Neoplatonic Virtue: Contemplation and Theurgy

Neoplatonic Virtue: Contemplation and Theurgy

In this session of our Neoplatonic Virtue course, we first finish Porphyry’s Sententiae 32 by wrapping up our discussion of purification: How does the rational soul govern the passions? Can inner order arise simply through presence and attention, without violence? Drawing on Platonic metaphors of honor and self-respect, we examine the soul’s gradual alignment with its higher principle through contemplation and philosophical training.

The second half of the class turns to Iamblichus. I introduce his role in the development of Neoplatonist ethics and we read together a passage from De Mysteriis II.11. This raises a number of questions about the contrast between the ethics of Porphyry and Plotinus and that of Iamblichus. We ask:

In what sense is there — or isn’t there — theurgy in Plotinus?

Can contemplation alone suffice for union with the divine, or does true divine action require ritual and symbols?

What does it mean for an action to be initiated by the gods rather than by human intention?

How does Iamblichus’ conception of symbolon differ from philosophical discursive thinking?

We also contrast the ideals of wisdom behind each thinker. For Plotinus, the sage must be capable of answering any philosophical challenge, yet need not teach systematically. For Iamblichus, by contrast, the philosopher must be able to render divine truths in a systematic, expository form — because this, too, is part of acting in harmony with the divine order. This results in a need for more definite categories in his thought as opposed to the "fuzzy" limits of psyche and nous in Plotinus.

In the next few classes, we will be further discussing Iamblichus and also his Platonic background.

Transcript