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Laws of Chametz and Matzah Chapter 6 Laws 6-13 (Auto Translated)

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📋 Shiur Overview

Summary of Shiur – Rambam Hilchos Chametz U’Matzah, Chapter 6

Halachos 1–4 (Review): The Obligation to Eat Matzah Only on the First Night

The Rambam: On the first night of Pesach there is a mitzvas aseh (positive commandment) to eat matzah; the rest of Pesach there is no obligation to eat matzah, only a prohibition of chametz.

Explanation: Only on the first night is there a Torah obligation to eat matzah. The rest of Pesach is optional – one may not eat chametz, but one is not obligated to eat matzah.

Insights:

1. Comparison to Sukkah – An Important Distinction: The law is similar to Sukkah, where also only on the first night is there an obligation to eat. But there is a difference: By Sukkah there is an obligation of dwelling in the sukkah all seven days – one must spend time in the sukkah, sleep in the sukkah, even if one doesn’t eat. By Pesach there is only a prohibition of chametz but no positive commandment after the first night. Therefore one makes a blessing on sukkah every day, but on matzah only on the first night. This is a well-known question from Tosafos.

2. Answer to the Distinction: By Pesach, although there is no mitzvah to eat matzah after the first night, a person must eat to live – and if he wants to eat grain, he must eat matzah (not chametz). But he can also eat fruit or other things. By Sukkah there is a positive commandment of dwelling. The Gemara learns the law of Sukkah through a gezeirah shavah from Pesach.

Two Types of Guarding: Guarding from Becoming Chametz (Chapter 5) vs. Guarding for the Sake of Matzah (Chapter 6)

Innovation – Two Separate Laws of Guarding:

1. Guarding from becoming chametz (Chapter 5) – This is a law in the prohibition of eating chametz. If one doesn’t guard it, it becomes chametz, and one may not eat it the entire Pesach.

2. Guarding for the sake of matzah (Chapter 6) – This is a law in the mitzvah of eating matzah. One must bake it for the sake of the mitzvah in order to fulfill the obligation on the first night. But if it only lacks the “lishmah” (like dough of dogs), one may eat it the entire Pesach – it’s not chametz, but one doesn’t fulfill the mitzvah with it.

3. Proof from the Rambam’s Order: The Rambam does not mention the matter of “lishmah” in Chapter 5 (where he discusses chametz). He mentions it only in Chapter 6 (by eating matzah). This proves that “lishmah” doesn’t belong to the prohibition of chametz, but to the mitzvah of eating matzah. Also Halachah 9 (thick crackers) confirms this – even thick crackers that are kosher matzos, but if they weren’t made for the sake of matzah, one doesn’t fulfill the obligation – but one may eat them.

Halachah 5: Matzah Kneaded with Fruit Juice

The Rambam: “Matzah kneaded with fruit juice – one fulfills one’s obligation on Pesach. But one should not knead it with wine, oil, honey, or milk – because of ‘lechem oni’ (bread of affliction).”

The Rambam in Chapter 5: “It is permitted to knead the dough with water and oil and honey and milk… But on the first day it is forbidden to knead it except with water alone, so that it won’t become chametz and testify against him that it is lechem oni.”

Explanation: Fruit juice (plain) – one fulfills the obligation. But wine, oil, honey, milk – no, because it’s not “lechem oni” (it’s matzah ashirah – enriched matzah).

Insights:

1. Major Innovation – Fruit Juice ≠ Wine/Oil/Honey/Milk: The Rambam makes a clear distinction between “fruit juice” (plain juice from fruits) and “wine, oil, honey, and milk” (important liquids). Fruit juice is not important enough to make it “matzah ashirah” – it’s merely sweat – therefore one fulfills the obligation with it. But wine, oil, honey, milk are important things, and this makes it “lechem ashir” instead of “lechem oni.”

2. Apparent Contradiction between Chapter 5 and Chapter 6: In Chapter 5 it says “only with water alone” – only with water. In Chapter 6 it says that fruit juice is indeed kosher. The answer: In Chapter 5, “with water alone” is not literal – it means not wine/oil/honey/milk, but fruit juice (plain) is permitted. Or: “with water alone” in Chapter 5 is literal, and Chapter 6 is bedieved (after the fact).

3. Fruit Juice in Chapter 5 Regarding Becoming Chametz: The Rambam says in Chapter 5 that fruit juices don’t cause leavening (fruit juices don’t cause leavening unless water is mixed in them). There he includes wine, milk, oil, honey, olives as fruit juices. This is puzzling – regarding leavening they are all “fruit juices” (don’t cause leavening), but regarding lechem oni he makes a distinction between plain fruit juice and important liquids.

4. Question on Wine: Wine is mostly water – why doesn’t it cause leavening? This remains a question.

5. Question on Fruit Juice with Water: If fruit juice alone doesn’t cause leavening, but fruit juice with water does cause leavening (and according to some opinions – even worse/faster than water alone) – how can one fulfill the obligation with matzah from fruit juice? The dough must be from something that can become chametz (things that can come to leavening)!

6. Answer – Distinction between Type of Grain and Type of Liquid: The grain must be from a type that can become chametz (the five species of grain), but the liquid (water/fruit juice) doesn’t necessarily have to be a type that causes leavening. If one had a technology to make matzah without water at all, one would apparently also be able to.

7. The Lechem Mishneh’s Question and Answer: The Lechem Mishneh asks the same question – how can one fulfill the obligation if it doesn’t “come to leavening”? He answers: Only with things that in no way whatsoever can become chametz (like wheat that is completely not subject to leavening) can one not fulfill matzah lishmah, because “u’shemartem es hamatzos” requires that one guard from leavening. But with fruit juice – the grain itself can come to leavening (with water), only the fruit juice itself doesn’t cause leavening.

8. Dispute Among Rishonim: The Maggid Mishneh brings that Rabbeinu David ben Nachmi argues with the Rambam: “Anything that doesn’t come to leavening, one doesn’t fulfill the obligation of matzah with it.” According to them, matzah kneaded with fruit juice alone – one doesn’t fulfill the obligation. Rabbeinu David perhaps wants to interpret the Rambam as speaking only regarding lechem oni (matzah ashirah), not that it doesn’t become chametz at all.

9. The Raavad’s Position: The Raavad says: “One doesn’t fulfill the obligation with matzah kneaded with fruit juice alone. And regarding what was smeared with oil or honey, if it was cooked, one doesn’t fulfill the obligation with it.” The Raavad makes a distinction – if one only smeared oil or honey afterward, it’s good, but if it was cooked, one doesn’t fulfill the obligation. The Rambam’s distinction is different – he speaks about what it was kneaded with.

Halachah 6 (First Part): Mursan and Subin

The Rambam: One fulfills the obligation with bread that has flour and subin or flour and mursan, but not with mursan or subin alone (without flour).

Explanation: Mursan is the waste from wheat that comes out at the beginning of sifting, and subin is the rest of the waste. “Lechem oni” doesn’t necessarily mean poor bread with waste – even clean bread (pure matzah) is kosher. But subin or mursan alone without flour is not good, because subin is not flour – it’s not bread at all.

Insights:

1. “Pasdera” – Dispute Among Rishonim: In the Gemara it says “one might think one only fulfills the obligation with pasdera.” The Rambam learns that “pasdera” means a mix of flour with mursan/subin (mixed). Other Rishonim learn that pasdera means specifically mursan. According to the Rambam, the Gemara asks: Would one have thought that one only fulfills the obligation with mixed (not pure) matzah because that is “lechem oni”? The verse “matzah matzah” comes to include even clean bread.

2. “Matzas Shlomo”: The Gemara says “the verse says matzah matzah to include even matzas Shlomo” – a very pure, fine matzah (like King Solomon’s matzah). This is the source that even clean bread, the finest flour, is kosher for matzah. The initial assumption is that one needs specifically important matzos, but the verse teaches that even simple matzos are kosher – and also conversely, even very pure matzos are kosher.

3. Source for Mursan/Subin Alone: The Magen Avraham and later authorities bring that the source for mursan/subin alone not being good comes from Maseches Challah, where it says that mursan and subin are not considered bread – and one needs to have bread.

4. Soles by Korbanos: Soles by sacrifices always means clean soles – the best flour. In practice, there is no difference between wheat or other types of grain, one can fulfill the obligation with both.

Halachah 6 (Second Part): Method of Baking – Oven, Alfas, Baking in the Ground

The Rambam: “One bakes matzos… in an oven or in an alfas” – one can bake matzos in an oven or in an alfas.

Explanation: An oven is when the fire is inside (enclosed oven), and an alfas is when the fire is from outside (like a frying pan or grill). Baking in the ground means like the Arabs make pita: one digs a pit, puts in fire, and sticks the dough on the side. This is also kosher for matzah.

Insights:

1. Dispute Among Rishonim About Alfas and Bread: It is widely discussed whether something made in an alfas is called “bread” regarding blessings and regarding matzah. The Ramban and Rashba hold that alfas is not bread regarding blessings (one makes mezonos), but the Raavad disagrees – he says “alfas work, even gavla de’ura” – even such dough, the Raavad admits it’s called bread. Rabbeinu Yerucham brings the Gemara in Berachos to support the Ramban/Rashba.

2. Mar bar Rav Ashi’s Reasoning – Lechem Oni: Mar bar Rav Ashi argued that even something that is less important than normal bread (like alfas-baked items), which “better people don’t eat it” because it’s “gavla de’ura” – on Pesach one fulfills the obligation, because “lechem oni I call it” – on Pesach one specifically needs lechem oni (poor bread), so specifically a weaker bread fits.

3. The Main Innovation – Lower Threshold for “Bread” by Matzah: Pesach has a lower threshold for “bread” than the laws of blessings. To make hamotzi one needs actual bread, but for matzah – because “lechem oni I call it” – one can fulfill the obligation even with a weaker bread. This is the explanation of Mar bar Rav Ashi’s statement in Berachos 38a.

4. The Rama’s Ruling: The Rama himself in the laws of Pesach rules that alfas-matzah is mezonos (not bread regarding blessings), but on Pesach one fulfills the obligation. If one establishes a meal on it, one does make hamotzi.

5. Reasoning Why Matzah is Different: Matzah looks different from normal bread, one can eat it casually. The importance comes specifically from sitting down and establishing a meal on it.

Halachah 6 (Third Part): Matzah That Wasn’t Fully Baked

The Rambam: “And similarly if it wasn’t fully baked, one fulfills the obligation with it, as long as it doesn’t have the measure of chametz.”

Explanation: One can fulfill the obligation with matzah that isn’t completely baked, as long as it’s not chametz.

Insights:

1. “Matzah Henah” (or “Matzah Na”): The Gemara (Pesachim 30b) calls this “matzah henah.” Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel defines: “Anything that when you break it and threads don’t stretch from it” – when you break it and no threads pull, it’s good. “And if not, this is dough” – if yes, it’s still dough.

2. The Problem Isn’t Chametz, But the Form of Bread: Here we’re not talking about the laws of chametz (which was already in a previous chapter), but about fulfilling the obligation of matzah. The problem with half-baked is that it’s not bread – it’s still dough, and one can’t fulfill the obligation with dough.

3. Interesting Version: “Henah” is a variation of the word “na,” which Chazal interpret as half-baked (as by korban Pesach “do not eat from it na”).

Halachah 6 (Fourth Part): Soaked Cracker (Soaked Matzah)

The Rambam: One fulfills the obligation with a cracker (thin matzah) that was soaked, “as long as it didn’t dissolve” – as long as it didn’t completely dissolve.

Explanation: Our matzos are “cracker matzos” (thin matzos), as opposed to “loaves of matzah” (larger, softer matzos like Sephardic matzos, pita, laffa). It makes sense that one would want to soak thin matzos so they won’t hurt the teeth.

Insights:

1. Why Not Dissolved? If it completely dissolved, it’s no longer bread – it’s porridge. But if it didn’t change its form, it’s still kosher.

2. Taste of Matzah – A Law in the Object: The Rambam writes “the taste of bread”. The Gemara says: “But if it was cooked… what is the reason one doesn’t fulfill the obligation with it? Because we need the taste of matzah and there isn’t” – one needs the taste of matzah. “Taste of matzah” doesn’t mean that the person must actually feel the taste, but that the object of matzah must have the taste – it’s a law in the object, not in the person.

3. Taste vs. Form: According to this discussion, the main thing is taste (flavor of matzah), not form (looking like bread). This has a practical difference: When it comes to form, one must look at the dispute between Mar Zutra and Abaye; when it comes to taste, it’s a different standard. Taste is more important than the form of things. But a question remains: How strong is the requirement for taste? After all, it all revolves around it needing to be bread.

Halachah 7: Matzah That is Forbidden to Him

The Rambam: “A person doesn’t fulfill his obligation by eating matzah that is forbidden to him, such as if he ate tevel, or first tithe from which terumah wasn’t taken, or stolen bread, or borrowed bread. This is the rule: Anything on which one recites birkas hamazon, one fulfills one’s obligation with it, and anything on which one doesn’t recite birkas hamazon, one doesn’t fulfill one’s obligation with it.”

Explanation: A person cannot fulfill the mitzvah of matzah with matzah that is forbidden to him – tevel, first tithe without terumah, stolen, or borrowed. The rule is: What one can bentch on, one can fulfill the obligation; what one can’t bentch on, one can’t fulfill the obligation.

Insights:

1. Explanation of “This is the Rule” – Not a Reason but a Sign

The “this is the rule” doesn’t mean that the reason one doesn’t fulfill the matzah obligation is because one can’t bentch. Both – not fulfilling the matzah obligation and not making birkas hamazon – come from the same reason (mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah – a mitzvah that comes through a transgression). The Rambam means: If you want to know which types of prohibitions fall into this, look in the laws of blessings where it states more explicitly which prohibitions one can’t bentch on.

2. Even Rabbinic Tevel – Major Innovation

In Hilchos Berachos (1:19) the Rambam rules: “Anyone who eats something forbidden, whether intentionally or unintentionally, doesn’t bless on it, neither before nor after… One who eats tevel, even rabbinic tevel.” Through this “this is the rule” we learn that even rabbinic tevel – a rabbinic prohibition – causes one not to fulfill the matzah obligation. This is a major innovation: a Torah mitzvah (matzah) is not fulfilled because of a rabbinic transgression, and this is called “mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah.”

The innovation is even greater by not fulfilling the matzah obligation than by not making a blessing – because by a blessing it’s only a blessing-law, but by matzah it means one hasn’t fulfilled the mitzvah at all.

3. The Raavad’s Objection in Hilchos Berachos

The Raavad disagrees with the Rambam in Hilchos Berachos. He says that “one doesn’t bless” doesn’t mean one doesn’t make any blessing at all, but that one doesn’t join a zimun (because eating forbidden food has no importance of establishing). But a first and final blessing one must make, because one had benefit. The Raavad writes: “It’s a great abomination to reward the wicked with blessing, but one doesn’t join them in zimun… But why shouldn’t he make a first and final blessing since he benefited.”

The Rambam’s position is unusual: that when one steals something, one is exempt from thanking the Almighty for the benefit. The logic is: one commits a transgression and simultaneously thanks the Almighty – this is hypocrisy (“the thief who blesses blasphemes Hashem”).

4. Stolen – Does One Need a Separate Teaching from “Lachem”?

If the principle is mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah, why does one need a separate teaching from “mitzvoseichem” (=lachem, yours) to disqualify stolen? This should already fall into mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah! The distinction: By borrowed matzah the disqualification is from mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah (because borrowed isn’t actually theft, but it’s not his). By stolen matzah there is an extra law of “lachem” – it must be yours.

5. Four Positions in the Yerushalmi About Stolen Matzah

The Yerushalmi brings four positions why one doesn’t fulfill the obligation with stolen matzah:

Rabbi Hoshaya: It’s forbidden to bless on it – “would I bring the Name in”

Rabbi Yochanan: Transgression mitzvah

Rabbi Yitzchak: Mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah

Rabbi Elai: A mitzvah that undermines its mitzvah

It’s asked whether all four positions are actually different or perhaps they’re all the same. It’s also noted that the Yerushalmi only says “it’s forbidden to bless on it” – not that one doesn’t fulfill the obligation.

6. Acquisition Through Change – Stolen Wheat vs. Stolen Matzah

The Yerushalmi says: Stolen wheat and made matzah – one fulfills the obligation, because it’s acquired through change (the change makes him acquire it, and he’s only obligated to pay money). But stolen matzah itself – one doesn’t fulfill the obligation.

The same reasoning: Stolen money and bought matzah with it – one fulfills the obligation, because the matzah itself is not a forbidden object. But stolen flour (me’ilah) and baked matzah – one fulfills the obligation because of acquisition through change.

7. Ritva’s Question from Maseches Sukkah / Kesubos

The Ritva brings a question: In Kesubos it says that one who eats another’s milk, although he’s liable for kares, is not exempt from payment due to “kam leih bidrabah minei” – because the obligation of payment comes at chewing (leisah), and the kares comes only at swallowing (beliah) – two separate moments. According to this, by matzah: When does one fulfill the mitzvah? Not when buying the matzah, but when eating. And if the acquisition through change already happened earlier (when baking), then when eating it’s already his – and there shouldn’t be a problem.

8. Rabbeinu Yonah’s Position

Rabbeinu Yonah says that the Rambam doesn’t hold of this reasoning. He means that when fulfilling the mitzvah – meaning the eating – it’s a “whole time” process (chewing and swallowing together), not two separate moments.

9. “The Thief Who Blesses Blasphemes”

The main problem of mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah with a moral point: When one says birkas hamazon “who gives bread to all flesh” on stolen matzah, this is blasphemy – one thanks the Almighty for food that one obtained through theft. The Gemara says “the thief who blesses blasphemes” – this isn’t “who gives bread to all flesh,” the Almighty didn’t give it to him through theft.

[Digression: Story with a Thief by the Rebbe]

A thief came to the Rebbe for a blessing for livelihood. The Rebbe asked “Should I give a blessing for stealing?” The thief answered: “If it’s already destined that someone will be robbed, let it be through me.” The Rebbe’s daughter, Moras Chaya’le (a miracle worker), applied the same reasoning to blessings – that if someone already needs to receive a salvation, let it come through her blessing, so she should also have a share.

10. Practical Difference – Matzah Bakery

Rabbi Avraham Bransdorfer said that one doesn’t fulfill the obligation with matzah from a certain matzah bakery (Toldos Aharon) because it’s like theft. However, it’s said that this is nonsense, because it’s like stolen wheat (acquisition through change) – one steals the “binding” (the money/business), not the matzah itself. Later authorities also said this isn’t a halachah at all.

Stolen Shofar – Distinction Between Shofar and Matzah

The Ramach’s Question

The Ramach (glosses) asks: In Hilchos Shofar Chapter 1 Halachah 3 the Rambam rules that one fulfills the obligation with a stolen shofar – how does this fit with the law that one doesn’t fulfill the matzah obligation with stolen matzah?

The Rambam’s Answer

The Rambam says: “Because the mitzvah is only in hearing the sound, and there is no law of theft in a sound” – the mitzvah is only in hearing the sound, and a sound has no law of theft. By shofar, the transgression (theft of the shofar) and the mitzvah (hearing the sound) are two separate things. Unlike matzah – the transgression (theft) and the mitzvah (eating) are the same act: When you swallow it, you are both fulfilling the mitzvah and doing the ultimate theft (because the other can never get it back).

Mitzvos Were Not Given for Benefit – Second Answer by Shofar

The Rambam says further: “If you say but he benefits from hearing the sound — mitzvos were not given for benefit”. This answers a second problem: Even if one says that benefit from another’s object is a prohibition, hearing the sound is not “benefit” because mitzvos were not given for benefit.

Distinction Between Benefit and Theft

By shofar the question is only about benefit from another’s object – and to that mitzvos were not given for benefit helps. But by matzah, the problem is not only benefit – it’s taking and destroying another’s object. To such theft, mitzvos were not given for benefit doesn’t help. However, it’s left as requiring further study.

Halachah 6 (Continuation): Kohanim Fulfill with Challah and Terumah; Second Tithe; Bikkurim

The Rambam: “Kohanim fulfill the obligation with challah and terumah, even though it’s matzah that isn’t fit for everyone. One fulfills the obligation with matzah of second tithe in Jerusalem. Matzah of bikkurim — one doesn’t fulfill the obligation with it.”

Explanation: Challah and terumah – although only kohanim may eat it, one fulfills the obligation. Second tithe in Jerusalem – one fulfills. Bikkurim – one doesn’t fulfill.

Insights:

1. Distinction Between Second Tithe and Bikkurim: The verse says “in all your dwellings you shall eat matzos” – the Gemara expounds that the matzah must be fit for everyone and for all dwellings (edible everywhere). Bikkurim may only be eaten in Jerusalem and one cannot redeem it (no redemption), therefore it’s not “fit for all dwellings.” Second tithe also must be eaten in Jerusalem, but one can redeem it – therefore it’s “fit” and one fulfills the obligation.

2. Rabbeinu Manoach’s Proof: Rabbeinu Manoach brings a Gemara on “kohanim fulfill”: “You shall not eat chametz upon it seven days” — one who is included in the prohibition of eating chametz, excludes one who is forbidden due to another prohibition.” It’s asked why this verse wasn’t also brought regarding mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah (as a source that one needs a fit matzah).

3. Ritva – Does One Fulfill with Stolen Matzah in Practice? Rabbi Akiva Eiger brings the Ritva who says that in practice one does fulfill with stolen matzah, and the Ritva disagrees with the Yerushalmi. The Bavli and Yerushalmi disagree on this topic.

Loaves of Thanksgiving and Crackers of a Nazir – Guarding for the Sake of Matzah

The Rambam: Matzah must be guarded for the sake of matzah, and loaves of thanksgiving and crackers of a nazir – one doesn’t fulfill the obligation with them, but if one made them for the sake of guarding matzah – one fulfills.

Explanation: Matzah must be made with intention for the sake of matzas mitzvah. Loaves of thanksgiving that are made for the sake of a sacrifice – one doesn’t fulfill, but if one also had in mind for the sake of matzah – one fulfills.

Insights:

1. Rabbeinu Manoach and “They Shall Not Eat Unleavened Bread”

Rabbeinu Manoach brings the Gemara “they shall not eat unleavened bread seven days – one who eats only matzos seven days, excludes one who is forbidden due to another prohibition” – but only regarding kohanim who fulfill with challah of terumah (but not Israelites). It’s asked: Why didn’t they bring the same verse also regarding destruction of chametz?

2. What Does “For the Sake of Matzah” Mean? – A Major Investigation

It’s discussed whether “guarding for the sake of matzah” must be a direct, explicit intention, or it’s enough that one has in the background in mind that it can be used for matzah.

The Rambam brings the case of a merchant who bakes matzos to sell – “that if he doesn’t sell he will eat them” – if he doesn’t sell, he eats them himself. This shows that even an indirect intention – where he has in the back of his mind that perhaps he will use them himself for matzas mitzvah – is enough.

3. Dispute in Understanding the Merchant Case

One side argues that the merchant makes it directly for the sake of matzah for his customers (he sells matzos for Pesach). The other side argues that the Rambam’s language “that if he doesn’t sell he will eat them” shows that the main intention is not for the sake of matzah – but he has a secondary thought that perhaps it will remain for him. If the merchant meant directly for the sake of matzah for others, the Rambam wouldn’t have needed to add “if he doesn’t sell he will eat them.”

4. “Plain Making” – Is It Enough

It’s argued that “plain making” without any specific intention is enough – the disqualification is only when one makes it directly for another purpose (like loaves of thanksgiving). But it’s also argued conversely: “There’s no such thing as not thinking” – every person makes something for a reason. If a machine makes matzah without any human awareness – one doesn’t fulfill; there must be the awareness of the one conducting it.

5. Tosafos’s Position

Tosafos says that “plain” – without a specific other intention – is enough for the sake of matzah. The disqualification is only when one has a direct intention for something else.

Baking Matzos on Erev Pesach

Insights:

1. Proof That One Doesn’t Necessarily Bake on Erev Pesach: From the law of loaves of thanksgiving (which aren’t made on erev Pesach because there’s a prohibition of eating chametz after midday) a proof is brought that matzos can be baked earlier – he comes out with matzos baked on the 13th of Nissan.

2. Erev Pesach That Falls on Shabbos: A Tosefta says that when erev Pesach is Shabbos, one bakes the matzah on erev Shabbos (meaning the 13th of Nissan). This shows that one doesn’t necessarily bake on erev Pesach itself.

3. Rabbeinu Yonah’s Position – “So That Its Baking Should Be Close to Its Eating”: Rabbeinu Yonah holds that it’s better to bake close to eating – just as the korban Pesach is only eaten roasted, so matzah should be close. Rashi is also brought in this matter.

4. The Kol Bo: Says that even for the second night (Pesach second day of Yom Tov) one should bake fresh matzos – “dearness of the mitzvah.” It’s noted that this could be simple because fresh matzos are better.

Aviyah Rokei’ach (Father of
Aviyah Rokei’ach (Father of the Ba’al HaRokei’ach) – “Whoever My Matzah Comes To”

The Sar Shalom (first Belzer Rav) brings in the name of Aviyah Rokei’ach that one should say “Whoever my matzah comes to, it is not a gift” – just as by lulav and esrog it says in the Gemara “whoever my lulav comes to.” This is only relevant according to the position that matzah must be “lachem” (yours). But by matzah it doesn’t say “lachem” like by the four species (“u’lekachtem lachem”), so it’s a stringency, not from the essential law.

Maharam Shif – When One Bakes with Others

The Maharam Shif brings that when one bakes matzos together with other people, each one should take his own – in order not to have a problem of ownership.

Halachah 14: Who is Obligated in Eating Matzah

The Rambam: “Everyone is obligated in eating matzah, even women and slaves.”

Explanation: Everyone is obligated in matzas mitzvah, including women and slaves (even though it’s a positive time-bound commandment).

Insights:

1. A Minor Who Has Reached Chinuch – What is the Measure?

The Rambam says that small children who still cannot eat bread are exempt. The measure for chinuch by matzah is “a minor who knows how to eat bread” – he doesn’t need to “understand” the mitzvah (like by blessings where one must “know to Whom he blesses”), but simply be able to eat bread.

2. Distinction Between “Knows” by Blessings and by Actions

By blessings it says “knows” (he must understand what he’s saying), but by actions like eating matzah it doesn’t say “knows” – only “able to eat bread.” By lulav it says “knows how to shake” because he must know what he’s doing. But by eating matzah the measure is only physical – he can eat bread.

3. The Source

The Gemara in Sukkah brings “a minor who eats a kezayis of bread” – from when he can eat a kezayis of bread one begins to educate him. The Rambam’s language “a minor who is able to eat bread” doesn’t have a direct source in the Gemara’s language, but it comes from the Beraisa.

4. Practical Difference – Very Small Children

A child of one year old can already eat bread, therefore one is already obligated to give him a kezayis of matzah! This is something that “people don’t know about.” One must be careful to give the small child a kezayis of matzah for the afikoman, for Shulchan Orech, because later he goes to sleep.

5. Chinuch or Habituation?

If chinuch means training – no one remembers that he ate matzah when he was one year old. Therefore it’s not “training” in that sense, but “habituation” – a habit of mitzvah.

6. Distinction Between Mitzvos That Require Awareness and Mitzvos That Don’t

By things that require a certain awareness (like kiddush, blessings) the age of chinuch is higher. But by eating matzah, which is a physical act, the measure is only “able to eat bread” – from when the child can bite and eat.

A Sick Person Who Cannot Eat Matzah

The Rambam: One soaks a cracker for him in water and feeds him. And if he cannot eat – one softens it more and gives it to him.

Explanation: A sick person who cannot eat matzah, one soaks a thin matzah in water for him. If he cannot even eat that, one breaks it up more.

Insights: This is a practical application of what was already learned earlier (soaking, softening – that one fulfills the obligation with soaked matzah as long as it didn’t dissolve). It’s noted that this is not a new innovation, but a compilation of already-learned laws.

The Rambam’s Order of Laws – A Structural Innovation

Innovation in Structure: Usually the Rambam writes “who is obligated” in the first halachah of a chapter. Here “everyone is obligated in eating matzah” is the last halachah of the laws of eating matzah. This is unusual. It’s suggested that because he says “in every place and at every time” it would have fit well together with “who is obligated” – but the Rambam structured it differently.

From the Words of the Scribes: One Doesn’t Eat After the Final Matzah (Afikoman)

The Rambam: “From the words of the scribes, one doesn’t eat after the final matzah even roasted grain and nuts and the like.”

Explanation: Rabbinically one may not eat anything after the last piece of matzah (afikoman), so that the taste of matzah will remain in the mouth.

Insights:

1. A Difficult Question – Why Do We Eat Matzah Twice?

The first kezayis of matzah is already the Torah mitzvah. Afterward one eats a meal (with potato chips, charoses, candy, etc.). Then one eats again a kezayis of matzah (afikoman). What is this second piece of matzah? It’s not a Torah mitzvah! It’s a strange thing. One must say that there is an extra rabbinic law – one should end with a taste of matzah in the mouth. This is not the Torah mitzvah, but a special enactment.

2. Another Question – Wine After the Afikoman

One drinks two cups of wine (third and fourth cup) after the kezayis of matzah! If the matter is that the taste of matzah should actually remain in the mouth, how does this fit with drinking wine afterward? (This is not found so difficult.)

3. A Deeper Question – What is “Taste of Matzah”?

Matzah doesn’t have a special taste – it’s a taste of bread! “Are you at a level to feel a difference in taste in order to eat plain matzah?” The concept of “taste of matzah” is hard to understand – by korban Pesach one understands that the taste of Pesach should remain, but what is the special “taste of matzah”?

4. Different Reasons for the Afikoman

The Rambam says the reason is “taste of matzah.” Tosafos has other reasons (Pesach al hasova, breaking the evil inclination, the incident of Rabbi Akiva). Other opinions are mentioned (Shem MiShmuel, etc.).

From the Words of the Scribes: The Sages Forbade Eating Matzah on Erev Pesach

The Rambam: “The sages forbade eating matzah on erev Pesach, so that there will be a distinction to its eating in the evening.”

Explanation: The sages forbade eating matzah on erev Pesach, so that there will be a distinction (recognition) when one eats matzah at night.

Insights:

1. Two Parallel Rabbinic Laws

Both laws – not eating matzah before Pesach and not eating other things after matzah – have a similar reasoning: one shouldn’t have a taste of matzah before the Seder, and one should have a taste of matzah after the Seder.

2. Distinction Between “From the Words of the Scribes” and “The Sages Forbade”

The Rambam uses two different expressions. “From the words of the scribes” is a heading for the entire section. “The sages forbade” is a specific halachah.

3. The Reason of “Distinction” – Not Only Appetite

The Rambam says “so that there will be a distinction to its eating” – it shouldn’t look like eating in the middle. If one eats matzah the whole day, at night another piece of matzah is not a special thing. The Rambam’s reason is not (only) that one should eat with appetite, but that it should be a recognizable act. The Ramban doesn’t say “distinction” but differently.

One Who Ate Matzah on Erev Pesach – He Receives Rabbinic Lashes

The Rambam: “One who ate matzah on erev Pesach receives rabbinic lashes.”

Explanation: Whoever eats matzah on erev Pesach receives makkas mardus (rabbinic lashes).

Insights:

1. “Until His Soul Departs” – A General Law in Rabbinic Lashes

It’s asked about the language he receives rabbinic lashes – whether this means until his soul departs, as the rule is by rabbinic lashes. Rabbeinu Manoach addresses this language “until his soul departs” and takes it seriously. The Ben Ish Chai also takes seriously the version, but it’s noted that not all agree.

2. The Source for Rabbinic Lashes – Yerushalmi “They Received Permission and Beat Them”

Rabbeinu Manoach brings the Yerushalmi which says “they received permission and beat them” – they received permission and one beats them. The Rambam took the Yerushalmi literally – “beat” means lashes, but because it’s not a Torah prohibition, it’s rabbinic lashes (rabbinic lashes).

3. Specifically Matzas Mitzvah – Rabbeinu Manoach’s Distinction

Rabbeinu Manoach says that the prohibition speaks specifically of kosher matzah – matzas mitzvah. For example, matzah that wasn’t made for the sake of mitzvah, or matzah of gentiles (as it says in the Gemara) – one may eat on erev Pesach, because one can fill oneself from them. The reasoning is: The prohibition is not in matzah in general as food, but in the distinction of matzas mitzvah specifically – specifically the type of kosher matzah that one will use for the mitzvah at night.

4. A Homiletical Interpretation of “Until His Soul Departs”

It’s suggested that the “soul” that ate matzah is no longer there, and a new soul begins with freshness. This doesn’t mean actual death, but that he no longer thinks about it – the taste of the matzah is gone, and he can begin the Seder with a fresh taste.


📝 Full Transcript

Laws of Chametz and Matzah Chapter 6 – The Mitzvah of Eating Matzah: Fruit Juice, Matzah Ashirah, and Lechem Oni

Introduction: The Order of Study in Rambam’s Laws of Chametz and Matzah

Speaker 1:

We’re continuing to learn in the Rambam, and it’s not a novelty, the Rambam has large volumes with customs.

It’s a law, in the laws, wait it’s not in the laws of Sukkah, it’s in the laws… the laws of the… that is, the laws of chametz and matzah. We’ve learned the laws of chametz, and now we’re going to learn the laws of matzah.

Chapter 6 – The Mitzvah of Eating Matzah

Chapter 6 speaks about the mitzvah of eating matzah, specifically the first night of Pesach there is a mitzvah to eat matzah. The entire Pesach there is no mitzvah, there is a prohibition of chametz, but it’s not a mitzvah to eat matzah. This is according to the Rambam.

Review: What We’ve Learned Until Now

And now we’re learning how, what kind… until now we’ve learned more or less, let’s say, until law 3 it speaks about the mitzvah of eating matzah, right? We learned when one must eat it, how, in what manner, with intention, without intention, swallowed, didn’t swallow, and so forth.

From law 4 one began to speak about what kind of matzah one must eat, right? Correct? What is kosher matzah and so forth. From what the kosher matzah must be made, more specifically, right?

We learned in law 4 that it must be made, right? One can call it chomer hamatzah, it must be made from one of the five species of grain, from things that can become chametz.

Okay, afterwards we learned other laws of… yes, if it’s mixed, if it has a taste of grain, we learned that there is a dispute about this, other opinions. We learned a matter of… another law, isah shenilshah, which is apparently a law of lishmah, it must be guarded for the sake of matzah. It’s not for the same reasons, it doesn’t belong in the proper place in the law, right?

Now, we’re holding in law 5, or uh, it’s the end of or in the middle of law 5, which takes us to another law.

Discussion: The Difference Between the Mitzvah of Matzah and the Mitzvah of Sukkah

Speaker 2:

I want to ask a small thing. The law that the first night is a mitzvah and the other nights is not a mitzvah, is very similar to how one learns in the laws of Sukkah, right? That the first night… but there is a difference. The Rambam in the laws… where am I? What is the difference?

Speaker 1:

He begins the laws of lulav, Sukkah and lulav, he says indeed, uh, “Initially on the night of the first Yom Tov it is a positive commandment from the Torah to eat a kezayit of matzah in the Sukkah”. But he begins, regarding the mitzvah of Sukkah, it relates to eating and drinking, it becomes there in the Sukkah all seven days.

It’s not a mitzvah that one is obligated to do. No, it’s not an obligation to eat. One has such an obligation to dwell in the Sukkah seven days. If you don’t want to eat, you can fast, but you must be in the Sukkah. But to be for example not here, you must sleep not here, you must be.

Speaker 2:

Let’s see. There is indeed a difference, the difference is known that one doesn’t make a blessing. On Pesach one only makes a blessing the first night, and on Sukkot one makes a blessing every day.

Speaker 1:

On Sukkah every day.

Speaker 2:

The Gemara asks, Tosafot and everything, specifically about this.

Speaker 1:

Ah, Tosafot speaks about this? And what is his answer?

Speaker 2:

No, one can understand it this way, because it’s indeed not a mitzvah, but a person must live, he must eat. And if the Torah says you should do it in this manner, you shouldn’t eat chametz but matzah, or the answer is, or you can eat fruit, you can eat grapes.

Which is not so with Sukkah, there is indeed something of a mitzvah that you should be in the Sukkah these days. You don’t actually have to eat, just so is not a mitzvah. In short, this is a topic, all the Rishonim have already struggled to understand the difference on the same.

Speaker 1:

In short, I want… let’s see. Both have to do with the fact that it says mikra kodesh only the first and last Yom Tov.

Speaker 2:

No, it’s not mikra kodesh. It has nothing to do with that. It has nothing to do with mikra kodesh, it only means prohibition of work.

Speaker 1:

The Gemara learns it out from what?

Speaker 2:

It has to do with a gezeirah shavah. Yes, okay. In short, Sukkah is learned from Pesach, but Pesach is learned out.

Speaker 1:

In short, let’s learn, let’s start again what we know, what we’re learning here. Okay? We’re going to start learning how one makes matzot, from what one makes the matzot. Okay? From what one makes the matzot, how to bake the matzot.

Innovation: Two Types of Guarding – Guarding from Chametz and Guarding for the Sake of Matzah

Speaker 1:

But I know that one has already learned this, it’s very interesting. In chapter 5, if you still knew, the main matter of shemirat hamatzot, which already stood in chapter 5.

Speaker 2:

Ah, because making matzot is the mitzvah of guarding from chametz.

Speaker 1:

And not… it appears from the Rambam, if one is already precise so, it appears that the matters of shemirah that one learns in chapter 5 are not matters of the mitzvah of eating matzah. It is in the matters of the prohibition of eating chametz.

No, the mitzvah that he needs by the mitzvah is not that he prepares himself to have matzot for Pesach. No, there is a difference. You know, we just learned in law 6, that dough that is guarded for the sake of isat hakelabim, that one can eat the entire Pesach, right?

Two Types of Guarding

There are two types of guarding. There is guarding for the sake of matzah, if it’s for the sake of matzah, that one can eat… one cannot fulfill the mitzvah with it, but certainly one can eat it tomorrow.

The some guarding that stands in chapter 5, where he speaks there about guarding from chametz, that is such guarding that that one may not eat the entire Pesach. It doesn’t say there that he’s speaking about the mitzvah of eating matzah, or he’s speaking about the matter. Just like all other laws that stand there how one…

But because in chapter 5 the Rambam speaks about chametz, he doesn’t mention the thing of baking for the sake of matzah. He only mentions guarding from becoming chametz. And if he doesn’t mention at all the matter of for the sake of matzah… as I see, he doesn’t mention it. He brings for the sake of mitzvat matzah, but no, not the matter of lishmah. The entire matter of lishmah stands only here by the law of isat hakelabim. So it appears.

But here it doesn’t say “since they are guarded for the sake of matzah”. No, this is a law for the sake of mitzvat matzah, not a law of… once you know that there isn’t such a prohibition to eat Pesach, right? No. Okay.

Explanation: Guarding from Chametz vs. Guarding for the Sake of Matzah

So, it can perhaps be that when he says “since they are guarded for the sake of matzah”, he doesn’t mean something extra more than what stands in chapter 5. He means to say, it must be guarded, it shouldn’t be chametz. But if you want to fulfill the mitzvah of matzah, it must be guarded for the sake of matzah. This is a law, exactly, in the laws of eating matzah, it’s not a law in guarding from chametz.

Just to eat Pesach in the morning, it must be… and in law 9 he says it more clearly, that even if one made rekikin avim, which also comes… rekikin avim may not become chametz, it seems, I don’t know. He didn’t say that he didn’t make the matzot. Apparently, rekikin avim is connected to… exactly.

Speaker 2:

We are here, the question isn’t that it’s chametz, the question is because of lishmah. And isat hakelabim one speaks of Pesach, but it’s not guarded for the sake of…

Speaker 1:

Chametz, guarding from chametz is more like guarding from a prohibition, and for the sake of mitzvat matzah is more like preparation for a mitzvah, for a mitzvah. Just like… yes. Very good.

Law 6: Matzah Kneaded with Fruit Juice

Speaker 1:

Matzah kneaded with fruit juice. Now we’re learning more laws of what one fulfills. There is another law that the matzah that we eat, the measure, the matzah that is on the first night must be lechem oni, therefore there is a question of fruit juice.

So with what is one indeed fulfilled, righteous one? You read very nicely. Ah, “Matzah that was kneaded with fruit juice, one fulfills his obligation with it on Pesach”. But in… but you should understand lechatechilah? No, no, but “one should not knead it with wine and oil and honey and milk”. That is, fruit juice yes, but wine and oil and honey and milk no. “As it says ‘lechem oni’” etc.

Discussion: The Difference Between Fruit Juice and Wine/Oil/Honey/Milk

Speaker 2:

And what about wine? They already spoke about another thing, which is another difference in the laws. It’s interesting, in section 4 it stood, yes, they spoke a law, in chapter 5 already stood the laws how to make matzot?

There it stood that one may put in spices, sesame, nigella in the dough, and one may also make matzah ashirah. Only the first day one may not, why? Because it must be lechem oni, and lechem oni must be specifically… the language of the Rambam is “on the first day alone that requires mentioning lechem oni”.

Only this is the law of the first day, he means to say the law of… it’s interesting that here it says the first day, one could have erred that he means the entire first day. No, when he says yes the first day he means to say the mitzvah of eating matzah.

Speaker 1:

But what’s going on here? “Matzah that was kneaded with fruit juice, one fulfills his obligation with it on Pesach”. Very good. But not with wine and oil and honey and milk. Why? Wine and oil and honey and milk is not the same category as fruit juice? No, you’ve now discovered.

Innovation: Matzah Ashirah Means Wine/Oil/Honey/Milk, Not Fruit Juice

As the Rambam mentioned in chapter 5 law 10, he says “It is permitted to knead the spices and sesame and nigella within the dough”. I’m speaking here about fruit juice. “It is obligated, it is permitted to knead the dough with water and oil and honey and milk, these and similar things. And on the first day it is forbidden to knead it except with water alone”. Except with water alone. “So that it won’t become chametz and testify about it that it is lechem oni”.

You’ve now revealed… water or fruit juice? You’ve now revealed, certainly here is specifically and there is not specifically. You’ve now revealed that matzah ashirah means wine, oil, honey and milk. Fruit juice comes from mikveh mayim, so. According to the Rambam, so the Rambam understood. Whether everyone understands so I don’t know, but so the holy Rambam understood.

Speaker 2:

I thought all along that it’s called, that it’s all types of fruit juice, not as you asked. What you meant, someone asked you what you meant? I asked myself. I meant, I tell you, you meant, I can’t help you.

Explanation: Fruit Juice is Not Significant, Wine/Oil is Significant

Speaker 1:

Fruit juice is a different problem. Oil is also fruit juice, I mean it’s worth I should tell you. It’s a different, one can understand simply what fruit juice the Gemara says many times is mere sweat, it’s not a significant thing. Wine and oil is also fruit juice, I mean wine and oil is also fruit juice, but it’s significant.

Why does it say maaser rishon? It’s not speaking about fruit juice. From where do you understand? I’ll tell you from another place. It appears that Chazal didn’t look at fruit juice as a significant thing, it’s mere sweat, it has no blessing. Which is not so by wine and oil which is indeed a significant thing. But according to Rabbeinu Moshe there is no difference, it’s not maaser rishon.

Which is not so in chametz for example, there is a place, there is another question. You learned chapter 5, what did we learn? What does it say in chapter 5 about fruit juice? What does it say in chapter 5 about fruit juice? Let’s see.

Fruit Juice in Chapter 5 – Regarding Becoming Chametz

Once in chametz, “fruit juice doesn’t cause leavening unless water is mixed in it”. And what are fruit juices? He says “wine and milk and oil and honey and olives”. It’s very interesting, because here he puts in wine and milk and honey and olives. Regarding wine, it’s a question, but anyway, it’s not a matter of becoming chametz.

All these things don’t cause chametz, but wine is indeed most of the water in the world. What does a little water do to cause chametz? We have a great dispute in the Rambam, that fruit juice alone doesn’t cause chametz, fruit juice together with water… very good, this I ask you a question. Others say that then it’s even worse, then it’s even worse than it was? Or then it’s even more chametz if it has a little water.

Question: How Can One Fulfill with Fruit Juice if it Doesn’t Cause Chametz?

I ask you, so one may fulfill with matzah even though it doesn’t cause chametz? So we learned earlier that it must be from a type of grain that causes chametz, but the water doesn’t have to be from a type of water that causes chametz. Fruit juice, there is the resident that one fulfills… fulfilling things, what there are fine things, even something can’t do with its interesting things.

But what is this that the bringer of our…

Law 6 (Continued): Matzah Kneaded with Fruit Juice

And what are fruit juices? It was wine and milk and honey. Very interesting, because here he puts in wine and milk and honey. Regarding that, but regarding the matter of becoming chametz, all these things don’t cause chametz. But wine, as the Rambam writes, the waters of the world. I can’t ask the question, because this is a different type of leavening. Here he takes a great difference, that the Rambam holds that fruit juice alone doesn’t cause chametz, and fruit juice together with water does cause chametz. Very good.

Now I ask you a question. Then it’s even worse than water. But the Rambam says, it’s liable to become chametz if it has a little water. And I ask you, so one may fulfill with matzah even if it doesn’t cause chametz? So we learned earlier that it must be from a type of grain that causes chametz, but the water doesn’t have to be a type of water that causes chametz. By fruit juice, the Rambam says that one fulfills the obligation of eating matzah on Pesach even if it can’t become chametz. Very interesting thing.

But what is this that you’re speaking about… correct, very good. Simple. What is the problem? Something doesn’t fit? It fits very well. Everything fits. True? Okay.

Discussion: The Difference Between Type of Grain and Type of Water

I must however understand, apparently you’re saying very well. If matzah couldn’t come to leavening, it appears that the law is not that it must be able to come to leavening, but it must be from the type that causes chametz. But for example in the water there is no law about the type. Because if you’ll find a way to make matzot without water at all, and it’s not relevant at all, if someone would have had such technology, apparently one would be allowed. Because it says “causes chametz”, matzah must be from a type of wheat that causes chametz.

But I ask you, if you can say that shemirat hamatzot one says literally that it can become chametz, and you guard it. One can say this about all types of things. It’s not what one says indeed. True? Always the question is what one says indeed, not what one can say. Okay, let’s see the Rambam. No, you’re saying what one can say, I’m not saying what one can say.

Okay. What is the problem? Everything fits.

The Maggid Mishneh and Other Rishonim

The Maggid Mishneh brings that other Rishonim argue with the Rambam and they say that all fruit juice makes matzah ashirah. Who are the others and why do they say so?

Ah, again, says the Maggid Mishneh, “However there are those who say that one only fulfills with fruit juice alone, but fruit juice with water no, because it’s not guarded from chametz, and anything that doesn’t come to leavening one doesn’t fulfill with it the obligation of matzah”. This is the proof of Rabbeinu David ben Nachmi.

Rabbeinu David ben Nachmi, it can come in that perhaps he wants to learn into the Rambam that the Rambam only speaks regarding the matter of lechem oni. It can come in that the Rambam also admits that it causes chametz. He means to say when one puts in a little water. I wouldn’t have thought so easily.

So, wait, what does the Raavad say?

“Said Avraham, the Raavad, one doesn’t fulfill with matzah that was kneaded with fruit juice alone. And that which they dipped in oil or honey, if it was cooked, one doesn’t fulfill with it”.

Yes, this is another thing. If it became cooked, then what? Then one doesn’t fulfill.

Ah, ah, ah, the Rambam makes a difference between with what it was kneaded, he tells you no.

No, he doesn’t say differently than the Rambam from this aspect.

Let’s go further.

Ah, that stands there further, that he speaks when one smeared it afterwards, not that it became cooked.

So until here are the laws of fruit juice.

As we explained, in total he already said the law once, but there he didn’t say the difference that wine, oil, honey, specifically fruit juice is kosher. But this is basically, and the Eshkol he also brought a proof on this. Not only one language in Rabbeinu David, one doesn’t fulfill. This is the innovation.

It’s apparently simple, anyway.

Yes? Let’s go further.

The Gemara About “Yom Hakamah” and Lechem Oni

Translation

This matter comes from the Gemara. The Gemara says “yom hakama,” Rabbi Meir says “yom hakama” liten lo shiur. He says, a matzah is after all a matter of “lechem oni” (bread of affliction). You eat a matzah on “yom hakama,” what is the concept of this? That it should be a matter of “lechem oni.” It’s not simple. But if you eat it on other days, it’s not simple. But if you eat it on other days, it’s not simple.

But in any case, what does “yom hakama” mean? Does it mean the first day? No, he means to say the first two. He doesn’t mean the first day at all, he means the first night. Ah, okay, okay. He means it practically. He’s still talking about the mitzvah of “lechem oni,” he’s not talking at all about… This is no question on Rabbi Meir. He means practically, he means the mitzvah, he doesn’t mean the essence of the first day. It’s simple, it’s not a chiddush (novelty) what you’re saying.

The Lechem Mishneh’s Answer

Okay, now, another thing that one doesn’t fulfill, okay? One fulfills. Yes? If you want to learn a concept, or you want to look for problems. Umm, yes. Do you have a problem? The Lechem Mishneh argues with the Maggid Mishneh, and he asks the question that you asked, how does it say that it must be “bal yechametz” (not leavened)? He says, “And I have to answer, that all things that are not bal yechametz in any way or manner in the world, such as wheat, it’s impossible to make from it matzah lishmah (for its own sake), for behold the matzah is bal yechametz, and how do we cause it not to become chametz?” What’s the point? He says what I told you.

Something bad that I told you that you need to talk with other people now? I’m here. What is this? It’s not nice. Yes, okay. I want to see if other people clarified it for you this way. It’s obvious that this is the understanding, it’s not a great Torah. Okay. Because the printing has inserted all these people here, and you think you need to talk now with all these people. Lots of people, and now learn these things. Okay? I’ll buy you a Rambam without all these things, and leave off.

“Brings” means if one doesn’t understand something. If one understands, it’s good. “Brings” doesn’t mean just looking at commentators. Matzah sheloshtan bemayim peirot (soaked in fruit juice). I’ve already learned it four million times. Now go further.

Mursan and Subin

The next halachah, “We only fulfill with bread, we only fulfill with pat mursan.” Mursan is what’s made from the waste of the wheat, you know, whole wheat matzah. One must know, whole wheat has only a little mursan. But pure flour, he says so, but flour kemach and subin without mursan, is indeed good. If it’s only made from the fine flour, not.

Ah, that’s what he means? Yes. Ah, that’s what he means. What’s the difference between the two things? They’re both the same thing.

So he says, “Mursan is the waste of the wheat that comes out from the beginning of sifting, and subin is from the rest of the waste.” Whatever that exactly means. Okay.

Discussion: What is Kosher and What Isn’t

But what does the Rambam say in a halachah? That you shouldn’t think that lechem oni means specifically poor bread that also has a lot of waste, but also clean waste can be called lechem oni. One can fulfill with the waste instead, but not fulfill the… Ah, l’chaim! Not any rich thing with any honey and wine and oil.

So what doesn’t one do and what does one do? I’m confused. But with mursan and with subin isn’t good? Why not? It’s after all a matter that it should be… It’s after all pat nekiyah (clean bread).

Subin is not flour. Subin is not flour. Seriously? Yes. That’s the explanation? Yes? Yes. Ah, then if the Lechem Mishneh would have said something, I would… But I say I don’t understand, then it makes sense yes. Hello?

Umm… I’m jealous that I give more attention to the Lechem Mishneh.

Exactly. Gone over to the people. A living lion and a dead dog, a dead dog and a living lion. I mean it says a living dog and a dead lion. I’m after all a living dog, I’m after all here.

The Lechem Mishneh on Mursan and Subin

He brings such a thing in hilchot challah, there’s such a halachah that… if one has mixed mursan together with subin, I don’t see any way to stop.

Ah, it’s not so simple. In the Gemara there’s “pisdera minayhu.” Now it’s the question, the Rambam says “pisdera” means that it has both. Others learn “pisdera” means specifically mursan. It’s a question how one fulfills with it. Okay, the Gemara says one side that one needs specifically pisdera.

No, “yachol… ah, halachah not this and not that.” Ah, it could be about how the Rambam answers the matter, because others have Rav Yitzchak lechem oni. The Rambam isn’t concerned, he says this is the Gemara. What would one think? That one only fulfills with pisdera, but that is called lechem oni? The Rambam says, pisdera means that it has mixed in mursan. No, I’m saying how one learns according to the Rambam, what the Rambam would presumably also have learned. Pisdera means mixed. And the Gemara says, what would one have thought? That one doesn’t fulfill with mixed, because perhaps one needs to have lechem oni? Ah, on the contrary, that one doesn’t fulfill with… Ah, that one doesn’t fulfill with clean, talmud lomar (the verse teaches). But those who learn that pisdera means only mursan, struggle with the Rambam, but it’s not relevant, because we learn the Rambam.

Okay, very good.

Sources of the Halachah

The Magen Avraham and all the Acharonim say that this comes from… “and subin without mursan” isn’t so strong. I don’t mean to say from opinion. No, from opinion. They also don’t say the measure. They also say the measure, that it comes from Masechet Challah, where it says there that mursan and subin are not considered bread, and what did they say? One needs to have bread. They say that… and here it says “yachol lo yatza ela bepisdra,” one must say that pisdera is not the five species of grain, but it’s the question whether the five species of grain isn’t real flour.

I hear. Who is making a distinction here?

Matzat Shlomo

Okay, the Matzah Shlomo says even… where does it say this? Even in the Gemara? The halachah that even pat nekiyah is also good, is also in the Gemara? Yes, it’s in the Gemara. What? Even with the Tosafot called in Yehoshua.

Tosafot at least learns, the Gemara says “yachol… ela Pesach dorot,” talmud lomar “matzah matzah” to include even matzat Shlomo which was a very pure matzah. King Solomon’s matzah. King Solomon had after all clean matzot, “miloni gedolah Shechinah.” Certainly King Solomon had clean matzot.

Halachah 6 (Continued) – Very Clean Fine Flour

Speaker 1: Yes? This is in the Gemara? What? Even with very clean fine flour?

Speaker 2: Yes.

Speaker 1: This is apparently what the Rambam learns, but the Gemara says “yachol yehei zeh pasul ela pat hadoreh, talmud lomar ‘matzah matzot tochelu,’ even like the matzot of Shlomo,” which was a very pure matzah.

Ah, King Solomon’s matzot. King Solomon had clean matzot. Miloni gedolah. Certainly King Solomon had clean matzot.

Speaker 2: Who says?

Speaker 1: Okay.

Isn’t this after all not a hava amina (initial assumption) at all? I can understand this. This was poverty, one wanted to maximize as much as possible from the wheat. Ah, wealth doesn’t do so. Solet is always when the Torah makes solet, solet always means to extract clean fine flour. Yes, by all korbanot (sacrifices) there’s solet, it’s after all more important… Solet, one takes in the good. Solet is an important thing, it’s a symbol of good bread. It’s obvious, yes, I agree. One must take out from this the this. This is after all obvious.

Okay, in practice for halachah there’s no difference between wheat or others, one can fulfill both very well. I don’t know, but our wheat is what there is. Yes, a wheat means that one puts in a little of the… something, I don’t know exactly what. One doesn’t put in at all a waste, something one puts in.

Halachah 7 – Method of Baking: Tanur, Ilpas, Baking in the Ground

Speaker 1: They baked matzot, now we’re going to learn how one must make the matzot. Yes? “We bake matzot in a tanur or in an ilpas.” Yes, either one made it in a tanur. They already learned last night in the context of this. A tanur means such a place where there is… a tanur is heated from inside, right? A tanur means such a box that you put inside it the fire and all. Ilpas is heated from outside, it’s a kind of top, right? A frying pan such a thing. Perhaps such a tripod basically ilpas, but this became such a grill kind of thing, yes, one puts it from below.

One has no choice for working, kneading, mixing.

Speaker 2: I know this is an eighth minute. I mean here on… No, how does it say? You learned a time way… But… peshichah (spreading).

Speaker 1: Very good. By me it was stuck on peshichah. No, I don’t know. Something pulled me quickly. Well, I meant that in all time one has already learned. Until now also. No.

Discussion: What Does “Pat” Mean Regarding Ilpas?

Speaker 1: I mean that what it seems to us here to bring mixed, the camel, it seems that the question is what bread means. Because if one cooks and makes a kneidel (dumpling), it doesn’t fall under… Yes, in hilchot berachot there’s the question. You assume that every side that one makes from dough is bread, automatically. If one makes it in an ilpas, here is the novelty what is called yes bread. I can some but some not be a bread. So when one makes kneidels, and mean to fulfill with this the mitzvah for matzah? Kneidels?

Speaker 2: Is it already made from matzah… one makes a fresh kneidel.

Speaker 1: But Rav, one makes something a… so like many foods that one cooks on one takes flour and one cooks in a pot. Kishke… what doesn’t have the form, regarding berachot, regarding various things.

What does the Rabbeinu see here, what has it meant to me not already. Either what that was cooked from… or, says the holy, very drawn Maggid Mishneh, see a dispute of Rishonim at all.

Speaker 2: Ah, a dispute of Rishonim…

Speaker 1: Ummmmmm… Not a simple thing. Ilpas that one puts in water, first boils, and afterwards one puts in the dough. Yes, I believe it’s something more than just the way to be. Rabbeinu’s however in hilchot, that if one is a self that boils, both is called also, and fulfills the dispute and more… Understand, two things that here has a ruling from a ruling, as it brings in hilchot berachot, which also has apparently.

But until now have you learned… There is… Ummm… Before this… Regarding challah… What bread means, is the general language… Obligated in challah and one fulfills with it one’s obligation on Pesach. So the Rabbeinu Yerucham held like the Ramban and the Rashba, but the holy Ra’avad said differently. The holy Ra’avad said, “Ma’aseh ilpas, even gavla d’ura,” with this the Ra’avad admits that it’s called bread.

We come at night, as I said that one must make hamotzi for everyone, at night one goes to say the entire Birkat Hamazon, as one says the entire Birkat Hamazon, Ya’aleh Veyavo, Retzeh Vehachalitzenu, everything. By the way, in practice Chol Hamoed, unless it’s not a Yom Tov meal, but another thing, he brings a proof, because Rav Huna said, “Charichah detarti shema minah lechem.”

I don’t know, there’s something a problem of chametz. By the way, he admits to the Ramban that it’s bread, but it’s a question of chametz, I don’t know.

Speaker 2: What does the Maharsha dispute?

Speaker 1: Ah, it’s his reasoning, he says his own opinion. “For matzot there is one who disputes because of a reasoning that stands.”

Speaker 2: How does he say on this Ra’avad?

Speaker 1: But one Yosef Noris, he argues on a proof from the Gemara on page 40 at all.

In any case, already. The Ramban says that one can make so.

Baking in the Ground

Speaker 1: Even baking in the ground, what is this? What’s the difference of baking in the ground? Do you know what baking in the ground is? Like the Arabs make pita. Do you know how they make pita these days? They make a pit, they put fire in the pit, and they stick it on the side. Baking in the ground, the heating of the fire.

Speaker 2: Aha, he said that it’s just kneading, whatever that is.

Speaker 1: But others said, said Rav Ashi, said Mar bar Rav Ashi, one fulfills with it one’s obligation on Pesach, which is lechem oni. Ah, Mar bar Rav Ashi argued, even regarding importance, better people don’t eat it, they said that it’s just heating of fire, but Pesach you don’t need to be any better person, Pesach is the obligation of lechem oni, so certainly on Pesach one fulfills.

Novelty: Lechem Oni Requires Less Importance Than Pat

Speaker 1: It’s a dispute, the Rabbeinu Yerucham brings the Gemara in Berachot, the Rambam says that one must make al achilat matzah, and be kove’a seudah (establish a meal). So he said that it’s less important, and it’s not bread. Ah, on the baking in the ground, the heating of fire. Aha, he said that it’s just kneading. But others said, said Rav Ashi, said Mar bar Rav Ashi, one fulfills with it one’s obligation on Pesach, which is lechem oni. Ah, Mar bar Rav Ashi argued, even regarding importance, better people don’t eat it, they said that it’s just heating of fire, but Pesach you don’t need to be any better person, Pesach is the obligation of lechem oni, so certainly on Pesach one fulfills.

In Berachot 38a it says… It says that matzah is customary to eat with it other things, but still one makes hamotzi. My grandfather made yes hamotzi. Mar bar Rav Ashi said, since one fulfills one’s obligation with it on Pesach. What’s the reason? Lechem oni we call it.

The explanation is, says Rav David, that the Rema himself in hilchot Pesach rules that one makes on it a mezonot actually, because it’s not bread regarding hilchot berachot. But Pesach, although it’s mezonot, he says perhaps if one is kove’a seudah it’s yes, because… Ah, very good, my grandfather doesn’t say differently. He says if one is kove’a seudah on it, and this one makes hamotzi.

Pesach, in any case Pesach, apparently the explanation is that it looks different on the house, therefore there’s a possibility to eat more in the manner of casual eating. It’s not like bread which is important and one always sits down to eat on it. And Pesach this itself is the importance, that which one sits down and one is kove’a seudah on it. Just like my grandfather was kove’a seudah, and he sat down at the seder with this. So it seems, I don’t know.

And who says this? It says at all that matzah, if it’s not bread. But here he says that matzah has a weaker… According to what Mar bar Rav Ashi says, that matzah needs less bread than normal. To make hamotzi one needs really bread, but matzah is lechem oni we call it, so from the aspect of lechem oni it can be even something a weaker bread. Do you understand so?

Speaker 2: Yes.

Speaker 1: Interesting.

Speaker 2: Isn’t that interesting?

Speaker 1: It is.

So it comes out that regarding this it can be less. Very good.

Okay.

Halachah 7 (Continued) – Matzah That Wasn’t Fully Baked

Speaker 1: And so if it wasn’t fully baked one fulfills with it, provided that there isn’t in it the measure of chametz.

And so if it wasn’t fully baked, how… Ah, not fully baked he doesn’t mean that it’s completely unbaked. Provided that there isn’t in it the measure of chametz, it must be completely baked. It can be half baked, but it may not be “a coal inside dough.” What is this exactly? Isn’t this raw pieces? Apparently this is the concept that can still become chametz. One didn’t bake it enough, it can still become chametz.

Matzah Hanah/Matzah Na

Speaker 1: The Gemara calls this “matzah hanah.” It says in 37b, “Matzah hanah, what is matzah hanah? Said Rav Yehudah said Shmuel” – I don’t know what “hanah” means – “Said Rav Yehudah said Shmuel, anything that when one breaks it and threads don’t extend from it. And if not, behold this is dough.” Not simply chametz, it’s another problem, it’s not bread. You can eat bread, not dough. And you don’t wait that it can still become chametz, because you’re not eating it yet finished.

Here we’re not talking at all about hilchot chametz. Hilchot chametz was already in a previous chapter. Here one talks about what one fulfills the obligation of matzah. Here one talks about something that didn’t become chametz, because one eats it immediately. What’s the difference?

Speaker 2: You’re worried that it can become chametz? We’re not talking about now and now.

Speaker 1: He brings another version “matzah na.” Interesting. “Hanah” is changed from the word “na.” According to Chazal’s explanation that “na” means half baked. We make our meal in a third. Interesting.

Halachah 7 (Continued) – Soaked Cracker

Speaker 1: Okay, another thing is one fulfills with “soaked cracker.” A cracker means a cracker, like our matzot are cracker matzot. You have loaf matzot and cracker matzot. Loaf matzot are the Sephardic matzot, the old-fashioned matzot. Or even pita, more soft, laffa, whatever. Large. The point isn’t that it’s soft, the point is that it’s larger. And cracker matzot are thin matzot. It made sense that one would want to soak it, so it wouldn’t kill the teeth.

Speaker 2: Exactly.

Provided It Didn’t Dissolve – Taste of Matzah

English Translation

Speaker 1: He says, “v’hu shelo nimoch” – it should not be completely dissolved. But what’s the problem if it’s dissolved? Then it’s not bread, it’s porridge. But matzah that hasn’t undergone nishtaneh tzuraso, hasn’t undergone nishtaneh tzuraso. But he writes “ta’am hapat” – it’s not bread, but it doesn’t have the taste of bread. “Aval im nitbashla, omeret hagemara, mah ta’am ein yotzin bah? Mishum d’ba’inan ta’am matzah, v’leika.” We learned that “ta’am matzah” in the sense of “b’lo matzah yotzei bah.” It’s clear that we do rule that one needs a… it’s not the same ta’am hamatzah, understand? But what I’m saying is, there is indeed a concept of b’inan ta’am hamatzah, again, that one doesn’t need to stand… no, b’inan ta’am hamatzah doesn’t have to mean that people must feel the ta’am hamatzah, which is for divrei Bora yotzei. But it doesn’t mean no people.

End of Discussion on Tzurat Pat

Speaker 1: But even so, it’s a good answer, we don’t equate the laws of ta’am matzah and lechem. Earlier we learned that ta’am matzah in the sense of bole’a matzah yotzei we said. One sees clearly that we do rule that one needs to have the same ta’am matzah. Understand what I’m saying? There is indeed a concept of b’inan ta’am matzah, again, that one shouldn’t equate… the new b’inan ta’am matzah says that a person must feel the ta’am matzah, because the proof is bole’a yotzei. But it doesn’t mean matzah that doesn’t have the taste of matzah. What makes it matzah? The appearance, the taste of what it’s made from, wheat.

The point is, it seems there’s no problem if it doesn’t look like bread. Perhaps this is a way, I don’t know, it became something else. Because he says that one needs that it should have the concept of it shouldn’t look like bread. For example, the concept that it should indeed be yotzei looking. The point is, there’s no strong b’inan must things to, it’s apparently about form, not about taste. Okay, here is… so it comes out a great nafka minah, that when it’s form one needs to look at the dispute between Mar Zutra and Abaye, I don’t remember the names. But when it’s taste, it’s a different framework. One doesn’t need to seek any… taste seems to be more important than tzurat hadevarim. Yes, but still, to what extent is this such a strong taste? It’s all about saying that it must be bread. Okay.

Until here the laws of tzurat pat, more or less. Laws of bread.

Introduction to Law 8 – Forbidden Matzah

Speaker 1: Now one can learn other problems that exist with matzah. Matzah that’s made from something forbidden, whether one can be yotzei with it, and which type of prohibition. The Rambam says in law 7, ein adam. Yes?

Speaker 2: Yes.

The Rambam’s Language in Law 8

Speaker 1: “Ein adam yotzei yedei chovato ba’achilat matzah she’hi asurah lo.” Ein adam, there’s no person who is yotzei yedei chovah. There’s no person. Second, yotzei, one must go out. Third, this is how the Chassidic Jews used to say. But in zeh eino. A person is not yotzei. What comes in a person? Specifically for us.

“Ein adam yotzei yedei chovato ba’achilat matzah she’hi asurah lo, k’gon she’achla tevel, o ma’aser rishon shelo nitla terumato, o pat gezulah, o she’ulah.” These three things are called asurah lo, therefore he cannot be yotzei matzah.

“Zeh haklal, kol shemevarchin alav birkat hamazon yotzei bo yedei chovato, v’chol she’ein mevarchin alav birkat hamazon ein yotzei bo yedei chovato.” Isn’t it obvious, the Rambam says in Hilchot Berachot, “botze’a berach netz,” yes?

Speaker 2: I don’t know, are you now saying something you remember from thin air?

Speaker 1: From thin air? It lies in my Torah-filled head. Okay. “Botze’a berach netz Hashem,” as the Gemara says in Challah.

But this is also the problem of… this is also the reason.

Understanding “Zeh Haklal” – Not a Reason but a Sign

Speaker 1: “Zeh haklal” doesn’t mean to say that because one cannot make birkat hamazon one cannot be yotzei matzah, rather he’s saying that regarding birkat hamazon it’s written out more… it’s written out more. Both come from the same reason. Not that one cannot be yotzei matzah because one cannot birkat hamazon, right? He says “zeh haklal,” if you want to know which things, look in the laws of birkat…

The simple meaning that comes in here, apparently it’s a law of mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah. Mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah. Yes. So he says, “zeh haklal,” you want to know which types of transgressions, look in the laws of birkat hamazon which types of transgressions one cannot bentch at all, that’s what he means to say?

He says that in the laws of berachot of the Rambam he says… the editor says, “kitzur Rabbeinu Pinchas shevirach shemo.” Therefore one apparently needs to look there.

Speaker 2: No, but there it says that even rabbinic prohibitions have “botze’a berach netz Hashem.”

Speaker 1: It’s interesting that it’s called mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah. A Torah mitzvah that comes with a rabbinic transgression is called mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah, regarding this law. Let’s go look in Hilchot Berachot. Berachot alef yud tet, end.

Hilchot Berachot – Even Tevel D’Rabbanan

Speaker 1: Tevel of rabbinic origin. Aha. And “otzarcha lo yimalu na’i v’eilta d’reisha.” Okay, he rules here, “Kol ha’ochel davar issur, bein b’meizid bein b’shogeg, ein mevarchin alav lo b’techilah v’lo b’sof.” He says, “ha’ochel tevel, afilu tevel d’rabbanan” – here he didn’t write out the word tevel d’rabbanan, but by telling us “zeh haklal,” he told us even tevel d’rabbanan. It’s a great chiddush.

Speaker 2: It’s a greater chiddush that one is not yotzei matzah than that one doesn’t make a berachah.

Speaker 1: No, if one would understand that it’s for the same reason, that it’s something of a concept of mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah, then it’s the same thing. It could be it’s not about that, but if it’s about that, it’s the same thing.

What does the holy Rabbeinu Manoach say? What did Rabbeinu Manoach say? He says that tevel means “ta’ev lo,” not good. And another interpretation that it means “tavul shel etz,” it’s something one cannot eat, it’s a piece of wood. And “i nami milashon arev shekorin l’davar me’urav mevutal.” Okay, very cute Rabbeinu Manoach, and he wants to explain to learn the word tevel.

Question: Gezulah – Is It a Law in the Bread?

Speaker 1: There’s another question: the question whether matzah gezulah, whether it’s a law in the bread? It says “mitzvoteichem.” Gezulah is an extra law, arisoteichem. If the word is mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah, why do we need the extra teaching regarding theft? He brings a proof that if two people bake in one oven, one should check well that it’s yours, because it needs to be bread. In the Megillat Esther he says… but others say no. It’s not about that.

Speaker 2: There’s an opinion that matzah needs to be lachem, so one is not yotzei with borrowed matzah?

Speaker 1: Gezulah is stated. But with borrowed matzah it says mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah has an extra law. Wait a moment, I’ll ask you a question. If it says… if it says “ulekachtem lachem,” so there’s no problem?

Four Opinions in the Yerushalmi About Matzah Gezulah

Speaker 1: Matzah gezulah is forbidden to bless on it, Rabbi Hoshaya said tzvi achnis et hashem. Rabbi Yochanan said aveirah mitzvah, Rabbi Yitzchak said mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah, and Rabbi Ela’i said mitzvah shemusasin mitzvatan.

So according to what’s here in the Yerushalmi there are four opinions? What are the four opinions in this matter? What does the Magein Mishneh say?

Speaker 2: Yes, but perhaps they’re all the same.

Speaker 1: Whoever can should say what the four opinions are. One aveirah mitzvah, one mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah. There it says forbidden to bless on it, it doesn’t say that one is not yotzei.

The Ra’avad’s Objection in Hilchot Berachot

Speaker 1: And the Ra’avad, if you look in Hilchot Berachot you would have seen that the Ra’avad argues on this Rambam altogether. The Ra’avad says that the Rambam didn’t understand what he’s talking about. The Ra’avad says, no, what it says in Hilchot Berachot… in Hilchot Berachot, I noticed, if you don’t look in Hilchot Berachot, you would have seen that the Ra’avad says that what it says “ein mevarchin,” the Rambam brings there, the Ra’avad says, this doesn’t mean that one doesn’t make a berachah. What he means to say is, one shouldn’t be mezamen, one doesn’t have the importance of a stolen thing, but a berachah one must certainly make. So says the Ra’avad there.

He learns the simple meaning in the Gemara, he looks in the Gemara there. The Ra’avad wrote, ha, what does it mean? To’evah gedolah leshalem resha’im b’varchan, ela she’ein mezamnin aleihem, lo mishum chashivut kevi’ut achilat davar issur, like fruits, but berachah techilah v’sof lamah lo yevarech, ho’il v’neheneh. It’s very funny the law that the Rambam understands that if you steal something, you’re exempt from thanking the Almighty for pleasure. I don’t need it, I don’t need it, it’s a framework with a berachah. It’s not a mitzvah. I understand the reason, because you do a transgression and you still thank the Almighty.

Discussion: Exempt from Berachah and Not Being Yotzei Matzah

Speaker 2: The boy stole money from the maid, he said, “Daddy, you need to give me money.” And one is exempt? What is the law here actually? That one is exempt from the berachah?

Speaker 1: One may not say a berachah. The question is, what is the law with exempt? If I eat it, am I exempt? Yes.

I understand the hypocrisy, clearly. But what does it have to do with not being yotzei? Not yotzei is an invalid law. You haven’t done the mitzvah properly, you need to do it again.

Koneh B’Shinui – Gazel Chitim vs. Gazel Matzah

Speaker 1: And if it’s koneh b’shinui, then one is indeed yotzei. Yes? Like for example gazel matzah, the Yerushalmi says gazel chitim yotzei, because it’s koneh b’shinui. You don’t say that a person who steals money may not make a berachah because you bought your bread with stolen money. It’s a bit further, because the person is a thief, but the bread is bread.

Practical Nafka Minah – Matzah Bakery

Speaker 1: Rav Avraham Brandsdorfer said that one is not yotzei when one eats matzah from the Toldot Aharon matzah bakery, because it’s a decree. The Acharonim also said it, that it’s nonsense. The Acharonim also said that it’s a law in principle. Because it’s like gazel chitim, it doesn’t mean like stolen matzah. You steal the binding, not the matzah.

Speaker 2: So it’s nonsense?

Speaker 1: Apparently. It could be that such great poskim say nonsense, but it could be.

So that’s how it goes. It’s clearly so.

Rav Abramowitz’s Opinion – Transgression at the Time of Eating

Speaker 1: Rav Abramowitz argues that from the Yerushalmi it comes out that it’s a concept itself on the transgression. You do a mitzvah at the time you eat it, then everyone agrees. But now one can speak, you stole money and you bought with it, you paid the money. But you stole matzah. Or you stole flour and bought matzah. One steals flour, you are koneh b’shinui, you’re not obligated to pay. Money. Because it’s not a cheftza of prohibition at all. But the Gemara has a brutality that it’s a cheftza of prohibition.

Question from the Rashba in Sukkah

Speaker 1: But the Rashba brings in Tractate Sukkah argues that it doesn’t fit, because in Tractate Pesachim it says that one eats a…

Kinyan B’Shinui by Stealing Flour and Baking Matzah

But he steals matzah, yes? Suddenly he steals flour and bakes matzah. He steals flour, he steals flour, he steals flour, but he steals flour, he steals flour, but he is koneh b’shinui, now he’s not obligated to pay matzah, he’s obligated to pay money. Because it’s no longer a cheftza of prohibition at all. He steals bread, is it a cheftza of prohibition.

The Ritva’s Question from Ketubot – When Does the Obligation of Payment Come and When Does Karet Come?

But the Ritva brings in Tractate Sukkah an argument that it doesn’t fit, because in Ketubot it says that one who eats his friend’s forbidden fat, although he’s liable for karet, he’s not exempt from paying because of kam leih b’deraba minei. Why? Because it’s two different levels. Kivon d’lo ati, when he acquires it, he was first then he’s liable for payments. Mah she’ein kein the karet only works when it’s bole’o.

It comes out that here regarding matzah apparently, when is he benefiting from the matzah? Isn’t the word bole’o. Rather the matzah? No, by the Shulchan Aruch there’s no mitzvah to buy the matzah, there’s a mitzvah to eat the matzah. Right? Therefore it comes out that he was already koneh always b’shinui, he comes, you hear? So he argues, the Ritva brings.

Rabbeinu Yonah’s Answer – The Entire Time of Eating

Rav Rabbeinu Yonah says that the Rambam doesn’t weigh it out that way. Why? I can also understand why. He wants to say that in fulfilling the mitzvah, yes, that’s the question, when does one eat matzah, when is one fulfilling the mitzvah? By chewing or by swallowing? He says it’s the entire time.

“Ganav U’Verach Harei Zeh Mena’etz” – The Moral Problem of Mitzvah Haba’ah Ba’aveirah

I also can’t understand. One can understand a bit why. What do you say about a person? You thank the Almighty who gives to everyone, the Almighty has in mind every person and He gives him food. How did He have me in mind? He gave me the power of stealing? Hello? It’s a disgusting thing, the whole thing is not good. The Almighty doesn’t give him. It’s not “noten lechem l’chol basar.” Disgusting, disgusting, it says in the Gemara, “ganav u’verach, harei zeh mena’etz.” Heaven forbid. Yes, the Almighty can, but it’s not, the Almighty doesn’t take any compliment. “Ni’etz Hashem,” the Almighty says that I was pained by him. Like one who speaks blasphemous words. You say “noten lechem l’chol basar,” and you also say that the only way I can have the bread is through stealing. It’s a disgusting thing.

Story with a Thief by the Rebbe

Well well, you know the story, there was a thief who came to the Rebbe, and he said he wants a blessing in his livelihood. He said, “I give a blessing on stealing?” He said, “Yes, I’m a person, if anyway someone is destined to be robbed, let it be through me.”

The Rebbe z”l had a daughter, Marat Chaya’le, she was a great ba’alat mofet. She said, “Just as the thief said to her father, that if anyway someone is destined to be robbed, let it be through me, she asked her father that she should have the power to bless blessings that will take effect.” And she said not that she will exchange, but one who needs anyway to receive a salvation, before that should have come to me for a blessing, I should also have a part in it. So she said, that’s how she wants to give the blessing for the thief.

Discussion: Is Stealing Merit?

That’s the story. This is not from the time. Have you heard of this?

No, he also wasn’t. This is not with thefts. All rebbes actually are in this. Because they steal on it, because the power of the rebbes is that the Almighty has mercy, that He sends… no, one doesn’t steal the merit, rather the person who needs to already be helped, he goes to the rebbe because the Almighty wants the rebbe to…

I see stealing as a contradiction, you’re a thief, liable for his life, yes? For the other Jew. Actually that one receives it, but you’re an old wicked person. Right? So you say, one steals the merit, it’s the same thing. The salvation should come through an intermediary person, which person.

Aviyah Rokei’ach – “Kol Mi Sheyagi’a L’Yadi Matzah Sheli”

The Satmar Rav, the first Belzer Rav, the Sar Shalom, he brings here Aviyah Rokei’ach, they know him, he means a second one, perhaps the father of the Ba’al HaRokei’ach, said that one should say “kol mi sheyagi’a l’yadi matzah sheli einah matanah.” Like it says regarding lulav and etrog, yes? The Gemara says regarding lulav and etrog “kol mi sheyagi’a lulavi l’yadi.” Yes, well. So says the Aviyah Rokei’ach, the father of the Ba’al HaRokei’ach, that one should also say by matzot “kol mi sheyagi’a matzah l’yadi.” This is only according to what says that it needs to be matzah “lachem.” Here it doesn’t say that it needs to be “lachem,” here it doesn’t say that one needs to have a transgression. But by matzah there’s no problem. No, because he permits, it’s not a transgression. The opposite, right? “Kol mi sheyagi’a l’yadi matzah sheli” means no, perhaps it means yes, if someone steals or what. Stealing can mean a bit more… stealing can mean that it was prepared for me in the matzah bakery and that one took it. It can be a bit more of a subtle thing.

Maharam Schiff – When Baking with Other People

Rabbi Noach brought from the… not Rabbi Noach, the Maharam Schiff brought from the… that when one bakes with other people, each one should take his own. Yes, exactly, because if it’s a general sale, if you need to help, he looks at you that you need to free him from sale. The Gemara says clearly that it shouldn’t be matzot chametz. “Ulekachtem lachem,” the four species says “ulekachtem lachem,” here there’s no matzot chametz. Tzorech yom tov. Right, very good. Thank you. Okay, let’s continue.

Stolen Shofar – Distinction Between Shofar and Matzah

The Hagahot HaRamach’s Question

Well, um… the Hagahos HaRamach asks that in Hilchos Shofar the Rambam rules that one is not yotzei with a stolen shofar. But I think it’s very different, because there with a stolen shofar… what’s the answer? What do the old sefarim say about being yotzei with a stolen shofar? But I think there it’s mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu, no? And it’s also very different, because when you swallow down food, simply, now you’re transgressing a sin. You won’t be able to return it. If mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu, but you can’t say that when one eats.

Why not? Why can’t one say? Let’s ask this. Why not? Why is it certain that one can’t say it here?

The Rambam’s Answer — “She’ein HaMitzvah Ela BiShemias HaKol”

Okay, let’s see what he says about a stolen shofar, Chapter 1 of Hilchos Shofar, Halacha 3. “She’ein hamitzvah ela bishemias hakol, v’ein bakol din gezel.” So there’s no question. The Rambam says a very beautiful thing, that the sin and the mitzvah have no connection. Here the sin and the mitzvah are the same thing, because the ultimate theft is when you eat it up, when the other person won’t be able to have it anymore. Mah she’ein kein blowing shofar isn’t the sin that you’re blowing, rather the mitzvah is shemias hakol, and shemias hakol isn’t a sin. That’s a different answer.

Mitzvos Lav Leihanos Nitnu — Second Answer

If it goes… now the Rambam says very clearly. What is the Ramach asking? The Rambam says clearly that there it’s not mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu. He doesn’t say mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu. He says that shemias hakol, the mitzvah is the shemias hakol, and shemias hakol… I remember that there is indeed something about the concept of mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu there. Perhaps that’s for a different problem? Not for the problem of mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah, and that answers some other issue? Okay. Ah, he says further, im tomar halo neheneh mishemias hakol, mitzvos lav leihanos nisnu.

Discussion: Does Mitzvos Lav Leihanos Nitnu Help for Theft?

So now there’s a great point. Two things, two nafka minos that we learn from here, that mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu. Then what? Granted the pleasure makes it into an issur, because he has pleasure from the other person’s thing?

Shimon, let’s know… there’s a bit of a question here, who is obligated in the issur of theft? That’s from the moment when one steals it from the other person. So here is the thing of having pleasure from the other person’s thing. So on that was the thing that if you steal a shofar, yes, perhaps you’re doing an issur with having pleasure from it. But swallowing down is certainly a… it doesn’t go with the pleasure, because when you swallow it down you’ve done the greatest theft, you can’t return it. So it’s certainly more of a sin to swallow down the other person’s thing than to use pleasure from the other person’s thing, like a shofar.

Nu nu. And I already know that for something like eating one can say mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu. The question is what does it help… okay, I don’t know. Let me go further because I don’t remember. I need to know for which problem the mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu works, understand? He says mudar hana’ah, the example. We’re talking about just someone who is mudar hana’ah. A mudar hana’ah I understand, why mudar hana’ah? Simply it’s that this is a pleasure, and the Torah said that the pleasure is permitted. But I don’t know if it helps for a problem of theft. What’s the meaning of theft? The theft isn’t in the pleasure, the theft is in the taking. And taking one may take, so to speak, understand what I’m saying? Perhaps that’s not… okay, let’s go further.

Halacha 9 — Kohanim Are Yotzei with Challah and Terumah; Ma’aser Sheni; Bikkurim

“And kohanim.” But this is an interesting thing, the stringency that one should say yes to reveal. Again, he’s talking about the manner that we saw the Ra’avad speaks about, that it’s a manner where such a thing happens, right? That he stands in the situation essentially and he says “yes, I’m not crying theft.” When is there a stringency? He’s speaking regarding people who are in such a situation where it could happen that his matzah came to another person, or perhaps he means to say at the seder at night, when one distributes the matzos, the father distributes the matzos, one needs to know something that this has… I understand what I mean? Everyone speaks in the Beis HaMikdash where one took from each person lulavim, one needs to know the schedule, but it’s not min hamuvchar. Okay, let’s continue.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger — Ritva Who Argues with the Yerushalmi

I see Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks, and he brings a Ritva, that the Ritva says that in practice one is indeed yotzei, the lav haba michlal aseh comes with kinyan gezel, and the lulav is the Ritva who argues with the Yerushalmi. The Bavli argues with the Yerushalmi about this sugya. Now, it’s also interesting, with the help of Hashem one can better understand how not to do a mitzvah with a sin, in the way that I said, that you can’t thank the Almighty for what you stole.

The Rambam’s Ruling — Kohanim, Ma’aser Sheni, Bikkurim

Do you want to learn more Torah? Sure. The kohanim, kohanim yotz’im b’challah u’viterumah, afilu shehi matzah she’einah re’uyah lechol adam. Why could one argue that one is not yotzei? No, one is indeed yotzei. Okay. And likewise, v’chein hu omer, one is yotzei with matzah shel ma’aser sheni biYerushalayim. But what is one not yotzei with? Yes, if you eat ma’aser sheni in Jerusalem one is yotzei. But matzah shel bikkurim one may not be yotzei. One may eat it, but not be yotzei with the mitzvah of matzah.

The Distinction Between Ma’aser Sheni and Bikkurim — “B’chol Moshvoseichem”

Why? An interesting thing. Because it says regarding bikkurim “olim heiter v’chlum yashuvu”. Hey, ma’aser sheni also must be eaten in Jerusalem? No, different. One can redeem it. Granted, it says “b’chol moshvoseichem tochlu matzos”, but the simple meaning means that one must eat matzah everywhere, not only in Jerusalem. But the Gemara darshened that it means that it must be matzah that is “ra’uy lechol adam u’lechol moshavos”. Where possible, granted bikkurim that one cannot eat, one may not eat in another place, one is not yotzei. It’s an interesting thing to interpret the Gemara, the distinction is all the forms of the explanations.

Rabbeinu Manoach’s Proof — “Lo Sochlu Alav Chametz”

I see Rabbeinu Manoach brings on the kohanim being yotzei a Gemara. It’s interesting to me why they don’t bring that Gemara regarding mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah. The Gemara says “lo sochlu alav chametz shivas yamim”, mi shehayah nasun Yisrael al achilas chametz, yatza zeh she’asur mishum issur acher. Why didn’t they say this in the Gemara?

What’s the proof? Rabbeinu Manoach brings the Gemara “lo sochlu alav chametz”. Regarding Pesach, regarding Pesach.

Speaker 1: I see, Rabbeinu Manoach brings on the kohanim yes a Gemara, and it’s interesting to me why they don’t bring that Gemara regarding the mitzvah of biur. The Gemara says “lo yochlu lechem matzos shivas yamim, mi she’eino ochel ela matzos shivas yamim, yatza zeh she’asur mishum issur acher”. Why didn’t they say this? Why does Rabbeinu Manoach bring the Gemara “lo yochlu lechem matzos” regarding kohanim, regarding one who is warned about something forbidden to him? And I ask, I don’t think, why did theft need a completely different one?

Okay… now we’re not learning about davar ha’asur lo, now we’re learning about ra’uy la’achilas kelavim and Shabbos.

Speaker 2: No, I’m saying, Rabbeinu Manoach says that kohanim yotz’in b’challah shel terumah but a Yisrael doesn’t, just as the Gemara says “lo yochlu lechem matzos”.

Speaker 1: Why don’t we understand one halacha earlier, yes? He learned it, that a person is not yotzei with matzah ashirah. Did he already learn it?

Speaker 2: But he learned it.

Speaker 1: He brought a Gemara, which I don’t understand why they didn’t bring the previous one.

Speaker 2: Okay. He brought it directly.

Speaker 1: It’s not about biur chametz! Again! I don’t mean the previous one, one who is yotzei when it’s forbidden due to another prohibition. That’s the matzah thing they brought different ones. They didn’t bring the teaching from “mi she’eino ochel ela matzos shivas yamim, yatza zeh she’asur mishum issur acher”.

I have a beautiful Lechem Mishneh. Rabbi Yaakov said you can stay and review one page of Kodesh and Lechem Mishneh.

Speaker 2: Okay. Did you say a page of Kodesh is a Lechem Mishneh?

Speaker 1: Instantly, let’s learn this… Okay. Yatza bahen is very good. Let me learn the Lechem Mishneh.

Halacha 10 – Challos Todah and Rekikei Nazir

The Lechem Mishneh’s Pilpul

Speaker 1: This is Pesachim a beautiful pilpul. It comes out in the Gemara, that there’s a disqualification in family regarding chametz, which is obvious. Sounds like a random halachos list. Okay. Another thing. Very good.

Challos todah u’rekikei nazir – that one is yotzei for himself, his own interpretation for himself. He wants to bring a korban todah.

Speaker 2: Yes.

Speaker 1: Likewise, one is yotzei from them, the continuation is shemirah leshem matzah. Matzah must be guarded leshem matzah alone, not yotzei from them. But if he guarded it leshem zevach, very good. It must be leshem kedushah, yotzei with this. Why? Because he says there, “she’im lo yimacher yochal osan”, and he made the shemirah leshem matzah.

Discussion: What Does “Shemirah Leshem Matzah” Mean?

Speaker 1: Interesting. He sees that the shemirah isn’t really a direct one, that you must have matzah in mind. Rather if you have directly in mind something else, that’s the problem.

Speaker 2: No, he has in mind also matzah. That’s the point. He’s a merchant, and he wants to sell it. He wants to sell leshem matzos mitzvah.

Speaker 1: No, he says “yochal osan”. He ends with “she’im lo yimacher yochal osan”. Not that he has in mind for the other person leshem matzah. He doesn’t say that. He sells it, and he has in mind for the other person leshem matzah.

Speaker 2: Why do you say so? Why does he speak of challos todah? The other person can also give it for challos todah.

Speaker 1: True, but the point is that he has a double intention. He didn’t make it for himself. When he makes it for himself, he made it only leshem challos todah. But now he makes it leshem “whatever”, and “whatever” includes also matzah.

Speaker 2: You’re saying something good, but here there’s no direct intention. Here there’s no direct intention. Here there’s no direct intention. He bakes it for the public, and we know that when he bakes it there’s an opinion that he has a certain intention that perhaps it will remain for him.

Speaker 1: I don’t understand what you’re saying. It must be made leshem you should eat Pesach at night. That doesn’t mean that I’m obligated to eat this piece of matzah Pesach at night. It means that it’s made for the matzah that one eats Pesach at night. But that’s not, that’s not made to sell.

Speaker 2: Someone has an obligation to eat Pesach at night, or I do. What’s the difference?

Speaker 1: But the Rambam doesn’t say it that way. If it were as you say, the Rambam wouldn’t have needed to come to “im lo yimacher yochal osan”. He would have said “she’oseh osah leshem matzah” for other people.

Speaker 2: That’s what it means, nu.

Speaker 1: No, the Rambam doesn’t say so. I don’t understand what you’re saying. “She’im lo yimacher yochal osan”.

Speaker 2: Very good. And if there’s someone who sells every single matzah, he’s not yotzei.

Speaker 1: I understand. You’re saying he doesn’t sell matzos for Pesach. He only sells matzos for challos todah. What’s the difference? The only point is just that one who sells, he doesn’t necessarily mean that, because always when someone sells he also means that, but he also means that. We must mean also that. If he means it only for that, it’s a clear error, he won’t be yotzei.

Speaker 2: Yes? It’s not a negation, he must mean also that. What’s the simple meaning? One doesn’t need to know which matzah one will eat, that’s not the clarification, that’s not the novelty. He must have simply in the name of matzah.

Tosafos’s Position – Stam Is Enough

Speaker 1: Tosafos says explicitly that simply a reason that one doesn’t sell matzos, one makes simply, that’s not the reason that it should be. Understand? It’s a Jew, he looks like simply a reason, what kind of reason? If he doesn’t think of anything, he makes it so for a good year to stand, he doesn’t think, he doesn’t think. Ah, I say that making simply is enough.

The first thing is that one is not yotzei if it’s not leshem matzah, meaning he makes it for another reason. He makes it for challos todah. There’s no such thing as not thinking. Why are you making it? Can you ask him why he’s making it? He doesn’t know, he’s brain dead. Very good, then one is not yotzei. If a machine makes a matzah, one is not yotzei. It must have the intention of the one operating the machine.

Speaker 2: Fine, let it be so, but there’s no such thing. Every time a person makes something, he makes it for some reason.

Novelty: The Thought in the Back of His Mind

Speaker 1: And here we have a good question, whether the thought that isn’t a direct thought, rather it’s something so in the back of his mind, he remembers that perhaps he’ll use it leshem matzah, is enough to call that not direct. It’s not direct. A person has a bakery, yes? He has a thousand workers. Fine, the intention doesn’t mean I plan to eat this matzah on Pesach. The intention means I’m making it for Pesach matzos. Now, he’s not making it, he’s making it to sell, and the customers will buy it for challos todah and for kiddush. You see that this doesn’t have the thing that he also meant for himself. Every seller who sells also means himself. So it says in the Gemara. It’s fine, you want the prices, it’s no problem at all.

Discussion: Whether One Must Make Matzos on Erev Pesach

Speaker 1: And that the commentators argued that from this halacha is a proof that one doesn’t need to make matzos on erev Pesach. Ah, very good. I said the Gaon Menachem, and the Menuchas Ahavah has the same thing. Why he perhaps has a rejection of the Gaon Menachem, I didn’t understand. Perhaps specifically with terumah. In short, why? Because challos todah it says in the Gemara that one doesn’t make any todos on erev Pesach. Why doesn’t one bring a korban todah on erev Pesach? Why? Because there’s a prohibition of eating chametz after midday. Very good. Therefore, he comes out with his matzos baked on the 13th, and he’ll be yotzei with that. No, what’s the novelty? At least, he can’t have his matzos baked on erev Pesach. So therefore, he’ll be fine.

And it says, he brings even the Rishonim, I remember that there’s Piskei Recanati, the Rishonim, one must indeed, but they bring, it’s not clear, they bring all that what? But we see on Shabbos erev Pesach that one is yotzei with matzah from an exemption. Why can one make it on erev Pesach Shabbos? Yom Tov? He says that there’s a house, he brings a Tosefta that one makes the matzah on erev Shabbos when erev Pesach is Shabbos, like that year then. And then one would indeed have needed to make it, if it’s like Pesach, one would have needed to make it on Motzaei Shabbos. But he says that even when one used to make the korban Pesach itself, one didn’t need to make the matzah then, there’s no such thing written. So I don’t know.

Rabbeinu Yonah – “Kedei SheTehei Afiyasah Samuch La’achilasah”

Speaker 1: But others say yes that it’s better to make it on erev Pesach. Like Rabbeinu Yonah says, “kedei shetehei afiyasah samuch la’achilasah”.

He also said, “keshem she’ein hapesach ne’echal ela tzli, kach ein hamatzah ne’echeles ela al yedei ha’or”. That’s the, he brings a Rashi, yes. In short, he argued with the Rashi, even bedieved what’s lesser, it doesn’t fit like the Gaon Menachem. There’s such a law that Pesach, not so? That matzah ashirah for Pesach should be made at the same time as Pesach. And they don’t agree with this the halacha.

Okay. More, he says, the Rach says that even for the second night one should bake the second night chibuv hamitzvah. Okay, that can be because it’s fresh matzos. That’s indeed a beautiful thing. It could be that that’s the real reason, it’s fresh, it’s better. Old matzos… no, fresh matzos, just baked. Every day one makes better matzos.

Halacha 11 – Everyone Is Obligated in Eating Matzah

Speaker 1: Okay, he says all these Gra”ms further. Halacha 11, who… you see the Gra”ms, does this go into afikoman?

Speaker 2: No, next. Apparently it goes in the next halacha, 14.

Speaker 1: No, no, it’s page 11. They’re with you, the things aren’t like you can throw in, it goes later. Okay, halacha 11. Who is obligated in eating matzah?

If I bake Pesach matzos, is that a beautiful thing? If I bake? No, I don’t bake, I’m not a baker. I let my wife bake, if she wants she can. Hakol chayavim, as we just discussed. But the wife wants less, it indeed says “hakol chayavim ba’achilas matzah, afilu nashim va’avadim”. He wants that she shouldn’t have been obligated with him, she shouldn’t have had the comfort of matzos. But he wanted…

A Minor Who Knows How to Eat Bread

English Translation

Speaker 1: He says that very small children don’t eat bread, do you need a Gemara for that? Have you ever had small children? As far as I remember, small children eat bottles with milk from the mother, each according to his custom, and when they get a bit older they eat bread. But here “katan” (minor) means he says that one can soak the matzah. But for that, but I said, put in the bottle… I said, soaking is completely not good. Ah, soaking. “And that it was not soaked”, right?

Okay, but this is a general thing, like katan shehigi’a lechinuch (a minor who has reached the age of education), that by every mitzvah, not by every mitzvah, but by various mitzvot one looks at a minor according to the matter. Exactly, this is interesting. Yodei’a (knows) that he understands that it’s a mitzvah, but simply yodei’a le’echol pat (knows to eat bread). Yodei’a is only for blessings that must be said, but for eating it never says yodei’a. You don’t need to learn bread. Yodei’a lena’ne’a (knows to shake) it does say, okay, things that you know, you don’t need to know, you simply eat.

By the way, the things that you’re telling,

Katan Shehigi’a Lechinuch – The Measure of Education for Matzah

Speaker 1:

Okay, but this is a general thing, like katan shehigi’a lechinuch, that by every mitzvah, not by every mitzvah, by various mitzvot one gives a minor according to the matter.

Katan sheyodei’a le’echol pat – that he understands that it’s matzah, but yodei’a le’echol pat. Yodei’a is only for blessings that must be said, but for the action it never says yodei’a. Yodei’a lena’ne’a it does say, okay, that he needs to know what he’s doing. That’s not eating bread.

This is by the way, the Rambam himself, there’s no source for this language. Katan, the Gemara says, ah, he brings in Sukkah it says there katan ha’ochel kazayit pat (a minor who eats an olive’s volume of bread) for the Passover table. Okay, but the education is from when he can eat challah, from when he can eat bread. What does it say there? Matchilim mechanechim oto lemitzvot, mechanechim oto le’echol kazayit matzah (We begin to educate him in mitzvot, we educate him to eat an olive’s volume of matzah). Very good.

This is, the world doesn’t know about this. It’s a very small measure, the minor who can eat bread. A baby one year old can already eat bread. One must be careful to give to the small children. We’re not talking about bread just like that, but a small olive’s volume. He goes to sleep, otherwise he goes to sleep. But remember to give him. One must give for the afikoman, for the shulchan aruch, whatever, before we get to the maror he falls asleep.

Education or Habituation?

If education means training him, no one remembers that he ate it when he was a year or a year and a half. It’s only habit, not training him, but habituation.

This he says, according to the Baraita, there’s a Baraita in Chagigah whatever, this is brought more often in tractate Sukkah, the education doesn’t go according to, not everything is according to the years. It doesn’t go with that, it goes with what he can do. That’s how it looks.

So, it comes out, I didn’t know about this. But it comes out that what? That one must indeed, even very small children according to the Rambam. We usually go… One needs to know, it’s the age of education, and we always say the age of education that a younger one is a greater measure, but that is perhaps only things that require a certain understanding, like tefillin. But that isn’t there at one year, from when it becomes that you give him a cookie and he can bite and he can eat.

A Sick Person Who Cannot Eat Matzah

Speaker 1:

Yes, choleh she’eino yachol le’echol (a sick person who cannot eat), what does one do? Matzah. Yes, eino yachol le’echol matzah (cannot eat matzah). Does it say by me? Very good. Look into the… because if he cannot eat, soaking doesn’t help, let him eat. Because I can’t eat, yes, a little. There’s no difference. The law is, shorin lo rakik bemayim (we soak a cracker for him in water), and we don’t look if he’s a minor who cannot eat bread.

Now, I just have a practical question, what does one do? Shorin lo rakik bemayim uma’achilin oto, ve’im eino yachol le’echol (We soak a cracker for him in water and feed him, and if he cannot eat), we don’t lose the entire combination of bread, yes? We learned earlier, namoch venotein lo (soften and give to him). In liquid it goes out, in a cracker it’s permitted, ve’im eino yachol le’echol, namoch (and if he cannot eat, soften). That’s the thing. That’s the explanation. I don’t know what exactly is the novelty here. Okay.

It’s more on the “and if he cannot eat.” But that we already learned, again. Yes, but this is already just a practical application that we already knew. It’s not something we don’t know. Okay.

Conclusion of Laws of Eating Matzah – Everyone is Obligated

Speaker 1:

So, until here are the laws of eating matzah. Now we’re going to learn the Rabbis’ laws about eating matzah. From the words of the Sages. From the words of the Sages regarding eating matzah.

It’s interesting, because for example the last law, usually the Rambam writes the first thing in every matter, right? Again. Usually the question of who is obligated in a certain mitzvah is the first thing, and here it’s perhaps the last thing, the hakol chayavim (everyone is obligated). It’s interesting. It’s actually a question. Because he says bechol makom uvechol zman (in every place and at every time), it would fit very well to say who is obligated. Yes, clearly.

Law 12: From the Words of the Sages – We Don’t Conclude After the Passover Offering with Afikoman

Speaker 1:

So. The words of the Sages is what? Divrei Sofrim she’ein ochlim achar matzah achronah afilu keliyot ve’egozim vechayotza bahen (From the words of the Sages that we don’t eat after the last matzah even roasted grain and nuts and similar things), and we eat nothing after matzah. So what does one do? These, these eat matzah, eat after it charoset and vegetables, returns.

If he already ate, does he eat more matzah? Right, what’s the explanation? The explanation is, one doesn’t need to… let’s see what’s the explanation. The explanation is, one doesn’t need to… let’s talk further. The explanation is, one doesn’t need to eat only matzah. “After eating matzah” doesn’t mean the first olive’s volume of matzah. One may eat later, but at the end, the last thing you eat is matzah.

Discussion: Why Do We Eat Matzah Twice?

Speaker 1:

It’s interesting, because seemingly, what we call afikoman, right? But think about it, it’s a bit funny, this thing. From what you’re saying, the idea of returning the meal is a bit funny. Why? We say that after eating the matzah, which matzah? The matzah is already a mitzvah, right? An olive’s volume fulfills the obligation. Seemingly one shouldn’t be allowed to eat anything after. And here it comes out that we eat, and we eat again. What is this second time that we eat? It’s not any mitzvah. Something is funny, right?

Speaker 2:

No, do you understand what he’s saying? Yes there is. The mitzvah of ending with Passover, remaining with a taste of Passover in the mouth.

Speaker 1:

He means taste of matzah. Taste of matzah, yes. It’s a bit funny. Let’s see what he says.

It says in the Mishnah, “Ein maftirin achar haPesach afikoman” (We don’t conclude after the Passover offering with dessert). Afikoman means dessert. Yes, we say afikoman means the matzah. Afikoman means what we’re not allowed to eat after the matzah. Afikoman means the last piece of matzah.

Speaker 2:

No, but it becomes the last thing. Yes, yes.

Speaker 1:

It’s not clear, perhaps this is talking about if he didn’t eat any matzah at the beginning. This eating matzah twice is still funny. I don’t see any simple answer.

Speaker 2:

No, the Rambam says that one can’t fix it, because it’s not the explanation that the olive’s volume of matzah, one may not eat anything after the olive’s volume of matzah. That’s not the prohibition. The prohibition is that one shouldn’t go away, one should remain with a taste of matzah. So you can always do it.

Speaker 1:

Do you understand what I’m asking?

Speaker 2:

I don’t understand what you’re asking, no. The Rabbis said that after eating the matzah one shouldn’t eat anything. The explanation of this is that one eats matzah and that’s all. Or another way one can say, one should eat matzah last so that one won’t eat anything after. If you already ate matzah, after that you took to eating potato chips, will you eat matzah again? What comes in the again?

Speaker 1:

Right. One must say because the last one is anyway not the mitzvah, it’s not the matzah of the mitzvah. But if one says that there’s an extra law of a way like the grandfather with a taste of matzah in the mouth, it can be.

Look, if one would eat before it won’t work seemingly, I haven’t seen the law, but there is a matter that one shouldn’t eat a large meal. Yes, if one says that he’s going to eat the matzah, the olive’s volume, after eating all other things, then eating a large meal. In no way is it not considered like eating a large meal. But what is only the essence that one eats a taste of eating, a taste in the mouth.

Speaker 2:

No, there’s no contradiction. No, there’s no contradiction. I was right.

Speaker 1:

But still, Passover, come Passover, one eats last and that’s all, included in the satiation. If so, why must one eat matzah last for the sake of… what is the second piece of matzah that we eat? It’s very funny. I mean, it’s very funny.

It’s even more funny when we know that one drinks two cups of wine after the olive’s volume of matzah. So if the point is that there should literally remain a taste in the mouth from the matzah in the mouth…

Speaker 2:

That’s not so difficult for me. But what is difficult for me is that it’s a bit funny that one should… what is the fake matzah that one eats here so that there should be a taste? Not any taste of matzah, it’s a taste of bread, but it’s not any taste of matzah. Do you understand what I’m saying? Are you at a level to feel a difference in taste in order to eat just a matzah?

Speaker 1:

We don’t yet know what is at all the source of the rabbinic mitzvah, what is the explanation of this. Passover we have a matter of the Passover offering. But what is the matter of matzah? In order to be a taste of matzah? But taste of matzah means taste of eating matzah seemingly. This is hard to understand.

What’s the explanation? One says just taste of matzah and that remains in? It’s funny. Yes, it’s funny. You can distinguish that here it’s not funny and there it’s not funny. True. It looks a bit funny.

Speaker 2:

You don’t see any difference?

Speaker 1:

I see a difference. It’s not funny. Funny, no problem, let it be funny.

There are various answers to this, what is the reason.

Speaker 2:

What? What are the answers?

Speaker 1:

There are other reasons. There are other reasons for this. Okay.

The Rambam brings that the pillar of truth said… It’s funny, the top one is literally mockery. The Rambam says the reason is taste of matzah. Tosafot has another reason, Passover on satiation, breaking the evil inclination, the story of Rabbi Akiva. After that he says that the Ish Chai Yisrael says…

Speaker 2:

Hello? He’s a normal person. Do you catch that he’s making mockery of us?

Speaker 1:

They have a difference. The Shem MiShmuel says that this is the learning.

Speaker 2:

Hello? What? I want a Chassidic answer. I don’t have patience to understand the simple meaning. The simple meaning is not a Chassidic answer. Okay, continue. Yes?

Law 13: The Sages Forbade Eating Matzah on Erev Pesach

Speaker 1:

Another law that the Rabbis forbade, the Sages. Yes?

Speaker 2:

Hello? The Sages forbade.

Speaker 1:

This went into me. Yes, yes, the Sages forbade. I think that from the words of the Sages goes up on the last two laws, not only most of it.

Speaker 2:

No, no, the Sages forbade is another thing. That was like a heading. From the words of the Sages. Now we’re going to begin various laws from the words of the Sages that are not obligatory. They’re not there to translate the sentence.

Speaker 1:

There’s a difference by the Rambam with the words of the Sages and with the Sages forbade. The whole reason, because both prohibitions of the Rabbis are very similar. One shouldn’t have a taste of matzah before, and one should have a taste of matzah after. Kedei sheyihyeh heiker la’achilato ba’erev (So that there will be a distinction for its eating in the evening). He doesn’t say like the Rambam says, you should eat with appetite at night, or is that what it means? The Ramban doesn’t say a distinction. It shouldn’t look like you’re just eating in the middle. Aha, the whole day you’re already eating matzah, now you’re eating more of the same thing. Okay, very good.

Well, they wanted to add a stringency here.

The Reason for the Prohibition: A Distinction for Its Eating in the Evening

Speaker 1: One shouldn’t have a taste of matzah before, and one should have a taste of matzah after, so that there will be a distinction for its eating in the evening. He doesn’t say like the Rambam says, like one should eat with appetite at night. Is that what he means? The Rambam already says a distinction. It shouldn’t look like you’re eating just in the middle. The whole day you’re already eating matzot, now you’re eating more of the same thing. Okay, very good.

The Law of Lashes of Rebellion

Speaker 1: From where… aha, I wanted it to be clear. And therefore, mi she’achal matzah be’erev Pesach makin oto makat mardut ad shetetzei nafsho (one who ate matzah on the eve of Passover, we strike him with lashes of rebellion until his soul departs). What does it say in the Rambam? Makin oto makat mardut (We strike him with lashes of rebellion). Are you reading the Rambam that Sharif’s grandson wrote? Perhaps you’re reading the Rambam that Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon wrote? It’s a general law in lashes of rebellion. Lashes of rebellion goes until his soul departs. You said you want a distinction, you’re talking about punishments. By the Rambam it’s lashes of rebellion, he’s talking harshly. That mi she’achal, one who already finished eating.

Speaker 2: Yes, I’m sure he doesn’t mean that. One needs to understand what it means.

Speaker 1: Yes, okay, what it means what it means. Chaim.

Discussion: The Source of Lashes of Rebellion — Yerushalmi

Speaker 1: The Ben Ish Chai takes on the text, but anyway, it’s not correct. The… what can’t come in? Ah, the Rabbeinu Manoach addresses the “until his soul departs.” He takes that on. In any case, how does this stand? Is there a source for the lashes of rebellion? Is it just such a general thing? I think you’re asking funny.

Speaker 2: Perhaps “kiblu reshuta veloku” (they accepted authority and were struck)? Is there such a version? In the Yerushalmi, perhaps.

Speaker 1: Yes, I see in Rabbeinu Manoach he brings the Yerushalmi, “kiblu reshuta veloku.” Ah, very good. Rabbi Avraham, very good, you’re right. He said “loku” (they were struck). He took very literally the Yerushalmi. So, “loku.” Oy, what is “loku”? “Loku” rabbinically, lashes of rebellion. Well well, Chaim.

Rabbeinu Manoach’s Distinction: Specifically Matzah of Mitzvah

Speaker 1: He says, Rabbeinu Manoach, that this is talking specifically about kosher matzah. For example, matzah that wasn’t made for the sake of the mitzvah, or what the gentiles make, it says in the Gemara, right? He says that this is “memalei nafsho mehem” (fills his soul from them), because no prohibition came. That’s the explanation, because there’s no law in that matzah, there’s only in the distinction of the matzah, specifically the matzah, that sort of kosher matzah. Do you understand?

Speaker 2: Right, matzah of mitzvah.

Speaker 1: Okay. Further.

A Homiletical Interpretation of “Until His Soul Departs”

Speaker 2: Yes. There can be another interpretation in “nafsho” (his soul), means like this, that the soul, because now it fixes it, because the soul that ate matzah is already gone, now the new soul begins with freshness. It’s a dead carcass. It doesn’t mean death, it means he doesn’t think about it anymore.

Speaker 1: Yes. Okay.

Speaker 2: What is the doesn’t think about it anymore? Because he doesn’t think about it anymore. Because he doesn’t think about it anymore.

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