📋 Shiur Overview
Combined Summary — Chapter 74 of the Guide for the Perplexed: The Kalam Proofs for the Creation of the World (Introduction and the First Proof)
The Chapter’s Place in the Overall Plan of the Guide for the Perplexed
Chapter 74 opens the discussion of the Kalam (Mutakallimun) proofs for the creation of the world. Its placement is determined by the plan presented at the end of Chapter 71: first a description of all existence (Chapter 72), then the premises of the Mutakallimun — their physics (Chapter 73), and now — the proofs they build upon these premises regarding four “inquiries”: the existence of God, His unity, that He is not a body, and the creation of the world. Chapter 72 served as a special introduction that was supposed to be common to both Kalam and philosophy, though there is room to debate whether this is indeed the case.
In Chapter 74 itself, seven proofs of the Mutakallimun for the creation of the world are presented (eight according to Wolfson, who added one from al-Ghazali). Some of the proofs can also be found in Saadia Gaon and in Duties of the Hearts — books closer to the Kalam tradition.
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A Fundamental Methodological Question: What is “Creation of the World”?
Before entering into the proofs themselves, we must address a question that has not yet been discussed in depth: What exactly does the concept “creation of the world” mean?
– The concept “created world” (as opposed to “eternal world”) came from Arabic philosophy, and especially from Islamic Kalam.
– In the Torah and in the words of the Sages, the expression “creation of the world” does not appear — “creation of the world” is familiar, but there is room to debate whether this is the same concept.
– Similarly, the expression “something from nothing” does not appear in the Torah and the Sages as an expression; it is possible that the concept exists, but the specific formulation carries with it certain philosophical-theological assumptions.
– Every such expression is built upon a complete philosophical conception, and tracing the evolution of expressions reveals that what seems like a uniform concept throughout the generations is actually a concept that changes with its intellectual context.
– One must distinguish between “eternal” (qadim) and “everlasting” (nitzchi) — it is possible that according to Maimonides these are two separate questions.
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Maimonides’ Introduction to the Chapter: The Nature of the Presentation
The Language of “Narration” Rather Than “Proof”
Maimonides emphasizes that he is going to narrate and describe the proofs of the Mutakallimun — not to teach them and not to prove by means of them. The choice of language is precise: he uses the root “narration” (story), not “proof” or “teaching,” because in his view these are not true proofs, and he is not adopting the Kalam position but only describing it from the outside.
Two Things Maimonides Announces He Will Not Do
1. He will not use Kalam terminology — not only will he not copy word for word, but he avoids their terminology, from a position that their terms are not precise enough even to describe their own system.
2. He will not be as lengthy as they are — the reason for Kalam’s lengthiness was already explained in Chapter 71: because they argue against observable reality, they are forced to invest great effort, length, and arguments to establish their positions.
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Maimonides’ Attitude Toward Lengthiness: Three Different Types
The Lengthiness of the Mutakallimun — Persuasion Without Proof
Maimonides disdains the lengthiness of the Mutakallimun and their “professional” terminology. From the outside it appears that there is a precise language requiring deep study, but in practice it is “a waste of time” because the lengthiness adds nothing. The reason: one who tries to prove things against reality is forced to be lengthy and to engage in sophistry. The lengthiness is tendentious from the start and there is no real proof behind it.
The Comparison to Aristotle’s Premises (Opening of Part II)
At the opening of Part II of the Guide, when the 25/26 premises of Aristotle are presented, the approach is completely different:
– All of them have been proven demonstratively and there is no doubt about them.
– Precise references are given — the Book of Hearing (Physics), the Book of What Comes After Nature (Metaphysics).
– It is written explicitly: “The intention of this treatise is not to copy the books of the philosophers, but to recall the premises.”
– The reader is directed to study the proofs in their original sources, including commentators.
The essential difference: Maimonides also summarizes Aristotle, but he does not think that original study is superfluous — on the contrary, he encourages it, because one who knows only the summary is not truly called knowledgeable. In contrast, with the Mutakallimun there is no point in returning to the source.
The Lengthiness of the Talmud — Dialectical Rhetoric
A third type: the lengthiness of the Talmud is dialectical rhetoric in the Aristotelian sense, built upon what people think and not upon the truth. Once the law has been decided, there is not much importance in knowing what convinced the decisors, because what leads the law is the decision of the Great Court or the Sages of Israel — the rest is only a historical matter.
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Two Tasks Maimonides Defines for Himself
1. Summarizing the intention (al-gharad) of each proof — what its aim is, without the circumlocutions and rhetoric.
2. Alerting (tanbih) — briefly directing the reader’s attention to which premises each proof relies upon.
The word “tanbih” (note/alerting) is not “illumination” in the passive sense, but active alerting — to cause the reader to think for himself. Maimonides does not always complete the entire process, but rather points to the structure and leaves the reader to complete it: since the premises themselves are questionable (as will be seen in Chapter 73), the proof built upon them is also not a good proof.
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Two Directions of Proofs for the Creation of the World
Maimonides notes that there are two different directions:
– Proofs establishing the creation of the world (affirmatively)
– Proofs refuting the eternity of the world (negatively)
These are not necessarily identical, since there could be intermediate possibilities — such as eternal matter — in which the negation of eternity does not automatically prove absolute creation.
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Maimonides’ Claim: His Summaries Exhaust the Content
Maimonides addresses the reader and says: after you read my summaries and then turn to their lengthy and famous books of the Mutakallimun — you will find no additional content beyond what you will understand from his words. The word “content” (ma’na) is opposed to “words” — that is, the meaning and content are identical; the difference is only in scope and style.
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Criticism of Two Rhetorical Tactics of the Mutakallimun
First Tactic — Literary Beauty
What is found in their books beyond content is lengthiness of speech, clear and pleasant language, and even writing in measured poetry (poems with fixed rhythm) and rhetoric. Beautiful literary writing is important for popular books intended for a wide audience, but in books intended for philosophers it does not prove anything. This criticism goes back to Plato: the beauty of speech and rhetoric do not help in knowing the truth.
> Possible example: “Keter Malkhut” by Rabbi Solomon ibn Gabirol, which includes theology within poetry, as an expression of the tendency to write philosophy in poetic form.
Second Tactic — Deliberate Obscurity
The complete opposite — writing in obscure and vague language, intended to create an impression of depth, to astound the reader and to “frighten” (to amaze) the observer. The obscure writing creates an illusion of deep content, but in practice there is nothing substantial behind it — only a literary effort to create an impression of mystification.
The Guiding Principle
There is a place for rhetoric when addressing the masses, but in a question that is scientific-philosophical one must examine coolly and with judgment, without fanfare, rhetoric, intimidation, and mysticism. A complete separation is required between literary-rhetorical means and philosophical truth inquiry.
Three Types of “Padding” in Kalam Books — Summary
1. Rhetorical expansion — beautiful language and rhetoric that add no content
2. Frightening language — obscure and threatening writing intended to create an impression of depth
3. Internal lengthiness — including internal objections and answers, redundant language, and arguments with opponents (“confrontation” — *muqawama*)
Reflexive Note
One can direct some of these criticisms toward Maimonides himself — he too writes in obscure language, he too “confronts” his opponents. The difference, according to his system, is that behind his style stands real content. But from a logical perspective, such a writing style is not proof that there is content — it is only not proof that there is no content. Among the masses, precisely the frightening and obscure style is perceived as proof of depth, and this is useful for managing the masses, but not for clarifying truth.
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The First Proof for the Creation of the World
The Structure of the Argument — Analogy from the Particular to the General
Some of the Mutakallimun argue that the world is created, based on the following argument:
1. Premise A (observation): We see created things in the world — for example, Reuben who was a drop of seed and was transferred from state to state until he became a complete person; or a seed that became a date palm.
2. Premise B (causal principle): The created thing did not change itself — “it is false that it is what changed itself.” There must be an external agent that caused the change.
3. Inference (analogy): Just as every particular created thing in the world needs an external agent, so the world as a whole is created and needs an external agent.
The Hidden Assumption
At the heart of the proof lies a hidden assumption that was not explicitly stated: every natural law, metaphysical law, or rule that applies to one body — must apply to all bodies. Therefore, just as one person or one date palm was created and did not create itself, so too the entire world must be created and did not make itself.
The problem: there are two stages that need to be proven regarding the entire world — (a) that it is created, and (b) that it did not make itself — and the proof makes an enormous leap from the particular to the general without sufficient justification.
Two Possibilities for Interpreting the Criticism
1. According to the atomistic system: Since all atoms are identical to each other (the first premise of Kalam), the world as a whole has no special status — one cannot say that a different “law” applies to it than to other things. Later Maimonides will bring arguments that explicitly follow from the assumption of atomic identity.
2. Broader criticism: Even without atomism, the argument simply lacks foundation — from the fact that particular things are created, it does not follow that the world as a whole is created. There is no reason to believe that this analogy is valid.
Distinction Between Types of Arguments — Methodological Warning
One must be careful not to attribute to this argument more than what it says. The natural tendency is to do *pattern matching* to other arguments that are actually much better. The distinction:
| Argument | Content | Example |
|—|—|—|
| The analogical argument (the first proof here) | Something is created and made → the entire world is created and made | We see things being created → the world was created |
| The infinite regress argument (the second proof) | Reuben son of Jacob son of Isaac… → must reach a first | A chain of causes must end |
| The design argument | Wisdom and design testify to a designer | “You saw a perfect apple — someone must have made it” |
The analogical argument here is not the design argument and is not the regress argument. It simply says: something is created, something is made — and that’s it. There is no claim here about wisdom or order, and there is no causal chain. Therefore it is extremely weak.
Criticism of the Watch Analogy
Against the famous analogy “you saw a watch — surely someone made it,” the answer is: I saw that the watch was made (I have prior experience with watches and manufacturers), but I have not yet seen that the world was made — that is, the empirical basis for the analogy itself is lacking.
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Contexts
– Chapter 71 — The general plan and criticism of Kalam lengthiness.
– Chapter 72 — Introduction on “all existence” as a common foundation.
– Chapter 73 — The premises (physics) of Kalam, upon which the proofs are built.
– Opening of Part II — The Aristotelian premises, as a methodological contrast to Kalam premises.
– Introduction to the book — The student’s original questions: what are the ways of Kalam and are they proper ways.
– Saadia Gaon, Duties of the Hearts — Parallels to some of the proofs brought in the chapter.
– Al-Ghazali (“Tahafut al-Falasifa”) — Brings similar arguments for the creation of the world, some overlapping with Mutakallimun arguments.
– Wolfson — Attempted to interpret and make sense of these proofs, and added an eighth proof from al-Ghazali.
📝 Full Transcript
Chapter 74: Introduction to the Kalam Proofs for the Creation of the World
The Chapter’s Place in the Overall Plan of the Guide for the Perplexed
We are here beginning chapter 74, which is the chapter where he begins to teach us the proofs of the Kalam for the creation of the world based on the premises we learned in the previous chapter, and this is all in accordance with the framework, the plan that he wrote for us at the end of chapter 69 — if I remember, or when did he write us the plan? Not chapter 9. Where was it, the introduction where he told us this? Chapter 71, yes? At the end of chapter 71 he told us his plan.
He told us that he is going to give us the premises of the Mutakallimun. Generally there was a methodological introduction about his entire approach, his whole attitude toward the Kalam, and especially toward the question of the creation of the world, which is one of the four questions, the inquiries in it. And at the end of the chapter he gave his plan — he said he is going to describe the premises, the physics of the Kalam, and then their proofs, and then the philosophical physics, and then the proofs, the discussion built upon it regarding the creation of the world, and that’s the matter.
So here it’s just important — so we’re now holding in the middle, yes? Before this he gave us an introduction in chapter 72, which was a strange introduction, neither to the premises of the Kalam nor to the premises of philosophy, but something that is supposed to be common to both of them, and we discussed whether this is correct, but that was the question of chapter 72.
And now we are actually arriving at the part where he summarizes for us the proofs of the Kalam for the creation of the world, and afterward for the other inquiries. Regarding these topics and something we already saw in the previous chapter.
Summary of the General Plan
So this is the very general plan — he says first of all he is going to tell you the totality of existence, which is chapter 71, then he will bring chapters of the premises of the Mutakallimun, and then the ways in which they explain the four inquiries, and then chapters of the philosophical premises and their ideas and so on.
So we are in chapter 74, which is the beginning of the proofs of the Mutakallimun, and he gives an introduction to it, and then he recounts for us seven proofs of the Mutakallimun for the creation of the world. And whoever studies Rav Saadia and Chovot HaLevavot and the other books that are closer to the Kalam, will find some of these proofs there at least, and we’ll see if the Rambam agrees with them.
The Rambam’s Introduction to the Chapter: The Nature of the Presentation
So I will read. This is the chapter. So first he gives an introduction to what he is going to do. This is a very organized chapter, where he informs us exactly what he is doing, and not like all the chapters in the first part, where many of them don’t say what he wants to do with them.
He says like this, this is the chapter: I will summarize for you in it — that is, one can translate something like I will condense for you apparently or something like that, and I will give you the generalities. The account — the word that Ibn Tibbon usually translates as “narrative.” That is, I will give you, I will tell you, not teach you and not prove to you, because first of all he doesn’t believe they are proofs, and second, he is not doing it, he is not going to be a Mutakallim now, he is only going to describe.
Someone, what’s his name, Schwarz translated “to describe” — I don’t think that’s an accurate translation here, but he means, I think, something like to convey to you the information, yes, not to teach you, because there is no teaching in his opinion here.
So he tells you the proofs of the Mutakallimun for the world being created — the proofs that the Mutakallimun brought that the world is created.
A Methodological Question: What is “Creation of the World”?
We still need, I’m giving here some kind of reference points to premises that we need to understand. We still need to understand, I don’t think I’ve ever discussed this — I’m putting a placeholder here for this question.
We need to discuss first what the meaning of this word is, the world being created in general — this is an Arabic word. This precise word came to us from Arabic philosophy, that is from the Kalam that spoke about a created world as opposed to an eternal world, that was always old, as if old as opposed to new, or actually eternal. Eternal, eternal and ancient are perhaps two more questions according to the Rambam, but ancient as opposed to created — and this is a new expression.
So I’m putting here like, how do you say, putting here like a heading that we need to remember to discuss and examine: why exactly, how exactly did this become the important question whether the world is new, created or not created? Where did we get this thing from? In the Torah and also in the words of the Sages you won’t find the word “the world is created.”
We are accustomed today to different language — about which we also need to examine whether it is the language of the Rambam, the word I don’t remember right now. We are accustomed to the word “something from nothing” — also another word that is not written in the Torah and not in the words of the Sages, that is in this expression. It could be that the concept is written, but this expression — and we generally think to follow the chain of expressions that seem to everyone to be the same thing always, but when you examine it you see that it is always built on some complete philosophical, theological conception, and therefore it is expressed precisely in this expression.
So I’m saying it’s important to understand that suddenly among the Muslims it became very important to speak about whether there is proof that the world is created, and it’s not as if — the existence of God you can say is something agreed upon, perhaps the word existence is not written, but God in some sense, His existence is clearly something widespread and fundamental, also His unity. Well, likewise there are new interpretations for all these concepts, but the word “creation of the world” — we know the matter of the creation of the world in the Torah, yes? It’s not written “creation of the world.” We need to discuss whether it’s the same thing or not and so on.
But here, when this is what’s important — what, the proofs here are precisely about the concept of creation of the world, whatever this concept is exactly, okay? This is the first introduction, and I didn’t say the introduction, I’m only saying that there is something here that needs — there is a question here. I’m establishing a novelty, I’m saying a novelty: there is a question here that is not simple for everyone. I’m not sure that the word “creation of the world” corresponds to the word “creation of the world” from all sorts of aspects that need to be discussed, and this is certainly a new word that the Rambam — before the Rambam, but the Muslim Kalam apparently introduced into our language, and we also need to evaluate this regarding the language of “something from nothing,” which is perhaps the same thing, perhaps not, and so on.
What the Rambam Will Not Do: Language and Length
So now he tells you, says the Rambam what he is going to do, and this is very similar to what he wrote in the introduction to his summary of their premises. But there is also an implied criticism here of the learning methods of the Kalam.
The Rambam says like this: And do not ask of me to recount them — here he should also have described, because this is really the root they use to describe — in their language and not in their length. So two things he is not going to do.
You say, Rambam, if you think that I will give you the proofs in the language of the Kalam, or with the same measure of length that they give to these things — this is not my role, this is not, don’t ask, that is, don’t expect that you will give me. But it could be that don’t ask is also intentional, that is, perhaps someone would be inclined to ask this, yes? A student who comes to the Rambam — and we already discussed this, this is one of the preliminary questions for the whole book that he described in the introduction, yes? That this is the question: what are the ways of the Kalam and whether they are optimal ways, yes? Two questions that he posed for us in his letter, students, I remember already.
And now he says, okay, now I’m going to teach you what the Kalam says, but I’m not going to teach you neither their language nor their length.
Their Language: Terminology
So that is, their language — he means also their terminology, yes? I think. He doesn’t mean that he’s not going to copy word for word, that’s fine, whoever wants word for word can look in their books, but he means, I think, also not — this is how Pines also emphasizes their terminology, in the same words they give to everything. It could be that the Rambam thinks that their words are not good enough, even to explain their own system — that’s the first thing.
Their Length: Reasons and Criticism
And the second thing is the length. The Rambam thinks, and he already wrote this in chapter 71 — 1, which I thought was connected, but it’s also connected there — that the Kalam always lengthens very much, and he gives there the reason: because from the beginning they are against reality, so whoever wants to prove things against reality, then he of course needs much effort and much length and many arguments and such things, yes?
So that’s one of the reasons he gives in chapter 71 for their length, but apparently he the Rambam, now he is going to give more reasons, yes? In another moment, why is this arranged in measure — this is the Rambam claiming that when you look from outside, you see here certain languages, yes, supposedly professional terminology.
Chapter 74 – The Distinction Between Aristotle’s Summaries and the Mutakallimun’s Summaries
The Rambam’s References to Aristotle’s Premises
The Rambam notes that each of these premises is proven by demonstration. If I remember correctly, there is also an explicit word where he says he doesn’t need to elaborate on this. Look, yes, where is it written. Let’s look.
Yes, also at the end he says: Some of them are first intelligibles, some require many demonstrations and premises, and all of them have been clarified by demonstration, there is no doubt about it. He repeats that this is demonstration.
But then he says — where is it written — part in the Book of Physics (yes, in the book of natural hearing, that’s what they called the book of Physics) and part in the Book of Metaphysics (the Metaphysics). And you already know that the intention of this treatise is not to copy the books of the philosophers, but to mention the premises.
But he writes, if I remember, it’s written explicitly somewhere that you should aim at their places — if you want to know the proofs. So I don’t find it here, but he writes that if you seek the proofs, then he indicates what the places are here actually, yes?
The Essential Difference Between the Two Types of Summaries
So very different — what he does for Aristotle is very different from what he does for the Mutakallimun. Even though both of them he thinks can be summarized, yes?
The Rambam in this sense believes in summaries, as a pedagogical device at least, yes? He is going to teach him briefly, to the student, the 25 premises, or 26 premises of Aristotle, from which he proves his divine existence, his theological conception. And then he presents it in summary.
But he doesn’t think there is no benefit in studying the things in their sources. He does think there is benefit, because he thinks he can give this only by way of account — in the same word — and by way of narrative. He gives to summarize it, but if you read it in the Rambam, you won’t know why, you won’t know the reasons for all the things.
What do you want to know why? So indeed he gives you even the reference — look in this book. And if there are commentators, he also gives him a kind of reference for commentators, for those who come after him, where to look. And it’s not a waste of time to study these books, even though they too are long and deep books, speak in their own certain terminology and everything. But there is still benefit in their length, even though it all comes out of the summary.
An Important Distinction Regarding Length
So yes, so we need to distinguish. When I say, the Rambam is a person who is not so much a devotee of give-and-take and likes to summarize things — that there is a very important difference here regarding things he thinks are not true. That is, that have no proof, that have no reason, that have no real why — because they are tendentious, or because regarding the Gemara, because he thinks the Gemara is only rhetoric, only rhetorical dialectic in the Aristotelian definition, yes?
That it’s built on what people think and not built on the truth. Which is not terrible, yes, it’s part of wisdom, but it’s a waste of time to engage in this once they’ve already admitted to you, yes? If everyone agrees that the law is like this, then it doesn’t matter what convinced them that the law is like this, because that’s not what really drives the law.
What really drives the law, according to the Rambam, is the conviction of the people who determine the law, yes? The Great Court or the Sages of Israel and so on. But to know what convinced them is a historical matter, it’s much less important.
Three Types of Length
So this is true regarding the law, and it’s also true regarding the premises of the Mutakallimun, which are only persuasion according to at least the position of the Aristotelians, yes, the position of the philosophers. And the Rambam more or less goes from this direction, yes? Although we’ll get to the fact that he complicates it — we were already in the previous chapter — that he complicates it, he says it’s not so simple, that this whole system is not good. But in practice he doesn’t go from this system, yes? He is completely a philosopher.
And therefore, in both these systems it’s a waste of time to read the length.
But if there is a system that is indeed built on something, whose proofs do show you the true why, the reasons, what is behind the summaries — then the Rambam is not a person who thinks it’s enough to know the examples without the summaries. He is the opposite: precisely if they are correct examples, then it’s more important to know the calculations and the things that lead to this, even the arguments with certain errors within that same topic. Because then you really know. As long as you don’t know the proofs, you are not really called knowing.
The Rambam’s Philosophical Summaries
So even though the Rambam also makes summaries of Aristotle — he also does things like principles of faith and summaries of philosophy in Yesodei HaTorah and all these places — it’s not because he thinks there is no importance.
There is a very big difference between the relationship between the long study and looking at the original books regarding Yesodei HaTorah as opposed to regarding the law or as opposed to regarding the systems of the Mutakallimun, yes? That’s what I think.
What the Rambam Commits to Do in This Chapter
So let’s return here and continue.
But, so the Rambam says: don’t expect me to do this, don’t ask of me. But I will give you what I’m going to do. I will tell you — yes, again, I will tell you, here it’s the same word he translated before with the word “account,” I would write in both “account,” “narrative” — the intention of each of them, yes?
That is, the intention — this is a word used many times, but yes, it’s also intention in Arabic apparently. But the intention is the intended, yes? Not what the author thinks, yes? The intention is intended — what do you actually want from this, yes? The intended in these things, without the detours on the way and the rhetoric and so on.
So what does he, what does he ultimately want, and the way of its proofs to establish the creation of the world, or to negate its eternity, yes?
Two Types of Proofs
Yes, so he gives it the summary, the intended of each of the proofs, and how — yes, the way — how this proof leads to the establishment, to the establishment of the… yes, I don’t write “confrontation,” because it’s not confrontation, but establishment of the creation.
And there is now, we see that there are two types of proofs: there is the type of proofs that establishes the creation of the world positively, and there is another type of proofs that rejects the eternity of the world, yes? They are not exactly the same thing, even though apparently there is one division — it must be either creation of the world or eternity of the world. But perhaps there are also intermediate possibilities, like eternal matter, which the Rambam quotes later, or other possibilities, one can think of them.
So it’s not necessarily that every proof that establishes creation of the world proves the negation of its eternity. That is, we don’t need to see later if this works, but there are two types of proofs.
The First Task: Summarizing the Intention
So he says like this: and then, this is what he is going to do — he is going to summarize the intention of each way, each approach, each proof that establishes the creation of the world or negates the eternity of the world.
The Second Task: Alerting to the Premises
And then he says what the second thing is that he is going to do: And I will alert — yes, there is here the word alert, also attention please to it. That in this root I already mentioned that I see here also that Pines likes to translate this “I will draw your attention,” yes? I will alert you, yes?
We, our context, our connotation for the word “illumination” has already lost its original intention, yes? To alert someone is not to give illumination in the sense of a footnote or something like that, yes? He means: I will cause you to think, yes?
Briefly — he says briefly, yes, he says at the end briefly — but I will cause you to think about what, yes? So I’m not going to always finish the whole process, yes? Yes, I will make a reference, but I don’t mean reference in the sense of “okay, and what? Just that it will be a whole book.” Rather he means: I will alert you, yes? The word “alert,” to alert is better translated “to arouse” in Hebrew, yes?
I will arouse you to the premises which the proponent of that way relied upon briefly. Thus I briefly summarize each proof.
Application of the Method Inside
And this is what he is going to do inside. When you read, you see: each time he summarizes a proof, and then he says “see,” and he usually formulates it in this sense of addressing the reader, the student. He says: see, understand, pay attention that this proof is built on this and this premise from the premises that…
The Rambam’s Criticism of the Rhetorical Style of the Mutakallimun
The Rambam’s Working Method in Reviewing the Proofs
And then you’ll know why the proof is not so good, because after all all these premises are questionable, yes? This is actually what the second stage after this is, which he doesn’t do explicitly, but that’s what he means.
And then he says, and you, yes? So now, now, after you read my book, the premises, my summaries, when you read their long books, the long books of theirs, and their known compositions, the famous compositions.
A Note on Translating the Term “Famous”
It’s written, this word fame, like the famous ones, what’s it called, Tibbon translated known, but I translate more as famous, it seems to me more accurate. That is, he means books not only famous, that already were, which could be that this is the meaning of published book simply, a book not secret that is studied only in a certain study hall, but a famous book. But it could be that he also means that it’s like famous, it has a name, everyone, as we say, famous. Everyone knows, ah, this is the famous book that proves the creation of the world.
The Central Claim: The Summaries Exhaust the Content
And in the end, says the Rambam, after you read my summaries, and then you read in these long and famous books, you will find no additional content at all beyond what you will understand in these words of mine. You won’t find another content, yes, there is the concept of meaning. You won’t find any content, yes, any matter.
The Meaning of “Matter”
Ibn Tibbon loves this word, matter. You won’t find any, the intention is matter as opposed to words, this is always the contrast, there is the matter in things and there are the words, that is meaning. You won’t find there any content beyond what you will understand from my summaries, says what you will understand, it could be that he doesn’t write everything, but you need to contemplate here, you need to understand, but if you understand the content of my words and then you read their lengths, you’ll see it’s the same content, basically I shortened and they lengthened.
A Note on Translating “Matter” in the Sense of Goal
And their father saw about this matter, yes, what they bring proofs about this point, or about this the goal should have been translated. This is also Schwarz’s translation here, and apparently he’s right. Yes, because if exactly he very much loves the word matter, he uses it to translate some, I don’t remember, there’s a list of words he translates with the same word, but he means, yes, it’s the same matter of creation of the world and so on, but in the original it’s really written intention or goal.
Two Rhetorical Tactics of the Mutakallimun
The First Tactic: Literary Beauty and Length
Rather, so what will you find? Rather that you will find things more expansive, basically you’ll see length, length of things and pleasant and beautiful language, yes? Terminology, very beautiful words, yes?
The Rambam’s Position Toward Eloquence of Language
The Rambam Here — On Eloquence and Style
The Rambam here, as is well known, was not a great enthusiast of eloquence of language, right? That is, he uses, tries to write with eloquence. In this book a bit less, but in all his books he is meticulous about precise speech. But he doesn’t think this replaces content, right? He says, you’ll find another book, yes, so maybe he’s a better writer, yes? And being a writer doesn’t prove the truth, yes?
The Critique Going Back to Plato
This is the critique that goes all the way back to… the critique that goes back to… what do you call it? Back to Plato, that beauty of speech and rhetoric etc. don’t help us know the truth.
Writing in Measured Poetry
And perhaps, says the Rambam, and perhaps, yes, and perhaps this is also a somewhat interesting translation. Sometimes one can translate, or already, there are also some who wrote this in poems, yes, they wrote poems that describe their proofs, and were measured in rhetoric, yes, this is in measured poems, yes.
Types of Poems
There are apparently two types of poems here, just poems, Schwarz translated rhymed prose or limitation of verses, yes, yes, but in ancient language this is called balanced poems and measured poems, poems that have the… measured is, what do you call it, that have this fixed rhythm, ta-ta-ta, ta-ta-ta etc., according to syllables.
And they chose for themselves, eloquent words, and they chose eloquent language, yes, beautiful language, and as if to choose words that sound good etc. So this is one thing, yes, three words for three modes of the same thing, but the intention is very beautiful literary writing.
Is the Rambam Writing Ironically?
So this is one way, yes, so the Rambam says, yes, fine, maybe read another book that wrote this in a more beautiful way. It could be that he’s somewhat laughing, when he says, well, write it in measured poems. It could be that there really are books of proofs written in poetry, I don’t know such books, it could be there are, but maybe he’s actually laughing, that is, in that they trouble themselves to write this with clarity, it’s literary, it’s a waste of time, yes, literary writing is important for popular books, that everyone needs to read, but books that are already intended for philosophers, so why does it matter if it’s written in poetry? Well, write it in measure too, yes, like, what exactly does this help you?
That’s how I read this line with a kind of irony, but it could be that yes there are, yes.
Example: Keter Malkhut by Rabbi Shlomo Ibn Gabirol
There is for example, Rabbi Shlomo Ibn Gabirol wrote the Keter Malkhut, which includes within it a kind of theology and proofs, not really proofs, but, so there really was such a trend to write philosophy of a certain type in poems, but this is a prayer, one needs to examine if there really are, one needs to search if there really are books that wrote proofs for the creation of the world in measured poetry, yes? I don’t know, maybe there are.
The Second Tactic: Obscure and Vague Language
So he says, and further, and perhaps something, there is also another tactic of facilitation, yes? And perhaps, yes, or sometimes, or already, they were said in obscure language and they intended this, and the intention is that sometimes there is a book that is the opposite, yes?
Two Opposing Tactics
So there are two rhetorical or stylistic, literary tactics, but they are opposites of each other, yes? One tactic of people who in the Rambam’s eyes don’t really have much to say in content, both because their content is incorrect and also because it’s far from reason, yes? It’s far from the basic intuition of people and of course of philosophers.
But as we showed at length in chapter 71, the argument of philosophy is that it is actually closest to the normal eyesight of normal human beings. But whoever wants to prove things against this, so he has all kinds of tactics.
One tactic, to write very beautifully, to write poems and rhetoric and such things, and another tactic is the opposite tactic, to write in obscure language, in vague language, in murky language.
The Purpose of Obscure Writing
And what is the reason for this? Says the Rambam and intended by this, this, yes, the intention in writing of this type to bring to the listener, to bring to the language, yes, he translates to witnesses, or how “to astonish” is written in Pines, yes, to impress you with murky words, makes a certain impression on the soul, and to frighten the observer, yes.
Linguistic Note on “To Frighten”
I need to check this word, to frighten.
Yes, to be awesome or something like that.
Manhil yuzel zeer this suits me.
Yes.
Ta’wala is the root, ta’wala.
Interesting.
To astonish, yes?
No, but I want to know what the difference is between this, this sounds to me like the same thing as… how do you say? To terrify is frightening, yes, Tibbon translated, it’s a different root, don’t know, really, okay.
In short, it makes a frightening impression, yes, we know books that do this, yes.
Summary of the Two Tactics
So this is the opposite tactic, to write in vague language, and yes, you’ll need to work hard to understand, but the Rambam’s claim, of course nothing is written here, there’s a lot of impression here, there’s a lot of literary effort to create either an impression of beauty, or an impression of such mystification, and… yes, that’s basically what he means. And this is not, this is nothing, a waste of time.
And you will also find in their compositions, so these are two things they do, opposite things, yes? But there are such books and there are such books.
Open Questions: Who Writes This Way?
I also need to check, another question, I don’t know which Kalam writes books this way, I don’t know, Kabbalists, like to write like this, yes? Many times there are more frightenings and threats and astonishments and such things, there is content in the writings of the Kabbalists.
And well, it could be there is, this doesn’t prove there’s no content, but it certainly doesn’t show there is content, yes. It makes an impression on people, but it’s not, the Rambam is very not, yes, of course the prophets do this, yes, the Rambam admits there’s a place for this, so well, I’m not entering the question of Kabbalah, but yes, the Rambam is very critical on this point. Not impressed by this.
The Guiding Principle: Separation Between Rhetoric and Philosophical Clarification
Yes, because if there’s a place for rhetoric, then it’s for the masses, not for proofs, yes? That’s basically the point. It could be there’s a place for this, but certainly not in a question that is itself truly a scientific-philosophical question that needs to be examined coolly, yes? Coolly, without bells and rhetoric and frightenings and mysticism and such things.
Chapter 74 — The First Proof for Creation of the World: Analogy from the Particular to the General
Summary of the Introduction: Three Types of Padding in Kalam Books
So until here his introduction to what he’s going to do. If we summarize, this introduction includes the Rambam’s method — that he shortens both their terminology and their lengthiness. And second, includes a kind of critique of them in that he says that this summary is really all the content in all the Kalam books on these topics. That is, you read these chapters — 73, 74, 75, 76 — you know everything they say, despite the fact that their books are a thousand times longer than these chapters.
And he has a list of three things that their books do, none of which are substantive, none of which are topical:
First thing — either they lengthen, expand in beautiful language.
Second thing — or they write in frightening language.
Third thing — or they lengthen with questions and answers and repetitions of language and arguments with others.
All these three things, where the third divides — each of them divides into several — this is all the content in those books that is not in this book, that’s not in his summary.
Reflexive Note: The Rambam’s Own Rhetoric
Of course in the Guide for the Perplexed there is also uprising against those who disagree with him, it’s not that… there’s also a lot of rhetoric in these places that can be turned back on him too, yes? The Rambam also writes in obscure language, and someone cynical could say: okay, you’re just frightening us throughout the entire first part with all these arrangements, and what, maybe in the end nothing is written here.
So I say, these arguments he makes are a kind of sharpness. Of course, this is based on the fact that he really believes he includes the content and they don’t. But this is not — what I said — the logic doesn’t say that whoever writes like this, proof that he has no content. It’s just not proof that he has content.
And although for popular people this is indeed proof that he has content. And indeed, regarding management of the masses, such things are needed. But if we’re discussing for the sake of knowledge itself, then really not.
The Goal: Reaching Substantive Content
So all this is very much — there’s a very large part of their books occupied with topics, with occupations of this type, that are not what you need. So if what concerns you is to know whether there’s a proof for creation of the world or eternity of the world or existence of God, then ignore all this and the summary I give will suffice, and from this you’ll already understand if this is a good proof, if not, if it’s partially good etc. — everything the Rambam is going to do.
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Transition to the Proofs: List of Proofs for Creation of the World
So until here the introduction. So we can begin the first proof. Let’s start. So let’s try to go through the proofs.
I looked in Wolfson’s book — he makes a list of, the Rambam here has a list of seven proofs, and Wolfson added another one, that is there are eight proofs, some in al-Ghazali, some in the Rambam. And well, so more or less all the proofs they use.
This is of course an opening to the main philosophical topic we said he deals with most seriously — which is the topic of creation of the world and its proofs and everything dependent on it and everything it depends on. And there’s much learning here for several good years.
—
The First Proof: Analogy from the Particular to the General
So we begin to read.
“The first way” — here is the way. Tibbon didn’t know that “way” (derekh) is feminine, so he translated “first” (rishon) [masculine]. So the moderns say one should translate “rishonah” [feminine]. And of course in the Gemara it’s written that derekh can be masculine. So a dispute between Hebrew and our tradition.
“Some of them thought” — so one of them or some of them, I don’t know why Schwarz completely [translated] “one of them”, it says “some of them”. Some of the Mutakallimun think the world is created. It says “mehadesh”, I think one should vocalize here “meḥudash”, I assume. “The one” — there is a proof that the world is created.
Structure of the Argument: Basic Analogy
This is a proof that goes from the general to the particular, in a kind of analogy. I’m reading here the words, and to delve into these subtleties also requires — I’m putting here some flag that we’ll delve into this more.
But the main argument of this Mutakallem, or of this approach, doesn’t matter — is that we see created things in the world, and if there’s one created thing in the world, it must be that the entire world is created. That’s basically his argument.
Important Methodological Warning
This is a kind of argument, and what’s important to note about all these arguments — that we, when we hear arguments of this type, we very often immediately give them a certain interpretation in our head, that in a vague way is pattern matching. It matches all kinds of arguments that are actually better arguments.
So one needs to pay attention exactly to what — what is the bad type, how does he think this argument works. Because apparently this argument is supposed to work by way of analogy, not by way of inference from general to particular or something like that. The Rambam is going to explain this and explain what it’s based on, why it can work or how it can work, and why it’s not such a good argument.
I’m just warning not to insert into the hearing of the argument all kinds of assumptions we have in our heads when someone says things of this type. I don’t know — do you mean that the creation must start from something? Or do you mean that there’s something common in all things and therefore?
He doesn’t mean all these things. He apparently means a very basic analogy: if there’s one created thing, it’s necessary from this that all things are created. That’s basically the complete formulation of the argument, in this line: “from the one being created, there is proof that the world is created”.
The Example: Reuben Who Was a Drop of Seed
“As if you would say” — and then the Rambam explains, he gives, fills this with an example. “You would say, for example, that Reuben” — we already spoke that every time it says “Reuben” in the original it says “Zayd” or “Zed”, by the way — “who was a drop of seed”.
We know many changes, that is many creations in the world. There was Reuben who once was a drop of seed, “and afterwards was transferred from state to state” — slowly he became other things — “until he reached his perfection” — he became a complete man, a grown man.
So we know, look at this Reuben, see that he is created. Creation is basically a word for change. He is created, he wasn’t always Reuben, first he was a drop of seed. This drop of seed became Reuben, very nice.
The Causal Principle: A Thing Does Not Change Itself
Now, “and it is false” — impossible or false in the logical sense — “that he would be the one who changed himself and his formation from state to state”.
And we understand, it’s not clear here from where — maybe we see this, and I’ll return again to all these proofs that I’m beginning to learn here — that Reuben himself is the one who gave birth to himself, who caused himself to be from seed to a complete person.
But “he has a changer outside of him” — so there must be something, someone, who changed him that is not him. “Behold he already required a maker” — so he needs a maker, that is a changer, creator — “who formed his state and the formation from state to state”.
This is the argument. I won’t add much to what he wrote in the summary. This is: there is one created thing, and we see that there is one created thing, and we see created things, and we also know that created things don’t make themselves. It’s not the child, the baby himself who caused himself to grow, but it’s something — we don’t need to examine what — but something from outside, external to him, must be what’s responsible for his creation.
Extending the Argument to the Entire World
“And therefore, says this one, and so the analogy” — thus that same analogy, that same argument — “it’s possible to make regarding this date palm and others”.
He took an example of a human being, a child who grew, but one can make the same example from any natural thing — that there was a tree, first there was a seed and afterwards it became a tree etc. “And he said that so is the analogy with the world in its entirety”.
So this argument goes: you see things changing, you understand they don’t make themselves, so look at the entire world and understand that it doesn’t make itself. Something like that.
One needs to examine at all if there’s an argument here.
The Rambam’s Comment: This Is His Comment
“And the Rambam concludes” — and this is his comment. “Behold you see that this…”
The Rambam’s Critique of the First Proof — The Hidden Assumption and the Problematic Analogy
The Hidden Assumption at the Heart of the Argument
He says, see that this man, there’s a hidden assumption here, yes, that he didn’t say, that he said that if every thing that applies, every kind of natural law or metaphysical law or something that applies to one body, it must apply to all bodies. And therefore we see one man or one date palm, yes, that grew, that was created, behold, you admit that things don’t create themselves. Look at the entire world, it must be that it too is created and also didn’t make itself, yes?
There are two stages here he needs to prove regarding the entire world. I barely understand what he means, this approach, I need to read, what’s it called? Wolfson, who tries to make, to give sense to all these proofs here.
Two Possibilities for Interpreting the Critique
But it could be that the Rambam means this works according to the atomistic system, yes, that we spoke about, that all bodies are similar to each other, all identical to each other, and therefore the entire world cannot be something different that has a different law, yes? That is, a kind of law or some rule that’s different from the rest of the things in the world, yes? This is seemingly something, maybe something he means, I’m not sure.
It could be he means something simpler, yes? Yes, that there’s no beginning of an argument at all, where does this argument even come from. Later there will arise arguments that he explicitly writes about them, that they derive from the first assumption of atomism that all atoms are identical to each other. So I’m not sure he means this point here.
It could be he means something much broader in the sense of okay, so very nice, correct, there are created things that others create them. Now prove to me that the entire world is created and that others created it, you’ve made a very big leap and maybe you have some strange assumption that one can make analogies between all things for some reason but he really didn’t give a reason to believe this analogy.
So I’m not sure and I think I’m going to stop here and next time we can continue with this matter of what they’re called, yes, okay, okay, it seems this is my thing, this is the first and last thing that all people say.
Distinction Between Types of Arguments — Analogy, Regression, and Design
Not of expression this is not, I’m not sure, because usually they mean the argument of infinite regression in the end. That is, therefore I say one needs to distinguish here between the different distinctions, he brings here below that Schwarz… no, the simple people, not people of some great sophistication.
No, but even the simple people say the second proof, that Reuben must be the son of Isaac, of Jacob, and then arrives at the first man, and then he arrives at the first. This is the proof of Amnon Yitzhak.
The First Proof — Basic Analogy
This proof is not even the proof of Amnon Yitzhak, yes, it’s an even more basic analogy proof, that you see that something, yes, do you understand what I’m saying?
Yes, like they say, you went and saw a watch, surely someone made the watch.
Yes, this is very nice, but I didn’t see the watch, I saw that it’s made, I didn’t yet see that the world is made, yes, so something very basic is missing here in this watch.
So I’m telling him, and this will be the argument, like, this seems very… Well, if this is the argument, then this is the argument, I don’t know, I need to look. This is an argument for the matter, say the Kuzari of 30 and like… I thought usually they mean the argument of this chain.
No, like there was Rabbeinu, you saw an apple, you saw something somehow sophisticated, there must be that someone made it.
The Design Argument vs. The Analogical Argument
Okay, this is an argument of another type, this is the design argument, this is another argument.
Ah, this is the argument of 30.
Therefore I say, we need to be very precise with these things. There’s an argument of, see that there’s wisdom here, and wisdom doesn’t come by itself, okay? This is a certain argument. Here he doesn’t say this, he says that something is created, it has, it’s made, and that’s it. Yes, that’s all. Not clear.
You understand, this is not, I saw that he calls this an analogical argument, yes? This is not, one needs to examine this, and one also needs to read al-Ghazali, when he has all kinds of arguments for creation of the world that are partly the same arguments, and what happens there.
End of the Lesson
So like I have work here, I started here. Okay.
Okay, thank you very much.
Thank you very much.