; if you’re already good, you don’t need the law.
– Acharonim (later authorities): No known Acharon would agree with Ibn Ezra’s position.
– One exception: Rav Moshe Cordovero (the Ramak), a Kabbalist, agrees in a “fancy kabbalistic way.” All the Mekubalim agree in a certain sense, but in a “weird way” — to be explained.
– The Ramban basically says Moshe Rabbeinu himself didn’t have mitzvos — consistent with the idea that the perfected person transcends the need for law.
[Minor digression: Moreh Nevuchim]
A student quips that *Moreh Nevuchim* (Guide for the Perplexed) is “redundant” if the goal of teaching is to make the teacher unnecessary. Correction: *Moreh Nevuchim* is not telling you what to do — it’s teaching you how to think. It addresses the *navoch* (perplexed person) and tries to guide them out of confusion. This is precisely what good teaching (and good law) does.
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6. Torah as Teacher, Not Instructor — The Deeper Point
Torah is a guide for imperfect people (“nevuchim”), teaching them how to think (“teaching you how to fish”), not merely giving instructions to follow mechanically. People who claim Torah is for “perfect people” misunderstand entirely: perfect people don’t need Torah at all — they’d be angels (*malachim*). Torah exists precisely for those who need guidance toward becoming better, and ideally the student eventually internalizes the teaching and no longer needs the teacher in the same way.
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7. The Mekubalim (Kabbalists) and Their Critique of Conventional Torah Study
[Semi-digression: Ambivalent relationship with Kabbalists]
The mekubalim are positioned as both loved and critiqued — they are “the last people to understand what Torah means” but also “we are mekubalim.” This framing is necessary before presenting their view.
7a. The Ra’aya Meheimna and Tikkunei Zohar — Background
Two texts printed within the Zohar corpus but universally acknowledged as distinct works: the Ra’aya Meheimna and the Tikkunei Zohar. They were written by a frustrated Jew who, after studying in yeshivas, wrote scathing critiques of conventional Torah learning — in the name of Moshe Rabbeinu himself. The author claimed to be (or channel) the soul of Moses speaking to the Tannaim and Amoraim, telling them that most people read Torah “from the back, not from the inside.”
7b. The Core Critique: Torah Made “Dry” (*Yabashah*)
The Tikkunei Zohar’s central metaphor: conventional learners turn Torah into yabashah (dry land) — parched, shriveled, lifeless. The original divine intention was to make *yabashah* into *eretz* (from the root *ratz*, meaning running/desire) — living, flowing Torah. The author’s mission is to re-stream Torah, to make the *nachal* (stream) flow again as a *nachal nove’a* (gushing spring) rather than a dead wadi (*nachal eitan*).
7c. The Metaphor of Hitting the Rock vs. Speaking to It
The Tikkunei Zohar’s drash on Moshe hitting the rock:
– Hitting the rock = the conventional method of Torah study: beating, squeezing (*kvetshen*), struggling to extract tiny drops of meaning. The midrash says when Moshe hit the rock, only two small drops came out.
– Speaking to the rock = a different mode of learning: listening, connecting to the source. When Moshe spoke to the rock, water gushed forth abundantly.
R. Chaim Vital is cited as quoting this passage in his introduction, applying it to those who don’t learn *Torah Lishmah* — who are content being Roshei Yeshiva and functionaries but never truly connect to the source. He contrasts this with the Arizal, for whom new Torah interpretations flowed effortlessly because he was connected to the source.
7d. The *Kad* (Jug) Metaphor — Limited vs. Unlimited Torah
From the Tikkunei Zohar: Rivka’s jug (*kad*) = the 24 books of Tanakh (כ״ד = *kaf-dalet*). If your Torah is only the finite texts — the little jug you laboriously haul up from the well — you’ll struggle endlessly and never arrive anywhere. But the real Rivka experience was *ha-mayim alu likratah* — the waters rose to meet her. Torah should become like a self-surging spring (*ma’ayan ha-mitgaber*), not a laborious extraction.
The 24 books are a doorway into all of reality, but they are a tiny portion of reality. If you treat them as the totality (*keilim*, vessels only), you remain stuck — hitting the rock, hitting your students, hitting your children. The Tikkunei Zohar calls such a person a *ba’al nigleh* — someone who knows only the revealed/surface Torah.
7e. The Proper Orientation: Torah Flows from Connection to Reality
If you learn Torah understanding that these texts came from people who had access to God/reality, then you recognize there is always “more where it came from.” The texts are entry points into an inexhaustible source. You never need to be *farkvetsht* (squeezed/stuck), because wherever you are in reality, Torah/knowledge is available there.
*Lo ba-shamayim hi* (“it is not in heaven”) is briefly referenced as a potential objection but deferred.
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8. [Digression with Sharp Polemical Edge: Critique of Anti-Intellectual “Daat Torah” Claims]
A specific claim made in the name of a certain *tzaddik* is attacked: that his political opinions constitute daat Torah because he has never read anything besides Torah (no newspapers, no outside knowledge). This is called outright apikorsus (heresy) for multiple reasons:
1. Factually false: the person in question actually did read newspapers.
2. Conceptually absurd: a *posek* who doesn’t engage with reality is not pious but an *am ha’aretz* (ignoramus) and a *batlan* (idler) — like someone ruling on laws of *niddah* who has never seen blood.
3. Theologically heretical: it contradicts the very nature of Torah as connected to and flowing from reality. Restricting Torah to isolated textual study, cut off from the world, is the opposite of what Torah is.
The Blueprint Analogy
Torah is the “blueprint of creation” (*histakeil b’Oraisa u’vara alma*). If Torah is the blueprint of reality, then reality itself is a legitimate way to recover the blueprint. Just as you can reconstruct a house’s blueprint by measuring the house, you can learn Torah’s content by studying the world. If you restrict yourself only to the texts and refuse to look at reality, your Torah becomes constricted (*metzumtzam*) and you’ll always be struggling. But if Torah is understood as the gateway (*sha’ar*) to everything else, then wherever you are in life, you’re never stuck — reality itself becomes a field of Torah study.
Implication for “Torah Lishmah” and the Working Person
*Torah lishmah* (“Torah for its own sake”) means learning Torah for what it actually is — a gateway to understanding reality — and then the toil (*amelus*/*yegiah*) changes character.
[Side digression]: An old class aimed at “the working class” is mentioned, arguing that working people naturally think about reality (not abstract *lomdus*), so Torah study for them is actually more organic than they realize. This class is inexplicably popular on Google.
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9. Return to the *Raya Mehemna* and Its Radical Critique
9a. The Book’s Central Message
The *Raya Mehemna* argued:
– The Torah has layers, like a nut (*egoz*) with multiple shells (*klipos*). The Kabbalistic image is of a nut with four layers of shell that must be cracked to reach the fruit inside.
– The accusation: People spend their entire lives learning the shells and never reach the fruit — the inner meaning (*pnimiyus*) of Torah.
– The book urges: stop bluffing and start learning the actual Torah, which is a good thing, not the burden people treat it as.
9b. [Side Digression: Tone and Temperament — *Raya Mehemna* vs. Rambam]
– The *Raya Mehemna* is written angrily — it essentially curses out the *Roshei Yeshivos* of its time. Though names aren’t given, contemporaries likely knew exactly who was being targeted.
– The Rambam, by contrast, wrote calmly and nicely, almost never angrily (though his letters show more frustration than his books).
– The Rambam’s calm style is the correct way to write a *sefer*; one should not emulate the *Raya Mehemna*’s angry tone.
– Nevertheless, the *Raya Mehemna* was essentially a student of the Rambam’s approach — the Rambam originated (or popularized) the concept of *Pnimiyus HaTorah* (the inner/esoteric meaning of Torah) vs. the external/exoteric meaning.
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10. The Problem These Ideas Posed for Later Authorities (*Achronim*)
10a. No Problem for *Rishonim*
The *Rishonim* had no difficulty with the *Raya Mehemna*’s claims. The idea that Torah has an outer shell and an inner kernel was standard Maimonidean doctrine.
10b. The Sabbatean Distortion
Later, Sabbateans seized on these ideas and perverted them: if the Torah’s laws are merely *klipos* (shells), they claimed one should practice the “higher Torah” — which they interpreted as antinomianism (e.g., marrying one’s sister). This is nonsense: the “higher Torah” isn’t about transgressive physical acts. The higher Torah is about intellect and the absence of bodily concerns — “you don’t have a body to marry at all.” The Zohar’s inner meaning is intellectual, not behavioral.
10c. Rabbi Moshe Cordovero’s (*Ramak*) Anxiety
The *Ramak* (pre-Sabbatean, but facing proto-antinomian arguments in his time) was deeply worried about the implications of the *Raya Mehemna*’s framework. The Zohar cites a (fabricated) verse: *Torah chadasha me’iti tetze* (“A new Torah will go forth from Me”). The actual verse says *Torah me’iti tetze* — and the Zohar reads it as necessarily meaning a new Torah. This troubled the *Ramak*.
10d. The Ramak’s Difficulty: A Tension Within the Rambam’s Own Legacy
– Rambam’s idea #1: The Torah’s external/shell meaning = law as a teacher for imperfect people. The Torah makes dummies smart (*machkimas pesi*); smart people don’t need it in the same way. The laws are pedagogical tools for moral improvement.
– Rambam’s idea #2: The Torah has a true inner meaning — knowledge of God and reality (*chochmas haTorah al derech ha’emes*). The real content of Torah is metaphysical truth, not behavioral instruction.
10e. The Rambam’s Own Framework Explained
The truly substantive *mitzvos* are those of *Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah* — about reality as it is. These aren’t merely pedagogical. All other *mitzvos* participate in those truths primarily through preparation: you can’t do metaphysics without being a good person, and *mitzvos* make you a good person. In this sense, most laws are “shells” for the metaphysical kernel.
The Rambam himself used the language of *klipah* (shell) — this wasn’t invented by the Kabbalists against him; it was his own terminology (possibly borrowed from Arabic philosophical discourse).
The core Rambam principle: The true meaning of Torah = knowledge of God and knowledge of creation/reality. This is the fruit inside all the shells.
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11. The Rambam’s Internal Tension: Every Word Is Holy vs. *Toch* and *Klippah*
The Rambam states in his Hakdama to Perush Hamishnayot (7th or 8th *Ikkar*) that every word of Torah is equally holy and there is no *toch u-klippah* in Torah. Yet the Rambam clearly does believe in an inner/true meaning and an outer/useful meaning — a real hierarchy within Torah’s content.
Resolution: the outer meaning is not “untrue” but rather useful — it serves the political/social function of making people virtuous, which in turn leads them toward intellectual perfection and knowledge of God. The Rambam would never publicly declare certain *mitzvos* to be mere *klippah* — for political reasons: telling people the reasons for commandments causes them to take the commandments less seriously (as illustrated by the case of King Solomon).
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12. The Rambam’s Reading of Aggadic Narratives and Pre-Sinaitic Torah Study
The Rambam would interpret the *midrash* about angels (*malachim*) wanting to learn Torah as referring to the inner/intellectual content of Torah (knowledge of God), not to practical *halachot* like *basar bechalav*. The story expresses the duality of Torah: there is a dimension meant for angels (the angelic/intellectual part of a person — the “separate intellect”), and a dimension meant for embodied human beings who have mothers, get married, etc.
[Side connection to Sabbatians]
This duality also addresses the Sabbatian claim that one can worship a purely spiritual Torah and discard practical commandments. The response: you are not an angel — you have a body, a mother, a spouse — so you must observe practical *mitzvos* like *kibbud av va-em*.
The Rambam explicitly mocks the idea that the *yeshiva* of Shem and Ever studied practical *halachot* like *hilchot shomerim* or *dalet minim*. They obviously studied metaphysics and physics. Similarly, when Solomon said *amarti echkama* (“I thought I would become wise”), he was not struggling with *migo* — he was grappling with the deepest truths of reality. The verse *tapuchei zahav b’maskiyot kasef* (“apples of gold in settings of silver”) encapsulates this: the *pshat* (plain meaning) is the silver setting; the hidden truth is the golden apple within.
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13. The Kabbalists’ Dissatisfaction with the Rambam’s Framework
The *mekubbalim* (including the Ramchal and the authors of *Tikkunei Zohar*) were not satisfied with the Rambam’s solution. Their dissatisfaction was generated by the Rambam’s own statements — particularly his insistence (via the verse *gal einai v’abita niflaot miToratecha*) that every word of Torah contains secrets, and his identification of specific *parshiot* as containing hidden metaphysical teachings.
The Kabbalists took this further: not just Torah in general, but every single mitzvah must have a true inner/divine meaning. They could not accept that any commandment is *merely* utilitarian.
Example: *Ve-asita ma’akeh le-gagecha* (“make a railing for your roof”) — the Kabbalists interpret this as encoding the idea that one must not think beyond the capacity of human reason (connecting to the Mishnah’s prohibition on speculating about what is above, below, before, and after).
The Problem with the Kabbalistic Approach (Classroom Debate)
A student objects: by encoding the philosophical idea *into* the mitzvah of *ma’akeh*, you are actually downgrading the philosophical idea — making it subordinate to a practical commandment. Counter-objection: the Kabbalist isn’t replacing the practical mitzvah; he’s adding a layer.
The deeper issue: the Kabbalists are not willing to accept that a verse of the divine Torah could be *only* about mundane, this-worldly matters. Why not? Because Torah is divine, prior to creation. It is strange for something prior to creation to be *about* creation in a merely practical sense. This is a problem of belief, not of reality — there is nothing logically wrong with God creating a Torah for the created world. But for theological/political reasons, it feels inadequate to say a divine text is “just” about building railings.
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14. [Side Digression: The Political Problem of Revealing *Ta’amei Ha-Mitzvot*]
The Rambam himself holds that one should not publicly teach the reasons for commandments, because people who know the reason tend to take the commandment less seriously. This is derived from the Talmudic discussion about King Solomon, who thought he could violate certain commandments because he understood their reasons.
[Sub-digression: The Halacha of Starting the Seder Early on Pesach Night]
The one *halacha* where the reason is explicitly given — start the Seder early so the children don’t fall asleep — is the one nobody follows. If instead they were told *shedim* (demons) would come, people would comply immediately. To fulfill this *halacha* properly, one should not go to shul for Ma’ariv on Pesach night, since the walk to and from shul delays the Seder. A personal anecdote about whether a closer shul was attended on Pesach night follows. Further tangent: one shouldn’t go to shul for Shabbat Mincha either (referenced from a separate Gemara/Rambam shiur).
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15. The Mekubalim Extend the Rambam’s Framework
Core claim: The holy mekubalim took the Rambam’s approach to the next level. The Rambam himself would have no problem saying that a mitzvah like *ma’akeh l’gagecha* has meaning simultaneously on multiple levels — a *remez* (hint) in *Olam Atzilus* (the world of emanation), and a practical meaning in *Olam Asiya* (the physical world). In the physical world, the mitzvah is straightforward; in thought, it’s “obvious” and functions more as a *remez*.
Key principle: According to Kabbalah, all the *olamos* (worlds) correspond to one another. Therefore, if a mitzvah had no *to’eles* (purpose/benefit) in *Olam Asiya*, it would have no corresponding reality in *Olam HaMalachim* (the angelic world) either, and thus no mitzvah for us.
Consequence: Every mekubal who truly understands Kabbalah must agree with the *kind* of reasons the Rambam gave for mitzvos — i.e., that mitzvos have purposive, functional reasons in the physical world. They might disagree on specific reasons (“you gave a bad reason”), but the *category* of giving reasons cannot be rejected by a genuine mekubal. A “stam dogmatic believer” could reject it, but a mekubal cannot.
Attribution: This point was explained at length by the Radziner Rebbe (in a book covering many topics including this), and similarly by others, possibly the Leshem from a different angle.
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16. The Mekubalim’s Distinctive Insistence on the Literal Words of Torah
Despite agreeing with the Rambam’s framework of reasons, the mekubalim want the specific words and letters of the Torah to carry *true* meaning (not merely *useful* meaning). They are “more stuck” on the particular mitzvos with the particular words as having intrinsic significance. This creates a tension with the Rambam’s more functional/instrumental approach.
Two solutions:
Solution A: Reinterpret the mitzvah’s language kabbalistically
The example of *ma’akeh* is given a kabbalistic reading. The Ari z”l gives this kind of reading in the Zohar as well. Other mitzvos can similarly be reinterpreted.
Solution B: The Ramban’s approach (see next section)
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17. The Ramban’s Solution — Torah Before Creation
The Ramban’s premise (from his Hakdamah to the Torah): The Torah was written before the universe existed.
The Ramban’s problem: Before creation, there was no *sha’atnez*, no wool and linen, no Egypt to generate mitzvos that are *zecher l’yetzias Mitzrayim*. So what was this Torah “written in black fire on white fire” actually talking about?
The Rambam’s answer (contrasted): Obviously, the pre-creation Torah was talking about God — it was God’s plan for the world, identifiable with *Nous*, *Chochmah*, *Torah*. The Rambam explicitly connects this with Plato. No difficulty here for the Rambam.
The Ramban’s answer: The Ramban, like all mekubalim, tries harder to connect the pre-creation Torah with the *literal letters and words*. His “trick”: He claims a *kabbalah shel emes* (authentic tradition) — which the Rambam would have explicitly opposed — that the entire Torah is *שמות של הקדוש ברוך הוא* (Names of God), understood literally as divine names in the style of the known mystical names (*Shem Mem-Beis*, *Shem Ayin-Beis*).
The mechanism: The Torah can be read in multiple ways. Taking three verses (*Vayisa, Vayavo, Vayeit*) and reading them in a grid/chart (essentially “Bible codes”) — an ancient practice going back to the Book of Daniel. Rashi mentions this in Sukkah. You can cut up the words differently, scramble them, rearrange them. So before creation, the Torah didn’t say “Bereishit Bara Elokim” — it was the twenty-two letters in various permutations, and “Bereishit Bara Elokim” is only *one* way of reading them.
[Side digression: Historical note]
The Rambam explicitly denied traditions about mystical names and gematria in his writings, but the very fact that he needed to deny them proves they predated him — they weren’t invented after him.
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18. The Problem with Letters Before Creation
Objection: If there was no physical world before creation, there were no *alef* and *bet* either. So even the Ramban’s “scrambled letters” solution doesn’t work literally — letters are also physical-world entities.
Resolution (universally agreed upon by real mekubalim): “Letters” (*otiyot*) are literally *signs* — symbols for something deeper. They represent ideas. When we say the Torah existed as letters before creation, we mean the *things the letters symbolize*, not the physical marks on parchment. Every genuine mekubal understands this.
Assessment: This is “very simple” (*me’od pashut*). If you follow this all the way to the Tanya, you find it’s just a more poetic and elaborate way of saying the same thing the Rambam said. The advantage (*ma’ala*) of the kabbalistic way is that it provides additional layers of meaning — you can find different readings (*pshatim*) from the same letters that work in different ways.
[Side digression: Connection to Sefer Yetzirah]
The concept of the world as different configurations of basic matter and basic ideas goes back to *Sefer Yetzirah*, probably the oldest Jewish “science book.” Calling it “mysticism” vs. “science” is a false distinction — both are attempts to know reality.
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19. The Pedagogical Problem — Kabbalistic vs. Rambam’s Method
Critique of the kabbalistic method: It is a “horrible way to teach.” The metaphor of letters and permutations, while ultimately saying the same thing as the Rambam, creates constant confusion. People misunderstand. You have to be “a little high” (i.e., in an elevated or intuitive state of mind) to do gematriot and letter-permutations properly and see that they make sense.
The structural problem: The kabbalistic approach tries to bridge the gap between *klal* (the universal/abstract) and *prat* (the particular/concrete) — between the pre-creation divine wisdom and the specific words of Torah. But in doing so, it tends to “ruin the distinction” between klal and prat. The Rambam had a very clear path: there’s klal and there’s prat, and we maintain the distinction. The kabbalistic mashal of letters seems to create a “mismatch” or “misdirection” when moving from klal to prat.
Judgment: The Rambam’s way is a *better way to teach*, even though both approaches ultimately arrive at the same truth.
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20. The Problem of Misuse on Both Sides
The Rambam’s method’s failures: Many of the Rambam’s followers (*chassidim*) — this is the complaint of the Kabbalists — literally transgressed prohibitions while believing they had transcended them through knowledge. This is the “Shlomo HaMelech problem”: when you know something, you think you’re beyond the thing you know.
The Shlomo HaMelech Paradigm in Detail
When you intellectually understand the purpose behind a commandment, you assume you are already beyond it. The reasoning goes: “We only daven to remind us of God; therefore, I don’t need to daven.” This does not follow — understanding the purpose should make you daven *more*, not less.
[Side Digression: Practical Rebuke]
If you’re not davening, are you at least spending that time studying Moreh Nevuchim? You’re not — so you have no excuse. One might as well do one’s philosophical study in shul. This is not a halachic argument (whether one is obligated to go to shul) but a practical-philosophical point about consistency.
The kabbalistic method’s failures: Leads to confusion and misunderstanding among those who aren’t prepared.
Conclusion: There is no method that prevents stupidity. “The only solution is: *rabotai*, stop being stupid, and then we can learn whichever way you want.” The Rambam’s way is pedagogically superior, but neither method is immune to misuse. The fundamental problem is human arrogance in the face of knowledge — the story of Shlomo HaMelech in a nutshell.
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21. The Seesaw Problem and the Specific Danger of Shabbateanism
The tension between rationalist and kabbalistic approaches is framed as a seesaw — correcting one side’s error inevitably risks the opposite error. The mekubalim are trying to solve the problem that rationalists fall into (abandoning practice), and therefore they speak in a language that emphasizes the mystical depth and indispensability of every detail of Torah.
The Specific Danger of the Kabbalistic Method: Shabbateanism
Because the kabbalistic method involves “scrambling” — rearranging letters (tzerufim), gematria, finding hidden configurations — there is a pedagogical benefit: you learn that surface appearances are not necessarily reality. However, this opens a catastrophic door: people conclude that if Torah can be read backwards or rearranged, then perhaps “lo tirtzach” (do not murder) could become “tirtzach” (murder). This is the Shabbatean heresy.
Nuanced Response to Shabbateanism
– There is a Torah of the klipa (the “shell”/husk) where things are inverted — this is a real metaphysical concept.
– The Shabbateans are not wrong that such a level exists; they are wrong because they think they are ascending when they are actually descending.
– One does need to engage with that lower Torah as well, but that is a different enterprise entirely.
Key Philosophical Principle: “Beyond Knowledge” ≠ “Contrary to Knowledge”
When we say Hashem’s knowledge is beyond ours, people mistakenly think this means it could be contrary to (soseh) the Torah. This is wrong. “Beyond knowledge” means something that is not contrary to knowledge but simply exceeds it. Every deeper reason for a commandment will be consistent with the plain meaning, just going further — never contradicting it.
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22. Return to Rebbe Moshe Cordovero: The Shatnez Example in Full
The Layers
1. Surface klipa: You don’t even understand the plain meaning properly.
2. The real/deeper meaning: Illustrated through shatnez (the prohibition of mixing wool and linen).
Cordovero’s Radical Claim
– Before Adam’s sin (before humans had physical bodies), the Torah did not say “lo silbash shatnez” (do not wear shatnez).
– The Torah originally read: “lo silbash satan az matzef u’visfashim” — meaning Adam should not do the thing that *causes* the condition we now call shatnez (i.e., having a physical body subject to the admixture of spiritual impurity).
– Adam’s sin was acquiring a body — that is what “wearing shatnez” meant at his level.
– After the sin, the Torah reconfigured into its current form: “lo silbash shatnez, tzemer u’fishtim” — a new, lower-level meaning (don’t literally mix wool and linen), which is even worse in some sense because it’s a further descent.
– Before Adam HaRishon, there was yet a third configuration of this verse with yet another meaning.
[Side Note: Tagim on Shatnez-Getz Letters]
The Ashkenazi custom of placing tagim (crowns) on the letters shin-ayin-tet-nun-zayin-gimmel-tzadi connects to the kabbalistic idea that these letters are prone to “confusion” and need fixing. This is just a hint (remez) — and what about all the other letters?
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23. The Convergence Thesis: Rambam and Kabbalah Agree
The threads are drawn together into the central convergence argument:
– The mekubalim agree (and “we agree with them”) that the Torah as it currently exists is a configuration designed to help us — it is instrumental, not ultimate.
– The Torah’s current form exists to get us away from shatnez (metaphorically: away from spiritual corruption/physicality). But that is not the Torah itself — the Torah itself is “way beyond that.”
– For the Rambam: Mitzvot teach virtues → virtues teach you to think about God → knowing divine things is the real content.
– For the mekubalim: The current tzerufim (letter-configurations) of Torah address our fallen state → the deeper tzerufim reveal higher truths.
– Both systems hold: the Torah we practice is hachanos (preparations) for the real Torah.
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24. Final Summary: Kabbalas HaTorah and the Meaning of Shavuos
A recapitulation of the entire shiur’s argument:
1. We need to distinguish virtue from mitzvot — two separate things.
2. According to the Rambam, mitzvot produce virtues.
3. Torah and mitzvot are not the truth itself — they are hachanos (preparations) for the truth.
4. This is true also al pi Kabbalah: the kavana of not wearing shatnez is really about not having “satan az” (spiritual corruption); the Rambam would say certain mitzvot teach certain virtues which are the pnimiyus (inner dimension) of them.
5. Virtues themselves are only relevant because we live in this world; they point toward knowing God and divine realities, which are the ultimate content.
6. Kabbalas HaTorah (receiving the Torah) on Shavuos means receiving this Torah — the instructional, preparatory Torah — because without it we would be bad people incapable of approaching truth.
7. We must observe shatnez and all the mitzvot in order to begin learning the real Torah, which is revealed progressively — “next year’s Shavuos” brings a new level.
8. This progressive revelation corresponds to:
– The mekubalim’s framework: different tzerufim of Torah revealing different things at different levels.
– The Rambam’s framework: mitzvot like “Anochi Hashem Elokecha” and other truth-bearing parts of Torah.
The Midrash discussed throughout has been explained, and the session concludes.
📝 Full Transcript
Generosity as Virtue and the Relationship Between Mitzvos and Virtues: A Study in Rambam’s Eight Chapters
Chapter 1: Opening Frame – Erev Shavuos and the Study of Shemonah Perakim
Instructor: Reb Yisai, we’re having Gashi for Erev Shavuos [Shavuos: the Jewish holiday celebrating the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai], really we’re just continuing our study of the Shemonah Perakim [Shemonah Perakim: Rambam’s “Eight Chapters,” his introduction to Ethics of the Fathers], but we’re going to discuss something about the connection of Matan Torah [Matan Torah: the giving of the Torah] because it’s important.
So as everyone knows, everybody has their own inyan [inyan: topic, matter of focus] at Shavuos, and the inyan is what you do when you talk about, what you think about, or thinking and talking is also a big thing to do, but as long as it’s what you do, right?
Chapter 2: Fundraising Appeal and “Im Ein Kemach Ein Torah”
The Annual Pre-Shavuos Campaign
Instructor: So what do we do every year before Shavuos? We make a campaign. We raise money for our Beis Medrash [Beis Medrash: house of study], because there’s a Mishnah [Mishnah: the first major written collection of Jewish oral law], “Im ein kemach ein Torah” [Im ein kemach ein Torah: “If there is no flour/sustenance, there is no Torah” – Pirkei Avos 3:17].
Critique of Citing Self-Evident Truths from the Mishnah
Instructor: Because even if there wouldn’t be such a Mishnah, we have to get out of this habit of proving things that you can see with your own eyes from the Mishnah, okay? Someone, I call up someone, the boy says “Im ein kemach ein Torah,” so I need money to support. What? There wouldn’t be a Mishnah? You wouldn’t know? This is very annoying. So we’ve got to try to stop doing it, but let’s talk about this in depth.
The Mishnah’s Actual Chiddush: The Paradox
Instructor: So why does the Mishnah have to say it? The Mishnah is trying to show you the paradox. The Mishnah is giving you something. This is the same question we just asked before. What does the Mishnah say?
Student: Yeah, yeah. You got it. You got it. I was trying to talk about it.
Instructor: But the point is, we have a very weird habit of trying… When you do too much, it’s destructive. So we’re going to stop doing it. Start saying things because… Not because I say it. People say, oh, so you’re saying you’re a dual? Who are you? No, it’s not me. You know who it is? J.P. Morgan. That’s who. If I don’t raise money, he tells me, I gave you a mortgage for your house, what’s going on? It’s not me. And it’s not him either. The reality.
Student: God.
Instructor: God said, not I said. Not the Mishnah, not me. So that’s the reality. So I’m due for the reality of our inyan, is to raise money for… So that’s the way. Everyone should do their part. We’re already almost at $200,000. Let’s see if we’ll get to $360,000. And we’ll have enough money to pay the staff for the next year. And we’ll be able to do Matan Torah correctly. That’s enough for that, right?
The Reciprocal Relationship Between Understanding and Giving
Instructor: I think you’ll tune in to hear more. Tune in to hear more? Tune in to hear more, so it’s clear, very clear. I think that anyone that understands, there’s a cycle. If you understand the shiur [shiur: Torah lesson] a whole year, then the better you understand it, the more money you give or the more money you raise, and vice versa. The more money you give, the more you understand the shiur. That’s the pshat [pshat: the plain meaning, the interpretation].
That’s the pshat. That’s the pshat. Pshat what I’m saying. In this world, it says, stop anything saying. In this world, everything you get, what you pay for. You get what you pay for. You pay for what you believe in, for what you hold of, what you get. So the payment, how much time you put into it, how much money you put into it, how much effort, that’s what you get. And sometimes you, sometimes the effort is before the thing, sometimes it’s after, but it’s all the same.
Instructor: Okay, now let me ask like this. Sean, Sean, check your phone, see if I made more money by saying this.
Student: No, I’m not lying. It doesn’t help.
Instructor: Yeah, I’ll put it on, we’ll see. No, I’m actually trying to check what my questions were to you that night.
Instructor: No, no, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait.
Chapter 3: Introduction to the Study of Virtues in Shemonah Perakim
The Source Material: Aristotle via Abu Nasr
Instructor: So we are doing something very interesting which is studying this book called the Eight Chapters, which is some kind of summary and shortening and so on of the book called, you already know right, what’s going on here, the Ethics of Aristotle [Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics], mediated by Abu Nasr [Abu Nasr al-Farabi: 9th-10th century Islamic philosopher]. Heard of Abu Nasr, right? Abu Nasr, one of the Rambam’s [Rambam: Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, Maimonides] teachers. He really likes him. He really likes him.
The Concept of Virtues and the Problem of Translation
Instructor: Now, these people taught some very important things. And where we are up to is how they were teaching us about this thing called, we call them virtues, which is a weird translation. You could listen to my class on Sunday with Antonio who decided we should translate it as “powers,” but then said it’s not good. I said we should translate it as “greatnesses.” That was my proposal, right? Because “virtue,” people think means some, nobody knows what it means actually, but it has this moral or economic sense. But it’s not.
In Aristotle’s world, and also in Plato’s world, virtue is something that, it’s the perfection of a thing, right? Just “perfection” is another restricting word and no one knows what it means. So I thought of a word in English that means “greatness,” which might be a good translation. Like a great car or a great guy. You could get it. That sort of works the same way. Anyways.
Student: You want to ask him for my translation?
Instructor: No, because how is that more for the same price? I don’t know what greatness is. You have to know what it is.
Student: You have to kind of think it is, not a largeness.
Instructor: I thought the issue was not the word. The issue was just the way people frame substances in the first place.
Student: Okay, we’re not going to say the same thing with greatness.
Instructor: Yeah, words don’t actually, changing the words doesn’t actually help, because they just don’t think of that. They still don’t think of it that way. It doesn’t make them think.
Student: With explanation, I hear.
Instructor: Yeah, yeah. But after you have the explanation, we try to use a word that may be better. Maybe if you explain that word would be more…
Student: No words can help without the explanation, I agree.
Instructor: But the point of these words is either to be a better way of getting in or to be a better way of getting out. Like, be a better way for us to talk about it without saying weird words and nobody knows what they are. The Rambam called them something like greatnesses, right? Like ma’alos [ma’alos: elevations, virtues, greatnesses]. What is that? That’s the translation, at least. Goodnesses. It sounds funny.
Student: Does Antonio know Rambam also?
Instructor: No, meaning that you were able to find a word because you learned Rambam when he doesn’t?
Student: He learns also when he doesn’t want to.
Instructor: Meaning he knows the word ma’alos?
Student: Probably. I know Hebrew, and I started in Hebrew.
The Semester’s Task: Going Through the List of Virtues
Instructor: So what am I trying to say is like this. And we were, our task here this semester, this period, has been to go through the list of virtues and talk about each. That’s really our task. We discussed a little in the previous classes about what makes the list and how the list works. Probably didn’t finish discussing that, but because it’s the subject of the day you say, and you know the inyan is the meaning of the day anyways, we will discuss.
Chapter 4: Two Main Topics for Today’s Shiur
Announcement of the Two Topics
Instructor: We’re going to talk about two things. I want to talk about two things. And you said I took too many people something before we make very clear. I want to talk about two things, okay?
Topic 1: The Virtue of Generosity (Nedivus)
Instructor: Number one is I want to talk about a virtue called generosity. Obviously, no one calls it the nedivus [nedivus: generosity]. The opposite of it is, or there’s two opposites of it. What are the two opposites of it, right? Every virtue has two opposites. Kamtzonus and pazronus [kamtzonus: stinginess; pazronus: wastefulness]. Right, the too much and the too little. Kamtzonus and pazronus. Right, very good. Kamtzonus and pazronus. Or stinginess and wastefulness or something like that. Too much giving.
So we’re saying that we’re going to talk in inyan dehama [inyan dehama: the matter at hand], so we’re talking about virtues. I’m talking about the virtue of generosity, which has two extremes, two bad opposites, bad opposites, which are too much and too little, giving too much money and giving too little money.
Alright, we’ll talk about this in a little. That’s the first point. I want you to try to talk about it a little, to understand what it is and how it’s defined and what it means, and maybe a little bit of what the Rambam says about it, if we can get to it.
Topic 2: How Mitzvos Relate to Virtues
Instructor: The second, and even more important thing, for your questions and for your purposes, is to talk about how something, some interesting thing called mitzvos [mitzvos: commandments, laws] plays into this.
The Translation of “Mitzvos” and the Post-Kantian Debate
Instructor: Or in English, mitzvos are called laws. “Commandment” is just where you get the laws from. The Rambam definitely translates mitzvos as laws. Other people, famously, Rav Martin Buber [Martin Buber: 20th century Jewish philosopher] said that we should not translate mitzvos as laws, because he was a Kantian [Kantian: follower of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy], and to him “laws” means obeying the law, and of course that’s wrong. So he said we should say, instead of a Gesetz [Gesetz: German word for “law”], we’re going to say Gebot [Gebot: German word for “commandment” or “given thing”]. That was the chilek [chilek: distinction, difference].
Student: No.
Instructor: Given things. The commandment. Mitzvos means something like “given things” to him. Okay, that’s not our conversation because that’s a post-Kantian conversation and we’re all people that never heard of Kant yet.
Student: One day.
Instructor: Maybe one day we’ll discover him and realize how he’s right. Meanwhile, we think it is wrong.
What Is a Law? The Essential Question
Instructor: And when we say mitzvos… We don’t know. Just to be very clear, when we say laws, just to be very clear, when we say laws, we don’t mean things that you do because they are in obedience to some lawgiver. The lawgiver is someone who tells you about the laws. Of course, there’s a lawgiver in every system and every understanding of the world. Everyone that talks about politics and how to make laws has a lawgiver, a law enforcer, all these things. But that’s not the why of the law. That’s not the what of the law, even. A law is not something that a lawgiver gives, unlike what most post-Kantian Jews think, right? A law is something else, right?
What is a law?
Student: Oh, that’s when he doesn’t have a problem with the law.
Instructor: Of course not. One is true. What is the law? But what is the law?
Student: It’s stickler there. There’s more than that. What is the law? What is the mitzvah? Sharia [Sharia: Islamic law], what is the mitzvah? What is the law?
Instructor: It’s true that Allah has a lawgiver, someone that tells you the laws.
Student: I think it’s an act that you do because it’s correct in the majority.
Instructor: Okay, but wait, what is it? What kind of a thing is it?
Student: So it directs you, directs your greatnesses in a certain way.
The Distinction Between Mitzvah and Virtue
Instructor: And how is it different? So let’s do it like this. How is a mitzvah different than a virtue?
Student: The thing that the mitzvah is working on.
Instructor: That’s right. Alright, so this is says in the end of this book, the end of Ethics [referring to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics].
The Nature of Law and Mitzvah: Distinguishing Divine Command from Virtue
The Essential Definition of Law – Teaching for Those Who Need It
Opening Question: What Kind of Thing Is a Law?
Instructor: Of course not. One is true. What is a law? But what is a law? It’s *shtikl et teretz* [a piece of an answer]. There’s more than that. What is a law? What is a mitzvah [commandment]? *Sharia* [wait], what is a mitzvah? What is the law?
Student: It’s true that Allah has a lawgiver—someone that tells you the laws.
Student: I think it’s an act that you do because it’s correct in the majority.
Instructor: Okay, but wait, what is it? What kind of a thing is it?
Student: So it directs you—directs your greatnesses in a certain way.
Instructor: And how is it different? So let’s like this. How is a mitzvah different than a virtue?
Student: This is the thing that the mitzvah is working on, that’s why.
Instructor: All right. So this says in the end of this book, the end of the *Ethics* [Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*] says that since most people are not good—literally says this in the end of this book, it’s like the last thing it says. It says, since, gosh, I’m not going to be able to read it down. It says something like this: Since most people are not good, if everyone would be good, then there would be no need for laws. Because, get it?
Ibn Ezra’s Illustration: The Torah in India
If you were the *Malach* [angel], right? You wanted to know about *Malach*. Ibn Ezra says, if the Torah was given in India—I told you Ibn Ezra already many times, right? It’s the kind of thing that I should have told you many times. That doesn’t mean that I’ve told it to you many times. That by Abraham Ibn Ezra went to India, he was very impressed by the Indian people, at least in some ways. He said that they don’t steal.
So the Benazir [Ibn Ezra] said that if the Torah would be given in India, *Parshat Mishpatim* [the section of Exodus dealing with civil law] wouldn’t exist. Because *Parshat Mishpatim* is for people that steal. And they need all kinds of punishments for stealing, all kinds of laws of how to give back, how much you stole, and so on. But if the Torah would be given in India, they would not steal.
And also, since in India they don’t eat animals, or at least not cows, they wouldn’t be able to eat *shechita* [ritual slaughter] either. Because *shechita* is for people that eat cows.
Student: Well, maybe they have a mitzvah to need to eat cows.
Instructor: No. See, this is very important. He doesn’t think that. That might—that’s not necessarily true, at least. Right, let’s say they’re lacking a virtue. Let’s say they’re lacking a virtue. I told you I’m going to answer your questions. Let’s say they’re lacking a virtue that is accomplished by eating cows, and they’re going to eat cows. If that would be correct. But it’s—I think this gets to a different question. Let me write it down and talk about it in a second. Let’s try to go in order. But let’s not—let’s not get confused. Let’s get off the point that we’re on right now. Right, because we’re going to get to a different discussion. That’s a very important discussion, but what we’re trying to get to is to explain…
Two Concepts: Virtue and Mitzvah
Remember, I’m talking about two things. I’m talking about the virtue and I’m talking about the mitzvah, okay? And when we talk about mitzvah or Torah, we have to first remember what a mitzvah is, what kind of a thing it is, okay?
I’m just using this whole story of Ibn Ezra to illustrate how ancient people or medieval people, how old people used to think of what a mitzvah is, right? A mitzvah is not—nowadays, people probably think of a mitzvah as a good thing, just to be clear. Mitzvah means the right thing to do. Of course, why is it right? Because God made it right. God told you to do so.
There’s two meanings of mitzvah. It’s the right thing to do. And mitzvah also means what you do because it was commanded. Things like that. *Milashon tzivui* [from the language of commanding], you’re right. *Mach tzens* [make sense]. It’s mitzvah because it was commanded. And so on. Or we say a commandment. That is how we people—
Student: No, but what is it? You’re still not saying what it is.
What a Mitzvah Is Not
Instructor: I’m trying to tell you what it’s not, right? What is it not? So now, to be clear, now I’m showing you. It’s not that—why do I think it’s not that? Because the mitzvah is also something—let’s make it clear, you—let’s get one definition out of this, right?
A mitzvah is something that has to be told to you, right? For first, from, for some reason, that has to be told. Not—that’s what the difference in a law and a virtue is, right? A law, as I was quoting from *Rebbe* [Rabbi/Master] Aristotle, and Plato said this in other ways, and *Ram* [Rambam/Maimonides] said this in other ways—like I told you—but as I said this in other ways, everyone said that law, and the *Moshe Rabbeinu* [Moses our Teacher] told them in other ways, everyone before five minutes ago agreed that laws are only things said for people that need them, right?
Laws Exist Because Most People Are Bad
Why do we have laws? Because most people are bad. If people would have—would have actual, actual knowledge of how to act, they wouldn’t need laws. Just to be clear, that is the ideal person, right? The ideal person needs less laws, right? Forget about the questions of specific virtues that you need to change, but those are virtues and not laws, right?
See, I’m still talking—that’s just the basic way of getting out of your question, right? I’m talking about laws, not virtues. The ideal person, the perfect person, doesn’t need laws to teach him. Laws is—right, let me give you another definition.
Student: Why?
Instructor: Because he already knows what to do. Because if you have the correct virtue of whichever subject we’re talking about, the virtue—it means knowing what to do, right? Like in India, it’s like even as there’s Indians who know that someone else’s money is his, and therefore they don’t take it, so they don’t need laws that tell them don’t steal, and if you steal all these kind of things. That’s what a law is. You heard it with the *niggun* [melody]—that’s the *niggun* of a law.
The Good Person Doesn’t Need Laws
And if you’re already a good person, you don’t need the laws, right? Plato literally said in his *Republic* [Plato’s *Republic*], and in his ideal city, there’s going to be less laws than in other cities. Because he said *mimon afshach* [either way]. Plato didn’t know how to say *mimon afshach*—he said it in Greek—but it’s the same idea. If you’re a good person, you don’t need as many detailed laws. You might need some laws, like very broad guidelines, but you don’t need laws because you already know what to do.
And if you’re a bad person, don’t laws—don’t help you. So making details laws, legislating a detail like Allah does, he according to Plato is not useful. Why doesn’t help you, you know, because you’re gonna—I think not listen to it.
Student: I’m at the punishment of the—you have to be punished all the time, and that’s not really—
Objection from Rambam’s Shemonah Perakim
Instructor: That’s not according to what the Rambam holds in *Shemonah Perakim* [Eight Chapters, Rambam’s introduction to Ethics of the Fathers], because somebody who wants to be virtuous that doesn’t understand that he’s not virtuous—
Student: Yeah, right, right. So how he says someone’s sick, right? Okay, he doesn’t know that he’s sick, but if you teach him—if you—you can’t really teach a sick person to be sick. The real person says you could teach him why he’s sick. You might as—
Instructor: Once, yes, yes, I agree, I agree. I have a good idea.
Student: What, what if you tell him that measure that came from a shaman told you have to do it? I mean, if you go to your hand otherwise, then you know that—
Instructor: No, by the way, you’ll notice that it doesn’t help for bad people, right? Everyone knows that the Torah doesn’t help you over a bad person, right? We’re criticizing this sometimes.
Student: Bad? I mean, it helps for mediocre people that wouldn’t listen otherwise.
Two Different Kinds of Laws
Instructor: Yeah, that’s not the argument. That’s not the argument. This argument is against too many details of the laws. You’ve got laws that make people into good people, instead of having laws that tell people what to do. That’s two different kinds of laws.
I’m just giving you all these illustrations to explain to you what a law is, to distinguish it from the contemporary what most people think of a mitzvah as—like I told you, either the good things are ultimate true good thing, or as what God commanded, which to them is found the same. I’m giving you these two statements, and according to that, that way of thinking, what even as it says make no sense, right? Correct. And one make no sense.
The Contradiction: Ibn Ezra vs. Modern Understanding
Student: Yeah, I’m going to, because I’m just not going to steal. I’m not going to erase that from the *Dibros* [Ten Commandments]. It’s a waste of ink and nice, great, good stones. Why would you chisel that in a good stone if everyone else isn’t ready?
Instructor: But you see how there’s a contradiction between these two theories of the law, right? Ibn Aziz [Ibn Ezra] thought of the law. Now you get a third word, right? Nobody’s taking notes—you’re not gonna remember if I’m old if I just skip a number. But yes, yeah, yes, yeah, it doesn’t definitely doesn’t know if you skip a number was something. Laws were for helping people being good, and if they’re ready go, they don’t need to laws.
Definition: A Mitzvah Is Not the Same as a Virtue
So that’s not what a mitzvah is according to him. Again, a mitzvah is a law, and a law is something that makes people be good. If they’re already good, they don’t need it. So a mitzvah included in the definition of mitzvah, as distinct from a virtue, from a greatness, as we said a minute ago, is that it’s for people that don’t know how to act. That they’re not good already.
There are bad ways he says about *Moshav* [Moshe/Moses], and basically he doesn’t have a mitzvah. In some places he says he doesn’t have a mitzvah. We can get into a lot of, like, textual discussions about this, but we’re going to try to stick to the ideas. Okay?
Historical Agreement Among the Rishonim
So, *mach tzens* [make sense], *mach leukes* [makes sense], *mach leukes*, the Ibn Ezra, and basically all the *Rishonim* [early rabbinic authorities] with all the *Akhrim* [later authorities]. Now, I don’t even know of one *Akhrim* that would say, that would agree to this Ibn Ezra that says that if the Torah would be given to people that don’t steal already, there would be no steal. Only one, which is that *yid* [Jew] over there, *Ramosh Ikor de Vero* [Rav Moshe Cordovero, the Ramak], he agrees. But he has a very fancy Kabbalistic way of agreeing, but he kind of agrees. He’s the most—the most recent person who would agree?
Student: He’s a great guy.
Instructor: He’s the most recent person?
Student: He’s the most recent person that I agree.
Instructor: No, all of them in a certain sense agree, but in that weird way.
Student: What do you mean?
Instructor: I’ll tell you. Give me that booklet over there. *Shkod* [wait]. *Shkod*. But you understand my use of it?
Torah as Teacher: The Core Definition
But I want to first add another word for therefore what the word *toida* [Torah] means, what mitzvah means. I’m using them interchangeably at the moment, right? Therefore what mitzvah or *toida* means is—is a teacher, a guide, a teacher. I like the word teacher, because that’s my job, I like—a law is a teacher, and a teacher is needed only for people that are not yet knowing everything themselves, right? Of course, the job of a teacher is to make you not need a teacher in the end, because he needs to teach you instead of instruct you, and you have to keep on coming back, right? He’s trying to teach you.
So *Moreh Nevuchim* [Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides’ major philosophical work] is redundant really, because like Plato said—other, other, right—it’s teaching you how to think. It’s teaching you how to fish, of course. Is doing what—
Torah as Living Water: The Critique of Mechanical Learning and the Call for Connection to Reality
The Mekubalim’s Critique – Torah Made Dry vs. Torah as Flowing Stream
The Teacher’s Goal: Making Yourself Unnecessary
Instructor: Of course, the job of a teacher is to make you not need a teacher in the end, because it’s to teach you instead of instruct you and you have to keep on coming back, right? He’s trying to teach you. So *Moreh Nevuchim* [Guide for the Perplexed] is redundant, really. *Moreh Nevuchim* is… Because like Plato said, *Adar Adar* [?], right?
No, *Moreh Nevuchim* is not telling you what to do. It’s teaching you how to think. It’s teaching you how to fish.
Of course, *Moreh Nevuchim* is doing what? What God was doing when he gave the Torah. Any Torah that’s not for *nevuchim* [the perplexed/confused] is useless.
Torah Is For Imperfect People, Not Angels
That’s the opposite. People think, you’re for *nevuchim*, I’m for the perfect people. Perfect people don’t need no Torah. Perfect people are *malachim* [angels]. They could go eat with *Saba Khulaf* [?] to get with *Ramavini* [?]. No *sheik* [doubt/question] is with them. You understand?
The Torah is for imperfect people who need a guide, a teacher, and a teacher specific in the ways that is going to make them better and get them to be good. And afterwards, they won’t need the Torah in that way. *Stimmt* [Right/Correct]?
Introduction to the Mekubalim’s Perspective
You want me to tell you how *Mekubalim* [Kabbalists] said this thing? He said it like this. So should I tell you? But it’s not interesting. It’s not going to help you at all.
We love *Mekubalim* because of this, precisely because of this. Because *Mekubalim* are the last people to understand what Torah means. But since they have different commitments, which makes so it’s—I’ll make it clear, okay? We love *Mekubalim* and we’ll make it clear, okay? No, let me explain so and not sense what we’re saying. So I’ll call them the Torah is a teach now.
The *Mekubalim*, they say like this. I’m going to teach you.
The Ra’aya Meheimna and Tikkunei Zohar: A Frustrated Student’s Critique
There’s this *sefer* [book] that keeps on publishing from his commentary on the *Zohar* [foundational Kabbalistic text], which goes on for like 10,000 pages. It’s all reprinted, but he just reprinted it. It was nice and stuff.
And the *Zohar*, specifically which is a part of the *Zohar* or different author, it doesn’t matter. It goes on and on about the Torah that most people learn being fake. Did you know this? Did you know this? There’s a book.
Okay, okay, okay. So I’ll tell you a story. First, I’ll tell you a story. There was a *Yid* [Jew]. No, but don’t tell anyone where he lived. But in any case, there was a *Yid* who was meant to be a yeshiva. And he was really, really frustrated with what they taught in that yeshiva. He was so frustrated, he wrote two books in the name of Moshe Rabbeinu [Moses our teacher] himself, cursing out all the yeshivas he went to. Okay? Two books.
Those two books are printed as part of the set of *Zohar*, but everyone agrees—because there’s no debate about this—that there’s distinct books that might be scripted by the same author, it doesn’t matter, but they’re distinct books. And these books are called, one is the name of [*Ra’aya Meheimna*] and the other one is called [*Tikkunei Zohar*].
Both of these books are the frustrated curses—there’s literal curses in it—rants of a *Yid* that went to yeshiva and said, he says like, you’re a kind of *poshet* [simple/literal interpreter]. You make everything dirty. That’s the Torah from the *klipah* [husk/impurity]. He literally likes, very much likes, the *Zohar*, the *Mekubalim* very much like the imagery of water and streams and dryness.
The Metaphor: Turning Flowing Water into Dry Land
And said, you’re making the Torah into *yabashah* [dry land]. That I actually wanted to make the *yabashah* into *eretz* [land/earth, from root *ratz* meaning “to run”]. And you’re making the *eretz* into *yabashah* again. Okay?
You’re making the Torah dry and, how do you say in English? Dried out. Dried out. No? Something better? Shriveled up? Parched.
Student: Parched.
Instructor: Okay, more, yeah, I don’t know, more worse than dried out, okay?
And his job is to re-stream, to make the Torah flow in the *wadi* [dry riverbed] that they dried out, right? The *nachal* [stream] should be *nachal nove’a* [gushing stream]. It shouldn’t be a dead *nachal* like the *nachal eitan* [permanent/enduring stream] and so on. And all these *derashot* [homiletical interpretations] were his where he’s already.
The Author’s Strategy: Speaking in the Name of Moses
So that’s he wrote this book. And famously they were—okay, we’re not gonna get into politics. So that’s the book. And of course, since it’s very hard to be a *Yid* after, you know, the *chutzpah* [audacity], and come and attack everyone, so he took Moshe Rabbeinu himself. No, I’m good.
He took Moshe Rabbeinu himself, and he said that I am speaking—he spoke in the name of Moshe, or said that he was a *neshamah* [soul] of Moshe Rabbeinu himself, that came to speak to the *Tanna’im* [Mishnaic sages] and *Amora’im* [Talmudic sages]. That’s literally what he says, and he uses those words. So of course it wasn’t written by either a *Tanna* or an *Amora*, as everyone has noticed.
This is, again, not my tradition. *Darid al-Seldi* [?] was a *neshamah*, it doesn’t matter. Everyone agrees that there’s something beyond time going on here.
And he said, I am Moshe speaking to the *Tanna’im* and *Amora’im* and telling them—people, he claimed that the real *Tanna’im* and *Amora’im*, of course, no. But most people don’t know they’re reading the backwards Torah. They’re reading the Torah from the back, not from the inside, and so on.
The Drash of Hitting the Rock vs. Speaking to It
So this is a really beautiful book, but it’s very hard. First, it has all these great *derashot*. Like one of his *derashot* is this that I’m reading here, how Moshe hit the stone and all your people are basically the stone that Moshe hit or the rock. And I have a new way I’m going to crack the stone. I’m getting the water already, okay? Stop hitting the stone. Try to drink the water already. Maybe talk a little to the stone.
I was very interested in this. In this, keep it hitting the rock.
Student: Is he saying, yeah, you’re like hitters, you’re just the *hak*, the *hak*, the *hak* [hitting/chopping]. What’s going on?
Instructor: And he says that, you know, there’s a *midrash* [rabbinic interpretation] that said that Moshe hit the rock, two little drops came out, right? Then he spoke to it and the whole it started to gush out water. He said that’s the way, the way you learn Torah is you *kvetch* [squeeze/struggle] and then you get a tiny bit of Torah. And he said, could you talk to the rock a few minutes? Could you listen to it? We go in and go to the *shul* [synagogue] and listen to it. You’ll get a *shefa* [abundance/flow].
After this says this, and it’s like them of him, they quote this *stickle* [passage] and says that people don’t know, which means they don’t really care what the Torah is really. They’re happy with being *Roshei Yeshivos* [heads of yeshivas] and *gaba’im* [synagogue functionaries] and so on. And he literally uses this.
He says, you’re struggling so hard to get like, to fetch up one *pshat* [simple interpretation]. Come to us. You read that? He doesn’t ever have difficulty with making up a new *pshat*, right? It’s all flowing.
No, but of course, there’s a lot of *drash* [homiletical interpretation] and stuff going on. But when you care about, you see, when you connect it, you see, I’m going to explain this to you very clearly in my way. And if I’m too off track, remind me where I’m coming from. But it’s very simple, right?
The Core Problem: Torah Disconnected from Reality
If your Torah is something that is contrary to reason or contrary to reality—which reason is just the way we understand reality, what we call reason is just the way we understand reality—come next week, Tuesday, or whenever, you’ll hear a clear explanation about this.
And then all the Torah you have is like five little books, five books of Moses. It’s like the *Rivkah* [Rebecca]. It says, says that the *Tikkunei HaZohar* is like a little jug that Rivkah brings down to the well and *schleps* [drags] out a little Torah. And when it was really Rivkah, what happened? She got everything, everything by itself. That’s called [*ha-mayim alu likratah* – the waters rose up to meet her].
The Kad Metaphor: Limited Vessels vs. Unlimited Source
He stops being the guy that’s… Think about it. How many words are in the whole [*Tanakh* – Hebrew Bible]? There’s nothing. That’s not enough. That’s a tiny bit of reality. Of course, it’s a way into all of reality. But it’s a tiny bit of reality.
And if your Torah is just like the books, the *kad* [jug], then you’re going to be struggling all your life and never getting anywhere. You’re hitting the rock, hitting the rock all your life, and you’re stuck with the hitting. And you hit your kids and you hit your children. It’s all one big hitting. You’re a [*ba’al nigleh* – master of revealed/exoteric Torah only]. That’s how he calls it. You’re a guy that only learns *Gemara* [Talmud] and not *Kabbalah* [Jewish mysticism]. This is the language.
Student: Yeah, yeah.
Instructor: But he means really, he’s angry. He’s not talking about, you could call it, you could add to, you could just keep on adding. But that’s not the point. The point is, I’m saying it’s a way of living.
The Alternative: Torah That Flows From Connection to Reality
But if you learn the Torah, if you believe—this is not a belief, it’s really a—I mean it’s a belief, but it’s a—like when I say belief, I mean an active thing, right? Not a dead thing. It’s a way of doing it, right? It’s a way of learning.
If you learn in the way that you say, of course, I’m going to use these texts a lot, but I don’t have to use these texts, by the way. Where did these texts come from? Like you said, prophecy. Where did they come from? From God. Yeah. Thank you very much. Everything is from God. Where did they come from? From people who have access to God, who have access to reality and gave us all of this, okay?
So that’s they’re still, how do they say, there’s a lot more of this where I came from, right? There’s more where it came from. There’s always more where it came from. I know it says there’s nothing more where it came from, okay? That will take that *drash* a different time. I figured out. But the point is there’s always more where it came from, right? It’s the same one, but it’s more. That’s just for the people to be happy. There’s the same one, there’s more.
And therefore, you don’t have to ever, like, be *farkvetsht* [squeezed/stuck]. Because wherever you are in the reality, you’re going to have the Torah there. You’re going to have the knowledge there. You got what I’m saying?
Critique of Anti-Intellectual “Daat Torah” Claims
If your Torah is always about, let’s not read any book, let’s not read… The more you… The less you read, you know how it goes. This is the biggest *apikorsus* [heresy] of all ever, right?
Someone said the name of a *tzaddik* [righteous person]. I don’t believe he ever said it, because it’s a *mamash apikorsus* [outright heresy]. No, I really don’t believe that he said that. How does he know he has that Torah? Because he’s never read anything besides the Torah. This is called *apikorsus*.
It was said in the name of a certain *tzaddik* that he knows that when he has a political opinion, it’s Torah. How does he know? Because he doesn’t read any newspapers, and therefore doesn’t read anything besides the Torah. And all his knowledge is from the Torah.
Now, this part is *apikorsus*, besides for it not being true, because the specific person that it’s said about actually did read newspapers. It’s just not true. If someone is a [*posek* – halakhic decisor] and so on, doesn’t read newspapers, it’s just not an *apikorsus*. It’s like a guy passing by and never saw blood. It doesn’t begin. It doesn’t begin. But besides that, it was [*apikorsus*].
Because what is the Torah? Like we say, the Torah is [*Torat chaim* – Torah of life].
Torah as Blueprint of Reality: The Rambam’s Framework and the Problem of Inner Meaning
The Epistemological Error of “Torah-Only” Learning
Reality as a Valid Path to Torah Knowledge
Okay, there’s ways to find that. Also, the hidden things, not so hard. Yeah, whatever. You get a pipe. You could also just follow the pipe. You don’t even need the x-ray. The point is, you go in the basement, you see, it’s not so complicated to find out the blueprint. But you don’t believe that. You only look in these books.
So, of course, your Torah is very much something you’re always going to be struggling. If your Torah is the door path [sha’ar: gateway], like the Shah, like Shah Revena [possibly: sha’ar revana, gate of understanding], is the door path to everything else, wherever you are, you’re never going to be stuck. You have what I’m saying?
That’s why if you turn to the Shema [possibly: Torah lishmah, Torah for its own sake], which means for what it is, then you’re going to have not a male [amal: toil] or whatever. It’s not going to be again in the same way.
Application to Working People
So I was looking at the old class. I think it’s again, you said about that, the philosophies for that. My name is like that. There’s one title I want to post it for the working class. It says, right, I want to post it for the campaign. But that’s what I like to. It’s one of my most popular classes on Google. I have no idea why.
But the point is that you can always think. As I thought about this, if you’re sitting and learning and working, and you have to think of a specific Rebbe Chaim [referring to a specific style of Talmudic analysis], you’re never going to think about that. You’re going to think about reality. It’s not that hard. You know, working, there’s parts of reality you could think about. Right, okay.
The Raya Mehemna’s Radical Critique
Acknowledging the Digression
So now let’s go back to where we are. So now I’m just, there’s all the side notes. It’s very important. I know that it’s connected to everything I say. All my side notes are connected. I never get off topic, but you have to believe me. But…
Student: No, you should let your arm, like, this is off topic.
Instructor: Now I’m saying it’s off topic, but it’s also never really off topic. It’s off topic. The captain is that’s never of his greater topic, right? He really, it’s really, really cares about.
The Sefer and Its Message
So now we were saying, so there’s the sefer [book] that he was learning in yeshiva [Torah academy] and he wrote. The commander says he was with mana [possibly: money] going in. It doesn’t matter because he was managing him. And the highly commander, the blazer commander said that it was his money going. We didn’t believe either that was from the tunnel.
So the point is that he wrote this whole book with all these beautiful dirijas [possibly: derashos, homiletical teachings], like the one that I just told you, to hack, not to hack—I mean, he does hack a little bit, which is, I think, a problem—but to explain how we should start learning the Torah if I get to you, okay?
We should stop bluffing around and hacking around and start learning the actual Torah, because the Torah is a good thing. Not as a bad thing as you people think. It’s a good thing. That’s what he said. And he spoke in the name of Moshe [Moses] about himself. You understand?
The Kabbalistic Image of Shells and Fruit
And he said things like this, that the Torah itself, just like in Kabbalah [Jewish mysticism] language, everything has klippas [klippos: shells, husks], everything has hetzoimis [chitzonius: externality]. Everything is surrounded by, like they have this image of a nut, right?
A nut, you have to crack it. You don’t get the shell. You don’t get to the nut without breaking the shell. And they’re thinking always of a specific kind of nut. I’m not sure, a walnut or an almond. I don’t know, some kind of nut. They call it egoz [nut], which has four different levels of shells. And you’ve got to get through all of them and the whole thing until you finally get to the fruit inside.
And they said the Torah is like that. And you people are learning about the shell your whole life. Klippa is shells, right? If you start translating things into English, they start sounding better or worse, I’m not sure. And you should start learning the fruit for once. Yohab [possibly: yofi, beautiful].
Connecting to the Main Argument
Okay, now, how does this connect to what I was saying? So now, these statements were kind of problematic for the Achronim [Acharonim: later rabbinic authorities], because for Achronim this is a problem.
The Rishonim Had No Problem
See, the Rishonim [early rabbinic authorities] had no problem with saying this. You understand, this is literally, like, this Moshe Ra’a Mehemna [Raya Mehemna: the faithful shepherd, referring to Moses] wrote this, this book Ra’a Mehemna was a gilgul [reincarnation] of Moshe Rabbeinu [Moses our teacher] and also of Rabbeinu Moshe [our teacher Moses, referring to Maimonides], right?
The Rambam Would Have Agreed
Because Rambam [Maimonides] would agree to every single word in this book. Maybe not all his theories about God and so on. Maybe also, yes, but because it works a lot with Rambam’s ten maluchim [possibly: ma’amaros, sayings] and stuff.
But he definitely would agree to this theory of the Torah, that everyone is reading it backwards. And he might be less frustrated because Rambam was a nicer guy, guy, but that’s already questions of temperament and things like that.
Comparing Writing Styles: Rambam vs. Raya Mehemna
Rambam wasn’t angry. He never wrote angrily. Almost never. He mostly writes nicely instead of angrily. And the drama [possibly: Raya Mehemna] wrote angrily. Okay. Moshe Rabbeinu [Moses our teacher] himself wrote angrily. He had a whole book in his name that’s just full of anger.
Well, if you put drama that writes angrily, it’s that, like, Antigonash Hashem [possibly: a reference to anger against God] told this beautiful idea to dumb people. It’s like, it won’t play anything.
Student: You think he’s angry?
Instructor: I think so.
Student: Oh, he gets angry a little bit, but very little in his writings.
Instructor: I think he’s angry at that move.
Student: Yeah, yeah.
Instructor: No, in his letters, he’s angry. He’s angry about that Gerasimov’s writing [possibly: a reference to a specific controversy].
Student: Yeah, yeah.
Instructor: He gets angry. I’m just saying, but he doesn’t write. His books are written very nicely and not angrily, which is the correct way to write a Sefer Torah [Torah book]. You should not follow the Rambam’s process of writing angrily. You should try to follow the Rambam’s process of writing nicely.
The Rambam’s Concept of Pnimiyus HaTorah
But he was still a Talmud [talmid: student] of the Rambam, and the Rambam was the one who taught us this, and Torah has an inner meaning, right? Called Pnimiyus of Torah [pnimiyus haTorah: the inner dimension of Torah]. The Rambam was the one who came up with this word.
I mean, it comes from Arabic, ta’ar [possibly: batin, inner], and then revealed, or an external meaning, or people call it esoteric and exoteric, and true meaning is the esoteric meaning, and so on, right?
The Problem for Later Authorities
The Raya Mehemna’s Radical Language
But now, for the later people, so for the people that read Rambam, and like I call it Sholem [possibly: shalom, peace/harmony], this was no problem. And I don’t know of anyone that was even upset at the Rambam when it came out for saying things like this.
Student: Later people, people ask, he uses the right language also, I think.
Instructor: No, Raya Mehemna is really radical. You gotta read it. He doesn’t use any of the right language. He really curses out all the Rashashivas [Roshei Yeshivos: heads of Torah academies], like…
I’m sure that when he actually was published, or whenever, when people started reading it, people knew who he’s referring to also. Like he doesn’t have names, but like, you can get who he means. Like he’s not talking about, he’s not talking about in the abstract, like…
Raya Mehemna very much doesn’t name names, so he likes, like specific, like Mahalakalim [possibly: machlokes, controversies] type of thing. You’re pretty sure that if you learn from the same yeshiva, you know exactly why he’s saying these words. And he might even be using certain idioms that they used but we don’t know them because we didn’t learn the same yeshiva, so we don’t know what it exactly means. But it’s a very obvious book.
The Sabbatean Distortion
Now for later people, these things were a problem of some of sorts. Of course you probably know about something called Sabbateanism [Sabbatai Tzvi movement], who really took these ideas around with them and said that since the Torah is only one klippa [shell], they’re going to do the higher [Torah], which means you should marry your sister or something like that.
Which is also nonsense, by the way. That’s not what the higher Torah is.
Student: Yeah, I feel like historically people take these ideas, but then they still get stuck with the klippa.
Instructor: That’s very dumb. It’s a big klippa, because there’s the higher… Of course, the higher Torah doesn’t say you should marry your sister. The higher Torah is that you don’t have a body to marry at all. That’s really what Israel [possibly: Yisrael, or the Zohar] is trying to talk about. It’s about the intellect. It’s not about doing anything.
So, but that’s what they’re like. They hate this idea. They just move it to a different level. They take it back. I have to get back to where I was.
Rabbi Moshe Cordovero’s Concern
The Problem of “Torah Chadasha”
So, therefore, therefore, so Rabbi Wojcik-Odovero [Rabbi Moshe Cordovero, the Ramak], he was before Shabbatianism [Sabbateanism], but there were people making such arguments in his times also, and whenever he gets into this, he gets into this problem at length. He’s very worried about this idea, right?
The Zohar likes this midrash [medrash: rabbinic homiletical teaching] that made up a posek [pasuk: verse] that says, “Torah chadasha me’iti tetze” [A new Torah will go forth from Me]. There’s no such posek, of course, but it does say in the posek, it says “Torah me’iti tetze” [Torah will go forth from Me]. Of course, only one [Torah], right? What is it saying?
But he’s very worried about this and he tries to explain this.
The Ramak’s Difficulty with the Framework
And the way he explained this, because he had a little bit of this problem, because it wasn’t simple to him that law is just about—it would be simple to him, right? Just let’s explain clearly. If you would be like, and it would be clear to you that of course the Torah has a shell and the shell means, like, and what we say when we say a shell, we mean the law in the sense that we just explained.
The law in the sense of a teacher for bad people. So it is for bad people, like it said in the [verse], that was like, right? It is a sham [possibly: Tehillim, Psalms]. “Machkimas pesi” [making the simple wise]. No, I’m gonna make him a specie [possibly: pesi, simple person]. But there is to make smart dummies. It’s not to make smart smart people. It might be already smart. We got to make them smart. They’re fine. It’s a dummy that we gotta make smart, right? And that’s all of us.
But since they had already a different [understanding]…
The Rambam’s Two-Tiered Framework
Clarifying the Ramak’s Source
At the end, just to be clear, that other video is also on the Rambam, right? They did [say] the Torah is not just about this. This is the Rambam’s idea for me Saturday [possibly: mishneh Torah] too, right?
Because the Rambam himself taught that the external meaning of the Torah is this. And of course, the external meaning includes most of the laws, the literal sense of the laws, at least. The Rambam didn’t claim that there’s a metaphorical sense to every law, but he did claim that there is a metaphorical and metaphysical kernel or fruit of the whole Torah. It might not be of every law. The Zohar took it further and said it’s of every law.
The True Meaning of Torah
But there’s a kernel, there’s a meaning of truth in the whole Torah. In other words, the meaning of truth of the Torah, which the Rambam himself called “chochmas haTorah al derech ha’emes” [the wisdom of Torah according to the way of truth]. You’ll remember who took that word for himself.
And the true meaning of the Torah is what it teaches about truths, not what it teaches about how to do. Of course, there’s some teaching of that also, but it’s really just like repeating things that you should know. Okay, we can get into that, but it’s not about teaching. It’s about the truth being true.
The Rambam’s View of Mitzvos
Like the Rambam would tell you. The Rambam would tell you that there’s only one mitzvah [commandment], or two mitzvos [mitzvos: commandments], or five mitzvos in the Torah, which are about the reality as it is. Those mitzvos are not for teachers. They are, of course, teachers also, because he tries to make them teachers also. But basically all mitzvos are participating in some form of one of those…
The Rambam, they participate mostly by preparing you, right? In the way of preparation. You can’t do metaphysics if you’re not a good person. And mitzvos are making you a good person, and so on. And that’s how those mitzvos are shells.
The Rambam Used the Language of Klippa
For the Rambam himself is the one that used this language of klippa [shell], by the way. It’s the language that Rambam himself used. And he was against… Whatever. He came up with this word. I don’t know if he came it up. Again, it’s a Muslim word also.
The Core Principle: Knowledge of God and Reality
So the Rambam is also the one who said that there is a true meaning of the Torah, which is the knowledge of God and the knowledge of reality, God and creation.
The Rambam’s Dual Torah: Inner Truth and Outer Utility, and the Kabbalistic Response
The Rambam’s Interpretation of Pre-Creation Torah and Angelic Learning
Instructor: In other words, if you would ask the Rambam—then the Rambam himself was asked, didn’t ask, but kind of said things like this—if you would ask the Rambam, what does the *midrash* [rabbinic homiletical interpretation] that talks about the Torah existing before creation mean? What kind of Torah did the *malachim* [angels] want to learn? Right? If you go back to the story that he was talking about, right? The *malachim* wanted to learn the Torah. What did they want to learn about? Does that mean that they—right? You have to understand the question and the answer, and they’re referring to different things. Did they want to learn about *basar bechalav* [the prohibition of mixing meat and milk]? Of course not.
So what is even the story? The story is that the true meaning of the Torah is something that *malachim* want to learn, which is knowing God, and that’s what *malachim* do anyways. And of course, the Rambam read such *midrashim* as not literally being a dialogue, it’s not an answer to the question, it’s just expressing this duality of the Torah. There is a sense in which the Torah is for *malachim*—of course for the part of a person that’s like a *malach* [angel], his separate intellect, and so on.
The Sabbatian Connection: You Have a Body, Therefore You Must Observe Practical Mitzvot
Instructor: That’s what I was saying, I think that it’s really also talking to the Sabbatians. They’re saying basically they’re saying one who worships that type, don’t do that, and the answer is that’s from a lot of them—you actually have to do *kibbud av* [honoring one’s father and mother]. Well of course you do, because you have a mother. You do have a mother, exactly. And you’re getting married, so you can. And if you do have, then you’re right, the above that, like you said, it’s not getting married, it’s not anything to do with that thing, and you’re getting married. But you see, this is—wait, wait, we understand why the Kabbalah precisely has that issue in a second.
If you want to be against Kabbalah, I’ll give you also why. Because—no, not why, just explain to you the *sha’ar hadash* [new gate/approach], the source of this problem.
The Rambam’s Framework: Kernel and Shell, Truth and Utility
The Rambam Would Not Be Confused by This Duality
Instructor: So the Rambam wouldn’t—the *Olymp* [possibly referring to a student or another scholar] was getting confused already. The Rambam wouldn’t have a problem with this. The Rambam was the one that tells us that there’s a kernel of the Torah which is truths about God. This is what Adam *HaRishon* [the first man] learned during the night and before the *chet* [sin]. This is what Shem and Ever studied in their *yeshiva* [academy of Torah learning].
The Rambam really laughs and is like a *dam* [blood/fool] at the first time *Mishnah* [the first major written collection of Jewish oral law]—everyone thinks that Shem and Ever’s *yeshiva* was studying *hilchot shomerim* [laws of bailees/guardians] and *hilchot dalet minim* [laws of the four species used on Sukkot]. He said that’s nonsense. Nobody in his right mind would think that. Nobody in his right mind would think that Shlomo HaMelech [King Solomon] who said *amarti echkema* [I said I would become wise—Ecclesiastes 7:23], said he couldn’t understand the reasoning of *migo* [a Talmudic legal principle]. That’s not what it was about. It was obviously about metaphysics and physics, about the reality, and that’s what Shlomo was all about.
And the fact that the Torah has an external meaning, which is to make you a better person, that is the external of the Torah.
The Rambam’s Own Problem: Every Word Is Holy vs. Hierarchical Meaning
Instructor: Now, the Rambam himself does have a problem saying this, of course he caused this also. Gosh, I can’t—I’m explaining to you why the Rambam is the cause of everything. But the Rambam himself has a problem, because the Rambam says we have to believe that every word in the Torah is as holy as everything in the Torah. That’s what it says in the *Ikkarim* [principles of faith], the seventh or eighth. But Rambam does really believe that there is—in the real sense there isn’t a doubt about this—of course he says he shouldn’t say it for various reasons, but he obviously believes that there is a true meaning of the Torah and a non-true—you can’t say non-true—and a useful meaning of the Torah as opposed to a true meaning. You can say something like that, right? There is the utility of the Torah and the truth of it, and they are not the same thing.
The utility of the Torah—yes, political truth is necessary for human beings to get to actual truth—but political meaning, or the utilitarian, the useful meaning of the Torah is to become a better person, and that’s what most *mitzvot* [commandments] are about. But I’m very explicit that most *mitzvot* are about this, and the true meaning of the Torah, which is perfecting the intellectual part of the person, or we could say the *malach* part, that is the part that is still for *malachim*, and still for people who are like *malachim*.
The Kabbalists’ Dissatisfaction with the Rambam’s Framework
The Rambam’s Own Statements Generated the Problem
Instructor: But now, other people, people like *mekubbalim* [Kabbalists], including the Ramban [Nachmanides], very explicitly, were not happy with this. They were not happy with this precisely because of this language of the Rambam that said that we have to pray—one of the *pesukim* [verses] that the *Zohar* [foundational work of Jewish mysticism] liked the most, and it comes from the Rambam liking this *pasuk* [verse], because the Rambam interpreted this *pasuk* as meaning that in every word of the Torah there are secrets, and the Rambam explicitly mentions *parshiot* [Torah portions] like—what are the *parshiot* that the Rambam thinks nobody thinks they’re but knows what they’re about? That’s in the mention in the *Mishnah* and the kings of Edom, exactly, and some other things.
And the Rambam says you cannot be *mevazeh* [disgrace/dishonor] *mitzvot*, because they’re also teaching you something. Of course, the Rambam himself in *Moreh Nevuchim* [Guide for the Perplexed] part three, chapter forty-something, told us what he thinks they actually teach, and you could see over there what he actually thinks.
Every Mitzvah Must Have a True Inner Meaning
Instructor: But the important thing now is that there is some flies. Okay. The important thing now is that the *mekubbalim*, because of these kinds of statements that Rambam made, and of them not agreeing with the kind of solutions that Rambam has for such questions, said that it’s not only that there isn’t a Torah in general, an inner meaning, a true inner meaning, and an outer meaning. They said that every *mitzvah* in the Torah has to have a true inner meaning.
So if it says in the Torah *ve’asita ma’akeh le-gagecha* [and you shall make a railing for your roof—Deuteronomy 22:8]—what that inner meaning of that *pasuk* is, that you should not think beyond the capacity of human reason [referring to the Mishnah’s prohibition on speculating about what is above, below, before, and after].
The Problem with Encoding Philosophy into Practical Mitzvot
Student Objection: You’re Downgrading the Philosophical Idea
Instructor: So this is the problem. It’s really weird because you don’t need the *pasuk* *ve’asita ma’akeh* for this. There’s a lot of problems with this. But *ve’asita ma’akeh*, the *Zeizim Mishnah* [possibly referring to a specific Mishnah], the *inal ha’alok ma’alekh nim ha’alokha* [do not inquire into what is above, below, before, and after], the weird *Zeizim Mishnah*, *ve’asita ma’akeh*, the *Zeizim pasuk*.
There’s two issues. First of all, you’re buying into this. You’re always keeping the *klippah* [shell/husk] there. You’re keeping the *klippah* there because you’re saying that you’re making that in the midst of—you actually downgrading it now. When you’re making the *Zeizim Mishnah*—you’re actually downgrading it.
Student: What do you mean I’m downgrading it?
Instructor: You downgrade the idea of *ma’al tzidim ha’rachah* [possibly: the idea of the railing/boundary] and you make it into a *mitzvah*. It’s just a *mitzvah*.
Student: He’s not making it into a *mitzvah*. He’s masking that you have to make a *mitzvah*.
Instructor: Also, the problem is—the problem is that you’re not willing to say that the Rambam’s reasons are good enough. Why is he not good enough?
Student: No, they are good enough, but not good enough for—
Instructor: No, I’ll tell you what. No, no, I don’t think it’s—I think that the more precise thing to say would be that he’s not happy and the Rambam himself made him not happy with this. That’s what I’m telling you. You have to remember that the Rambam is the one that made him unhappy with this.
The Theological Problem: Torah Is Divine and Prior to Creation
Instructor: And, of course, that *Gemara* [Talmud] that the Rambam is based on is not happy with saying that there’s a whole *pasuk* in the Torah, a whole *parshah* [Torah portion] that’s only about human beings in this world.
Student: Why not?
Instructor: Okay, so wait. So let me tell you very clearly. Very good. Why not? Because the Torah was given by what God is. God is divine. And the Torah is prior to the universe, prior to the world, prior to creation. And therefore, it’s very weird to have the Torah be about creation, right? Basic ground.
These problems of belief, these are not problems of reality, but these are problems of belief, just to be clear. That’s the problem.
Student: Very good.
Instructor: There’s no problems of reality. There’s nothing wrong with reality being like this, because if God could create the whole world, he could also create a Torah for that world. There’s nothing wrong with that. But for people—for political reasons, maybe some people would agree to this—for political reasons you can’t say this.
The Rambam’s Public Position vs. His Real View
Instructor: Rambam himself would never allow you to say in public like what I just told you—in public that *ma’akeh* [the railing] is the *klippah* of the Torah. He would insist on saying that it’s divine just like everything else. And it’s not really—of course when he says it’s divine, he means to say, and he means very seriously to say, that it leads you—when you make a *ma’akeh*, you become a good person. And then slowly you start to understand God and so on.
Student: I think the problem is that you’re minimizing this. My problem with what you’re saying is that you’re minimizing this idea. You’re saying that’s not enough. It can’t be that’s enough. Why can’t that be enough? Why is that not a good enough purpose?
Instructor: Nobody said it’s not enough. What they say is not divine. And it’s true it’s not divine. Why is that divine? It’s not divine. It’s only a *hachana* [preparation] to the divine.
Student: I hear you’re fine. So why is the *hachana* to the divine not important? It could be enough. I always thought of this issue. It could be.
Instructor: The Rambam says *korbanot* [sacrifices] are to get rid of *avodah zarah* [idolatry]. He thinks, by the way, that that is just as important as your being a *sechel alumnus* [possibly: intellectual/wise person]. You think it’s a small thing. You said it multiple times.
Student: I’m asking him. I’m asking him.
Instructor: You think it’s a minor thing to get rid of *avodah zarah*?
Student: No, it has to be a *sechel alumnus*.
Instructor: I’m asking him. I’m asking him. I’m asking him. But let’s try to move on. We have to get back to—he’s talking about avoiding a piracy.
Student: I’m asking him. Right? That avoiding doesn’t have to be the highest level.
Instructor: Yeah. Also, I’m asking him. I’m asking him. But there’s other reasons. But we can’t explain everything.
The Political Problem of Revealing Reasons for Commandments
People Take Commandments Less Seriously When They Know the Reasons
Instructor: Wait, wait, wait, I know, I know, there’s other answers to this question, but this is all a sidetrack of something. So, it’s true. But just to be clear, you have to also agree that there’s a political problem with saying this. The Rambam himself would agree that, you know, that’s what people tell me about this. And the Rambam understands that most of the—that’s why this is the most serious Rambam on this subject, right?
The Rambam understands, from the *Gemarot* [plural of Gemara] that talk about this, most famously by Shlomo HaMelech [King Solomon], and we can’t get into this, that people, if you tell them the reason for something, they take it less seriously. Because people are dominant that way, what can we do?
Practical Example: The One Halacha Where the Reason Is Given, Nobody Follows
Instructor: The reason is start to say they’re right away because the kids be tired. Nobody listens that one because the *shedim* [demons] are going to come in five minutes—they would start right away. Nobody starts ready. Nobody knows that one because it makes too much sense. They can’t know whatever. So I never listen.
Problem could sleep is obviously a good reason. The best possible reason? Wow, nobody’s going to say that.
Student: I’m with you.
Instructor: But also, you know what *halacha* [Jewish law] means? I shouldn’t go to *shul* [synagogue] for *Ma’ariv* [evening prayer service]. If you go to *shul* for *Ma’ariv*, there’s no way you’re going to be in *Minkah* [possibly: on time for the Seder].
Student: No, I’m serious.
Instructor: You’re not allowed to go to *shul* for *Ma’ariv* if you want to be in *Minkah*. Okay, that’s—I was in *Minkah* after I went to *shul*, so it’s not a lie.
Student: In how? Walking 30 minutes.
Instructor: Wait, did I go to *shul* for *Ma’ariv*? I have to remember if I went to *shul*. Yeah, there was a *minyan* [prayer quorum of ten men]. You were not in *Minkah*. I wasn’t in *Minkah*. I don’t remember. I think there was a *minyan*. No, I went to a—no, I went 10 minutes to a—I didn’t go, I went to a closer *shul* to *Minkah* in the *salach* [possibly: neighborhood], but also go to one in the *minyan*.
But, it’s clear to me, no, the truth is that, whatever, it’s not set up, it’s not set up for that, but of course the *halacha* assumes that you’re staying home. You shouldn’t go to *shul*, in the *klal* [general rule], go to *shul*, you should go to *shul* in *Sha’ar Zamincha* [possibly: Shacharit/morning prayers]. I have an eye on this, and the *halacha*, if you listen to my *shiur* [Torah class], when I’m done, you’ll find out.
Okay, now, in *Minkah*, it’s problematic. *Sha’ar Zamincha* has to be earlier since you’ve the kids from ISIS, the kids from ISIS, so the kids I wouldn’t be happy with it would not be happy.
Summary: The Kabbalists’ Rejection of the Rambam’s Utilitarian Framework
Instructor: So you understand, so you—let’s understand that there’s a problem with saying this to most people at least. And I think that some of the—
[End of chunk 5]
The Kabbalistic Approach to Torah’s Pre-Existence: Ramban’s Letter-Permutation Solution and Its Pedagogical Challenges
The Mekubalim’s Agreement with Rambam’s Framework of Reasons
Instructor: That’s why Al-Piqa Bola, every time that many in Maqbal al-Makhram noticed this already, that all the Rama’s reasons are true, Al-Piqa Bola. And there must be such reasons, there must be reasons by the Rama himself, there must be such reasons Al-Piqa Bola, because according to Al-Piqa Bola, all the elements correspond one to another, and therefore if there’s not a *te’elis* [תועלת: purpose/benefit], the Rama when he says reasons, he means a goal, a point, of a mitzvah on Al-Masih, there wouldn’t be a mitzvah on Al-Masih, it would be a mitzvah for the *maluchim* [מלאכים: angels] and not for us.
So every *mekubal* [מקובל: kabbalist] that knows what he’s talking about agrees with every reason that the Rambam gives. It might be disagreeable on specifics—you give a bad reason—but the kind of reasons you can’t disagree. As a *middafqa* [מדקדק: one who examines carefully], as a *mekubal*, you can’t disagree with it. As a *stama* [סתם: simple/dogmatic] believer you could disagree with it, but as a *mekubal* you can’t disagree with it.
And this is something that Rabbeinu explains at length. He has a book that looks at a lot of things including this, and others explain this in similar ways, maybe the Leshem even, but from other perspectives.
The Mekubalim’s Distinctive Problem: The Literal Words Must Have True Meaning
Now, the important thing is, but, there’s a problem. This is what I’m saying: the *mekubalim* [מקובלים: kabbalists], when they say Torah, for some reason they’re more stuck on the specific *mitzvahs* [מצוות: commandments] or the specific words of the Torah as having a true meaning and not only a useful meaning.
So, therefore, there’s different solutions to this. One is to say that *ma’akeh* [מעקה: parapet] means what I just told you—that’s one *pshat* [פשט: interpretation], we can make other *pshatim* [פשטים: interpretations] in different ways and so on. But that is also…
Solution A: Reinterpret the Mitzvah Kabbalistically
Another thing you can do is what Rambam did. You remember the Rambam, right?
Solution B: The Ramban’s Approach to Pre-Creation Torah
What does Rambam say? The Torah. Very basic Rambam. Rambam says that the Torah was written before the universe. Remember?
Then Rambam is thinking, because he read Rambam, and he did try to think about reality and not just randomly say stuff. And he says, wait, this doesn’t make sense. There were no *shatnes* [שעטנז: forbidden mixture of wool and linen]. There’s not *semer* [צמר: wool] and not *pishtim* [פשתים: linen] before the world was created. And so on and so forth.
So what are we talking about when we say there was a Torah and black fire and white fire? What was he talking about that Torah?
Says the Holy Ramban like this. And here, it was talking about God. And God created the world by the plan that he has for the world which is called *Nous* [Greek: νοῦς, mind/intellect], which is called *Chochmah* [חכמה: wisdom], which is called Torah—everything obvious. And the Ramban explicitly identifies this with Plato and so on.
But the Ramban as *Olimic* [עולמי: worldly/kabbalistic] tries harder to connect this with the literal words and letters of the Torah. But they have a different trick.
The Ramban’s Letter-Permutation Solution
So his trick was like this. I don’t know why, I just told you, forget about the why *kacha* [ככה: like this], it’s a fact. This is where it goes off the rails. Wait, I’m done. You know it starts the story. We could solve that difference also if you want.
But this is the fact. I already gave you one why that you have to agree with. And what they did was, there might be more why. There’s more things than that going on, but I can’t say everything at once. That’s what I’m going to say all the time also, right?
So anyways, but let me finish my story. I’m just trying to describe to you, let’s go back. Maybe we’ll go backwards. Maybe we’ll find a solution, and we’ll see if we can make a solution that makes sense.
He had a different solution. He said that he has a *kabbalah* [קבלה: tradition], he has a tradition—would be totally against this tradition precisely for this reason—and he said he has a tradition that said that the way we read the Torah is only one way of reading it, right?
He said that the entire Torah is, by which he understands literally, names of God. And names in the style of the names that you know, like *Shem Ha’em Be’ez* [שם מ״ב: the 42-letter Name], *Shem Ha’em Be’ez* [שם ע״ב: the 72-letter Name], which Rashi already told us, it’s kind of an ancient tradition, it goes back to, I don’t know where.
The Rambam kind of denied these traditions very explicitly in his book, but it means that they were before him, right? It’s not a *chachmat* [חכמה: wisdom], but the Rambam said these are fake. This is before the Rambam. The Rambam, this is about *kameh* [כמה: how much], the Rambam had a need to deny this, but that means that it’s before the Rambam. It wasn’t invented after the Rambam, it was invented before him.
The Bible Code Method
And they said that if you take like three *pesukim* [פסוקים: verses], and you read them in a chart, right? Bible code. Bible code. Instead of reading the *pasuk* [פסוק: verse] in the normal order, you take three *pesukim*, that you have the same amount of letters, and you read them this way.
Very ancient thing of magic to do this. I don’t know who’s the first one, but it’s a very classical magic thing to do. You know what I’m saying? You know where it goes back all the way to the book of Daniel, this kind of magic, right? It’s very normal.
The problem with this idea is… So therefore, said Ramban, that we could read the Torah this way and many other ways. And therefore, when it says in the *Medrash* [מדרש: rabbinic commentary] that the Torah was written before the world in fire, it doesn’t mean that it says *Bereshis Boreleim* [בראשית ברא אלקים: “In the beginning God created”]. The Ramban says, I think maybe it wrote, it said, you could make it into whichever words you want, basically. That’s only one way, because you could cut up the words differently. You could also scramble the words, and so on.
So basically, there’s only 22 letters that were before *Bereshis* [בראשית: “In the beginning”].
The Problem with Letters Before Creation
The problem is also that you’re pretending that letters are in *Olam* [עולם: world], I don’t know what the other word is. It’s in *Olam Asiyah* [עולם עשיה: the World of Action/physical world], letters are also in *Olam Asiyah*.
Wait, wait, thank you very much. Of course, anyone that has a little science who says like you, one says that even the Ramban is not *kipshuto* [כפשוטו: literally], because of course, before there was a world, there wasn’t *aleph* and *bet* [אלף ובית: the first two Hebrew letters] either.
The Resolution: Letters as Symbols
So what the Ramban says, it’s very simple. Letters are the thing that are not in our *Olam Asiyah*. They stay out in *Olam Asiyah* also. Letters, of course, they represent ideas.
*Ma’at Bashut* [מעט בשוט: a little with a whip/briefly]. *Ma’at Bashut*, exactly.
So now there’s different answers to this problem. But every real *mekubal* understands exactly that. When we say letters, letters are literally signs. Obviously, they’re signs for something. They’re not the sign that we’re talking about. A letter, it means a sign. It’s a symbol of something. But the thing that they’re symbols of is the thing that we’re talking about.
And when we say that, nobody disagrees with that. It just, that’s what I’m saying, that’s why if you go all the way to the text, you’ll notice that it’s just a more poetic and more elaborate way of saying the same thing, that gives, but the *ma’alah* [מעלה: advantage/virtue] of this way of saying it is, that instead of saying that *ma’akeh*, it’s already to say, no, *ma’akeh*, *ma kif ayin* [מה כיף עין: what is the kaf-ayin], which is *chvezesh* [חבזש: ?], you understand, you could figure out a different *shah* [שה: ?], which is actually the same letters, and works in a different way. This is a way, it’s also, there’s also another, more meanings in doing these things this way.
The Pedagogical Problem with the Kabbalistic Method
It’s a hard way to teach though. It’s a hard way to teach. You have to be a little, if you’re always misunderstanding, you have to be, you have to, most people understand anything, it doesn’t help. You have to be a little high. If you’re, you have to be a little high to start doing these geometries and stuff. But if you’re a little high then you understand that it makes a lot of sense and don’t understand the whole world is like this, because what is the world if not different configurations of the basic matter and or even of the basic ideas and so on.
Connection to Sefer Yetzirah
So this concept, this is if you see that goes all the way back to *Sefer Yetzirah* [ספר יצירה: Book of Formation], is probably the oldest Jewish science book. Some people say mysticism, but those are the same thing, right? Science, we don’t understand what reality is, and that’s also what I’m trying to say.
The Structural Problem: Bridging Klal and Prat
Student: What’s the problem with this question that Rambam asks? Like, what do I need to die for? That Rambam didn’t have a problem with this, because Rambam said…
Instructor: He said it’s tough to keep you safe, it makes you a good person, then you become… No, what’s Rambam’s question?
Student: What?
Instructor: What’s Rambam’s question?
Student: I’m not sure. Which question? In the beginning…
Instructor: What does this *Medrash* mean?
Student: I’ll tell you. It was really tough, tough, tough, tough, whatever it is, it’s…
Instructor: Of course, he ignores the *Medrash*, or he can say it’s Rambam’s question. Means, means wisdom. God with them or with them itself. Once he told you that scrambled *Torah* right, like that is not a *Torah*, right? It’s something else that we just called for human things. You can’t have that the last analysis in the *Torah* is for human things only, the external, the external type.
Student: Oh, because you went outside and I told you the challenge. You missed the whole chapter of the message that you wanted to know. You should go back to the helicopter.
Instructor: This seems to be just, just, I know they don’t approach it so there’s always an excuse, but there seems to be a mismatch here when they’re going from the *klal* [כלל: general principle] to the problem here. There’s just a mismatch always. I’m sure you could understand the correct way, but this *mashal* [משל: parable/metaphor] seems to be a misdirection and taken from *klal* to *prat* [פרט: particular/detail] and you just the whole thing.
So I’m in a very clear path. This problem we’ll talk about that right here. And just like you end up saying this *mashal* of the letters whatever, right? Letters is real. Well, letters, that doesn’t mean the literal, the letters written on another paper. But you’re trying to bridge this gap between *prat* and *klal*, and you sort of ruin the distinction in the first place. I don’t know if the person, I’m not saying you’re a fan of this thing, but it seems that it just leaks this almost every time.
Instructor: Maybe. There’s not a lot that I could do about this, though. Not do it this way, do it the wrong way. It doesn’t seem like dope, but the wrong way, you’ll remember the wrong way had other stupid people going around doing antinomianism in different ways. It doesn’t solve it.
There’s stupid people in every way, and the basic answer is not to be stupid, okay? There’s no solution. The only solution is the way to stop being stupid, and then we can learn whichever way you want. I don’t know.
Comparing the Rambam’s and Kabbalistic Teaching Methods
I guess what I’m saying is that the Rambam’s way is a better way to teach people. But it’s not. Because the Rambam’s *chassidim* [חסידים: followers], stop, stop, stop. Many of the Rambam’s *chassidim*, I mean, this is the complaint of them, *Qumran* [?] at least, that many of the Rambam’s *chassidim* literally did *aveirot* [עבירות: transgressions] even while knowing that their Torah is for them. They’re like…
Everyone thinks… The problem is when you know something, you always think you’re beyond that thing that you know. So it’s the *Shulaimah* [שלמה: Solomon]. The *Shulaimah*. The story of *Shlomo HaMelech* [שלמה המלך: King Solomon] is that. That’s the basic problem.
Well, the Torah is… we all need to have…
The Convergence of Rambam and Kabbalah: Torah as Preparation for Ultimate Truth
Comparative Evaluation and the Problem of Both Methods
The Rambam’s Pedagogical Advantage and Its Fatal Flaw
Instructor: I don’t know, I guess what I’m saying is that the Rambam’s way is a better way to teach people, that’s what I’m saying. But it’s not, because the Rambam’s Chassidim [followers], many of the Rambam’s Chassidim, I mean this is the complaint of them, Qumran [possibly referring to critics or a specific group] at least, that many of the Rambam’s Chassidim literally did Aveirah [עבירה: transgression, sin] of Laos [possibly “la’os” – לעוס, or referring to abandonment], even while knowing that their Torah is for them.
They’re like, everyone thinks, the problem is when you know something, you always think you’re beyond that thing that you know. So this is Shlomo [שלמה: King Solomon]. The story of Shlomo HaMelech [שלמה המלך: King Solomon] is that. That’s the basic problem.
Well, the Torah is, we only daven [דאַווענען: pray] and remind us of God. Therefore, I don’t have to daven. That’s what many people say until this day. And it’s still daven. It doesn’t follow. Therefore, you should have to daven. That’s exactly what I’m telling you. But no, you’re not davening.
But those people… Do you remember? Do you spend all the time instead of davening reading Moreh [מורה: referring to Moreh Nevuchim, Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed]? I know what you spend your time doing instead. That was my cop [point/argument]. Yeah.
But these… If you’ll be doing that, you might as well do it in shul [שול: synagogue], like me. And it’s a good time. Everyone is close. You can do whichever Moreh you want. But you’re not going to the shul because you’re a Rambamist. What are you doing?
I’m not saying, halachically [הלכתית: according to Jewish law], you have to go to shul. That’s a different child [issue]. I always say, we’re not talking about halachah [הלכה: Jewish law]. You get it that there’s problems in every way.
The Seesaw Problem: Correcting One Error Creates Another
And in any case, the thing that the Mekubalim [מקובלים: kabbalists] are, everyone is just like jumping. It’s always a merry-go-round. Not a merry-go-round. A seesaw, right? If you go down this way, it goes down that way. So the Mekubalim are trying to solve this problem. And therefore, they speak very much in this language.
And of course, then there’s people. Now, of course, that’s why I said I’m going to make you happy. But I talk about a worse thing, which there’s a specific kind of [problem] which is because their way of doing things is scrambling them, I think there’s also a method here, like if you start scrambling things you start understanding that the way you see things is not necessarily the way they are and so on, but then people come and say, wait, so if the Torah came in backwards then maybe it says [the opposite].
The Shabbatean Danger: When “Scrambling” Goes Wrong
But stupid, no, it has to say something better, not something worse. It’s true that there’s a Torah, by the way, it’s true that there’s a Torah where it says [the opposite], that’s the one more klipah [קליפה: shell, husk; in Kabbalah, forces of spiritual impurity] of the Torah. You instead of making, going up, you went down. That’s true. They’re not wrong, these Shabbateans [שבתאים: followers of the false messiah Shabbatai Tzvi]. They just think that they’re going up, but really they’re going down. And it’s true, you have to go down. You have to go down. That’s it also. Okay. But that’s a different [matter].
Beyond Knowledge vs. Contrary to Knowledge
And this is another way to say this, is maybe we say this similar kind of thing, that the idea is that Hashem [השם: God, lit. “the Name”] knows more and more than we know, right? So people think that means that it could be soseh [סותר: contradictory]. So the Torah, the idea is, no everything that’s beyond the Torah is not going to be soseh [contradictory] in itself.
People think it could be, right? People think, oh, it’s something beyond our knowledge. No, no. Beyond our knowledge doesn’t mean it’s soseh knowledge. Soseh knowledge, we know what that means. Beyond our knowledge is something that’s not soseh knowledge, and it’s just beyond it. So every reason beyond that is not soseh saying, this is the Makkah [מקה: possibly “makah” – מכה, or referring to a principle] of Gagacha [unclear reference]. It’s just going to be beyond that.
Rebbe Moshe Cordovero’s Interpretation of Shatnez
The Klipot [קליפות: shells/husks] of Torah
In any case, back to my story with Rav Moshe Cordovero [Ramak – רמ״ק: Rabbi Moshe Cordovero, 16th century kabbalist]. So this is his interpretation of the Zohar [זוהר: foundational work of Kabbalah], which talks about the klipot [קליפות: shells, husks] of the Torah. And he says, well, first there’s a klipah [קליפה: shell] that you don’t even understand. He’s basically spending the whole time on the standard Shat [שט: possibly “shat” or abbreviation] and so on.
The Radical Claim: Shatnez Before Adam’s Sin
But then he talks about the real meaning, which is that he takes the example of Shatnez [שעטנז: the prohibition of mixing wool and linen] and he says that before there was a body, it didn’t say in the Torah that it was Shatnez. That’s only because of domination and sin and it caused us to have physical bodies that it says in the Torah that it was Shatnez. Otherwise, it would have said “lo” [לא: no/not]. He literally had an idea of what it should have said.
It says in the Torah [a different configuration]. And it’s going to mean that the other Maritians [possibly “meritim” or another term] shouldn’t do the thing that causes us to have Shatnez, right? And the Torah itself is really beautiful.
Student: Yeah, this is based on Midrash Shatnez [מדרש שעטנז: Midrashic teaching about shatnez].
Instructor: Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, it is. It is. It must be for sure to say that it was Shatnez. Or something.
Student: Exactly. There’s a matter that she brings on the bottom. That’s why the person brings on the bottom. It’s talking about that.
The Tagim [תגין: crowns on letters] on Shatnez-Getz Letters
Instructor: That’s why we, in the Torah, we make our minigash [מנהג: custom] is to make tagim [תגין: crowns placed on certain Hebrew letters] on Shatnez-Getz [שעטנז ג״ץ: the letters shin-ayin-tet-nun-zayin-gimmel-tzadi], Oasis, whatever. There’s Kabbalah [קבלה: Jewish mystical tradition] about this. Point is, because those letters get confused, we have to fix them. So, it’s just a remnant, but what about all the other letters? It’s just a joke.
The Three Configurations of the Shatnez Verse
Okay, the point is, no, you have to know it. You see, the problem is that we live in the world of the Moshe [משה: Moses], and we have to try to remember the names all the time, so this helps you. Get it? You understand?
So, the both sides, so in other ways, when we’re going to do teshuvah [תשובה: repentance, return], in the Torah, it’s not going to say “lo tilbash shatnez” [לא תלבש שעטנז: do not wear shatnez], it’s going to say “lo tilbash satan az” [לא תלבש שטן עז: do not wear satan/adversary then], him, instead of “shatnez tzemer u’pishtim” [שעטנז צמר ופשתים: shatnez of wool and linen], right?
And “matzef” [מצף: possibly a letter configuration or term] means klipot [קליפות: shells], and means you shouldn’t have a body. That’s what it means. And that is the correct peshat [פשט: plain meaning] of the Torah.
So why am I getting out of this? So what? Exactly. And he was in his world, that’s what Shatnez means. Now, Shatnez is a new meaning. Don’t do it. Even worse, like mix somehow, tzemer u’pishtim [צמר ופשתים: wool and linen] together is even worse. I don’t know why, but that’s only only one level. And before, it was the third way to configure this pasuk [פסוק: verse], which meant something different.
The Convergence Thesis and Final Summary
The Agreement Between Rambam and Kabbalah
What am I getting at with all of this? That at least the high-level people agree with us, and we agree with them, whichever way you want, that the way the Torah is now is a configuration that’s to help us. It’s only to get us away from shatnez. But that is not the Torah itself. Torah itself is way beyond that. Stimmt [שטימט: Yiddish – correct/agreed]?
Okay, it’s enough for today, isn’t it? 10 to 11, it’s time that I start speaking.
Student Summary of the Lecture
Wait, I have to finish something. Tell me, give me a summary of my drusha [דרשה: lecture, sermon]. Or we’re not going to know what I said today. I started planning to talk about a few other things, but we didn’t get to them. Berkshire didn’t knock the idea that we’re wrong again, so the main thing was what the idea is of what Torah is.
Student: Okay, we started to say we have to talk about virtue and distinguish that from mitzvot [מצוות: commandments], two things. And, of course, according to the Rambam [רמב״ם: Maimonides], mitzvot are to give you the virtues, right?
So, because this is the thing that most people are confused about nowadays, we have to go on and explain why Torah and mitzvot doesn’t mean the truth, it’s the hachanos [הכנות: preparations] for the truth [אמת: emet]. And we explained why it’s true al pi Kabbalah [על פי קבלה: according to Kabbalah], right?
And al pi Kabbalah, the not wearing shatnez is going to, of course, the kavanah [כוונה: intention, deeper meaning] of not wearing shatnez is going to be to not have the satan az geh [שטן עז גה: the adversary/satan configuration], whatever it is.
And that is the same thing for the Rambam. In his language, he would say something like certain mitzvot are to teach you certain virtues, which are the pnimiyut [פנימיות: inner dimension, essence] of them. Of course, virtues themselves, only if you live in this world.
So virtues are to teach you to think about God, and to know divine things, which are real. And that is what Kabbalat Torah [קבלת תורה: receiving the Torah, referring to Shavuot] is. Kabbalat Torah is what is Kabbalat Torah? This Torah. The Torah that we’re doing on Shavuot [שבועות: the holiday of Shavuot/Pentecost] is this one which means that it’s a teacher for us, because we wouldn’t have known most of these things, we would have been bad people, we wouldn’t have been getting close to getting close to people.
So therefore we have to stop wearing shatnez and all these things that I say on the Torah in order for us to start learning the real Torah, which we’ll learn next year on Shavuot, so every year a new thing, which is what the meaning of the Torah is in the Mekubalim’s [מקובלים: kabbalists’] way, the different sort of the Torah that says different things, or in the Rambam’s way like the mitzvah of “Anochi Hashem Elokecha” [אנכי ה׳ אלקיך: I am the Lord your God – the first of the Ten Commandments] or different parts of the Torah which are about truth.
Instructor: Must speak [מוסט שפּיק: Yiddish – must speak/correct]?
Student: Yes.
Instructor: Make sense?
Student: That’s all.
Instructor: The Midrash [מדרש: rabbinic homiletical literature] that you discuss is always…
I’m going to expand the Midrash.
Is that enough?
Student: Yeah.
—
*[End of Lecture]*