Laws of Shabbat Chapter 24 (Auto Translated)

Rambam Hilchos Shabbos Chapter 24 — Things That Are Forbidden That Are Not Similar to Melacha and Do Not Lead to Melacha

Introduction to the Shiur

Good, we are learning Rambam Hilchos Shabbos, the 24th chapter, Chapter 24. Before we go and learn this Rambam, I want to thank all those who support our shiur, and who spread the shiur among their friends, lehagdil Torah ulehaadirah, and first and foremost for the main sponsor of this shiur, our friend, the well-known supporter of Torah, Rabbi Uri Englander, may he live, may Hashem his God be with him, may the merit come in Heaven completely, and may we merit leharchiv gevulei hakedusha, to spread more Torah in Israel.

General Introduction to the Chapter — A New Category of Rabbinic Prohibitions

Yes, we have learned, we are holding in the 24th chapter, we have already learned all 39 melachos, and we have even already learned all the rabbinic prohibitions that are connected to the 39 melachos. That means, on Shabbos there are many Torah prohibitions, there are also many rabbinic prohibitions. Many of the rabbinic prohibitions are directly connected to a certain Torah prohibition. Especially after the Rambam has done the job, because in Maseches Shabbos it’s not clear, there are many rabbinic prohibitions where it doesn’t say which melacha it’s from, but the Rambam has done the work of attributing very many things that are forbidden to a specific thing. One may not, I know, do a… what’s it called, fix a bubble, because it’s a gezeira of boneh or of makeh bepatish. But one may here things… ah, yes, it’s from the Torah, excuse me. Okay, there is, or one makes a hole in a vessel, because it’s a… it’s not called building, but it’s a rabbinic building, and so forth.

But now, now the Rambam is going to begin a new category of things that are rabbinically forbidden, but not connected to one of the 39 melachos, but rather more generally rabbinically forbidden. For example, we learned yesterday that buying and selling, doing business, doing commerce, is forbidden on Shabbos as something connected to writing, “lest he come to write.” But what about types of business that have nothing to do with writing? It’s just somehow being involved in the business, it has nothing to do with writing, for example. So there are still things that are rabbinically forbidden, but for other reasons, not because of a branch of the melacha of writing, but for other reasons that the Rambam is going to enumerate here in this chapter and in the next chapters.

Discussion: The Distinction Between “Domeh Lemelacha” and “Mevi Lidei Melacha”

Speaker 1: You say the word “connected,” presumably because you want to include two other ways. The first is what is actually a gezeira for a melacha, because when one does that, he may come to do a melacha. And the other is apparently also because eventually it will come to a melacha, but because it’s similar to a melacha. Presumably because people will get confused. Not simply something that one does that is close to a melacha, but… sorry, the first type of things is things that when one does them one comes to do a melacha. The second type of things is things that people will get confused with a melacha. That’s how one would apparently have to learn.

Speaker 2: So, in other words, it’s a gezeira and a fence, just as the Sages made a fence for the Torah, it’s a fence for the 39 melachos. Now one can learn things that are not a fence for the 39 melachos, but let’s see what yes. It could be that these parts are also a fence, but it’s a fence for a different aspect of Shabbos.

Halacha 1 — The General Prohibition: “Asos Chaftzecha” and “Vedaber Davar”

The Rambam says as follows, “There are things” — until now the Rambam has said by each one of the rabbinic melachos that it’s forbidden for one of two reasons, either because it’s similar to a melacha, or because it leads to a melacha. But there are things that are forbidden even though they don’t have both these categories. “There are things that are forbidden on Shabbos even though” — they don’t have one of the two categories that makes them forbidden, which we’ve been taught until now. “Even though they are not similar to melacha” — it’s not similar to melacha, “and they don’t lead to melacha”.

Discussion: The Distinction Between “Mevi Lidei Melacha” and “Domeh Lemelacha”

Speaker 1: I mean what you’re saying is correct. “Mevi lidei melacha” means that the person who does this will also do that. That is, if we let him do healing, he will come to grind spices. And the other thing is that it looks similar, not that he’s going to do it. There’s no concern at all that he’s going to do it, but another person sees him, it looks to him like one is doing a melacha, or it has some similarity to the melacha, not that he’s going to do it directly now.

Speaker 2: It could even be that the same person will get confused, but not because the things are like a melacha. It could be it’s not a melacha at all, just as doing healing is not a melacha, but usually during the week when one does that, it comes to a melacha, so they forbade it. “Domeh lemelacha” can mean just as… “Mevi lidei melacha” means to say, maybe the person will do the melacha on Shabbos. “Domeh lemelacha” means eventually, or another person will do a melacha, or there will be a degradation of the prohibition of melacha. Because one does it, it looks similar. Like a practical difference that one can understand how there’s a distinction, but there’s no distinction, in practice there’s no distinction, it’s just two reasons. But the Rambam in practice there are things that are neither this nor that, and also forbidden.

Speaker 1: Yes, the word “forbidden” means the Sages forbade. The Gemara regarding Shabbos is exempt, okay.

The Source of This Prohibition — The Verse in Yeshayahu

He says here as follows, because it says, there’s a verse about this. He says as follows, it’s a rabbinic prohibition. The rabbinic prohibition the Sages took from a verse. The Sages saw such a verse, in the prophet, in Yeshayahu it says as follows, the Torah speaks about Shabbos, and the verse ends with blessings, the prophet ends with blessings for those who keep Shabbos. But what is the language? He says as follows, “Im tashiv miShabbos raglecha”, you will restrain on Shabbos your feet, or your habits, “asos chaftzecha beyom kodshi”, you will restrain from doing your affairs on the holy day. And later in the verse it says again a similar “beyom kodshi”, on the holy day which is holy to the Almighty. And the next verse continues, “Vechibadetoh”, you will honor the Shabbos, how? “Me’asos derachecha”, by refraining from doing your ways, from doing your things, “Mimtzo cheftzecha”, from finding your affairs, it already says “doing” what you need, here it means to become from speaking, to refrain from certain speech.

The Explanation of the Verse — Prohibition of Walking and Speaking About One’s Affairs

So the Sages properly explained the verse and said as follows, therefore, here they saw as follows, it is forbidden for a person to walk in his affairs on Shabbos, a person may not go about his affairs. It doesn’t mean physically going about his affairs, it means being involved, going in the way that leads to what he’s seeking now in his affairs, and what he desires. Chefetz means to desire, or does that mean a thing? A chefetz is lent to me. Yes, a chefetz. A thing that one desires. A thing that a person has acquired. A person should not go about his matters on Shabbos, and not only that, but even to speak about them, even not to speak about his matters, which is stated “vedaber davar”.

So he explains, such as speaking with his partner what he will sell tomorrow or what he will buy. For example, speaking with his partner about the future of their business. Or speaking with… not necessarily in the business, but “how he will build this house”, how one will build such and such a house, “and with what merchandise he will go to a certain place”, what it’s worthwhile for him to do business in such and such a place. All this and similar things are forbidden.

Discussion: The Distinction Between This Prohibition and Buying and Selling

It’s actually all these things that are a bit similar to what we learned about buying and selling, but even if it’s not in the category of buying and selling, it’s not something that… buying and selling means selling, here it means speaking about commerce. But by selling we also had a bit more than actually selling. But buying and selling one can say is something that when a person is involved in that he will write, because it’s really connected. This is more planning, matters that have to do with his business. It’s not similar, it’s not similar to melacha, it’s not something where he’s going to earn money.

Speaker 1: What about like calculating accounts that need to be carried, whether of the past or of the future?

Speaker 2: Accounts of the future is very similar to what’s written here “with what merchandise he will go.” But that is actually an account, which is why it’s similar to melacha, because when he makes the account one writes. But here we’re speaking more, even when it’s much less than that. It’s not actually an account, a plan that one is going to do, but one is brainstorming, one is speaking about something future in the business. Yes?

Speaker 1: Okay.

Speaking Is Forbidden, Thinking Is Permitted

All this and similar things are forbidden, these things, and similar things are forbidden, as it says “vedaber davar”. Interesting that he focuses on the “davar” word immediately. Speaking is forbidden. That is, one should refrain from “vedaber davar”. From speaking about what? About your affairs. You should not walk, your walking on Shabbos should not be like on a weekday, you should not go as it were about your affairs, and also not speak about them, as it says “vedaber davar” which refers back to your affairs. Okay.

So he explains, the prohibition here is on speaking. Speaking is forbidden, but thinking is permitted. A person may think. I don’t know if the word is limiting, but one cannot prevent a person from thinking his thoughts, from thinking about his future. The prohibition is on speech.

Speaker 1: Permitted lechatchila, truly. Yes.

Speaker 2: So, it’s not as you say that thinking is permitted because one cannot force a person. One can, there are thoughts that are forbidden in the Torah. Yes, but thinking is permitted means that it’s fine, it’s good.

Discussion: Why Does It Say “Thinking Is Permitted” Here?

Speaker 1: Yes, good. The prohibition is on speech. Forbidden and permitted are technical terms in Hilchos Shabbos. In Hilchos Shabbos, forbidden means rabbinically forbidden, and permitted means completely permitted. Right.

Speaker 2: Someone wants to say that there’s a measure of piety that one should not think, one should not contemplate, but what it says… as if, he comes to limit piety. It doesn’t mean about thoughts, it means in practice. Yes. Yes, it could be, but it’s a bit funny why he puts it in here.

But he means to say, one learns from this also the permission, that it says specifically speech, not thought. I mean what he means to say is that the minimum action of Shabbos is speech. It says, he’s going to say, going by the boundaries of the places to look at the properties is more action. The smallest type of action of Shabbos is speech. One would have thought that one may not even think, but that’s already more than what was forbidden. The forbidden things are however until after speech, going and coming and speech.

Now we’re holding at bringing the verse. It says in the verse, it doesn’t say “vechashov chaftzecha,” it says “vedaber davar”. So already.

So now the Rambam is going to say further what else one may not do. I mean that it’s more with the words of “tashbos raglecha”, not going with the feet, or “asos derachecha”, not doing actions that are weekday matters. So apparently, first one learned the source, both the source and also the idea, and now one goes in practically. That what it said “forbidden to walk in his affairs”, but that was essentially the explanation of the verse and not any halacha. What does “to walk in his affairs” mean? He doesn’t know anything yet. He’s going to tell us various examples of this.

Discussion: The Status of This Verse — Torah Law or Rabbinic?

Speaker 1: One must mention, you spoke about this yesterday, that there’s a verse, if so it’s apparently from the Torah. But the Rambam holds that even Prophets and Writings is essentially rabbinic. It could be that it’s a decree of Yeshayahu the prophet, there’s no difference. A verse from the words of a prophet, divrei kabbalah, according to the Rambam, I mean according to most, almost always a verse from divrei kabbalah is rabbinic, yes? Except sometimes there are Rishonim who learn differently. There are places where one finds that it’s more stringent because it’s in the Prophets, but by the Rambam he certainly holds very extremely that a prophet cannot even decide a halacha, it doesn’t come from the prophet. I mean the Rambam says this very clearly in his language, because he says “ne’esru”. “Ne’esru” means he, when he says “ne’esru” afterwards it says what he means, the Rabbis forbade it. Why did the Rabbis forbid it? Because they found a verse. It’s a rabbinic prohibition.

One can even say more than that. “Ne’esru” — the Rabbis, one of the Rabbis was called Yeshayahu the prophet, and he forbade it. Here it says that he forbade it.

Speaker 2:

No, it looks like later “ne’esru because it says”, one of the Sages saw the verse in Yeshayahu, but the verse says that Yeshayahu didn’t say an explicit prohibition. Yeshayahu also didn’t say an explicit prohibition, yes, later he says a blessing about it, he doesn’t say a language of prohibition. The Sages made a language of prohibition. Yeshayahu also doesn’t say “lo ta’aseh,” even by muktzeh.

Speaker 1:

“And from where were they forbidden”? This means like they saw in the verse that this is how Shabbos should look, but perhaps not in the form of a prohibition. Yeshayahu the prophet simply said a prohibition. Yeshayahu, part of his prophetic words there he speaks about the holiness of Shabbos.

It could be, I’m just saying, the Sages later forbade it based on the verse. Or it could be that Yeshayahu is the Sage who forbade it. Or it could be a third thing in between, that all Yeshayahu gives the idea that on Shabbos there must be “mimtzo cheftzecha,” so there are things that are forbidden, which are like a fence for this. Or that there was a decree based on this later. There are certainly things that Yeshayahu didn’t say everything, but…

It could also be that Yeshayahu said more general words. For example, “lalechet bechaftzecha” he means “la’asok bechaftzecha.” Later the Sages explained more what this means. “Vedaber davar” means actually speaking, “Shabbos raglecha” means going to look at the business. It’s really explained.

When the verse is read, one will see that it’s a language of a verse that says that one may not go on Shabbos. It doesn’t mean walking, it means going to be involved in my business.

Speaker 2:

Yes, but I mean also, as long as he says “it is forbidden for a person to walk in his affairs on Shabbos”, he hasn’t yet begun to say the prohibition of going. “To walk in his affairs on Shabbos” is really the same language as “to be involved in his affairs on Shabbos.” Now he’s going to say what the “to walk” means, because the “to walk” here doesn’t yet mean walking, it means being involved. Just as “to walk in a good way” doesn’t mean walking, it means being involved in something.

Speaker 1:

Exactly, it’s certain that there are verses of tradition in us to walk on the paths that the good ones have walked, you know? “Vehadarta pnei zaken,” “vehalakhta bidrachav,” that’s a thing. But yes, actually, it’s a parable, yes, or less than a parable, it’s called an image, right? An image, a simile. Yes.

Halacha 1 (Continued) — “It Is Forbidden for a Person to Inspect His Gardens and Fields on Shabbos”

Speaker 1:

Good, what is the prohibition of going to be involved in his affairs on Shabbos? “It is forbidden for a person to inspect”. “To inspect” means to visit. To visit means from time to time. Well, an inspection, well, to inspect his affairs. “To inspect,” “inspection after inspection,” yes. The periodic thing. A person who has a business, has a field, from time to time he goes to visit.

Laws of Shabbos Chapter 24 – Preparation from Shabbos to Weekday, Speech on Shabbos, and “Vedaber Davar”

It’s a time to time thing, it can be on a regular basis, but pekida (inspection) is checking, right? But checking at a certain time. If someone looks at something the whole time, he’s not poked. Poked means when he remembers that he needs to once in a while, minimum once a year, maximum, he must go be poked. It says in this week’s parsha, “yifkod es kol adam”, “yifkod Hashem”. The Almighty is a checker person. Ah, you know what, chayav misa. No, also Rishonim, “yifkod”, yes. It says “lifkod”. “Yifkod kol basar”, “im kifkudas kol basar”, yes. This we just discussed in Berachos. Pekida is a language of remembrance, like “pakod yifkod eschem”, Zichronos. And here too is the language, it means to check out, as you say, it’s implied from this that before you didn’t, but simply it doesn’t mean to visit exactly, it means more like to check. “To check” in English is a good word for us.

“It is forbidden for a person to inspect his gardens and fields on Shabbos”, to go check out, but not to stroll around looking at how beautiful it is. To go like an inspector goes down to inspect a place on Shabbos. “Inspect” is perhaps a good word, okay. “In order to see what they need or how their fruits are”, to check what the field needs or how the fruits turned out. “For this is walking to do his affairs”, this is literally the translation of the word, this is walking, he goes to do his affairs, to do, to know how his affairs are, to know what he has to do.

And seemingly, just to do would have been an unsustainable thing. Someone who is contemplating on Shabbos, may one just like that… Someone makes a big Shabbos meal, may he go look around in the kitchen? It means to do things that one does.

Story of a Certain Chassid

Speaker 1:

It’s interesting, he brings here on the side a story, it says in the Yerushalmi and in the Bavli, that there was a certain chassid who went walking on Shabbos in his vineyard, and he saw something, a fence of the vineyard, a part of the gate. A vineyard has a fence, yes? It says in Yeshaya too. He saw a gate that needed to be fixed, so he thought, “Okay, motzaei Shabbos I’ll fix it.” Then he caught himself, “Oh, I thought on Shabbos to fix, I’ll never fix it.” This is already a midas chassidus, it’s not a prohibition on such a thing.

Speaker 2:

No, he didn’t mean from now to do, he wanted to make backwards that it was never a sin. The sin only took away from you to fix it, so retroactively he didn’t have any sin. I thought it was like a fine, like someone who does a melacha on Shabbos may not have benefit.

Speaker 1:

And the Almighty made a miracle, there came some sycamore, some sort of plant, and grew there exactly and made the gate, and from that he had sustenance his whole life from it. Because he was concerned about opinions, but opinions is not according to halacha, but from there you see that there is a prohibition to go check the vineyard on Shabbos what it needs, and the like.

Halacha 2 — Waiting at the Techum

Speaker 1:

Right. And similarly it is forbidden for a person to go out on Shabbos to the end of the techum. A person may not go on Shabbos until… Here we’re talking he’s not going to his field, just, he has somewhere he needs to go motzaei Shabbos, to travel somewhere, to deliver something, so he goes already on Shabbos as much as he can. That is, on Shabbos one may not go out from the techum, but within the techum he wants to go the maximum that he can, and stand there until it gets dark, and wait there, in order that he should be close to do his affairs on motzaei Shabbos, so it should be close to do what he has to do motzaei Shabbos. And since he is found walking on Shabbos to do his affairs, because he goes in order to be able to do his affairs, he goes in order to be able to do what he has to do.

The Principle: Under What Circumstances

Speaker 1:

The Rambam says a very important principle, these words are said, yes, these words are said, when he waits at the techum, when this is only when he went, this is called machshich al hatechum, he went before it becomes night, that means he went together, he waited together with the sun, the sun goes away, it gets dark, he waited along, he went there where it gets dark until the Shabbos techum, to do something that is forbidden to do on Shabbos, because then he prepared for something that is forbidden. But if he waits to do something that is permitted to do on Shabbos, even if he goes out from the techum to do it, he went to look at the end of the techum because he wants to soon go try a melaveh malka at the Rebbe’s, this is permitted. Even though one may not go out outside the techum, but he didn’t now go out for a forbidden thing, the prohibition is going out when he does it.

It’s not like guarding, he’s not going to check, for example earlier we said he goes to plant, let’s say he wants to go plant, the prohibition is sowing, that he doesn’t do. But he goes just because he needs to guard there, he’s a guard, he needs to make sure that they don’t steal during Shabbos too, he’s a guard, it’s forbidden to do on Shabbos, so that he may go, even he goes, interesting, a gabbai goes out outside the techum, so that doesn’t mean that he goes out outside the techum, that’s not a melacha that he saw.

Right, right. Or going out, it happens to be that it doesn’t happen here, but interesting, it’s only a hypothetical that he could do the thing. Aha, the Gemara brings the Gemara.

Examples from the Gemara

Speaker 1:

One may not wait at the techum to bring attached fruits. One may not go to the techum erev Shabbos before motzaei Shabbos, before it gets dark before motzaei Shabbos, to bring attached fruits, to go cut and bring fruits that are still attached, or to hire workers, or hire workers. Because these are, to bring attached fruits is a Torah prohibition, or even to hire workers is only rabbinic, this is forbidden.

But one may wait to guard fruits. But one may indeed go down there to guard the fruits, for it is permitted to guard on Shabbos. One may guard fruits on Shabbos. One may even wait to bring an animal and detached fruits. Why? Because he’s not going to ride there on the animal, riding is not permitted, but if the animal, he calls it and it comes. There is a way of bringing the animal in a simple manner, he should call the animal and the animal will come. Even if it is outside the techum, even if the animal is outside the techum and he will need to signal for the animal to come out.

Speaker 2:

On Shabbos may one do this too? An animal may come out outside the techum?

Speaker 1:

No. An animal, if it goes by itself, it can go as much as it wants, but if a person calls it, it is bound to his techum. I don’t know. It seems that he may indeed. He says so. Why is this different? Not clear.

Discussion: Why May One Signal for an Animal Outside the Techum?

Speaker 1:

He says, the animal, he calls it and it comes, even though it is outside the techum. It seems that one may, because the person does nothing. Going outside the techum is not permitted, but signaling for an animal. It seems that it doesn’t have to do with shevitas behemto. Techum Shabbos is perhaps a fence for oneself, it’s not from the 39 melachos. It seems that one may make an animal do this. If he would have had to go himself to bring the animal by hand from outside the techum, one wouldn’t be allowed to go even erev Shabbos, because he must do something that is a desecration of Shabbos of going outside the techum. But here where he only needs to basically signal for the animal, why is this not like a donkey driver and such things that we learned earlier?

Speaker 2:

A donkey driver is when he carries, that’s a fence on carrying, but outside the techum is itself only a weaker prohibition. That one may. One didn’t learn about techumin Shabbos because…

Speaker 1:

Okay. The same thing, fallen fruits one may also, because if there were partitions, even if it is indeed outside the techum, but if there would have been… or even from a karmelis to a reshus hayachid, or whatever. But if there were partitions through their father on Shabbos, which is not really a melacha, even he may not.

It’s interesting the definition, as if it doesn’t have to do with really a prohibition, because he goes on Shabbos, Torah, in melacha.

Laws of Shabbos Chapter 24 – Preparation from Shabbos to Weekday, Speech on Shabbos, and “Vedaber Davar”

Continuation: Going Outside the Techum for Detached Fruits

Speaker 1:

Have you already learned about techumin Shabbos?

Speaker 2:

Okay.

Speaker 1:

Detached fruits went out – one may also, because if there were partitions there, even if it is indeed outside the techum, but if there would have been partitions there, even from a karmelis to a reshus hayachid or reshus harabim, but if there were partitions there, it would be permitted to bring them on Shabbos, which is not really a melacha. Even if he may not.

Innovation: The Definition of This Permission – It’s Not Essentially a Melacha

It’s interesting the definition, as if it doesn’t have to do with really a prohibition, because he goes indeed outside the techum, he won’t go, and even not only a techum, it could be even a Torah prohibition, but still, essentially what I’m going to do is not something that is forbidden on Shabbos, for if they were within the techum or within my domain I would be allowed to pick up detached fruits, so I’m not going to do a melacha. It’s an interesting definition, one must understand it.

Definition of “Preparation” – Must Be a Noticeable Action

Speaker 1:

Yes, and it seems here from all these things too that he must do something that is very noticeable that he is engaged in something for motzaei Shabbos.

Question: Going to a Different Shul to Finish Earlier – Is This Preparation?

Because I was thinking to myself, many times here a person knows where he davens shalosh seudos every week, and this week he needs to fly right after the time, so he goes to a different shul because there they finish earlier. He goes on Shabbos, doesn’t that mean he’s preparing to be able to fly, yes? It’s also like preparing.

Answer: Preparing Must Be When He Goes to a Place That Isn’t Shabbos-Like

But one sees that preparing must also be when he goes to a place where there are the fruits, he goes to a place that isn’t Shabbos-like. Do you understand what I’m saying? If a person should do something at home so it should be ready motzaei Shabbos to do a melacha, we don’t broaden the prohibition that far. That is permitted, that’s for sure. He must also do something that is preparing.

Speaker 2:

Ah, you mean that he makes a techum?

Speaker 1:

One used to also make a techum, but he goes until there. But he does something a little bit, but when he should do something… as I say, I want to finish shalosh seudos earlier so I should be able to do motzaei Shabbos, that he may do.

Example: Going to Sleep to Be Rested

But for example going to sleep, people talk about this, yes, one shouldn’t go to sleep because one wants to be rested motzaei Shabbos, or erev Pesach, I don’t know what, Yom Tov. Then one starts to talk, but I don’t know, not about preparation. There one starts to say preparation, one may not make preparation on Shabbos, yes? Even he doesn’t do anything. That’s not with this preparation. It’s the same law, but one must see in his action that he does something weekday-like, he does something that has relevance.

Example: Going to the Cigarettes

For example, think, let’s say a person, he must grab a cigarette motzaei Shabbos on time. So when it’s still Shabbos, he starts to walk around in his house, so when it’s his mentioned time, he can still grab the cigarettes. There you’ll say, I’m going to the cigarettes. But he goes home, a person may go home. It’s not… these are somewhat open things. I say, one must find the exact definition, but one sees this all the time. Someone goes next to his cigarettes, I don’t want to say next to his phone, and he needs it very importantly. One must think. Clearly, it’s relatively permitted, but one sees enough that the prohibition… and here one sees it’s not yet standing. It’s not in the case, this we’ve already seen.

Example: Saying to His Friend – “To Such-and-Such Place I’m Going Tomorrow”

In general, one sees another example that one may do so. Just like that you can also say the permissions. Ah, a cigarette is certainly forbidden to smoke on Shabbos. Okay, in general, another thing. In general, saying to his friend. A person may indeed say, “To such-and-such place I’m going tomorrow”. I’m going to such-and-such city tomorrow. Suddenly you know that one may not say also not. He’ll catch you with. He’s talking something practical. He’ll make you business. He’ll buy that right.

Why May One Do This? “If There Were Burganin”

Why may one do this? Because one may go to another city, technically. Because, “if there were burganin there, they would walk there on Shabbos”. If there would have been buildings, burganin means guarding, little houses where guards sit. Such a thing would make the Shabbos techum spread out. Because if next to a city there are such small houses close to the city, the Shabbos techum spreads out. So, someone needs to walk to the next nearby city, even if it’s not in the Shabbos techum. But it’s something that we would have had a way that it should be permitted, so it’s not so extremely forbidden. Not only a bit, it’s similar to the previous halacha of if the fruits would have been in a domain he would be allowed to carry, if the city would have been a bit closer he would have been allowed to go. As if he doesn’t say that I’m going to do a melacha, he only says I’m going to go, going is permitted on Shabbos, it just happens that here is too far that city, imagine it wouldn’t have been far.

He Doesn’t Say What Business He’s Going to Do

When he says “to hire workers” he doesn’t say what business he’s going to do, because then it would indeed have been forbidden. He only talks about the walking, and the walking is something that is permitted on Shabbos. It means, he doesn’t say something clearly that techum Shabbos makes it not forbidden, it’s only the steps in the field.

Discussion: Why Does One Say “Because If There Were Burganin”?

Speaker 2:

“Because if there were burganin” means to say, at least there wouldn’t be any problem of techum Shabbos, yes?

Speaker 1:

It means, let’s say, if he says I’m going to travel with my horse, which is rabbinically forbidden, or I’m traveling with my car, which is perhaps forbidden by Torah law, I don’t know, that he certainly wouldn’t be allowed to talk, because if I say I’m going to travel motzaei Shabbos, it means I’m going to do a melacha, one may not talk about doing melachos.

Distinction: Talking About Going vs. Talking About Traveling

One may not say motzaei Shabbos I have a car, so it comes out here. If I say motzaei Shabbos I’m going home, it happens I’m going home with my car, you don’t need to know, you don’t need to talk, I didn’t talk about the melacha. Going home one may indeed on Shabbos too. Ah, even if it’s outside the techum I may indeed arrange, like there where there is an eruv one may. I can even say “because of eruv techumin”, but he doesn’t say. The burganin is simply that it’s already become so you say the distance of the techum.

Question: One Can Say “Because If There Were Burganin” on Every Melacha!

Speaker 2:

No, one must understand not “because if there were burganin”, because one can say it on almost every melacha. When I’m going to go motzaei Shabbos to dig, if it would already have been dug out one would be allowed to go, what’s done here?

Speaker 1:

“Because if there were burganin”, it’s not there.

Answer: Going Is Essentially Permitted, Digging Is Essentially Forbidden

There is something that is indeed permitted. You see that the things that are essentially previous things, that means going is not a melacha, going is permitted. If there would have been burganin they would have been allowed, only it happened that here one forbade. You see that what I’m seeking is not to go in a forbidden manner.

“It Seems That You’ll Stand With Me in the Evening” vs. “Be Ready for Me in the Evening”

Speaker 1:

Further what else one may, it is permitted for a person to say to his friend, for a person may not hire a worker, he already said, yes, he said “to hire workers”. One may not even go to a place that is prepared, a person may chat with someone and say so, “It seems that you’ll stand with me in the evening?” Do you think we can meet tonight? If he doesn’t say about what he’s talking. But he should not say to him “Be ready for me in the evening”, he may not tell him in a manner he commands him.

Distinction: In the Language of a Question vs. In the Language of a Command

When he says it in the manner of a question, in the manner he’s chatting, “What do you think, can we meet tonight?” He doesn’t tell him about what. But when he says it in a manner, “I want to make with you tonight an appointment”, it turns out your affairs on Shabbos, because when he does that, he does something.

Explanation: Thought Is Permitted, Speech Is Forbidden

I would perhaps say it like this: One didn’t forbid thought, one only forbade speech. So when he chats with someone, even in his head he has that at the meeting he’ll talk business, so he has a thought, “and in his heart, heart at all”, he didn’t even speak. He talks, he says things that one may do on Shabbos.

“Be Ready” = Making an Appointment

But when he says, “I want to make an appointment”, he now does an affair. One of the things that a person must do when he does business is make appointments. When he chats off with someone when they’ll meet, he has now done some preparation for something that isn’t Shabbos-like.

Discussion: What is the Difference Between the Different Expressions?

Speaker 1:

The expression “heyei nachon” sounds very weak. I once thought that it simply means to say, “be ready to work.” If you add the one word “to work,” everyone understands why it’s forbidden. The problem is that it says that a little less is also forbidden. This is hard to grasp – what is the difference between what is in question form or what he says “heyei nachon,” something like “hanir’eh” – the simple meaning is you want, perhaps also the reason is to me.

Explanation: “Heyei Nachon” is an Expression of Authority

“Heyei nachon li la’erev” is, I think, there is an authority here, he says it like an authority, like a boss says to his worker. He must agree, but by hint. Good, but he says, do you see how he makes an appointment? He says to his worker, “Tonight, be ready, I need to talk to you.” He has now made an appointment, he has now done something boss-like, he has now done something that has to do with his… he has done his will, as you say. But when he says, “Perhaps you can come tonight?” “Heyei nachon li,” what we’re going to do is work… something is not exactly clear about the difference, I haven’t brought out the example so well, the expression that the Gemara’s world made between the difference of the expressions, I don’t understand it so well.

The Beit Yosef’s Explanation

He says that the Beit Yosef says “vehayei im nachon” means be ready to work. He says, when he says “shetimta demilta” he means it can be a way that people speak. That is, perhaps it is so, if it’s “mishtama litrei apei,” it could be that they’re going to meet to eat pizza. Precisely, you can’t, you won’t meet him for pizza, you’ll meet to do business. Or according to our explanation there is indeed a revelation of intent, whatever you know, but “heyei im nachon” is more an expression that is only said about business, you’re just coming to a meeting. The expression of “heyei im nachon li le’et erev” is truly such an expression, “heyei im nachon li baboker,” “velishma’el achi.”

Speaker 2:

Yes, he says, also a condition, it’s also a condition. There is a halachic ruling. Okay.

Conclusion: The Custom of the World – “Little Pictures” and “Not Spoken About on Shabbat”

Speaker 1:

So, we have discussed here about… if people want to be careful about the laws, they need to know the detailed laws. We see from here that the custom of the world to say “bilderlech” (little pictures) instead of money, or even to say the words “nisht um Shabbos geredt” (not spoken about on Shabbat), is often a funny thing, because often it doesn’t help, but we see that an expression that has two meanings has a place in the prohibition of “vedaber davar.”

Speaker 2:

Yes. Yes, yes, true. Because hirhurim (thoughts) are permitted.

Hirhurim are Permitted Even When Everyone Knows What is Meant

Speaker 1:

Hirhurim are permitted means even in a manner where everyone knows what is being discussed. That is, the bilderlech means money, but he didn’t say money. Okay. But when someone actually makes business, “I’m selling you the house for nine hundred thousand bilderlech,” okay, we’ve closed the deal, he has actually made an act of buying and selling on Shabbat. But when it’s more an expression with two meanings, he hasn’t transgressed a clear “vedaber davar,” only a hirhur.

Speaker 2:

Right. Right. Okay.

Additional Explanation: Hirhur vs. Dibur (Speech)

Speaker 1:

One can perhaps say a bit more. We don’t say that when someone speaks something about hirhur on Shabbat… We can say it this way, hirhur is permitted, but anything that you bring out the hirhur with words, is no longer good, because it’s already “vedaber davar.”

Innovation: Only When the Speech Itself is Forbidden

But I would say no. If in the “vedaber davar” itself, without the hirhur, there are still no words there… even let’s say the person who said “nir’eh shetimta demilta le’et erev,” he made an appointment now, yes? Because in both their thoughts an appointment happened, but in the speech no appointment happened.

Speaker 2:

Right. I think there is such a reasoning, that the speech that is forbidden on Shabbat is primarily speech that does something. That’s how he brings it in Har HaMoriah.

Example: Talking About a Meeting vs. Making an Appointment

Speaker 1:

That is, if I, as you say, if I talk and it becomes a bit of a deal, or you’re actually going to come, but just talking, “What do you think about this?”, it becomes fantasies because you want to talk. Work that isn’t work, that he needs to make more appointments? It becomes for him a certain dream, or a sign that something isn’t happening. I didn’t say that this is the word, because when he says that he says yes, they’ve discussed it, he doesn’t need to… no, but it’s not necessary, because it’s not necessary.

Idle Talk, Walking, and Speech on Shabbat – Laws of Shabbat Chapter 24 (Continued)

Law 24 (Continued) – Clarification in “Speech” About Objects: When Does a Conversation Become a Prohibition?

Speaker 1:

That is, if I, as you say, if I talk and it becomes a bit of an agreement that you’re actually going to come, but just talking like that, “What do you think about this?” It becomes fantasies because you’re talking to someone from Chaim Stein.

“What do you say to a nice beautiful work job? So, you’ll make more appointments?” It becomes in this a certain decision, there lies in this something or a shadow that something will be taken. Someone goes… because he says a foolish student the work, when he says yes, they’ve discussed it, he doesn’t need to… no, it’s not obligatory to me, because it’s not obligatory. He doesn’t want to come, the other one can’t come, or… aha. I’m saying a leniency for myself, I want to say a leniency, that if even one speaks yes about things, if it’s only spoken, not because I spoke must the other one do it. Because we see people can do, very many people do almost all masses, because usually this is only spoken. One must know here exactly everyone. It matters if one is someone who does seriously. Again, even as one speaks only holding still we’re just the first stage, but essentially it’s seriously spoken. It’s spoken, but if it’s just chatted, that’s just chatted. One must know, you don’t know.

Example: Looking for a Ride on Shabbat

But for example, I’m looking for a ride on Shabbat, you’ve perhaps understood Monsey tomorrow, it counts that it’s ten, because if driving, I can say to myself, driving, I’m not talking about starting the car, I’m talking about the driving. Imagine you would have had a way to go to know, you don’t know. That would go the leniency. But here comes in, if a person finds a creative way, that he asks, he makes a conversation, and he asks people, when are you going home from here? He doesn’t say the word driving, and he doesn’t say the word, even in his head he’s now making, he’s now building that tomorrow when he goes inside he should approximately know when the people go how, as long as it’s not said, it remains a way everyone thinks underneath. Maybe.

Two Leniencies in “Vedaber Davar”

And also by me is the other leniency, that other leniency, not about the thought with the other leniency. There are two leniencies that have been learned until now thought, when one doesn’t say clearly, and second said when one says about a thing that it’s not clear that it’s a prohibition, one can do it in a permitted manner. I say, when it’s not clear, even the thought is in back of the whole thing clear, but in the speech itself it hasn’t yet stood clear.

Speaker 2:

Okay, or do you want to say that the previous leniency is also about this? That is, I can say “limtzo chaftzecha ani holech” (I’m going to find my objects), that although he’s going to do it in a forbidden manner, but he hasn’t said it. He said that he’s going to go, it’s not a prohibition to go.

Speaker 1:

Ah, precisely there there isn’t the lack of chefetz (object/desire). I didn’t speak about that. Perhaps that is the reason why it’s a leniency.

Philosophy of Language: Words vs. Intent

It’s interesting, it has to do with how we look at language a bit, and I’m not going to go into philosophy of language now. Because once one could say that whatever brings out the hirhur you’ve said it, no difference which words you say. But we see yes, there are expressions that work, “harei at mekudeshet” (behold you are betrothed) works, “harei at nesu’ah li” (behold you are married to me) doesn’t work, whatever, it’s the right expression.

Speaker 2:

Okay, very good.

Law 24 (Continued) – Prohibition to Run and Jump on Shabbat

Learning the Verse “Im Tashiv MiShabbat Raglecha”

Speaker 1:

The verse says “im tashiv miShabbat raglecha” (if you restrain your foot from Shabbat), literally every word is explained and learned from. It’s like this, we have already learned one meaning of “me’asot derachecha” (from doing your ways), that one may not go outside the techum (boundary). This is the “lalechet” (to go), we learned from “lalechet bechaftzecha” (to go in your desires) or “im tashiv miShabbat raglecha”, holding back the feet on Shabbat from going. But the feet from going. Yes, it specifically spoke about the expression of “walking.” But we learn out something more from the feet, that besides the prohibition of going for the sake of work from here, no, from the expression “derech.” No, it could be that “me’asot derachecha” we have already learned out that one may not go to the techum. But “me’asot derachecha” means something more, that one may not run.

The Rambam’s Language

What do we learn out this way? “Ve’asur larutz uledaleig beShabbat” (And it is forbidden to run and jump on Shabbat). Two types of ways of running fast: one can through many small steps but very fast, or one can make very large steps, yes? Shene’emar “me’asot derachecha”, you should restrain yourself from going your ways. What does this mean? “Shelo yehei hiluchecha beShabbat kehiluchecha bechol” (That your walking on Shabbat should not be like your walking on a weekday). On Shabbat you should only go the calm way of walking, not like the way of walking of running.

Question: “Hiluchecha Bechol” Also Isn’t Usually Running

It’s interesting, because “hiluchecha bechol” also isn’t usually “larutz uledaleig.” But “larutz uledaleig” is a weekday running, a running of worry, of business, he needs to catch something, he needs to do something. Shabbat is calm, one doesn’t need to run anywhere.

The Rambam’s Explanation: The Prohibition Isn’t Exertion, But the Manner of Walking

Says the Rambam, but it doesn’t mean to say that one may not walk a lot. It means the manner how one runs should not be in the manner of running and jumping, but a person may walk even if he exerts himself very much with the walking. Veyeired adam (And a person may descend), a person wants to go down to drink water from a lake, from a spring of water, he needs to crawl very far for this. Veyeired adam, be’er, rechitzah, chamah, afilu ein mei amami, afilu hu dakak mei amami, umtapes (And a person may descend, a well, washing, sun, even if there’s no people’s water, even if he needs to hack people’s water, and climb), he needs to crawl and go down and drink, umtapes ve’oleh (and climb and ascend), and crawl again up the way, all these things one may do.

Speaker 2:

That means, the prohibition isn’t to go far? Although outside the techum one may not go, but a well is a hypothetical case that as an opening of the techum he may go, even if it’s difficult. It’s not a prohibition to go on a difficult walk, the prohibition is to run.

Speaker 1:

He also says that basically being medaleig (jumping) and being metapes (climbing) isn’t the same thing. A person who… one can say that being metapes is a type of way…

Speaker 2:

Yes, because a person climbs on a mountain, it’s a type of way of… it’s also not normal walking.

Speaker 1:

True, he needs to crawl because he’s crawling on a mountain. Yes. But he means to say that it’s not the word “walking with exertion,” because walking with exertion is also entering into the cave. It’s the manner of walking of running. The Rambam is going to explain it more.

Why Does a Person Run? Business vs. A Matter of Mitzvah

Why does a person run? He needs to catch the bus. On Shabbat one doesn’t catch a bus. He doesn’t need to catch business. But soon we’ll see, to a shiur (Torah class) to learn one runs. This will be soon. For a davar mitzvah (matter of mitzvah) they permitted it.

Law 24 (Continued) – Prohibition to Increase Idle Talk on Shabbat

The Rambam’s Language

Speaker 1:

So, it was added from this verse that the essential thing that it means to be engaged in business on Shabbat, it was added walking like on weekdays. And something more was added, speaking like on weekdays. Not speaking about business, but the way how one speaks. What is to increase idle talk on Shabbat? One may not increase idle talk on Shabbat. Shene’emar “vedaber davar” (and speak a word), shelo yehei diburcha shel chol kediburcha shel Shabbat (that your speech of weekday should not be like your speech of Shabbat). Your speaking on Shabbat should not be like your speaking on Shabbat. What does this mean? That there should not be an abundance of idle words.

Difference From the Previous “Vedaber Davar”

It’s going to be clarified the difference from the earlier verse that brought “vedaber davar,” which brought “vedaber davar” in continuation to “mimtzo cheftzecha” (from finding your desires). Speech that is not of weekday. Now we’re already not only speaking about speech about business, but just to speak for fun and for nothing. Is there a measure how much one may speak on Shabbat? Because he doesn’t say how much. This can’t be a complete prohibition, because sometimes it says to increase, when a person needs to have it for important, you know, he needs to spend time with his child, there is very much idle talk, also not any abundance.

Speaker 2:

That’s not idle talk, that’s actually a mitzvah.

Speaker 1:

Here he’s speaking about some sort of idle talk that is generally permitted, true? On weekdays, because it’s speech of weekday as if, and on weekdays one may, but on Shabbat one may not. It’s very unclear what this means, but that means, it’s like a little. The idea is, according to how much one talks on weekdays, he should talk less.

Explanation: It’s Not About the Topics, But the Abundance

Without the words “leharbat besicha beteilah” (to increase idle talk), one would have said “shelo yehei diburcha shel chol,” as if one would have said something the topics should not be topics from weekdays. But we don’t see such a thing. It’s not the simple meaning that on Shabbat one may not speak about cars or about recipes. But that is idle talk. But idle talk one may not. I mean to say, there isn’t a prohibition of speaking about non-Shabbat things. Speaking about rabbis or about cars, both is idle talk that one may not have that it’s an abundance of speaking too much.

Speaker 2:

Speaking about rabbis is a mitzvah.

Speaker 1:

Or is it a mitzvah, or is it a mitzvah to speak lashon hara (evil speech) about them. One of the two.

Speaker 2:

But don’t you know that it’s a tradition in Ropshitz that one must before davening speak about enemies of the righteous?

Speaker 1:

Anyway, I’m not saying so, it’s very important, there’s an obligation on the community to trample its leaders, I don’t know his language.

Speaker 2:

No, no, I know what you want to say, but what I mean to say is that it’s not about the topics, it’s about the abundance of idle talk. It’s an abundance, also the prohibition is the abundance.

The Rambam Didn’t Give Any Measure

Speaker 1:

He brings here from the Gemara, a little one may, a little one may, but a lot one may not. So, at some point one must stop the conversation. I don’t know when it’s a lot.

The Rema’s Leniency: If Someone Has Pleasure

And the Rema has a leniency that if someone enjoys it specifically, this is oneg Shabbat (Shabbat pleasure). Interesting. Because as if you could be abundance of idle talk, so also the leniency is oneg Shabbat. This speaks about a person, that a normal adult doesn’t truly enjoy speaking nonsense. You know, sometimes on weekdays he needs to… he speaks nonsense and afterwards he feels funny about it, yes. Even during the act.

Speaker 2:

I hear. Regret afterwards, even if he has pleasure during the act, but regret is to him afterwards.

Connection to Previous Laws: Reading Secular Documents

Speaker 1:

But I see, he notes that in the previous chapter we learned about reading secular documents on Shabbat. That was actually the prohibition of erasing, but we had the language that one may not read even in Ketuvim (Writings), a decree lest he tilt.

Speaker 2:

Yes, okay, he needs to think to… during the time of the study hall.

Speaker 1:

Right, so on Shabbat there are two prohibitions, the prohibition of speaking or even reading things during the time when the community learns.

Speaker 2:

Interesting, there he brought it in precisely right after speaking about the prohibition of erasing.

Speaker 1:

Yes, okay, but after speaking about writing, nonsense, he said what one may not speak idle words, idle words.

Why is Idle Talk Forbidden? Rest, Not Just Learning

Speaker 2:

But I understood that the Rambam already said that Shabbat is a time of learning.

Speaker 1:

It’s not clear. It seems, we, I would have thought, presumably certainly you’re right that Shabbat is a time of learning, or even not speaking, speaking of righteous people, most righteous people, something. But from here it seems more from the topic of the rest of Shabbat. It has to do with the difference of Shabbat. Shabbat should be calm. It seems somehow idle talk is not calm. It has to do with the rest, like tashev (you shall sit), yes? Tashev, tishbot (you shall rest), from finding your desires and speaking a word. Don’t do so much. Idle talk is a bit of a sort of work. I don’t know why it’s a melacha (work). It’s not an actual melacha, but like going to work is a sort of melacha, so talking nonsense is also a sort of melacha. I never understood, what do all those people do whose job is to make podcasts and talk for one evening? On Shabbat he’s surely exempt, he doesn’t need to make a podcast.

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It’s interesting, because here it says that what one has pleasure from is permitted. Normally, his pleasure is from the Rebbe. There is indeed a normal person who has pleasure the first ten minutes, and afterwards he’s already talked too much. The person who speaks for an hour, he needs an hour.

It’s difficult, and because of this the Rambam left it open. Also, the Rambam didn’t grasp it, he didn’t say, I don’t know, a half hour, it’s not an amount. But it seems to me from the context that it’s a burden, it’s somewhat like not rest. What is rest? Don’t speak too much. To us it seems perhaps it’s not speaking too much.

Again: Shabbos Rest, Not Just Learning

But even here it can also be that it’s connected with what the Rambam already said that Shabbos is a time for learning. It’s not clear. It seems, we, I would have thought, presumably certainly you’re right that Shabbos is a time for learning, or even not speaking, speaking tzaddikim, most tzaddikim, something. But from here it seems more from the topic of the rest (shevisa) of Shabbos. It has to do with the difference of Shabbos. Shabbos should be calm. It seems somehow idle talk (sicha betela) is not calm. It has to do with the rest, like “tashev,” yes? Tashev, tishbos, mimtzo cheftzecha vedaber davar. Don’t do so much. Idle talk is a bit of a sort of work. I don’t know why it’s a melacha. It’s not an actual melacha, but just as going to work is a sort of melacha, so talking nonsense is also a sort of melacha. I never understood, what do all those people do whose job is to make podcasts and talk for one evening? On Shabbos he’s exempt, he doesn’t need to make any podcast.

It’s interesting, because here it says that what one has pleasure from is permitted. Normally, his pleasure is from the Rebbe. There is indeed a normal person who has pleasure the first ten minutes, and afterwards he’s already talked too much. The person who speaks for an hour, he needs an hour.

It’s difficult, and because of this the Rambam left it open. Also, the Rambam didn’t grasp it, he didn’t say, I don’t know, a half hour, it’s not an amount. But it seems to me from the context that it’s a burden, it’s somewhat like not rest. What is rest? Don’t speak too much. To us it seems perhaps it’s not speaking too much.

Conclusion: One Shouldn’t Look at It This Way

It means that on Shabbos we are truly limited with what one can speak, yes? If it’s interesting, it’s apparently a story and a story, or words of Torah, and all other things are idle words (devarim betelim). One shouldn’t look at it this way.

The Rambam in Peirush HaMishnayos: Five Types of Speech

The Rambam in Peirush HaMishnayos, again and again, he is very lengthy a bit about the topic of speech, yes? You remember the five types of speech: mitzvos, sins, and vows, and hated ones. The Rambam was very interested particularly in the topic that most people are

Halacha 7-8: Things Permitted on Shabbos for the Sake of a Mitzva

Halacha 7 — Continuation: Idle Talk on Shabbos

Speaker 1:

If it’s interesting, if it’s a Chassidic story and wonder, or words of Torah, and all other things are idle words (devarim betelim). It may be that one needs a certain edge to look at it this way. The Rambam in Peirush HaMishnayos again and again is very knowledgeable, he is lengthy a bit about the topic of speech, yes. I remember there are five types of speech: mitzvos and sins and vows and lashon hara. The Rambam was very interested in general in the topic that most people speak too much nonsense. So on Shabbos is a bit less nonsense, nu? So it’s simple.

Very good. So when are all these things permitted? Yes. I also think the obligation is perhaps only for men, for adults. One can say children and women, children yes, all their talk is idle talk, because they’re not engaged in maasei merkava, they’re not engaged in Torah. Everyone has his level. Everyone has his situation. Someone who speaks a lot, on Shabbos a bit less.

Source from Yerushalmi — Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and His Mother

They bring that in the Yerushalmi it says that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai saw his mother speaking on Shabbos. But it doesn’t say speaking, “marbe bedibur,” speaking too much. “Shtuki Shabta yoma.” He would have said that once it becomes a burden for her she should stop. Ah, very good. You see that it’s also for women. For a woman.

Speaker 2:

No, but there you see, according to the woman is a rabbi, it’s already a thing even for a woman.

Speaker 1:

That’s the source for shouting “Shabbos.” When should one shout “Shabbos”? Not when one sees a Jew driving on Shabbos, he’s not standing here. When one sees a Jew speaking too much nonsense on Shabbos, “Shabbos!”

Speaker 2:

No, he didn’t God forbid shout at his mother. He didn’t shout at his mother.

Speaker 1:

No, he said very nicely, “Mommy, let’s speak Shabbos.” Let’s say it’s good Shabbos. There the language is, “shtuki Shabta yoma.” He didn’t shout God forbid, it’s not right. He said nicely Shabbos. He said Shabbos. It’s not a matter.

It may be that the point is, regarding the mother of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai was certainly a learned righteous woman, who yes knew how to learn. She could have put in five-six hours Shabbos afternoon in words of Torah, things that are relevant for women. It says yes, “Yom Tov is given for women.” Okay, let’s learn further. And this speaking is already almost doubled.

Speaker 2:

Yes.

Speaker 1:

No, but he certainly didn’t shout. He said “Shabbos hayom,” one remembered that he speaks, but not too much.

Digression: Conversation at the Meal

“One may run on Shabbos for matters of mitzva.” No, I say it for a reason, because I’m an agitated person. There are people who shouldn’t talk at the meal. A meal is also part of the meal that everyone should feel free to open their mouth. If there’s a certain tension at the table, that means it’s idle words. That means people should have pleasantness.

Speaker 2:

Yes.

Halacha 8 — One May Run on Shabbos for Matters of Mitzva

Speaker 1:

“One may run on Shabbos for matters of mitzva.” We discussed that one may not run on Shabbos. Now he goes in to speak the details of the prohibition. He says, what we said that one may not run on Shabbos, that’s not for a matter of mitzva, but for a matter of mitzva one may run on Shabbos. Such as, he may run to the synagogue or to the study hall.

It means, running on Shabbos is not the prohibition simply because it’s a burden, because when one goes to a matter of mitzva, even if it’s a burden, but there’s perhaps a joy of mitzva, therefore one may.

This is to note, the entire reason is essentially ways that one may indeed run or speak or do one of the things that we discussed that it’s not Shabbos-like. When it’s a mitzva it is indeed Shabbos-like.

Speaker 2:

No, I mean to say that one can say it this way: speaking a lot is a burden, running a lot is a burden, but both are only forbidden when it’s for nothing. Both things, when it’s for a good purpose, a person doesn’t look at it as a burden.

Speaker 1:

Okay, in any case. And in any case it’s because a mitzva overrides the matter of the talking.

Speaker 2:

Yes, true. Many rabbinic prohibitions are not decreed in a place of mitzva. Such as he may run to the synagogue or to the study hall.

Calculations of Mitzva

Speaker 1:

And what else may one do? Calculate calculations of mitzva. We learned that one may not make any calculations on Shabbos and Yom Tov, or, here was also “vedaber davar.” Yes, but to think calculations of mitzva. We also learned that one may not make measurements, check how much things weigh. That was in the previous chapter 23. But in measurement of mitzva one measures, such as a mikva, to know if it has the required amount. A mikva to know if there’s a measure. It means that one is learning laws of mikva, or that it’s relevant for prayer on Shabbos. One needs to check the mikva, see if it’s kosher. If a garment unfortunately receives impurity, these things also require measurement, but ordinary measurement one may not do because of lest he write, lest he erase. But this one may, because by mikva mitzva the Sages didn’t decree.

Discussion: Where Lies the Prohibition of Calculations?

Speaker 2:

Yes, I just want to say, there are apparently two prohibitions, both on calculations, and also because we’re speaking about allocating charity, the next piece, it can be a prohibition of business dealings, which is lest he write or erase. And here we’re apparently only speaking about the running and talking. One needs to understand how went the concern that he’ll write. It may be that when it’s a mitzva that too is permitted, just as we see that many things are permitted for the sake of mitzva. Or it may be for the sake of mitzva one doesn’t come to write, because one takes a mikva, it’s already kosher. One needs to understand.

Speaker 1:

I mean the point is, look in 23:18-19, the Rambam has a very interesting language. Both times when he speaks about lest he write and lest he erase from writing and calculations, he says “so that it shouldn’t be like weekday, his thoughts on Shabbos like weekday thoughts.” It’s something, you see that the Rambam even by the lest he write and lest he erase he also thought that it’s a matter of doing one’s affairs, you see? Both times, he says again… I thought that he means to say that if he conducts himself weekday-like, he can already take out his pen, because he feels already weekday-like. And you want to argue that when he speaks of charity he doesn’t feel weekday-like. Perhaps so.

Perhaps the Rambam held, he was in doubt where to place the calculations of mitzva, whether in lest he write, lest he erase, or it’s what is indeed very close, yes, making calculations. It may be making calculations perhaps, but I don’t think it’s a prohibition of speech, because he can even make the calculations in his head. Let’s say he says it out of his mouth, but it’s not a matter of conversation. When a person counts, yes, he stands and he makes in his head the calculations of the size of his fields, how much he’ll make, it’s not a matter of talking, it’s a matter of… But it’s more than thought. When a person makes a calculation, let’s say he needs to say it because that way he’ll remember it, but it’s not something he needs to do in communication with another, it’s not conversation, it’s not business dealings, it’s a calculation. But it’s also not thought, it’s more than thought, it’s a calculation.

So, he placed it in lest he write, but he also said “like weekday,” you see, both times he said. At least, and calculations of mitzva, the unique name is also only rabbinic which is in a place of mitzva.

Speaker 2:

Okay. It’s actually interesting, because the other prohibitions that the Rambam said, all these rabbinic prohibitions he didn’t say that one may in a place of mitzva, only the “doing your affairs,” because the matter is the object of prohibition.

Allocating Charity to the Poor

Speaker 1:

Okay. Like allocating charity. Allocating charity to the poor, we learned yesterday that one may not give any gift on Shabbos, because it’s a matter of commerce, it’s a type of financial exchange. Here too, here would apparently be a matter of commerce, but allocating means only one says to. But because it’s charity there’s the thing of saying to the Most High is like giving to an ordinary person, as if one would now be transferring to him.

Speaker 2:

Right. It can be both. The two things are connected. One may not transfer, but it’s very good. Either way, one may not transfer, but giving charity to the poor one may indeed.

Discussion: Selling Aliyos on Shabbos

Speaker 1:

Right. I saw in the previous, there’s a dispute among the later authorities about selling aliyos on Shabbos. It’s apparently commerce. There are those who say it’s not real commerce, one can’t go to court over it. Perhaps yes? Or one can say that here there’s the leniency that for the sake of mitzva one may. But this is dependent on the inquiry, whether for the sake of mitzva is also actually permitted commerce. We’re only speaking that the topic of speech is permitted.

There are shuls where one conducts oneself to say, one doesn’t say dollars, one says one hundred thousand, ten thousand. What does it help? It’s very interesting, because one can truly see a place to forbid this selling of aliyos, because it’s much more than pledging charity to the poor, because it’s as if one is selling a product. One is selling charity, one says he gives charity. Here he’s buying shishi, he’s buying it, it’s actual commerce. But one sees that the custom of Israel is that even there one is lenient. I know that actually there one said a different language, I know.

Speaker 2:

Yes, but the language is only a topic of speech. On the contrary, it’s a trick that we say, the language is generally not the problem. You can speak of dollars as much as you want for the sake of mitzva. The problem is the selling. On that it doesn’t help that you say thousand instead of dollar. And the question is also later, when one makes the Mi Sheberach, “in merit that he pledged” such and such, the language is actually allocating. Yes, that’s certainly permitted. But it’s charity to the poor. But it’s for a shul. It’s a shul, it’s not for a poor person. It’s a bit of a stretch to say it’s a mitzva.

Speaker 1:

Yes. You’re asking a question. Hekdesh. But hekdesh is not permitted. It happens to be that it’s indeed a shul, and one needs now to consecrate it to something. Okay, I mean the next piece will perhaps speak about a shul. “And one may go to synagogues and study halls…” No, one needs strength. Yes, but not to pray, but let’s see. “And even… one may go either way to be engaged in communal affairs.” That is, although business dealings are forbidden, a person will think that going to meet politicians, speaking about the city, speaking about politics, is forbidden. But one may go, if the political rally is in a study hall, in a synagogue, and it’s speaking about this rabbi or that rabbi, or it’s speaking about gentiles, this politician and that politician, even if it’s in theaters, it doesn’t happen among gentiles, even in theaters or in palaces of gentiles where one must go, to oversee communal affairs on Shabbos, to be engaged in communal affairs. Although there’s also the matter of weekday-like activity, yes, one speaks about, let’s say, one speaks about business, but when one has already gone for the sake of the public, the community has gone, one may go.

Communal Affairs

It can be even melacha, one goes to fix the street, I don’t know what. One goes to make a meeting on Shabbos about, I don’t know, about safety of drivers during the week. Although it’s not a Shabbos-like thing, but it’s a matter of communal affairs. Whatever it is, I don’t know. To oversee doesn’t mean simply, the city council can meet, the planning board may meet on Shabbos in the study hall. There the Jews meet at shalosh seudos, they speak about how they’ll improve the mikva, I don’t know what, whatever. Mikva is anyway a mitzva, but for the sake of the public, even simply, the traffic lights should work better, other things.

We learned yesterday that one doesn’t consecrate on Shabbos, which also has a matter of acquisition. But one may indeed speak of matches. But here one speaks of improving the wells. But it’s more closely connected. Yes? It’s forbidden to consecrate, forbidden to give for consecration, but permitted. It’s forbidden to calculate calculations, forbidden to speak in commerce, but such types of acquisitions or such types of conversations one may indeed.

Arranging Matches for Children

“And one may arrange for children to be betrothed”, one may, the language is somewhat interesting. “One may arrange for children to be betrothed”. Are there children? Arranging means speaking. Yes, just as one consecrates without matchmaking, there is indeed a matter of a match, it’s an agreement. No, I mean, here, according to the languages, here the language as you say, the language that we saw, as I said, it says in Rabbeinu Avraham ben HaRambam “consecrates with language of discussion,” discussion means talking, discussing.

Halacha 24 (Continuation) – Arranging for a Girl to be Betrothed, Visiting the Sick and Comforting Mourners on Shabbos

Explanation of “Arranging for a Girl to be Betrothed”

Speaker 1:

The language is somewhat interesting. “Arranging for a girl to be betrothed”. The father goes to shul and he says that there’s a girl in court. No, not there’s a girl. “Arranging” means speaking.

“Arranging” means speaking? Yes, just as “consecrates with language of matchmaking.” What is a match? What we call a match? A match means an agreement? No, I mean that here, according to the opinions, here the language, just as the same thing the language that we saw, as I said, it says in Mareh HaPanim that one consecrates with language of matchmaking, “matchmaking” means talking. One may talk, discuss that one will have a wedding, one will be betrothed, consecrated.

So “arranging,” I mean that the word “arranging” applies to all the things afterwards. One may make plans, be engaged between people. Just so one may sit together a few activists, I know, “for a girl to be betrothed,” to arrange a match, because a child. He may be engaged because a child to teach him a book, he may discuss on Shabbos with a teacher who should learn with the child. Or even to teach him a craft, he may speak with someone about teaching his son computers, which is a weekday thing. This comes into this matter because there’s an obligation on a father to teach his son a craft.

This is a mitzva, simply the mitzva of a father for his child is to teach him either a book, that is Torah, and also to give a profession.

Visiting the Sick and Comforting Mourners – Distress on Shabbos

Speaker 1:

And visiting the sick and comforting mourners

On Shabbos one may not be occupied with things that involve distress. Have we already had this clear? We haven’t yet had it clear, but we already know that one may not… On Shabbos it was nullified, we learned in Hilchos Tefillah, on Shabbos one does not occupy oneself with troubles. On Shabbos one does not occupy… The Rav does not stand up on Shabbos to recount all the troubles that exist in the world, that one should pray about them, because that will bring in distress. But that doesn’t mean that the mitzvos of chesed are not still there. Visiting the sick, one must indeed go visit a sick person, and one indeed comforts a mourner. Even on Shabbos, the mourner doesn’t sit shiva, one doesn’t perform public mourning practices on Shabbos, but one may comfort. One sees that he is a broken Jew, one comforts him.

Discussion: Mourning on Shabbos

Speaker 2:

Who says one doesn’t sit shiva on Shabbos?

Speaker 1:

One sits, one doesn’t observe public mourning practices. But sitting shiva one does sit. That means that he is a mourner. One goes to see him at home, one comforts him. I have never yet seen anyone comfort mourners on Shabbos, because there is a text for comforting mourners, one doesn’t say “Hamakom.” One doesn’t say it on Shabbos. But here one sees that yes, but the person is in mourning, Shabbos is still a meal of Shabbos.

I think that comforting mourners here doesn’t mean the mitzvah that one goes to say “Hamakom yenachem eschem.” No one has ever been comforted by that in the history of comforting mourners. That is a mitzvah, but the main thing is being there. In any case, I think it’s a strengthening for people – I haven’t spoken with many mourners – that he is not alone in his days of mourning. Everyone who has a connection with him comes over. But here comforting mourners doesn’t have to mean the form that one sits low. No, comforting mourners can also mean he speaks to a broken person, I comfort a person who is sad. On Shabbos he is also sad, and if one comes to him on Shabbos one does the mitzvah of comforting mourners.

Speaker 2:

It is said that one doesn’t say it.

Speaker 1:

People know, it’s not instituted, I don’t know why. I mean, there are places where on Shabbos mourners come to shul and one says “Hamakom yenachem” – not more critical places.

Speaker 2:

But do you know about this?

Speaker 1:

Well, but I mean to say that the comforting mourners of Shabbos doesn’t have to be the saying, but the comforting mourners is not that. A person comes who is in the midst of his days of mourning, you bring him close and you gladden him, that is the manner of comforting mourners on Shabbos. Because on Shabbos there is indeed a custom that one doesn’t perform mourning practices, but he is sad and you do the mitzvah of comforting mourners.

It’s the same comforting mourners on Shabbos, it doesn’t mean something different than the whole week, except for what… no, let me explain better. A person can either he has some friend who is very depressed lately, he can go spend time with him, or he can go to some shiva house to comfort someone whose sister passed away. The first is a mitzvah d’oraisa, that means true comforting mourners, comforting a person who is sad. The second is a custom, a custom that after a person is a mourner one does such a form of custom. So even if one doesn’t do the form of custom of comforting mourners, but there is something called the mitzvah of chesed.

Discussion: Custom vs. Mitzvah D’oraisa

Speaker 2:

But that’s exactly what I come to argue about. First of all, I don’t know what you mean, it’s not a custom to go sit by the mourner. It’s a social thing, it’s comforting, that’s how one comforts, it’s an order. It’s not asked, the people come. So they come, and when comforting mourners means that, it doesn’t mean the other thing you’re saying. Actually, all comforting mourners means what you’re saying in the first case. That’s why one comes, in order to provide for him, one is with him. But there are many people, it becomes such an order, it’s like that. One says some verse because it’s written on a card, one doesn’t have to say it, one fulfills it without saying that verse also, not the words. But the main comforting mourners, that means the normal comforting, goes on Shabbos also. Mourners don’t sit, you say that one doesn’t say shiva on Shabbos, that’s not true, on Shabbos one doesn’t conduct mourning practices, Shabbos overrides all the… but you say public mourning, he doesn’t sit on a low bench, but there’s no difference, one comes in and says to him “Hamakom yenachem,” exactly like during the week.

And you say that there are places where there is literally such a custom that on Shabbos in shul, when the mourners come to shul, one says “Hamakom yenachem.” I think it’s even brought in the Shulchan Aruch or in the books of customs. We think, as you say, we think that comforting mourners is some formal thing, that if he’s not sitting I can’t do comforting mourners. One can very well. You know that someone is sitting shiva, you can go to him on Shabbos, and one fulfills it. He should be happy also, also not.

Speaker 1:

At the same time I also want to say, that when one doesn’t say the specific verse, and one is simply nice to him because one knows that he is now in his days of mourning, one has also fulfilled comforting mourners. Because the plain meaning of comforting mourners doesn’t mean to say a certain verse, it means to comfort a person who is a mourner. It doesn’t mean comfort, it means indeed to go to his house, and I don’t know whatever one does.

Digression: Formality vs. Reality of Comforting Mourners

Speaker 1:

I have some side agenda. Often there is a person who died, and he had a very close friend, who is literally his closest friend, no one looks at him. He has some sister who came the day before from Eretz Yisrael, because that’s the halacha. So seemingly to accept the custom-law, the sister is a mourner, and the friend is not. But if someone goes to comfort the friend, he will do the mitzvah of comforting mourners d’oraisa even more than he comforts the sister who is not really sad. But that’s not relevant, those are the laws about mourners.

Speaker 2:

But what is there sad?

Speaker 1:

Anyway, why should he be sad? You understand what I mean to bring out, to take out from the formality to the reality of the… be well, continue.

Speaker 2:

True, true. Here it also says this, but what do I say? Yes.

Visiting the sick on Shabbos – “Shabbos hi milizo’ok”

Speaker 1:

Further the Rambam now says, one goes to visit a sick person on Shabbos, he does the mitzvah. But usually when one goes to visit a sick person in the middle of the week, what would the person have done? He would have prayed with the sick person, or he would have listened to the details of his troubles, that’s the manner. But on Shabbos there is indeed a concept that one should not be occupied with asking for needs on Shabbos, one should do the mitzvah differently. “And so one who visits the sick says to him Shabbos hi milizo’ok, Shabbos is not a day that one cries out, u’refuah kerovah lavo, and the healing will soon come.” It must be a manner that the form of visiting the sick should look different on Shabbos. I would say it’s also more of a recommendation, because if the sick person is indeed one who is crying now and he’s screaming and you need to listen to him, the mitzvah of visiting the sick will indeed be to… Here one can also come to the formality. There is a formal way how one usually goes, one would have said a chapter of Tehillim, one would have said the long prayer for healing, and now one says the short version Shabbos hi milizo’ok. If you want to say it not formally, you can translate this into the broader conversation. The conversation on Shabbos goes more in the way of strengthening, on Shabbos one doesn’t cry out, on Shabbos a healing will come, instead of “Oy, Ribono shel Olam, help already.” You can say it, both can work the same thing.

We already learned, as you say, we already learned in Hilchos Tefillah the law that one doesn’t cry out on Shabbos. That’s why indeed the Mi Sheberach that one makes in the beis midrash, afterwards one still says Shabbos hi milizo’ok. It’s a bit funny, because it means one doesn’t say any Mi Sheberach, one only says Shabbos hi milizo’ok. The Baal HaTanya actually leaves out the entire text of Mi Sheberach “Mi sheberach avoseinu yevarech es hacholeh,” and he says immediately Shabbos hi milizo’ok, because the long version is indeed crying out. Of course, if there is a sick person who is in danger, we learned one may indeed pray on Shabbos.

Discussion: Prayer for the sick

Speaker 2:

And further, what else does one do? You should know that it agrees with the Rambam in Hilchos Talmud Torah, I don’t know about saying a verse for the sick person.

Speaker 1:

Ah, it’s not… we’re talking here about prayer, we’re talking here about prayer.

Preparing for a mitzvah – needs of a bride and needs of a deceased

Speaker 1:

One may prepare initially, we learned earlier that one may not go to the edge of the techum on Shabbos in order to be able to go out immediately after Shabbos for weekday matters. But one may indeed, for example, a groom or a bride, he is waiting for the bride’s dress to arrive, or for a deceased person, and an aron and shrouds. And one says to him, one may say to a worker or to whom, go to such and such a place.

Speaker 2:

“To him” means to a non-Jew? If one does it through a non-Jew?

Speaker 1:

I think one says one to the other, tomorrow, he’s talking about tomorrow. Or one may do the weekday matter for a bride or for a deceased, or to bring additions from there, or to bring from such and such a place, or to bring additions of a maneh, or to bring finishers. But Rebbi says, that he should not mention to him the sum of the purchase. It means, one permitted for a mitzvah matter, but also still one should… ah, that’s it, not say the sum of the purchase. It remains indeed more forbidden, some such thing. Not a number, buy for two hundred dollars. I think that’s why the custom when selling the aliyos one doesn’t say the amount. He says ten thousand instead of a thousand, because he doesn’t say the sum of the purchase. But when one decides on tzedakah one indeed certainly speaks of a sum, because one says, so-and-so gave a thousand dollars for the appeal. And there one doesn’t say not to mention value.

Conclusion – “Your affairs are forbidden but Heavenly affairs are permitted”

Speaker 1:

He says that the Rambam, the conclusion, is on all these things that we just learned. All these and similar things, all these things, even to run for a mitzvah matter, a well and similar, all these things, it is a mitzvah for him, as it says “me’asos chaftzecha.” Chaftzecha, that’s what you desire, are forbidden, but chaftzei shamayim, that’s Heavenly matters, are permitted.

I see here he brings down, that later… there is a question, how does one comfort mourners on Shabbos? Must one say a similar thing, like “Shabbos hi milnachem,” some such thing. And the Darchei Shalom says that one conducts that one doesn’t comfort mourners on Shabbos by us. Anyway, there is what it says.

Well, we’re flying, but the foundation is the same thing. What is the plain meaning of the permission “me’asos chaftzecha”? One can learn further on both our ways. It’s not decisive, it’s only a precision in the verse. But it’s interesting, the Chazal permitted here, but there are still the small limitations of not saying the sum, or only saying “Shabbos hi milizo’ok” versus really groaning along.

Digression: Strengthening on Shabbos vs. during the week

Speaker 1:

But it seems to me from the matter of the sick person, that in the middle of the week one should not go with the approach of “Shabbos hi milizo’ok,” because there are people who when someone is sad one says, it will be good. I say to that that it’s terrible, and one says it’s a quick act of Rabbi Elimelech Biderman, because one doesn’t want the time to come in, that’s good for Shabbos. But in the middle of the week one must hear his time, put into his time. Again, the reason why people say strengthening is because they, he doesn’t renew for you, he asks himself, it’s hard for him to be with time, so he says strengthening, understand? He quickly pushes away from there. True, on Shabbos it’s true, on Shabbos one doesn’t want to despair, so one indeed says so. But during the week is indeed as you say, it’s indeed a mitzvah to despair in a measured way.

Chapter 24, Law 12 – Reasons for the prohibition of carrying/muktzeh (continued)

The Rambam’s three reasons for the prohibition of carrying

Speaker 1:

Because the Sages didn’t want Shabbos to look like the weekdays. And the prophets, and the Rambam explains, he even adds, because there is even a danger from this. Because on Shabbos one doesn’t do any melacha, one doesn’t go to work, a person will say, “Ah, today is a good day to organize my garage.” He will be busy every Shabbos, what is there like Sussex Boy, and the Torah says indeed “lema’an yanuach”, so he won’t have any rest on Shabbos.

“Lema’an yanuach” – reason, not mitzvah

But again, the whole piece of “lema’an yanuach” doesn’t really fall out, because he already said enough that it’s a kal vachomer from “vedaber davar”. Right, but I think the prophet itself is “lema’an yanuach.” Why does he say it here specifically? Why doesn’t he say as an explanation for the prophet right when he says, the “lema’an yanuach” also goes up on speech and walking also? Perhaps when speech is not relevant. I want to tell you that it’s harder than speech and walking. Because speech won’t make “she’lo yanuach,” but if he will be carrying he won’t rest at all. It could be that speech is also because it’s like a fence for “lema’an yanuach,” but it’s even further. And here you’re even closer, it’s literally “lema’an yanuach.”

I would say perhaps an approach like this: that it says in the Torah “lema’an yanuach.” So someone will say, “lema’an yanuach”? Obviously one may not carry. Someone will ask, isn’t it true that “lema’an yanuach” only goes on the 39 melachos? Why all other things may one not? He will say, “No, you see that the prophets forbade more than the 39 melachos for the reason, that it should look Shabbos-like.” So you see that “lema’an yanuach” is broader than the 39 melachos.

Right, but it’s still not d’oraisa. “Lema’an yanuach” still doesn’t mean that it’s a prohibition d’oraisa. It’s still not d’oraisa. “Lema’an yanuach” from the Torah only goes on the 39 melachos. But you see that the Torah wants one to rest, the reason why the 39 melachos are forbidden is so that one should have rest. So the act is not forbidden mid’oraisa, but the reason for the matter is d’oraisa. The picture of the matter is that the Torah wants Shabbos to be a different kind of day. And you see that even that Yeshayahu Hanavi learned the verse this way, Yeshayahu Hanavi understood that “lema’an yanuach” is not only the narrow meaning of the 39 melachos, he added speech and other things that it shouldn’t look like, one should see that the rest, the rest should be visible. So certainly one can add carrying also. One doesn’t need any… I don’t know why he says that word “visible.” I don’t know where it says. One accepts three. I don’t mean specifically that word “visible,” but…

Discussion: “Lema’an yanuach” – reason for muktzeh, not for shevus

Speaker 2:

The Rambam says later shevus and nikeris, but that’s another thing.

Speaker 1:

You’re putting… I’m still at the first reason. I think that yes, but one must only mention that we remember, we spoke at the beginning of Hilchos Shabbos, the Rambam, what the Rambam wrote that “tishbosu” means that he should not do all these labors, not nullify the rest. And the Rambam said that this means rest. One sees from the Rambam that no, rest is certainly a general rest, but it’s more similar to melacha or resembling melacha. “Lema’an yanuach” is a reason for the prohibition of muktzeh, not for the prohibition of shevus. Indeed “lema’an yanuach” is a two… first thing, first difference between Rambam and Ramban. And the second difference is that the Rambam doesn’t say that it’s a mitzvah to rest on Shabbos. Rest is indeed a mitzvah, and perhaps here like what the Rabbis call shevus, is an obligation of that. But “lema’an yanuach” is not a mitzvah, rather it’s the reason. That means, the Torah wants one to rest on Shabbos. Although the Torah didn’t command to rest on Shabbos, if someone finds some way, he doesn’t transgress the Torah, but one sees that the intention, the reason, is “lema’an yanuach.” And regarding this reason the prophets and the Sages added the prohibition of carrying. Right?

The second reason – he will come to do melacha

“Furthermore,” says the Rambam, “there is another reason for the prohibition of carrying. That when he will inspect and carry vessels whose work is for prohibition,” he inspects and touches the vessels whose work is for prohibition, he is very close, as part of the inspection, he wants to check the whatever, the drill works, he will quickly give it a turn on. First he is occupied with them a lot, he will come to do melacha.

The third reason – recognizable rest for everyone

English Translation

“And furthermore,” says the Rambam a third reason, “perhaps one of the craftsmen who are idle all their days will go out.” There are people, a portion of the nation, who are not craftsmen and are idle all their days, “such as the idlers and those who sit on street corners,” whom the Rambam says are enjoying themselves all their days. The only hard work they have is there in Sefer Nashim that the idlers and those who sit on street corners must do every day. “For all their days they do no work,” they do nothing. “And if it were permitted to walk and speak and carry as on other days,” if one would be allowed to walk, speak, and carry as on other days, “it would turn out that he did not rest a recognizable rest.” One would not see upon him that he is resting. The hard workers, one sees that they don’t work on Shabbos, but the respectable Jew, the distinguished talmid chacham, one doesn’t see any rest upon him. Therefore, rest from speech and carrying is a rest that is equal for every person. The Sages said that there must also be a rest that is visible by everyone.

In other words, he also says that there is a prohibition for the craftsman. Yes, he has another reason. But the Rambam adds a third reason, that there is a person who does work all week. Certainly in truth Shabbos is different, but one needs Shabbos to be different from the entire week. If someone who is a kollel young man, he also does mitzvos on Shabbos, he doesn’t have, one doesn’t recognize any difference between Shabbos and the entire week. Why must there be a recognizable rest? Also because it says “so that he may rest.” He doesn’t say why, but it’s somehow obvious that Shabbos is different from the entire week. It cannot be that Shabbos is basically the same. Ah, a question arises, what will be with the people who don’t work? Do you know what is the essence of their work? So, in carrying is essentially the main Shabbos for the people who don’t work, because that is the entire difference that he makes Shabbos different from the entire week.

As I once told my friend, he said, “How do you know there’s a difference between Shabbos and Yom Tov?” On Shabbos one puts the coffee into the hot water, and on Yom Tov one puts the hot water into the coffee. That is the recognizable difference. So, if one doesn’t do any work, that is the main thing. But you’ve seen very clearly that all three reasons are not only on muktzeh, but also on “walking and speaking.”

All Three Reasons Apply to Everything the Sages Added

So, he comes back again to Yeshayahu, that Yeshayahu had all three things in mind. Perhaps the second is not clear, “from finding your needs,” but it could be, because the first and the last are relevant to everyone, and the middle one is specifically on carrying, so the Rambam’s order is a bit difficult. Nevertheless it fits because he says, “Apparently he wants to say this, that this is all still one thing that is essentially included in the words of Yeshayahu, although it doesn’t say there ‘to carry,’ but the Sages understood that this was also so.”

“They Practiced Not to Carry” — Levels Upon Levels

He says, “And from these matters they practiced not to carry…” they spoke. I mean “they practiced not to carry” he means to say this, because in carrying there were levels upon levels. First they had forbidden everything. The Rambam says that it is relevant, meaning the entire topic of carrying, and in carrying there are several phases. The entire topic of carrying begins with this.

Discussion: What Does “Relevant” Mean?

Speaker 2:

The Rambam says relevant, both. Let’s talk about this in a minute. When the Rambam says by Nechemiah they forbade everything… wait, wait, it says thus, “they returned and permitted.” The Rambam doesn’t say it, but it could be that he says the word “relevant” because it happens to be from that. Wait me a second.

Speaker 1:

I would say that “relevant” means that it’s not stated. It’s not really a proof, it’s a reasoning. It’s not that carrying is stated here. By the Rambam one must remember that there’s a great difference from something that one can speak of the scent of the matter, which the Ramban takes seriously. By the Rambam however it says. If it’s relevant, it means, this makes me think that one must make such a thing. There’s no source in me for this. It’s about the reasoning, it comes relevant, as opposed to how we see “for what reason,” there’s no source. It’s only like a touch, there’s a thought, like the scent of a journey, so one should say smelling.

The General Rule of Carrying — “Vessels That Are Needed”

“And they forbade carrying except vessels that are needed for them,” which is very important. As the Rambam says that there is a prohibition to carry, the general rule of carrying is that one doesn’t carry any vessel except what one needs on Shabbos. Not only that there is a list of things that are not, but you essentially have a list of things that you may yes, “a thing that is needed for them.” We will see in the next chapter more clearly. This must be the last three reasons is really interesting, the language of the Rambam and the way he sets it out.

The Raavad’s Objection — The Reason from the Gemara

The Raavad says that there is another giant, and it says in the Gemara explicitly that carrying is “for the need of spreading,” that carrying is a fence for hotza’ah. Says the Raavad, in the Gemara it says this, and the Maggid Mishneh and all the commentators here are amazed that the Rambam has… the Maggid Mishneh is, “Our teacher wrote here correct reasons,” the Rambam wrote here very beautiful reasons, “from his own mind and they are not mentioned in the Gemara.” How did the Rambam make an entire beautiful story about carrying, and in the Gemara it doesn’t say anything at all? And the Raavad already brings what it does say in the Gemara.

The Maggid Mishneh’s Answer — Nechemiah’s Enactment Is Nullified

The Maggid Mishneh argues what you wanted to say, that what it says in the Gemara about carrying, that is only when Nechemiah’s was the original enactment. But essentially that is already nullified, because they already changed it. Therefore one must say that the Rambam gave a new reason for carrying, which has more to do with the broader idea of Shabbos, “so that he may rest.” All the reasons that he says. And it is certain that it comes out from this verse, because that is the topic of this chapter, your needs, and speaking a word, etc.

So basically, I mean that all three reasons are so relevant to everything that the Sages added.

Discussion: Why Does the Rambam Bring Reasons?

Speaker 2:

What does it mean the Sages added?

Speaker 1:

To all that from Yeshayahu and further. Yes, yes.

Speaker 2:

Yes. It’s interesting that the Rambam has the idea that one can sometimes say his own reasons. In general, why must he say reasons? He can simply say that the Sages don’t allow.

Speaker 1:

It has to do with the fact that the Rambam essentially wants his book to be built on the Chumash, he brings on each thing the verse. Here indeed he only has a verse from a prophet, but somehow it helps also. And it’s extremely interesting, because the Rambam is not accustomed to bringing a verse from the prophets to make a source for a prohibition. But here he makes it as if Yeshayahu the prophet already has a communication with the Torah. Yeshayahu the prophet comes after it says “so that he may rest” and the mentioned rests. That is, when a prophet says something new that is not included at all in the Torah, the Rambam would not have brought it here. But Yeshayahu speaks from here about the prohibition of Shabbos, and Yeshayahu the prophet also already thinks about the “so that he may rest.” As if the Rambam puts in here that Yeshayahu is the sage who thinks about all these things.

Speaker 2:

Yeshayahu is simply one of the sources. Interesting.

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Speaker 1:

Okay, until here chapter 24. We are in chapter 25.