📋 Shiur Overview
Summary of the Shiur: Rambam Hilchos Chametz U’Matzah Chapter 6
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Introduction: The Matter of Learning Hilchos HaRegel — Thirty Days Before the Holiday
“Cash” vs. “Credit”
The Gerrer Rebbe says that Torah must be known “cash” — not “credit”. Credit means “I know where to look it up”; cash means “I truly know it”. When a time comes that one must do something practically, one must have the knowledge “in cash” — in hand. A Breslover from Ecuador (Meir) published a booklet “Atah Yadata Kol HaTorah Kulah” — a system for how one can know all of Torah through review.
The Source: Moshe Rabbeinu
The Gemara in Megillah says: “Shara Moshe lahem l’Yisrael b’hilchos haPesach b’Pesach” — Moshe Rabbeinu himself established the practice of learning hilchos Pesach before Pesach. This is the original way of learning Torah — not just a custom, but a foundation in the order of learning. It is implied from the halachah that one should make this the order of learning — not just “fifteen minutes of hilchos Pesach after davening”, but the main learning should be hilchos haRegel.
To Which Yamim Tovim Does “Thirty Days Before the Holiday” Apply?
– In the Poskim (Shulchan Aruch) the first siman appears only regarding Pesach.
– The Mishnah Berurah brings a dispute: One opinion says it applies only to Pesach (because the source is from sacrifices — korban Pesach); a second opinion says it applies to all yamim tovim.
– Proof that it applies to all yamim tovim: In the Gemara there is “prusa Atzeres” and “prusa Chag” — half of thirty days before Shavuos and Sukkos.
– Tosafos says that regarding Purim there is not the din of thirty days (except hilchos Megillah).
– Question on the “sacrifices” opinion: If the foundation is sacrifices, why does one learn hilchos chametz u’matzah, hilchos shofar — not sacrifices? Answer: The essential takanah remained even when one doesn’t learn actual sacrifices.
– The Mishnah Berurah says that Sukkos halachos are essentially not so relevant because most sukkahs and most lulavim are kosher — “walls and a third even a tefach”, “most of them are kosher”. Pesach, on the other hand, has many practical halachos.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Baal HaTanya)
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav rules: “Mitzvah al kol echad v’echad lilmod hilchos haRegel ad she’yehei baki bahem”. The obligation of the Rav to give drashos to the community is less relevant today (because everyone can take a Mishnah Berurah), but the obligation on each individual to learn remains.
The Meiri
The Meiri says that people learn maseches Moed at each moed. This connects to the custom of Shabbos HaGadol with the piyutim.
[Digression: The Word “Va’ad” — Beis HaVa’ad]
Rashi says “she’ein lomdim hilchos haPesach b’beis hava’ad shelo yishme’u am ha’aretz”. One opinion (from a sefer “Menakeh Yagrev”?) says that beis hava’ad means like Sanhedrin — where general/public halachos are decided, as opposed to beis hamidrash where one learns. The root of the word “va’ad” is perhaps from yud-ayin-dalet (like “v’no’adeti”), a language of gathering/coming together. The concept “ye’ud” means something designated for the future, connected to “mezuman”, “moed”, “no’ad”. “Va’ad” in “l’olam va’ed” — all commentators say it is the same root as “ad” (ayin-dalet), not a separate root vav-ayin-dalet. R’ Menachem ben Saruk holds that no word begins with a vav as the primary letter.
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Halachah 1: Mitzvas Aseh to Eat Matzah on the Night of the Fifteenth
The Rambam’s Words
“Mitzvas aseh min haTorah le’echol matzah b’leil chamisha asar, shene’emar ‘ba’erev tochlu matzos’. B’chol makom u’v’chol zman, v’lo teluyah achilasah b’korban haPesach ela mitzvah bifnei atzmah, u’mitzvosah kol halailah.”
Plain Meaning
It is a positive commandment from the Torah to eat matzah on the night of the fifteenth of Nissan. The mitzvah applies in every place and at every time (even nowadays without korban Pesach), it is an independent mitzvah, and one can fulfill it all night long.
Insights and Explanations
1) Order of Mitzvos — The Rambam’s Structure:
The Rambam in the first 5 chapters spoke about prohibitions of chametz: (1) not to eat chametz on the first day, (2) tashbisu, (3) not to eat chametz all seven days, (4) mixtures of chametz, (5) bal yera’eh, (6) bal yimatzei. Now at the seventh mitzvah comes the only positive commandment — to eat matzah on the night of Pesach.
2) Three Separate Questions in the Mitzvah:
– Question A: Is there even a mitzvah to eat matzah? Perhaps “matzos tochlu” only means that one should not eat chametz, and consequently one will eat matzah, but not as a positive commandment. In those times people ate bread every day — if someone specifically doesn’t want to eat bread at all, does he violate a positive commandment? This is not stated explicitly.
– Question B: Perhaps the mitzvah is only “with the Pesach” — together with korban Pesach, as it says “al matzos u’merorim yochluhu”. If so, nowadays when we don’t have korban Pesach, there would be no mitzvah.
– Question C: Perhaps the mitzvah applies all seven days and not just the first night?
3) The Source of “Ba’erev Tochlu Matzos” — Analysis of the Verses:
In Parshas Bo there are two separate sections:
– First section — speaks about korban Pesach: “v’achlu es habasar balailah hazeh tzli eish u’matzos al merorim yochluhu”. Here matzah is part of eating the Pesach.
– Second section — after the verse “v’hayah hayom hazeh lachem l’zikaron v’chagosem oso chag laHashem l’doroseichem chukas olam techaguhu”, begins a new mitzvah: “shivas yamim matzos tochlu ach bayom harishon tashbisu se’or mibateichem”, “u’va’erev tochlu matzos”. This is a separate mitzvah of chametz and matzah, not connected to korban Pesach.
This is the foundation of the Rambam’s ruling that “lo teluyah achilasah b’korban haPesach ela mitzvah bifnei atzmah” — because the verse “ba’erev tochlu matzos” appears in the second section, separate from korban Pesach. This is also explicit in the verses: the Pesach is on the 14th of Nissan, and matzah is eaten from the 15th to the 21st — it’s clear that it’s not dependent on the Pesach.
4) “Matzos Tochlu” — Mitzvah or Just Advice?
Almost every time “matzos tochlu” appears, it comes together with a prohibition of chametz. Chazal understood that every time (except once) “matzos tochlu” doesn’t mean an actual positive commandment to eat matzah, but rather a description of what one eats when not eating chametz. The word “matzah” simply means bread that hasn’t undergone leavening. “Matzos tochlu” and “lo sochal chametz” both say the same thing — just one in positive language and one in negative language. This is davar v’hipucho.
Normal people (in the period of Matan Torah, in Mesopotamia) ate bread every day. The Torah never writes “eat bread” because that’s simply what people do. Consequently, when the Torah says “eat matzah,” it only means: when you eat bread (which you do anyway every day), it should be matzah and not chametz. It’s not a novelty that one eats matzah — the novelty is only that one doesn’t eat chametz.
But the commanding language (“tochlu”) shows that it’s more than advice — “you shall not eat leavened, but shall eat unleavened.” Also: “Chag HaMatzos” — the holiday is called this — it’s not appropriate to have a holiday called “Chag HaMatzos” and not eat matzah.
5) Nowhere in the Torah is there kares for not eating matzah. When the Torah wants it clear that one must do something, it states what the punishment is for not doing it (like bris milah — kares). By matzah, kares appears only for eating chametz, not for not eating matzah. This is strong proof that eating matzah (even all seven days) is not a separate mitzvah.
6) The Radical Claim — No Distinction in the Chumash Between First Night and the Rest:
In the Chumash there is nowhere a clear distinction between the first night of Pesach and the remaining seven days regarding eating matzah. “Ba’erev tochlu matzos” perhaps only means that the obligation begins in the evening (not in the morning), not that the first evening is different from the rest. That the Chachamim distinguished — that the first night is obligatory and the remaining days optional — is “absolutely a novelty from the Chachamim.” They have their ways of “squeezing it into the verse,” but the plain meaning in the Chumash doesn’t say so.
7) Connection to the Gemara (Pesachim 120):
In Pesachim 120 the Gemara didn’t address the matter according to the simple scriptural approach, but through the thirteen principles by which Torah is expounded — “davar she’hayah b’chlal v’yatza min haklal l’lamed,” “mah shevi’i reshus, af rishon reshus,” “ach bayom harishon tashbisu.” The entire dispute of the Amoraim whether matzah is d’Oraisa all seven days revolves around drashos, not plain meaning. In the Gemara there are opinions of Rabbi Yoshiyah and Rabbi Yonasan — according to Rabbi Yonasan there indeed doesn’t exist a separate obligation of matzah independent of korban Pesach, but other opinions hold yes.
The distinction between “reshus” and “good advice”: “Reshus” is already a halachic concept — it only speaks in the context of a mitzvah. In the Chumash it doesn’t say “reshus” and doesn’t say “mitzvah” — it simply says “eat matzah,” which means “don’t eat chametz.”
8) Practical Difference:
– Berachah / Leshem Yichud / Holiness of the Mitzvah: If eating matzah all seven days is a mitzvah, one makes a berachah, it’s a holy mitzvah. If not — one eats matzah practically (like all Jews do, except the Lisker Chassidim who don’t eat matzah after the first night), but without a berachah.
– The “Funny Person” Case: What if someone wants to fast or eat only peppers/broccoli all seven days? If it’s a mitzvah — he has an obligation to eat matzah. If not — he hasn’t done any sin, he just hasn’t eaten chametz.
9) “U’Mitzvosah Kol HaLailah” — Dispute of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah:
The Rambam rules like Rabbi Akiva that the mitzvah is all night, against Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah who holds that korban Pesach (and according to some — also matzah) is only until midnight. The principle is (as the Gemara in Megillah and other places): “Kol mitzvah she’mitzvosah balailah — kesheirah kol halailah.”
10) Is There a Rabbinic Decree to Eat Before Midnight?
Regarding korban Pesach the Rambam brings (in Hilchos Korban Pesach) that the Rabbanan decreed one should eat before midnight — “kedei l’harchik min ha’aveirah”. But regarding matzah — the Rambam does not say there’s even a rabbinic decree to eat matzah before midnight. This means, according to the Rambam, by matzah even l’chatchilah it’s all night, without any decree.
The reason: By Krias Shema there’s a concern that one will miss the time. But by matzah — if one eats after midnight, all that happens is that one hasn’t fulfilled the mitzvah, not any prohibition. The Beis Meir explains that by korban Pesach there’s a special reason for midnight — because if one eats after dawn he’ll be eating nosar (which is a prohibition). By matzah this concern doesn’t apply.
Other tzaddikim/Rishonim were indeed careful about matzah before midnight, and from this stems the custom of Jews who rush with the meal before midnight — but the Rambam doesn’t hold of this at all.
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Halachah 1 (Continued): The Rest of the Festival — Matzah is Optional
The Rambam’s Words
“Aval b’sha’ar haRegel, achilas matzah reshus. Ratzah ochel matzah, ratzah ochel oroz o dochan.”
Plain Meaning
Only the first night is matzah obligatory; the rest of Yom Tov, matzah is optional, and one can eat rice or millet.
Insights and Explanations
1) The Rambam rules that rice and millet don’t come to leavening — this is a discussion in the Gemara. This stands in contradiction to the prohibition of kitniyos (which is an Ashkenazi custom).
2) The language “ein yotz’in ela b’chameshes minei dagan” is noted — one certainly can’t fulfill with chametz, because chametz is forbidden to eat. The intent is that only the five species of grain (which can become chametz) are valid for matzah.
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Halachah 2: The Measure of Eating Matzah — A Kezayis
The Rambam’s Words
“Achal k’zayis matzah — yatza.”
Plain Meaning
The measure for matzah is a kezayis.
Insights and Explanations
1) The language “yatza” is interesting — why must one say “yatza”? A possible answer: “Yatza” means that afterwards one doesn’t need to eat more — similar to tzafun/afikoman. The matzah one eats afterwards is no longer mitzvah matzah, but just regular matzah.
2) The language in the Gemara “achal k’zayis matzah yatza” is brought incidentally in a sugya about heseibah (whether one must recline), not in a sugya about measures. The Magen Avraham brings in several places that a kezayis is sufficient.
3) By maror it also says a kezayis — but the question is asked: where exactly is stated the principle that all eating in the Torah is a kezayis?
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Halachah 2 (Continued): Swallowing Matzah / Swallowing Maror
The Rambam’s Words
“Bole’a matzah — yatza. Bole’a maror — yatza.”
Plain Meaning
One who swallowed matzah without chewing — fulfills the obligation, because swallowing is also considered eating. The same with maror.
Insights and Explanations
1) Dispute of Versions: Swallowing Maror — Yatza or Lo Yatza?
All four halachos (swallowing matzah yatza, swallowing maror, swallowing both, wrapping them in fiber) come from a statement of Rava in Pesachim 115b.
– Rashi has the version “bole’a maror lo yatza” — but the word “lo” is circled (uncertain in the version). Rashi’s reasoning: “I efshar shelo yit’om ta’am maror” — it’s impossible not to taste the bitter taste of maror even when swallowing.
– The Rambam has (according to one side) the version “bole’a maror lo yatza” — because maror specifically requires taste of bitterness, and swallowing doesn’t give enough taste.
– Other Rishonim (Ra’avad, Maggid Mishneh) — it’s discussed what their version was.
2) Two Ways to Understand According to Both Versions:
According to the version “bole’a maror lo yatza”: Maror requires taste — the essence of maror is the taste of bitterness, “vaymareru es chayeihem”, not just eating greens. Swallowing without taste doesn’t fulfill the mitzvah. Matzah, however, doesn’t specifically require taste — lechem oni is remembered through the appearance, the look, how it digests, not through taste. Swallowing is sufficient.
According to the version “bole’a maror yatza”: If maror is also fulfilled by swallowing, one must understand why both together (swallowing matzah and maror) the maror is lo yatza — and this is because maror becomes tafel to matzah.
3) Rashbam’s Explanation — A Little Taste When Swallowing:
The Rashbam learns that with every swallowing one feels a little taste — not the full taste as when chewing, but something. This explains why swallowing maror yatza (according to that version) — because one tastes some bitterness.
4) The Meiri says there’s no matter of tasting — swallowing itself is called “eating.”
5) Source Reference (Merkeves HaMishnah) — “Kol HaRa’ui L’Bilah”:
The Merkeves HaMishnah explains why swallowing matzah yatza with the principle “kol hara’ui l’bilah ein bilah me’akeves bo” — as long as it’s fit to taste, it’s not invalidating that one didn’t actually taste.
6) Three Approaches to the Foundation of Eating and Taste:
Side A: Eating always means one must taste — when the Torah says “eating” it means with full taste, to chew and eat. Swallowing without taste is not eating. According to this side, someone who has no taste buds, or had COVID and doesn’t feel any taste — has a problem with fulfilling the obligation.
Side B: Eating doesn’t necessarily require taste, but by maror there’s an extra requirement of taste because “al merorim yochluhu” — the bitter taste is the essence. But by matzah and other mitzvos one doesn’t need taste.
Side C (A Middle Opinion): Swallowing also has some taste — the Rashbam says that by maror, because it’s a sharp thing, one feels it even when swallowing. Consequently, swallowing might be a weak tasting, and eating means full tasting.
7) Question: Must One Have Just Taste, or the Specific Taste?
If eating requires taste, must one only feel that something is in the mouth, or must one feel the specific taste of the thing? For example, someone with COVID who feels maror like matzah and matzah like maror — does he fulfill? This relates to the Rambam who says that a sick person for whom maror is sweet must eat something else.
8) Taste as a Condition, Not as the Definition of Eating:
If one says that taste is necessary, it’s a condition in eating, not the definition of eating. This means: eating is eating (chewing, swallowing), but there must be a condition that one also tastes. Therefore, someone who chewed well and spit out — had taste but not eating, and doesn’t fulfill.
9) Practical Difference — A Sick Person’s Matzah:
A sick person who can’t chew, and one breaks the matzah into small pieces for him and he swallows it — does this fulfill? This is a practical difference from the inquiry of what “eating” means — whether it must be tasting or swallowing is sufficient.
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Halachah 2 (Continued): Swallowing Matzah and Maror Together
The Rambam’s Words
“Bala matzah u’maror k’echad — yedei matzah yatza, yedei maror lo yatza, she’hamaror tefilah lamatzah.”
Plain Meaning
When one swallows matzah and maror together, one fulfills matzah but not maror, because maror is secondary to matzah.
Insights and Explanations
1) The Foundation of Tafel:
When one eats bread (matzah) with a vegetable (maror) together, the vegetable becomes tafel to matzah. Even though he swallowed both — and by both swallowing is sufficient — nevertheless maror is not fulfilled because it has the status of tafel and is nullified.
The distinction: when one tastes both together (proper eating), tafel is not a problem — because one tastes both. But when one swallows (swallows without taste), then the tafel status becomes a problem, because it’s as if one didn’t eat the maror by itself at all.
2) Main Analysis: What Does “She’hamaror Tefilah LaMatzah” Do?
If swallowing maror lo yatza:
– Then one doesn’t need the novelty of “she’hamaror tafel lamatzah” to explain why one doesn’t fulfill maror — one simply doesn’t fulfill because swallowing maror isn’t good.
– But one would need this novelty to explain why one does fulfill matzah — because perhaps one should fear that the maror’s strong taste nullifies the matzah. To this one answers: maror is tafel to matzah, therefore it can’t nullify.
– However this is a chaseiri mechsera in the Rambam — one inserts a whole piece that isn’t stated, and one can’t make chaseiri mechsera in the Rambam.
If swallowing maror yatza (the correct version):
– Then there’s a great novelty: by wrapping matzah and maror together one does not fulfill maror, even though swallowing maror alone does fulfill. Why? Because when it’s together with matzah, maror becomes tafel, and as tafel it’s not good.
– This fits perfectly with the Rambam’s language.
Conclusion: This is proof that the version in the Rambam is swallowing maror yatza, because only then does the Rambam’s “she’hamaror tefilah lamatzah” work without difficulties.
3) Taste vs. Importance — What Does “Tafel” Mean?
– If it speaks of taste — it’s actually the opposite: maror’s sharpness is stronger than matzah’s taste, maror overpowers matzah!
– If it speaks of importance — matzah is more important (d’Oraisa), maror is less important, therefore maror is nullified.
Novelty: The “tafel” speaks not of taste but of importance. The approach: swallowing matzah yatza — because matzah doesn’t require taste. Swallowing maror yatza — because maror also doesn’t require taste (according to the version). But when both are together, there’s a new problem: not a taste problem, but a kind of “chatzitzah” — the maror isn’t felt as a separate eating, because the more important matzah takes over. “What do you have in your mouth now? You have the holy matzah — you would completely forget that you now have in your mouth the silly maror.”
Further proof: If the problem were taste, it makes no sense why by swallowing maror alone one fulfills, but by two together not. But if the problem is importance/tafel, one understands: when maror is alone, it’s a separate eating; when it’s together with matzah, it becomes nullified as tafel.
4) Korech — Hillel’s Opinion:
“Al matzos u’merorim yochluhu” — Hillel learned that one makes a korech (sandwich) of Pesach, matzah, and maror together. But the Gemara (page 115) says that nowadays one should not make korech, because “oseh maror mevatel ta’am matzah”. The reason: because maror is nowadays only d’Rabbanan (without korban Pesach), and matzah is d’Oraisa — one can’t make korech, because the d’Rabbanan maror will nullify the d’Oraisa matzah.
5) The Ra’avad’s Dispute with the Rambam — Reason for “Maror Tefilah LaMatzah”:
– Rambam’s reason: She’hamaror tefilah lamatzah — therefore maror is nullified.
– Ra’avad’s reason: One doesn’t fulfill maror unless one ate it in a way that one feels the taste — he goes with the Ramban and other Rishonim that by maror one specifically must have taste. Perhaps the Ra’avad understands that matzah one fulfills even mezalzel (without taste), but not so maror — maror is such a thing that one can’t fulfill without taste.
6) Maror in Charoses — The Matter of Taste of Maror:
Tosafos says that matzah dipped in charoses is similar to maror in charoses. The commentators say that one must feel the bitterness in the maror — therefore one dips it in charoses but shakes it off (only a little remains). This is because one must still have the taste of maror. According to the reasoning that one needs the taste of maror, perhaps one should take a maror that has evaporated (very bitter), or if one is uncertain which type of maror the Mishnah means, it’s better to take from all types.
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Halachah 2 (Continued): Wrapping in Fiber
The Rambam’s Words
[Karchan b’siv u’vala’an — lo yatza.]
Plain Meaning
When one wraps matzah or maror in a cloth/leaf (siv) and swallows it — one doesn’t fulfill.
Insights and Explanations
1) Two Explanations of Wrapping in Fiber:
– If one requires taste: Wrapping in fiber is certainly not fulfilled — because even the little taste that exists in swallowing isn’t there.
– If one doesn’t require taste: The problem of wrapping in fiber is different — it’s a chatzitzah, the food doesn’t touch the mouth. But “chatzitzah” here doesn’t mean like chatzitzah by tefillin — it means that this is a strong shelo k’derech achilah, because not only does one not have taste, but one also doesn’t have the sensation/texture of eating in the mouth.
2) Texture as Part of Eating:
With COVID one doesn’t feel taste but one feels texture very strongly. Texture is also a major part of what one “feels” when eating — in normal imagination one feels taste and texture together as one thing. Consequently, wrapping in fiber where one has neither taste nor texture is an even stronger shelo k’derech achilah.
3) The Spectrum of “How Far Doesn’t One Need Taste”:
If one goes with the side that eating doesn’t necessarily require taste, the question remains: how extreme? Does one only care what lands in the stomach, even wrapped in fiber? Or must one have at least some taste/sensation, and wrapping in fiber where one has nothing — not taste, not texture — is already too far and isn’t called eating?
4) Capsules and Shelo K’derech Achilah:
A capsule is not just shelo k’derech achilah, it’s not even food inside — it’s not a derech achilah at all. Perhaps for such medicines one should be stringent to take it with a sam (bitter thing) so it should be more shelo k’derech achilah, according to the Mishneh LaMelech’s first discussion.
5) Side Question: Drugs That Remove Taste:
If someone takes a drug that makes him taste nothing — does he fulfill? Also, if someone puts something sharp in his mouth that nullifies the taste of what he eats — is this also a problem according to the side that one needs taste.
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Halachah 3: Eating Matzah Without Intent
The Rambam’s Words
“Achal matzah b’lo kavanah, k’gon she’ansuhu goyim o listim le’echol — yatza yedei chovaso.”
Plain Meaning
Whoever eats matzah without intent — for example, gentiles or bandits forced him to eat — he fulfills his obligation.
Insights and Explanations
1) The Great Question: Do Mitzvos Require Intent?
The Rambam rules in other places that mitzvos require intent (for example in Hilchos Megillah). How does this fit with here, where he says that without intent one fulfills?
2) Answer from Devarim Nechmedim: Pleasure Stands in Place of Intent.
When there is pleasure, it stands instead of intent. As the Gemara says “shlumei emunei Yisrael nehenin mizeh u’mizeh.” By eating matzah there is pleasure, therefore one doesn’t need intent.
3) Another Answer: Mitzvah She’begufo vs. Hechsher Mitzvah.
The mitzvah of matzah is a “mitzvah she’begufo” — the body of the action (eating) is itself the mitzvah, doesn’t need intent. Unlike shofar — the blowing is only a hechsher mitzvah (so that one should remember), there one needs intent, because without intent there was no mitzvah action at all.
4) Distinction Between Hearing Without Intent and Eating Without Intent:
By hearing (shofar, megillah) — if one doesn’t have intent, it’s as if one didn’t hear, because there are millions of noises. Unlike by eating — “it went in, it went in” — the food is physically inside the body, this is an actual eating even without intent.
5) Alternative Explanation: “Without Intent” Doesn’t Mean Without Intent of Mitzvah.
Perhaps the Rambam doesn’t mean “without intent to fulfill the obligation of the mitzvah” but
“without knowledge that it’s Pesach.” The next section supports this: “achal matzah b’lo yedi’as Pesach, v’achar kach nispasach, chayav le’echol acheres” — there he doesn’t fulfill because he wasn’t a bar chiyuva at the time of the action. Unlike in our case where he was indeed a bar chiyuva.
6) Rabbeinu Menachem’s answer is mentioned (without specific elaboration).
7) The Novelty Regarding a Shoteh/Sleeping Person:
If someone was unconscious (not in his senses) and ate matzah, and later returned to himself — he must eat again. One cannot combine later intent with earlier eating — “there must be intent at the time of eating.”
8) Question: Intent for What — For Eating or For the Mitzvah?
Must one have intent for the mitzvah (leshem mitzvas matzah), or is it sufficient that one has intent to eat? The “coercion by gentiles” case can be both — (a) he didn’t plan to eat matzah for the sake of the mitzvah, or (b) he didn’t plan to eat at all. This makes a practical difference: if a secular Jew eats matzah without knowing it’s Pesach — does he fulfill? He did have intent to eat, but not intent for the mitzvah.
9) The Gemara of Coercion to Eat Matzah (Rosh Hashanah 28a):
“Kefa’uhu v’achal matzah — yatza.” Rava says: “Zos omeres, taka’u lo shofar — yatza.” Rashi says: “Achal matzah Rachmana amar, v’ha achal” — the Torah says eat matzah, and he ate. “But not zichron teru’ah, and he is merely a mis’aseik — this teaches us, even so a mis’aseik fulfills, for mitzvos do not require intent.”
Question: Why is “coercion” (ones) the example for “no intent”? By transgressions, “ones Rachmana patrei” — when one is forced to do a transgression, one is exempt. But by a mitzvah — he actually ate matzah! What is the deficiency?
10) Philosophical Discussion: Why Would One Need Intent?
– Opinion A: Mitzvos exist to improve character traits (like the Rambam in Shemonah Perakim) — if so, one perhaps needs to know what one is doing, because “monkey actions” (without consciousness) don’t bring any change in character traits.
– Opinion B: Mitzvos have a “holy power” — an atomic bomb that affects the person even without intent (like Rabbeinu Bachaye).
Distinction: If one speaks of knowledge that you’re doing something — one needs yes. If one speaks of knowledge that it’s a mitzvah — one perhaps doesn’t need. The distinction is important for understanding both opinions.
11) Distinction Between Shogeg and Mis’aseik:
A shogeg — he doesn’t know that today is Pesach, he eats matzah, and later finds out that it was Pesach night. A mis’aseik — someone does an action without thinking (like he’s playing with trees and a melachah results). It’s emphasized that the concept “mis’aseik” doesn’t appear in the Rambam here, and one shouldn’t bring in concepts that aren’t in the text.
[Digression: Chatzitzah in Marital Relations with a Condom]
In connection with the earlier discussion about korech (chatzitzah between matzah and maror), a digression is made about chatzitzah in marital relations with a condom:
– The matter of tumah by relations: perhaps relations causes tumah because of the relations itself (like mishkav zav and niddah), not because of contact — then a chatzitzah wouldn’t help.
– By relations the main matter is pleasure — with a condom there’s still pleasure.
– The rabbis don’t hold of this “heter” — it’s not a properly asked halachic matter.
– There’s certainly a prohibition of zera levatala, and it’s worse than derech evarim because it’s a bi’ah she’einah re’uyah.
—
Halachah 4-5: Eating Matzah — Only from the Five Species
The Rambam’s Words
“Ein yotz’in yedei chovas matzah ela b’chameshes minei dagan bilvad, v’hen hachitah v’hase’orah v’hakusemin v’shiboles shu’al v’hashifon… Kol sheba lidei chimutz — adam yotzei bo yedei chovaso b’matzah. Yatza oroz v’dochan v’kitniyos — she’ein ba’in lidei chimutz.”
Plain Meaning
One can only fulfill matzah with the five species (wheat, barley, spelt, oats, rye). Only things that can become chametz can become matzah. Rice, millet, legumes — even when they rise, it’s a “sirchon be’alma” (mere spoilage), not leavening.
Insights and Explanations
1) The Source — The Verse:
The verse is: “Lo sochal alav chametz, shivas yamim tochal alav matzos” (Devarim 16:3). From this the Chachamim learn: “Kol sheba lidei chimutz — adam yotzei bo yedei chovaso b’matzah. Yatza oroz v’dochan v’kitniyos — she’ein ba’in lidei chimutz.”
2) Novelty: “There is No Matzah Except from a Type of Chametz”:
The foundation is: matzah means bread that hasn’t become chametz — but it must have the potential to become chametz. Something that can’t become chametz at all is also not matzah. “That which can come to leavening but didn’t leaven” — this is matzah. But “that which cannot come to leavening” — this isn’t really a matter of matzah.
3) Moral Lesson / Derush:
According to this, one would think that the best way for Pesach is to eat only rice and millet (like “the Lisker custom”) — no risk of chametz at all! But the Torah doesn’t say so — one must take risks, one must specifically take the type that can become chametz, and make matzah from it. A Brisker vort: “The most chametz-like thing that can possibly be on Pesach — is matzah.”
—
Halachah 6 (Continued): Mixture of Rice with Grain — Law of Taste of Grain
The Rambam’s Words
“Yotzei adam yedei chovaso ba’achilas ta’aroves she’yesh bah ta’am dagan, k’gon oroz im chitim.”
Plain Meaning
One can fulfill matzah with a mixture of rice and wheat, provided one tastes the taste of grain.
Insights and Explanations
1) Taste vs. Majority — The Rambam Goes with Taste, Not with Majority:
The Yerushalmi says it goes according to majority (majority grain or minority grain), but the Rambam doesn’t go with majority — he goes according to taste. This is a practical distinction between the Rambam and the Yerushalmi.
2) Question of Chatzitzah:
Why doesn’t one say that the rice portion is a chatzitzah (interruption) between the person and the matzah portion, as one says in other halachos? The answer: the rice becomes nullified to the grain — it becomes nigar (drawn after) the grain. This is brought by the Ramban and others.
3) The Ra’avad’s Dispute:
The Ra’avad holds differently — he understands that one needs indeed a measure of a kezayis of grain itself. The Ra’avad asks a strong question on the Rambam. The answer to the Ra’avad: perhaps he holds that rice doesn’t nullify the taste of grain, because rice blends in — it’s a similar type of taste.
4) Measure of Kezayis in a Mixture:
Must one have a kezayis of grain itself, or is it sufficient that one tastes the taste? The Rambam says nothing about a measure — he only speaks of taste. All commentators assume that the Rambam simply holds this way, and the Maggid Mishneh brings proofs to this. The Gra has a lengthy explanation on this matter.
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Halachah 6 (Continued): Dog Dough
The Rambam’s Words
“Isas kelavim — im re’uyah l’ma’achal adam, yotz’im bah yedei chovasan; ein re’uyah l’ma’achal adam, ein yotz’im bah, afilu mishtameres leshem matzah.”
Plain Meaning
Dough that is made for dogs — if it’s fit for people to eat, one fulfills; if not, one doesn’t fulfill, even if it was guarded for the sake of matzah.
Insights and Explanations
1) New Principle — Fit for Human Consumption:
From here one learns a new principle: not only must matzah be guarded for the sake of matzah, but it must also be fit for human consumption. Both conditions are necessary.
2) What Does “Fit for Human Consumption” Mean in This Context:
“Fit for human consumption” doesn’t just mean that one can eat it — it means that it’s a type of bread/matzah that people eat. A dog is not a “matzah-eater” — only people are matzah-eaters. Therefore it must be food that is appropriate for people.
3) What is “Dog Dough”:
Dog dough means bread that is made for dogs, specifically for shepherds’ dogs. It’s not a question of mixture — it’s an actual kosher dough. The question is of leshmah — whether it was guarded for the sake of matzah, and whether it’s fit for human consumption.
4) A Conversational Point:
If someone goes to a matzah bakery that makes matzos for dogs, one doesn’t fulfill — because it’s made for dogs, not for people.
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[Digression: Matzah in the Sukkah]
One opinion says that one must eat matzah in a sukkah, based on the Toras Kohanim / Gemara’s kal vachomer: if Pesach which doesn’t require sukkah does require matzah, Sukkos which requires sukkah should certainly require matzah? The verse answers “Chag HaMatzos” — only that holiday requires matzah, not Sukkos. Philosophically it’s noted: “Strange is only what we’re not accustomed to” — if the Chumash had said that matzah must be eaten in the sukkah, we wouldn’t have found it strange.
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End of the Shiur: Matzah Kneaded with Fruit Juice
The Rambam’s Words
Matzah she’nilosheh b’mei peiros — this is the sugya of matzah ashirah — matzah that is kneaded with fruit juice (fruit juice, wine, oil, etc.).
Note
The shiur is stopped here — this will be learned later. It’s noted that it’s not too long a sugya.
📝 Full Transcript
Study of Laws of Chametz and Matzah Chapter 6 — Thirty Days Before the Holiday
Introduction: Learning Laws of Chametz and Matzah Chapter 6
Speaker 1: Yes, we’re going to learn chapter [of] Laws of Chametz and Matzah chapter 6. Perhaps later we’ll review the whole thing, why I need to learn the laws every year, but I think that for now we should learn here.
The Concept of “Mezuman” — Knowing the Entire Torah
I heard last night Rabbi… who? I looked at it, I think it was Shabbos Purim party. I see that he wishes the entire world, and it occurred to him that he should wish the entire world that they should know the entire Shas clearly without any doubts, and also the four parts of Shulchan Aruch.
I don’t know, it occurred to him that this is a good blessing for a Jew. So, I’m impressed. Because, when he says such blessings, it’s not Chassidic Jews, because… knowing Shas is just a Lithuanian thing. Lithuanians know Shas like crazy, beyond my fifth strength. So, but such Breslovers who have the knowledge, know the entire Shas, have it completely clear, not stories, know the four parts of Shulchan Aruch with all the Tosafos and with all the Shach’s. He has good clear aspirations, I have great pleasure.
Like the Breslover from Ecuador, that Meir you mean, he published a small book “You Know the Entire Torah.”
Speaker 2: He has a small book? That Meir?
Speaker 1: Yes. He knows, how? He makes a system, review, whatever, he figured out how. The battle will direct your ways, and not too precise, but overall that’s how it should be.
The Gerrer Rebbe: “Mezuman” Not “Credit”
Overall that’s how it should be, one must know the entire Torah. When is there such a thing? Now we’re learning Laws of Pesach, it’s Pesach. One must know the entire Laws of Pesach clearly. Like the Gemara says “chidudei mevichi,” or like the Gerrer Rebbe says “mezumana.” He has a point, one must know it mezuman, not credit. Everyone has credit, you see today that everyone has credit. Credit means I know where to look. Mezuman means I know.
So, to know Gemara like that is perhaps not reality, but the Rambam made himself for that, no?
Speaker 2: Yes.
The Source: Moshe Rabbeinu — “Moshe Taught Them to Israel the Laws of Pesach on Pesach”
Speaker 1: And Lubavitch… until the ideas. Learning Torah is from the Torah, but that one should learn Torah, one should go away from the other laws of precedence and go to thirty days before the holiday… I already told you the Gemara in Megillah I think, “Moshe taught them to Israel the laws of Pesach on Pesach.” This we see from Moshe Rabbeinu, it’s implied that it’s literally the original way of learning Torah.
This Is Not Just an Addition — This Is the Order of Study Itself
Yes, so anyway, it’s certain that this must be done, and therefore that’s how one does it. I need to answer the sub… It’s implied from the law literally that one should make this the order of study, not that one should start learning Laws of Pesach for fifteen minutes after davening. This will take here and there, and the poskim started Pesach, and this will be made first.
I’m already learning for Shavuos, there’s the law that there’s no stringency of thirty days in Torah study, so if one wants to really learn which sacrifices, omer, Shavuos, omer. But simply it’s Pesach, Shavuos, I mean it’s Pesach, perhaps Rosh Hashanah, Sukkos.
Question: To Which Holidays Does “Thirty Days Before the Holiday” Apply?
To which laws does the thirty days apply? Pesach. Which holidays does the thirty days before the holiday apply to? It applies to Pesach.
Speaker 2: It only applies to Pesach?
Speaker 1: There are among the poskim who started Pesach, the first siman is only on Pesach. So this must be thought about.
The Mishnah Berurah: Dispute Whether It Also Applies to Shavuos and Sukkos
Ah, the Mishnah Berurah says that there’s a dispute whether it’s relevant by Shavuos and by Sukkos, because the main thing comes to know, one spoke about the sacrifices, the matter of sacrifices.
Speaker 2: That’s what he says?
Speaker 1: Yes. From Moshe Rabbeinu, from me he takes sacrifices?
Speaker 2: Okay.
Speaker 1: By Moshe Rabbeinu it’s explicit about Pesach Sheni, one speaks of sacrifices.
Speaker 2: Yes, but that’s the proof that besides…
Speaker 1: I remembered that the other books, because Pesach has many laws, perhaps Shavuos, Sukkos have fewer laws.
Speaker 2: What does such a thing mean?
Speaker 1: But actually what the… yesh omrim?
Speaker 2: Yes. Yesh omrim.
Speaker 1: The Mishnah Berurah brings both sides. Either it has to do with sacrifices, or it has to do with every holiday.
Question: If It’s Sacrifices, Why Learn Laws of Chametz and Matzah?
Speaker 2: It’s strange to say, because you say it starts with sacrifices, but then you say one should learn, I don’t know what, Laws of Chametz and Matzah, Laws of Shofar. If the matter is sacrifices, one should learn sacrifices.
Speaker 1: One can perhaps say that you don’t know any sacrifices, but the essence of the enactment remained.
Speaker 2: Okay, one must look into it.
Why Pesach Requires More Preparation Than Sukkos
Speaker 1: Perhaps one can say that because Pesach has many laws, kashering utensils, purging vessels, removal of chametz, which other holidays don’t have.
Speaker 2: But Sukkos does have many laws, both the four species and sukkah.
Speaker 1: But the Mishnah Berurah says that essentially all these laws in Sukkos are not really relevant, because all sukkahs and all lulavs are kosher. What you have walls and a third even a tefach, and most lulavs are mostly kosher, meaning it doesn’t fail.
Proof from the Gemara: “Perusa Atzeres” and “Perusa Chag”
Speaker 2: But you see that in the Gemara there is indeed perusa atzeres and perusa chag, and one speaks, yes?
Speaker 1: Apparently regarding what? That one already makes preparations.
Speaker 2: Yes, regarding laws of sacrifices, from when the perusa chag means half of the thirty days, half of the fifteen days. One sees that the thirty days is a thing also in other holidays, not only Pesach.
Speaker 1: There isn’t very clearly an actual decision, but one sees that there’s a matter of the thirty days.
Tosafos: By Purim There Isn’t
Tosafos says that by Purim there isn’t, except what’s needed in the Megillah. Let’s see Tosafos.
Speaker 2: Okay, that’s not the same as what we’re learning now.
Speaker 1: Right, right, we’re not going into that. Tosafos says yes.
Speaker 2: Come on, it’s not relevant.
Speaker 1: Okay, back to the matters, okay? That’s your good. Let’s go back.
The Meaning of “Mezuman” — Cash in Hand
I don’t hold. I hold that one must know clearly the entire Torah bemezumanim, as the Gerrer Rebbe says. Nu, what does mezuman mean? Cash is needed when it’s lacking to give out, then the most important thing is to have the cash. Understand? I mean that there comes a time when one needs to do it, one needs the most important thing to have the cash in hand. That’s the simple meaning here.
Discussion: Should This Be the Order of the Yeshiva?
For this, when you ask whether one should make the order of the yeshiva this way, I wouldn’t think so. That is, in general, I don’t know, perhaps the order of the yeshiva shouldn’t be such a thing at all, I don’t know. But if there is an order of the yeshiva, it’s presumably not that it goes this way. There’s an order, and that’s the outlook.
Yes, you can make an order this way, and say that a whole year is enough when it touches on a law in Choshen Mishpat, you don’t know, something that has to do with the cycle of the year, it will certainly happen. That must be mezumanim umukanim, because I need to know what’s happening. That’s the chapter because you bring your bundle, that’s clearly stated explicitly, make a nice chapter.
But if one expands the obligation of question and thirty days to all holidays, when he still wants his spark my Purim, this is a Torah from the longest.
The Meiri: Learning Tractates of Moed by Each Moed
I already said that the Meiri, who says about the world learns moed, each moed, or when does he learn. I already said that the Meiri says that the same the custom, Shabbos HaGadol by the piyutim one says everything Pesach, that someone not to say that you see yourself in the reason bothered, the same thing as you say the Meiri, and not so did he see all in merit, because it’s not in practice the custom of the students of the wise. Each one, there are students of the wise who from each one.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Baal HaTanya)
The Baal HaTanya writes, yes that the law asks that the scholar must learn beforehand, and nothing more, because everything goes into the public. The asking when the scholar must learn to teach the world, today there isn’t the obligation that once was, because each person can take a Mishnah Berurah. But this is a mitzvah on each and every one to learn the laws of the festival until he is expert in them, so rules the Shulchan Aruch HaRav in Laws of Worms.
Yes, okay, fine. Let’s see, let’s see.
Speaker 2: You look into more places, you’re told that this means, mezuman means that one knows clearly.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Digression: The Word “Va’ad” — Beis HaVa’ad
Who is the Menakeh Yagrib?
Speaker 2: I don’t know.
Speaker 1: It’s a book in the back of the Gemaras, no?
Speaker 2: Yes, Yanki.
Speaker 1: No, because he says an interesting thing. That Rashi says that they don’t learn the laws of Pesach in the Beis HaVa’ad lest an am ha’aretz hear. Okay, there’s the Beis HaVa’ad, and the Beis HaMidrash. That Beis HaVa’ad means like the Sanhedrin, more or less, where they would decide if there are laws of… I understand it that way. If there are general laws that need to be decided.
Speaker 2: Public.
Speaker 1: Do you know that va’ad means Sanhedrin? Because he says that on this word there’s no word at all from the Torah. It’s a word that the Sages enacted, they made it on the first symbol of their Beis HaVa’ad.
Speaker 2: But what does it mean a matter of gathering, yes?
Speaker 1: What he means by va’ad is gathering, I know, but why… from where the word comes I don’t know.
Okay, hello, we’re still bothered by time.
Speaker 2: Okay.
Speaker 1: Okay, very good. We’re not bothered by time, it’s a sixth of the night exempt from Torah. Okay, let’s go up to sixth. Say the holy holiday.
Root of “Va’ad”
Speaker 2: Perhaps the word comes from the language “and I will meet and be appointed.” It’s not the root vav-ayin-dalet, it’s the root yud-ayin-dalet.
Speaker 1: Nu, yud-ayin-dalet. But there’s a vav and an ayin there in the middle.
Speaker 2: Afterwards, perhaps it’s such a… it works perhaps with the word “le’olam va’ed.” One spoke about the word “va’ed.” There’s le’olam va’ed. There’s such a word in the Torah, le’olam va’ed.
Speaker 1: No, not the translation. But the word exists. But the translation isn’t such a… what does le’olam va’ed mean?
Speaker 2: I don’t know. I don’t understand what you’re saying. Le’olam va’ed, Hashem yimloch le’olam va’ed.
Speaker 1: See Tosafos, that va’ed is a language of… the root isn’t va’ed, that’s certain. Le’olam va’ed, everything, le’olam va’ed. How one explains the word I don’t know. And he says that the root of no’ad is yud-dalet-ayin, it’s never, it never says any awakening.
Speaker 2: No’ad is from the language of ya’ad, from the language of wealth?
Speaker 1: Yes, it’s from the language, the root is yud-dalet-ayin, that’s the root.
Speaker 2: Why, yes, no’ad is a language
Chapter 6: The Mitzvah of Eating Matzah — Law 6
Linguistic Discussion: Root “No’ad” and “Va’ed”
Speaker 1:
Why…yes, “no’ad” is a nifal from yud-ayin-dalet. Why isn’t there even once “ya’ad” in the Torah? I don’t know. But that’s what he argues. I looked in the dictionary.
To what do these words apply, it could be that there’s another form how one says the same root, and sometimes it comes out with a vav. Rabbi Menachem ben Saruk says…
Speaker 2:
I know, Rabbi Menachem ben Saruk says that there’s no vav at all. There’s no word that begins with a vav that is an essential letter.
Speaker 1:
That’s what I actually meant before.
Speaker 2:
Why doesn’t he answer that? That “ad” and “va’ed” mean the same thing. What is the vav?
Speaker 1:
A good question. But that’s the translation. All commentators say that it’s like the language of “ad.” There’s no root vav-ayin-dalet. It’s ayin-dalet. Or ayin-yud-dalet could be the root, whatever. But there’s no root vav-ayin-dalet. So say all the righteous. You can’t build any words from this.
Speaker 2:
Testimony or something like that?
Speaker 1:
Everyone will say that this is a mistake, there’s no such word. What is ad? Le’olam va’ed. What we wanted to spell it isn’t exactly why it spells that way. It’s like hands and add, le’olam va’od, there’s no such thing.
Yes, so no’ad is yo’ad, this comes essentially from perhaps appoint, he says appointing, or an appointed, or an agreed upon. Fulfillment of the appointment, like fulfillment of prophecy, ye’ud means something that’s destined for the future. Ye’ud means mezuman, mo’ed, or no’ad, everything has. So a designated place can be like a development from this word.
Ad olam and le’olam va’ed is the same thing. Sometimes it says in the verse ad olam, sometimes it says le’olam va’ed. Ad and va’ed is in this account the same thing. Ad olam, to your seed I will give ad olam, and his name will endure le’olam va’ed.
Perhaps we say language of appointment, language cut off at a specific time. Understand? But you can say that far far also that initially. But this isn’t language of holiness, not language of Scripture, I don’t know, language of the Sages.
Speaker 2:
Okay, but why do we actually for all my side things? After all ad, after all ad means the mountains that will stand forever, yes? Perhaps it’s from the language of testimony from this, a testimony that gives strength and stability.
Speaker 1:
One must check R’ Tzadok, he surely has a discussion on this matter.
Law 6: The Positive Commandment to Eat Matzah on the Night of the 15th of Nissan
Speaker 1:
Okay, now we’ll continue. Okay, come, come, we need to go further to the…
Fine, says the holy… It is counted on it sixth, says the holy Rambam, a positive commandment from the Torah. Okay, to eat matzah on the night of the fifteenth.
Order of the Mitzvos — Prohibitions of Chametz and Mitzvah of Matzah
Fine, okay, so more or less the first five chapters spoke about the prohibitions of chametz, here about how many prohibitions there are regarding chametz, a bunch of them. After all, the prohibition of chametz is… the Rambam started with not to eat chametz even on the first day, tashbisu, not to eat chametz all seven, mixture of chametz, bal yera’eh bal yimatzei. These are the six mitzvos that all speak about the prohibition of chametz. Now we’re holding by the one mitzvah of eating matzah on the night of Pesach. The seventh mitzvah that the Rambam brings.
Explanation of the Rambam
It is a positive commandment to eat matzah on the night of the fifteenth, as it says “in the evening you shall eat matzos.” This mitzvah applies in every place and at every time, that is not only when one makes the Pesach sacrifice, and not dependent on the Pesach sacrifice that you eat it, and its eating is not dependent at all on the Pesach sacrifice, rather it is a mitzvah by itself.
Speaker 2:
Yes, although it says “on matzos and bitter herbs they shall eat it,” one could have thought that it’s only with the bitter herbs, but Chazal accepted the opinions that there’s an extra mitzvah by itself no matter, but that’s how they understood.
Speaker 1:
The verse “in the evening you shall eat matzos” is a very weak source, and what’s the simple meaning in the verse? Why should this be together with the sacrifice? Read the verse, what does the verse say next?
Discussion: Three Separate Questions in the Mitzvah
Question A: Is There Even a Positive Commandment to Eat Matzah?
Speaker 1:
There are two things, there’s what there’s only a mitzvah on the night of the fifteenth, and there’s that there’s even a mitzvah at all. These are two different things, right?
Number one, what our matter is, I said, “Seven days you shall eat matzos, but on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses,” I then told you the verse “in the evening you shall eat matzos.”
Speaker 2:
Okay, that doesn’t say together with the Pesach sacrifice. A verse before is “and this day shall be for you a memorial,” and afterwards he says the verse “in the evening you shall eat matzos.”
Speaker 1:
Ah, okay. But what’s the wonder why one should say that the first night is a mitzvah? Because the verse looks like that night they should start eating the matzos. Okay, this lets us know how Chazal divided it.
There are two different things. One, that there’s even a mitzvah of eating matzah at all. Because it could have been that the verse speaks, it doesn’t say that there’s even a mitzvah, but it says one shouldn’t eat any chametz, and what should one eat with the bread. I mean that’s how Chazal understand, that the other days there’s no obligation.
Question B: Is the Mitzvah Only with the Pesach Sacrifice?
Speaker 1:
There are three different things. One, that there’s even a mitzvah to eat matzah at all. Perhaps it means only one shouldn’t eat chametz? Certainly, perhaps it’s simple, one will eat provisions, they won’t eat any chametz provisions, there wouldn’t have been any mitzvah to eat matzah. Not such a mitzvah at all. That’s one interpretation one could have said. As you say, such boundaries of Chazal, and they actually learn this way regarding other things that there’s no such mitzvah.
The Second Question
The second question is, perhaps there is indeed such a mitzvah, but only “with the Pesach.” As it states in the verses of “al matzos u’merorim yochluhu” (on matzos and bitter herbs they shall eat it). If you look in my booklet of all the sources on Pesach, which is called Pesach K’Hilchaso, we will be able to see very clearly what it says. True? Do you agree? Chametz and matzah. Do you agree? Do you have my booklet? You, you, I have one. You can see.
Analysis of the Verses in Parshas Bo
Speaker 1:
If we look here, we’ll see… Look, we’re talking here in the verses in Bo, yes? It says like this, in the beginning it states, “v’achlu es habasar balailah hazeh tzli eish u’matzos al merorim yochluhu” (and they shall eat the meat on this night, roasted over fire, and matzos with bitter herbs they shall eat it). This is the first time we see matzos. A few verses later it states, “v’haya hayom hazeh lachem l’zikaron v’chagosem oso chag l’Hashem l’doroseichem chukas olam techaguhu” (and this day shall be for you a remembrance, and you shall celebrate it as a festival to Hashem for your generations, an eternal statute you shall celebrate it). Ostensibly, one can understand that here we have finished speaking about how to make the korban Pesach. And now we’re saying a new mitzvah of “shivas yamim matzos tocheilu ach bayom harishon tashbisu se’or mibateichem ki kol ochel chametz” (seven days you shall eat matzos, but on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses, for anyone who eats chametz), and so on. One can indeed learn the plain meaning of Scripture like the Chazal, it fits nicely.
In what respect? That the verse counts out the first time matzos, it counts it out specifically as a part of eating the Pesach, “al matzos u’merorim yochluhu”. But the verse finishes the discussion of the korban Pesach with the words, “v’haya hayom hazeh lachem l’zikaron v’chagosem oso chag l’Hashem l’doroseichem chukas olam techaguhu”. And here begins a new mitzvah, “shivas yamim matzos tocheilu ach bayom harishon tashbisu se’or mibateichem”, “u’vayom harishon mikra kodesh” (and on the first day a holy convocation), and further “u’shemartem es hamatzos” (and you shall guard the matzos), “barishon b’arba’ah asar yom lachodesh ba’erev tochlu matzos” (on the first, on the fourteenth day of the month in the evening you shall eat matzos). These four verses as an extra mitzvah of chametz and matzah. Which is not connected with the korban Pesach.
Question C: Is the Mitzvah Only on the Night of the 15th or All Seven Days?
Speaker 2:
And now which of the three things are you talking about, tzadik? There are three different things, right? The first question is, is there even a mitzvah to eat matzah? Or when it says eat matzah does it only mean not to eat chametz? We didn’t learn that from this source at all, right?
Speaker 1:
No, we didn’t learn it.
Speaker 2:
What? We learned it now, now in other hours?
Speaker 1:
That one must eat matzah, right? It’s an obligation to eat matzah. That’s not stated anywhere.
Speaker 2:
It is stated, it is stated.
Speaker 1:
Where is it stated?
Speaker 2:
It’s stated in the verse, “shivas yamim matzos tocheilu” (seven days you shall eat matzos).
Speaker 1:
Yes.
Speaker 2:
“Ach bayom harishon tashbisu se’or mibateichem” (but on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses). It says that one should be busy so there shouldn’t be any chametz. And then the verse says, on the first day it is especially a mikra kodesh. And then the verse says again, “u’va’erev tochlu matzos” (and in the evening you shall eat matzos).
Speaker 1:
Okay, I didn’t find a place. I can see how the Chazal saw here from the verses that the first day is not, because the first day is also mikra kodesh, because the verse counts here the first day four times.
Discussion: “Matzos Tocheilu” — Mitzvah or Just Advice?
Speaker 1:
They all clearly understood that every time it says “matzos tocheilu,” except perhaps once, but every time it doesn’t mean to eat matzah literally, and they are completely right, because almost every time this comes together with a prohibition to eat chametz. “Matzos yochel” (matzos shall be eaten), “lo yera’eh lecha chametz” (no chametz shall be seen to you). Now, certainly a normal Jew can understand, certainly one will eat something, one won’t fast for seven days, right? And eating means one will eat bread, there weren’t potato chips to eat in those times. So naturally one will eat bread. The verse says, you should eat matzah and not chametz. But it doesn’t become a mitzvas aseh, that if someone wants specifically to eat potato chips, which is the whole question. On this it doesn’t say, not only the first day. In general, I’m not talking… You’re talking the whole time about the third thing, about the first day and the seventh day.
Okay, the first step is, that one should eat matzah, and not just that one shouldn’t eat chametz which naturally one will eat matzah perhaps, but not as a mitzvas aseh, that if someone wants specifically to eat potato chips, this is not stated explicitly in the Torah. One can learn that it’s an obligation, one can learn what one wants, but it’s not stated.
Speaker 2:
You say so categorically it’s not stated. It’s stated in the language of a command.
Speaker 1:
Because one can twist the language of command, that’s how we see it’s always like this. But what does the verse say? “Shivas yamim tochlu alav matzos” (seven days you shall eat upon it matzos). Should we say that the Torah is a short verse for your diet, because I want to take away your chametz, therefore I give you advice, is it ready that the advice of the word matzah is the part of the word, the lack of not chametz, you’re forgetting something. No, you shouldn’t eat chametz-like, but you should eat matzah-like. Well, well, but
Mitzvas Achilas Matzah – Is Eating Matzah All Seven Days a Mitzvah?
Dispute: Is “Matzos Tocheilu” a Mitzvas Aseh in Its Own Right?
The Claim: “Matzah” Only Means “Not Chametz”
Speaker 1:
He says categorically, it’s not stated. It’s stated in the language of a command, and one can twist the language of command and say that this is good advice. But it’s stated in the verse “shivas yamim tocheilu matzos” (seven days you shall eat matzos). To say that the Torah is simply concerned about your diet, because I’ve taken away your chametz, therefore I give you advice, is precisely not so clear. The meaning of the word matzah is after all even not chametz, you’re forgetting something. You shouldn’t eat chametz-like, but you should eat matzah-like.
Speaker 2:
Well, well, but to say that the Torah tells you this just because the Torah is concerned that you won’t have what to eat, is not necessarily so. It is indeed a mitzvah.
Speaker 1:
Simple Jews believe that it is indeed a mitzvah. The question is, you say that it’s only good advice the first day from the Mishnah. You’re not right. You’re not right. Why not? Because simple…
Speaker 2:
I didn’t say that it’s only good advice. That’s not yet the question, right? Not eating matzah and yes eating chametz according to the plain meaning is two ways of saying the same exact thing.
Speaker 1:
Not exactly.
Speaker 2:
Yes, exactly. In short, you have a prohibition that one burns, throws out all chametz. We’re not talking about yes eating, we’re talking about not eating. You should eat from an animal. We’re not talking about what one can eat, we’re talking about what one cannot eat.
The Claim: Normal People Eat Bread Every Day
Speaker 2:
Normal people eat bread every day. That’s how we see in all of Torah always. That’s not a point, right? Certainly. That’s the normal meal. It’s not stated even once in the Torah “eat bread.” Eat bread because one eats bread.
Speaker 1:
But what then does one eat? Should one eat potato chips?
Speaker 2:
We’re talking. If you want specifically… Well, well, God forbid, it’s not a joke. It’s not an invention. Always in those days, normal people eat bread every day.
The Nafka Minah: Blessing, L’Shem Yichud, and the “Crazy Person” Case
Speaker 2:
Okay, so the whole question, the whole nafka minah what we’re asking whether it’s a mitzvah, right? Has like two levels, the whole nafka minah what we’re talking about now. The first question is, one, whether one makes a blessing, whether one makes over this “l’shem yichud,” whether it’s a holy mitzvah or not, right?
Because practically, practically in current times, even according to those who hold that it’s not a mitzvah to eat matzah, practically all Jews eat matzah the seven days, except for a few, as they say, the Lisker Chassidim. Exactly, except for the Lisker Chassidim everyone eats matzah all seven days.
Speaker 1:
Why should they need to represent?
Speaker 2:
One minute, you ask a good question, whether one can eat potato chips. Well, well, one can. But, right? So that’s the first question. That’s not a blessing, that’s not a great joy. So that’s one question. I already know, Chazal in general have a concept that there is a blessing. I’m not saying a blessing, it’s a mitzvah. It’s a question whether it’s a mitzvah. I’m not saying that it’s a mitzvah.
What’s the nafka minah? What’s the nafka minah? Other days, God forbid, if you want to eat only… Again, again, you’ve laid down a strong nail that every day people eat bread. Normal people.
Speaker 1:
You’re talking about the people in Europe that you know, who eat bread. What about the other millions of people who eat only rice, and the other millions of people who eat only potatoes or or or…
Speaker 2:
No, no, no, no, don’t say that, don’t say that. That’s not true, that’s not true. Please, I don’t like this post-modern nonsense. The Torah speaks of people. If the Torah had been given in Asia, it would have said about rice. Now we’re talking about the Torah that was given in Mesopotamia, where there the normal thing that every person eats every day is bread. Not nehama Avraham, more is bread. The normal order is like this. You can see proofs for this. You don’t stand… I’m not arguing with you.
The Question: Is “Eating Matzah” a Mitzvah in Its Own Right?
Speaker 2:
So, that’s not the point. The question is only something else, right? So naturally, if a verse states “eat a certain type of bread” – let’s say it differently more clearly: eating matzah and not chametz means “eat a certain type of bread,” right? The Torah didn’t invent a new thing called matzah. There have always been the two types of breads. So seven days you eat a certain type of bread. Very good. We all agree that this is stated.
Speaker 1:
One minute, today there are other things.
Speaker 2:
We all agree that this is stated, right? We all agree that this is stated. The question is only, this is a mitzvah, right? It’s forbidden to eat another type of bread, that’s stated explicitly. You’ll see that you get kares for eating another type of bread.
But what if someone wants to fast? But he wants, right? Again, but what is the whole nafka minah of this? In the normal case – the Torah always speaks of the normal case, right? We’re not looking now for an exception, a crazy person, right? In the normal case, certainly seven days we eat matzah, that’s not a doubt, and that’s stated explicitly in the verse, right?
The Two Questions: Blessing and Obligation
Speaker 2:
But how does the question begin? Two things begin: either whether we make a blessing seven days on such a matter, or the way the Gemara learns and says it usually is, what if I’m a crazy person and I want to eat peppers all seven days? A strange creature. So is the plain meaning that it’s an obligation? What does an obligation mean? That you get a punishment? Does he shout, “You shouldn’t eat matzah, but also not eat chametz, but eat I don’t know what”? Are you crazy? Or no, that’s not a sin. The Torah only says that if you eat bread, you should eat such a type of bread. You don’t eat any bread at all, you’re an idle creature, I don’t know, but you haven’t done any sin.
The Proof: There’s No Kares for Not Eating Matzah
Speaker 2:
Now, for the second law, that it should be an obligatory mitzvah to eat matzah at any point, is not stated anywhere in the Torah. At least, as long as we understand, the simple plain meaning means simply “eat a certain type of bread and not another type of bread.” That which it’s stated in the language of obligation “matzos tocheilu”, the same thing is stated in the language of negation “v’lo sochal chametz” (and you shall not eat chametz), both mean the same thing. True?
Speaker 1:
Yes, I would have laid down the same discussion with the other languages.
Speaker 2:
One can say that the Torah says it’s a mitzvah, one can say that the Torah says it’s optional. In practice we see in the Talmud that Chazal took a different approach, they said that all days it’s optional.
Discussion: What Does “Reshus” Mean?
Speaker 1:
I don’t know what you mean “reshus.” I’m not saying it’s reshus. I’m not saying it’s reshus. I’m telling you now… Reshus is already a concept of halachah. I’m telling you what it says in the Chumash. It doesn’t say “reshus.”
Speaker 2:
What does “matzah is reshus” mean? What does this “reshus” mean?
Speaker 1:
What does this “reshus” mean? I don’t want to get into the discussion of reshus. Reshus is when we’re talking about a mitzvah. That’s the plain meaning. You say one should eat matzah, because one can’t eat chametz, one should eat bread as matzah.
Speaker 2:
No, no, that’s what you’re saying. You keep on going back to this. This is like good advice.
Speaker 1:
What does good advice mean? You want to eat bread, don’t eat chametz. That’s all.
The Question: Is There Stated in the Torah an Obligation to Eat?
Speaker 2:
From where should come the crazy thing of an obligation to eat? In general, is it stated at all anywhere in the Torah that there’s an obligation of eating at all? In your Chumash is it stated anywhere that one must ever eat anything?
Speaker 1:
A thousand times!
Speaker 2:
Ah, sacrifices, ma’aser sheni, by all sacrifices and…
Speaker 1:
One minute, one minute, clearly, let’s be clear. Where is it stated in the Torah an obligation that one must eat something? Bring me the verse.
Speaker 2:
“U’vayom hashvi’i yochlu mimacharas ha…” What? What? What? I’ll tell you more than a verse, I’ll bring you a Vayikra.
Speaker 1:
Okay, bring a Vayikra. Show me once where it states a mitzvah to eat something. Let’s hear, let’s hear already.
Speaker 2:
I don’t know if the Torah has a mitzvah to eat things. Not, I mean, I’m not saying I don’t know, but I mean that it’s not such a simple thing. In general, the concept of a mitzvas aseh that one must do in this way, I don’t know if it’s stated in the Torah. I would want to know perhaps that’s a question.
The Proof from Bris Milah
Speaker 2:
And also, you would expect… Ah, I do know where there’s a mitzvah to do something. For example, there’s a mitzvah for bris milah. It states, whoever doesn’t have bris milah God forbid will get kares. You know clearly that one must do this, it’s not an optional thing. And here for example it states very clearly that kares one gets only for eating chametz, it doesn’t state that one gets kares for not eating matzah.
Speaker 1:
What isn’t a mitzvah is kares? There’s a difference a mitzvah.
The Torah Says Clearly What One Should Do
Speaker 2:
Again, I want to see you a proof for the essence of the matter, not that one can say, one can also say that there’s someone who holds that it’s a mitzvah. I mean, let’s be real, it’s not. When the Torah wants it clear that one should do something, it says precisely what one should do. And usually it even says what will happen if one doesn’t do it. Because that’s a way how we can know for sure clearly that one should indeed do it. You see that even in this matter when the Torah wants it clear, it gives kares for not. As opposed to yes eating matzah, nothing is stated.
The Verse: “Eat Matzah Because Whoever Eats Chametz Gets Kares”
Speaker 2:
And it states literally a thing and its opposite. It states, eat matzah, because whoever eats chametz gets kares. Look at this verse, yes?
Speaker 1:
What does it mean eat matzah because whoever eats chametz gets kares? It’s not a thing and its opposite, according to what simple plain meaning is this?
Speaker 2:
Yes, eating matzah means simply to say not chametz, right? This thing haven’t we already discussed years ago?
The Gemara in Pesachim 108
Speaker 1:
In 108 the Gemara about this not according to the simple Scripture approach, but with the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded. But the whole dispute of the Amoraim why matzah is yes or not a d’oraisa, and plays around with the verses with the “ach bayom harishon tashbisu” (but on the first day you shall remove), “mah shvi’i reshus” (just as the seventh is optional), “davar shehaya bichlal v’yatza min haklal l’lamed” (something that was in the general rule and left the general rule to teach), only on it.
Speaker 2:
Can you understand what I’m saying? I have a much bigger problem with the very idea that there is such a mitzvah at all.
The Rambam: Matzah is Not Dependent on Pesach
Speaker 2:
That which the Rambam says that this is not dependent on Pesach, in this I’m one hundred percent right, it’s stated explicitly in the verse. Because not only that, but the verse even counts that the Pesach is the 14th, and matzah one eats from the 15th until the 21st. It’s clear that it’s not dependent on Pesach, it’s the opposite thing. But if it were dependent on Pesach, it’s not both, it’s more the language of a mitzvah of anything else.
Speaker 1:
But the… But you’re starting from the backwards.
Speaker 2:
But the Pesach is only the Pesach, and it tells you practical advice how to make the sandwich.
Speaker 1:
That’s not practical advice! Where is there such a thing? You shouldn’t need to worry that the Torah doesn’t want to help you, go talk to me the days.
English Translation
Speaker 2:
No, I have no idea… The Torah says over ten times “tochel matzos” (you shall eat matzah). I have no idea… You should know that only because the world is hungry and sells for chametz. I have no idea where you come from with this idea of “practical advice.” I don’t know where you got it from, the idea is literally worth nothing.
The Claim: “Matzah” = “Not Chametz”
Speaker 2:
Again, what it says that one should eat matzah means that one should not eat chametz. If someone wants specifically to eat nothing, he is also permitted. The Torah doesn’t say…
Speaker 1:
Where does it say that?
Speaker 2:
Should I bring you the pesukim (verses)?
Speaker 1:
Bring me the pesukim. “Vayikra,” “Vayikra.”
Speaker 2:
Should I bring you all the pesukim that say one should eat?
Speaker 1:
No, the pesukim in “Vayikra.” “Bayom harishon tashbisu se’or mibateichem” (on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses), “Pesach hu laHashem” (it is a Pesach offering to Hashem). It says nothing about that. “Matzos yochel es shivas hayamim” (matzah shall be eaten for seven days). “Shivas yamim matzos tochelu” (seven days you shall eat matzah). This is the chag hamatzos (festival of matzah).
Speaker 2:
Matzah means not chametz. It’s not relevant to have the yom tov (holiday) called “chag hamatzos” and not eat matzah.
Speaker 1:
No, no, matzah means not chametz. Again, not becoming exempt. Becoming exempt is a different mitzvah of the yom tov. Matzah means not chametz. Not chametz, yes. Matzah is a thing that one doesn’t eat chametz. One should not eat chametz. Yes, you eat matzah. One should not eat chametz, that’s the yom tov chag hamatzos.
Speaker 2:
Exactly. Obviously normal people eat matzah. That’s why I’m telling you, this is the chiddush (novel interpretation) that you’re being mechadesh (innovating). Obviously, every Pesach what does one do? One doesn’t eat Pesachdik. “Chag hamatzos,” technically, right? What does one eat? Matzah. Obviously it’s called “chag hamatzos,” what should one eat? Should one not eat matzah?
Speaker 1:
Again, you’re taking the command.
Speaker 2:
Oh, now it’s called “chag hamatzos,” what’s the chiddush that you’re being mechadesh?
Speaker 1:
Not about that. You have a crazy idea.
The Claim: You’re Backwards
Speaker 1:
But you’re saying that the Torah tells you not to eat chametz, therefore eating matzah is already your own decision, because you don’t have enough grass, or because you’re crazy and you want to eat every day what you want to eat.
Speaker 2:
No, you’re backwards. You’re backwards. You’re backwards. You’re backwards. You’re again backwards. You’re assuming that eating matzah is a chiddush. A normal person eats every day. Modern people who fast, I’m not talking about them.
It’s Not an “Eitzah Tovah” (Good Advice)
Speaker 2:
It’s not an eitzah tovah that one should eat matzah. That’s number one. Number two, the meaning of the word “matzah” is not the expensive thing that’s sold for fifty dollars a pound. The meaning of the word “matzah” is a thing that is not chametz. But you can even argue more about bread that is not chametz. Someone who doesn’t want to eat any bread at all, he wants to eat broccoli. It says nothing about that in the Torah. Not about whether it’s an eitzah tovah. That’s my claim. My claim is that it doesn’t say one should eat a billion. Like, I don’t know exactly… what’s the example for that? This is something that doesn’t say. And what I’m saying that I have a proof from the Chachamim (Sages), the Chachamim also understood it this way, because the Chachamim also said that in changing times.
Discussion on the Obligation of Eating Matzah from the Torah
Did the Torah Obligate Eating Matzah on the First Night?
Speaker 1:
He doesn’t want to eat bread at all, he just wants the birchas hanehenin (blessing of enjoyment). It says nothing about him in the Torah. Not about whether it’s an eitzah tovah. That’s not my claim. My claim is that it doesn’t say what one wants to eat. Like… I don’t know exactly… what’s the… what’s the… what’s the example for that. But this is something that doesn’t say.
What I’m saying is just a proof from the Chachamim, the Chachamim also understood this, because the Chachamim also said that essentially there’s no such mitzvah that one must specifically eat matzah or eat matzah every day. They understood that this is what it means.
And not regarding the other, it’s the same din (law). No, the words are always the same words, tzaddik (righteous one). Tzaddik, the words are not different. It always says the same sort of words. It’s not different.
Speaker 2:
Okay, you’re answering a different question. Rebbi (Rabbi), you’re answering two different questions. And again, why are you confusing? Again, these are two different questions. Another question, which nobody ever asked, and there’s no actual reason to think that it should be like this, perhaps there is a reason, but that’s not the big problem, is, who says there’s an obligation to eat matzah separately from the korban Pesach (Passover offering)? Because you want to be able to say, even though it says “al matzos umarorim” (on matzah and bitter herbs), but it says in Devarim (Deuteronomy) for example “shivas yamim tochal alav matzos” (seven days you shall eat matzah with it). That means, you can say that somehow the matzah… you want to be able to say, okay, it doesn’t say so many times, perhaps indeed, it doesn’t say in other places, it only says there. That it’s not as prominent as it’s mentioned with the Ivrim (Hebrews) by korban Pesach. But for matzah it doesn’t make so much sense, in short, one learned from this to other places.
The Claim: There’s No Distinction in the Torah
Speaker 1:
It says so many times in the Torah. First of all, it’s obviously simple, seven days one eats matzah and only one day the korban Pesach. I mean, it’s literally explicit that the matzah is not dependent on the korban Pesach, right?
I understood that the real problem of the Chachamim only begins, as you say, after they have an idea that there is a matzah of reshus (optional) and that matzah is chovas Torah (Torah obligation). But simple peshat (plain meaning), if you don’t know that there’s a matzah of reshus and chovah (obligation), there isn’t this that the matzah is not dependent on the korban Pesach. This is not something that apparently needs a proof. It’s pashut uvarur (simple and clear) that matzah is not dependent on korban Pesach. One could have said a claim, okay, ein lecha ela chidusho (you only have its innovation), but here, at the time if one was offering on erev Pesach (Passover eve) the korban Pesach, then one should eat matzah the other seven days, and if not, not. Okay, it would have been a chiddush for me, because I don’t see why one should really say so.
But the entire essence of the matter that there’s an obligation to eat matzah, which the Rambam calls a mitzvas asei (positive commandment), and you don’t receive a punishment, kares (excision), whatever punishment you get for not doing a mitzvas asei, this is a davar ketzas peleh (somewhat wondrous thing). I don’t know why I would have such a thing. Do you understand? I’m going backwards. Most people don’t understand why the Chachamim were me’atik (copied) and said that all other days it’s only reshus. I say that I don’t know from where they took that the first day there’s an obligation at all.
Speaker 2:
Nu, nu. What are you doing with nu, nu?
Speaker 1:
They did understand, they have dozens of proofs, and also from the pesukim.
Speaker 2:
They don’t have a single proof that there’s an obligation to eat matzah. They don’t have a single proof. They don’t have a single proof. It’s not a chiddush what I’m saying. I’m telling you the simple meaning in the Chumash (Pentateuch). It always says so.
Speaker 1:
But the Chachamim say there’s an obligation. They didn’t just say a tasty thought.
Speaker 2:
They don’t have a single proof. It’s not a chiddush what I’m saying. I’m telling you the simple meaning in the Chumash. It always says so.
Discussion on the Pesukim
Speaker 1:
But not “ach bayom harishon” (but on the first day).
Speaker 2:
“Ushmartem es hamatzos” (and you shall guard the matzos), nu, at first they apparently said “ba’erev tochelu matzos” (in the evening you shall eat matzah). And then there’s a pasuk again, “bachamishah asar yom lachodesh hazeh chag hamatzos laHashem” (on the fifteenth day of this month is the festival of matzah to Hashem).
Speaker 1:
And what did they interpret?
Speaker 2:
I mean to say, this is the Ivri (Hebrew) meaning. Exactly, this is the Ivri meaning. This is the Ivri meaning. Not only do I say this is the Ivri meaning, the Chachamim say this is the Ivri meaning, right? The Chachamim say this is the Ivri meaning. Not only me, but the Chachamim also say like me that this is the Ivri meaning.
Speaker 1:
But there regarding “shivas yamim tochelu matzos” (seven days you shall eat matzah), but there it says “ach bayom harishon tashbisu se’or” (but on the first day you shall remove leaven).
Speaker 2:
But the Ivri meaning, the essential Ivri meaning, they all agree that it doesn’t mean that one must. They asked a question, why here, when it says here, does it mean reshus? They took toras ma’aseh (practical law).
Speaker 1:
Not toras ma’aseh, it’s obviously the Torah would distinguish between the first day and the other days.
Speaker 2:
Now, absolutely not. Because the Torah mentions it extra two times.
Discussion on “Ba’erev Tochelu Matzos”
Speaker 1:
It’s not… you falsely twisted that pasuk. Just to be clear, there it says a pasuk “ba’erev tochelu matzos” (in the evening you shall eat matzah). It’s not a… it’s an absolutely false.
Speaker 2:
“Me’arba’ah asar yom lachodesh ba’erev tochelu matzos ad yom ha’echad ve’esrim lachodesh ba’erev” (from the fourteenth day of the month in the evening you shall eat matzah until the twenty-first day of the month in the evening). What are you making Purim of me? It never says in the pasuk extra in the evening like other nights. Never.
Speaker 1:
“Ba’erev tochelu matzos.”
Speaker 2:
That the obligation begins that night. Even according to the Chachamim they had to have a source to interpret that this says in the pasuk. It’s not a melitzah (figure of speech).
Speaker 1:
“Ba’erev tochelu matzos” also says “shivas yamim matzos tochelu.” The night is not called chag hamatzos, but all seven days are called chag hamatzos. It’s how the pasuk is divided. It doesn’t say anywhere a distinction. It doesn’t say any place a distinction from the first night to the second night regarding eating matzah. No place at all. Obviously the first night one eats korban Pesach. This is included, not only that you eat matzah. But regarding eating matzah it says nowhere no distinction. No place at all.
This is absolutely a chiddush of the Chachamim. Obviously they have their ways how to squeeze this into the pasuk, but this doesn’t say any place. Obviously not. And certainly not from the pasuk “ba’erev tochelu matzos” is this literally a kefirah baTorah (heresy against the Torah). When the pasuk says “ba’erev ad” (in the evening until), it means the total that the obligation begins in the evening, shelo tomar (lest you say) it begins in the morning like other things perhaps, it begins in the evening. This is the Ivri meaning of the pasuk. It doesn’t say any more than that. This is literally a peleh (wonder).
An Alternative Explanation
Speaker 1:
I think that simply the peshat is that obviously the Chachamim understand that one must eat matzah all seven days. This is like a minimum measure. What’s the minimum measure? Perhaps eating matzah every day. Like how it doesn’t say that one must eat only a kezayis (olive-sized portion) of matzah? It doesn’t say, one must eat matzah. How much? I don’t know. The minimum is a kezayis. Perhaps the minimum is the first night. I don’t know, I once thought, why do I think so? Because it makes sense. I don’t know, it makes sense for the Chachamim and somewhere.
In any case, the Rambam took very seriously the Chachamim as it says, as always.
The Dispute of Tannaim and Amoraim
Speaker 2:
It says in the Gemara in Pesachim, it says in the Gemara in Pesachim, there are different shitos (opinions) of Tannaim and Amoraim how they learn which day is an obligation and which day is reshus, and libi nosein (my heart tells me) that they are right. I don’t understand your problem. Why is there a distinction from the first night leil Pesach (Passover night) the next night? That the Torah counts fifteen times that there’s a mitzvah to eat matzos, and they all say that it’s lav davka (not necessarily) already just an explanation, because the Torah wants to give them more explanation. It’s not lav davka, it’s not understood. I have a second answer, my older brother said it, it occurs to me. I didn’t look in the Orchos Chaim, it doesn’t say in this thing.
Speaker 1:
Okay, let’s learn a bit of Rambam. Says the Rambam, in practice the Rambam says yes that one must eat matzah min haTorah (from the Torah). And also the Gemara that he brings, which comes up, everything begins with such a funny havah aminah (initial assumption) that perhaps there’s a mitzvah Pesach one must eat matzah, which I don’t know why, I can hear such a tzad (side), but that’s not the main nusach (version) here. The main nusach is here at all, how is there the mitzvah of eating matzah.
So in practice there’s a dispute between Amoraim and Tannaim whether there’s a mitzvah to eat matzah min haTorah. And the poskim (halachic decisors) say like those who say that one must eat matzah min haTorah. There’s a dispute in the Gemara, Rabbi Yoshiyah and Rabbi Yonasan. There’s a dispute, I see the Rabbanim, by Rabbi Yonasan there’s an obligation of eating matzah in a separate manner doesn’t exist according to other shitos. That’s not the… I told you, I don’t have the question, because I think it’s obviously simple. Again, I can perhaps hear the peshat, but that’s not my chiddush. I don’t see why this should be the main thing that one must show. The main thing that one must show is what is there at all a mitzvah to eat matzah.
Halachah 6: Mitzvas Asei to Eat Matzah on the Night of the Fifteenth
Speaker 1:
In any case, this is a mitzvah according to how the Rambam said. Mitzvah le’echol matzah v’lechem mishneh b’leil chamishah asar (it’s a mitzvah to eat matzah and double bread on the night of the fifteenth). Already, when is the mitzvah? Mitzvah zo bechol makom uvechol zman, v’einah teluyah ba’achilas haPesach, ela hi mitzvah bifnei atzma, umitzvasa kol halaylah (this mitzvah in every place and at every time, and it’s not dependent on eating the Pesach, rather it’s a mitzvah by itself, and its mitzvah is all night). Stop, stop. When is the mitzvah? Ah, I didn’t see. And… that means mitzvasa kol halaylah, the whole night one can be yotzei (fulfill the obligation).
Discussion: When is the Mitzvah? Kol Halaylah or Until Chatzos?
Speaker 2:
Yes, when is the mitzvah? This is a dispute, right? Like the Gemara says that every mitzvah whose mitzvah is at night, at night means that a… kol halaylah (all night). Very good. But what about the Chachamim who say until chatzos (midnight)? Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah? In several places, “v’ein ne’echal ela ad chatzos” (and it’s not eaten except until midnight), says in so many places, right? It’s indeed a dispute. The Rambam paskened (ruled) like you say, brings in the Mishnah in Megillah and in other places… aha, it’s kosher kol halaylah. And in the Gemara he says, halachah k’Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah (the law is like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah). But in several other places one sees that one does go with the shitah of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, that Pesach can only be eaten until chatzos, at least miderabanan (rabbinically). Right?
Speaker 1:
But it says “v’ein ne’echal ela ad chatzos” says in so many places on korban Pesach. I think that Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah holds that the mitzvas matzah is the same time as the mitzvas… Not only Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, I think everyone agrees that this goes together at the same time, at least.
Speaker 2:
And every… I don’t know, let’s see. “Kiyum diska shel Pesach” (fulfillment of the Pesach plate), yes, amar Rava (Rava said), amar Rava, the Gemara in Pesachim 120, “af al pi shemitzvasa bazman hazeh ad chatzos, mitzvasa latzeis yedei chovasa” (even though its mitzvah nowadays is until midnight, its mitzvah is to fulfill one’s obligation). And so other tzaddikim (righteous ones) indeed paskened.
The Rambam’s Shitah: Kol Halaylah, But with a Rabbinic Decree by Korban Pesach
Speaker 1:
And… yes. The Rambam went generally with the shitah like Rabbi Akiva who argues with Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah and says that the mitzvah is kol halaylah. There is indeed a gezerah (decree)… ah, he says explicitly, this he brings in Maseches Berachos it comes out that one must eat it before chatzos, that the Rabanan (Rabbis) prohibited lest one stumble, one should eat after… yes, this is only by korban Pesach, not by matzah, not by the other mitzvos which… kol halaylah, and in order to distance from the sin they added to it. But he says that even this doesn’t exist by matzah, even the Rabanan didn’t decree the decree by matzah, and I don’t know why the Rambam doesn’t say it, I don’t know. But regarding the Chefetz he says so.
What’s the halachah? Let’s see. Again, the Rambam doesn’t bring that lechatchilah (ideally)
Halachah 6: Time of Eating Matzah, Amount of Eating, and Swallowing Matzah and Maror
Time of Eating Matzah — Lechatchilah and Bedieved
Speaker 1: Now he hasn’t yet come to himself not by matzah, like by other mitzvos whose mitzvasan is kol halaylah, and in order to distance from the sin they stopped. But he says that even this doesn’t exist by matzah, because matzah even the Rabanan didn’t decree the decree of matzah. Why not? Because the Rabanan say it’s not so important. He comes to himself, he says that it’s yes a halachah l’Moshe miSinai (law to Moses from Sinai).
Again, the Rambam doesn’t bring that lechatchilah is before chatzos. It comes out that even bedieved (after the fact), even lechatchilah is after chatzos, because the Pesach is like Rabbi Akiva.
Speaker 2: Eh, the Imrei Chachamim…
Speaker 1: Ah, he says that the Beis Meir in Hilchos Matzah explains that the entire reason why the stringency of Pesach is — perhaps he’ll go eat after alos hashachar (dawn), and it will be kodesh (holy) to eat nosar (leftover sacrifice). But matzah is not relevant to this concern. In total he wasn’t yotzei the mitzvas matzah, not the issur (prohibition).
Speaker 2: Eh, by krias Shema (reciting the Shema) there is indeed this thing, perhaps he’ll in total miss krias Shema.
Speaker 1: And he says kol daas harbeh, ah, there he changes the language of the Rambam slightly, he changes the language of Kampan slightly. He says that yes, it must be after midnight. You see clearly that the Rambam makes the distinction that even the Rabbinic requirement of until midnight doesn’t apply to matzah.
And other tzaddikim conducted themselves that… other tzaddikim conducted themselves… were also careful about matzah before midnight, but that’s a separate discussion. They ate specifically matzah specifically before midnight. For example, who?
Speaker 2: I don’t know, other Rishonim, yes. From this comes all the Jews who rush to eat the meal before midnight and the like. And the matzah is even… yes, but the Rambam doesn’t hold of the whole thing. The Rambam doesn’t rule at all like the Zohar HaKadosh, yes. Good.
Digression: Matzah in the Sukkah
Speaker 2: Yes. Tosafos, you can see other tzaddikim who say differently. The main thing is whether one must eat specifically in the sukkah or not in the sukkah. And on this there is the long Mishnah Berurah.
Speaker 1: In the sukkah? Yes. Why in the sukkah?
Speaker 2: Because the Toras Kohanim discussed it, “miki mashma yom lachutz zeh chag hamatzos”, says the Gemara, “yom zeh taun matzah v’ein chag hamatzos Sukkos taun matzah”. The Gemara brings, “mah im zeh she’eino taun sukkah taun matzah, zeh she’taun sukkah eino din she’taun matzah?” One only needs “hazeh chag hamatzos”, “zeh taun matzah v’ein Sukkos taun matzah”. The Gemara says, no, it has an answer apparently. But anyway, you say it’s strange, the same thing.
Let’s say there’s no such thing, one doesn’t have to. But if you see a Jew eating in the sukkah and it says there “matzah”, he’s concerned about some opinion in the stars. That one must eat matzah in the sukkah, and not that one must eat in the sukkah with matzah.
By the way, you understand, if the Torah would have been like this, God forbid, you would have yelled at me that I’m saying differently than the simple understanding of this day, it’s a kal vachomer, he says here.
Imagine the Torah would have come and said, the sukkah means to say that the matzah must be eaten in the sukkah, or the sukkah must be sat in with the matzah. Would you have said it’s madness? No, we would have been accustomed to it, we would have said that something else is madness. Madness is only what we’re not accustomed to. It’s obvious.
Speaker 1: I wouldn’t have told you it’s madness by definition. No, it’s not, I don’t understand what he’s asking, so I need to delve deeper.
Halacha 6 (continued): The Rest of the Festival Days — Matzah is Optional
Speaker 1: Okay, let’s continue. Something is derived from Pesach to Sukkos, I would like to know what is derived. All the mitzvos of Pesach that apply. Okay, but, this is the important thing. “aval bish’ar haregel, achilas matzah reshus. Ratzah ochel matzah, ratzah ochel orez v’dochan.” Let’s rule that rice and millet don’t become chametz.
Speaker 2: Yes, it’s a discussion in the Gemara, I think. You already learned it earlier apparently. They learned it earlier apparently. If one eats that portion. But what was written here? “ein yotzin b’chametz ela”. What could be written? “ela ein yotzin b’chametz ela bachameshes haminim”? And what’s the question?
Speaker 1: Ah, “ela bachameshes minei dagan”. But one should never say that one fulfills with chametz. One fulfills with chametz? It’s food that’s forbidden to eat.
Speaker 2: So one will eat those things, one won’t eat. There’s a contradiction to the prohibition of kitniyos, yes. On kitniyos and fruits, “ela b’lechem chametz levad”. Obligation, obligation. And how long is the obligation? How much must one eat?
Speaker 1: “b’shiur k’zayis, like they fulfill the obligation”. The whole text, it’s something that’s confusing… a sentence that seeing this sentence, one couldn’t write simply a clear statement, that only remains. Chametz she’atar, and the rest is optional, that it goes back and forth. Does it say that the language is somewhat mixed in.
Speaker 2: Yes yes, it’s true. Yeah, ah, no no, sounds a bit complicated.
The Measure of Eating Matzah — A Kezayis
Speaker 1: And how much is the measure? The measure is a kezayis. He also gives, it’s also interesting language. Also is also kezayis yetzah. It means to say, you shouldn’t think like what it says on the eve you’ll eat the whole night. What does he mean?
Speaker 2: Ah, yetzah means what it says he doesn’t need to eat more. It’s like tzalah afikoman. Erev doesn’t mean the whole night. No, perhaps it means to say that the matzah eaten afterwards is no longer matzah of mitzvah. It’s already just eating matzah. I don’t catch in more mitzvos to the matzos. But what does it mean, it was, the erev no meaning. You know, the example, eating in the sukkah, let’s say the whole sukkah, means one fulfills. One also says the first kezayis, that’s the mitzvah. I go, what does that mean? But what does it mean that one doesn’t need to eat more, but not that there’s no choice, but what does it mean?
Speaker 1: I don’t know what it means. What does it mean to fulfill a mitzvah? What’s the whole point? A question arises.
One needs to know, what does it say in the Gemara, yotzei yedei chovaso regarding what? What happened afterwards? One could have done better mitzvos, more beautiful mitzvos. One wants to know whether one should again… What are we talking about? Yotzei yedei chovaso? Because he doesn’t say there, yes, simply the measure is a kezayis. When it says the language “shiur kezayis”, one understands, shiur kezayis. Yes, it doesn’t say more. He brings a language, “achal mishhu kezayis k’shiuro, harei zeh yotzei”. He brings a language.
Yes, what… all eating apparently is a measure of kezayis. What is the… what is the…
It sounds from the Baraisa regarding the first halacha itself, from the Baraisa that they bring, that the Gemara itself brings from Rava, that essentially the problem is more, do you have an obligation at all to make a seder nowadays? Apparently it only comes on Pesach, something like that.
Um… “amar Rav Huna, kol halaylah”, I already remembered. Um… very good. “mevi lefanav matzah”, yes, it’s simple, but what… the language is somewhat strange. Okay, I’ll continue. It’s simple, and the language is strange.
Yes, “achal mishhu matzah, yatza”.
The Measure of Maror
Then regarding haseibah, it also says in passing. What does it say in passing? Ah, I say it’s interesting, the law is thus, it says here in passing, “achal mishhu kezayis”, and in the Gemara there it discusses regarding when one must sit, it’s with haseibah. We’re not talking about measures at all. So I don’t know, there’s… Okay, he says that the Magen Avraham says in several places about Pesachim that a kezayis is enough, I don’t know.
Okay, let’s continue.
Ah, the Mishnah says how he must meet the kezayis, regarding different types of maror. Okay, that maror must be a kezayis. I mean it’s the same thing.
Maror only says the thing from names. I mean you need proof that it’s a kezayis, because it’s a general rule in all of Torah that measures are a kezayis. I mean it’s in Chaim Sha’al, where exactly does the rule say? I also want to ask. I don’t know, I don’t know.
Okay. Let’s continue.
Yes.
Halacha 6 (continued): Swallowing Matzah and Maror
Okay. “bole’a matzah yatza”. Ah, he didn’t taste it, he swallowed it. Bole’a, that also means eating, swallowing means eating. One doesn’t need to taste. The Meiri says it’s not a matter of tasting, swallowing means eaten. But the same thing, “bole’a maror also yatza”.
“Bole’a matzah u’maror” I would apparently have said he fulfills, because he swallowed both, and both is enough with a kezayis. But in practice it’s not so. “Yedei matzah yatza, yedei maror lo yatza”. Why? Because the maror becomes secondary to the matzah. Always when one eats bread with some vegetable, I don’t know what, the vegetable is secondary, the accompaniment.
And what’s the problem then? Does that mean you didn’t eat maror? So and so. What is it? I don’t know.
Halacha 3 (continued): Swallowing Matzah and Maror – Matzah Fulfilled, Maror Not Fulfilled
Speaker 1: Swallowing matzah and maror – you would apparently have told me he fulfills, because he swallowed both, and both is enough with such swallowing. But in practice it’s not so. Your matzah is fulfilled, your maror is not fulfilled. Why? Because the maror became secondary to the matzah. Always when one eats bread with some vegetable, I don’t know what, the vegetable is secondary, the accompaniment.
And what’s the problem then? Does that mean you didn’t eat maror? So and so. What is it? I don’t know, because it’s secondary to the matzah.
Fine. The Gemara says differently. Let’s see. The Rambam says so and so, it sounds like you’re saying, that it’s secondary and nullified, because it’s swallowed. Again, if he eats tasting together, secondary is not a problem, right? Secondary is together with the main thing and with the tasting. It’s a problem, right? But if in practice he tasted both, the question is only, if he didn’t taste it becomes a problem, right? That’s why the Rambam nullifies it.
Source: Rava’s Statement – Pesachim 115b
Speaker 1: Let’s finish. What does the wise man say? And do we fulfill even with this? What’s the problem then? It’s not… I don’t understand clearly. What does it mean didn’t eat? He swallowed something, he didn’t eat? He didn’t taste, it’s not… the mouth didn’t come in contact with the food.
Okay. So what’s the story? This is all a Gemara in Pesachim, amar Rava, bole’a matzah yatza, bole’a maror lo yatza. Bole’a matzah u’maror, matzah yatza, maror lo yatza. This is the whole, all four halachos are all one statement of Rava in Pesachim 117b.
Dispute in Versions: Swallowing Maror – Fulfilled or Not Fulfilled?
Speaker 2: And what’s the answer? Ah, there are two answers here. There are two answers here. First of all there’s a dispute among the Rishonim. So if one goes with swallowing maror lo yatza, one also understands the second halacha, swallowing together lo yatza. That is, one says that matzah no, matzah one fulfills because one doesn’t need to taste, but with maror, because one wants to bring out a taste of bitterness, lo yatza. That’s one explanation, right? But if one says that swallowing maror also yatza, one needs to understand the second, why eating both together lo yatza. The Rambam has the version “bole’a maror lo yatza”.
Speaker 1: From where do you say what you’re saying here about guarded as swallowed? It’s obviously about would have been swallowing.
Right, so let’s again, let’s say what is the…
Speaker 2: The Ra’avad, the Maggid Mishneh, all of them had the version “bole’a maror lo yatza”.
Speaker 1: No, no, yatza.
Speaker 2: “Bole’a maror lo yatza”.
Speaker 1: No, no, no one had that version. What are you saying here? Look, you can see it.
Speaker 2: Ah… it’s very confused.
Speaker 1: Look in the Maggid Mishneh, you’ll see.
Speaker 2: Ah, so if… again, if…
Speaker 1: What does it say in the Gemara? What’s the version in the Gemara? Look what the Gemara says.
Speaker 2: There are both versions in the Gemara.
Speaker 1: No, in the Gemara there’s a dispute.
Speaker 2: No, no, it’s not both. The Rambam has…
Speaker 1: There’s also a dispute… there’s also a dispute… there’s also a dispute of…
Speaker 2: Ah, I see in Rashi there’s a dispute “lo yatza”. Ha, in Rashi there’s “bole’a maror lo yatza”, and the word “lo” is circled, and he says “i efshar shelo yit’om ta’am maror”.
Two Ways to Understand According to Both Versions
Speaker 1: So again, so… ah… so again, what’s the point? If there are two ways for us to understand, let’s understand both ways. What are we going to do? Who… what comes out here? What do we need to know? It’s a simple question. “Shloshah mekomos bachag” I’ll come ask, “bole’a” I when the matzah.
Speaker 2: No, but here comes out interesting halachos about the mitzvos must taste the mitzvos. What does eating mean? These are investigative halachos here essentially. There are very strong practices, for example, we have a sick person, we give the matzah, we make it from crumbs, and we crush it, and we crush it.
Speaker 1: Okay, it’s not the same thing as swallowing! Wrapping in a napkin?! I’m asking strongly! Wrapping in a napkin?! I’m asking where it says! Wrapping the matzah or Gemara. You’re sure, and I’m not sure.
Speaker 2: No, I’m sure, so why good what’s sure for a good yes? From the Gemara, but it comes out clearly like this. Because the Gemara says, swallowing matzah maror the matzah yatza, wrapping in a napkin even the matzah namely yatza. So what is he talking about from the case that you made both at once.
Speaker 1: No, what does it say?
Speaker 2: So, he’s talking about this, that if… meaning if, have you seen the Gemara’s language? I was exactly, but the Gemara says, even from the matzah yatza, because wrapped is worse than simply not feeling the taste. If wrapped and the matzah lo yatza it wasn’t wrapped. Not all maror is necessary because wrapped.
Speaker 1: No, if it’s not already lost. What always should be… it’s not correct what you’re saying. Simply when the Gemara discusses the case, it’s correct that if the reason would be here that you yourself actually had that this is the reason, I don’t know that this is the reason, perhaps this is a problem that what makes it that the maror should nullify the matzah they have no problems like that, right? But has another reason, let’s see his reason… but this stands only on the…
Speaker 1: So which is the true version in the Rambam? What do I care what the true version is, first let’s see what the problem is here.
According to the Version “Swallowing Maror Yatza” – The Problem of Secondary
Speaker 1: Even let’s learn both versions, if one says “bole’a matzah yatza, bole’a maror yatza”, it’s implied apparently that there doesn’t need to be actual taste, there doesn’t need to be taste. But what then? Even if there doesn’t need to be taste, if it’s secondary it’s even worse. And the matzah one fulfills, because the matzah is not secondary, but the maror, because it’s secondary, doesn’t mean you ate real maror. Unless one will learn the halacha that the whole maror is there to be secondary, “al matzos u’merorim yochluhu”. Apparently it’s implied that specifically Hillel learned this way, but the simple reading says very clearly “al matzos u’merorim yochluhu”, he makes a meat sandwich.
Korech – Hillel’s Opinion and the Matter of Secondary
Speaker 1: Either way, on this the Gemara says on page 111, that Hillel said in the name of the Gemara that nowadays one shouldn’t make korech, why? Because “making maror nullifies the taste of matzah”.
Speaker 2: Ay, matzah nullifies how? It’s Torah law, it’s Torah law.
Speaker 1: No, initially but he also says “lo yatza”, differently. I don’t know, “lo ya’aseh”, I don’t know. Because it’s actually nullified. That is, if both were Torah law, then one could say such a thing. Like the opinion, but since today maror is Rabbinic, it’s nullified and one doesn’t fulfill both.
Speaker 2: Okay, it’s difficult, because according to that Gemara it’s implied that the matzah one also doesn’t fulfill. Unless the Rambam understood that the matzah one does fulfill. He says perhaps the Rambam’s version was different, he learned differently. But the point is, according to the Rabbis the problem is actually what you’re saying that it’s secondary, and therefore the maror becomes secondary, therefore one doesn’t fulfill eating maror, because one doesn’t eat maror as secondary.
Speaker 1: Ay, you’re saying that maror is secondary in its essence, it seems that the mitzvah of Rabbinic maror is not. Rabbinic maror is an extra mitzvah to eat maror. Unlike the matzah which is despicable.
Speaker 2: Okay, korech with haseibah, one must learn like you until now, it has nothing to do with it. I could indeed say that korech with haseibah is the explanation, it’s not in matzah, that doesn’t mean it’s not a way of eating.
Practical Difference – A Sick Person’s Matzah
Speaker 1: Okay. It’s further that someone eats matzah through an IV, but even whatever, one swallows things in a capsule, chapter 14.
Speaker 2: Very good. So, this is the…
Source Reference – “Anything Fit for Swallowing”
Speaker 1: The source reference says for example why does one fulfill swallowing matzah? Because one can taste, “kol hara’ui livilah ein bilah me’akeves bo”, that’s his language, he says. He goes yes with the version yatza. If it goes with the version yatza, it’s because this is the version lo yatza. According to the version swallowing maror is also lo yatza. According to that version… I have two explanations to say afterwards. Either because in practice one feels a taste, in doubt, one doesn’t feel any taste, but with every swallowing one feels a bit of a taste, one doesn’t feel the full taste as one would have when chewing, so the Rashbam learns.
Rashbam’s Explanation – A Bit of Taste When Swallowing
Speaker 1: Okay. Unlike swallowing matzah with maror, according to the version that matzah yes fulfills maror no, because then there’s… ah, what apparently if one feels the taste, one feels the taste, even when there’s both together.
Discussion on the Question of Taste in Eating Matzah and Maror
The Version that Maror is Different from Matzah
Speaker 1: But even the taste, you still feel the taste, even if you eat both together.
Speaker 2: No, because again, according to the version is he yotzei or not yotzei? According to the version that maror is different. It’s clear that that version held that there is a concept of tasting maror, because maror – the taste is bitter. Maror isn’t just eating green vegetables, it has to be bitter. But you don’t taste it when you’re not yotzei. Unlike matzah where there isn’t a concept of tasting, or not such a major concept of tasting. It makes sense, it’s not so hard to understand, right? Not a problem. True.
Speaker 1: Because here it touched your mouth, here it didn’t. That’s the difference between wrapped or not wrapped.
Three Different Versions in the Foundation of Eating
Speaker 2: So let’s understand clearly. There are three different versions simply. Yes. So here one must be. According to the approach, most Rishonim held that whenever the Torah says achilah it means you must eat. What does eating mean? Have the full taste, to chew and eat. But that’s obviously when it’s not yotzei.
For example, if I understand that the essence of maror is to feel the taste… wait, wait, wait. Let’s go further with the taste. According to the side that one must always be tasting, someone who doesn’t have taste buds for example, that’s for him a different type of eating. Generally speaking, achilah means pleasure, one must be tasting. Basically beliah, beliah means I eat without a taste, right?
Question: Must One Have the Specific Taste?
If I have… yes, someone doesn’t have taste buds. Or someone, let’s say deeper, if let’s say I have an abnormality, I had corona, and he thinks he ate something that’s not fit for eating, it’s already become completely moldy, perhaps that’s an object not kosher.
Let’s speak, Rebbe, one can argue, you want to argue that achilah means one must taste, and not necessarily, or one must taste the specific type of thing that’s there. That is, not just feel that there’s something in the mouth. No, for example let’s say, I had covid, someone had covid unfortunately, and he feels that maror tastes to him like matzah, and matzah like maror, I don’t know, it got mixed up, his wires are mixed. For him chametz tastes like sour cream.
You can ask according to the Rambam who says that a sick person for whom maror is sweet, he needs to eat something sweet to be able to have the taste of maror. Just the opposite, just the opposite, well, let’s not get into if such a person exists, because that’s the same thing, it’s an abnormality.
The question is whether achilah means… I’m not speaking now halachah, I’m speaking now the sides. Whether achilah means one must have a taste in general, or one must have the taste of the specific thing.
Nullification of Taste – Matzah and Maror Together
So if the halachah would have been that matzah and maror one is not yotzei with beliah, but with actual achilah, beliah is as the Gemara says without a taste. For example if someone… one can even say, wait a minute, one can say that even if one must have taste one can be yotzei with beliah, because with beliah there is some taste. That’s also an approach to say. With beliah you feel something, it’s like a certain, I mean the Rashbam says so, that with maror, because it’s a sharp thing, he will indeed feel the beliah, even not…
In short, just the opposite. Even if one says the thing that beliah means tasting, it could be that achilah means tasting, it could be that beliah is a weak tasting. One must know. But if one goes that beliah is not tasting at all, then apparently one is not yotzei neither with matzah nor with maror.
If one goes to learn that beliah means not necessarily tasting, I mean, achilah means not necessarily tasting, then automatically matzah one is yotzei. With maror there’s an extra law that it should remind him of the matzos and marorim.
Speaker 1: Yes, what one wants to say, you give me from maror is different from matzah, that the maror is different because of vaymareru, and that says… the question is nothing, and they ate the maror on the opening of Rabbeinu Chananel.
Speaker 2: So if the general rule in the Torah doesn’t need to be tasting, I don’t know, all other mitzvos. When for example matzah doesn’t need to be tasting. Because matzah reminds of lechem oni. Lechem oni apparently reminds in the shape and appearance thereof, or in the way it’s digested. It has nothing to do with taste. It’s not the taste of lechem oni.
I say, matzah must remind of something just like maror must remind of vaymareru es chayeihem, but now it has nothing to do with taste, that’s matzah not she’hechemitz, one must feel that this isn’t a matter of the taste, it’s a matter of you’re going to feel that it’s different which is hard, which is crude, or which is digested differently, maror is experiencing the taste and you’re going to feel there.
Taste as a Condition in Eating
So there’s generally the question whether achilah is the taste that one must taste and therefore someone doesn’t taste, can one go someone who doesn’t taste? Yes! Wrapped in a sack, wrapped in a sack, certainly not, certainly not and the like. Afterwards there’s another side that wants another means, according to that side never must one be yotzei, because one can say that apparently beliah apparently is also not eating.
And therefore if it’s ruined… no, wait a minute that side is more complicated. That’s certainly also, that it’s in that side in that approach, it’s not just that there must be a taste in general. There must be a taste of the thing, it’s obviously demonstrated.
Wait a minute, it’s the topic of nullification, batel, nullifying. If I… from this I understand only mitzvos. Yes, if I put in a… I said an example of someone who had covid. But what if someone puts something else in his mouth while he eats? No, let’s make the case even more. He puts in something sharp that makes him barely taste what he eats. That’s also a problem.
Speaker 1: No, but what you’re saying even more, that not only swallowing matzah and maror, but even if he chews together matzah and maror, he has full taste, but they nullify each other’s taste. That is swallowing matzah and maror. But that’s a different Gemara. But there is such a Gemara also, right?
Speaker 2: Wait, wait. It wasn’t clarified, I didn’t go into that. When I said the Rambam on page 115a, it wasn’t clarified, but they all bring and cite the Gemara. Because he holds that matzah, even if there’s only one mitzvah, so and so, derabbanan nullifies de’oraisa. There are those who learn that this means the taste is nullified, and therefore it’s as if an addition of evil. A piece isn’t, it’s fine, but if one puts a sharp thing, something that completely nullifies, and it could be… does he say it as bedieved or also lechatchilah? I don’t know. And it could perhaps be bedieved also.
It could be that even maror is indeed such a thing, because it’s a very sharp thing, it completely takes over the taste of the matzah. And since if it would have been a mitzvah, even a mitzvah is a small mitzvah, one mitzvah nullifies the other, but since it’s derabbanan, that doesn’t help. And therefore it’s a problem.
Koreich in a Sack – Two Interpretations
So it comes out that according to the side that one must completely have a taste, one hundred percent comes out the Gemara that if I put in something… I take a drug, I take a drug and I taste nothing, it’s a problem. But apparently, if one goes with the ruling, one must apparently say with the same logic like someone who ground well and spit out, you had the achilah because you had the taste. So the logic is that the taste is a condition in the achilah, not that this means the achilah? It’s a condition in the achilah. Right, right, of course. One must be tasting.
Speaker 1: But an argument, if I have a drug that gives me the taste, the comparison that I have the taste and I don’t have the taste. Many times I see a cake that speaks to me, it looks terribly good. But I don’t need, I’m not now in the mood to just engage with another cake. And let me put in a bit to have the taste of it.
For example, someone who has achilah gasah, is it different the problem. Someone who has already eaten too much. I don’t want to look into those sugyas, because achilah gasah is not looking into those sugyas. Achilah gasah, achilah gasah. Fine, it’s a… it reminds…
But before we go into the sugyas, let’s think the second approach that one can say that one doesn’t need taste. One doesn’t need taste. But what? With maror there’s an extra law that one must, “al merorim yochluhu”, that here you must have indeed taste. But the only one is maror. I looked up for a moment, something wasn’t hinted at, I didn’t hear it.
Speaker 2: Matzah must also remind of something that it’s lechem oni. But I say, the lechem oni has nothing to do with the taste. Lechem oni is a piece, but it doesn’t digest well. It’s not the taste. Because it says maror, it’s plain, pure taste. Therefore maror must have an extra law that it must have taste.
Texture as Part of Eating
What is now koreich in a sack? Koreich in a sack one can say thus: if the matter is taste, then koreich in a sack according to halachah is several times, that there isn’t even the bit of taste that exists during beliah. But if one says that one doesn’t need taste, then it hangs back on the question of koreich in a sack. It could be koreich in a sack is even worse because there’s a chatzitzah, it doesn’t touch the mouth. The touching of the mouth is a matter. This one must understand.
It could be the word isn’t… I’m settled that one must understand in this. It could be it doesn’t mean the word chatzitzah like a chatzitzah in tefillin. Chatzitzah means that this isn’t called achilah, it’s a strong shelo kederech achilah, because not even, both it didn’t have taste, and both it didn’t have that your mouth touches the food, the sensation.
Like with covid, when one asks people what do you feel, he doesn’t feel the taste, but he can very strongly feel the texture. Because he doesn’t have… texture is also a major part of the… of what you feel. In your imagination, when it also has salt, you feel it together like one big thing which is taste. The texture is a piece of taste.
It’s even worse. He says when he says because this you didn’t feel during beliah, it doesn’t necessarily mean the matter of the law of chatzitzah. He means to say it’s a strong shelo kederech achilah, an even stronger shelo kederech achilah.
The Spectrum of “How Far Must One Not Taste”
If normally one must taste, certainly not. But if one says never taste, the question is how extreme does one say one doesn’t need taste. Whether it only matters to me what landed in my belly, even wrapped in a sack, doesn’t matter to me? Or the word is yes, some bit of taste, and when one wraps in a sack, it’s much further, then it doesn’t mean any achilah.
Speaker 1: A good point. And I mean it’s the whole matter, because…
Swallowing Matzah and Maror Together – Continuation of Discussion in the Rambam’s Interpretation
Shelo Kederech Achilasah – Capsules and Medicine
Speaker 1:
It was said that it’s a strong shelo kederech achilasah, an even stronger shelo kederech achilasah. So if normally one must be tasting, certainly not. But if one never needs to be tasting, the question is how extreme does one say that one doesn’t need to be tasting. Whether it only matters to me what landed in my belly, even wrapped in a drug doesn’t matter to me? Or the word is, yes, some bit of taste, and one doesn’t understand any sacks, it’s much further, then it doesn’t mean any achilah. A good point.
And I mean that’s the whole sugya, because that’s the thing that one can put in capsules and all things where there’s a concern that one will eat it, or a person would have eaten it, apparently not for this is that permitted as… a capsule isn’t any derech achilah. It’s not even inside any eating.
Speaker 2:
Shall I tell you? Apparently that’s not just a drug, it’s not even inside needs to be eaten.
Speaker 1:
Perhaps that’s the thing. Perhaps on that type of medicine one should be stringent to eat it in a drug. I’m speaking in this manner, let’s say that it doesn’t matter taste. I’m speaking the first discussion of the Mishneh LaMelech. I know certainly that there are people who practice this. I don’t know. But I don’t know… it’s roughly like someone there is who is about the young man who said that… no, no, that doesn’t come in. Okay, I hear. In short, I don’t know, it seems that…
Return to the Sugya of Swallowing Matzah and Maror
Speaker 1:
But one must know whether what we discussed, swallowing whether one who swallowed, both were forbidden, said that the Gemara speaks about this. Not matzah and maror at one time. That’s the topic, whether they can nullify each other. That one has no problem with “al matzos umerorim yochluhu”. Yes, that one didn’t go with Hillel. Again, that one says he only works on the reisha, or doesn’t he go with him? Or should there be an extra answer of together? Or is it indeed a dispute? Don’t do like Hillel, which is indeed a major. Or is there a difference that with the Rabbis it only works, it doesn’t work for the head with the Rabbis together, whatever that is exactly I’m not going into. Hello?
Maror in Charoses – The Matter of Taste of Maror
Speaker 2:
Everyone dips maror in charoses, that the charoses should take away the sharpness of the maror.
Speaker 1:
Ah, a Tosafos, he brings a Tosafos, he brings a Tosafos here, that matzah metubeles it says in the Gemara that it’s reasonable… it’s the same thing as the charoses.
Speaker 2:
No, it’s interesting, because he says here, the commentators say that one must feel the bitterness in the maror, that therefore, because of this one is not yotzei, even generally there isn’t the rule. According to that approach comes out another topic, that according to that approach… and by the way, it indeed says so in the poskim. No, one dips it in, but one shakes it off, just a bit. And not only that, there are those who according to the reasoning perhaps want to say that one needs a maror that has been shaken off, or if a person is in doubt which one the Mishnah means, apparently it’s better when he takes one of all. Okay, because if one is not the correct one…
The Raavad’s Difference with the Rambam – Reason for “Maror Tafel to Matzah”
Speaker 1:
In short, the Raavad had… you had a difference for me, I just forgot to say, the Raavad says that what the Rambam says that maror is tafel to matzah, the Raavad agrees to the halachah, but doesn’t agree to the reason, because the Raavad’s reason is what you told us earlier, that the reason is because the other interpretation in the Rambam, that there’s a question what the Rambam means. But this is a reason separate from the Raavad, he says that one fulfills not yotzei maror, unless they didn’t eat.
Speaker 2:
Very good. Very good. Unlike matzah.
Speaker 1:
Ah, perhaps the Raavad understood that matzah one tastes even when swallowed, unlike maror, maror is such a type of thing that one cannot taste, that’s the point.
Speaker 2:
No, I mean he goes with the Ramban and all that with maror there’s extra that one must indeed have taste.
Speaker 1:
Okay, he doesn’t say clearly what he means. He asks reason reason of maror. We don’t know, truly. We don’t know, I would have assumed that he means that he goes with the other Rishonim who say so, because for us there’s no question.
Analysis: What Does “That Maror is Tafel to Matzah” Do?
Speaker 1:
The question is however if so, whether when the Rambam says that maror is tafel to matzah, is that indeed the reason why one is not yotzei the maror, because it becomes a tafel, and a new problem of tafel? Or is that a reason why the matzah one is indeed yotzei?
Apparently both things are true.
Speaker 2:
No, that the matzah one is indeed yotzei is simple, because swallowing matzah.
Speaker 1:
Ah, but one has a deficiency. It depends, it depends on the question. If this is swallowing matzah extra, or perhaps this is a new problem?
Discussion: Taste vs. Importance – What Does “Tafel” Mean?
Speaker 2:
No, he says like this, if one swallows matzah yatzah, swallows maror lo yatzah, the end of swallowing matzah and maror doesn’t fit, he’s explaining it again. Because the maror one is not yotzei because it wasn’t felt at all. Then why do you need the distinction of shehmaror tefilah lo?
Speaker 1:
Ah, no, he says that then you need the distinction of shehmaror tefilah lo, because seemingly the taste of the maror would nullify the taste of the matzah. To this the Rambam answers that it’s not mevatel because it’s a tafel. Understand?
Discussion: Taste vs. Importance – What Does “Tafel” Mean?
Speaker 2:
What does he mean that it’s a tafel? Tafel seemingly you shouldn’t say that it has to do with tafel in importance, it has to do with taste. If the whole discussion is about taste, seemingly the opposite, maror is sharper, maror seemingly overpowers. When a person takes maror and matzah, what will he feel much stronger? Seemingly the sharpness of the maror. So, tefilah lo means because it’s less important? Shehmaror tefilah lematzah, it’s less important? On the contrary, the opposite.
Speaker 1:
If you say that matzah doesn’t need to have taste, matzah doesn’t need to have taste, so that’s why bole’a matzah yatzah. Eh, should one be concerned here that in practice you don’t have matzah in your mouth entirely, because the maror is mevatel? Perhaps one should look at it like this, like when you take the matzah until it’s swallowed, because you’re not going for a long time, it doesn’t matter to me, because the maror is not mevatel, because the maror is a tafel in importance. So it’s interesting. Because if the problem is practical, you can’t give me the halachic solution of importance. If you tell me that the maror has a very strong taste, automatically…
Speaker 2:
Ah, again, you don’t need to have the taste of matzah. But if what then should one say it doesn’t mean at all like you’re eating matzah, because your mouth is surrounded with maror while you’re eating matzah, then I say that the maror is less important.
Speaker 1:
I said that one is not yotzei the maror, if bole’a maror one is not yotzei, then one is not yotzei the maror. Why is one not yotzei the maror? Because it was said that the maror needs to have… If you go with the version “bole’a maror yatzah”, why is there a chiddush? Why is one not yotzei matzah when one also eats maror? Why is one not yotzei matzah in bole’a maror matzah together? Because it’s tefilah.
If both are yotzei with swallowing, it means seemingly that taste doesn’t matter to me. Taste doesn’t matter to me, but it’s more similar to chatzitzah. I don’t want to have any chatzitzah, but the fact that you don’t have maror in your mouth now, because you have more important things in your mouth, you have matzah. It will be worse, it will be worse.
Speaker 2:
No, but taste doesn’t matter to me, because if yes, bole’a maror yatzah. I see that I’m being told there must be something real in the mouth, because you have the more important thing in the mouth. I’ll tell you, what do you have in your mouth now? You have the holy matzah, you would completely forget that you now have the foolish maror in your mouth.
Speaker 1:
It seemingly has nothing to do with taste. Because if taste, it matters to me which is more important. If we’re talking here about taste, seemingly the “shehematzah tefilah lo” in halachah is a bit different than you’re saying, because the matzah is double in importance.
I want to tell you another thing, the “shehematzah tefilah lo”, this is the reason why one is not yotzei the maror, because it’s a tafel. You see that the mitzvah is that one is yotzei the matzah and not the maror. On this halachah there’s no doubt. I say like this, the question is only what does the maror tafel lematzah do? If the reason is the cause why the maror is not good and the cause why the matzah is yes good, if it’s the reason why the maror is not good, then you only need it if bole’a maror lo yatzah. If bole’a maror generally yatzah, if bole’a maror lo yatzah, you don’t need to come to this. You don’t need it, right? You only need it if bole’a maror yatzah, you only need the chiddush that shehmaror tafel lematzah, but then it comes out that one is yotzei maror. You don’t need it. You don’t need it, because bole’a maror is usually yotzei.
Proof That the Version Is “Bole’a Maror Yatzah”
Speaker 1:
So, again, if bole’a maror lo yatzah, then you don’t need to have shehmaror tafel lematzah. You don’t need it, you don’t need it. Right? You don’t need it. Finished. One is not yotzei, even maror together with matzah one is not yotzei. Why don’t you need it? Why might you need it? Because the matzah one is yes yotzei, because the maror was a new problem that doesn’t stand in the Rambam. Just, we’re imagining it, right? Just to be clear, it’s not the correct pshat, because we’re imagining it. We see that the version can’t be correct, understand? Because we’re imagining that here there’s another problem that the maror is mevatel the matzah. He says that it’s not mevatel because maror tafel lematzah. One tries to make chasurei mechsera vechi katani in the Rambam, one can’t make chasurei mechsera vechi katani in the Rambam.
Rather what, the version must be bole’a maror yatzah. If so it’s difficult why koreich, or is the shittah that the tafel makes a problem. If bole’a maror yatzah, seemingly the bole’a matzah umaror together is only like this, an allusion, to such an extent one is okay with maror without taste, with matzah without taste, that even if there are other things in his mouth, even if there’s maror during the act. This is the whole chiddush in the second piece.
Speaker 2:
No, again. If I would have said that by both swallowing is yotzei, no, then it’s a great chiddush, because here by koreich one is not yotzei the maror. Great chiddush, one must even make a new din. It bothers, because then it becomes a tafel, and the tafel is not good. The other shittah fits. The other shittah needs to make a great difficulty on the words “shehmaror tafel lematzah” and insert a whole piece that doesn’t stand.
Speaker 1:
It’s also a great discussion whether the problem is taste or it’s a matter of importance. Whatever the reason is, true. I also couldn’t reconcile the two, it wasn’t clear to me the two. It makes further no sense. If indeed further it’s a proof that the version in the Rambam is yatzah, right? Because if the reason is taste, it makes no sense, why do you need to have bole’a maror yatzah? What is it when it’s the two you need a problem? Rather what, it’s a different sort of problem. Tafel, I don’t know exactly. It’s two together not good, one doesn’t eat. One must eat maror separately.
Speaker 2:
One doesn’t eat, one is not using a kezayit.
Speaker 1:
One must find some pshat, perhaps it is as I hear. I need to understand exactly. If there is here majority and minority, one says that one is mevatel the other. One can hear, perhaps there is a full eating, because what can he do?
Halachah 3: Eating Matzah Without Intent
The Rambam’s Language
One who ate matzah without intent, such as if gentiles or bandits forced him to eat — he fulfilled his obligation.
It only says gentile, but it also says bandits, interesting. Ah, I bring it here in the Tosafot Al HaTorah, it’s not a chiddush. There is in the Devarim Nechemadim this, that he says, ate matzah, gentile or bandits to eat, he fulfilled his obligation.
Question: How Does This Fit With Mitzvot Requiring Intent?
No, how does the Rambam say mitzvot don’t require intent? It’s indeed a wonder, because many other places he rules that mitzvot require intent. It’s indeed, one can hear that, that, that, ah, I said in the laws of Megillah, when we learned last week, that the Rambam rules “anyone who does without intent is yotzei”. And how is the pshat that here it says that one needs to have intent?
Answer from Devarim Nechemadim: Pleasure Is in Place of Intent
So the holy one, he elaborates on this, that this is indeed a sugya in the Gemara that when there’s pleasure, this is in place of intent. Like the Gemara says “shlumei emunei Yisrael nehenim mizeh umizeh”, and he shows it like the Gemara says that the mitzvah is enjoyed.
Another Answer: Mitzvah in His Body
He says a bit differently that, that the mitzvah is the body of doing the mitzvah doesn’t need intent. As opposed to the mitzvah which shofar is, as if the mitzvah one must afterwards do some action, it’s a preparation for the mitzvah to remember. As opposed to if the mitzvah is matzah is in order to remember that one left Egypt, this is not, it’s a mitzvah in his body. As opposed to eating shofar, if you don’t have intent there was no act of mitzvah at all. This is approximately the answer, it’s a bit different than the Yosef. But other commentators say the answer that the pleasure is equivalent to intent, and there are other explanations.
Alternative Explanation: What Does “Without Intent” Mean?
Or one can say at all that the Rambam doesn’t mean here “ate matzah without intent”, doesn’t mean which “without intent” does he mean? “Without intent to fulfill the obligation of the mitzvah”, or “without intent” that he doesn’t know that it’s Pesach at all? And in the next section it clearly says that what, “One who ate matzah without knowledge of Pesach, and afterwards Pesach came, he is obligated to eat again”. One sees that as if he’s exempt, all the mitzvot, not that there was no act of eating. From this one sees that even by force he’s obligated, but he wasn’t a bar chiyuva then. As opposed to the first thing, he was indeed a bar chiyuva.
Be well. Rabbeinu Manoach says this answer, I have no comment. I have no comment, yes. Okay.
The Foundation: One Must Be a Bar Chiyuva
But this is certain that the person must be a bar chiyuva, this is simple. It’s not similar to… It’s not intent, it’s not a matter of not intent. He wasn’t yotzei because he’s not a bar da’at, he’s not a person. The person died. In general, yes.
Distinction Between Hearing Without Intent and Eating Without Intent
One can actually hear the distinction between hearing something without intent and eating something without intent. I mean simply and practically, every person who…
Yes, because something that you heard and you didn’t have intent, here there are millions of noises, you didn’t hear it. If you didn’t have intent, it’s as if you didn’t hear it. Because hearing is… As opposed to eating, it’s in, in. This is approximately more the simple matter, the distinction in reality. This is approximately the distinction.
When he takes the poskim and he brings something according to this, I’m not sure, he says that according to this he must know that it’s Pesach. I don’t know, on the contrary, this he says indeed that it makes no sense. You’re going to eat matzah, what do you think? Shofar, you say, “I know what I’m doing, I’m going to stand, I’m going to do a mitzvah.”
Discussion: The Case of One Who Was Asleep
You mean to say if he knew that it’s Pesach, yes, that first day, that night. They grab me now, tell me my wife was two years ago in a hospital that was in and out, asleep, seconds.
No, but anyway, ah, excuse me.
No, but the Nechenami, seemingly, no, seemingly this means it. No, the awakened means exactly that. You say he still couldn’t awaken either? But what does awakened mean? He’s in such a state that he can’t be? Not conscious. If he’s not conscious, he’s certainly such a case, right? Unconscious he’s exempt, he’ll come back, he’ll need to eat.
The Chiddush of the Halachah
The chiddush here is that he already ate while he was a shoteh, right? This is indeed the chiddush of the halachah. The chiddush is not simply that… Right?
Yes.
The chiddush here is that he was… that he already ate yes, again, the chiddush here is that he didn’t eat, he’s indeed not obligated. You can’t now combine now the intent with the previous eating. There must be intent during eating. This is indeed the main chiddush, seemingly.
Makes sense? Yes. Okay.
Investigation: Intent Before Eating or Intent for Mitzvah?
What can do now? Yes. So seemingly the “ate matzah without intent”, seemingly, I can also have a less dramatic version, and say for example mitaseik. He snacked, he didn’t have in mind that he… We know the definition of “requires intent” is, he must eat for the sake of the mitzvah of matzah, or is it enough that he eats? One is Pesach and he doesn’t observe Pesach, a secular Jew, and he snacks on matzah at home. And the Rambam still didn’t understand the matter of for the sake of mitzvah. Everything he must understand for the sake of mitzvah. But here he seemingly spoke that his without intent is already “forced by gentiles”. Ah, I don’t know what this means “forced by gentiles”. What does this without intent mean? He eats it because he… I don’t know, I really don’t know. One must understand better the example of “forced by gentiles”.
Understanding the Case of “Forced by Gentiles”
If the gentiles essentially have a reality to be with the matzah, there is indeed a reality of matzah. This is what the gentile holds in his head doesn’t determine the status. The question is whether he thinks of matzah or he doesn’t think of matzah. Yes?
He doesn’t think of matzah, without the word. But he has no connection. But if he’s not an observer… “Forced by gentiles” means that he only thinks of the gentile who’s on his head. Means like this, let’s say that a Jew who’s a renegade decided that he’s going in no way to eat matzah. So we know that he won’t eat matzah. So the fact that he did eat matzah we know clearly that this was by force. Now one must know what comes in.
My question was whether there must be intent for the mitzvah or there must be intent for eating. Because the “forced by gentiles” can be both. It can be not that he had in plan with other words to eat matzah, and he didn’t have in plan at all to eat. He didn’t have in mind at all to eat. Because if we had the matter that one must have in mind the mitzvah of matzah, one could have said that he ate matzah without knowing let’s say, he didn’t know that now is Pesach, he ate matzah. Later he told me, “Ah, it was Pesach last night, now last night.”
Shogeg and Uncertain
And this is called in the laws of Shabbat this is called shogeg, forgetful. The shogeg goes on a transgression, but he’s a shogeg, he’s not uncertain. I don’t know exactly uncertain. You say the word uncertain, I don’t know what that means.
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Digression: Chatzitzah in Intercourse with a Condom
Connection to the Previous Discussion About Koreich
What is it when it’s the two you need a problem? Always it’s a different sort of problem. The tafel, not exactly, it’s two together, not good, I don’t know, one must eat maror separately. I need to understand exactly why. I need to find some pshat. Perhaps it is indeed a pshat, I need to understand exactly why.
There are different… There is such a thing as in hearing one says that one sound is mevatel the other. One can hear, you have even an eating, because you eat it. I don’t know, perhaps. It’s indeed all an eruv tavshilin.
No, you don’t lose it. You don’t lose it. You ask a person, what should you now only eat? Very good, you have an answer. Why is it an interruption? In the aspect of interruption. If you call it in the aspect of interruption, because the matzah is so important, it means that you shouldn’t have anything else in your mouth. But not in the aspect of interruption. Let’s call it like this, not chatzitzah, not that it doesn’t touch. A different kind of interruption.
Complete Chatzitzah
But it’s indeed a complete chatzitzah, it’s indeed… A touch essentially is worse than not being. It makes a lot of sense. No, the world doesn’t explain that it’s only not there. The world explains that it’s much more. There is a complete chatzitzah that nullifies the important and the tafel goes away. Means that the tafel is not yotzei. Complete chatzitzah, let’s say, is even matzah itself. Is there such a thing? That you have a plastic bag on something and you eat it? Perhaps indeed about this.
The Case of a Condom
Like there was someone who wanted to say that if one has intercourse with a condom… Ah, I thought about this. There it’s the matter of pleasure, no? No, no, no. I can ask, I can set up that a chatzitzah of immersion and a chatzitzah regarding that it doesn’t touch the body. I don’t know, I can’t the chatzitzah. I don’t know. Perhaps the matter of impurity is indeed like this, perhaps he doesn’t become impure at all. Or perhaps no, perhaps if there’s impurity it works through intercourse, like the bedding of a zav and niddah is impure because of the intercourse, not because of the touch. Then even if it’s intercourse it’s impure anyway.
By intercourse it’s indeed not the matter… it’s indeed the matter of pleasure. Perhaps he’ll have less pleasure, but it can still be the same. So one must understand the reason for eating. Okay, very good.
The Heter Is Not Asked
Translation
Doctor, I’m not so sure that that sugya is such a settled sugya. One needs to look into the sugya of shelo k’darkah hana’atah (intercourse not in the usual manner – its pleasure), the whole thing. The rabbis certainly don’t hold of that heter (leniency) of the condom, because I’m not sure that it’s such a settled thing halacha l’ma’aseh (in practical law).
Why is it indeed settled, this thing? Why? Because everything is there, there is bi’ah (intercourse) and there is… What should be less of an issur (prohibition)? First of all, it’s certainly an issur of zera levatala (wasting seed). The kula (leniency) is the chiddush (novelty) of the bi’ah. Well, a bi’ah she’einah re’uyah (improper intercourse)… My thing makes it worse than derech evarim (through the limbs). It’s worse than a bi’ah she’einah re’uyah. Why? What’s the difference between derech evarim and this? What’s the difference? Because here he does it with the wife, but he doesn’t ejaculate on the wife. He’s not with the wife.
Derech Evarim and Bi’at Issur
No, I’m talking about derech evarim or just plain zera levatala. In all the issurim (prohibitions) of the Torah, bi’at issur is not an issur, eshet ish (a married woman) is not an issur. Derech evarim… I don’t understand what you’re asking. Perhaps b’derech… shelo k’darkah one is punished. I don’t understand what you’re asking. Mishkav zachor (male homosexual relations) one is punished, but plain derech evarim one is not punished. This is not a chiddush in the matter. But this is indeed derech evarim, because even if there is a chatzitzah (barrier)… bi’ah through a garment between them, it’s still an ervah (forbidden relation). An ervah is not present. Okay, it can’t last. At the very least it can’t last. At the very least not. Yes, it’s not a chatzitzah. One can say that it’s not a derech (way). Perhaps the custom is that it is indeed so. There is indeed derech hana’ah (way of pleasure), derech achilah (way of eating), plain derech hana’ah. Okay, let’s continue. Yes, there is the thing, but one doesn’t need to go into the extremes, okay? It’s already been enough of the ta’am (reason) according to halacha.
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Siman 3: Achal Matzah — Connection to Devarim Nechmadim
Siman 3, achal matzah (ate matzah). It’s a bit connected, siman 3, also according to certain interpretations of the Devarim Nechmadim. Yes, achal matzah b’lo kavanah (ate matzah without intention). Such as if a non-Jew or bandits forced him to eat, he fulfilled his obligation. It only says non-Jew, but it also says bandits, interesting. Ah, I bring it here in the Tosafot al HaTorah, it’s not a chiddush. It’s there in the Devarim Nechmadim, that he says, achal matzah, a non-Jew or bandits forced him to eat, he fulfilled his obligation.
Discussion on Mitzvot Tzrichot Kavanah and Laws of Eating Matzah
Continuation of Discussion: Mitzvot Tzrichot Kavanah
Speaker 1: It could be not that they intended for him to eat matzah, but rather he didn’t intend to eat at all. He didn’t want to eat. If the issue were that one needs to have in mind the mitzvah of matzah, the Rambam could have said he ate matzah unknowingly. Let’s say he didn’t know that today is Pesach. He ate matzah, later someone said, “Ah, it was Pesach last night, now last night.”
And that’s called in Hilchot Shabbat it’s called shogeg (unintentional).
The shogeg applies to a transgression, but it’s called a shogeg. Mitaseik (acting without awareness). I didn’t say mitaseik. You’re saying the word mitaseik, I don’t know what that means. That’s the context of mitaseik.
That means he’s distracted, he doesn’t have it in mind.
No, mitaseik means someone does a melachah (forbidden labor) without thinking, he’s playing with trees and he gave a speech. That’s not the original context of mitaseik, that’s psak din (halachic rulings) from today’s tzaddikim.
Normally, I don’t know what mitaseik means. It doesn’t say mitaseik here, so I don’t know what it means. I know what it says here. I don’t know us, so the problem isn’t that he didn’t know. I said, when someone eats matzah, he knows that he’s eating, but he has no intention to eat matzah. When he doesn’t know that it’s Pesach, it’s called in Hilchot Shabbat it’s called shogeg.
Speaker 2: I don’t know what it means. I understand that it’s possible to do a mitzvah b’shogeg. But what I’m trying to understand is a bit funny, because also, let’s say, he does a transgression b’ones (under duress), certainly ones rachmana patrei (the Merciful One exempts one under duress). True? If non-Jews forced him to transgress one of all the mitzvot, he must give up his life.
Speaker 1: Except for the three severe ones.
Speaker 2: He doesn’t need to give up his life. Again, here ones doesn’t necessarily mean ones of life, whatever. But if they forced him, I’m not transgressing. True?
Well, but a mitzvah yes? But the mitzvah I ate.
Speaker 1: No, the mitzvah I also wasn’t yotzei (didn’t fulfill).
Speaker 2: The mitzvah I was yotzei.
Speaker 1: One needs to be yotzei.
Speaker 2: The non-Jew ate matzah, what does it have to do with you?
Speaker 1: No, because it had the taste of matzah.
Speaker 2: Ah, you said that it’s connected to the previous one. No problem. So when the non-Jew, according to Rabbeinu Menuach’s answer, so when the non-Jew forces you to do a transgression in this joint, does ones mean specifically with a gun? If they stuff his mouth and nose, and they stuff matzah in, and he chokes on it, is that like the sword? It’s not like the sword.
I understood. But I ask you a question. The right sword is perhaps it would have been a chatzitzah. Okay, I don’t see that that’s the problem. I mean I’m asking another question. The right sword, the non-Jews who forced him to eat matzah. What do non-Jews want? They go around forcing people to eat matzah? I don’t get what’s going on here.
Speaker 1: The non-Jews wanted to do teshuvah (repentance). For years they forced the non-Jews to do transgressions, so a camp went around forcing the Jews to do mitzvot. Can you see that Trump with the Creator should start forcing all the Reform Jews to become Orthodox?
Speaker 2: It’s very funny, the case of ones. Why is this the example of lo kavanah (without intention)? Do you understand what I’m asking? What does lo kavanah mean? I threw such a thing into his mouth. He doesn’t know that it’s Pesach, he doesn’t know that it’s matzah. I don’t get how he slept through this. But what was the question? That they can be specifically ones. I don’t see that the Rambam changed the culture of… because mitzvot tzrichot kavanah is…
The Gemara in Rosh Hashanah: Kafa’uhu V’achal Matzah
Speaker 1: Shulchan Aruch, Rabbi Shmuel, kafa’uhu v’achal matzah, yatza (they forced him and he ate matzah, he fulfilled). Kafa’uhu from the world or kafa’uhu for a demon? The Gemara asks this. Amar Rava, says the Gemara, says Rava, zot omeret (this teaches), that taka’u lo shofar, yatza (they blew shofar for him, he fulfilled). Because either for singing or for a demon. Yes, Rashi has two versions. Either he wants to drive away a demon, or simply because he wants to sing and he doesn’t have mitzvah in mind. So here we see yes, that kafa’uhu is compared to other cases like for singing. I would have said, similar to for singing would be like we say ones, he doesn’t know that it’s a mitzvah of eating matzah, yatza. Obviously.
Hai nami, achal matzah rachmana amar, v’ha achal. Aval lo zichron teru’ah, v’hu mitaseik b’alma, kamashma lan (This too, the Torah said eat matzah, and he ate. But not remembrance of the shofar blast, and he’s just occupied with something else, it teaches us), says Rashi, afilu hachi mitaseik yotzei, d’mitzvot ein tzrichot kavanah (even so, one occupied fulfills, for mitzvot don’t require intention). So this is the Gemara, Rava who holds mitzvot ein tzrichot kavanah.
But also the hava amina (initial assumption) in the Gemara is very interesting, what does it have to do with this? “He thought eating matzah is what the Torah requires.” The main thing is that he held that at the time, he held that when there’s taste, ah, I can hear, because he held that the action is the taste, as you say, mitaseik, perhaps that’s the explanation of Rabbeinu Menuach.
Speaker 2: No, the Gemara certainly doesn’t say so. Rabbeinu Menuach one can answer a different question. Here it goes, according to the position of mitzvot ein tzrichot kavanah one doesn’t need to arrive at Rabbeinu Menuach’s teaching. According to the position of mitzvot ein tzrichot kavanah, the simple meaning is, as you say, mitzvot ein tzrichot kavanah regarding being yotzei. Mitzvot ein tzrichot kavanah means, the Almighty wants, it’s like a theological question, whether the Almighty doesn’t want people to have in vain, it has to do with this, perhaps. The Almighty wants, as you say, the Almighty says “eat matzah”, you ate matzah. Part of why did you eat?
Discussion: The Philosophical Foundation of Mitzvot Tzrichot Kavanah
Speaker 1: Apparently it would have to do with this, whether the mitzvot need to give us good character traits, or the mitzvot are simply like a holy power, they’re an atomic bomb that breaks us, as Rabbeinu Bachaye says, I don’t know where.
Speaker 2: Which way? What? Which way does it connect? Because if one says that the whole matter is, ah, one can learn it both ways. One can learn both ways, but apparently, if one would only say that the only thing that has to do with character traits, you need to be aware that I’m working now on my character traits, I’m making now my habits, and that makes the habits.
Speaker 1: I would have thought exactly the opposite, truly. I can hear. That if a mitzvah has a reason, I’m doing now a mitzvah for the Almighty. I mean already, if you’re simply working on having better habits. If we’re talking with this intention or that intention. But also this one can, regarding making better habits, perhaps part of it is that one knows that one is making better habits. It’s not that one does good actions alone, it’s perhaps also, it comes with the intention of this. This is a conversation that we’ll see in Shemonah Perakim, yes? That when a person habituates himself to do good things, whether it has to do with the fact that it has to do with intention, or that has nothing at all to do with intention, the action itself. It could be that when one does, when one habituates himself with good things, part of it is with intention, with knowledge, not monkey actions. If you turn it into monkey actions, I don’t know if it brings anything else. It depends what kind of knowledge you’re talking about. If you’re talking about knowledge that you’re doing something, then you must have yes. If you’re talking about knowledge that it’s a mitzvah or something like that, you don’t need to have. If he’s going to learn, I don’t know, but at some point, yes. One needs to learn even after Sefer HaMitzvot, as we’ll learn Sefer Lamdan today.
So let’s go further, okay? One needs to learn the halachot. Let’s see there the Gemara how… Already, the whole thing comes from that Gemara. It’s coercion, there isn’t, he’s obligated. But Persian coercion is… The Gemara goes into the sugya whether one needs to have intention. All the sugyot are interesting.
Speaker 2: No, I don’t want to. Do you want?
Speaker 1: Yes, because there are very difficult questions. I don’t know, simply, I don’t know why one goes into all these scholarly matters. Here is a dispute of Amoraim whether mitzvot tzrichot kavanah. Here he goes in with the position that mitzvot tzrichot kavanah. Already, fine. What bothers you? Is there a problem?
Speaker 2: No, there’s no problem. There’s no problem, everything is perfect.
Halacha 4: The Material of Matzah – Only from the Five Species
Speaker 1: Let’s go further. Back further to the sugya. There are many sugyot here, much Shabbat HaGadol drasha material. On each section here, on each line here, rabbis have already preached for long hours, and we unfortunately, we’ll first see the Shulchan Aruch, the simple halachot. The Mishneh LaMelech is a classic Sha’agat Aryeh, Noda BiYehuda, precious responsa.
Speaker 2: Yes, yes, exactly. Let’s go further.
Speaker 1: Achal matzah, one of the mitzvot, section 5, 4, okay? One of the mitzvot is the obligation of eating, achilat matzah. Eating. We’re talking that there’s an obligation. We’ve already had how many times there was an obligation. Okay, okay, righteous one, righteous one, let’s go further. Obligation, obligation, obligation. It’s all details. Okay, okay, yes. One of the mitzvot is the obligation of eating, achilat matzah. No eating except from one of the five species. It’s also an interesting language, “lo yochal chametz” (he shall not eat leavened bread). He could have told him, “lo yochal chametz” is indeed a matter of eating. He could have said “lo yochal chametz”, and one would have had to make it with one of the five species.
Speaker 2: “Lo yochal chametz”, how was that said?
Speaker 1: “Lo yochal chametz” he brings, “lo yochal chametz” was said regarding korban Pesach (Passover offering). “Lo yochal alav chametz” (he shall not eat leavened bread upon it). That was said regarding korban Pesach. But here it says so, here it says “lo tochal alav chametz” (you shall not eat leavened bread upon it).
Speaker 2: Why doesn’t he say that verse fits?
Speaker 1: Because that one speaks of the korban Pesach. Okay.
“Lo tochal alav chametz, shiv’at yamim tochal alav matzot” (You shall not eat leavened bread upon it, seven days you shall eat matzot upon it). But other things, like rice and millet and legumes, the point is that it says “lo tochal alav chametz”, the Sages learn things that can become chametz, can become matzah. But things… Rashi says that matzah means bread that didn’t become chametz. But other things, that are not included in chametz, like rice and millet and legumes, which we learned or which the Sages saw, even if you see it risen, it’s merely sirchon b’alma (mere decay).
Speaker 2: “Ein matzah ela min chametz” (There is no matzah except from something that can become chametz). Exactly.
Drush: The Reverse Logic of Matzah
Speaker 1: What did I want to tell you? Yes, from here one learns, as is the position of the Sages, not Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri’s position, that a thing called matzah is only “mi sheba lidei chametz v’lo hechemitz” (that which can become chametz but didn’t become leavened). But one that is “ein bo lidei chametz” (cannot become chametz) is worse. It’s better. Exactly. One that is “ein bo lidei chametz” is also not really… is not truly a matter of matzah. That’s the chiddush that he says here.
Further, according to the drasha that matzah is only from the species of the evil inclination, he would have had to say that one should stay away from everything. As I said earlier, because in other places in the Torah there is the thing of “sur mera” (turn from evil) and “aseh tov” (do good). Apparently a person would have had to say that the thing that is the most staying away is what has a connection to chametz. The whole Pesach one should only eat rice and millet, like the Lisker custom. Exactly. I once heard from a Brisker, the most chametz-like thing that can only be on Pesach is matzah. It’s actually true. But the Torah doesn’t say so. One needs to take risks. One can’t go with the way of the straight path that is… for transgressions, just foolishness.
Rabbi Yitzchak, chametz is simple, the logic is simple, and one doesn’t need any drashot. Or one will say that the drasha strengthens the simple logic, isn’t that reasonable?
Law of Mixture of Rice with Grain, Dog Dough, and Matzah Ashirah
Halacha 6 (Continuation) – Mixture of Rice with Grain
Speaker 1:
It’s actually true that Pesach means matzah, but one doesn’t need to take risks. We’re joking, one can’t go with the way of the straight path that is… for something, it’s foolishness. The Rabbis say it’s chametz, it’s simple, the logic is simple, and one doesn’t need any drashot. And I must tell you that the drasha strengthens the simple logic, and doesn’t agree.
Great, because here is also the proof that they didn’t learn the verses as you learned them. Because as you learned them, if you find another type of bread that can’t at all become chametz, it’s surely good and pleasant.
Speaker 2:
No, no, what are you saying? Because you want to come to say that I can learn the Torah so, that people eat bread.
Speaker 1:
Let’s go further, we’re not going to talk about this forever. You’ve already understood correctly what I want to say. I know, I feel that I don’t have the strength to go into it. I feel that your kashrut needs to be kosher, and not kashrut that I say.
Discussion: Law of Taste of Grain in a Mixture
Speaker 2:
On the contrary, it goes to me that the water has the taste. Im yesh bah ta’am dagan (if it has the taste of grain), one doesn’t go after the majority or after others, one goes after taste. You fulfill your obligation.
Speaker 1:
Taste works well. I just wanted to know if one fulfilled.
Speaker 2:
Doesn’t one say that there needs to be a k’zayit (olive-sized portion) of the wheat itself? Isn’t that the word?
Speaker 1:
That’s not what it says here. Here it says that there needs to be a taste.
Speaker 2:
Yes, but if he ate a k’zayit and part of it is nullified, potatoes become so nullified. And there becomes a thing nullified, the waffles.
Speaker 1:
Yes, I still need a k’zayit from the part of the wheat itself, and the word is that the intention is not nullified.
Speaker 2:
Yes, that’s the word perhaps?
Speaker 1:
You’re asking questions, that one needs a measure. I know, that it’s a good question. It doesn’t say about the measure. We learned in other places. Our going further later. We learned because of lentils and they learned at… That’s what the Rambam says. But he doesn’t see this clearly according to the Rambam. He doesn’t say the Rambam.
Ah, the Maggid Mishneh brings from the Rambam, a young woman spinning without a k’zayit is yotzei, yotzei, yotzei, and from something else, wheat flour and barley.
Speaker 2:
Okay, then the wheat flour and barley become yes kosher, because it could have become chametz with the help of the wheat with which it’s together?
Speaker 1:
Well, what is something… for the Sifra, for the way. The Maggid Mishneh, he won’t simply. Okay, what are what they are with this, what does it say. Okay, it won’t say that it’s not called bread. It’s that it says in the vicinity, Menachot is all laws. It won’t be called so bread, because there should be other things?
Now there’s still a problem. People… okay, lox, one fulfills the obligation with rice and millet, like a measure of a quarter of fish. That’s the Talmud. Here is the halacha SMINE, one fulfills the obligation with the measure, because it also had before, one fulfills the obligation with rice and millet, like a measure of a quarter of fish.
The Rambam says nothing further about millet, not much. The Yerushalmi says that it goes according to much, and the Rambam here goes with taste. It’s a Mishnah and Gemara in practice.
Question of Chatzitza (Interposition)
Speaker 2:
Why don’t we say here that it’s like a chatzitza that the skins prevent from the… tent, as it were, and the matzah there, because oil is nullified. Can we also say here that the part that has the skins is nullified? If not, one would seemingly say that it’s a chatzitza, the rice part is a chatzitza for the matzah part.
Speaker 1:
We’re talking even more, it becomes nullified, it becomes reversed from that side. This is a very great novelty, but if we don’t go with the exact reasoning of the Ramban this way. This is the Radbaz in the Mishnah, and he brings that the Shalmi Tzibur says so, the Ramban says so, and the Maharitz says so.
The Yerushalmi’s Distinction
Speaker 2:
But there is a Yerushalmi, there is a distinction whether there is a minority of grain with a majority of grain. It’s a complete prohibition with a minority of grain. If so, wouldn’t we say that it’s a problem that it’s a chatzitza?
Speaker 1:
I told you, it becomes nullified.
Speaker 2:
No, but if previously we would have said that the matzah is invalid because there is matzah, then even with a mixture of the measure.
Speaker 1:
I don’t understand what you’re saying.
The Raavad’s Position
Speaker 2:
The Rambam says so, the Raavad holds differently. The Raavad asks a very strong question.
Speaker 1:
The Rambam doesn’t say this clearly.
Speaker 2:
Yes yes, all the commentators assume that the Rambam holds it’s simply understood, and they bring that it’s stated explicitly so, and this is not a problem. But there is a long Gra on this, the Biur HaGra.
Speaker 1:
Okay, I’ll tell you what the Rambam says.
Speaker 2:
The Gra, yes.
Speaker 1:
These are clear matters. Rice is dragged along, so brings the Ramban and the like.
Speaker 2:
Okay, continue.
Speaker 1:
Yes. The Raavad actually disagrees.
Speaker 2:
What does the Raavad say?
Speaker 1:
The Raavad, we’ve already seen this, the Raavad understood that one must indeed.
Speaker 2:
You ask, according to him, according to the Raavad there is a question that it is, but the answer is that he doesn’t hold that this nullifies the taste. Perhaps rice doesn’t nullify the taste, because rice blends in the taste, it’s the same type of taste.
Speaker 1:
Oy, I have to give a shiur on rice, forget it.
Speaker 2:
One thirtieth?
Speaker 1:
Now it’s two o’clock, that’s not one thirtieth, now it’s two o’clock.
Speaker 2:
Well, okay. Seemingly one must give a shiur.
Speaker 1:
Okay, I’m moving away from this. I don’t have strength to talk about this. I don’t know what you want, do you want me to talk about Tosfos or about one Tosfos?
Speaker 2:
I want you to talk about everything.
Speaker 1:
That’s the question, what’s more important, Tosfos or thirty days before the holiday?
Speaker 2:
A fixed shiur, yes.
Speaker 1:
Okay, unless it’s fixed.
Speaker 2:
If you’re a wise man, yes.
Halacha 6 (Continued) – Dough for Dogs
Speaker 1:
Dough for dogs, let’s finish thank God. Dough for dogs, what does one make dough for dogs from?
Speaker 2:
That’s from the dough.
Speaker 1:
It’s completely kosher. There’s nothing mixed in. There’s no question of mixing. It’s a question of lishmah, of being guarded for the sake of matzah.
Speaker 2:
You’re right, that’s not the problem.
Speaker 1:
But I want to tell you, what does dough for dogs mean? Dough for dogs means… not our type of bread, and not regular bread.
The Law of Fit for Human Consumption
And when you say fit for human consumption, it means something that is fit for people to fulfill their obligation with.
Speaker 2:
What does it mean, guarded for the sake of matzah?
Speaker 1:
Correct, if it’s not fit for human consumption, one doesn’t fulfill the obligation with it, even if guarded for the sake of matzah. We’ve learned a new principle, that it must be guarded for the sake of matzah, which is not explicit.
Speaker 2:
But what does guarded for the sake of matzah have to do with fit for human consumption?
Speaker 1:
Fit for human consumption makes it that it’s called bread that one can eat. A dog is not a matzah eater! A dog is a dog! Only people are matzah eaters. Ah, it must be fit for human consumption. And it doesn’t mean that it’s fit for eating. There are many things to eat. My Pesachim made it that people sing.
Speaker 2:
Exactly.
Speaker 1:
And people perhaps guard it for the sake of matzah, for the sake of matzah on Pesach, or for the sake of matzah. I don’t know. In any case, there must certainly be matzah for people, matzah for dogs. Not matzah. Something like that.
But here one can learn that if one goes to a matzah for poor people, which is made for dogs, one doesn’t fulfill the obligation. This is made for dogs. Or for example such certain Chassidim who are in the category of dogs, one doesn’t fulfill with it. There will be those categories there, one doesn’t fulfill. But truly one fulfills. It’s fine. They’re not dark.
In short, one fulfills with that which goes upon people, not upon dogs, right?
Speaker 2:
What is not upon my explanation?
Speaker 1:
See, I mean that it means that the dogs fulfill.
Speaker 2:
Why do you say it doesn’t mean that the dogs fulfill?
Speaker 1:
That we know, perhaps the dogs did a favor for Jews at the Exodus from Egypt, one wants to make it for dogs. Dogs are seemingly the dogs that work for the shepherds, that’s the word. Working dogs, sheep dogs.
Speaker 2:
Okay, okay.
Halacha 7 – Matzah Kneaded in Fruit Juice
Speaker 1:
“Matzah kneaded in fruit juice”, the last halacha of this section.
Speaker 2:
What does it mean? The whole long discourse?
Speaker 1:
Here comes a new topic of “matzah kneaded in fruit juice”. In my edition of the Rambam it’s still in the same halacha.
Speaker 2:
Ah, you’re right. But it’s a new topic, the topic of “fruit juice”. We’ll do it later, tomorrow. The topic of “rich matzah”. It’s not too long, anyway.