Lo Sachmod is the Midda for Lo Tignov Tirtzach Tinaf Taane – Transcript

Authentic vs. False Interiority: The Relationship Between Inner Virtue and Outward Action

I. Opening and Technical Setup

Instructor: Yeah, so now we’re having a sheet there. You go with my microphone on, I hope so. Can’t see from here. I hope that it’s on. So yeah, it’s doing the green up and down, my green voice thing.

Student: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Instructor: And with there you have to see also. Okay, it’s got up and down the right under the platter.

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II. Recap of Previous Week’s Topic: Fake vs. Real Pnimiyus [Internality]

Instructor: Okay, so last week we finished off Noysek B’FonKluli [noyse klali: general subject]. The first half of last week’s shiur [Torah lecture] was about the chiluk [distinction] between fake—what I call fake, but maybe other people are old of it—and real internality, internalism, pnimius [pnimiyus: internality/inwardness]. Right? What was the fake version? Fake version is a kind of internality. How do you say pnimius [pnimiyus]? That ends inside. Yeah, interiority is a better word. Interiority. That interior designers know there’s some of the interior design is of the human being.

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III. Illustrative Analogy: Jewish vs. Non-Jewish Houses

Instructor: And then there’s other Yidden [Jews]. You know what they’re thinking between a Goyish [non-Jewish] house and a Yiddish [Jewish] house? What’s it looking like? You live here in Lakewood, in Howell? What’s it looking like between a Goyish house and a Yiddish house? How do you know if a house is Yiddish or Goyish? You pass by. Firstly, you can see which Yiddish have certain cars. No lights. Goyish don’t have lights inside. But they have a lot of lights outside. You notice?

Student: Yeah, that’s true.

The Non-Jewish House Pattern

Instructor: Well, I think literally a Goyish house, American Goyim [non-Jews]—the Mexican going to have a different monogamy, but the American going to the Dominican—the outside of the house is beautiful. It’s very taken care of. There’s nice furniture, there’s lights, there’s grass is groomed, and all of that. But it’s light. They put in money and a nice facade and all of that. Something called curb appeal by the real estate agents.

And then you walk inside and like the kitchen is like piles of rice cakes on the counter, and their toaster is kept on the counter, and also the hot water machine, and also the coffee for the next four weeks. Four weeks they keep everything out and it’s a big huge mess, basically. Or maybe in their head it’s not a mess, but to me it looks amazing. It’s also dark. I say the style of keeping everything out, like yeah, and there’s dots on the wall, the spoons around the counter, like and so on. So the inside is not so nice.

The Jewish House Pattern

Instructor: And you get the house from the outside looks like a Harvard. There’s like a broken car in the front if you’re a Jewish, and there’s grass is not caught, and the there’s like broken bikes that the kids might have used last year still. And where you live is also like that.

And you come inside and the sputle [spotless] is the floor. Nothing is out of place. The counters are all clean, like pure surfaces. A lot of lights always. That’s the chiluk [distinction].

Explanation of the Pattern

Instructor: And that’s why is it that? Because in Golus [galus: exile], the Yidden [Jews] don’t care about the external, because we know who cares? It’s for the Goy [non-Jew] that’s going to watch.

Supporting Anecdote

Instructor: You know, the guy—there was a Yid [Jew] that the Gevir [wealthy person] from Stut was passing around with his new stramo [shtreimel: fur hat worn by Hasidic Jews], and the Schlepper [poor person] said, “I think you should have made it a little different over there.” And I was like, “Who are you? Could you see your stramo when you wear it?” “No.” “So it’s for me. I’m giving you my criticism. I think it should have been…”

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IV. The Problem with Excessive Internalism

The Risk of Self-Reinforcing Internal Loops

Instructor: So the Kitzit [in short], the Eden [Jews], got very into this idea of internalism or interiority, which is very important. What we say the and everything. But the Meise [ma’aseh: deed/action], not so simple. It’s very easy to get into little self-reinforcing loops, like internal loops with all of these things. And one of the problems with being too internal is that you get in Kavanah [intention], right?

The Kavanah Framework

Instructor: We have this word Kavanah. There’s Kavanah and Maisa [ma’aseh: action]. Kavanah is the inside. There’s Kavanah as the inside, and Maisa, or words, are the outside, right?

The Core Problem Identified

Instructor: Now what happens is that you get a concept of Kavanah, or of inside, intention or interiority, which is not directed towards anything but itself. This might be a very good thing for a certain other level of ethics which we’re not discussing in this class yet. But you have to remember with the victim a part that we said last week is that most of the time now we learn Rambam [Maimonides] talks a lot about the internal. That we talk about Midas [middos: character traits]. We have this big lot that says it’s not enough to do correct actions, you have to also be a good person, right? Which is something internal.

The Misinterpretation

Instructor: People think that this means something that ends by the internal, an internal that is focused upon itself. It’s somehow self-recursive thought, like looking a mirror you see thousand mirrors. It keeps on really telling you the same thing, just getting smaller and smaller.

Concrete Example of False Internality

Instructor: And therefore people think, “I’m a good person.” What do you mean you’re a good person? “Well, I don’t help anyone, but I feel very much for that pain. I have a lot of empathy.” Sometimes they’re also words. Like, “I’m not going to actually give you a dollar, but like, yeah, I feel so bad for you.”

Brief Historical Note

Student: I think the dynamic comes… That might be a goal, I think, because it comes from… Because you don’t have money. A different… A different path to the Jewish religion, not the Jewish religion.

Instructor: Mm. We can talk about that, but that’s another whole… It’s more… I’m going to give you a little bit of history about this, but I think something’s going on. But there’s a lot… There’s a lot… This is a very serious question. It’s very deep. There’s also a correct way of having that, which I… We also said that’s also a level.

Student: Yeah, yeah, I know.

Instructor: I don’t want to make fun of it. I just want to say, in certain contexts, at least, it’s totally useless. And therefore, it’s important to disambiguate when we talk about this thing. It’s very important.

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V. The Correct Understanding of Middos: Action-Oriented Interiority

Central Clarification

Instructor: We’re not talking about actions. We’re talking about midas [middos], about something internal. But what our main part was to say, to clarify, that this does not mean wanting, not mean something that is focused. The intention is not towards itself, not towards having the correct feelings towards you or something like that, but it’s about having the correct intention, the correct feeling, the correct emotion towards the action.

The Definition Principle

Instructor: So we say, for example, we’re going to get into all the list of virtues, the list of good midas [middos]. You have to understand that what defines the good midas is always an action. It’s never an internal feeling. But the mida [middah: character trait] consists of an internal feeling, of an internal habit, of an internal disposition to choose, as we’ve discussed last week’s, right?

Example: Generosity

Instructor: So for like the middle of the correct amount of—how does he call it—the generosity, the liberality, the correct amount of giving is a middle which is about the outside. It’s not about itself, right? Someone who says, “I’m a generous person on the inside, but I don’t actually help many people, don’t give much”—there is only one way in which that can be somewhat true, and even then it’s only halfway through.

The One Valid Exception

Instructor: It can only be somewhat true in the sense where maybe you’re very generous, but you have no possessions, or you have no money, or you have no capacities to share with anyone. Then you could say, “Well, I’m as good as I can be, but I need some external tools with which to be generous.” And even then, couldn’t tell, at least, you’re not really generous. You’re only potentially generous. But then you could say maybe you’re a good person.

The Love-Action Connection

Instructor: But besides for that, it never means something like having the correct feelings. It only means the correct—you have to have the correct feelings, but what the definition of those feelings is—the loving that generosity is not “I want to give you,” it’s “I love to give.” That’s all point of it, right? That’s why if someone says, “I love to—I’m generous,” and he doesn’t act generous, generously—lying. He’s not just like—it’s not possible to have a conflict between mid [middah] and a—I mean, there could be a conflict, but it’s not the way we imagine it usually.

Rejecting the Common Excuse

Instructor: It’s not like I say, “I haven’t you good on the inside, I just have some yetzer hara [evil inclination] that can makes me not do it.” That doesn’t really make sense, or less there’s some cases where there are—there is ways of explaining this.

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VI. Interactive Discussion: The Inside-Outside Relationship

The Reverse Case: Action Without Feeling

Instructor: But it could be the other way around also, where the guy just gives, gives, yes, but inside he’s for sure, right? That’s that’s the normal case, because we talk about educating yourself. When you start giving, you don’t feel anything. You don’t like it. You start doing it, and then you like it. You train yourself. So there is such a case, of course. But still, the liking is…

Student’s Confusion About the Asymmetry

Student: Why me, vice versa? Not really. That you want to do it, but you don’t. I mean, other than, like you said, it’s not possible.

Instructor: There is that. There is another way. There is something else also, but we have to… We’ll get to that at some point, because this interaction was about in the past couple of weeks.

Student: Which is?

Instructor: This interaction between the two, which is something bad. It’s like me.

Student: Why? I’m trying to grasp it, and it’s slipping out of my grasp.

Instructor: Explain.

Student: I don’t know, because it’s 6 in the morning on the 8th. Like this. Like that. It wanted to be neat, and say, like, it’s a neat answer. Bad. It’s not so neat. But that, then that’s in the inside. If it’s real, automatically it’s the outside. But the outside, you could do the action without needing an inside, and that doesn’t have to be the case.

Instructor: What’s the problem?

The Motivation Question

Student: You’re acting as if. You’re acting as the good person would have acted. But what’s motivating that?

Instructor: Oh, that’s a good question.

Student: Like in that sense, could you say that you want to be that type of person?

Instructor: Yeah. Usually, the weird thing with this is usually the answer is something like education, external education.

Student: See, but what’s motivating the motivation? What’s motivating that? Is it that—is it that you actually love wanting to be that person? And when you say just—just push it back, it’s that? Or is it something else?

Instructor: No, usually it’s someone else telling you that. The reality—in reality, and I think also—yeah, in reality, when I say in reality, I first I meant like in reality in the books, and also in the reality in real life, that’s a good question. But someone else—can you always push back and just find another thing that you love? Like you love listening to authorities, so that’s why you’re doing it? Or you love…

[Class discussion continues, ending mid-thought]

VII. The Problem of Motivation in Virtuous Action

The Regression Question: What Really Motivates Good Actions?

Instructor: What’s the problem? You’re acting as if—you’re acting as the good person would have acted. But what’s motivating that?

Student: Oh, that’s a good question. Like in that sense, could you say that you want to be that type of person?

Instructor: Yeah, usually the weird thing with this is, usually the answer is something like education, external education. See, but what’s motivating that? Like, shelo lishmah [not for its own sake]. What’s motivating that? Is it that you actually love wanting to be that person, and when you say it, just push it back a step? Or is it something else?

No, usually it’s someone else telling you. That’s the reality. In reality, and I think also, yeah, in reality, when I say in reality, I first meant, like, in reality in the books, and also in the reality in real life.

Student: But what if you can listen to that someone else?

Instructor: Well, that’s a good question. But someone else…

Student: Can you always push back and just find another thing that you love? Like, you love listening to authorities? So that’s why you’re doing it? Or you love trying to be that type of person, even not yet that type of person?

The Foundation: Pleasure and Pain as the Basis of Education

Instructor: I mean, in some sense, you could push things back in the sense of everyone knows, even education starts with the love of some, namely the love of pleasure and the aversion of pain. Education educates by pleasure and pain. So everyone likes pleasure. Pleasure is just a word for what we like, in some sense. Not entirely, but in some sense.

Therefore, when we educate you, and also when you educate yourself, maybe, but definitely the primary case of education is when someone else educates you, then they’re going to give you prizes and promise you rewards and threaten you with punishments for doing the correct thing. Then you’re going to start doing them for the wrong reason, right?

Reframing the Distinction: The “For” Behind the Action

You see another way of defining having them in the being of the person versus not being is the reason you’re doing it, the “for,” right? The good person does the good for the good reasons, which is that he loves the good, which is the good reason. The bad person which does good things does good things but for the wrong reason.

That’s called in our tradition precisely this, right? If you give tzedakah [charity] because you want to have honor, then you’re doing the right thing but for the wrong reason. So you’re not really a tzedakah giver, you’re really an honor looker for.

The Transformation Process: How Wrong Reasons Become Right

And slowly you’re going to start liking the gift. Yes, this is what I discussed a few times here. It’s good, it’s good to do that, because you don’t actually stay with the honor for the most part. It moves a little bit, almost for everyone, because of how education works, because of the power of habits, because people tend to like what they are used to.

And also because you start seeing the good in it. Because how do you see the good? Seeing the good is an experience. How are you going to see that it’s good to give? Like you never saw giving. You can see it by someone else or you can see it by yourself. And you see how it is to give, and you start seeing that it’s good, and then you start liking it. Does that make sense?

VIII. Transition to Specifics – The Case of Lo Tachmod

Instructor: So now, what I want to do a little bit today—this is all the things that we already know, or hopefully already know. I wonder how much it helps in reality, but we already know these things. What we have to do today is talk a little bit about some specifics.

Specifics, that’s really the next part of the course. Never ending course.

Student: No, it’s not never ending. Never ending is only the eternal.

Instructor: You’re supposed to be up to see this, like I told you.

Student: What? Like according to the banks, my guy, what do you mean supposed to go back? I see this in Shevat HaKadokim [unclear reference]. The fact that I see this goes…

Instructor: Okay, okay. So we’re supposed to have to—why? I’m not sure you’re predicting. I don’t know. I don’t remember. You were very ambitious then. Not sure. I’m not sure I remember what you mean.

But what I want to tell you is that we have to get into specifics. So the next part of the course, also this is what we’re up to in Shevat HaKadokim, is going to be about working through some or all, or figuring out how to decide what are the some and the all of these good middos [character traits] and seeing what they are and how to get them. At least, maybe at least to judge the people that don’t have them. That would be more fun.

Introducing the Mitzvah: Lo Tachmod [Do Not Covet]

So, since this week was Parshas Yisro [the Torah portion of Yitro] and this week is Parshas Mishpatim [the Torah portion of Mishpatim], I’ve decided to talk a little bit about a certain mitzvah [commandment], maybe more than one mitzvah, but specifically one mitzvah that is seemingly a middah, a very explicit halakha [Jewish law], a very explicit mitzvah that is about an internal thing.

And I want to describe to you how there are different readings of it, some of which are entirely internal and they’re bad, according to me, and some of which have the correct understanding, which is an internal thing that is directed towards an external action. And then the internal becomes very important because the external is caused by it, but not because it’s caused by itself, not because it’s turned towards itself. That’s the discussion, but I will try to show you how complicated this is.

So, you know already what the mitzvah is, right? It’s the last one of the Ten Commandments. Lo Tachmod [Do not covet]. According to some people, the second, the two last ones, but for sure the last one. And the end of the Aseres HaDibros [the Ten Commandments], which is a great piece of law or literature or Musa [Moses], whatever you want to call it. Pretty nice shtickle [piece], right? Musa is not that bad.

Student: What? Musa is not that bad.

Instructor: As I said, this is a pretty nice shtickle. Many people have been quite impressed by it. Right?

IX. Digression – The Rabbinic Attitude Toward the Ten Commandments

Instructor: Not our ancient teachers, may their memory be blessed. They were not very impressed by it. They were kind of against being impressed by it, right?

Student: Aristotle you’re talking about? Who’s the ancient teachers that were not impressed by it?

Instructor: I’m sorry, I just stopped saying it. The Ten Commandments.

Student: No, exactly. What?

Instructor: The rabbis of the Mishnah and the Talmud were not impressed by the Ten Commandments. They did not make a big deal out of it. They even said that you should not, that it might have been a nice idea. Saba Pekarsim [the heretics] said that the main thing is the Ten Commandments. And they said it’s not. You should not make a big deal of it.

Whenever they say something like this, like apikorsim [heretics] say that, that means like there’s a good reason to think that, but it’s wrong. You could always say it’s just external, just because it’s like you. You can’t put it in tefillin [phylacteries]. Yosei Elkrief Elkrief [unclear reference]. Don’t read it. Don’t repeat it twice a day. Or don’t put it in your mezuzah [doorpost scroll], as others did.

Possible Explanations

Student: We could have a different interpretation of this, where it’s just totally political, like don’t wear the hat because they wear the hat. But it seems to me more that this is a real, a real opposition between some—you think it’s not just because it leads to an imbalance?

Instructor: Leads to?

Student: An imbalance. What do you mean?

Instructor: It means that, let’s say Shema [the central Jewish prayer] is very general, he doesn’t have this issue. When you get, when you elevate certain specific mitzvos, even if maybe they should be elevated, they’re automatically to get elevated too much at the expense of everything else. So it’s an imbalance of how, meaning they should be somewhat more.

Instructor: That’s what they said. That’s what they said. The rabbis that said this were opposed to making the mitzvos into a logical system. I think that this is very related. This is going to be another whole shiur [lecture], so I can’t get into it. Very related to people later, like Rabbi Yitzchak Abarbanel being opposed to Ikkarim [fundamental principles] and Ali Khamzaif [possibly Albo or another reference] and others.

Because there is a kind of rationalization, making sense of things. Like we have this whole Torah, it’s very big, it’s long, it’s five long books, relatively long books, and there’s six Sidrei Mishnah [orders of the Mishnah] and all of that. And what is this?

The Hillel and Shammai Story Reinterpreted

A ger [convert] once came to Hillel and Shammai and told them to teach him the whole Torah on one foot. And Shammai gave him the traditional answer: Get out of my life. That’s the traditional answer to someone who tells you, what is Judaism? Drop dead. What do you mean, what is Judaism? I don’t know. So I didn’t mismatch [study Mishnah] for 35 years. Maybe you’ll know. What is this all about? Right? Very traditional.

Hillel was nicer, so he said, you know what, I can speak to you in your language too. Judaism is about being good to your fellow man. But that was just him sort of acquiescing to that guy’s framing. It doesn’t mean that Hillel really thought that. It’s explicitly framed this story as Hillel being nicer. It’s not framed as Hillel having a better theology, right? There was just a different guy who was Hillel’s contemporary who did seriously think that. But that’s not what Hillel thought.

I think Hillel did exactly what Shammai did, just in a more diplomatic way. That’s what I think.

Student: No, Hillel did tell him something. There is some very important point that I’ve heard from my teacher about, what was his name? One of my living teachers.

The Critical Textual Point

Instructor: Basically, everyone said that Hillel said, the whole Torah is, and the rest is commentary. That’s what everyone says it says in English, but the Gemara [Talmud] doesn’t say that. It doesn’t say that.

Student: What does it say?

Instructor: No, I said, whatever.

Student: What does it say?

Instructor: Very good. And now for the rest. Come to the beis midrash [study hall] tomorrow. It doesn’t say, and then the rest is commentary.

So he didn’t say, go away from here. He said he did give him some kind of klal [general principle], but he didn’t say that the Torah consists of elaborating this klal, elaborating this generalization. What he said was that there is something simple I should tell you, you’ll finish with this. It’s more like I told you the story of the Skverer Rebbe [the Rebbe of Skver], that’s what you’re interpreting it, right? Skverer Rebbe, Chalane Levrocha Rebbeca Yosef Doris [unclear reference].

The Ten Commandments as Principles: Rabbinic Ambivalence and the Case of Lo Tachmod

I. Alternative Interpretations of the Hillel-Shammai Story

A. The Skverer Rebbe Analogy: Progressive Teaching Method

Instructor: And then the rest is commentary. So he didn’t say go away from here. He says he did give him some kind of clout, but he didn’t say that the Torah consists of elaborating this clout, elaborating this generalization. What he said was that there is something simple, I should tell you. We’ll finish with this. It’s more like I told you the story of the—

That’s what you’re interpreting it, right? Some students came to him. They heard that he’s a Chassidish rabbi, a real Chassidish rabbi. They wanted to know what Chassidus is. They said they’re going to write it up in their newspaper. So he said, well, first Chassidus is not reading newspapers. But then they said, okay, so we won’t write it in the newspaper. We’ll just really want to know. He said, no problem. Come to my office, I’ll tell you.

And he came and he told them, look, we have a tradition that we only teach you the second thing after you understand and internalize the first thing. So I’ll tell you the first lesson. When you finish understanding it and internalizing it, you’ll come back. I’ll continue. First lesson of Chassidus says that everything is השגחה פרטית [hashgachah pratis: divine providence]. Now, goodbye. Come back when you understood what am I saying.

That’s what Hillel said, right? The first lesson is like, love, don’t do what your friend does. You figured out this, come back. Let’s see. And the guy never came back. Okay.

B. Counter-Interpretation: Rejection of Ecstasy-Seeking

Student: I think the opposite. I think like this. This guy came to see some ecstasy.

Instructor: If you want to speak, you have to speak into the mic.

Student: I think what happened was, this guy was looking for ecstasy. Like a lot of people, right? When they become, they become like, they’re finding religion. They’re finding religion, yeah? So they come and they’re like, oh, whatever. They think this is the זך [zach: the essence], yeah? So they think like they caught God in a bottle. So they asked what’s this. So Shammai is like, you crazy or something? Get out of here. This is not our religion. We’re not into these CBGB’s, some ecstasy stuff. So then he went to Hillel and he told them the same thing. He answered exactly what I did, just in a much more diplomatic way. He said the most basic simple human thing.

Why is it kind of שוגר [sugar: strange/odd] that he’s all of a sudden turning into a Jew, like, what’s the דוהן געזיין [dohen gezein: what’s going on here]?

Instructor: Okay, okay. That’s a good question. But that would be your מעשה רב [ma’aseh rav: authoritative precedent]. Okay. Let’s move on. Point is, very nice Torah. Thank you. Shabbat shalom. Very nice Torah. Now if anyone else has a word to say, otherwise we can continue.

IV. Rabbinic Ambivalence Toward Systematic Principles

A. The Tension Between Generalization and Particularity

Instructor: What I was saying is that our rabbis were kind of opposed, our rabbis, some of them, later during, even in those, in ancient times, our rabbis that were doing this. But the rabbis of the, whose words were written down in the Mishnah and the Talmud, were not very big fans of doing this kind of rationalization, where you find, like, this is the one rule, everything follows from it. They were kind of opposed to it in many different ways.

Well, they did it, of course, but there’s no such thing as learning without doing that. That’s what understanding is, is finding generalizations and forms. But they were opposed to doing too much of it. And, by the way, our teacher Aristotle was also opposed to it. That’s why he was not so happy with certain Platonists. And that’s another שטיקל תורה [shtikel Torah: piece of Torah teaching] that I have, but that’s enough for now.

B. The עשרת הדברות [Aseres HaDibros: Ten Commandments] as Principles

Instructor: And therefore, עשרת הדברות [Aseres HaDibros] was understood very ancient times already as being some kind of ten generalizations, ten principles, right? There were kinds of principles actually in Greek, which is what all the Greeks are always looking for. And they said, these are the principles of the Torah. Everything else follows from them.

Our rabbis were like, nah, yeah, nice things, not against them. It might be very important. Principles? I don’t know. How about, how about knowing the exact amount of אמות [amos: cubits] that you have to put wheat from a vineyard from? Do you know that? It seems important. That’s the principle that everything else is built on. No, it’s important. It’s just as important.

C. The Danger of Over-Simplification

Instructor: So they were not fans of this. They were very afraid of people simplifying Judaism, like Zephyr said. Why do we have such long books? We could write a little small book called the Catholicism. How do they call it? The Catholic thing. This is what you’ve got to know to be a Jew. No, it doesn’t work like this. You’ve got to live a life. Of course, there are some principles, but you can’t make it into a principle. Sometimes you take it out of the life. That’s, I think, the real criticism.

It’s like someone says, what is the יסוד [yesod: foundation] of Chassidus? The יסוד of Chassidus is just to come every week to the Rebbe’s טיש [tish: Chassidic gathering], or whatever, to hang out. What is the teaching of Yitzchok Lohar? There’s no teaching of Yitzchok Lohar. I hope not. The teaching is you come every week to the שיעור [shi’ur: class]. And slowly you start having that kind of mind that understands things in that way, you start living that kind of life that lives that way, and so on.

There isn’t like a teaching which can be bottled in a bottle and sent down the ocean. Maybe someone will find it. That’s not how the Torah works. I think that that’s the main reason that they were opposed to this, because it’s like this, it turns into something that can be bottled into a little bottle, and then sent down along the ocean, and then someone finds it and creates a new religion because it’s based on the same principles, and you go there and you talk to the guy, and he’s doing all kinds of weird things. They’re like, what do you mean? What do you mean? I went with your principles. זה לא עובד ככה [zeh lo oved kacha: it doesn’t work like that]. That’s how I understand the position to principles.

V. Historical Development: The Ten Commandments as Systematic Framework

A. The Chumash’s Own Emphasis

Instructor: But what am I talking to you about now? Oh, but other people were very impressed by this עשרת הדברות [Aseres HaDibros], and they did think as principles. And obviously, the Chumash itself seems to think that, because what’s the point of this whole story? So, and it’s repeated twice. I mean, it seems to have been something like, I don’t think there’s even one other thing. I mean, there’s many repetitions in Mishnah Torah, but almost word for word repetition. There’s 20 words difference or something like that. There isn’t anything else like that. It’s obviously something seen as central already in the Chumash itself. Of course, in Tanakh it’s not mentioned even one more time. But anyways, in the Chumash it’s mentioned twice. So it seems to be important.

Now, this is their significance. I think that it’s important. In other words, I think it’s very nice. Very nice שטיקל תורה [shtikel Torah].

B. Philo of Alexandria as Originator

Student: And who was the first one to say that the עשרת הדברות [Aseres HaDibros] are the principles?

Instructor: I don’t know who was the first one to say. The first one to write that the עשרת הדברות are principles for all the mitzvos?

Student: Thank you very much. I’m before him.

Instructor: That’s what Rashi brings.

Student: Of course Rashi brings that.

Instructor: Before him was a Jew, not long before him. Centuries before him.

Student: Oh, that was not before עשרת הדברות, you see?

Instructor: No, no, he’s before that. I just bought Philo this week, so forgive me for not being able to speak.

Student: Okay, very good. Who’s that father in the Gemara there? He doesn’t say I said to him. He’s in that whole Gemara. I said to him, so I’m not one of them. He makes it up, then he ordered one, right?

Instructor: I’m sure. I have Philo, who was a Yid [Jew] in the times of the Tannaim [Talmudic sages], called ברבי מנחם עזריה ידידיה [Barabai Menachem Azariah Yedidya], which is a cute translation of Philo. אבל [Aval: However], Philo, who was a good Jew, he wrote a book called the Ten Commandments, or something like that, and then wrote a book on the details of the commandments, and there’s a long book, it’s like three volumes in the translation, and all of this is describing how the Ten Commandments include all the mitzvos, and then going into detail and explaining all the mitzvos as they are coming out of the Ten Commandments.

C. The Question of Transmission

Instructor: So he was the one that invented this, and like many other things, somehow magically, all the later, what we call medieval rationalists and medieval mystics, all the people that were trying to interpret the Torah in some kind of language similar to what Philo was doing, all ended up saying the same exact things as him. But I don’t think it’s because, I mean, some people would say they must have stolen it somehow, like there was some manuscript somewhere, which is also possible. There is some kind of genealogy that leads from Philo to Rav Saadia and so on. But nobody could really trace the book. But there is something like that.

I, myself, think something like that in his very famous history of thought in פרק אלף [Perek Alef: Chapter One]. But also, of course, Philo was just learning from Plato. Plato learned from Yirmiyahu [Jeremiah]. Anyways.

D. Earlier Midrashic Precedents

Instructor: But also, it’s kind of obvious, right? I think the more the better is that this is pretty obvious. If you read it, it’s a [text unclear] that show you how פרשת קדושים [Parshas Kedoshim: the portion on holiness] or פרשת משפטים [Parshas Mishpatim: the portion on laws] are interpretations of עשרת הדברות [Aseres HaDibros]. It’s not something that Philo entirely invented, just like the text. We read that guy about the pattern, but the pattern isn’t true, is it?

Student: Yeah. No, the ירושלמי [Yerushalmi: Jerusalem Talmud] says that קריאת שמע [Krias Shema: the Shema prayer] is עשרת הדברות.

Instructor: These are things that are in Midrash also. So it’s not like he entirely invented the idea, but he very much formalized it and saw it this way.

VI. The Paradox of the Ten Commandments’ Content

A. The Simplicity of the Commandments

Instructor: Okay, so now the עשרת הדברות is a very nice text. And what’s interesting is, you read the עשרת הדברות? This got only 10 things, very nice round number, 10, very important number. There’s different ways of making it into 10, but for sure has 10 things. All of them are very simple, right?

Simple what? רבי אברהם אבן עזרא [Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra] all of that says that the דברות [Dibros: Commandments] are things that we don’t need lights and sirens to know, besides for one.

B. The Theatrical Revelation for Obvious Truths

Instructor: Remember Hashem made His whole pyrotechnic show, where He lit up a mountain in fire and descended upon it with His chariot, that’s what it says in Tehillim [Psalms], and made the whole world silent and spoke, and then said, something like you claim Hillel was doing to make fun of us, and said, I please don’t murder anyone. I beg you. And everyone was like, good thought, God. Thank you so much. Thank you for the root of our Torah coming out past the soup.

The Self-Evidence of Moral Law and the Nature of Revelation

I. The Structure of the Ten Commandments – Which Require Explanation?

Opening: The Rhetorical Problem of Divine Revelation

Instructor: Thank you for coming out past the soup. And then they had the cheesecake, because they didn’t know how to anything. Gosh, I’m going into this rhetorical mood.

So all of the sides for one are obvious things that every person in the world agrees to, which one doesn’t they agree to or that they don’t disagree with that needs an explanation?

Student: Which one, Matt?

Instructor: No, which one?

Student: Okay, just a bit thick.

Student: Chavez?

Instructor: Chavez, yeah. And I go Chavez if there’s a shame. Now of course you might not know that there’s a God, but after you know there’s a God and that’s bringing His name falsely is pretty obvious. But there’s only one thing that you would not know if nobody would tell you.

And you know how I know that my understanding is correct, that this is the only thing that needs an explanation? How do we know? It says that. Thank you very much. Because the Pasuk [verse] itself thinks so. When it says—well, it gives you a threat, it does give you like a key. It says, “Please don’t have any other gods, because don’t you dare, don’t even think about it.”

There was a funny line about that, to make sure. The reason is, like it says in the Pasuk, he’s like, he’s a little bit, he’s a…

Student: Where?

Instructor: I’m not sure what you mean.

Student: Okay.

Instructor: But basically because I am the only one. Okay. Also, because God will be very mad, but it’s understandable why He will be mad, right? Very good.

The Case of Shabbos: The Exception That Proves the Rule

Instructor: Everyone’s like, what? What’s this Shabbos thing? By the way, they already knew. You know how they knew, right? They kept them in Mitzrayim [Egypt].

Student: In Mitzrayim?

Instructor: In Marah. We’re reading the Pesach [Passover] in Marah, right? Shai, shi, shi, yom, tov, k’tiv [six days, good day, written]. There was already Shabbos.

But anyways, Hashem told me, you know why? I was like, why? What’s this thing about Shabbos? Oh, ki shai, shi, shi, yom [for six days]—thank you very much. Now we understand why.

And then He moved on, you know why? Doesn’t say “ki” [because], right? Says “l’maan” [so that]. Will be nice, will give you sachar [reward], but really obvious.

Then He said another five things, all of which don’t even have that level of explanation. You don’t even need a threat or a promise from God to do them, right?

Student: Why?

Instructor: He’s going to go to Ghana.

Student: No, that’s where it ends.

The Self-Explanatory Nature of the Final Commandments

Instructor: All these things, they’re self-explanatory. And if someone says—then he ruined it. Because let’s take a self-explanatory: if I tell you there’s—you right away say, “Yeah, that makes sense.”

Now you want—I want to tell you something. One second. Can I say there’s actually, I think they say that it’s—mind the Tyrant made it pashut [simple], the fact that the Tyrant wrote it, that’s what makes it so pashut.

Student: I’ll tell you the part in the gap with other stuff.

Instructor: That’s what Abkhazia said, literally.

Student: I know, I know, you have other—your AI is working well.

Instructor: My AI?

Student: Yes, I said it’s a little short, but it’s a little short.

II. Understanding “Self-Evident” – What Does It Really Mean?

The Critical Distinction: Simple vs. Already Known

Instructor: Listen, very important to realize this. When you want to understand what is the great thing—I think you know it’s great, this is really great—because my sheet most of the time, it’s not like once I told you it’s like, “Yeah, itself just saying it explains it.” Usually it’s like, “Well, I think he said it, maybe he knows what he’s talking about, so I might take it seriously,” or “You know, we had a good eye from the Rambam, so maybe it’s good,” and so on. That’s why whatever I tell you something, usually it’s not called vanish’em [from heaven]. You don’t say, “Wow, they put—God Himself came down and with His chariot and told us this.” You got it?

When someone says something that is so obvious—when I say obvious, I don’t mean that you know it before. Because it’s not—I don’t think it’s true that everyone knew before this. When I said, “This is a dozen explanation,” I don’t mean—I’m not going to have a Tzaddik [righteous person] who said it the wrong way. I don’t mean that everyone knew that not to kill.

You know how I know that not everyone knew that? Yeah, they’ve done that since forever. Then the first second guy in humanity, according to the story of Parshas Bereishis [Genesis], was a murderer. Obviously he didn’t think that it’s obviously wrong to kill. Of course, in some sense he did, because the story continues with Hashem telling him, “What’s going on with you?” But not that obvious.

But when I tell you—okay, so that’s only the first person. What about the 10th and 20th and 30th person? They found out. They found out. You could find this out. That’s what I’m trying to say.

Two Meanings of “Simple”

Instructor: They’re not innate in the sense that you can’t find that out. It’s simple in the sense that if I tell it to you, then you’re like, “Wow, you tell me something true.” You see, there’s a big difference between me telling you something and it being something you already knew—and that’s why it’s simple, like, “Thank you very much, obvious”—and me telling you something that you only know because I told you, or at least some—maybe you only know it because I told you. But when I tell it to you, you don’t have—you don’t go around saying, “I know it because he told me,” or even “because he proved it to me,” or even “because he made me a mofeis [sign/miracle],” he made the—the best midrash move. And that’s how I know it. He told me something that is as clear as the seven heavens opening up and the earth opening up.

Student: Why did you use that motion? It’s not a wish. Let’s have a mission for the clear—for the clear part.

Instructor: That’s what clarity is.

Student: Is that what I’m talking about?

Instructor: Yeah.

Student: When I say—what do you think the difference is? What do you think the difference is? So what? Therefore.

The Griz’s Point: The Torah Writing It Makes It Pashut

Instructor: So therefore, what I’m trying to say is that if you say, “It’s simple, we don’t need God to come down in heaven to say that”—that’s nonsense. It might be simple in the sense that when it’s told to you, it’s its own proof. But it’s not simple in the sense that everyone knows it. It’s not true that everyone knows it. I know a bunch of people that don’t know it. And even more people literally don’t know it. In other words, they never heard of the problem. You can say, “Know it,” but you already know it. But there’s many people, and I can show you this, many cultures even, or many generations who don’t know it.

Once you make this rule—in other words, let’s think, I can get into very deep about this and talk about, like, the amount of criticism of Rav Saadia for saying that the mitzvah of sichli [rational commandment] is because it’s not something that has anything sichli in the other mazah [attribute]. Sichli is only God and His angels. That’s what I’m saying, right? Therefore they can’t be mitzvos, because only God Himself and His angels are sichli.

III. The Rambam’s Critique of Rav Saadia Gaon

The Debate Over Mitzvos Sichliyos

Student: But are they talking at each other? There are other principles—the holy Albam and better in our book that we’re reading in Berick [Shemoneh Perakim]—love says Rav Saadia Go and said nonsense. He said that there are mitzvos, there’s no mitzvos. That’s what the holy Rama said.

Instructor: So what are you doing? I’m telling you right now what they are. Word sichli is in the same way.

Student: No, they’re using the same way, and the round thing that—

Instructor: Now I’m telling you to believe me because I don’t have patience to show you all the proofs, but there’s things that say no, exactly.

Student: So that’s the other way, but that’s not why the Rav was upset at Rav Saadia for saying sichli.

What the Rambam Actually Objects To

Instructor: The Rav was upset at Rav Saadia for saying, then he wouldn’t be upset at him for saying Shemiyas [hearing]. That was not the opposite. The Rav was upset at Rav Saadia for saying sichli because he thinks that Rav Saadia doesn’t understand what seichel [intellect/reason] means. He thinks that anything that sounds reasonable is seichel. Sounding reasonable is not seichel. It’s unreasonable—is, in other words, the question that the Tzivuvis [commandments] are answering, at least the second part of them, is not the question of what the truth is.

There isn’t any truth anywhere that says you shouldn’t kill anyone, or at least not in a simple sense. In some complex sense, yes, because that’s why we say that God said this. But in a simple sense, there isn’t.

IV. Reframing the Question – What Makes a Good Rule?

The Real Question the Commandments Answer

Instructor: But if I—I’ll tell you how it’s simple. It’s simple in the sense, exactly—it’s simple in the sense of the answer to the question which most people should have, which is: What would be a good rule for putting on our Aron Kodesh [Holy Ark] in our shul [synagogue]? What would be a good rule for organizing my society? That’s the question.

And now, for that kind of question, I can tell you it’s a good rule because an angel came and told me that. That would be one way of making good rules. I can tell you it’s a good rule because if I’ll explain to you at length that the free market is a good thing—because when Milton Friedman said, when he wrote a book, and then someone else wrote a different book, but it turns out that he was right because he made a long experiment and he showed you all of this—okay, I might be convinced. But that’s not self-explanatory. That’s not self-evident.

What Self-Evidence Actually Means

Instructor: Self-evident things: if someone comes and says, “You’ve got a question, like how should you live your life? How should you relate to other human beings? Let me tell you: don’t murder.” Everyone says, “That’s a good rule.”

“I didn’t think of it before. At first I thought maybe we should go on around murdering and whoever is the greatest murderer should win. I don’t know. I didn’t realize. But once you told me the rule, it’s very obvious.”

It’s obvious in the sense that it explains itself. It doesn’t need more explanation. It’s a really good proposal. There were a lot of people that said it’s not a good proposal. But normal people think that it’s a good proposal.

Student Question: The Thought Process Before Being Told

Student: What is the thought process before that? Before someone tells you that? I’m not understanding.

Instructor: You’re all too good people. I don’t have to go to the conclusion now. We are all too nice people that think that murdering is bad. Is it because it’s a better rule of thumb than the other ones? Because the other ones also might be true. Because they’re not really categorically different. Let’s make a rule like how do you set how to make iron cutters.

V. The Wheel Analogy and the Nature of Moral Revelation

The Debate on Murder’s Self-Evidence

Instructor: Now, you right away think that’s a good rule. Why? Why is it a good rule? I think it’s a terrible rule. Explain.

Student: Explain? No, no, no, I can’t explain. If you’re going to start explaining then we’re not talking about this.

Instructor: What?

Student: I think society would be amazing if you weed out the bad.

Instructor: Who is talking about bad people? Murder means good people.

Student: No, no, no, murder doesn’t mean… This is just a translation issue. It means don’t kill anyone who does not deserve to die.

Instructor: What does “deserve” mean? Ah, good question. We’ll find out next week, Parshas Mishpatim [the Torah portion dealing with civil and criminal law]. You’re not saying anything here. I’m saying something very simple. Murder by definition means an unjustified murder. I know. So when you say you can justify a bunch of murders, you’re not talking to me. You’re talking to someone else. Parshas Mishpatim talks about that.

Student: I don’t mean a justified murder when you say bad. When I say bad, I mean like a goat and a lion. That’s what I mean bad. In other words, I need to eat. Those murders are not justified.

Instructor: Those aren’t justified for the lion?

Student: It’s very justified.

Instructor: Why not?

Student: What do you mean? He needs to survive. This is how you survive.

Instructor: Very good.

Student: For life, it’s good for you.

Instructor: It’s not good for you. It’s not good. I’m just telling you that you see that it’s not good. You didn’t think—you thought there was to be a good idea.

Student: I think it’s an awesome idea. No problem. I’m not going to have a card game with you.

The Problem of Pre-Revelation Understanding

Instructor: I don’t understand why you—what are you clarifying? I’m really not playing a game. Meaning, I’m trying to tell you that there was such an understanding that *tzirtzah* [murder] was good. There was not an understanding. You keep on thinking there’s understandings. We all have this weird funny way of thinking that people that don’t understand, understand things. It’s a big mistake.

Gosh, I could talk to you about this for 500 years. Listen to me. Listen to me. If I get you—let me never listen to me—but listen to me. You keep on thinking that revelation is something that comes to go against something that someone thought otherwise. Nobody thinks things otherwise.

Student: You said that.

Instructor: I didn’t say that. You said that. You said the guy came down—

Student: Suppose it’s also—

Instructor: No, it was very clear to them.

Student: Exactly. That wasn’t clear to them before.

Instructor: Exactly. Something was not being clear. Not being clear doesn’t mean that you thought a nice Toyota wine murder would be good. It means that I don’t know—nobody considered it. You can’t even imagine this because you’re so with Hashem [God], so Jewish, so much. And you, by the way, just to be very clear, you are so—you are so convinced by this revelation. There’s so many things you were so convinced by this revelation that whenever I tell you someone thought something differently, you start imagining these fancy, weird *shtiglach Torah* [Torah interpretations/arguments].

But I’m not telling you that. I’m telling you in the way, like, imagine someone comes—I can’t even tell it to you because it’s very hard to imagine a different world.

The Wheel Analogy: A Paradigm for Revelation

Instructor: I can tell, like, something like, imagine someone, like, I’ll give you an example. Think about a technical invention. But when you say that you killed the *Ishamar* [unclear reference] of murder, that’s the problem.

Student: No, I’ll tell you, I’ll give you an example, okay? I’ll give you, exactly. We did, in some sense.

Instructor: In some sense, yeah. I’ll give you, well, not entirely, but in the sense of, in the moral sense. I’ll give you an example. Do you know that someone invented the wheel? What did they think before? Did they think that…

Student: I can tell you what they think, by the way, but it would be an explanation, but I’ve thought about this, by the way. I’ve tried to figure this out. And you have to understand that this explanation is not an explanation that he didn’t disprove it, and you can’t disprove it.

Instructor: He invented a wheel, and now no normal person uses anything besides four wheels anymore, right? What did the people think? You know that wheels are a weird thing. Like, what’s a wheel? You ever heard this concept, like the invention of a wheel? What does it mean to invent a wheel? What does a wheel do?

Student: Well, rolls.

Instructor: Okay. Now let’s think. Tell me *saykh layoushe* [unclear Yiddish phrase]. I have to *schlep* [drag] a chair over ground. *Schlep* me the chair, okay? And if I make it something that turns, can you explain me how a wheel works?

Student: Finally left something on cycle, right? Give me the sweater.

Instructor: Why is a wheel make it life easier for me instead of picking up a chair?

Student: It helps me drag it.

Instructor: Oh, you have to pick it up. You could drag the chair, but new, and the wheel, you’re still dragging it, by the way. It’s hard to drag it over ground again. And why would a wheel make it easier to drag it?

Student: Up with the horse, and the horse—

Instructor: The horse is not the invention of a wheel. I’m talking about a wheel. A wheelbarrow, okay? Explain to me how—why would I—why would anyone think that—

Student: I’ll explain to you. When you roll, like a wheelbarrow, right?

Instructor: Probably. Don’t imagine a wheelbarrow and tell me how it works. Tell me what—I never heard of a wheel. Explain to me why I should stop putting wheels on my stuff. I understand very well it’s hard to *schlep* things. You take a horse and you *schlep* it. Explain to me what is it hard with the earth?

Student: Much harder with around.

Instructor: You think it’s much easier? It’s not like you look like a minute sheet that you can’t come in a sheet, right? I’m in a sheet. I know I also use wheels and I believe you in that sense, but you can’t—it’s very easy. It’s not—there’s not a scooter here, by the way. There’s talking out of source to understand this.

Student: What do you need to learn? Some physics and mechanics and stuff?

Instructor: Yeah, I’m planning something simple. When you do—you know that when you *schlep* your wheel, you’re also doing the same *schlepping* as before. Think about it. How is it less *schlepping*?

Student: I’m not *schlepping* less?

Instructor: Not. You have to carry things without wheels. You have to *schlep* them along the ground, okay? So *schlep* it now. Yeah, put a wheel. So tell me how they turn when I *schlep* it. Who cares if it turns? Try this. How does it help?

Student: Okay, fine. You have my connection. I can’t be captured, but it’s in a very right—

Instructor: Like, you’re basically trying to tell me that you have to go back. You have to go back. I’m trying to tell you something.

Student: I know. I’m trying to tell you these things.

Instructor: No, it’s not, by the way. Nowadays also, it’s a very serious, sincere question. Not a serious, but it’s a good question. You should go ask your physics teacher why we—how wheels work. Because it’s not obvious. You don’t know the answer. How do wheels work? Maybe you do because you’ve happened—I’ve learned it, but it’s not simple. You need a lot of work to figure out how wheels work. How do wheels work?

Student: Yeah, but this is what I meant. Just get the wheel.

Instructor: Don’t figure out about—wait. So what I’m trying to tell you is now something else. Now when a guy made a wheel over a lot of—I’m not—you don’t have to explain how it works. But when a guy invented a wheel, right, it was obvious that a wheel is better than no wheel, okay?

Now what did they think before that? Well, I could tell you—for you want, I can give you this like weird spirit. Why this wheel? It’s just—there’s—let’s—I can even give you like a physical explanation. You know, it’s there’s—there’s—how do you call it? There’s a tension—attention—how’s it called? Friction. A wheel is just as much friction, so therefore it should be the same. You touching the ground the whole time. The wheel doesn’t make you pick up. You never go off the ground. If you would fly, I can understand it’s easier because air seems to be easier to move through than earth. But as long as you’re *schlepping* along the ground, who cares if it’s turning or not? I don’t see the difference.

That’s what they thought before, until the guy invented a wheel and he saw that there’s some difference, even if he didn’t know how to explain theoretically. Maybe they did. There’s some difference when it turns. Somehow it doesn’t—there’s not that much restriction. There’s some difference. Now that’s what they thought. But that’s not true, because then someone could argue with you. Let’s say it would be a theoretical thing. Someone can argue with you, you know, the wheel adds problems. Now you have a—

But anyway, it does add some problems. You’ve got to have an axle, you’ve got to figure out how to make it spin freely, and so on.

The Application to Moral Understanding

Instructor: Now, what happened was, nobody thought of a wheel. And by the way, you would never have thought of it also. You just received it, thank you very much. You never thought of how to make wheels. Maybe there’s something as simple as that that would make you be able to fly without an engine, without an airplane, that you just didn’t think of. You tried to go on an airplane—no, just walk two steps forward, then one like this, and you fly. I don’t know. How does it work? The physics, the side of it, they figured out how it works. You just never thought of it because it sounds crazy. Like, why would you think about it, right?

Now there’s also moral inventions or social inventions that are the same. It’s not like they thought that murder was good, like some weird anti-moralist could come up with a theory—that you could come up with such theories. But after someone discovered that, then you could say, you know what, I’ve read that some government people decided that square wheels might work better than round wheels for some purposes, or triangle wheels. I don’t know. Because think about it—triangles should be even better, right?

Student: If the least.

Instructor: Yeah, right? It’s the same for different reasons. But what do you mean why? You’ve got to minimize touching the earth. So if it’s a triangle, you can only touch the point.

Student: Oh, so a wheel works in a more complicated way than I pretended before.

Instructor: Okay. In any case, what I’m trying to tell you is, triangles are better than wheels. Anyways, what I’m trying to tell you is, think about it.

Student: I think you’re explaining—I think you explained the curse of being a Jew is that you can never not be a Jew because you always do the things they’re doing. They just never consider this.

Instructor: I’m just describing to you how these things are great inventions, so great that they show themselves by being invented or being revealed. It’s not clear that you can get to it by reasoning yourself into it. Maybe you could find reasons for it afterwards, but it’s not clear.

That’s why I say I don’t think it’s correct even to say that things like are reasonable in the sense that everyone thinks—everyone thinks them after they were invented and told to you. And it’s like, obviously we should be doing that. What were we thinking until now? The answer is that we weren’t thinking, or we weren’t thinking about this question even. Even just making it into a question is already a great revelation, as like you see how hard of a time I have making some simple things into questions.

And that’s what it means that we said now this is a good thing. Understand? That’s why we did—the Torah Sales [unclear reference] talks about God revealing himself on Har Sinai [Mount Sinai] and telling us these ten simple things. It doesn’t tell us complicated things. Like if we say God told us that Hashem has put us from Goliath to Goliath [text cuts off mid-sentence]

VI. The Revelatory Nature of the Ten Commandments and the Problem of Lo Sachmod

The Difficulty of Formulating Moral Questions

Instructor: The answer is that we weren’t thinking, or we weren’t thinking about this question even. Even just making it into a question is already a great revelation. As you see how hard of a time I have making some simple things into questions. And that’s what it means that we said, now, this is a good thing, understand?

That’s why the Torah talks about God revealing himself on Har Sinai [Mount Sinai] and telling us these ten simple things. It doesn’t tell us complicated things. If we say God told us that an asham [guilt offering] is patur [exempt] from ganav [theft] or whatever, we’re like, okay, reasonable, but not obvious. It’s not something that I tell it to you and you’re like, “Wow, that’s the only way I could live from now on.” No, it’s not the only way you could live from now on. I could still have a life in which Hashem [God] is the one that is, and I can even give you a theory for why not.

The Wheel Analogy: Revelation Creates Concepts

So I keep on touching this thing. But a wheel, right?

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: That was never, there was no concept, right? But murder, there was for sure a concept because it’s happened, right?

Student: The concept of murder is not the concept of me cutting off my brother’s head.

Instructor: Now I’m lost.

Student: Very good.

Instructor: That was the point.

Student: Yeah, because that could just be for a justified reason.

Instructor: No! Oh, you’re already answering the question of justification. Cutting off a brother’s head could have been further justification.

Student: No, that’s not murder.

Instructor: Exactly. Before you heard of the idea of murder, it’s not murder because I think he deserves it. It’s not murder because, I don’t know, the guy was with my wife, I cut off his head. What’s it got to do with murder? Who gave me this concept?

Student: Yeah, you don’t even know what I’m talking about.

Instructor: Okay, got it. You haven’t heard, nobody heard of tirtzach [murder]. Lo tirtzach [don’t murder] assumes that there’s tirtzach. But before the lo tirtzach, tirtzach really just means something that’s lo [forbidden], that’s what I’m trying to say. There’s no tirtzach that is ken [permitted].

By the way, even justify—that’s why I told you this point, and then make it up. Literally, I think the Targum [Aramaic translation] translates, let’s say it’s something like, don’t kill someone who’s—I don’t remember. Someone literally translates it that way.

Killing vs. Murder: The Pre-Revelatory Perspective

So what are the people before? The killing is? What’s killing? What does killing mean? Killing and murder are not the same thing.

Student: So they’re not the same thing.

Instructor: No, killing is just me getting rid of a problem. Is me moving a chair a problem? Is it a kind of thing that I have to justify? I don’t know. The chair was there and I wanted to be here. The guy was in my way. I pushed him out of my way.

Student: Yeah, it’s very good.

Instructor: I don’t want you to think otherwise. Please. It’s very good. I’m just trying to tell you that this is why this is called a revelation. Because it’s something that was told. It’s simple. It shows itself to be true. True in the sense of a good way to live, not in the sense of being an absolute truth. And that’s all.

Reveal to you murder. Murder, that’s the tirtzach. Lo tirtzach reveals to you murder. Murder is a bad thing that you don’t do. And now, that’s all. Same thing with gneivah [theft] and tachmod [coveting]. We’ll talk about tachmod. Oh gosh, maybe we won’t. Anyways, that’s the zeh kol hanekudah [that’s the whole point].

The Exception of Shabbos

The only thing that is not like that is Shabbos [Sabbath], and therefore it gave you the reason. Maybe even in some sense you could say something like resting is not a certain explanation, resting on a certain day is an explanation. That’s really what the explanation gives you, right?

You notice that the explanation of Shabbos doesn’t tell you why to rest. It only tells you why to rest on the seventh day. Because why to rest is obvious. I’ll give you a day off if you don’t ask me questions. It’s only about if I tell you, well, you should have your day off exactly every seventh day. Okay, well, why not every sixth day? I’ll tell you why.

So anyways, I’m not gonna get into what I wanted to get to. I’m not gonna go on for two hours now. Instead 28, according to my weird timekeeping machine, you know how it works. What does it mean?

The Revelatory Nature of the Aseret HaDibrot [Ten Commandments]

So now I want to tell you something here. Now this is something—now they understand, is this true? So anyways, all that such are revelatory. And I think that, by the way, you asked me before, where things start, where education starts. Some things, at least there’s a theory that says that we need these kind of stories of revelation, and we need revelation in the stories of revelation, because there isn’t really a way to get there otherwise.

Student: You said this. Everyone has a lawgiver.

Instructor: Yeah. So now we read these ten things. Like I said, Anochi [I am] and lo yihyeh [there shall not be]—theological things that make sense given that maybe isn’t obvious unless you see it, but it’s given that way. Nobody disagrees with kibud av va’em [honoring father and mother], besides for the ’60s revolution, which is—which you’d also only consider it because you had the first.

Student: It’s a meridah [rebellion].

Instructor: Exactly. It’s an inversion. It’s not a lacking of it.

Student: I agree. It’s an inversion.

Instructor: The worst, the even worse situation is that you don’t even need that. That’s where we’re up to now. But just kind of naturally, we revert to that, because that’s really how the world works.

The Basic Commandments as Foundations

All right, Shabbos, simple. Lo tirtzach [don’t murder], lo tinaf [don’t commit adultery], lo tignov [don’t steal], lo ta’aneh [don’t bear false witness], lo tirtzach [don’t covet]—all these things, they’re also extremely obvious. And by being extremely obvious, they’re also extremely basic.

Now we can talk about the concept of them being basic, right? They’re extremely basic by being extremely obvious, right? We build everything. All the questions, in certain sense all the questions that we have, all the more complicated things which are not such a direct revelation, are more complicated because there are ways of putting together these things, right?

There sort of isn’t any halakha [Jewish law] in the whole Torah, at least in all Mishpatim [civil/criminal laws], that isn’t a detail in one of these things. I think that’s correct, right? Some of these, when you read these, people doing this, some of them are forced. But they’re only forced in the sense of trying to say, oh, that includes all the mitzvos [commandments].

Lo Tignov as Generative Principle

But if I ask you something like, why is there even a question of—tell me a question. Tell me a question from the parashah [Torah portion].

Student: Hashavat aveidah [returning lost objects].

Instructor: Why is there such a question? Why would anyone—what’s the base time?

Student: Because you can’t steal.

Instructor: Or both, it’s based on lo tignov. Or some would argue, this would be gneivat da’at [deception], I don’t know if Mama should take it, whatever.

Student: Shame forever.

Instructor: What?

Student: Shame forever.

Instructor: It’s a kind of a thing, gneivat da’at also.

Student: What do you mean?

Instructor: It’s a tort. You broke my thing. You took something away from me in some way. We get…

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: But that’s the basic thing. It’s the thing that just says something that is me, don’t take it away. Now, how is it? What is it yours? All of us can answer the question of what this thing is. Oh, well, to what extent is it your problem? All these questions are just—the basic sense of them is just lo tignov. There isn’t anything else basic in them. There’s a lot of detail, a lot of the world is very complicated.

Does Lo Tignov Introduce Ownership?

Student: So lo tignov is also introducing ownership, or that proceeds out?

Instructor: Yeah, I think so. I don’t know about introducing historically, but you could imagine—just like I told you this whole relationship—you could imagine a world where lo tignov doesn’t make any sense.

Student: Josephus seems to blame Kayin [Cain] for this, for ownership existence, boundaries.

Instructor: Yeah, in some sense. But let’s just try to establish these things. These are more complicated, I said that. But it’s an obvious thing. It’s a tautology almost. What is not yours doesn’t belong to you. That’s what lo tignov says, right? And all the different questions are based on this. And we can understand therefore why anyone would put in the sefer Shemot [Book of Exodus] and put it there, right?

The Problem of Lo Sachmod

Now we got to the last one, and it says lo sachmod [don’t covet]. I have two questions. Firstly, it doesn’t say—it goes on and on. It repeats itself. Why shouldn’t it say? It’s as simple as that, right? Not simple. In the luchos [tablets], they always make it as if it’s simple. But it’s not, right? There’s a longer list, and it even says twice. There’s two of them. So something is weird. That’s one weirdness.

The second weirdness is that I don’t even know what it means. And because I don’t even know what it means, I definitely don’t know why it’s simple. It seems to me that I could have made nine dibros [commandments] and everyone would be happy. If I would miss lo sachmod, or lo tignov, or even Shabbos or lo tisa [don’t take God’s name in vain]—people would be like, that’s weird, missing something basic. Hopefully. Maybe afterwards it’s basically before now, but you can understand.

But even afterwards, if I take out lo sachmod, I have a version—I found in the new ktav yad [manuscript], doesn’t have lo sachmod. Yeah, it sounds a lot more powerful than it. Go for the sefer [book] with it. So fine, we’re happy, you know. Can suffer be a synopsis of it all?

Student: It could be.

Instructor: I think it is. Not a synopsis. Something to do with it all.

So the—we gotta discover this. That’s Ibn Ezra’s question. I didn’t make any of these questions up. They’re all basic questions. So we have to understand. I’m going to give you the answer that Ibn Ezra gave, for some of his answer.

VII. Lo Sachmod: The Internal Dimension of the Commandments

The Insufficiency of External Compliance

Instructor: It solves more problems than it could. But we don’t know what Lo Sachmod [don’t covet] is, so fine, we’re happy, you know. Can Lo Sachmod be like a synopsis of it all? It could be. I think it is. Not a synopsis. Something to do with it all.

So, we got it and discovered. This is Ibn Ezra’s question. I didn’t make any of these questions. They’re all basic questions. So, we have to understand. I’m going to give you the answer that Ibn Ezra gave for some of his answers.

It must be that we’re learning Shmoneh Perakim [Eight Chapters – Rambam’s introduction to Pirkei Avos]. Remember where I started? We started about how there’s external actions like lo tignov [don’t steal], lo tirtzach [don’t murder], lo tin’af [don’t commit adultery], lo ta’aneh [don’t bear false witness] – never says lo ta’aneh – which are things that you do that are bad, that you do to other people specifically that are bad.

Remember we said that it’s not enough to not steal – you have to be a nisht ganav [not-a-thief]. Interesting thing. You’ve never heard of this, right? The Ba’alei Mussar [Mussar movement teachers] don’t really talk about this, do they? Because they’re somewhat a little bit too caught up in interiority that doesn’t refer to anything.

The Internal Dimension of Each Prohibition

But they do say things like you shouldn’t have kinah [jealousy]. Don’t be jealous. Which is just a way of saying don’t be an internal ganav, right? Or they say things like, yeah, of course, don’t do ni’uf [adultery] with an eishes ish [married woman]. But you also shouldn’t imagine doing it. Don’t be an internal no’ef [adulterer], right? Like our great friend Jesus said, you’ve already slept with her in your heart. Remember? So, remember that he said that?

Student: Nope.

Instructor: So, there’s a story, I don’t know, it says this, and now, we’re saying this. Remember we’re saying this, we’re saying that this is fundamental, in some sense. It’s fundamental, as someone who does, who, like, I think that most of us are not going to be ganavim [thieves] and rotzchim [murderers] and m’nafim [adulterers], which is part of, I was so happy with this, because it’s the thing that most of us do.

So that’s what the Aseres HaDibros [Ten Commandments] says to us in Mecha [at Sinai]. It’s like check, check, check, the Aseres HaDibros. Say it in the Gemara [Talmud] days, right? Ashrei mi shelo chamad [praiseworthy is one who doesn’t covet]. It doesn’t make a lot of sense. What does it mean? Nobody does it. But of course, in some sense, we all do it. Maybe I’m exaggerating.

The Trust Argument: Why Internal States Matter

But what am I saying? We are saying that there’s something basic to being a good person that it’s not enough and we would not trust – I said this to you over here and I said in Boro Park Drush [sermon in Boro Park] – none of you would trust someone that’s like the ideal Brisker [follower of the Brisker method of Talmud study]. Nobody should go close to, right? Like, “Yeah, I think I should murder you but I’m having great hisgabrus [self-mastery], I’m a great guy.” No, no, no.

Like, really, like, really…

Student: Aggression, yeah, something like aggression, and he should put his aggression into something else.

Instructor: Not saying that it’s good to… It’s a better person. Like, the Gemara doesn’t even pretend that it’s better. It’s just what’s right to do. But you’re not a better person if… That’s the random discussion of Perek Vav [Chapter Six]. But for sure, you’re not a good person at all. Forget it.

But someone who doesn’t… Who’s missing the middah pnimis [internal character trait], let’s say, it’s not a bad person. We all agree on that. But I think all of us agree with that. And therefore, it seems to me very important to me that the sense of the Aseres HaDibros – if there’s something basic they need to include being a good person – and where is that you do something like it’s implicit and just like that’s a…

Lo Sachmod: The Midrashic Interpretation

Well, it is an action that it’s of them. The Aseres HaDibros, the Rambam [Maimonides] is saying all these four things that I told you until now. This is not my pshat [interpretation]. It says in the Midrash, it says in the Rambam brings it and more or less explicitly.

The pshat is saying, I’m going to finish with this pshat because I have a lot more to say, but the pshat is saying like this: Of course, those are things you shouldn’t do. I want to tell you something. You should not want to do them either.

Then everyone’s like, hmm, do I want to? The answer is no, do you want to? Do you want to ganve [steal]? You think that the guy… You think that it’s yours. That’s a different discussion. But you don’t want to ganve. At least you have that middah [character trait]. I think otherwise nothing would start. Most people would be killing if they wouldn’t have that middah.

Saying don’t want to. Now everyone understands. That’s why there’s so many words in this. You know why there’s so many words? I’ll explain to you.

Student: Why?

Technical Analysis: Lo Sachmod Is Not a New Object

Instructor: There’s two versions. I can get into details. But basically because Lo Sachmod is not a new thing. It’s not a new thing. There’s not really ten mitzvos [commandments] in a sense. You could count it as ten mitzvos, but it’s not an object. Lo Sachmod doesn’t have a new object.

Unlike the person that would say Lo Sachmod is a new thing. It’s a mitzvah shebelev [commandment of the heart] which refers to your heart. No, it’s a mitzvah shebelev but like all mitzvah shebelev refers to an action. Right?

Lo Sachmod is saying Lo Sachmod beis re’acha [don’t covet your neighbor’s house] means I’ll tell you what it means. At least one thing it means. It means don’t want your friend’s house enough to go to beis din [rabbinical court] and then say that you bought it with eidim shekeirim [false witnesses].

Lo Sachmod beis re’acha means lo tignov [don’t steal]. Not only lo tignov because Lo Sachmod comes from someone… Lo Sachmod doesn’t mean… It’s very clear it doesn’t mean don’t be a person that has… because that’s nothing to do with Lo Sachmod. That’s just a new thing. You should be turning and learning and not being worried about thinking. You shouldn’t waste your great mind and your great imagination on imagining nonsense. Okay, that’s a nice thing.

But Lo Sachmod means… means don’t be the kind of guy that wants to and likes to sleep with his neighbor’s wife, his friend’s wife, his neighbor’s wife, right? Of course, that’s a problem because this is something that people do like sometimes. It’s not so easy to say that you don’t, but I’m trying to explain to you that it’s…

The Distinction: Random Thoughts vs. Coveting

Very important. If I see my friend’s wife and I just say, well, that’s a beautiful woman, would be nice, that’s not… It’s very important. It causes bad things. But that’s not what it means. It’s jealousy, right? It means, that guy has such a beautiful wife. Who gave him the right to have a nice wife and not mine? I think I should get it. That’s what someone like King David did, right?

Student: Different.

Instructor: No, no. I’m giving you a true example. We have such stories. Usually you have to be a powerful person for people to even have the imagination. That’s why my brother [says] only kings are [over on Lo Sachmod].

So if you’re a king, then you can have a Lo Sachmod. I mean, even that just comes to me because I’m not the king.

Student: Exactly.

Instructor: And now the person doesn’t even have the sign of Lo Sachmod because how are you going to do it?

Biblical Paradigm: Achav and Navos’s Vineyard

So, no, no, I’m just saying that eishes re’acha [your neighbor’s wife], it’s like Rabbeinu Yonah says here, Lo Sachmod doesn’t mean you should want to have the same thing that that guy has. Right? Just like everyone understands. I go to the, I see a guy has a beautiful car, I would want to have that car too. That’s not Lo Sachmod. It’s maybe…

People think, talk about that. But it’s not. I want his car. Why do I want his car? There’s enough in the store. Okay, maybe there’s not enough. We can talk about the practicalities, how that would work. But it means I want his car. Therefore what am I going to do? I’m going to take it away from him. How am I going to do it? Lo tignov [through theft].

Which one did we miss? Lo tirtzach [murder]. Very obvious. He doesn’t give it to me, off with his head.

Who was the primary, who was the paradigm example of Lo Sachmod? Achav [King Ahab], the state of the land, the high-legged Rambam. I think the Rambam made this up. I didn’t find it. I mean, there’s a Midrash. There’s a Midrash, but I don’t know if that Midrash was written before or after the Rambam. But, Sefer HaMitzvos [Book of Commandments] says this. Sefer HaMitzvos says this. Why was this written? Because every one of them, there was someone that was over. And it goes through history.

So now, I find that. Who was Lo Sachmod? Achav. Remember Achav? Achav saw that he had a neighbor, would have made a very good pardeis [orchard/garden] for his shtibel [small synagogue/prayer room]. And he went to him and said, maybe sell it to me, I’ll give you a better one. What did the guy say? Not for sale. I’m not in the vineyard selling business. This is my father’s vineyard, I’m not giving it to you.

And Achav went home and he told his wife, Izevel [Jezebel], and said, you know, I was thinking of making a deal with this guy, but he’s not interested. And she’s like, are you a king? You don’t know.

Student: Who told me this thing? She was from Tzur [Tyre]. She didn’t, she didn’t have the Jewish tradition that a king can’t really do anything. Like, you know how kings work. Kings get things, they don’t ask, right?

Instructor: There’s this, this one of these like Jewish apologizing or Midrash. So he’s into this that the world, you see that even the bad Jewish king would never do this.

Student: And go ahead, tell him.

Instructor: No, it’s true, that’s true. Nowadays the Jewish kings all learned how to do this. But in the original Judaism is very little power. I mean, someplace very little power for anyone, can’t do anything to anyone.

Jewish Law and Limited Power

So I think it’s very impressive if you read, but it’s like the one thing like, people think that it’s the problem with such a powerful principle. But really just because we’re anarchists, like the beis din doesn’t really have any power unless they’re really, really sure they can take something away. Otherwise, like the guy has it, probably he knows why. Probably he’s right. Called kol d’alim gavar [whoever is stronger prevails], right?

No, it’s a basic principle of Jewish law that like we’re the worst… The most common thing by the way, it’s like people think what’s the most, what’s the hardest thing to do? The hardest thing to take is take money out of another Yid [Jew]. It’s the hardest thing. He’s one shit that can be plus. I don’t like that of it. You have never learned anything. What it just means to say, are you so sure that the Ra’avad [Rabbi Avraham ben David] is wrong that you take money out of my pocket?

VIII. Lo Sachmod as the Foundation of Character Ethics

The Principle of Hamotzi Mei’chaveiro and the Difficulty of Taking Money

Instructor: Otherwise, the guy has it. Probably he knows why. Probably he’s right. It’s called “hamotzi mei’chaveiro alav ha’ra’ayah” [the burden of proof is on one who seeks to extract from another]. That’s the Rosh, right? No, it’s a basic principle of Jewish law that it’s the worst, the most humiliating thing.

By the way, people think, what’s the hardest thing to do? The hardest thing to take is to take money out of an “adiyat” [someone’s possession]. In Halacha, it’s the hardest thing. He has one “shetak kimli” [document as evidence]. Plus, I don’t like that I have it. You will have never learned anything. What it just means to say, are you so sure that “I have it” is wrong that you’re taking money out of my pocket?

Oh, your social drive is wrong, your mattress is, for sure. Every day we do that. But take money out of someone’s pocket. It says in one of the Chazal, that’s a “shot of the head,” that I’ve half said “middle.” You know, that’s full of like, if it’s worth money, then what do you need for money? Yeah, because it’s a way to make money. You’re taking the guy’s money. It’s not money. Money is the most important thing. It’s not money. It’s not money. It’s not money. It’s not money. It’s not money.

The Story of Navot’s Vineyard: The Only Legal Execution in Tanakh

Instructor: Anyways, how am I getting back to my point? So Ahav’s [Ahab’s] wife told him, what do you mean you’re a king? You could take it. So what did they do? They did the only legal execution in the history of the Bible. You know? I heard this from Shemba [Rav Schachter]. People often talk about the laws of execution, like there’s too many things to execute for. He said that in the whole history of the Tanakh, there’s only one person that actually killed with “edim” [witnesses] and “hasra’ah” [warning] and everything. Moshe killed people for being “mechalel Shabbos” [desecrating the Sabbath], but in a weird way, there was no “hasra’ah,” it was extra-judicial. But there was only one person that did with all the “halachos” [laws]. “Chaladeis” [false witnesses] was justified, “halachadik” [according to Jewish law], that’s the best example that we’re able to check here, right?

Student: Somewhere else, not in the Bible, they tried, Susanna.

Instructor: What’s that?

Student: Ah, you mean that’s not…

Instructor: They tried to frame also.

Student: Okay.

Instructor: Anyways, the kid said he made a whole court, there’s a “megadef” [blasphemer], “beruch Elokim u’melech” [blessed God and the king], they killed him, he took his thing. And then the Eliyahu [Elijah] never came to him and told him, “you’re a ratzach” [murderer] and everything. And I’m like, “I’m a ratzach?” False “genkos” [witnesses], it is a “ratzach” from the “Edah Charedis” [ultra-Orthodox court]. You’re allowed.

Which “aveirah” [sin] was he over? He was over, they said “ratzach.” He was over, they said. He was over after they said. But he was really over on the “ratzach.” What’s the “ratzach”? He wanted to buy it. He wanted his thing. Now he could also understand why he wanted his thing, because it’s real estate—location, location, location. There isn’t another “kerem” [vineyard] “levis” [next to]. It’s not exchangeable. He wants that one. But it’s his. So he wants his, and he’s not going to be stopped because he’s the king, so he can take it. That’s called “lo sachmod” [don’t covet].

Lo Sachmod as the Internal Dimension of the Four Previous Commandments

Instructor: So “lo sachmod” is the wanting of all these five “dibros” [commandments]—all the four previous ones. And this is where the “mitzvah shebalev” [commandment of the heart] which is not a “mitzvah shebalev” but a “mitzvah shebalev” a “misyachas le’ma’aseh hara’ah” [that relates to evil action]—that’s the very, it’s very basic, the source of the whole thing of being a good person. We’re just saying that you have to have good “middos” [character traits].

State, a lot of people are very worried. That’s another thing. I’m talking specifically about the “middah” [character trait] of not being a “ganav” [thief]. We’re going to say that, that’s a “sachmet” [covetousness]. “Sachmet” state, that you shouldn’t be a person that wants other people’s things.

The Ibn Ezra’s Question and the Sefer HaChinuch’s Answer

Instructor: And here, the “Bnei Zed” [Ibn Ezra] does have a question. What if I do? Okay. We’ll talk about go to therapy. That’s what the Sefer HaChinuch says, basically. Go to therapy. Figure it out. Not my problem. But that’s the point.

Philo’s Misinterpretation: Desire vs. Coveting Another’s Property

Instructor: And that’s why it’s very important. And I do think that there were other people that explicitly, in Philo, interpreted “lo sachmod” in a much more radical way. They said “lo sachmod” means not to have appetite, not to have desires. And it connects us with this whole Platonic language of desire being the problem. And we need to go follow reason, not desire.

And I think that is wrong, because you read the wrong translation of the Bible. His Bible, “lo sachmod,” is translated as “don’t have desire,” “epithymia” [Greek: desire/appetite] in Greek. It shouldn’t be translated that way. We translate it as something else. So we translate a word that means wanting someone else’s thing too much. There’s a word for that. Aristotle has a “middah” [character trait] for that. I forgot the word, so I can’t tell it to you. This is not my “vort” [original insight]. This is other people. Harry Wolfson’s already noticed this, other people.

But even as there are other people, it seems a little bit to be on the other side. There’s definitely the version, I think, that “lo sachmod” means not to have “ta’avos” [desires].

Student: It was there should be more the “kashin” [difficult] my “kashin” is why it is not for this “achmod” [coveting] that’s a different question the answer is stylistic I don’t think such a thing yeah yeah like there’s two “edis” [witnesses] is in like be another did not have too much desire that would be a different whole different “pshat” [interpretation] that would be an internal “pshat” that entirely internal “pshat” like don’t be the kind of person that follows his desires too much because then…

Instructor: Oh, follows his desires.

Student: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Oh, not have. Well, having, having is a soul. Having. Not control.

Instructor: It doesn’t control his desires.

Student: Control in an internal sense also.

Instructor: Before doing it.

Student: Everything is internal.

Instructor: Right, but I’m saying…

Student: That would be something, that would be a whole different “pshat.”

Instructor: No, and the “mussar” [ethical teaching] makes much more sense, what you’re saying, because it’s focusing on the “rei’echo” [your neighbor] part. It’s not an issue in the street. It’s not a “rei’echo.”

Student: Well, some of them have issues.

Instructor: No, then that’s a “rei’echo” problem.

Student: Or you could say she looks to herself.

The Mechilta on Shidduchim: When Desiring is Permitted

Instructor: “Ochot nishtchayim” [desiring women]. It says in the “Mechilta” [early rabbinic commentary], and “Mechilta” says, “hava amina” [one might think] “lo sachmod” means now they have “shidduchim” [marriage matches]. Because it’s “b’tchalibni” [you captivated me]. Or “b’tchali” [captivate]. They have a way to explain the “limud” [teaching], why you’re allowed to ask for “shidduch” [marriage match]. Because that’s legitimate. That’s the message of “Mechilta.” A “p’nuyah” [unmarried woman] is “mutar l’histakel bah” [permitted to look at her]. “Mutar l’achmod” [permitted to desire].

What is “mutar l’achmod”? “L’achmod” doesn’t mean “l’anos” [to rape]. It means you’re going to ask her father to marry her or whatever. Ask her however it works. That’s 100% legitimate. You’re not taking it away from her. If your plan is to rape her, then you’re over on “lo sachmod eshet rei’echo” [don’t covet your neighbor’s wife], which says depends what the plan is. But depends what kind of person you are. If you’re going to be told no, then you’re going to do something else, then you’re over on “lo sachmod.”

So there is, in the sense there is a sense of desire being “lo sachmod.” We talk about “lo sin’af” [don’t commit adultery] being a step before, after that’s another whole “sheik” [discussion]. But anyways, I think that this is enough for us to understand that “lo sachmod” is the guide and the Torah for being that being the kind of person who wants someone else this thing and that is a “middah” [character trait].

Digression: Z’nus and the Scope of Lo Sin’af

Instructor: So we’re in the whole let’s say what is this what does that mean random women doesn’t sell listen up listen up but I mean random what’s random random means not your friends not someone that’s married so I’m just uh that’s a “middah” year what and…

Student: And what do you mean? Which of it is it?

Instructor: No, it’s this. It’s “k’deishah” [prostitute], no?

Student: Ah, that’s right. That’s not. That’s the Rav Moshe “kiddush” [sanctification].

Instructor: That’s not what I said. That’s not what I said. The Rav is in the “kiddush,” right?

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: What about Tamar? What was wrong with that?

Student: That was a “mitzvah” [commandment].

Instructor: Why do I keep on talking about this? If you’re allowed to go to a “zonah” [prostitute]. You don’t know? “Pilegesh” [concubine]. What do you mean, does it have to be for the “melech” [king] or the “pilegesh,” or I don’t know? And that’s because the “Ra’avad” [Rabbi Abraham ben David] was more traditionally Jewish, he didn’t hold a “melech” has specific privileges.

Student: Yep, but…

Instructor: What’s it got to do with anything? That’s not the news.

Student: No, because Rav Saadia said that it’s all “nichla” [included].

Instructor: Rav Saadia said if it’s “nichla,” if it’s “nichla,” then it’s “nichla.” Listen, Rav Saadia, listen.

Student: No, I’m saying maybe it’s all “nichla,” maybe only in the “lo sachmod.”

Instructor: That’s what I’m trying to say. No. Rav Saadia, by the way, says that “kashrus” [kosher dietary laws] is part of the “lo sachmod.” That was part of the problem. That seems to understand the other way around. Not the way that I’m saying it. Right. Because that’s not the…

Student: It’s for sure being “eshet ish” [married woman].

Instructor: Say it depends how you understand the “sefer” [book]. “Lo sin’af” [don’t commit adultery] you don’t have to understand that as a problem of “ta’avos” [desires]. You can send it as a problem is that she doesn’t belong to you which “amongst herself” you could explain depends how you play these kind of a see them explain that both ways you don’t have to you don’t have to I don’t know how much I’ve committed a “machlokes” [dispute] between this machine completion is theoretical of command right no no that’s a but that’s but what which part which one would that be no it’s about the listening and it’s all again but I’ve listened but how is it also how much what’s together why is it but it’s “lo sachmod” it is always the internal of all these things “lo sin’af” as well as I’m saying that the internal of all of that was happened that’s not internal thing that’s that’s the “ma’aseh” [action].

Final Synthesis: Lo Sachmod as Pure Internality Without Adding New Prohibitions

Instructor: So “lo sachmod” as “lo sin’af” as that’s a different question I’m thinking is that doesn’t add any there’s no that they’re not we’re not that’s very important because it seems to justify this I have to go through a lot of because there seems to be different things but first I tell them which makes sense there’s no new things that would have been but now they’re or they’re and now they’re because of whatever is why because then you’re going to bleed it’s going to lead you to this thing “kinah” [jealousy] and “ni’uf” [adultery] and also because it’s itself a bad thing because you’re a bad person for for wanting that that’s what I say to really justify this I have to get into the whole thing it’s not so simple might be I might be wrong but that’s that’s enough for for my “shiur” [lecture].

*[Class ends]*

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[End of Transcript]