📋 Shiur Overview
Summary of Lecture – Chapter 4 of Laws of Chametz and Matzah (Rambam)
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Halachah 1-2: “Lo Yera’eh” and “Lo Yimatzei” – The Foundations of Ownership of Chametz
Words of the Rambam: The Torah says “lo yera’eh lecha” and “lo yimatzei”. “Lo yera’eh” alone would have meant only what one sees; “lo yimatzei” comes to add that even tamun (hidden) or mufkad biyad goy (deposited with a gentile) one transgresses. “Bechol gevulecha” means even in another city in your domain.
Explanation: There are two laws: (1) “lo yera’eh” – it must not be visible, not under a partition/hidden, (2) “lo yimatzei” – it must not be “found” – even deposited with another. Additionally comes “bechol gevulecha” which speaks of domain in another city.
Insights and Explanations:
1. Three foundations in “lo yera’eh lecha bechol gevulecha”: There are essentially three points: (a) “lecha” – it must be yours (ownership), (b) “yera’eh” – it must be visible, not hidden, (c) “bechol gevulecha” – even in another city in your domain. If one has an apartment in Africa with chametz, this is a question of “bechol gevulecha”.
2. “Lo yimatzei” – the novelty of tamun and hifkido: “Lo yimatzei” comes to add that even tamun (hidden/buried) or deposited with a gentile one transgresses. The Rambam understands that hatmanah and hafkadah are essentially similar categories – both are a type of “hidden” from you: I have hidden (tamun), and the deposit is also hidden (mufkad). Both are derived from “lo yimatzei”.
3. Question: What is the difference between a deposit with a gentile and chametz in another city? A deposit with a gentile is in your legal domain (ownership) but not in your physical domain – exactly like chametz in another city! Why do we need a separate teaching for a deposit? Two answers:
– (a) Deposit with a gentile means specifically when the gentile lives at your place (in your house), but this chametz is in his physical possession – this is different from chametz in another city.
– (b) A simpler explanation: Deposit with a gentile means a gentile who works for you (a worker/employee), and this chametz is with him – this is a special situation.
4. The Rambam’s novelty regarding deposited with a gentile – dispute with the Ramban: The Magen Avraham and Mishnah Berurah bring that what the Rambam says that one transgresses on deposited with a gentile is a novelty of the Rambam – it is not in the Gemara. The Ramban on the Torah says explicitly that one does not transgress on deposited with a gentile, because it must be “shelo bireshuto” – both: his and in his domain. The Rambam however says that it only needs to be “shelo” (his) – even not in his domain.
5. “Not in his domain” – two approaches: “Not in his domain” can mean two things: (a) not in my physical house/place, (b) not in my legal domain. A deposit with a gentile is in my legal domain (ownership) but in the other’s physical property.
6. The Rambam’s consistent approach – everything is ownership: The Rambam views everything only through ownership, not through where it lies physically. Therefore:
– Your chametz with a gentile = transgression (because it’s yours)
– Your chametz in another city = transgression (because it’s yours)
– A gentile’s chametz in your house = no transgression (because it’s not yours)
This is derived from “lecha” – “shelcha atah ro’eh ve’atah ro’eh shel acherim”: a gentile’s chametz even openly on your table is fundamentally not a transgression.
7. Partition for chametz of a gentile – only due to concern: When a gentile’s chametz is at your place, one must sometimes make a partition – but this is only “shelo yavo lehistapek mimenu” (so one won’t come to eat from it), not due to bal yera’eh. By hekdesh, where this concern doesn’t exist, one doesn’t need a partition.
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Halachah Regarding a Gentile’s Chametz Deposited with a Jew
Explanation: When a gentile deposits chametz with a Jew, one must also be careful. If the gentile is a worker (employee) for you, even a partition doesn’t help.
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Halachah Regarding Chametz of a Gentile with Responsibility
Words of the Rambam: When a gentile has given chametz to a Jew, and the Jew has responsibility for it, one must eliminate it (bi’ur). Because responsibility makes it “shelo” – “shelo kemoto”.
Explanation: Achrayut (responsibility/liability) on the gentile’s chametz is enough to make it halachically “yours”.
Insights and Explanations:
1. Achrayut is a “potential ownership”: Achrayut is not truly a halachic ownership, but a type of potential ownership – you will have to pay if something happens. Yet it is enough to make it “shelo”. This fits with the Rambam’s approach that even some type of potential ownership is enough.
2. Question on the concept of achrayut: Achrayut is after all only a potential that it should become “shelo” (if it gets lost/damaged), not a current ownership. It’s a “dray” – it’s not currently his, but later he will have to pay. Nevertheless the Rambam holds that this is enough.
3. Dispute of Ra’avad: The Ra’avad disagrees with the Rambam. The Rambam builds this law on a Gemara of Rav Nachman. The Ra’avad argues that that Gemara speaks of a case where it never belonged to them (not that there is otherwise responsibility from others), and one cannot bring a proof from there to our case.
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Halachah Regarding Mashkon – Chametz of a Jew with a Gentile
Words of the Rambam: When a Jew has made his chametz a mashkon (collateral) with a gentile, it is good – it is considered the gentile’s. However one may eat it after Pesach only if one had established a time (of payment) before Pesach.
Explanation: If the time of payment has already come before Pesach, the gentile is already the owner of the collateral, and it is “of the gentile”.
Insights and Explanations:
1. Dispute of Ra’avad – even if no time was set: The Ra’avad holds that even if one did not set a time, and even not “me’achshav”, it is only an asmachta for the gentile – that is, the gentile already has a right to the collateral, and it is “of the gentile”.
2. Interesting contradiction in the Ra’avad’s approach: The Ra’avad’s approach by mashkon is opposite from his approach by achrayut. By achrayut the Ra’avad says: achrayut doesn’t make it “yours” (he is lenient). By mashkon the Ra’avad says: the gentile already has a right to the collateral, even without a set time (he is also lenient – it is “of the gentile”). Both times the Ra’avad goes leniently, but from different directions.
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Summary of the Three Main Points in Ownership
Until now we have learned three main points regarding ownership:
1. What is “yours” – even hidden, even deposited with a gentile (according to the Rambam).
2. Achrayut – when a gentile’s chametz is with you with responsibility, it is considered yours.
3. Mashkon – when your chametz is with a gentile as collateral, it is considered the gentile’s (if the time of payment is before Pesach).
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Halachah Regarding Sale of Chametz
Explanation: After we have established that chametz of a gentile even in your house is not a transgression, comes out a practical application: one can sell chametz to a gentile. The Rambam brings this in a context of shutafut (partnership).
Insights and Explanations:
The Rambam doesn’t present it as a general advice to sell chametz, but in a specific case. The novelty is perhaps more than just sale – it speaks of a partnership situation.
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Halachah 11: Nifsela Tzurat HaChametz, Cosmetics, and Nifsul Me’achilat Kelev
Words of the Rambam: Devarim shehem eruv chametz… kegon teriyak vechayotzei bo… mutar lekayeman bePesach, ve’asur le’ochlan. Cosmetics and other things where chametz is mixed but nifsela tzurat hachametz – one may keep them but not eat them.
Explanation: The Rambam distinguishes between two categories: (a) nifsul me’achilat kelev – where the food is so spoiled that even a dog doesn’t eat it, and (b) nifsela tzurat hachametz – where the chametz has lost its form as chametz, although it can still be a type of food.
Insights and Explanations:
1. Distinction between nifsul me’achilat kelev and nifsela tzurat hachametz: By cosmetics (creams etc.) the law is not nifsul me’achilat kelev, but nifsela tzurat hachametz – it is simply no longer chametz. The Torah forbade chametz, and a cream is not chametz. This is a fundamental distinction: by Pesach itself (korban Pesach) we speak of nifsul me’achilat kelev or melugma shenisr’cha, but by these things is a different reasoning – it is not chametz at all.
2. What does “achilat kelev” mean: “Achilat kelev” doesn’t mean literally what a dog eats. A dog eats stones too – that doesn’t make stones into food. Achilat kelev is a level of human eating – something that was once food for a person, became rotten/moldy, but a dog would still eat it. Something that was never food at all (like a stone), one doesn’t need to wait until a dog doesn’t eat it – it is not food at all. Also by the dog there must be a “law of eating” – a minimal definition of eating.
3. “Dog food”: “Dog food” is indeed food – it is made as food for dogs. But something that became not human food at all, is a different category. Dog food is a food (for dogs), but a stone or a cream is not food at all.
4. Practical examples – clothes starched with pig’s milk, papers glued with chametz: The Rambam brings examples of starching clothes with chametz, or papers glued with chametz – these are things where chametz was used but nifsela tzurato.
5. Bleach makes nifsul me’achilat kelev: If one pours bleach on chametz, it becomes nifsul me’achilat kelev as well. This is a practical advice for bi’ur chametz. There are people who are concerned about garbage – how long it takes until it becomes nifsul me’achilat kelev.
6. Chitah (wheat) and glue: A novelty – glue (white glue) is made from wheat, but there is no tzurat hachametz upon it, therefore one may use it on Pesach lechatchilah. Milk-glue has less of a question because of lera. This is a practical difference – Pesach children use glue that is made from wheat, and it is permitted because nifsela tzurat hachametz.
7. But one may not eat: Although one may keep (hold in the house), one may not eat – even chametz nuksheh is forbidden to eat. The rule: Kol sheyesh bo [chametz] asur le’ochlo, but one may keep it.
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Hasagat HaRa’avad and Maggid Mishneh on Halachah 11
Insights and Explanations:
1. The Ra’avad’s approach: The Ra’avad doesn’t see the concept of “ein tzurat hachametz alav” as a separate category. For him there is only one measure: if it is nifsul me’achilat kelev or not. The Ra’avad holds that eruv chametz cannot be nullified – in eruv chametz there is no bitul.
2. Maggid Mishneh’s defense of Rambam: The Maggid Mishneh brings that Rabbi Eliezer HaGadol goes with the same approach as the Rambam. This greatly strengthens the Rambam’s position – he is “strengthened by a great one in Pesach.” The Maggid Mishneh says on the Ra’avad: “be’emet devarav temuhin” and “devarav einam nir’in” – he strongly opposes the Ra’avad.
3. The Ra’avad’s argument regarding taste: The Ra’avad holds that ta’am eino ke’ikar (taste is not like the essence), and the Maggid Mishneh refutes this argument.
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Ta’arovet Chametz – Kol Shehu, Shishim, and Kezayit
Words of the Rambam: Kol davar shenita’arev bo chametz asur [bePesach] afilu bechol shehu.
Explanation: Chametz on Pesach is forbidden in any amount – not like other prohibitions which are nullified in sixty.
Insights and Explanations:
1. Chametz on Pesach is forbidden in any amount: The Rambam says that chametz on Pesach is forbidden in any amount. The Maggid Mishneh explains: what by all other mixtures is in sixty, by Pesach is in any amount.
2. The Rambam doesn’t say the leniency of before Pesach: The Rambam doesn’t bring the distinction that before Pesach is different. The Maggid Mishneh however mentions that the Rambam said that ta’arovet chametz only transgresses with a kezayit, and less than a kezayit is nullified in a majority – but this is only before Pesach.
3. Question – why not nullified in a majority like a regular prohibition? Why shouldn’t ta’arovet chametz be nullified in a majority like any other prohibition? And why specifically a kezayit? The Maggid Mishneh answers that the distinction is between before Pesach and on Pesach.
4. Cham becham belo rotev: By other mixtures that would not be more than the thickness of a peel (like hot on hot without liquid), also by Pesach is not more than the thickness of a peel – one only needs to cut off. A hot piece of chametz on a hot matzah without liquid – one cuts off and the rest is permitted.
5. The Rambam doesn’t go into the laws of mixtures of Pesach here: All these laws of mixtures of chametz on Pesach are dealt with later in Chapter 10, not here.
📝 Full Transcript
Summary of Chapter 4 – Laws of “Lo Yera’eh V’lo Yimatzei” and Sale of Chametz
Opening – Summary of Chapter 4
Speaker 1: Okay, we’re learning now Chapter 4. We’ve already learned it. Should we make a summary of the points that we learned? I mean we’ve almost finished Chapter 4, no? Have we finished it or haven’t we finished it?
Okay, so let’s say the kitzur inyan (brief summary).
Kitzur Inyan – “Lo Yera’eh V’lo Yimatzei”
Speaker 1: The kitzur inyan is that the Torah states “lo yera’eh v’lo yimatzei” (it shall not be seen and it shall not be found). There are various midrashim and various gemaras about this.
Shitat HaRambam – “Lo Yera’eh” and “Lo Yimatzei”
Speaker 1: The summary in the shitat HaRambam (Rambam’s approach) is that “lo yera’eh” teaches us that… if it only said “lo yera’eh,” one would think that when you don’t see it, but there is “lo yimatzei,” this implies that even if you don’t see it, hidden or deposited with a non-Jew, these two things. When it’s hidden and when it’s deposited with a non-Jew.
That is, in other words, “lo yera’eh” means… in other words, let’s learn what it says here. “lo yera’eh” means what is not seen. There are two conditions, it must be seen, visible, not under a partition, it’s tamun (hidden), whatever tamun exactly means. And also it must be here.
It’s understood that it’s… what does one think? What happens if it’s in my possession somewhere in Africa, I rented an apartment and it’s there? That already has to do with the next thing of “kol gevulecha” (all your borders).
Three Foundations – “Lecha,” “Yera’eh,” “B’chol Gevulecha”
Speaker 1: So apparently there are three things essentially. It must be yours, that is in your possession, and in the house where you live, where you move about, apparently “lo yera’eh lecha,” and it must not be hidden.
Now, “lo yimatzei,” that’s where we start, that’s like the starting point comes in. “Lo yimatzei” comes and says, no, even tamun or hifkido (deposited it), it should not be found. And for some reason, that means found. Right?
Hifkido Bid Goy – Question and Answers
Speaker 1: That is, tamun… why should hifkido mean? Hifkido, hifkido with a dalet. I don’t know, because it’s yours, clearly. Because it’s still yours, it’s still lying… it belongs one hundred percent to me, I’m holding it by you. I put it in a bank, I put it in… hifkad (deposit) can… let’s think what is hifkad.
Hifkad can also mean I have a storage, what’s that called? People rent storages, yes? I put it there. Essentially it’s deposited with that storage, he has responsibility, he doesn’t have responsibility, it’s a difference, that’s my deal with him, but it’s not by me, it’s not “yimatzei,” it’s not “yera’eh.” “Yimatzei” it is, yes. Very good.
And for some reason… and only if it’s in another city. This is very interesting, because hefker is apparently equivalent to being in his house, and how can you deposit it? That’s what I don’t understand now.
Speaker 2: So my clever son asks this question. He asks me a question, not crazy, it’s a good question. When you think about it, he’s asking me a good question.
Speaker 1: Perhaps one must say, let’s think for a second, one must say that hefker means to say, the non-Jew is actually here, he lives by me. Because if not, one could also derive this as being in another city from me, yes? You wouldn’t need the b’chol gevulecha. The Rambam says it’s not that issue, it’s a different issue. He doesn’t say it about the other things, he says it’s an attack built on different…
Oh, the second explanation is a simpler explanation, that hifkido bid nochri (deposited with a non-Jew) can mean that the non-Jew who lives by you, as if you have a worker or I don’t know, hifkido bid nochri.
Chiddush HaRambam – Dispute with the Ramban
Speaker 1: But again, let’s need to remember one thing that we already learned yesterday too, the Magen Avraham and Mishnah Berurah brought, that what the Rambam says hifkido bid goy is a chiddush (novel ruling) of the Rambam, it’s not stated in the gemara, and the Ramban al HaTorah said explicitly that one is not obligated regarding hifkido bid goyim, because it must be sheloh bireshuto (peacefully in his possession), and the Rambam says it must only be sheloh even not in his possession.
“Not in His Possession” – Two Approaches
Speaker 1: Now, not in his possession, let’s say this way, in any case this is certain, not in his possession can mean two different things. It can mean not in my house where I am, where I stand today physically, where I live, or it can be not in his possession, not in my logical possession, in my legal possession. Hefker is in my legal possession, but in a sense not, it’s in someone else’s property.
So, in the Rambam he learns that it must be even hifkido bid goy, yes, hifkido bid goy he is obligated.
The Rambam’s Understanding – Hatmanah and Hafkadah
Speaker 1: But this is actually interesting, and the confusion is apparently from where does he take that hifkido has something to do with this, because apparently the Rambam understood, one must say that the Rambam understood that hatmanah (hiding) and hafkadah (depositing) is the same thing. It’s not like I say that hifkido is a hidden thing. No, hifkido is not like… mufkad bid goy (deposited with a non-Jew) is not like… it’s not similar, what I’m saying, it’s not similar to my possession in a distant place. That’s a different thing. We don’t know that yet. It’s not from there that he derives it.
The Rambam derives it from “lo yimatzei.” That hefker is as if it’s a bit deposited from me, a bit hidden from me. One can hide. I hid, and the hefker is also hidden. Right? So that’s the prohibition, that’s the prohibition according to the Rambam.
As we say, the Ramban says differently, that he is not obligated.
Chametz of a Non-Jew and of Hekdesh
Speaker 1: Afterwards, conversely, what is not yours, what is that? Hekdesh (consecrated property), non-Jew and hekdesh. Interesting, he has non-Jew and hekdesh in not yours.
“Lecha” – Chametz of a Non-Jew
Speaker 1: The non-Jew not yours, on this he derives from “lecha.” Yes? That “lecha,” “shelcha atah ro’eh v’atah ro’eh shel acheirim” (yours you see and you see of others), even if it’s revealed. Fundamentally, we’ll soon see that sometimes one must make a partition, but fundamentally, even if I have on my table a non-Jew’s chametz, it’s not yours. That’s the shitat HaRambam. Even a non-Jew who is sho’el alav (borrowed it), he has nothing to do with it, it’s only all about ownership.
Partition by Chametz of a Non-Jew – Due to Concern
Speaker 1: So, but there is a law that when there is a concern, when there is a concern, even by a non-Jew there is a concern, then one must make a partition simply shelo yavo l’histafeik mimenu (so he won’t come to benefit from it). Right? Unlike hekdesh where there isn’t such a concern, one doesn’t need to make any partition. It’s a simple matter. Yes? Good.
Discussion – Difference Between Rambam and Ramban
Speaker 1: Now, let’s take a bit more. What does the Ramban hold regarding the second law? He only argues with one thing, hifkido bid goy. Why is according to the Ramban a difference between hifkido bid goy and in his courtyard in another city? Because the Ramban says it’s not in his possession, it’s in someone else’s possession.
The question is, it’s ownership but in one’s own possession. Wait. If it’s tamun bireshut harabim (hidden in the public domain), someone found it, it’s buried in the forest, but he didn’t give up ownership on it, will the Ramban also hold that he is obligated?
Speaker 2: It’s an ownership that has responsibility.
Speaker 1: Okay, let’s not support the Rambam, now let’s take the Rambam. I mean that the Ra’avad also has such a similar thing. I didn’t look up the Ra’avad. Ah, later. Conversely, by the hefker he is, by the responsibility I think he is the other thing. No, I don’t know.
The Rambam is Consistent – Everything is Ownership
Speaker 1: But in any case, this is an important thing. The Rambam is consistent. One can understand the Rambam, because hefker by him is the opposite. The Rambam looks at everything as ownership, not where it lies, but ownership. The law, the prohibition is dependent on this. And not only ownership, but even some kind of potential ownership. That if the other is a worker that you will have to pay. It’s not exactly ownership, not any halachic ownership.
Speaker 2: Wait a minute, wait a minute, let’s come back. Tzaddik, tzaddik, you are jumping ahead. You are jumping ahead. You are jumping ahead. We know that they already learned yesterday, but… apparently, apparently what?
Speaker 1: I’m saying, the Rambam one can understand, it’s consistent that it’s all about the ownership, the thing, not from where it lies, but the ownership. So, no difference if it’s yours and it lies by a non-Jew, or it’s yours and it lies in another field, or even it’s not yours, but we know that you will have to pay for the non-Jew, which makes it also something like yours.
Speaker 2: I understand, but that’s the opposite. That’s not yet relevant to this. Unlike when it’s the non-Jew’s and it’s in your possession, one won’t consider it, because one doesn’t look at all at the physical where it lies, one only looks at the…
Speaker 1: Exactly. That’s everyone agrees though, that the non-Jew’s that is not obligated, is not any controversy. The only point that is controversial is the middle thing, when it’s mine and it lies in someone else’s possession. And the Rambam says, it’s yours, I don’t care that it’s in someone else’s possession. And the Ra’avad says, no, I do care that it’s in someone else’s possession. That’s the dispute. Right? Yes. Okay. In any case, it’s fine.
Non-Jew Who Deposited Chametz with a Jew
Speaker 1: Now, let’s go further and we see that what… what happens when a non-Jew deposits with a Jew conversely? We spoke about this, that it says yes that a worker one may not leave, remember that? If the non-Jew is a worker, even with a partition it didn’t help. Hello? Yes. Okay, I don’t know. Let’s go further. Yes.
Ah, it says that one may not give to a non-Jew forbidden foods where there is possibly mar’it ayin (appearance of wrongdoing). You say it wasn’t yet in Eretz Yisrael, so there weren’t any strange non-Jews, but still it’s already there. It doesn’t say, I think, such a thing. Okay, in Rambam it doesn’t say such a thing. Okay.
Law – Non-Jew Who Deposited Chametz with Responsibility
Speaker 1: Now, let’s go further. Already. Now, if when a non-Jew gave chametz to a Jew, if he has responsibility one must destroy it. That’s the law. Why? Because responsibility is enough to be called shelo (his). Shelo kamoso (his like him). Responsibility.
Chiddush – Responsibility is Potential Ownership
Speaker 1: It’s a chiddush, because responsibility is after all only a potential that it should be shelo. It’s still a means that one can say so, it could perhaps have been marked as a three. So it says in the gemara. It’s not now, it’s later it will be his. No, no, not about that. It’s about the current responsibility. Responsibility is a type of ownership.
Dispute of Ra’avad
Speaker 1: And the Ra’avad holds that this is built on a gemara of Rav Nachman, and he holds that it’s not correct, because that gemara speaks of a manner where it never belonged to them at all, right? Not that there is anyway responsibility from others. If so, how can one bring a proof from there? It won’t arise at all. And in short, he doesn’t agree. The Ra’avad holds that this was his. Okay, already.
Law – Jew Who Pawned Chametz with a Non-Jew (Collateral)
Speaker 1: The next law is when a Jew made his chametz a collateral. The law is, if he made it a collateral, it’s good.
Dispute of Ra’avad – Setting a Time
Speaker 1: And the Ra’avad also disputes this on which point? On the point that the Rama says that one may eat it after Pesach, that you must set a time before Pesach. The Ra’avad says, even if he didn’t set a time, even not from now, because this is only an asmachta (conditional agreement) for the non-Jew.
Interesting Contradiction in the Ra’avad’s Position
Speaker 1: The Ra’avad is… it’s interesting, because with the logic from before of responsibility you said the opposite, now it’s of the non-Jew because for the same reason, because the non-Jew received responsibility. The non-Jew has no responsibility on the collateral. He owes you until the collateral.
And the Ra’avad holds that it’s not a question if it’s asmachta or collateral, what the law is. Until here are the main laws, basically, right?
Summary – Three Main Points in Ownership
Speaker 1: In total, until now we’ve learned the main laws from destroying to selling. We learned that it must be his. We learned that even responsibility, and we learned that conversely, the meaning of a collateral is if it was from now, and if the time of payment came before Pesach, it’s the non-Jew’s. That is, these are the laws in laws of ownership, right? What means yours? What means the non-Jew’s?
So the ways means, the manner of the non-Jew that he gave to you means it’s yours if you have responsibility, and the Jew who gave to the non-Jew means it’s his if it was a collateral. Basically three points in total.
Sale of Chametz
Speaker 1: Afterwards we learn with the interesting law, sale of chametz. Now, until here are the main laws. Now we learned, what is the point of the law? In order to do what? This built, ah, built on what is the chametz of another, even if it’s in your possession, even if it’s in your house, even if it’s in your physical house, is not obligated, he is obligated like this. What does one do if it’s difficult? One can sell the chametz to a non-Jew.
It doesn’t say that one can sell it to a non-Jew, it only says in one case. We are partners. Yes, it could be that the chiddush there is more than that, I don’t know. Yes, but…
Cosmetics, Destroyed Form of Chametz, and Mixture of Chametz – Laws 11-12
Law 11 – Destroyed Form of Chametz: Cosmetics, Glue, and Starch
Speaker 1:
Yes, this is the source of the law of all the cosmetics. Simply is very stringent, but simply, it is destroyed form of chametz, consequently…
It’s interesting, because for example, today’s people are not excluding, what is if someone, some crazy person, gave to a dog to eat, and he ate it? You’ll tell me not l’chatchilah (initially), here it doesn’t say that you shouldn’t… it’s l’chatchilah not any eating.
Difference Between Unfit for Dog Food and Destroyed Form of Chametz
Eating must become when it’s fine for dog food, because eating no one no eating, it’s a thing in itself. As it says the Pesach itself, Pesach by Pesach there is the law of unfit for dog food, or spoiled dough that rotted. But by these things is a different law, it’s not unfit for dog food, it’s destroyed form of chametz. It’s not chametz! Now, what is this? It’s a cream, it’s not chametz. The Torah tells us not to eat chametz.
What Means “Dog Food”
A Pesach itself, that it’s impossible… no, also dog food means when the dog eats it. A person can also bite stones. Dog food is when there is also like a more extreme of human food. Something that a person would never eat, one doesn’t need to wait for dog food. Dog food is simply human food, only not so appetizing anymore, but it’s still edible. Something that is not at all any food, but you wait for a dog that should eat it… no, that doesn’t mean it. Dog food, dog food is perhaps not at all human food.
Speaker 2:
No, no, no, you’re saying a different thing.
Speaker 1:
What we said is that if it’s not eating, if it’s not food, it’s destroyed form of food, that’s for the karet (excision). That’s for the karet, because it’s not food. If it’s food, and it’s rotten meat, I know what, dogs eat it, that’s something that was once human food, and it became repulsive, it became moldy. But something that at the time became as not human food at all, dog food is food, dog food is food. There are things that even when the dog eats it, it’s not eating. Not only that, a person can also eat it. You can eat a stone, because of that it doesn’t become… the same thing, if the dogs are a bit crazier than people, eat more things, because of that it doesn’t make… it must be dog food. But even a dog one must have a law of eating. The intention is, one can be stringent, but the intention is this.
Examples: Hides, Starch, and Papers
The same thing, hides that he gathered them in pig’s milk, yes, one still makes it, starch, yes, one starches clothes, or papers that he glued them with chametz, yes, there is such a thing. The Pesach itself says, that if one needs to destroy, it can’t be that a pit must be before him throwing to it a smell. I agree. Can I put this down a year before Pesach in the sea sometimes? I’ll agree that perhaps it escaped and one could eat it. But I agree, if one puts the bleach, it makes it unfit for dog food too. Also must be somewhere, one does, that there are people who are concerned about the garbage, how long it becomes before it becomes unfit for dog food.
Chiddush: Glue Made from Wheat
A good point that you made is wheat. I don’t like kissing with chametz, no evil eye. Yes, yes, yes, yes. Glue, glue, milk one can chew, less because of the paste, there’s no tzuras hachametz (form of chametz) on it. So what’s the explanation that people… the Elmer’s glue, the white glue, is made from wheat for Pesach children. It’s made from wheat. But it doesn’t have tzuras hachametz. One may use it on Pesach l’chatchila (from the outset).
Halacha 12 – Eating Chametz That Is Not Food: Permitted to Keep, Forbidden to Eat
Now, ah, but one may not eat it. Achilas… that is, chametz that is nifsal me’achilas kelev (unfit for a dog to eat), there is no achilas chametz (eating of chametz). It’s not so simple, every Raavad argues on this halacha. We hold like the Raavad says. Come, let’s finish the Raavad’s halacha.
Things that are a mixture of chametz, there is no dispute among people at all. If one is in dispute with everyone, there is theriac. What do people who eat it do? Ah, there aren’t such people. Simply “to fulfill ‘and you shall desire to eat it’”. Why do I need proofs for this? Anything that has in it is forbidden to eat. One may not eat even nuksheh chametz (hard chametz). But one may keep it.
Hasagas HaRaavad – There Is No Tzuras Hachametz Upon It
What do you say that the Raavad says? The Raavad doesn’t see the concept of “there is no tzuras hachametz upon it.” For him there is only one thing: if it is nifsal me’achilas kelev. Despite all this, I must tell you, I haven’t seen that the Raavad should say this. I saw that the Raavad says this: “yechdal yeshiva” (let him cease sitting), it won’t help with a mixture of chametz that nullifies itself. In a mixture of chametz there is no nullification of itself. Yes. After that, it itself became mixed in nosen ta’am (giving taste), when it doesn’t give taste, what are you doing with the mixture? And even after the taste, and nevertheless, one sees that besides what the Raavad means, the Maggid Mishneh says that Rabbi Eliezer HaGadol went with an approach that it doesn’t exist. That means the Rambam with Rabbi Eliezer HaGadol is already greatly strengthened on Pesach. He sits at the seder with a large chametz on the table. A large piece of chametz on the table.
Maggid Mishneh – Mixture of Chametz: K’zayis, Kol Shehu, and Shishim
Question: Why K’zayis and Not Nullified in the Majority?
It’s very interesting, because he asks, the Maggid Mishneh, the Rambam said that a mixture of chametz only transgresses with a k’zayis (olive-sized portion); less than a k’zayis is nullified in the majority. Also, what’s the difference? Why shouldn’t it be like a regular prohibition, that it’s nullified in the majority? Why by a mixture of chametz does one specifically need a k’zayis? Also, why shouldn’t it be that even a k’zayis should be nullified in the majority? Ah, the Maggid Mishneh says that he told him that one only transgresses with a k’zayis; less than a k’zayis is nullified in the majority, but if it’s before Pesach, then that’s the claim.
Maggid Mishneh Against the Raavad
This is what the Raavad is here, truly his words are puzzling. In short, the Maggid Mishneh doesn’t agree with the Raavad’s claim. I don’t know what the Raavad’s claims are. Truly his words are puzzling, his words, I don’t know, the Maggid Mishneh takes strong issue. No, we’re talking here about taste. The Raavad says that taste is not like the essence, says the Maggid Mishneh, truly his words are puzzling. Truly his words are puzzling, his words don’t seem right.
The Rambam Doesn’t Say the Leniency of Before Pesach
By the way, the Rambam brings here, the Rambam doesn’t say the leniency that it’s before Pesach. The Rambam says, anything that chametz was mixed into is forbidden even in any amount. And here, very important, and here says the Maggid Mishneh, it’s different. This is that a mixture of chametz is like all mixtures. That what for all other mixtures is in sixty is on Pesach in any amount. But there are even other mixtures that wouldn’t be only k’dei klipa (the thickness of a peel), for example like we learned hot in hot without liquid and so forth. Also one doesn’t need, you placed a hot piece of chametz on a hot piece of matzah without any davar hamafria (intervening substance), without any liquid, basically one needs to cut it off. That’s the halacha. The whole question of this is only even goes in even… okay, we’ll go further.
Beyond Chapter 10 – Laws of Mixtures of Chametz
The Rambam didn’t go into here the laws of mixtures of Pesach and all these things. Yes, later, here they learned. Chapter 10, yes, chapter 10. Let’s take chapter 10 also not too quickly, slowly, yes, chapter 10.