📋 Shiur Overview
Summary of the Philosophical Shiur: Desire, Temperance, and Middos
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I. Introduction: The Topic — The Middah of Zehirus/Prishus/Temperance
The first middah that the Rambam brings is zehirus/prishus — in English *temperance*, in simple Yiddish: not being a ba’al ta’avah. It’s difficult to find a positive Yiddish name for this middah — one can only describe what one should not be.
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II. The Central Problem: Lack of Practical Experience
a) Ethics is a Practical Wisdom
Ethics is a meleches machsheves — like medicine, one needs experience, not just theory.
b) No One Has Real Experience
There is no real example of a person who is truly *temperate*. The only people who “have no desires” are broken people — a “chatzi briyah” (like after electric-shock therapy), not a madreigah.
Conclusion: Practically, no one is truly restrained — “to some degree.”
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III. What Does the World Think About Ta’avah?
a) The Secular World Doesn’t Discuss It At All
There is no *self-help book* about temperance, no article in the New York Times about how to be temperate. On the contrary — there are “half-hour plans” for how to be a ba’al ta’avah. The secular world doesn’t have such a category at all — they are “aesthetic”, they don’t care.
b) Important Clarification: We’re Talking About “Social” Middos
All the middos being discussed are on the ba’al habayis level — bein adam l’chaveiro / bein adam l’atzmo. Not a tzaddik, not a mekubal, not a parush in a monastery. The Rambam’s Torah is a Torah for ba’alei batim.
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IV. The “Goy Shebkirbecha” — Methodological Principle
a) The Principle
When we say “goy” we mean the goy shebkirbecha — that is: what would you think if you weren’t a frum Jew? This is the real internal struggle. People need to be honest about their own thoughts, not just say “frum things.”
b) The Olam’s Position
In today’s world, ta’avah is only a problem when it causes harm — “addiction”, “excessive”. If it doesn’t cause harm, there’s no problem. But: “What does ’causes harm’ mean? Harmful for what?” — that it prevents one from feeling life. But then: “What’s wrong with not being able to feel my life?” — this already presupposes a value judgment.
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V. Concrete Examples: What Does “The World” Think?
a) Someone Else’s Wife
According to secular logic, going to someone else’s wife is only bad if you get caught — it’s only bad because it hurts the other person, not intrinsically. Here lies a contradiction: one says it’s “not a problem”, but simultaneously one looks up to a “respectable” person. But one doesn’t look up to him because he’s restrained — one looks up because he’s successful, good-looking, etc.
b) Young People
In one’s 20s-30s is the “frat-boy” life — there’s no issue with being a ba’al ta’avah. When one gets older, one wants other things. But this isn’t temperance — this is just a natural transition, not a middah.
c) Sharp Conclusion
> “Legal ta’avah is not a problem” — this is what people really think.
When people say “I have nothing to do with ta’avah”, this is an image, not truth. In truth: a Jew is a ba’al ta’avah, only he wants to keep it within “legal” boundaries. The geulah of America: “you have fun”, and the geulah of a Jew is to become a goy — not to have things to hold back from.
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VI. Clarification: Ta’avah vs. Inhumanity
When we speak of ta’avah, we don’t mean inhuman behavior (lying, manipulation). Someone who lives with his wife with ta’avah is also a ba’al ta’avah — ta’avah itself is the issue, not how it’s expressed. Lying and bad behavior is a separate category — not ta’avah.
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VII. [Side Remark] Young People Need More Vitality
A bachur needs to be more lively than an older yungerman — this is stated in Koheles, and even in halachah (“besulah yotzeis b’ner” — a girl goes out with fewer tznius restrictions, girls don’t cover their hair). Many people are confused about this, but this isn’t the main issue.
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VIII. Main Thesis: Middos Tovos as “Natural Beliefs”
When we talk about middos tovos, we’re talking about things that we believe are good — not just what the Torah says. The distinction:
– “As a goy” — what a person naturally holds to be good/bad
– “As a Jew” — what one forces oneself to do because of Torah
Even “as a goy” one doesn’t hold that every ta’avah is good — even when it doesn’t hurt anyone.
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IX. Proof from Jonathan Haidt — Moral Intuitions Without Rational Justification
The famous psychologist Jonathan Haidt asked people: if someone wants to sleep with his sister, no danger whatsoever, no one knows — is it good? Almost everyone says no, but no one can explain why.
This proves: People have moral intuitions that they cannot justify — but they believe them nonetheless. Our culture has contradictions: we hold that certain things are bad, but we can’t justify it.
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X. Critique of the “It Will Harm You” Approach
The typical mussar approach — “don’t do it because it will ruin your life” — has a fundamental problem: why should I care that it ruins my life? This already presupposes a value judgment about what a good life is — but psychologists claim they don’t make value judgments. This is a contradiction. There can be many ways of a good life, not just one — but one must have some picture of what “good” means.
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XI. Chinuch as Foundation — Aristotelian Principle
Important methodological point: Without chinuch nothing begins. Chinuch provides the facts upon which one theorizes when learning philosophy. Just like in science — one starts with facts/experience, afterwards one seeks causes and reasons. Moral science (toras hamussar) works exactly this way:
1. First one has facts (we know that certain things are better)
2. But we’re not consistent, we have contradictions
3. Philosophy comes to clarify — not to start from zero
Whoever wants to start from zero — that’s a different shiur.
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XII. Critique of Two Types of Mussar Drashos — And Both Don’t Work
Type 1: “One Must Sanctify Oneself”
One says: a Jew must free himself from desires, because of Gehinnom, because physicality is foolishness, etc. Result: People complain that they do love olam hazeh, they kvetch about it. It doesn’t help even for three seconds. One doesn’t become convinced even for a moment that it’s really not good. One just complains.
The Word “One Must” — A “Thought-Terminating Cliché”
When someone says “one must”, one stops listening. “One must” is just a way to say the same thing without solving the problem. “One must” + “one isn’t” = stuck. “Levels” (madreigos) is also just another way to say “one must.”
Shame (Bushah) — An Important but Misunderstood Thing
A sharp distinction:
– True shame: One doesn’t do the thing because one understands that it’s a shameful thing. This is internalized — like not going naked in the street. One doesn’t want to because it’s shameful, not because one holds back.
– False “shame”: One does the thing and is ashamed afterwards. This isn’t shame — this is a sign of conflict. The kvetch is not a good middah.
“Kol mi sheyesh bo boshes panim” — shame is important, but only when it’s an internal understanding, not just a feeling of guilt after doing.
The Alternative: Realistic Madreigos
> A realistic small madreigah that one can actually do, is much more valuable than kvetching about a madreigah that one cannot do.
We didn’t come to this world to kvetch about our deficiencies. We came to accomplish something — to become a bit better. Proof: Mature people stop listening to those drashos — this proves that it really doesn’t help.
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XIII. Critique of the “One Should Have” Narrative
The constant “should” blocks the person from finding what he can actually have. It might have been better for such a person to say “I don’t believe in this whole thing, leave me alone, I’ll do what seems good to me.”
[Side Digression: The Rebbe’s Bench]
On which bench does the rebbe sit when he kvetches about servants? — On a very comfortable bench. This underscores the hypocrisy motif.
[Side Digression: Eating by Charedi Jews]
An empirical proof: Charedi Jews eat no less than others — they have just as many restaurants, cafes, go to Weight Watchers, eat ice cream, kugel, etc. This proves that the “mussar” narrative does practically nothing.
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XIV. Type 2: “Torah Came to Make Good for Man”
Instead of Torah suppressing man (“adam nivra lishbor es hateva”), the “enlightened” approach (connected with the Rambam, Shemonah Perakim, mekubalim) says that Torah is chaim, came to make man alive — one should eat, but not feel bad about it.
Critique: The drashah is “very nice” and historically interesting, but does even less than the first. It leaves the person exactly where he was. It’s like a history lecture about architectural styles in Italy and Spain — interesting, but one doesn’t build a house from it. Halachah l’ma’aseh everyone remains as he is — a chanuk remains a chanuk, a non-chanuk remains a non-chanuk.
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XV. The Principle: “Gedolah Talmud Shemeivi Lidei Ma’aseh” — Learning Leads to Action
a) The Foundation: What a Person Sees as Beautiful/Good — That He Does
Man is a “rational being” — not that he never deviates from seichel, but that generally he lives according to what seems to him good, beautiful, right, “noble”, “correct”.
b) “Al Tifnu El Ha’elilim”
This is the foundation of the prohibition to look at beautiful foreign books/ideals — because it works. The Rambam says: one looks at “yofi hatzurah” of non-Jewishness, and in the end comes “v’e’eseh kein gam ani” — one starts to imitate. This is not changeable — it’s a basic mechanism of human psychology.
c) Learning Without Involvement is Impossible
Academically-neutral learning is a myth. Even academics who learn Kabbalah “objectively” eventually become mekubalim. Examples: academics who learn Kabbalah start having dreams with sodos haTorah; people who learn ancient Egypt start dreaming about Egyptian gods. A person who is immersed in something immediately becomes drawn to it.
The claim that one can learn “shelo lishmah” (without personal involvement) — this is like a berachah levatala. Only with very much kavannah to the contrary can one perhaps avoid this pull, but naturally one becomes drawn.
The rule: Learning = changing. “Gedolah talmud shemeivi lidei ma’aseh” — learning naturally leads to action, because what a person understands as good, that he does.
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[Side Digression: The Gerrer Rebbe]
The Gerrer Rebbe (R’ Yisrael) said that generally Shabbos doesn’t make one gashmiyusdik — “but if one wants very strongly, it can indeed make one gashmiyusdik.” The normal order however is that one becomes drawn after it.
[Side Digression: R’ Elimelech of Lizhensk and the Bathhouse]
R’ Elimelech of Lizhensk washed in a certain bathhouse that “Chassidic chanyukes” didn’t go there, and a non-Jew had complaints. [Cut off as distraction.]
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XVI. Why Most Mussar Drashos Are Not Effective
a) The Problem: Too Little Detail
Most mussar drashos are not useful because they are not detailed enough. One hears a beautiful shmuess at seudah shlishis about not being a ba’al ta’avah, but one doesn’t know what this means practically — and one eats the same cookies at melaveh malkah.
b) The Positive Example: R’ Yoel
R’ Yoel says specific brachos-hanehenin-drashos — this helps more because he says specifically what to do and what not to do, and makes it sound easy. This is important because:
– “Difficult” is when one doesn’t know what one is talking about
– The real difficulty is not the body, but not knowing what one wants
– Many more steps of thought are missing
c) Critique of Ba’alei Mussar
Ba’alei mussar who say “we have enough emunah b’da’as, we just need action” — if one would ask them a few questions about their emunah, they wouldn’t be able to answer. That is, the problem is still in the head, not just in the heart. If one knew everything, the “v’shavosa al levavecha”-problem would almost not exist.
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XVII. Back to the Shiur: The Distinction of Two Types of Ta’avos
a) Recap: Chush HaMishush
The Rambam brings four times in Moreh Nevuchim: “chush hamishush cherpah lanu” — ta’avah speaks only of touch, not of sight, hearing, smell. Even taste alone is not ta’avah — taste is a da’as/judgment — only the touch within it is the ta’avah.
b) The Two Things That Ta’avah Concerns
Ta’avah concerns only two things: eating (sustaining one’s own body) and procreation (sustaining the species). Both are natural and important — not selfish. But the ta’avah is not the purpose itself, but the pleasure within it.
c) The New Distinction: Two Types of Ta’avos
This is the core of the shiur:
Type 1 — Natural Ta’avah:
– This all people have — “man insofar as he is man.”
– When one is hungry, one eats; when one is thirsty, one drinks.
– Aristotle calls it “devarim yeveshim” (dry things) and “davar gash” (wet things).
– One can almost call it not human, but like a “tzimachon” (growth) — connected with the “chelek hazan” (nutritive faculty).
– But there is a certain love/taste in it — on this one makes brachos hanehenin.
Type 2 — is only begun but not elaborated in this shiur (will presumably be continued in a future shiur).
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XVIII. Structural Summary of the Entire Shiur
The shiur builds up in three layers:
1. The Problem: We have no real understanding of what temperance means — neither theoretically nor practically. The secular world (including the “goy shebkirbecha”) doesn’t have such a category at all.
2. Methodological Critique: Both types of mussar drashos (the “one must sanctify oneself” approach and the “Torah is life” approach) don’t work — they are not specific enough, and the real problem is not a lack of action but a lack of knowledge — one doesn’t know what one is talking about.
3. The Content Distinction: There are two types of ta’avos — the first (natural, connected with the chelek hazan) is explained; the second remains for later.
📝 Full Transcript
The Problem of Ta’avah (Desire): Do We Lack Practical Experience with Temperance?
Introduction: The First Middah (Character Trait) — Zehirus/Prishus
Instructor:
Gentlemen, the story is as follows, I’ll tell you the story, stories of tzaddikim (righteous people). The matter is this, that the first middah that the Rambam [Maimonides] brought is called the middah that we spoke about, the Rambam calls it zehirus [carefulness/caution], prishus [abstinence], or what else can you call it, temperance in English, and so forth. In other words, not being a ba’al ta’avah [one driven by desires]. In Yiddish it’s very hard to find the positive name of this middah, but not being a ba’al ta’avah, that’s the middah. Right?
The Central Problem: Lacking Practical Experience
Now, I have a big problem talking about this middah, because what do I know about being a ba’al ta’avah? I don’t understand. We’ve talked about all kinds of nice things, theories, that’s all fine. But simply put, we’ve learned that ethics is a melekhet machasheves [a craft requiring thought/practical wisdom], it’s not some theoretical chochmah [wisdom], it’s a wisdom that has to do with practice, practical wisdom, like medicine. So, it doesn’t seem to me that I know anything about experience, about not having any ta’avos [desires]. Yes, true, true, one minute, let me already say answers, I’ll already say teirutzim [answers/resolutions]. There is one teiretz [answer], but let’s be real.
And I don’t know anyone, anyone, who has experience with this middah, as I will soon try to bring out. Do you know anyone who has experience with this middah? It’s simply and plainly about being temperate. Can you give me an example of a guy who is temperate? Not a ba’al ta’avah. I can’t think of anyone at all.
What, simply a person who is unfortunately broken? Electric shock therapy, what does that do? It shocks a person. Ah, he has no ta’avos, he’s not in a house, he’s a chatzi beri’ah [half a creature], a quasi, lo chai v’lo beheimah [neither living being nor animal], as they say. You know such people, yes? So, I say most people are held back. I say, no one is held back, that goes for that.
Student:
No one is a strong word.
Instructor:
To some degree. What is covered under the term “ta’avah”? Let’s say.
Student:
Aha. Okay, good, we need to hold there. Let’s talk about this a bit longer.
Instructor:
Yes, yes, yes.
Because I want, I want, I just want to bring out that something is missing, that this is a problem. Do you agree [maskim] with the problem?
Student:
What problem?
Instructor:
I know many people who are ashamed. What do you mean what problem?
Student:
What is the problem with the fact that there isn’t anyone who has arrived at this…
Instructor:
Not only is there no one who has arrived. I don’t know what we’re talking about at all. I’ll tell you why. I’ll tell you what I know what people do. I know many people who give drashos [sermons] about ta’avos, okay? Many people. I only know two drashos that people say, okay? I’ve already said four other drashos besides those. But what I know, and you can tell me if you know differently. I’m speaking openly, like the kolos fun ever [voices from the past], what I hear the voices of the world that speaks of such things, the Jewish world. The non-Jewish world doesn’t talk about such drashos at all [bichlal], as far as I know. Do you feel that all non-Jews have… Have you ever heard that the, I don’t know, the… someone in the New York Times once wrote an article about how to be temperate?
Student:
There’s a half-hour plan to be a ba’al ta’avah.
Instructor:
Aha, so you say.
Student:
Yes. There are such things, no secrets [sodos].
Instructor:
I ask you, should we talk about this? Have you ever seen such things? Have you ever seen a self-help book about this?
Student:
Perhaps you’re telling me to talk about this.
Instructor:
Why would they care? They’re aesthetic. They’re aesthetic, they don’t care about…
Student:
Let’s go… The first couple that we need to know, he already says.
Instructor:
We’re not talking about anything today.
Important Note: We’re Speaking of “Social” Middos at the Ba’al Bayis Level
What I want to say is this. Let’s remember, all the midos tovos [good character traits] that we’re talking about are things that all people agree on. We’re not talking now about midos tachlis [ultimate/extreme character traits]. We’re not talking now about… Let’s remember clearly, everything we’re talking about is social middos for now, in this perek [chapter] or in this discussion. All our middos have to do with, you can call it bein adam l’chaveiro [between person and fellow], you can call it a bit bein adam l’atzmo [between person and self], just as ta’avah is bein adam l’atzmo a bit, but it’s all still on the very ba’al bayis [householder/ordinary person] level. We’re not yet talking about any extreme things. We’re not talking about being a tzaddik [righteous person], about being a mekubal [kabbalist], about being a parush [ascetic], in a monastery or something like that. We’re talking all about devorim [things] that are proper things. Ba’alei batim [householders]. Right? Klal gadol [great principle], he’s here for ba’alei batim. Whoever wants other Toros [teachings], the Rambam is a Torah for ba’alei batim. God forbid [Rachmana litzlan]. You want? Not in today’s world. Today’s world isn’t for ba’alei batim? For whom is it? Today’s world is such a problem for a ba’al bayis. Hm? The yetzer hara [evil inclination] is a problem. It’s not a problem? There’s such a thing called “addiction”, “excessive”. “Addiction”. “Excessive”. You want to ruin your life. The problem is that there’s a strong ta’avah. What’s bad that it harms my life? But the ta’avah itself is bad. There’s also that it harms your life. So what is it? There are bad ta’avos. You have one ta’avah, that you feel like you have one minute of ta’anug [pleasure]. You have one minute of ta’anug, it’s one of two things, yes? Are you sure it doesn’t harm at all? If it doesn’t harm, in today’s world there’s no problem. What does it mean it harms? It harms for what? You can’t feel your life. What’s bad that I can’t feel my life, by the way? Very good. So, let’s understand, let’s talk about this.
Discussion: What Does the World Think About Ta’avah?
The World’s Position: Ta’avah Is Only a Problem When It Causes Harm
So, you say… Let’s talk about what you’re saying. You’re saying that it’s accepted in the world that don’t do many things, don’t do many things that are nogei’a [relevant] to ta’anugei haguf [bodily pleasures]. Do you agree, Yoel? Yoel Yoel? Don’t love to eat generally, it’s very terrible. Right? The “law” makes it bad, actually. Okay, let’s say. Instead of a second one. Well, okay. You must love someone else’s wife, right? You may love? You may even also do something? You may also do something? If it doesn’t become known, yes? One may. That’s how the world holds. It’s no problem at all. Are you so sure that people hold that way, right? It hurts someone. Ah, it hurts someone. Ah, it hurts someone. It hurts someone. It’s no problem for their ba’alei batim.
Okay, that’s the ge’ulah [redemption] of America. You have fun. You have fun strongly. For Jews the ge’ulah of a Jew is to become a non-Jew. That’s the ge’ulah. Not having any things to hold back.
Okay, so two, I want to talk about two things.
The Instructor’s Methodological Principle: The “Goy Sheb’kirbecha”
So two things, let’s talk about this, I have two people to talk to, and it’s very hard. But two things. First [kodem], so, let’s say, let’s talk with Rabbi Rota. If it’s true that the oilam [world/people], our us, society, I don’t mean society, I don’t mean what we think, right? When I say what the New York Times thinks, I mean what we think lulei d’chumash [were it not for the Torah], right? Because that’s what we think, right? You already know my derech [way/approach] in avodas Hashem [service of God], right? Anything, when I say non-Jew, I mean you yourself, right? The goy sheb’kirbecha [the gentile within you], as someone says, right? You don’t know the goy sheb’kirbecha that goes to wage war [milchamah]. A second one thinks, I mean to say, when if you weren’t a religious Jew, you would have thought that way, right? But you would have thought that way, right? Or you want to think that way. That’s what I’m arguing in our entire shiur. I’m already experienced [po’el] in chinuch [education]. I know what I’m talking about. Just one second. Very good, very good.
So, let’s first talk about what we are, I just want to talk about what we’re agreed [muskem] on, because we don’t know. When I say like the non-Jew, it’s only as the Torah doesn’t allow under cherem [ban], right? What we think when we wouldn’t have been Hasidic Jews. So what we think is, we think l’cho’orah [apparently] that it’s very bad. You say to someone else’s wife isn’t bad only if he finds out, okay. Ah, yes, truly [mamash]. Is there a problem that someone should go check on another? Is that counter? What happens with people who lose their rights to their most saids? It’s only that it hurts the other person. Is there a problem that someone should go check on another? It’s not a problem, and that’s what, let’s ask this way, that’s what, I hear here two contradictory arguments. You say it’s not a problem, and also that’s what people look up to that person, right? No one cares. You’re talking about people looking up to him. No one cares. If there’s a person who wants to be respectable, he used to do his things, yes, and he does so, people look up to him.
How many people have mentioned the door that you looked at earlier, because he’s a person in the door? Far, far, people don’t look up to him because of that. People look up to him because he’s successful [matzli’ach] anyway, he’s good-looking, I don’t know what, he’s successful, so people don’t care about that.
Concrete Examples: Young People and the “Frat-Boy” Life
Student:
In the 20’s and 30’s, in the thirties, he wants to have a wife, he wants to have a life. He can’t already have the plaster person.
Instructor:
No, that’s the life. No. Yes. Certainly. That’s still the way of a frat-boy. When you get older, you already want to have other parts. But when one is young, definitely, there’s no issue with someone being a ba’al ta’avah. It’s an old thing in the world, and everyone holds themselves up. Yes, already. You had your time, already. Certainly [vadai].
One girlfriend is one thing, but six girlfriends, every day a different one. Not every day, the other week. Yes, but I want already the other part, the other thing should come. Do you understand me?
Student:
What does ta’avah have to do with the four women? Someone has every day with his wife, he’s a ba’al ta’avah in a way. That’s just expressed in a bad side. Let’s hear what the rabbi has to say.
Instructor:
And the rabbi wants here that the oilam should be convinced of this, and that’s what they think. Because they think I’m saying religious things. This talk of “I have nothing with ta’avah”, that’s an image. Legal ta’avah, legal ta’avah is no problem. People don’t say anything with ta’avah, a Jew is a ba’al ta’avah.
Mussar Lectures and the Problem of “One Must” – A Critical Analysis
Clarification: Ta’avah Is Not Inhumanity
It’s an old thing in the world, and Jews hold in one… Yes, already. Will you go by every thing say already.
One girlfriend is one thing, but six girlfriends? Every day a different one? Not the father, the other week. I don’t want the other part, the other thing of commentaries.
What does ta’avah have to do with the four women? Someone has every day with his wife, he’s also a ba’al ta’avah. That’s just expressed in a bad thing. One must hear what I want to say. And the rabbi wants the oilam to be convinced of what I must explain to him. They think I’m saying religious things. What you’re talking about has nothing to do with ta’avah. That’s an inhuman being. Lying and ta’avah is no problem.
Righteous Remark: Young People and Liveliness
Okay, by the way, is there anyone who disagrees with me that a bachur (young man) must be a bit more lively than an older young man? It’s even written in Koheles [Ecclesiastes]. It’s even the halacha [Jewish law] that way, right? “Besulah yotzeis b’ner” [a virgin goes out with a lantern – referring to a young woman’s greater freedom in public], a girl must go less modestly. Girls don’t cover their hair, right? There are many people who are very mixed up. People say… I don’t want to get into this discussion.
Main Thesis: Midos Tovos as Natural Beliefs
Anyway, do you understand what I’m saying? What I want to say is, that when we talk about midos tovos [good character traits], we’re talking about things that we believe are midos tovos. Why do we believe? That’s still an investigation [chakira]. And when I say believe, I mean what we hold as a human being [goy], not what we hold as a Jew, because that’s already a completely different level where one forces oneself. And I mean that I as a human being… Here I want to arrive, I want to return to where I began. I hold that I as a human being don’t hold entirely that every thing that one does with a ta’avah is good, not only what hurts the other person.
Proof from Jonathan Haidt – Moral Intuitions Without Justification
Are you very clear? I think that’s an excuse that people say. There’s a very famous psychologist called Jonathan Haidt, who gave a survey to people, and he asked them, let’s say someone wants to sleep with his sister, and he made sure that there’s no danger at all and no one will know about it, it doesn’t bother anyone, whether they hold that it’s a good thing. Almost no one holds of it. They don’t have a good teiretz [answer/explanation] why they don’t hold of it.
This shows, what people say they have an answer, what I mean that Rabbi Yoel Hoiz says is that they don’t have a good justification why one can’t say, but I mean that you also hold that then they are d’oraysa d’oraysa [Biblical-level prohibitions], but you don’t know why. Al pi Torah [according to Torah] you know why, but not al pi seichel [according to reason]. That’s what I mean, not like Nachmani.
There’s a thing called Dudel Yoel, which is like ben Yaakov. There are so many Yaakovs that you can write ben Korach ben Yaakov, because it ends with ben Yoel, so many, no one knows which Yoel. Anyway, do you understand what I mean?
Our Culture’s Contradictions
On the other hand there is, this shows that our culture has many contradictions, because we believe that many things are bad, but we can’t justify it. Let’s remember that truth.
Critique of the “It Will Harm You” Approach
Because when you ask yourself, because the Torah that’s taught to people is very weak. People say, don’t do it because it will bother your life. And by the way, and what do I care that it bothers my life? Can you explain to me?
There’s always an implied goodness of life, value of what a good life is, when you say that, right? It’s not like the psychologists say, one shouldn’t make any value judgments, just disturb your life. Okay, I specifically want to go commit suicide, I hold that that’s good, and I hold that it’s good. Almost no one means that. He means to say that I do have an idea of what a good life looks like. It could be that every stage looks different, it could be that there are many, there are sixteen ways of a good life, not just one way. Nevertheless [u’vechol zos], and if it disturbs you, a ta’avah that disturbs that is bad, you understand? That’s what I mean.
Chinuch as Foundation – The Aristotelian Principle
So what I want to say is, so but, let’s, I want to address what you said, that our children ruin our chinuch. It’s very important to be grounded in chinuch, not grounded, because as we learned at the beginning of Aristotle, without any chinuch nothing begins. Chinuch gives you the facts upon which you theorize when you learn philosophy. It came to clarify, perhaps to solve contradictions, to give a theory, to make better what we already know from the facts.
Just as in science, no science begins without any facts, without knowledge, experience. Facts, afterwards one explains the facts, the reasons, the causes. When one knows the causes one understands the facts better too. It’s not just a way of organizing the facts to end something.
The Same Thing in Moral Science
The same thing is in moral science, in toras hamussar (ethical teachings). First we only have facts. We know that this is a better life this way. Sometimes we think the opposite, we are soser (contradicting) ourselves, sometimes we think slightly different things, we’re not consistent, we don’t have any clarity in this. This came to make it clearer. But before this, nothing begins. If someone wants to start from zero, this is not the shiur (lecture), it’s a different shiur. Right?
The Two Types of Mussar Shiurim – And Why They Don’t Work
So in any case, what I’m saying is this: I start from a problem. I know that you didn’t go to cheder, and a cheder that taught that ta’avah (desire) is bad, and somehow you don’t have the problem, because you don’t have any problem, as you say. But I have a problem, and my problem is that I only know of two types of shiurim that talk about hilchos ta’avos (laws/teachings about desire).
Type 1: “One Must Sanctify Oneself”
One of them goes like this: rabbosai (gentlemen), a Jew must sanctify himself, a Jew must be free from ta’avos olam hazeh (desires of this world), because such and such and such and such, because that’s how one goes to Gehinnom (purgatory/hell), or because the physical foolishness is terrible, vechulee vechulee (and so on). It doesn’t matter the why.
And so one complains about the fact that we are very coarse young men, and we do love olam hazeh (this world), and… nothing. Basically, that’s where it ends. If I understand correctly, this is how most types of toras ha’avodah (teachings of spiritual work) work. True, it’s terrible, one shouldn’t love olam hazeh, one does love it, so one groans about it. One says, we shouldn’t love it, we shouldn’t love it.
And it helps… People say it helps for three seconds, I think it doesn’t even help for three seconds. I’m talking about the pnimiyus (inner reality), I’m talking about what I understand, perhaps it helps, but it doesn’t even begin for a second to be convinced that it’s really not good. True? So it doesn’t even help for those three seconds, because one complains about it. Right?
“One Must” – A Thought-Terminating Cliché
This is why, and I hold that this is lefi da’ati (in my opinion) a waste of time, not worth doing. And therefore I say, I’ve already said it several times, therefore I say that when someone says “one must,” I stop listening, because that’s a thought-terminating cliché. “One must,” and then he’s on the madreigah (spiritual level), great tzaddikim (righteous people) didn’t love the word “one must.” I can say “one must,” I already know that one must, one mustn’t, but it’s a waste of time. This is a way of not solving the problem. You have a problem, and it’s only a way of saying the same thing, “one must” and one isn’t.
Do you understand what I’m saying? One complains, one does teshuvah (repentance), one complains. “One must” is the same thing. Levels is another way of saying “one must.” Okay, if we’re talking about levels, let’s get into that. Do you want to give a shiur? Therefore I say, a shiur… and there is no shiur, one cries about it, and it helps nothing. I mean, it’s not that it helps nothing, it helps that I can say that I’ve complained, it helps something, it’s not that it helps nothing. But it’s not useful, I can’t do anything with this.
What One Gets from This: Shame Without Understanding
Like Yonah cries about it, he doesn’t come to beis hamedrash (study hall) with this. No, he doesn’t come to beis hamedrash. Ah, so what you gain is shame, or as it’s called today, guilt.
Shame (Bushah) – An Important but Misunderstood Thing
But let’s understand, let’s say this a lot. Shame is a very important thing, “kol mi she’yeish bo bushes panim” (whoever has shame – from Pirkei Avos), let’s understand this right away. Shame is a very important thing, but shame means that I understand that this is a shameful thing, true? Not that I’m ashamed, I feel bad. And understanding that it’s a shameful thing doesn’t mean that I love it less. No.
The Primal Example of Bushah
A person doesn’t go out naked in the street because that’s bushah (shame), yes, “ki cherpah hi lanu” (for it is a disgrace to us), it’s a bushah. What yevoshu (they will be ashamed), everyone understands that it’s a bushah that one doesn’t go naked in the street, true? Why don’t you go naked in the street? Because essentially you would want to, it feels so good, but what should I do, I’m ashamed. No, shame – I gave the primal example of shame.
Shame means that I don’t do it because it’s a shameful thing, because it’s a bushah to do this. But I don’t want to do shameful things. What you’re asking is theoretical, it would be a bushah ba’olam (in the world). It’s not something I would care about, right? Bushah is an internalized thing.
False “Shame” – Conflict, Not Understanding
But when you say that he feels shame, he does the same thing and he’s ashamed. That’s not shame. Shame is when one doesn’t do it, and one says the reason why one doesn’t do it, because that would be a bushah. But when I’m ashamed, I do it, but I do it with a groan. The groan is not a good character trait. The groan is a sign of a conflict. It doesn’t help. One is stuck.
The Alternative Approach: Realistic Levels
Kacha da’ati (such is my opinion). No, not da’as Torah (Torah opinion), this is what I think. Why do I think this way? Not because… It could be you’re right that it’s better than nothing. But what I think is that there are ways through this. If we stop doing this, and what I want to argue, what I do in all these sorts of cases, I’m softer on certain things, I say, it could be that what we’re talking about is not realistic. One must better speak and understand what one is seeking. And afterwards, the realistic thing one would at least be able to do.
The Principle: Small Levels Over Great Groaning
Like the klal (principle), a realistic thing, even if it’s a small madreigah, let’s say, that one can indeed do, is much more worth than groaning about a madreigah that one can’t do, that perhaps no one can do, or perhaps I can’t do, it’s not such a great nafka minah (practical difference). Because we didn’t come to the world to groan about our chesronos (deficiencies) and our shiflus (lowliness). We came to the world to accomplish something, true? To become a bit better. Right?
Proof: Mature People Stop Attending Those Sermons
So that’s one way of the drashah (sermon) that goes, okay? The drashah is totally useless, in my opinion. At least for me it doesn’t help. And the ra’ayah (proof) is that all people who are mature stop attending those drashos, for the most part. This is a ra’ayah that it really doesn’t help. Or the people who hold that their avodah (spiritual work) is to remain immature, they keep themselves in one saying…
It could be, it could be. I don’t know.
It could be, it could be. I don’t know.
It could be.
It could be. Could be that it helps. When I say that it doesn’t help, I mean to say that I have a better way of thinking.
Beginning of a New Direction: People Work Through Da’as and Narrative
We thought, we thought, I have a chaver (friend), a gaon (genius) who said that ethics is an inyan ma’asi (practical matter), but people are things that work through da’as (knowledge/understanding). People are not percentage obligations. People are things, as I said in the piece, people are things that work with a certain narrative, at least, a certain understanding of things.
Drashos About Ta’avos – Critique and Alternatives
Critique of the “One Should Have” Narrative
Instructor:
Could be, I don’t know. Could be. There are other drashos. Could be it’s not, I’m not saying it doesn’t help, I don’t mean to say that I have a better way of thinking. I really said that this is, that ethics is an inyan ma’asi. But people are things that work through da’as. People are not, there are no clear things. People are things that work with a certain narrative at least, a certain understanding of things. If your narrative is just that, it’s not doing anything to you.
I hold that one can, instead of saying this, I hold that we are very accustomed and very much inclined to say the narrative, to say, “one should have, but one isn’t.” And people live their whole lives, they do nothing about what he says. Every time he catches a hisorerus (a feeling of spirituality, a moment of inspiration), he says, “I think it would even be better, perhaps this may only be said for certain people, perhaps this is such a parah adumah (the red heifer, a chok that one doesn’t understand), perhaps this may only be said for certain people, but many times it would be better to say, ‘I don’t believe in the whole thing, leave me alone. I’ll do what seems good to me, not what I must believe.’” The “must” is what blocks you from finding out what one can indeed have. That’s my view.
Digression: The Rebbe’s Bench
Instructor:
One minute, on what kind of bench does the Rebbe sit when he groans about the servants in houses? On what kind of bench? On a broken, gold-wooden bench does he sit when he says this? Yes? It’s hard to believe, it’s hard to find a more comfortable bench than the Rebbe has. I don’t think. I’m very unsure about that.
Digression: Eating by Charedi Jews
Instructor:
Okay, okay. I mean that yes. Let’s say I mean that yes. I’m talking about the person who means that yes. I mean that yes. I mean that yes. One eats exactly as much kugel before or after. One eats exactly as much ice cream before or after. Kach hi da’ati (such is my opinion). In the Heimish areas one doesn’t eat less than in the free areas. I only answered one. I don’t know, I wasn’t there, I last checked on 13th Avenue, or whatever the avenue where one eats in Boro Park today is. There aren’t fewer restaurants, kosher or not kosher. Are there? And Charedi Jews don’t go to them? They’ve cried themselves into eating.
Fewer people are found at cafes in the second place? Fewer people? Charedi Jews don’t eat less than the others? Charedi Jews don’t eat like… No. You know what I know? Have you ever gone to Weight Watchers? Yes. Come to us, there are also Charedi Jews there. Yes, about the same amount. They’re already chunky, they do eat. Charedi Jews aren’t thinner than the Lubavitcher Jews? Honestly speaking. They’re fatter?
In short, okay, okay, I have a complaint about that. Okay, in short, it won’t help you at all, less than it could help. Do you want to know if it’s worth something? I hold that everything is worth something. One shouts in beis hamedrash, “shehecheyanu vekiyemanu vehigi’anu” (the blessing said on holidays), by Charedi Jews, one shouts in beis hamedrash by Lubavitcher Jews, and they’re very happy with everyone. And they say that Chassidus will hold for you that there is a better way, there is indeed a way through this.
How will it look that it will be the meat store, where our shalosh seudos (the third meal on Shabbos) foods, it comes, he’ll get a frankfurter, he’ll come in with a complaint, he’ll come in with a complaint, he’ll have a frankfurter with ketchup, with ketchup and mustard, and he’ll say, “Oh, it’s so good, it’s so good!” It’s such a good thing, it’s such a good thing, it’s such a good thing. I have no hasagos (understanding, comprehension). It’s such a good thing, it’s such a good thing. But, okay, I don’t know, I am not happy, I am not satisfied with such a drashah, what should I tell you.
Critique of the Second Drashah: “Torah Came to Make Good”
Instructor:
There is another type of drashah, which learned Jews also say, our friends, they say such drashos, it’s heard. There is a shitah (approach) of, I don’t know, let’s say the Rambam (Maimonides), or certain ways of the Rambam, or of the mekubalim (Kabbalah scholars), or of, I don’t know, the simple understanding of certain people, who hold against olam hazeh (this world), who hold that the Torah came to suppress the person, to press down the body, “adam nivra lishbor es hateva” (man was created to break nature), and he must break his ta’avos (desires).
But there is another, an enlightened shitah, which one also says is from the Rambam. Don’t ask me how, the Rambam can be both blamed and praised for the same shitah, which says truly as one learns in Shemonah Perakim (the Rambam’s introduction to Pirkei Avos) that the Torah is made to make good for a person. The Torah came, as they tell us? Torah is chaim (Torah is life), we know the drashos. The Torah came to make alive. One should eat, but one shouldn’t feel bad when one gorges. That’s basically the yotzei min hazeh (the result), true? One shouldn’t feel bad.
The drashah is very nice, and somewhat historical. I mean, it’s nice history, and it’s nice intellectual drashos, these are important things. Also one shouldn’t have any pleasure on any, also this writes Tosafos Yom Tov (commentary on the Mishnah) on any, I know the drashos. But that drashah does nothing for me, true? It basically leaves me exactly where I was. It does even less for me than the first drashah.
The Comparison with Architecture History
Instructor:
If drashos that deal with matters of ethics need to accomplish something, or need to at least have a plan, I’m not saying that everyone must follow the plan, but I give you a plan for how one can build a beautiful house. If someone is an architect and he has the tools, he will be able to build from this house. Not everyone will build, not everyone is building now. But someone, but the one who says that here in Italy they used to build houses this way, but in Spain they used to build houses this way, it’s history, it’s very interesting. But in short, what are you going to do with this? What does a person who does with this do? One can do with such things, build inspired by this style and so forth. But generally one doesn’t live from this at all. It has nothing with halachah lema’aseh (practically) one has nothing.
Halachah lema’aseh everyone remains more or less as he was. If he’s a chonik (glutton), he remains a chonik. If he’s not a chonik, he remains not a chonik. And it doesn’t help me at all.
I learned both of the two drashos. I heard both of the drashos, and none of them were very interesting to me. None of them actually moved me from place one to place B, besides for adding yedios (knowledge) or from I know what. Do you agree? Also don’t agree. One nods. Does that drashah help you more? Is it better than the first? The first drashah helps you be choniks, you not be choniks. And if you turn more with a community, you’ll catch that the community also doesn’t do much.
The Principle: “Gedolah Talmud Shemeivi Lidei Ma’aseh”
Learning Means Changing
Instructor:
Ah, the Torah came… Learning means changing. Learning means I previously thought this way, something, and afterwards I think this way. That means, I think that I can be this way, and not be this way.
Okay, come to me, he says a klal, “gedolah talmud shemeivi lidei ma’aseh” (great is learning that brings to action). The inclination of a person, yes, let me tell you how it works. How must I? The inclination of a person, I’ve already said the drashah enough times, I don’t know if I already had the Torah today. “Gedolah talmud shemeivi lidei ma’aseh.” The inclination of a person is, what he sees and what he understands, and for me it’s what he understands as good, he does. Even if he doesn’t want to, even if he only comes there barely, therefore there is indeed a mitzvah “al tifnu el ha’elilim” (do not turn to idols).
The Prohibition of “Al Tifnu El Ha’elilim”
Instructor:
Yes, one may not read the “beautiful” books that the zarim [zarim: strangers, non-Jews] have written, because one is nitpa’el [nitpa’el: impressed] by them. Unless one reads it leshem yedi’ah [leshem yedi’ah: for the purpose of knowledge], levatel avodah zarah [levatel avodah zarah: to nullify idolatry], that comes from a different place. But one must know that there is such an issur (prohibition), and the issur is “because it works”. “Because” if one looks at “beautiful” things, one is mitbonein beyofi hatzurah [mitbonein beyofi hatzurah: one contemplates the beauty of the form], as it says in the Rambam, one looks at the beauty of the non-Jewish world, and in the end one thinks “ve’e’eseh ken gam ani” [ve’e’eseh ken gam ani: and I too will do thus]. Yes, “eich ya’avdu hagoyim ha’eleh et eloheihem, ve’e’eseh ken gam ani” [eich ya’avdu hagoyim ha’eleh et eloheihem, ve’e’eseh ken gam ani: how do these nations serve their gods, and I too will do thus]. Or, yes, I will do thus, I want to, “just” “ve’e’eseh ken gam ani”.
This is the nature of a person, this is not something that can be changed. No, one cannot change it. It’s a very “basic” way of how people work, that what appears tasty to him, not at once and perhaps not twice, but what appears beautiful to him, appears “beautiful” to him, “so he starts doing”.
The Person as “Rational Being”
Instructor:
“Because what are you doing”? “A person is a rational being”. “Rational being” doesn’t mean that he never deviates [noteh: inclines] from his intellect, it means that generally, the way of life that a person lives is the way of life that appears good to him, that appears tasty to him, that appears beautiful to him, that appears true to him, correct. One can say “true” is perhaps too big a word, but correct, beautiful, “noble”, “correct”, “all kinds of words like that”. Nothing, everything is “easy”. Ah, ah, be good. So that’s still a bad…
One learns.
It’s a discussion leshem yedi’ah, it’s not a Shabbat Shuvah kabbalah [Shabbat Shuvah: the Sabbath between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur; kabbalah: an acceptance upon oneself] for craziness.
Learning Without Involvement is Impossible
The Example of Avodah Zarah
Instructor:
Yes, but “it’s true”. You can’t… if someone doesn’t have the nisayon [nisayon: test, experience], if someone tells me, I want to tell you, you want to learn all the tikunei avodah zarah [tikunei avodah zarah: the laws regarding idolatry]? I mean like this. If someone says he learns books of avodah zarah, he went to see the avodah zarah, he didn’t have any temptations to become an oved avodah zarah [oved avodah zarah: one who serves idolatry], whatever avodah zarah means, I don’t know, he needs to hear learning hilchot avodah zarah, he didn’t learn it well, because you don’t learn any desire. What’s the point? One can say like the halachah.
People say, the Baal Shem Tov [Baal Shem Tov: founder of Hasidism] said that chochmot chitzoniyot [chochmot chitzoniyot: external wisdoms] one must learn shelo lishmah [shelo lishmah: not for its own sake], and Torah one must learn lishmah [lishmah: for its own sake], right? But learning shelo lishmah is a berachah levatala [berachah levatala: a blessing in vain]. Why should you learn shelo lishmah?
Yes, for other reasons, we won’t go into it. Yes, it’s true. It’s a truth, if one reads the books and gets involved in them, one must actually make a lot of kavanah lehipech [kavanah lehipech: intention in the opposite direction] in order not to become nimsach [nimsach: drawn]. And naturally, bederech hateva [bederech hateva: naturally] you become nimsach. And it can be one speaks of what the halachah is, whether one may, whether one may not. But I’m just saying, because this is learning.
The Example of Academics
Instructor:
Anyone, I don’t know anyone, I know that here in academia there is, even the academics have a goal, and it’s an ideal, to learn things without being influenced. But it doesn’t actually work. At least lefi da’ati [lefi da’ati: according to my opinion], and you can be mechalek [mechalek: disagree] with me, lefi da’ati, every academic that reads kabbalah [kabbalah: Jewish mysticism] becomes a mekubal [mekubal: kabbalist] at some point. Most of them are not modeh [modeh: admit] in themselves, some of them are. And at night the Ari comes to him in a dream and tells him sodot haTorah [sodot haTorah: the secrets of the Torah]. Ad kedei kach [ad kedei kach: to such an extent]. It can’t be, a person lies in something, he shouldn’t… It’s in Hasidic…
Student:
[inaudible]
Instructor:
It’s one hundred percent that he’s a mekubal. The Ari certainly comes to him in a dream. Yes, he was, he started to have mekubalot. He had a certain version of kabbalah. Of course, of course. That’s right. Those people are obvious. There isn’t… There it starts from an interest. The interest has a certain mehalech [mehalech: process], but it starts from an interest. But I’ve seen many people who started as just curious. What does it mean you’re curious? Why are you curious about this? There are many things in the world to be curious about.
Student:
[inaudible]
Instructor:
No, no, it’s not true. I tell you, I hold. It’s not such a thing. It’s not personal for every person. Everyone must be in midot uma’asim tovim [midot uma’asim tovim: good character traits and deeds]. But I think that anyone that studies something… People that study ancient Egypt start dreaming of the gods of Egypt, okay? That’s the reality. It’s not… It’s a person. A person… again, if one makes a lot of kavanah lehipech, one can perhaps lehimane’a mizeh [lehimane’a mizeh: avoid this]. And what did Gershom Scholem do? He didn’t think about how the day went at night. What do you see that he sees differently from this?
Shiur on Ta’avot: The Distinction Between Two Types of Ta’avot
Back to the Main Topic: Ta’avot
Maggid Shiur:
I won’t go into it. I tell you, I’ll restrain myself. It’s not such a thing. I can’t be personal with every person, everyone must take care of their midot and ma’asim tovim. But I think that anyone who studies something, people who study ancient Egypt, they start to dream of the gods of Egypt. Okay? That’s the reality. It’s a person, a person, again, if one makes a lot of kavanah lehipech, one can perhaps prevent this.
And the Ribbono Shel Olam, what did Gershom Scholem do? Not think about how a day in dreams at night? How is he so different from this? He considers himself awakened, true? It’s a spiritual bonding. That’s what drives his life.
Of course. I can’t be his life. What, he starts to organize his life. Of course. 100%. I tell you, people, he can still be influenced, he won’t be like that one, because that one still had, you can still have things. No problem. He won’t mix up many things. I don’t believe there’s almost no one who can, at least, again, if there’s someone who has a lot of kavanah lehipech, like the Rebbe who is the Gaon, Rabbi Yisrael Salanter said that he heard that from eating on Shabbat one doesn’t become coarse, he said, “but if one wants very strongly it can indeed become coarse.” Understand? But fewer want strongly against all this, but the normal order is that one becomes nimsach acharav. The normal order is that eating on Shabbat doesn’t make a person coarse. What?
Student:
Yes. Yes. Don’t say, don’t say, I tell you yes. I read, exactly.
Maggid Shiur:
Well, but you’re saying it in a low way, you could say it in a high way. Because, not because one believes in it, because you start seeing the world from that perspective. Okay, rabbotai.
Discussion About Frumkeit and Belief
Student:
The opposite, you mean one doesn’t become frum.
Maggid Shiur:
The one who makes the frumkeit, you understand? The frum are those who don’t believe. I become the real one who believes yes. Yes, yes, correct. Correct. What’s the matter, there’s a derasha about this. It comes to another shiur about the details, we’ll see. It’s not so simple. He argued, by the way, let’s not talk and one mustn’t be choshed (suspect) the holy Rabbi Elimelech of Lizhensk. Because do you really think Rabbi Elimelech wasn’t a bit with you? He turned with the… he washed in that bathhouse, true. The Hasidic yeshiva students didn’t go there. There is, the yeshiva students didn’t go to that bathhouse, let’s be clear, true? No, the non-Jew had complaints. The non-Jew had complaints. In short, ah…
Student:
Very good, I have no complaints.
Maggid Shiur:
No, he’s talking about a Mishnah. I know, I’m just saying it’s not as simple as you make it. The heter, the heter that you’re standing not just the heter, it says in Rashi, and so on. In Rashi it says that one can read… I don’t want to make rumors, it’s not my discussion today. Okay, it’s a distraction this. Rabbotai, velo yasuru acharei levavechem. One mustn’t become distracted. One mustn’t become distracted. I just want to say, I’m going back to my shiur. Rabbotai, rabbotai, I have a shiur to say about ta’avot, hello, not about avodah zarah. I know that “the two types” is the continuation, but… It’s not here.
Why Most Mussar Drashas Are Not Effective
Maggid Shiur:
Rabbotai, I say like this, I say that when one learns about something and understands precisely what the requirement is, I say this, most mussar drashas are not useful because they are not detailed enough. That’s why. That’s the reason why they’re not useful. And therefore, one hears a beautiful talk at seudah shlishit, and one says how beautiful, how important it is not to be a ba’al ta’avah, but I don’t know what that means. In the end I eat the same exact cookies at melaveh malkah, exactly as before. That’s my custom, as opposed to the other custom.
Student:
Yes, yes, yes, because you remember, yes, you have your cousin Reb Yoel, another Reb Yoel.
The Positive Example: Reb Yoel and Birchot Hanehenin
Maggid Shiur:
In short, there’s another Reb Yoel who conducts himself to say birchot hanehenin (blessings on enjoyment), I tell you it helps. Much more than other drashas. Because he says precisely, it doesn’t last forever, one doesn’t change from one drasha, but if he says precisely what you should do and what you shouldn’t do, it can occur to you tomorrow, “okay, let me do it.” He also makes it sound easy, which is very important. Because difficult, as you also say it’s difficult, difficult is when you know what one is talking about. That’s the main difficulty. Difficult is not when you have a complete clear body. That’s a small problem, one must know how to get there. The main difficulty of all these mussar drashas is because one doesn’t know what one wants.
I know, mainly I know that I’m bad, that I must learn, and I mustn’t be bad, and I must be ashamed, and so on. But what practically, what precisely to do, you know? You can’t tell me. So, it’s indeed difficult, because many steps are still missing. I’m not saying the principle isn’t correct, but there is such a principle, but many steps of thought are still missing. One isn’t yet at the problem.
Critique of Ba’alei Mussar: The Problem is in the Head, Not Just in the Heart
I say many times, I can’t hear my drasha. All the ba’alei mussar who tell us we have enough emunah beda’at, we need to have lema’aseh, I want to ask them a few questions about their emunah beda’at, see if they indeed have faith in the head and only the heart is missing, okay? Can you answer a few questions? Do you catch yourself saying? Ah, you have no doubt at all, you have no problem with “vehashevota el levavecha”? You have so many horses, you already know, what should I tell you? After you know everything, we’ll see if you still have a problem with “vehashevota el levavecha”.
I mean there’s almost no such problem, I’m connecting the problem, I’m resolving the problem, I’m resolving the question, I’m resolving the question, I’m resolving the question. If he doesn’t stand in this, he falls back, no problem, on this one must strengthen oneself. No problem, then one must say, you must strengthen yourself every day. On this there are also remedies. But we don’t hold at us, we don’t hold there. Just being involved in the problem, the whole Shabbat doesn’t raise or lower anything.
So, therefore I say something else. Therefore I say this, and I understand what my argument is. So, where was I? So, I want to say this, so, that doesn’t help. So, I’m going to say a shiur from the holy Rambam, or from the Rambam’s teachers, the same thing, and try to explain a point. What, it’s already 10:13, until I’ll finally finish saying a shiur. So, I want to explain a little point.
The Distinction Between Two Types of Ta’avot
Recap: Chush HaMishush Cherpah Lanu
We want to tell it this way, we want to talk about ta’avot. We said, we want to make a distinction, that everything we do is indeed two things, truly two divisions, two types of things that one always talks about the same thing and it’s mixed up. If one makes two things, makes a distinction, one can know precisely what one is talking about.
So I want to make a distinction, it goes like this. Now send me the date, first of all, I’m not arguing with you. You know the date, I won’t put a head on you. Okay. So I want to argue like this, because I want to see if it’s a ta’avah. Perhaps the shiur needs me to know. My date is certainly a ta’avah.
So, ah, yes, okay. Let’s see. We explained last week a very important principle, and last week’s shiur was to explain the language that the Rambam [Rambam: Maimonides] brings four times in Moreh Nevuchim [Moreh Nevuchim: Guide for the Perplexed], “chush hamishush cherpah lanu” [chush hamishush cherpah lanu: the sense of touch is a disgrace to us], that the sense of touch, that’s the problem. And we explained what this means, that when one speaks of ta’avot, one speaks very very specifically of ta’avot of the sense of touch.
One can speak of ta’anugei haguf [ta’anugei haguf: bodily pleasures] as opposed to ta’anugei hanefesh [ta’anugei hanefesh: spiritual pleasures], it’s not enough to say this, one must still say which ta’anugei haguf, not pleasures from all the other three senses or four senses, at least three senses, meaning re’iyah [re’iyah: sight], shemi’ah [shemi’ah: hearing], rei’ach [rei’ach: smell], in this one is not a ba’al ta’avah. We spoke about this last week.
But ta’avah speaks of ta’avot also not of ta’am [ta’am: taste], because taste is not a ta’avah. Did you know? But the touch of taste is a ta’avah. Taste is really a kind of touch, it’s a bit more complicated, but the taste, the taste of food is a judgment and not a ta’avah. It’s da’at [da’at: knowledge/judgment]. But the ta’avah is in the touch within it. So that’s what is meant by chush hamishush cherpah. Here we hold, correct?
The Two Matters That Ta’avah Concerns: Eating and Periyah Ureviyah
It comes out that when one speaks of ta’avot and the quality of not having ta’avot, one speaks only very specifically of two matters that people do. One of them, by the way, let’s remember, why do people do these two things? One eats food in order to live oneself, yes? And periyah ureviyah [periyah ureviyah: procreation] one does so that humanity should live, true? These are the two things that sustain the person. It’s not at all a small thing, they’re very important things, true? It’s not selfish. Personal and in general, family, rather. It’s teva [teva: nature]. Why did nature make, why did the Almighty make achilah [achilah: eating]? So that people should live. Why did the Almighty make so that people shouldn’t die out when the first person dies, yes? What did He make? Correct.
Student:
It reminds of a wedding dying, therefore it’s a wedding the explanation yom hamitah [yom hamitah: day of death], one must go with a kittel [kittel: white burial shroud worn at weddings].
Maggid Shiur:
Why does one have a wedding? Because we’re going to die. Because we’re going to die, we had to have a wedding. Correct. Very sad. You say so, isn’t it dangerous to have children? Why does one cry at the brit milah dance? Very sad to have a wedding, understand? Certainly not only, one must also go to a wedding, indeed a concern. What?
Student:
Very good! That’s the joy, that even though I will die, I don’t die anymore, because the community lives on.
Ta’avah is Not the Goal, But the Pleasure Within It
Maggid Shiur:
So, in any case, these are the two things one speaks of, but the topic of ta’avah is not this, this is already the goal, this is already a good thing. We’re speaking of ta’avah, the pleasure within it, right? The pleasure that is pleasure. Ta’avah is a pleasure, or one can say that one must do these two things with pleasures, and in these things there is a ta’avah.
The Distinction: Two Types of Ta’avot
Now I want to say an interesting thing, I’m making a distinction. I wrote it here on my… I wrote here in my language, I’ll say it and I’ll look in. In the first piece, the first piece that has a header, there it says like this:
There are two, where is my paper? Yes, the lashon kodesh (Hebrew) paper. There are two types of ta’avos (desires), very important to grasp, two different types of ta’avos, or two different types of ta’anugim (pleasures), where the ta’avah is the attraction to the ta’anug, yes? Two different types of ta’avos. And these two things are two different types of ta’avos, and one must speak of both extremes. I wanted to say that only one of them is truly the middah (character trait) of perishus (abstinence), I mean that it’s not exact, but let’s see. There are two types of ta’avos.
Type 1: Natural Ta’avah
One type of ta’avah is natural. Natural, I mean to say, how can one see that it’s natural? Because all people have it. A person, insofar as he is a person, has such a ta’avah. So, for example, that every person likes to eat. What does it mean he likes to eat? That when he is thirsty he drinks, and when he is hungry he eats. That’s basically what it means.
In other words, when his body lacks some food, the type of things that Aristotle calls “devarim yeveshim” (dry things), the dry things, “davar gash” (solid thing), the attraction to this is called, then he eats. When he lacks wet things, a wet thing, then he drinks. That’s basically every person in the world, there is no person who doesn’t have this ta’avah, this natural ta’avah.
True, you can call it the appetite, you can almost call it not a human thing, but rather like a gufnus (physicality), a complete gufnus, as we discussed, which has to do with the chelek ha-zan (the nutritive faculty). But there is in this a certain ahavah (love), he likes it, there is a taste, yes, true. There is a certain… on this one makes a berachah (blessing), birchot ha-nehenin (blessings on enjoyment). True, birchot ha-nehenin one makes on