The Superiority of Intellect over Imagination – Note (A) | Part I Chapter 73 (14) | Guide for the Perplexed 169 (Auto Translated)

Tenth Introduction: The Distinction Between Intellect and Imagination — Foundation of Maimonides’ Wisdom

The Pillar of Kalam Wisdom: The Principle of Transference

We are holding here in the middle of the tenth introduction, which dealt with the matter of transference, which the Rambam said is the pillar of Kalam wisdom. And the Rambam said that this depends essentially on two things, which are connected to each other, but two things that enable this introduction — that everything that can be imagined is possible.

The first is their entire physics, which is what makes this essentially possible. And the second is the matter of imagination and intellect. He already wrote this here, that what they call possible, the Rambam essentially says thus, and we will reach the conclusion at the end of the matter, it seems this is the conclusion.

The Point of Agreement: The Possible is Broader than the Existent

The Rambam essentially says, it is clear to everyone that not everything we see is what is possible. According to all opinions, possibility, what can be, is broader than what exists. All natural science, all knowledge of the world, is based on understanding not only what happens to exist, but what can be.

And everyone agrees, that is, on the basic principle they state, that what you see is not all that can be. There is something we call intellect, and they also call it intellect essentially, that tells us what can be — wisdom. This is to learn, in other words, to learn physics is not the same thing as seeing what happens in the world, because there is wisdom here, there are laws that are broader. You see a white person, he could also be black and yellow, I don’t know how many colors, according to what is possible, according to what wisdom says. So this is correct.

The Point of Dispute: Expanding the Possible to the Negation of Nature

His dispute with them is only about the precision of this very statement — what is possible. And essentially, this is one thing, they greatly expand the boundaries of the possible, even to things that from the perspective of our physics are impossible. They don’t only say, you see that now it is day, it could be night — it cannot be night now, but something slightly different could be. They expand this to the statement that it could be night now, that there is only a custom that this is so, and this expansion is possible.

Because they do not see necessity in all causality in nature, they deny all causality itself and the entire word, they essentially deny all of nature — this is the first thing.

The Second Argument: Imagination versus Intellect

And the second thing, which is essentially connected to this, as we shall see, they ultimately come out the same, these two arguments, but we have not yet reached this.

So the second thing, the Rambam wrote here that what they claim is possible, meaning intellectually possible — you do not understand the word intellect. What you call intellect is actually imagination.

There is one thing called intellect, a second thing called imagination, and they are opposites of each other, not at all related to the same thing. There is perhaps even something in between or something, another type of thing called the beginning of common sense etc., all kinds of opinions that are not intellect, but what we call intellect is something entirely different from what you call intellect.

And therefore it is true that everything you — your definitions of what is possible, are definitions that have a place. He essentially admits that there is some power, there is a faculty, there is a certain ability that shows us this, they are not just saying words. But this thing is exactly what we call imagination, and not intellect. Intellect is something else. This is essentially the second argument.

The Status of This Section: “Note” — An Awakening, Not a Marginal Comment

And now we, this note, I think it is a note because it is a very general matter. I spoke about there being notes of this type in several places in the book, I have not yet counted them, I can count them, but this is not really our topic.

The notes are always things that go beyond — I think, things that go beyond somewhat, in some sense, this chapter. This is not exactly something that is a continuation of the explanation of the tenth introduction, or an explanation of why he did not accept it etc., this is a very general and very fundamental explanation.

The Meaning of the Term “Note” (al-tanbih)

But, and this is also a general note, I think another thing, this is the matter of the root. This is a note because it does not quite fit here, it somewhat departs from the matter, and this is also a note because it is a note from the root “to awaken.” Not only from the root — it may be that this is always the root of note. Something that one must awaken to and not only something one must read, which is a note, because we say note, usually the intention is something marginal. I am just saying note, what is this matter.

It may be that here the intention is always, I will check in another moment. Note — there is always a note in the introduction there is the word “awakening.” An awakening of this type appears truly only two or three times in the book in Part III Chapter 51, which speaks about the intellect which is the attachment between us and God. And in Part III I mentioned there is another place at the beginning where it is written “awakening,” I am not sure. I am not finding it at the moment.

In any case, this is always from the language of awakening. From the language of awakening you to something, and not only awakening, but also awakening to some other level of humanity — to be a different kind of human being. This is what we call “musarras,” to awaken.

Awakening from Sleep

When the Rambam calls “and awaken” he means now you will awaken, I am going to awaken you. Not only awaken in the sense that it is not the body of the book but awaken. He means, here I am going to awaken you to something, I am going to awaken you from sleep, because we remember from the Rambam’s instruction regarding the blowing of the shofar, and several other times in the book, also in the reasons for the commandments, I collected them in my commentary, on his commentary on the blasts, that he very much likes to use this term of awakening from sleep. Most people are asleep, or they are in darkness, asleep in darkness, and one must awaken them — bring them light, with an aleph, and also awaken them from their sleep.

The Address: “You, the One Who Studies This Treatise”

And the next section is essentially a tremendously fundamental section in this sense, that it in some sense teaches us, and this is the statement, the clearest statement of his on this topic of intellect and imagination, which is a kind of middle bar. If the pillar of Kalam wisdom is this imagination, this possibility, the pillar of the Rambam’s wisdom is one of his pillars, this is this distinction between intellect and imagination, which is exactly the distinction he is going to explain here.

And one must understand both of them. This is not only to say, stop imagining, start thinking, using intellect, but there is also here a very precise understanding of what imagination actually is, why it works this way, and what it does, and what is essentially the meaning of the transition, the ascent from intellect to imagination, sorry, from imagination to intellect.

The Rambam’s Language: Address to the Student

And he begins thus, Know, you the man who studies this treatise. The one who studies this treatise. There is such a type of man who studies this treatise, apparently he has already reached Chapter 73, so he has already received — no, so there are several times in the book where there is this type of address.

His intention is, he means it literally, what I said is not just so, he means that there is a type of people who study this book, who can study this book, and he addresses him. He says, I admit that most people cannot understand this.

You, there are several times, I am now, and one must, there are other places, this is not exactly this style. You the student, you the student of this treatise, and you the learner of this book. He has this style several times, and he means this.

Who is the Student: One Who Wishes to Reach the Level of Speculation

He means, you who are ready, he has different styles to say this matter as well, but also this point is correct. You who want to be the Guide for the Perplexed, you who want to reach the level of speculation, he writes this another time, if your desire is to reach this, the level of speculation, which is essentially the level of intellect and not imagination, then I address you, I am not speaking — this essentially says thus, the Rambam wrote for us in the introduction that there are all kinds of people, not for everyone, the book is not intended for everyone, so also here.

How shall we say? This note is not for everyone. There are many things he writes in this treatise that are essentially for everyone, like all the chapters that strip away corporeality, saying God is not like this, He is not like this, this essentially can be taught to everyone and must in some sense be taught to everyone. Here there are things that are explicitly not taught to everyone, this is one of his secrets, both the secrets and also one of the things distinguishing between this man and another man.

A Prerequisite: Knowledge of the Soul and Its Powers

And he says thus, that you, if you know the soul and its powers. The first thing you need to know, the Rambam constantly says what he assumes that the wise person studying this treatise already knows, and he does not teach us. He generally does not…

The Rambam’s Note on Intellect and Imagination — Its Status and Significance

The Status of the Note in the Guide for the Perplexed

At the beginning of Part II I need to… no, it says introduction. Well, there is a difference between introduction and note. A note of this type there are only two, very interesting, both deal with intellect.

If you… yes, one of the things that the student of this book must already know, or somehow he should have understood this, is to know the soul and its powers. This is something he assumes you need to know, but you do not actually know it, he does not teach it in the book, as I mentioned from the introduction at the beginning of Part III, Part II, he has his own reason why he does this there, but he writes there that this book is not for stating philosophy. Whoever wants to learn philosophy must learn Aristotle, yes? Know that in this book it was not my intention to compose anything on physics or to summarize the matters of divine science, yes? He does not deal with physics or theology, not really with physics. He speaks to people who have already read, as he writes, things in time he said to one who has philosophized. Such language appears in another place, I do not remember where at the moment. He writes, read to the philosophers and he spurs the philosophers to be philosophers and also solves for them the problem of the contradiction between philosophy and Torah, as written in the opening of the book. But he does not teach you philosophy, therefore whoever learned only this book and does not learn philosophy, then essentially he says, I am not speaking with you.

But here he does want to teach something, he does summarize something from wisdom, but not all of the soul and its powers. And I think this is truly perhaps one of the most necessary philosophical introductions for this book, and in general, yes, the Rambam and as already whoever wrote, whoever carved this on the door of the temple at Delphi, who wrote Know thyself, and according to the philosopher’s interpretation, what is the intention that one must know the soul? This is not the plain meaning, but not our matter.

Knowledge of the Soul as the Key to Understanding Everything

And they said that the main thing a person must know is to understand the soul and its powers, which is the key to understanding everything. Apparently we understand everything through the soul. So the type of our understanding is also, yes, this is essentially what he writes here, you want to understand the soul, you must understand what is the power of intellection and what is the power of imagination and representation, all these powers, and if you do not understand exactly what this is, then everything you understand, perhaps you are only imagining it, you do not understand at all the difference between intellect and imagination, that is, you do not know yourself and consequently you do not know all the rest of the world. One cannot understand the world without knowing oneself, not only because of all kinds of other matters, yes, there is also the matter that the world is man, man is a microcosm, which he spoke of in Chapter 72, but also for a very simple reason, that you do not know what intellect is, you do not know how it works, everything you say you confuse.

The Structure of Part One as Parallel to Aristotle’s “On the Soul”

So this is a thing, and therefore I think this treatise, Part One of the Guide for the Perplexed in some sense follows the order of Aristotle’s book On the Soul, and one must make order with it in order to understand, well, this is another one of the secrets. So no, because I had a commentary that if one reads all the chapters of negation, all his lexicon, one sees that this more or less follows the order of the soul. And whoever learns this well, he essentially understands the soul and its powers. Or this is built on the same structure, which he assumes you already know, or somewhat know.

So if you are among those people who know the soul and its powers, you knew, how did you know? Because I taught you by way of secret within the entire book. And each thing among them became clear to you according to the truth of its existence. Yes, also the Rambam, yes, one of the almost only things he actually teaches from philosophy is the powers of the soul, yes, as in the Eight Chapters in Chapter 1, where he goes over the powers of the soul in some sense, for his reasons there. Somewhat in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 4 and 1, where he speaks somewhat about this. So this is something very important for him to teach. So if you already know this and you understand, also there in the Eight Chapters he already deals with this matter of intellect and imagination, this was very central for him.

The Term “Became Clear” — Complete Intellection

And each thing among them became clear to you according to the truth of its existence, you understand, yes, became clear, the intention is, you reached the definition, yes, to become clear. This is somewhat a technical term, I think, I do not have the strength to open the Arabic here, but this is a technical term for them whose intention is complete intellection. So complete knowledge is called clarification, here there is knowing something from hearsay, or knowing something rhetorically, which is not clarification, this is not true knowledge. This is not only that you know it is true, this is not enough. The taste of the intention, you understand exactly the subject, you understand the definition, you understand it in a true way. Each thing according to the truth of its existence, that is, you understand exactly what is this thing we call intellect, what is this thing we call imagination, and thus the parts of the soul are clarified.

So now, behold you shall know, so you already knew, but I inform you, behold you shall know, that is you already knew, yes, this is not “know.” “Know” with which he opens for you, “you shall know,” this is the continuation, but you should already understand this, you should already know this, but he is going to summarize in a very clear way, I think this is the statement, as I said, not only in general, he brought, they bring, what are they called, the Mishneh Torah project, that there are Leibniz’s glosses on the Guide for the Perplexed, and on this chapter he writes that he has not yet found anyone who defines in such a clear and concise way the matter of intellect and imagination. So this is a very clear statement, yes.

Also the note, the Rambam had a note from heaven to write this section in a way… no, I am not saying it like this, because the Rambam himself uses this root, note, regarding prophetic awakening, yes, like “and I will pour out my spirit,” this is already in the Bible, but he explicitly intends to connect the concept of note to this thing. So it may be that this is truly a note.

Imagination — A Power of Animals

He says thus, Know that imagination is found in most animals. Most animals in general have imagination, yes? He is going to say this because he wants to say, you are a human being, all the… yoslo amina like food. All the attribution of the human being is that he has intellect, yes? He is a speaking animal. So you must understand that imagination exists in general in most animals. Most of them have imagination in general, this is not at all something human.

But not all of them, yes? There are animals without imagination, how we distinguish exactly between them is perplexing. Aristotle has interesting statements on this subject, where he decides which animal has imagination and which does not. In any case, yes, because all animals have, almost all have some power to plan, yes? He can know not to go to some place because he was there yesterday there was a problem etc., so memory and imagination, at least many animals have. We have reason to assume they have.

However, but this is not so much, there are doubts, so there are such creatures about which there are doubts, who has them. But all perfect animals, there is all of Aristotle’s natural science, working with finding paradigms, perfect examples of a thing, the ideal of an animal, meaning to say they have a heart, because this is a normal, perfect animal, that also has a heart, there are creatures without a heart or without something equivalent to a heart, smaller animals. But perfect animals, yes, that have a heart, the existence of imagination for them is clear.

The Word “Heart” — A Homonymous Term

Of course, the Rambam here, there is a secret in him, that he intends to interpret the word heart. There is a chapter on the word heart, Chapter 39, where he writes there that the word heart is a homonymous term, it is a word for heart, yes, the organ of the heart, it is a word for the middle of everything, like the heart of the heavens, the middle of the heavens, it is a word for thought, it is a word for opinion, that is, that is, imagination perhaps, or opinion, not exactly knowledge, like the heart of all Israel to make David king, one heart and one heart, because one man and one heart is not that they have intellect, but that they have agreement, they agree, and it is also a name for will and also a name for intellect. Sorry, there is thought, opinion, will, intellect, I need to see the other translation. In any case, yes, there is here a discussion of what exactly the words are.

So in the chapter on heart there is explicitly a discussion about the fact that heart has great multiplicity of meanings. This is of course also correct in the plain sense, yes, not every heart is a heart. And what he says here is that we can speak of heart, and the intention is the heart that animals also have, for animals have a heart, and truly we, those animals that have a heart, which is the reason we call imagination many times heart, those perfect animals, yes, that have a heart, then certainly they also have imagination. And therefore this is a matter of animals.

Parental Love as a Matter of Imagination, Not Intellect

The Rambam in the laws, yes, when he speaks about the commandment “you shall not slaughter it and its young on the same day,” or other commandments that speak whose reason is because of compassion for animals, he says that you must understand that your love for your child belongs to your imagination, and there is no difference between the love of a person for his child and the love of a cow for her daughter, for her son. Because we both have, we are both perfect animals, and therefore we have imagination, which is what connects the… arouses the… what we call emotions, that there are feelings of the mother for her child, and therefore one must have compassion…

The Absolute Distinction Between Intellect and Imagination — Opposite Operations

Animals and Imagination: What Distinguishes Man

This is the system, this is Aristotle’s understanding, yes? Aristotle and all, they all believed that animals have most of the intellectual abilities that man has. That is, what we call imagination, which is what most people call intellect, as we shall see, in general animals also have.

Descartes is the first or main philosopher who thinks that animals are machines without any sensation, without any, something heartbreaking. Which is correct, because something heartbreaking is truly a very abstract part. But here this distinction is not valid at that level.

So this is something, but the main thing he wants to say is not animal rights, although there is, yes there follows from here some more respectful attitude toward animals, or less respectful toward people, yes? One can say it thus, toward people who do not have intellect. And this is truly the step the Rambam takes.

The Divine Image is Not Imagination

In any case, animals also have imagination, and therefore man is not recognized by imagination. Man is distinguished from animals, yes, this is essentially the story of Genesis, because we will speak about this that man has the divine image or something like this, this is not imagination. For animals also have this.

The Address to “You the Student” — Part Two

So when it is written, the Rambam in the chapter, by the way, one of the places where he spoke about “you who examine this book,” there is the opposite, right? There is a person who does not examine this book. And he wrote, I just did a search, there is in the second chapter, which is also, where there was a difficulty for a person who actually thought perhaps that what distinguishes man is imagination, right? Or what he speaks about there, which is the distinction between true good and evil, right? Commonly accepted notions and so on, that what most people call intellect actually belongs more to imagination, or not only to imagination, it is even lower than imagination, it is only opinion.

The Critique of One Who Examines with Imagination

But in any case, there he writes, You, the man who examines at the beginning of his thoughts, the beginning of thought, in his times, and who thinks he will understand a book that is the straightest of the early and later ones, and passes over it in some leisure time from drinking and sexual intercourse.

You who examine with imagination, and you think to understand the wisest book in the world in your free time, right? So you, this is his cry, his address to one who examines Scripture, he does not examine this book, he examines Scripture with the power of his imagination, and he thinks that man was given intellect, and how then does he have a difficulty, how can it be that man sinned and he received intellect and so on. But you don’t even understand what man is at all.

If you truly understand, then you understand that man does not uproot with imagination. That is not what distinguishes man at all.

The Absolute Opposition: Intellect versus Imagination

And there is not, and this is his important point, right? And the action of imagination is not the action of intellect, but its opposite. Right, now people think, okay, but these are at least close things, right? To imagine and to intellectualize, they are both intellectual powers, they both belong to the brain, we would say. This is something very close.

He says, no. Not only is it not close, right? Imagination says they are close. But the intellect says, as he will say in another moment, the intellect is what divides. The action of imagination is the opposite of the action of intellect. Intellect and imagination do not help each other, but rather harm each other. They are not close, but rather as far apart as can be. They are exact opposites of each other.

The Action of Intellect: Decomposition, Distinction, Abstraction and Conception

And he says like this, and perhaps we need to count here what he says, For the intellect decomposes composites, and distinguishes their parts, and abstracts them, and conceives them in their truth and their causes, and grasps from one thing very many distinct matters to the intellect or according to the intellect, with respect to the intellect, like the difference between two men among humans according to imagination in reality.

He says, I want to tell you one thing, the first thing he says, the intellect separates things and imagination combines them. Therefore it is called imagination, right, it likens things. The intellect decomposes composite things. Right, we, and he is going to explain this in another moment from this side.

The Nature of Imagination: A Copy of the Senses

We see in our senses, and therefore also in our imagination, which is essentially a copy of the senses, what we call imagination is the other side of the… it is a stage behind memory, right?

The Senses, Memory and Imagination

When we, we have sensory perceptions, which grasp the tangible parts in the world, right? We grasp colors, and sizes, and heat and cold, such things, and this we can duplicate, make a representation, right, there is their display within our soul, right? We would say within the brain, but it is not correct that it is within the brain. In any case, within our soul, this is called memory, right? I can remember that I saw something yesterday, this is memory.

And now imagination is essentially memory plus, but in this sense memory is part of the… right, memory, I mean, that you can draw the form in your intellect or in your soul even after you see it, right?

Imagination Can Lie, the Senses Cannot

In this sense, for example, imagination is a liar, it can lie, whereas the senses never lie, right? The senses, if they err, you still sensed, right? You truly sensed. So imagination can imagine, exactly as it can remember, right? Which is called true imagination in this sense, you have within the soul the same image that you would have in your eyes outside the soul, thus it can draw things that are not, but that is not his topic here.

The Intellect Decomposes Composite Things

His topic here is that the intellect decomposes composite things. What are composite things already? All the things we see, therefore I entered into the senses, when we see with the senses we see only composite things.

What is Composition

What does composite mean? Composed of many compositions, right? They are even composed at the level of their matter, right? All the things we see are not simple entities. We see things composed of the four elements for example, and also composed of compositions of matter and form, right? This composition too is a very fundamental composition in all the things we see with our senses, but we see them only in composite form, we never saw one without the other, it is impossible.

The Intellect Distinguishes and Separates

And how do we even know to distinguish between them? It is the intellect that decomposes, the intellect sees in every place two aspects, right? This is the intellect. And therefore it distinguishes between the parts and abstracts them, right?

For example, it abstracts the form from the matter, not because it is possible to see this, because you can understand the form, the definition of something even without its matter. This is not a particular imagination, this abstraction is not imagination, it is a completely different action, and he understands them in a true manner.

Thinking About What Cannot Be Seen

You can think something you never saw, that also cannot be seen, and that is also more true than what can be seen. If for example, we never saw a thing except composed of the four elements, but we can, from intellectual understanding, understand that everything must be composed of four elements, right? And then that I can think about one element in an abstract manner.

Abstract, meaning simple, alone. Always abstract is, not always, but from the language more simple, right? Not from the language, I don’t know what. From the language simple, right? I can think, and almost see, but think, intellectualize the simple element without the other elements it is composed of, even though I never saw this, even though imagination, this is called that I decompose and compose things, parts of things.

Intellectual Conception: Knowing the Thing Truly

And now I know what it is truly made of, right? Because this is truly, I know, conceive them, right? Here conception, the meaning is not imaginative conception, intellectual conception, right? This is a word, also a complete technical word that is used, and I have in my intellect a conception of the thing as it truly is.

Knowledge of Causes

And another way one can say truly, this is in their causes, right? Right, causes is also the composition, the decomposition of a thing to its factors, to its parts is essentially to say to know the causes of the thing, right, what causes.

As for example in his previous conversation with the Mutakallim, between the Mutakallim and the philosopher, he made such a conversation, right, what causes butter to be soft, what is the cause, right, imagination cannot give you the cause, because it sees only butter, which is already composed of what butter is made of and has a form and the accidents of the form etc. But the intellect tells you what is the cause that butter is soft, because it is made of such and such matter, and therefore it has such and such form and so on. Or I tell you the cause why it is thus, which is its form.

Summary of the Intellectual Action

So the intellect decomposes composite things, distinguishes their parts, it abstracts them, one from the other, it takes them in simplicity and therefore it conceives them according to truth, according to their true definition, which is according to their causes. The causes of the thing, why the thing is thus, it is the only thing that can do this.

From One Thing — Many Matters

And then it emerges, right, so mainly, essentially mainly he says that here the intellect is a separator, the intellect is something that separates, it separates things from each other. And therefore from one thing that it sees, right, from one thing that it saw, the intellect, correct, the intellect receives the things it thinks about from the senses, at least usually, not at first, but from one thing it grasps very many matters.

Again, you see one man and the intellect sees at least five things, four elements plus form and matter, and truly man is even more composite, because everything can be decomposed into matter and form and form and so on.

Example: The Five Parts of the Soul in Eight Chapters

So you, as for example, for example, if we are speaking about Eight Chapters, the intellect tells us that man has, the soul of man has, five parts, right? And then we immediately have a problem, because imagination immediately thinks this means there are five men.

Therefore the Rambam, whoever read Eight Chapters, the first thing he says is no, there are not five souls, there are only five parts. And when I say parts, I do not mean things that can be cut, because this is again the language of imagination.

The Intellect as Separator and Unifier: The Five Parts of the Soul and the General Matter

The Five Parts of the Soul — The Imaginative Problem

And then we immediately have a problem, because imagination immediately thinks this means there are five men. Therefore the Rambam, whoever read Eight Chapters, the first thing he says is no, there are not five souls, there are only five parts. And when I say parts, I do not mean things that can be cut, because this is again the language of imagination. You can cut, and then each part will be another man. No, there are not five men within the man, there is only one man.

But, from the perspective of the intellect, these parts are more distant from each other, or at least as distant from each other as two men, who are separated according to imagination, right? That is, the intellect says, every person has several systems, or several systems is also, we imagine this as something physical. So man has several parts, he has matter and form, he has four elements, he has another five souls, we don’t know.

And when I say five souls, I mean in the language of the intellect. There are here five different things, they are also from each other, their definition is not related one to the other. It may be one needs the other and does not need the other, these are further investigations, but what it is is not at all related to the second. It is not at all related one to the other, exactly as imagination understands, sees two men in reality, who are not related one to the other, this is Isaac and this is Jacob, thus the intellect sees within Isaac five souls that are distinct from a planning perspective, from an essential perspective, what they are, they are completely different things from each other, they have no connection. Of course there is some connection if they are within one man, but from the perspective of what they are they are distinct like the difference between two persons among men according to imagination and reality, right? This is understood, right?

The Parallel to the Interpretation of “Show Me Your Glory”

This reminds us very much, for example, I need to mention this because I am sure he means this, this reminds of the Rambam’s interpretation of the verse Show me now Your glory, that Moses requested. The Rambam in the section, in chapter 1, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, and also here, I forgot where, mentioned this interpretation, in the chapter on faces, I think.

He says, what is the interpretation that Moses requested to see the face of God, does God not have a face, right? And he said like this, Moses requested that the existence of God be clear to him and separate from the existence of other existents, like the separation of a man who sees a man by his face. If I see someone by his face, I know exactly what distinguishes him, this already speaks in the language of imagination, in the language of the body, between him and other men.

Thus Moses requested that he understand exactly what distinguishes between God and existence, which is an intellectual distinction, not that God has a face, but in analogy, as one who sees the face of a man knows the distinction between him and someone else, which is exactly the language he is speaking about here. And then God answered him, no, you will understand the distinction between Me and existence in analogy in a somewhat weaker manner, like a man who sees the back of a man, who can still distinguish, but not so well, this is essentially his parable.

Does the Intellect Separate or Unite? — Resolution of the Difficulty

So this is a point. The intellect makes from one thing many things. The intellect is a separator, not a unifier. One can call it a unifier truly, because I need to mention this, because anyone who read Hasidic books or something knows that the higher something is the more it needs to be unified and not more composite. So this is a Platonic principle of course.

So there is here apparently a difficulty, right, if you say the intellect is better than imagination, imagination combines things, right, and the intellect separates, right, so the intellect makes, right, I am using here imaginative language first, right, but the intellect makes divorces and imagination makes marriages and matchmaking, right? This sounds bad.

True Unity versus Imagined Unity

But the answer is because this is not correct. The intellect also unifies, right? For when the unified things that imagination sees, like a complete man, they are not truly connected, they are truly composite. What imagination imagines as one is not one. When the intellect says that God is one, it means, He is completely different from everything else, and therefore He is truly one with Himself, right?

The things that imagination calls one with themselves are lies, essentially imagination composed them, this is the opposite, one can say it separated them more, that is it deals with a world in which the parts of a thing, the ones that imagination sees, are not truly ones, they are truly separate, they are truly composite.

The ones that the intellect sees are the only ones, so when the intellect separates, it essentially unifies not the whole thing, which was never truly one, it unifies the things, the things that appear to the intellect are truly one with each other, they are identical to themselves. The objects of imagination are not identical to themselves, but the objects of the intellect are identical to themselves, in this sense they are more unified, but this is not our topic.

The General Matter versus the Individual Matter

So this is one thing, right? From this follows a second thing, And in the intellect, right, so he opens one sentence with the intellect, this is what the intellect does, and then he continues to another thing, I think this is a continuation of the same thing, but he says like this. In the intellect it distinguishes the general matter from the individual matter. And no demonstration among demonstrations is verified except in universals.

Right, he says like this. Imagination, it has one deficiency that it sees only composite things and cannot distinguish them, discern them, divide them into their true parts. It has another problem.

Imagination Sees Only Particulars

Imagination sees only what are they called, only individuals, right, only persons, not in the sense of man, in the practical sense of woman, man in the sense of particular, right, it sees only individual things. You never saw a species, what is it called, a general matter. General matter is a genus or species.

Therefore, the difference between the language of the Sages and the language of Torah, the Sages always make generalizations from things, species, genera. In the language of Scripture, which is almost always completely imaginative language, the Torah speaks in the language of men, right? So there is never, species are not spoken of, right? Even the word “all,” for example, is a very non-biblical word, right? If the Torah wants to say all, it says heaven and earth, which is already two things.

Why? Because imagination can never see generalizations, never the general matter, or one can say the genera. The moment I ask you, these two things belong to one category, this is called an intellectual action. To extract an imaginative action that I can see many things, right, many you can see, but never general matters.

The Intellect Distinguishes Between Particular and Universal

And even this distinction, right, this is also the distinction, therefore he inserts this as another distinction that the intellect distinguishes. Imagination, it has no true distinction between individual things, between individuals and genera, species. Species is one of the important inventions of the intellect.

And also the word, or from this that also the distinction between species and person, particular, is an intellectual distinction, right? Imagination can see many ones, right? This, if there is a qualitative difference between saying many and saying all this genus, right? All this genus speaks about the one, the one thing that unifies them all, right? Here specifically this is literally correct that the intellect is more unifying than imagination, right? Because the intellect, because imagination sees only particulars, right? Only individuals, it can see many of them, but never see the one thing common among them, which is the general matter. Whereas the intellect, it sees, it distinguishes the matter, right, the intellect can perhaps also see the particulars, it is not that we do not understand what the individual means in an intellectual sense.

The Demonstration Works Only on the Universal

But here there is an important thing, No demonstration among demonstrations is verified except in universals. Proofs do not work on individuals. The entire concept of proof is a matter that belongs to intellect.

The Nature of Demonstration — The Aristotelian Syllogism

For what is a demonstration? We need to remember the Socratic Aristotelian meaning of syllogism, which is the best demonstrative proof, it is demonstrative when also its premises are based etc., but the proof always works in the form of dealing from the universal to the particular. If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal. The example of Aristotle already, I think.

And this is the meaning that we recognize in this, right? Why does the proof work, right? There is here a very important distinction between our logic and the logic of Aristotle. The logic of Aristotle, at least when it deals with true things, is supposed to derive true conclusions, it is not only validity, right?

The Demonstration as Proof from Essence

That is, if this conclusion, if there is such a thing man, and to man, not my man, not to Isaac, but to the concept man which is the general matter, right? Right, the genus man, the form of man, the same thing, the genus and the form the same thing. It, has true properties, right, that is, it has definitions and it has accidents, as we learned in the previous lesson.

So if a particular individual we can prove, show that it belongs to this universal, it is a man, if I am of the human species, then everything that applies to the human species applies to me, right, of course, only the essential things and so on, and perhaps I am a sick man, there are all the desirables to this rule, but therefore this proof is a physical proof, right? This is not only if you define man within this, then something follows thus and so, right? So this is just a word game.

What the proof, demonstration, what he calls demonstration, is indeed a demonstrative proof, it is always a proof from what a thing truly is to what it must be. That is, always from the universal to the particular, from the species to the particular. The demonstration is only on the universal, and truly the proof does not work in the sense of, there can always be a particular that deviates from the species, right?

The Caveat: The Deviant Particular

That is, he is not a complete man, right? In this sense it returns to being a kind of word game. That is, that all men, have two hands, does not obligate that every particular of man can be, has two hands, right? But this does obligate that in order to be a man, you need to be a possessor of two hands. Because there is a reason why man has two hands, that belongs to the form of the human species etc.

But demonstration never works on particulars, it always works only from a universal. Every demonstration is essentially a derivation from a universal on a particular that already—

The Difference Between Demonstrative Proof and Analogy, and the Actions of the Intellect

Demonstrative Proof as Bringing from Potential to Actual

The demonstrative proof is only, one can call it bringing from potential to actual, right? We did not know that this thing belongs to the particular of this universal, or that we did not grasp that therefore this thing follows. And of course there are very complex proofs that we truly did not know, not only because we did not pay attention. But the proof does not innovate any information, right?

The Essential Difference from Analogy

This is very different, I need to explain this, very important. This is very different from analogy, right? Whoever reads, for example, so again, we read for example in the words of the Sages, our Sages, so we see that most of them did not reach this level of demonstrative proof and they do not know the difference. Many people do not know the difference between demonstrative proof and analogy. Analogy is exactly something that is not a demonstration.

Example from the Gemara: Wine and Beer

If I say, like in the Gemara, the Gemara doesn’t have sufficiently logical language to explain this, but you can see that it labors to arrive at this thing. If I say, I say, yes, something like this, I say, this is an ancient Muslim example, if I say, let’s say, okay, a Nazir, a Muslim, a Muslim is forbidden to drink wine, yes? And then I say, okay, and what is the law regarding beer, yes? It’s written in the Quran only wine, beer is not written.

The Analogy — Comparison of One Thing to Another

So I do, in the Gemara actually, the hermeneutical principles labor over this, but I’m just sharpening the difference between one proof and another. So if I say, okay, now regarding wine, wine is an intoxicating thing, so, and I have another intoxicating thing, beer, then from this follows a comparison of one thing to another. If I compare beer to wine, then beer should also be forbidden because it intoxicates, okay?

Now, this is not a proof. Someone can always answer “what about beer that has something else,” yes? And therefore, in all these types of principles there is no proof, this is not a true demonstration, this is a comparison of one thing to another. The truth is that this is built on something intuitive that should be a true demonstration, but when you say it like this, it’s not really a true demonstration, and indeed it’s possible to refute it.

The True Proof — Rising to the Universal

When is it impossible to refute it? When we rise to the universal. When we say, the Torah says wine, but wine is not the definition of the prohibition, that’s how we learn, most of what learners do in the Gemara is to try to make the Gemara, which works analogically, into true proofs from universal to particular. And one must question how much this works, but I’m just using this to distinguish what he is saying.

What does the one who says no say? Right, if you just make an analogy, there are two intoxicating things here. Okay, there are another million properties of wine, and maybe in general, and there are another million properties of beer. Fine, this sounds logical to me. I can even explain in logical language why this is logical, but it’s not a proof.

What would be the proof? If I say that wine is not really the prohibition, there is no prohibition to drink wine, it’s just an example. Wine is the example that the Quran gave for a thing that is forbidden to drink. But what is forbidden to drink is an intoxicating thing. And if an intoxicating thing is forbidden to drink, then indeed it follows that without doubt beer is also forbidden to drink, yes? Because wine, it’s an intoxicating thing, conversely, wine is already a child of the universal, yes? When I look, I said wine, I didn’t mean wine, I meant an intoxicating thing, yes? This is called a proof that is only in universals, yes? Is this understood?

Imagination versus Intellect

As long as you deal with things that the imagination can see, you never arrive at a demonstrative proof. I only mentioned this because indeed Halakhah suffers greatly from this problem, that at least many of the proofs at the beginning are not distorted, because they are explicitly analogies, okay? So this is one important thing, very important.

The Necessity of the Intellect

The second thing that the intellect does, which is necessary, yes? This is what he says. As long as you deal with imagination, you don’t have any proof of your own, you won’t have a true demonstrative proof. And therefore the Mutakallimun, who think they use the intellect, but they don’t distinguish what intellect is, and they actually don’t recognize species of course, so there cannot be any proof, yes?

They don’t recognize species? No, after all they say there are no species in the world at all. God does everything all the time. Custom. The encompassing economy. Yes, but the weak ones intoxicate. The weak ones intoxicate and this is custom. It’s like the Sultan doesn’t walk in the street on foot.

The Rav doesn’t know what they recognize. They recognize human beings and their species. Regular people recognize species, but regular people, many times what they call, after all what did I mean to say that the analogy is built on? The analogy is always built in a hidden way apparently on the demonstrative proof, yes?

The Problem in Identifying the Correct Universal

When I say “what about beer that yes,” “to wine that yes intoxicates,” “beer also intoxicates,” I mean, okay, so now think that behind this there is a universal called intoxicating things, which is actually the prohibition. But because I didn’t photograph it, I can miss. I can also miss, and this is the next point. I can miss distinguishing the essential from the accidental, yes?

It could be that actually someone who learns will say, okay, that’s correct, but who told you that the reason for the prohibition of wine is that it intoxicates? It could be that wine is sweet and beer is not sweet and therefore it’s not it, yes? You need to add here some thing that is not written, which is the thing that is essential here, yes? The essential prohibition belongs to that which intoxicates and not to some other property that wine has, yes?

And it’s true that people, when they do this, but many times not, therefore people make incorrect connections all the time because they don’t distinguish the correct universal, yes? People say… half of speech is analogies, done, correct.

Aristotle’s Role in This Distinction

I’m not saying that people don’t normally distinguish between what you call this. But this is also a book for the ear too. They don’t know they’re doing it, but they do it. No, all people have intellect, it’s not that they don’t have intellect, but you need this language of distinguishing between intellect and imagination, yes?

Most people think that analogy is, after all this principle that Aristotle invented more or less, yes? It comes from Socrates in the end, but Aristotle taught, the Rambam says in the second part, Aristotle taught all people the ways of demonstration, yes? Whoever hasn’t read Aristotle or isn’t influenced by someone who learned Aristotle, doesn’t know the true difference between proof from universal to particular and analogy, you can go to a synagogue to see.

Analogy as Hidden Foundation for Demonstration

They are both actually valid, it’s not that analogy never works, there’s a reason we work, and it’s also always based on something that should be a demonstrative proof. But because it’s difficult for people to grasp this matter of the universal, you say, okay, so you mean most people are like this, therefore there are many things here that you need to grasp that there is such a thing as a person, of the species, of the Form, that therefore it comes out necessary, not most.

The Difference Between “Most” and “All”

There is a qualitative distinction between saying most people are like this, and therefore you are part of most, and saying every person is like this. This “all,” which is the first word in every valid logical rule in every demonstration, is a thing that must be, the intellect must see. The imagination cannot see this at all.

The Challenge Against Necessity

And someone can indeed challenge, yes? Indeed there is such a challenge. Whoever doesn’t recognize this thing, he can say no. Everything you call proof is only about most, and this is actually what Kalam said. Yes, you’ve never seen a person who flew, but that doesn’t tell you that a person cannot fly, yes? So there is only most or custom or presumption, I don’t know, all kinds of other words, things no, not demonstrative proofs, only habitual and conventional and such.

Philosophy as Refinement of Natural Intellect

It’s clear that all these things are refinements of what normal people think, yes? All philosophy is like this. It’s not really another kind of person, it’s just a person, it’s exactly as they say, it’s just distinguishing better between the things that are confused in the normal, initial intellect, yes? The normal, yes?

Distinguishing Between Essential and Accidental Predicates

And in the intellect the essential predicate will be known, this is the third thing he says, the intellect, these are operations of the intellect, because intellect is the thing that performs these operations. The third thing that the intellect does, I think this is of course connected to this, is that in the intellect the essential predicate is distinguished from the accidental. Only in the intellect can you see the difference between an essential distinction and an accidental distinction, sorry, not distinction, predicate, yes? Predicate, yes?

Example: Two-Legged

That is, the intellect tells us, for example, and this is also another important thing, yes? Whoever does, we can make the universals in an incorrect way, you can do, a person has two legs, and therefore, okay? Laws apply to him, and also a chicken has two legs, and therefore also a chicken is connected to something, yes?

And why is this not correct? This is also, this is already a valid achievement, yes? This is from universal to particular. All things, all two-legged beings, yes? Like Animal Farm. All two-legged beings, have human rights.

How Do We Know It’s Accidental?

And why do we know this is not, yes, it’s funny, but we know this is not correct, because that a person has two legs, at least in what… when we deal with the rights of a person, or the intellect of a person etc., it is accidental, yes? How do we know this? In the intellect.

We have seen people with two legs, we have seen people without legs etc., all these things we can see. We have seen birds with two legs, this doesn’t help us. We need some intellectual education that will go, a person is a thinking animal, can there be a thinking animal with three legs? Yes, there can be.

And therefore, that a person has two legs, in the sense, regarding the true definition of a person, which is a thinking animal, this doesn’t add or subtract, it’s accidental, it’s a case, it’s something that is predicated of him indeed, a person has two legs, meaning the person himself is not the two legs, yes?

The Need for an Intellectual Answer

How do we know this? Only in the intellect, in imagination it’s difficult to see, yes? It’s not that we can’t say this and people will laugh, but they can’t prove, we’re always talking with a person and they say this, how do you know that the definition of a person is that he thinks? How maybe the definition of a person is that he has two legs, yes? A good claim, this needs an intellectual answer. If you don’t have this concept of intellect, you say…

The Distinction Between Essential and Accidental Predicates — Continuation and Deepening

The Example of the Form of the Human Body

It’s true, the Form of the body of a person indeed should be two-legged, but when I speak about a person in the sense of this definition, then you can show, the intellect can see the difference between essential predicates and accidents.

Even for example, he said from above, a person has properties, accidents of his Form, yes? Only people laugh. But this doesn’t mean there is no qualitative difference between laughing and having thought, having knowledge, yes?

Superstition as Confusion Between Accidents and Essentials

Or for example, the Rambam later says that superstition, what we call superstition in one sense, he says, it is confusion between accidents and essentials, yes?

For example if a person says every time it rains my business succeeds, then this means that rain is connected to success. It’s true, there it’s an accident in another sense, but you have no reason, there’s no reason that all the births you don’t know, but science is a thing that distinguishes between such accidental connections and causal connections which are essential predicates yes.

True Causal Connection versus Accidental Connection

For example the reason for this that a person has this is that a person is a thinking animal has a true reason which is from the definition of a person. But