Virtuous habits don’t make actions automatic – Transcript

The Problem of Choice in Character Development: Shemona Perakim Chapter 8

Opening Remarks: The Need for Structure in Hasidic Gatherings

Instructor:

Obviously I like these Hasidic masses very much, but I’m worried that you’re not going to come if it’s only a Hasidic mass. Like, you have to have a *shiur* [shiur: formal Torah lesson], so you can *shmues* [shmues: informal Torah discussion/conversation] before the *shiur*, after the *shiur*. If there’s no *shiur*, then nobody’s going to show up to tell their stories. So you have to say a *shtickl shiur* [shtickl shiur: a little piece of Torah learning], and then you can *shmues* afterwards. It’s like that.

So I say, yeah, this is his *chumash* [chumash: the Five Books of Moses], nothing with me. Okay.

Introduction: Continuing Shemona Perakim and the Question of Choice

Instructor:

The story is like this. We’re starting *Shemona Perakim* [Shemona Perakim: Maimonides’ “Eight Chapters,” introduction to his commentary on Pirkei Avot] and *Perek Dalet* [Perek Dalet: Chapter Four]. Last week or the last two weeks, we’re discussing this thing, interesting thing called choice, sometimes known in Jewish language as *Bechira* [Bechira: free will/choice].

Now, some people thought that there’s no *shaychus* [shaychus: connection/relevance], but I’ll explain the *shaychus*. And then, according to that, I’ll explain some things about this.

The Framework: Character Virtues and Correct Actions

Instructor:

The *inyan* [inyan: matter/topic] is like this. We’re trying to understand and also hope that this understanding will help us somehow in reality to see if it does. But we’re trying to understand this framework, the framework of becoming a good person, known as the training of character virtues of *middos* [middos: character traits], which are supposed to lead to the correct actions based on them being their intermediate virtues, intermediate actions, and so on.

Now, when you think about this, there’s several questions, at least two questions, practical questions, not theoretical questions, but practical questions that go under the title of choice. What do I mean?

First Question: Free Will — A Theological Problem (Not Our Focus)

The Standard Free Will Problem

Instructor:

There’s one question of choice, which we discussed last week, the question of free will, or as I call it, free floating will, which is like a theological, theoretical question, which is nothing to do specifically with this framework of good *middos*, right?

It’s a question on any system that claims to give you the human good, or to explain what is good, and sometimes specifically exhortations, asking you to be good, and promising reward and punishment for being good, for being good or bad. People understand that to be contingent on some kind of free will, or really we should say some kind of responsibility existing between a person and his activities and his good or bad activities, because otherwise we say it’s not his fault, it’s not his responsibility, and therefore there should be no reward and punishment. But besides for that, there should also be no thing called ethics, right? There should be no exhortation or call to being better, because either I’m good or bad, there’s nothing that’s being there.

Student:

Yes, it’s very good.

Why This Problem is “Dumb”

Instructor:

So that’s what people usually think. And in some sense, chapter 8 in our book talks about that problem. Of course, if you think that this is a question, a theoretical question about free, extreme free will, I call it, or free-floating will versus contrary to determinism, which says that nothing makes a difference, that is a very dumb problem to have, like you say, because maybe that’s all part of it. And in any case, whoever is giving the exhortation doesn’t have free will to change that either. So it doesn’t seem to make any difference.

Also, on the other hand, even if you do have free will, it seems like that doesn’t actually solve the problem, because that kind of free will says that human actions, or at least some of them, the ones that are relevant, because the ones that are relevant are the ones that are said to have free will, are actions that have no reason, because once there’s a reason, then that’s not free will.

And therefore, it seems to me that you can’t really be a good person either. You can just choose things that happen to somehow randomly be good, because a good person, in our sense at least, is someone that makes his goodness make sense, or another more pertinent thing: you can’t give exhortations to becoming good, because that would be giving causes, and if you believe in free will as some kind of absolute thing, then you can’t tell anyone to be good and make them being good by telling them, because what makes them good must be their free choice. Otherwise you took away free will, and then it would be a bad thing for there to be *shaychus* [shaychus: connection/relevance] to the extent that it works. So if that doesn’t work, then it’s useless.

What Rambam May Actually Be Discussing

Instructor:

So that whole discussion we went through this last week and also our class yesterday, and also, I guess, a little in the second half of the class, that discussion is not relevant to us at least. It seems to be important, and we’ll get to chapter 8, we’ll try to figure out why the Rambam really thinks that it is a little bit important. I think the Rambam is not really discussing free will versus determinism, he’s discussing some kind of fatalism, some kind of astrological theories. He’s discussing something different, but I can’t talk about that right now because I don’t know enough.

Second Question: Choice Regarding Character — The Relevant Problem

Why This Question Arises From Our Framework

Instructor:

Well, something is relevant right now and right here. This is more important. And there’s two questions primarily that are very important right now. In other words, a question that is precisely because of the way that we explained what the human kinds of goods are.

We explained that the human kinds of what is a good person, a good human being, is someone who has something we call good *middos* [middos: character traits], but there’s something internal. We call it something like he likes or loves or enjoys doing the good actions, which means the intermediate actions. And this is a stable temperament in him, a stable kind of, what do we call it, like disposition, a stable wanting, it doesn’t change or something stable in him. In other words, it’s almost something that causes him always to act that way, or at least most of the time, otherwise it’s not a *middah* [middah: character trait], otherwise it’s just like some random wish or something.

And that is what being a good person consists of. It’s very important to understand that although actions are in some sense primary in the understanding of this, because what makes the *middah* good is if it leads to correct actions, but what actions is not what the goodness of the human being consists of. What the goodness of human being consists of is this more internal thing that we call having good *middos*, or having good character traits or virtues. Those are virtues. Virtues are excellences of the part of the soul that does these kind of actions. Okay? Does that make sense?

Now, because of this exact understanding of what a good human being is, which not everyone shares, precisely because of that, we have some questions of choice. Okay?

Two Connected Questions

Instructor:

And there’s really two questions. And I think they’re somewhat connected one to the other. But there’s two questions. One is a simple practical question, which is the *Tzemach Tzedek* [Tzemach Tzedek: Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneersohn of Lubavitch, 1789-1866] that we quoted, seems to have to do with it, and the other is a deeper question which goes to the structure of what this thing that we call having good *middos* is even.

The Practical Problem: Control Over What We Like

Instructor:

The first question is that it seems to people often that we don’t have enough control, or easy enough control at least, over what we are in this sense, in the sense of what we like. Many people will say something like this. You can tell me if you think I’m wrong. Many people say something like this.

If you come to Yeshiva and you say to both sides, all of you have to… We want to be good people, right? If you come to Yeshiva, you become better people. Listen to how you’re going to do it. You’re going to read three *blatt Gemara* [blatt Gemara: pages of Talmud] every day and you’re going to come to all the *sedarim* [sedarim: learning sessions] and you’re going to *daven* [daven: pray] three times a day and all these things you’re going to do. People say, okay, we’ll try. Those seem simple.

It seems like you can obviously everyone who this demand is addressed to can do those things. It’s not impossible for most people to learn that amount. It’s not impossible for anyone to come to *shul* [shul: synagogue] three times a day. It’s not impossible to do all these *mitzvos* [mitzvos: commandments]. It’s possible. And of course if you believe it’s impossible because you believe in some theory of deterministic theory then you have a problem maybe, probably not even not really, but it’s possible in our experience. It’s possible we decide to do things like that, I know how to become better. Simple, right?

If I come and tell you, no, this is not enough. That’s all very nice. Maybe you should do it, but not only because of that. A good person is someone who likes to learn. Learning is not a good example. I’m just saying it because everyone here wants to achieve and knows what I’m talking about. Okay? And someone being good is not someone who learns. It’s not enough to learn, you have to like it. That’s what having a *middah* consists of. It’s not enough to be good to your friends, not enough to be nice to your *chaveirim* [chaveirim: friends/companions]. You have to also be the kind of person who is good to his *chaveirim*, which means liking it.

Then people right away say, what? How am I going to do that? How do you become a kind of person? People say things like, I was born this way, or even if you would agree that you’re not stuck with what you were born, people say, okay, but it seems at least very hard. It seems to be weird to talk about choice or free choice in this kind of sense. It’s like you have free choice. It’s a very complicated process. Maybe it’s not even guaranteed to work. It seems to be a very difficult thing.

Why This Is Harder Than “Mitzvot on Feelings”

Instructor:

Even more, I’ll just have to make it clear. This is even more difficult than if I would say people have a problem. How could there be a *mitzvah* [mitzvah: commandment] on feelings, right? You should love God. You should love your neighbor. You should not hate him in your heart. Things like that. People say, what do you mean? What if I do? That’s a small problem relative to this problem. Because you could have access. You could. You have control of your heart a little more than you think, probably.

And anyways, the simple reading of these kind of *mitzvos* is something like, don’t hate them in your heart. You know what it means? It means don’t be the kind of person who smiles to people, but really plans their demise, plans how to denigrate them, to bring them under. That’s what to bring them down, that’s what this is, who that means. Now do you have control over that? Yeah, you do, because I’m like I say, talk about planning. If I talk about feeling in some feeling sense, and so that’s what it means.

Part 2: Addressing Objections and Clarifying the Problem

Addressing the “Mitzvos of the Heart” Objection

The Case of “Lo Tisna B’Lvavecha” (Do Not Hate in Your Heart)

Instructor: Things like that. People say, what do you mean? What if I do? That’s a small problem relative to this problem, right? Because you could have access, you could, you have control of your heart a little more than you think, probably. And anyways, the simple reading of these kinds of mitzvos [commandments] is something like, don’t hate him in your heart, you know, right? You know what it means? It means don’t be the kind of person who smiles to people, but really plans their demise, plans how to integrate them, how you say that in Yiddish, to bury them, to bring them under. That’s what, to bring them down, that’s what l’shech l’zach means.

Now, do you have control over that? Yeah, you do. Like I say, I’m talking about planning, I’m not talking about feeling in some feeling sense. Why do you say l’shech l’zach? That’s what it means, that’s one solution. That’s one solution to the problem. But what it means is that that’s one solution, one solution for that kind of problem. That’s not only what it means. It’s not if you’re selling the value, it doesn’t make it better really. That’s not the point. That’s just one solution. But I’m not saying a shira [song/solution]. I’m just trying to show you that’s actually a simple thing relatively.

The same thing that really means something like, don’t hate God, but come to Shul anyways. Anyways. Understand? But, now I’m demanding something a lot more than that.

Student: Well, it’s kind of the same thing. It leads to it, right? So, it says, and don’t be so nice to the fifth either, right?

Instructor: Yeah, yeah, that’s what I’m saying. It’s not like about getting you to here. It immediately follows up into what we’re proposing, right?

Student: Which is?

Instructor: That you should like to be good to them.

Student: Not really, no. Because it’s talking about a specific kind of problem where people are hypocrites.

Why This Doesn’t Solve the Main Problem

Instructor: He’s not talking about the kind of problem that we have.

Student: How would you address this hypocrite? Not by changing what he’s doing to them?

Instructor: No, like you said, there might be ways to change it. Or just think, don’t be that.

Student: How do you change it?

Instructor: It’s not here to do discussions. But it’s not making a demand on what kind of person you are. That’s not what it’s about. If I give you a demand, you should be that kind of person, which, like you said, it’s a long-term thing. You can’t have a middah [character trait] once. You can’t have a middah one day. It has to be, you have to become, be this kind of person and who loves the right things and hates the right things and is angry in the right amount and things like that for the right reasons and the right times.

And all of that, that seems to be a more, we could say, internal or even less controllable in the sense that we usually think of control. I have control over my hand, but do I have control over what I am, over the type of guy I am? That sounds extreme. Make sense, my question?

The Practical and Theoretical Questions

The Practical Question: How Does One Become Virtuous?

Instructor: And this is why this concept of tichinamidus [character development] seems to at least need some explanation of how it’s going to happen. And even now, this is one thing in the explanation, right? How it’s going to happen, practically. So that’s why I said there’s a practical question. Of course, there’s a practical answer. You people already know what the practical answer is.

But it also then needs a somewhat theoretical explanation of how, by that whole practical process, by we can tell you, okay, I’ll tell you, you have a problem, how you become this kind of guy, right? If I tell you it’s not enough to learn, you have to be a masmid [diligent learner]. Okay, how do you become a masmid? Secret answer. The answer is by learning. You learn enough until you become a masmid. And then you won’t have to learn anymore. You’ll just learn it somewhat, so to speak, automatically, which is another problem that we’ll see, right? But let’s talk first about the first thing, because it’s not automatic. If it’s automatic, it’s a problem.

The Theoretical Problem: The Paradox of Automatic Virtue

Instructor: All right, let’s say even we say this, now there’s still a problem, because it still seems like being the kind of person who likes to learn and therefore learning is not something by choice. You could say, okay, I made the choice to learn every day for five minutes and then I became the kind of guy who likes to learn five minutes every day. Okay, so I might you might say something like you deserve schar [reward] or I deserve praise or I am being a good person right this is really what I’m saying I’m being a good person by doing those like those actions but in what way am I being a good person and everyone understands that being a good person has a condition which is choice because anything this we went through last week very clearly right anything that is forced or even anything that’s not by choice even if it’s not forced, doesn’t count towards being a good person.

So, one necessary condition of something being a good action, something being good as a good person, is that it’s by choice. And if you have an understanding of a good person, which is something very far from what we usually call things that are by choice, like atomic actions, which seems to be where choice and will exist, then it seems to be hard to explain why is that even good. Why is that where we place the goodness of a human being?

The Genetic Analogy

Student: Just to clarify, are you trying to say that basically there’s no difference if it’s like a genetic thing, or you practiced until you got there? Ultimately, at this point, you’re just a guide, so it’s not something that’s of your choice.

Instructor: Yeah, it wouldn’t be that interesting. It wouldn’t be any different at this point. Yeah, you would have the same kind of problem. In other words, if you understand that the guy that already learns is doing it automatically, not by choice, and like you’re saying it’s so analogous to someone that would be born that way, maybe he gets credit for yesterday but for today he doesn’t get any credit. And that seems weird because we just told you our whole story was that this is the state of being the kind of good person and therefore doing good things is the good state, is the ideal state, not the state of getting to there, right? Because that would prioritize being a someone who self-control person, which the first stage is basically, over a virtuous person, which we’re not claiming.

What We Actually Praise

Normal Intuitions About Virtue

Student: I think that’s where your whole thing about people who have much of an option to be the ideal, they obviously respect people who, that’s not what they’re doing.

Instructor: Who are not much of an option?

Student: Yeah, that’s not what they’re doing. They enjoy learning, let’s say, for example.

Instructor: Yeah. Obviously, they’re an ideal person. They’re under no illusion that he’s fighting himself.

Student: I’m not sure. People claim, again, you’re asking about under illusion. The person sleeps up to the wee hours of the night and pushes until it’s a matter of…

Instructor: Yeah, our theory is that, I agree with you, that this thought that being a good person consists of liking the good is what normal people think. But if you think of, I don’t think anyone, I don’t really think anyone disagrees with that, that that’s what everyone thinks. We also praise people for liking the right things. Not only for doing the right things, like the story of Moshe being a ganav [thief], right? We don’t really believe in that story. Everyone believes that it’s better to be a good person than to be a bad person who does good things.

An Illustrative Anecdote

Student: I have a good story that brings up the Shikl Stira [apparent contradiction] that Shulberman walked into this marriage on this long summer Shabbos and said don’t look at his schar [reward], it’s like why not, right, that’s the question.

Restating the Core Problem

Instructor: So now, but you understand my question about choice. There’s both a practical question of like, what do you mean when you tell me that this is what I have to be, this is exactly the thing that I have less direct control all over, that’s one question. And even if you like answer the question by giving me the practical recipe which you all know, it still needs to be explained why precisely the second stage is the one we praise and not the first stage, right?

And if you understand that one important ingredient of praise of what a good person is, that is by choice, right? That’s like necessary. If something is not by choice, then it’s not interesting, ethically. That’s the question. That is a very good question. Make sense? It’s a good question.

Student: Is it a good question?

Instructor: I think it’s a good question. So, you must have asked a good question. Very good.

Methodological Turn: What Is Choice?

Reframing the Question

Instructor: So, I think that in order to answer this question, we need to ask a different question, which is, what is this choice thing even? What are we looking for when we’re looking for something that is by choice? If we understand very clearly what is this thing that we’re looking for, that we’re looking for choice, which is the thing that makes human activities ethically relevant or praiseable and damnable you know then we’ll understand why it will understand in a way that makes this kind of being a more choice like more chosen and another kind of being then will understand what we’re talking about that makes sense the guy that likes to do what what does he like you to do it as a product of choice.

Student: Yes.

Rejecting a Proposed Answer: The Avos and the Yetzer Hara

Instructor: So we could we could try to do with exactly this I’ll try we try to do exactly this and talk a little bit about this and maybe we won’t entirely finish this all the way to the end and hardly solve this question there might be simple things to solve this question I want to…

Student: Maybe, I don’t know. I don’t know anything about the Avos [Patriarchs]. I’m trying to talk about the thing. I don’t know.

Instructor: No, I don’t know. I don’t know.

Student: That the Avos weren’t… They didn’t have the Yetzer Hara [evil inclination].

Instructor: No.

Student: So the more you get the schar [reward], the more you get the Yetzer Hara.

Instructor: And what is the Yetzer Hara?

Student: The Yetzer Hara said that they got to such a stage.

Instructor: Okay.

Student: That they worked themselves up to such a place that they didn’t have the Yetzer Hara.

Instructor: I don’t think that’s the answer. I’m not happy with that answer. I’ll just explain to you why that’s not a good answer. It might be the same problem, but I’ll just explain to you why that answer is not a complete answer.

Beginning the Analysis: What Is Choice?

The Distinction Between Will and Compulsion

Instructor: So I need to try to think what this thing that we call choice is. Very important discussion. I’m going to just repeat the whole stupid toirah [teaching] from Avani Aristotle that tries to explain what choice is, or first explain what it’s not. Then maybe we’ll be able to get to this.

Now, number one is like this, there’s something called will, like, I think this maps very well to what we call Ratzon [will] versus Ones [compulsion] in Halakha [Jewish law].

Part 3: The Conditions for Ethical Choice

The Distinction Between Will (Ratzon) and Force/Ignorance (Ones/Shogeg)

Instructor: So I need to try to think what this thing that we call choice is, okay? Very important discussion. I’m going to just repeat the whole stupid toilet from Avani and Aristotle that tries to explain what choice is, or first explain what it’s not, and then maybe we’ll be able to get to this.

Now number one is like this, there’s something called will, like I think this maps very well what we call ratzon [will/desire] versus ones [force/compulsion] in halacha [Jewish law]. That is one kind of thing. Everyone understands that something that’s by ones, or even b’shogeg [through inadvertence/ignorance], which is some sort of a species of ones in this context, is not morally relevant, not ethically relevant.

What is the opposite of ratzon? Something that either done by force, done by force meaning something that was done to you by someone else, right? Instead of you doing it. This is an important definition. There’s differences that this definition makes that I’m not going to get into. But some, for example, like the extreme example, if someone pushed someone through you onto someone else and hurt them, you say, I didn’t do it at all. Someone did it with me, right? That’s by force. There’s more complicated cases where you’re like, somewhat you did a part of it and the other person did a different part. Okay, that’s called force. That’s not relevant.

There’s another kind of non-will which is called ignorance, right? That’s what we call shogeg usually in halacha. The difference between shogeg and ones is basically the difference between force and ignorance, right? Two ways of how you’re not responsible because you’re lacking will. It’s not a willing action, right?

Shogeg means either I didn’t know what this thing is, right? If I threw a rock at someone, I didn’t know that it’s metal and it’s going to kill him. That’s one kind of shogeg. Another kind of shogeg is I didn’t know the law, which Aristotle doesn’t think is a good shogeg ever, ever, where I forgot.

Student: What?

Instructor: It holds like this, right.

Student: It’s not clear that halacha disagrees.

Instructor: It’s shinkastin with Elizabeth, so we have to think of when that applies. Or, if I didn’t know that it’s the Shabbos [the Sabbath], things like that, those are another kind of shogeg.

Student: Yeah, but there’s some kind of responsibility there, because you have to bring a chatas [sin offering], so obviously there’s some type of responsibility.

Instructor: Very good, very good. But in some, it depends. That’s why there’s shogeg. If you should have known, the shogeg in which you’re responsible is when you have a matter of responsibility where you could have known. Whenever you couldn’t have known, that’s called literally an ones.

All the shogeg that are chayav chatos [obligated in a sin offering] are the ones where you should have known. You should have been more careful. Like, there’s two kinds of shogeg. There’s a shogeg where you didn’t know, and there’s also a shogeg where it’s like you didn’t… It’s also a kind of didn’t know, but something like you didn’t calculate… You forgot that it’s Shabbos.

Student: Right.

Instructor: You should have not forgot that it’s Shabbos. You did not forget that it’s Shabbos. Therefore, if it’s a case where you couldn’t… There was absolutely no way that you’re not considered a shogeg, you could be even found an ones.

I’m just telling you basic definitions to move on from this. Now, there’s something very… That’s the t’nai [condition] of ratzon, the t’nai of being willing. We understand this, okay? The law, for example, is very interested in this definition. Halacha is interested in this one.

The Central Thesis: Choice Requires More Than Will

Now, something very important. Choice is something more than willing. Something very interesting. When we say… When we say… Now, you understand? Something very important. When we say, in order for an action or a kind of thing a person is, which we’re trying to get to, is to be ethically relevant, we need choice. We have to understand that what we mean is something more than being willing versus being an ones.

Two Proofs That Will Alone is Insufficient

What is my ra’ayah [proof]? I have two ra’ayahs. Okay? One is a katan [minor/child] and the second is a mitasek [one who acts without deliberation]. These are our exact ra’ayahs also. I just gave it to you in Hebrew. Okay?

Proof One: The Case of Children

A katan has, obviously, does things willingly. I’m not talking about l’egiyah l’khenach [passive movement] or something like that with a one-year-old baby. Anyone that has children, they obviously do things willingly. There is no question about that. But no system of law punishes children up to a certain age. We can argue on the limits of this. But everyone understands that children, what they do, don’t count legally, don’t count ethically in some sense.

Proof Two: The Case of Mitasek

Another example is something called mitasek.

Student: Why is that?

Instructor: Wait, I’ll try to explain. I’m just showing you that will is not enough. When we say choice we mean something beyond will. It’s not the same thing.

Another example.

Student: Yeah, but I can give you an example of a child, right, that sticks his hand in the oven, but that comes from ignorance.

Instructor: Exactly.

Student: The second time.

Instructor: Exactly, exactly. But when a child does a good or a bad thing, he chose to do it in the sense of having will. You can’t say he was forced. Nobody thinks that children are forced. Even animals, by the way, probably do things willingly in that sense. At least Aristotle thinks so. Aristotle, animals can do or not do things. Nobody is forcing them to do many of the things they do so they have will yes of course they do and then like again a dog not a I don’t know some bugs.

Student: How do they have will? It’s ignorance.

Instructor: They don’t need ignorance. They’re not ignorant. They know a dog knows where he’s going and he decides to go there or not there. Not ignorant of the things that are relevant to him. He might be ignorant in the moral sense because he doesn’t know there’s something as law, but that would be, that’s another level ignorance. I’m talking ignorance in the sense of I don’t, usually that’s the main like primary example of ignorance here is that you don’t know what you’re doing. You don’t know the object or you don’t know like, I didn’t know that my car was on when I ate, something like that, right? And dogs have that.

Okay, so children or animals have will. And it’s not enough.

Another thing which is also easy to see is something, I think something we call halacha mitasek, doing things in some kind of, the translators call it the spur of the moment things. Reflexive is not a good definition for that I think. So it’s different. Something is something I just I don’t know I just moved that cup there. I didn’t choose to do it.

The Chandelier Example: Clarifying the Distinction

I’ll give you my example, good sometimes better examples but then it gets complicated. I’m trying to try to get to the intuition here. If I, if you come into this room because I spent a few hours trying to figure out what a good example to clarify this. If you go this room and you ask me, why is there this chandelier in it? I will tell you I chose it. If you come and ask me, why is that paper vertically and not horizontally? If I tell you I chose it, that sounds very weird. I put it there, nobody forced me to put it there in that way. I was the one that put it in that exact way. But me telling you that I chose it would sound weird. Why would it sound weird? It’s missing something. This word choice means something beyond.

Student: Intentionality?

Instructor: Some kind of intentionality.

Student: Some kind of, I could tell you a few things.

Student: For a purpose.

Instructor: Some kind of purpose. Missing some reason. Like, in other words, choice means a reason. Choice means a reason. There’s a reason I chose this, because I thought it will match the rest of the room. There’s the brown and the white and whatever. Something. And it wasn’t too expensive or too cheap. I could give you an account. I can give you a theory.

Not every choice might be that elaborate. But there’s some, I could give you at least three words of what this would mean. At least, like you said, there’s an intention and means something. It’s towards something. There’s a goal. I need to have a nice room. Therefore, I put this chandelier. There was some kind of deliberation in it. Like, I looked at the 30 different chandeliers that have it on people and I chose the nicest one or whatever. And there is some kind of reasoning in it, right? Why did I choose this? It makes sense. I might be wrong. It’s not something like an intellectual thing. It’s different than…

It’s different than, like, I give you a proof, why do you believe the drama meant this? I’ll give you a proof. I can’t give you a proof for why I chose it. Proof is the wrong category, or argument in the intellectual philosophical sense is the wrong argument. But reasons are correct. There is a reason. And I might have even discussed it with other people. Afterwards, I made a choice. There’s, like, a consultation going on. I asked my wife, what do you think? I asked this guy, what do you think? There is something going on.

Versus when you ask me, why is that paper that way? I can’t blame anyone else. Like in some sense legally if there’d been a violent doing that I’ll say I don’t know I wasn’t thinking.

Student: Well why aren’t you thinking?

Instructor: That wouldn’t, it wouldn’t absolve me from doing some, it would be good and bad in the legal sense probably sometimes it would, right? But we have the difference between like premeditated things and non-premeditated things. But so maybe it would make it like it turn into second-degree for some things for some. Something makes a difference, but it’s definitely not choice.

Why Choice Matters for Ethical Evaluation

In other words, now you can see something very simple already from this example. Why would this be more relevant to the kind of morality I care about? I’m trying to discuss, to explain to you. It would be more relevant precisely because we say that a good person and good activities is not good. We say something interesting, right?

We say something that there could be the same action that can be good, done by a good person, and the bad person can do good things and it doesn’t make him good, right? The right, the self-controlled person, the person who’s under self-control and the good person both do the exact same things. Like the beinoni [intermediate person] and the tzaddik [righteous person] in the Tanya [foundational Chabad text], they both do the exact same actions. That’s just that I don’t know why you’re so confused about explaining it. And they both do the same exact thing but one is a good person and the other one is a person who’s doing good activities. He’s acting as if he’s a good person but he’s not a good person, right?

Now what we mean to say, what do we mean to say about that? That there’s something in the way, there might be also different, but there’s something in which when the good person does it it’s expressive of the kind of person he is. When the bad person does it it’s not expressive of what it is. So this is different. He did it by self-control not by what he is, right? The reason, in other words there’s different reasons for doing it. When a bad person does a good thing he’s doing it because he thinks that it’s good and there’s self-control and so on. When a good person does it, it’s expressive of what he is already, right? Because I’m the kind of person that does these kinds of things.

Choice as Revelatory of Character

What am I telling you here? Now you can already see and I think that I jumped a little bit of a step but you can already see that when I tell the things, what is the difference from things that are done choice and that things are merely done willingly? At least one of the things is that if I tell you okay I chose this, then you know I’m the kind of guy that likes this kind of thing. This is my idea of beauty has something to do with this or my idea of what the purpose of this…

Part 4: Character, Deliberation, and Moral Responsibility

The Insufficiency of “Not Being Forced” – Arbitrary Actions and Moral Significance

The Problem of Arbitrary Actions

Student: It reflects something about me versus how that piece of paper is put down on the desk doesn’t say anything about me unless you say it says that I’m messy or something very general. It doesn’t say anything particular to this action about me. I’m messy, or then it goes back—that’s why I tried to get away—then it goes back, a question: if it’s automatic, does it come from some character trait that I have, right? It doesn’t really come from anything, some difference that’s entirely arbitrary. Can’t blame anyone else, but it doesn’t say anything else about me.

So now, yeah. Just going back to the kids thing, is that what you’re saying, the kids don’t have intentionality?

Instructor: Yeah, kids. So this, I’ll finish, I’m just going to finish one thing.

Redefining Why Choice Matters Morally

So now, when we say that choice is necessary for things to be relevant morally, if you think about it in this way, you’ll realize right away from thinking the difference between willing and choice, you’ll see that what we need is not that there’s something that wasn’t forced, that something else did that. It’s not enough. Because I showed you from these examples, what we mean by that is something—and also not, obviously, the problem of determinism, which would just be a thing that everyone is always forced because nobody ever does anything because the principle is not in him. He’s not the beginning of that action.

But what we’re looking for is a specific way in which an activity is mine. There’s some ba’alus [ownership/responsibility], some ownership of the thing, which is why we’re looking for this thing called choice.

Legal and Ethical Implications: Premeditation and Character

This is why it’s very obvious, right? Everyone understands that we have this category of premeditation, and we have, in law it’s very important to talk about intention—did the person plan it? And we can do something like character witnesses, which show what kind of person is, would he have planned it or something like that. Or even if he did it just out of anger, that doesn’t show so much. That isn’t somehow less bad.

Why is it less bad? It’s only less bad because we understand that what choice is, what makes actions belonging to a human being, is precisely that they come out of the kind of thing he is, the kind of person he is. Does this make sense?

And this is an entirely different definition of why choice is even important in ethics or in judgment—not only important to negate problems of someone else did it. It was important to negate the question: did he do it because of what he is, or did he just do it for some other reason, or for no reason? If you do something for a reason and part of the reason is what you are, then it’s something that shows what you are.

Chapter 6: The Relationship Between Character and Rational Deliberation

Distinguishing Character-Based Action from Pure Rationality

Student: Do we not want to—in this, just to maybe split it out into maybe this is a third category—but we’re not looking for exclusively actions that follow from rational deliberation, right? We’re looking for things that follow from character that was a product of rational deliberation?

Instructor: Well, we’re going to get to that problem. That’s more complicated. The kind of character is not something distinct from rational deliberation, some kind of reason.

The Circularity Objection

Student: So far this sounds very circular to me. In other words, where does it start from? The chicken or the egg, right? When I start doing something, anytime I start doing something, what type of person am I?

Instructor: Yeah, yeah, I’m talking about after.

Student: And then it turns me into that, whatever type of person. It’s circular.

Instructor: That’s not the problem. We’re talking about—I’m just telling you the ideal. The fact that it’s circular, that’s agreed.

Student: No, you’re saying that it tells me what type of person I am.

Instructor: Yes.

Student: So what is that? I thought action makes me a person.

Instructor: That’s true. But we’re saying that the ideal action—I’m just talking about how the ideal action is the one where you’re already a kind of person and you’re doing good things because you’re that kind of person. Not before that. There’s three stages in every—that’s the practical sense.

Actions Against One’s Nature

Student: But I can never do anything without—

Instructor: No, you could. When you’re doing something because you’re forced—

Student: No, that’s not true. Nobody is forced to do anything.

Instructor: And especially it’s obviously possible to do things against your own choice. We have to talk about this. It’s also possible to do things against what you think is good or against what you feel is good. At least that’s how practice works, right? Practice means—there’s not—I didn’t say ever that everything we do comes out of what we are. The opposite.

But those would be the less chosen actions, or the actions less connected to your choice. What you are doesn’t force you to do anything ever. There isn’t even such a thing as what you are in that sense.

Chapter 7: Character Traits as Chosen Dispositions, Not Automatic Forces

What Character Traits Are Not

This is something that we have to understand a lot better. When we say something like people have character traits, those are not force powers. They’re not energies that force you to do things.

What Character Traits Actually Are

What they are is precisely something choosy—I don’t know how you say that—something that has the attribute of choice. It’s actually what they are is almost a choice, choice plus something else, plus actually liking it. But that’s your liking isn’t aligned with your choice, but not habit—habit not in an automatic way.

All the habits that we’re ever talking about are not something that should be understood as an automatic thing. The only thing that is automatic—that it doesn’t mean you don’t become an automatic thing. This is another important thing. I’m again jumping around, I’m just jumping around.

Good Habits Require Thinking, Not Automaticity

But you should be very clear that when we say that a good person is someone that has good habits, we do not mean that he’s a person that does things without thinking. It’s almost the opposite. He does everything with thinking.

Student: Are you saying this is where the intentionality comes in?

Instructor: Yeah, yeah.

Student: How does that tie in with what you were saying before about having intention or purpose or whatever?

Instructor: Yes, because intention means I’m doing something for a reason.

Chapter 8: The Two Senses of “You” in Choice

Simple Willing vs. Complex Choice

So you want it to be two things. You want it to be you with a purpose or intention? “You” just means, you in the simple sense, in the willing sense, is just: I did it, not someone else.

But “you” in the more complex sense is: I did it because of me. Because of me understanding this to be a good thing, which is the kind of person I am. I see the good in certain things. I see how this is good. I’m trained to understand how to act in certain cases. That’s what we mean when we say choice.

Student: But also you’re doing it because it’s what you do.

Instructor: That’s what exactly doing, because it’s what I do, is what it means doing it because I chose it. That’s what choice consists of.

Choice Is Not Contrary to Habit

Student: That’s what I’m asking, I guess, your question also.

Instructor: There’s not—choice is not something—this is precisely what we’re trying to get to here. We could talk—trying to think if I—my four things here.

The choice is not something contrary to doing things automatically. There isn’t really—the understanding that we have here of habit is not really doing things automatically. There is not such an understanding. Maybe they think that it’s not the correct description of the things we call that way.

Chapter 9: Reasons and Character as Unified

Why Premeditated Actions Are More Expressive of Character

When we say, I explained to you, the reason why we’re interested in choice is not only because choice is distinct from willing. What’s interesting in choice is because we’re interested in things done that the person did, unlike something that just—they are not expressive of what he is.

Now the kinds of thoughts, the kinds of reasons that people have are a lot more expressive of what they are than their choices when they don’t have good reasons or their choices when they don’t like what they’re doing. This would be two different levels, but in any case.

The Murder Example: Planned vs. Impulsive

When I say he is the kind of guy that he likes, that he makes—he’s a murderer, right? He planned the murder. And he planned the murder because to him, murder is good. Murder seems good to him. That makes the action a worse kind of action and shows that he’s a worse kind of person than when we say someone murdered someone because he was angry in the moment or just for no reason.

The kind of reasons, the kind of reasons that people have, the kind of intentions they have—which are intentions that are just aiming towards a reason, aiming towards a goal that you have—the kind of reasons that people have is precisely expressed through what kind of people they are. There isn’t two things: the giving reasons and being a kind of person.

Chapter 10: Addressing the Automatic Habit Confusion

The Daily Cigarette Example

Student: I’m still confused. There’s two things going on. There’s the fact that you want it to be a habit, but also you want it to be a habit that isn’t just automatic. I don’t know. I don’t think that really. At a certain time every day, just automatic, not thinking.

Instructor: Those are precisely the things that I just said that we don’t call choice. The paper sideways or—

And again, choice doesn’t have to be every day. That’s another question.

Student: Even though it’s a habit, it’s still not a choice, basically.

Instructor: Well, only in—I don’t think we have to judge activity one by one. We could say, that’s another thing, as I said, if we can jump all the way there and talk about that.

The Proper Unit of Analysis: Life Stories, Not Individual Actions

There’s no reason, because the whole—when we’re talking about judging a person as the kind of person he is, right, we’re going to tell his whole life story, at least a long story. We’re not going to ask about every action. That’s the wrong framing or the wrong—

Student: But what do you think, a person goes out for a cigarette every day at noon?

Instructor: Right. But again, let’s talk about something more simple, right?

Chapter 11: The Chandelier Example – What Makes Choice Humanly Interesting

Returning to a Clearer Example

Can you go back to my example of choosing the kind of something that would make sense to say I chose? You see that this, what?

Student: Stopping to smoke a cigarette.

What’s NOT Interesting About Choice

Instructor: What’s interesting—no, I’m trying to get something. What’s interesting about me saying I chose to buy this chandelier is not that I could have not bought it. There’s something a lot—that’s obviously true, but there’s something a lot more interesting in saying that.

What IS Interesting About Choice

It’s that I chose in the sense that I checked into it, I looked into it, I found the right one, I have my reasons for doing that. And this whole story is what makes my choice of buying a chandelier interesting in a human way, in a way that is, I say, is expressive or has something to do with—

Part 5: Virtue, Practical Wisdom, and the Nature of Ethical Habit

VI. The Paradox of Choice: True Choice as Necessity

A. Inverting the “Could Have Done Otherwise” Criterion

Instructor: I could not have done otherwise. It’s the opposite. If I make a decision, assuming that this is something I can express—that example is not a really ethical example—but assuming that, if you imagine it as an ethical thing, and we say, I made this choice because I have a correct… You could use aesthetics as a place of ethics, right? Because I have the correct vision of beauty, I understand how proportionate things have to be and which colors they have to be and so on. That’s why saying that it’s my choice is interesting. That’s why it makes it part of me. It makes it something that I did, right?

It’s actually not true that I could have done differently. It’s almost the opposite. I couldn’t have done differently. I couldn’t have chosen differently. I could have been forced to do something differently. I could have not chosen differently. If I would do differently, it would be not by choice, because my choice is precisely what comes out of my understanding of how things should be.

B. The Chandelier Illustration

Instructor: If I would have bought an ugly chandelier—assuming that I’m the guy that understands this, right—if I bought an ugly one, you would say, “Well, he didn’t choose it.” For example, right? I’ll tell the same example. If you come here and you see, “Well, why is there that ugly thing?” And I say, “Why? I didn’t choose that. Don’t blame me for it. I didn’t choose it. It’s there by necessity because the air conditioner was there before and we didn’t have the ability to move it.” So therefore, right, you see how that absolves me?

That doesn’t mean I don’t have responsibility. Also doesn’t mean I couldn’t have done differently. I could have done differently, but it doesn’t express my choice. It’s not a choice that I made. Choice is a very positive thing and it’s not the same thing as “he could have done otherwise.” It’s almost the opposite of “he could have done otherwise.” He almost couldn’t have done otherwise. Of course, if he entirely could have done otherwise, it’s more complicated than this, but almost.

C. Clarifying the Relationship

Instructor: Did this help us split these two things? Somewhat. They’re still there. They’re closely connected. Nobody’s arguing. I just have to show you the difference, right? So I just—I want to—it has to follow. What takes place has to follow by virtue of your human participation, human kind of decision, which is by reasons and by understanding of what is good and things like that. So when you develop some *middah* [character trait] or something like that, what we’re saying is that you’re going to do that, but when you do that, it reflects the choice. That’s the point.

Radical Reframing of Middot (Character Traits)

Middot Require Practical Wisdom

Instructor: A *middah* always, all *middot*, this has to do with another class that we did, probably—all *middot* consist almost of, or at least require, something called practical judgment, *phronesis* [Greek: practical wisdom], practical wisdom. A *middah* is not—that’s why we have to keep on getting out of this model that we have. A *middah* has kind of energies that push you to do things. There’s no inkling of that. Having a correct *middah*, it means something like having a good—something, the closest knowledge that I have that people know what it is, means something like having a good aesthetic judgment. I mean, I have an eye for the correct activity, the correct action.

B. The Active Nature of Judgment

Instructor: And even very clearly, you can see very clearly what—no, it’s not true. You can see very clearly how there’s something active all the time. It’s not—someone, right, if you think of this analogy, right? Someone—there’s a person that has a good eye for beauty, right? When he judges something as beautiful, it’s true that he judges this from something you could call it energy if you really want, but it’s not the way that people would understand. It’s true that he was trained to be able to have this. This is not something he was born with, or maybe not necessarily born with. He trained himself by making a bunch of judgments and accepting criticism and however it is that you get trained into having a good eye for beauty. But it’s not the eye that he has sort of pushing him to have that judgment. It’s a judgment that he has right now.

Student: Even habits in this sense then can follow because they’re informed by an ethical perception of a certain…

Instructor: You could see how they’re ethically informed, even if they’re habitually carried out.

Student: Habits are not habitually carried out?

Instructor: Because I have the evaluative—because there’s always—because, not that’s what you’re doing, right? Because, yeah, every habit that we think of is something like, here’s a person that only gets mad in the right times, right? This means something like he has a good eye for identifying the times in which you should be getting angry. It doesn’t mean—it’s very important that all *middot* acquire *phronesis*. It doesn’t mean his boiler of anger is calibrated correctly in his soul. That whole story is a fantasy that you were taught by Disney, I don’t know who. It doesn’t exist. This is like my first class on ethics. People keep on going back to that for some reason. I don’t know why people like that image, like that understanding. There’s no reason to think of it.

C. Ethically Informed Activity

Student: I think it’s how informed, how ethically informed your activities are, even if they’re repeated. They’re repeated, but they’re actively repeated. They’re not passively repeated. It follows from an ethical understanding.

Instructor: Yeah, or a perception almost.

Student: Yes.

Instructor: Because that partially answers the question, right? Things can become easier in a certain sense, but it’s still—right, like I’m a very good painter. You have to understand the habit like this. Word “habit” is extremely confusing for the correct understanding. If the habit is more like, I’m a very good painter, I can habitually paint a beautiful art. I don’t have to think about it. I just come in the morning to a studio and I take out a paint and it’s painted in five minutes. Nobody would say that that means it wasn’t done with skill, right? Skill is art knowledge. Nobody would say, “Well, he’s not really doing it. It’s just his habit doing it.” It doesn’t even make sense. And then it’s the opposite. The more he has the habit, the better artist he is, not the worse artist he is. Then it’s more relevant to praise him for being a good artist.

Of course, you could say there wasn’t a challenge in it. I’m not saying that it’s more—in some sense, if he has a challenging thing, then he’s going to express even more of his art, because now there’s a complicated case. He has to express more of his knowledge of how exactly to paint something. But there’s no way it’s going to be looking like a three-year-old *mishka* [scribble/mess]. It’s not automatic.

Student: Exactly.

VIII. Challenging the Concept of “Automatic” Ethics

A. Questioning the Premise

Instructor: Exactly, but it’s never automatic in the sense that you’re imagining the whole time. And actually, if I—you know people, nobody ever—I don’t know, I don’t even know where people got this idea, now that I’m thinking of this. Where did you get the idea that people have automatic *middot*? Why? What are you people even talking about? The *oved* [one who serves/works] went automatically, what does this even mean? What’s automatic in the sense of—I mean, you could talk about automatic in things that are actually not ethical, like I have a certain tick, like whenever I wake up, I push my ear that way. That’s not relevant. There’s no good or bad in that. That’s something with no thought. But anything that’s ethically relevant, you really have an example of one that’s automatic in any real way?

Student: He’s a *masmid* [diligent scholar], they learned everything.

Instructor: Okay, well in what sense is that automatic? Seems like a very funny description of something. You got what I’m saying?

Student: No, I could—because what is following, like what you said, yeah, without like it going through his clear *hergel* [habit] or his *koach* [power/faculty], his *middas ha-modeh ha-emes* [the character trait of acknowledging truth]?

Instructor: Yeah.

Student: No, meaning, where does that come from?

Instructor: Yeah, I don’t know. Is that so hard to imagine?

Student: To bypass his so-called faculty of choice or his faculty of whatever faculty it is that determines this?

Instructor: Is it so hard to imagine? It doesn’t make sense because *modeh ha-emes* means that I know—doesn’t mean—just to be clear, this has to do with *derech mitzvah* [the way of commandments], right? If *modeh ha-emes* would mean something like I’m like a machine, you press a button and I tell you everything I’m thinking, then you would be correct. But since there’s no *middah* that’s like that, right?

B. Levels of Intentionality

Student: No, but there are levels of intentionality you could have, for example, not for the *middah*, not for an intermediate, right?

Instructor: No, no, no, even if it’s intermediate. For example, if it’s not governed by the rationality of the thing itself but by something else. So as someone tells me every morning when you come in, do this.

Student: Yeah, but that’s not an ethical habit.

Instructor: There’s nothing intermediate about that, right? The intermediate requires knowledge, always requires judgment.

Student: But it’s automatic.

Instructor: Automatic in what way?

Student: Automatic in the sense that—

Instructor: No, waking up at a certain time is not—it doesn’t follow from rational deliberation in any sense.

Student: Oh, it does, but I do it repeatedly.

Instructor: It does, because you need to know when it’s the right time. How do you know when it’s the right time?

Student: Yeah, yeah, so I’m saying it’s…

Instructor: You may have to do it without looking at the clock?

Student: Right, right, so let me…

Instructor: Or maybe you have an internal clock. That doesn’t change anything.

IX. The Light Switch Thought Experiment

A. Setting Up the Distinction

Student: One second, so is there a difference between the person who comes in and hits the light switch every morning because he was told, “By the way, every morning when you come in, hit the light switch,” and the person who turns on the light every day because he wants there to be light in the building?

Instructor: No, I don’t see the difference.

Student: Okay, there’s no difference.

Instructor: The person who turns on the light every day is because he wants there to be light in the building.

Student: No, no, no, let’s say, for example, he’s…

B. Acting as a Machine

Instructor: If he’s—no, of course, in some sense he’d be operating like a machine. Someone could tell him, “Hey, your job, you know, I’m paying you ten dollars a day to get this.” Rich people can be told to act like machines for other people. Then they’re not agents. Then they’re not ethical agents. Then they’re just *karka olam* [ground of the world; inert matter].

C. Degrees and Complications

Student: This idea that things—

Instructor: Yeah, but this idea that things can’t be done—you know, nobody would call that a choice, a hundred percent. But it does mean that things can be done automatically without participation.

Student: Oh, that’s complicated.

Instructor: Only in a relative sense. I’m not saying—but what I’m saying is that there are degrees.

Student: Yeah, but it’s not very interesting.

Instructor: Just to be clear, that’s why the “just following orders” excuse doesn’t work very well, ethically.

Part 6: Automaticity and Ethical Responsibility

The Limits of Automaticity in Human Action

Why “Just Following Orders” Fails as an Ethical Excuse

Instructor: This idea that things can’t be done 100%, but it does mean that things can be done automatically without participation in rational deliberation. Oh, that’s complicated, only in a relative sense. I’m not saying it’s not in a relative sense, but I’m saying it’s that there are degrees.

Student: Yeah, but it’s not very interesting, just to be clear.

Instructor: That’s why the “just following orders” excuse doesn’t work very well. Ethically, it doesn’t work very well, precisely because no action that’s relevant—again, the only extreme case is something like where I throw you onto someone, then I’m really using you as a tool—but everything besides that is going to go through your rational or emotional, even, whatever you want to call it. It doesn’t have to be rational. Again, everything we say rationally, we don’t mean reason in the kind of reason that learns to use. We mean the kind of reason that knows that if you want to go through the door, you have to open the door.

Student: Right, right.

Instructor: There isn’t a possibility for a human being to do that without that, and even in a sense without whatever kind of ethical judgment he has, because people don’t only do things because they think they’re correct. We have to get to this and more. I’m not going to finish it today—what time is it?—but I have to go through his four things that choice is. I’ll see a bunch of nice things.

But to conclude this point: you would, firstly, you would not be able to do anything without some kind of perception at least, which is a kind of judgment. So again, you could say I made a mistake, I have some habit that caused me to perceive things wrongly, and so on, but there’s something there. And also not really possible to go through some kind of choice, because, again, choice in the sense of the deliberative choice, this kind of thing where I aim towards something because I think it’s good.

Now, I might not have two sides, I might not have thought about it for a very long time—all of these things we could talk about, like degrees of choice. I agree. But you can’t really have anything that’s, again, anything that’s ethically relevant. That’s relevant. Now, ethically relevant is another way of saying something that is done through this, how we call it, the desiring soul, right? The part of the soul that wants things. Now, the part of the soul that wants things works by identifying what it thinks is good and doing those things. How are we going to do without that 100%?

The only thing that I would say is, and where I do think it’s interesting, is that by understanding, let’s say, what you’re doing better and improving your understanding of what you’re doing, in some sense you change a little bit, even if you’re doing the same thing. I think eventually you’re not doing the same thing.

Student: Right, right.

Instructor: You’re not doing the same thing 100%, but not doing the same thing because there’s many descriptions of the same thing, and human activities have to do with those descriptions just as they have to do with the physical activity.

Student: Right, right.

The Problem with Calling Actions “Automatic”

Challenging the Concept of Automaticity

Instructor: I’m just saying, because something can be automatic only shows that you have a minimum sense of—I don’t know which things are automatic. What does that mean? Tell me one automatic thing.

Student: So I wouldn’t call it automatic. I would say that there are some actions that follow from a much smaller narrative, right? For example, this is what I do so that someone doesn’t yell at me.

Instructor: Okay, so you could call it something like…

Student: Or not even this way: this is what I do because it works.

Instructor: It’s not automatic. It’s not interesting to say it’s automatic. What’s interesting is to say that you’re only following orders. So the real—in other words, if you want to judge this person, you could say something like… Even that I think is not true.

The Software Program Example

Student: No, I give you a dumb example for this, right? So if you have a program, right, there’s two typically—there’s different ways you can use it, right? But some people understand, “Hey, I click here and I click here and nobody—and everything works,” right? And then there’s a person who actually understands the mechanical function of that program and does this. They both do it habitually, right?

Instructor: I’m not sure what you mean by habitually. That’s what I’m confused about.

Student: Meaning, both of it follows from some sort of rational deliberation, but the way in which they’re doing that habitually is different. One is doing it habitually because they’re producing a certain outcome every time, and another one is doing it because they follow a specific procedure every time.

Instructor: Yeah, I’m not sure I understand, because they might be doing different things—the same people doing the same… Just to be clear, people doing the same physical thing might still be doing different things, right? In the ethical sense, right?

The Bus Stop Analogy: Same Physical Action, Different Ethical Actions

Instructor: Like our example of the people standing by a bus stop. Okay, people standing by the bus stop can all of them are standing by the bus stop, and then that’s the minimal description of what they’re doing. But also, one of them is going to visit his grandmother, another one is on the way to murder two people, and the other one is just checking if the bus comes on time. Those people are not doing the same thing. The ethically correct, ethically relevant, or humanly relevant description of what they’re doing—which is their intention—is not the same at all. Okay? Those are not the same thing.

Now, though, but the difference is not one of choice. It’s not that one of them have less choice. None of them are doing anything automatically. They’re just doing less of anything, right? I’m saying, of course, choice is more interesting when it’s a more complicated story, but none of them are doing anything not by choice.

Redefining What “Automatic” Really Means

The “Because I Did It Yesterday” Critique

Student: Right, but I think what people might mean when they say that someone’s doing something automatically means that it’s following from an adherence to a much less ideally rational place. If someone says something like…

Instructor: I get what you’re saying. Something like what we call automatically would just mean something like someone who the real reason he’s doing something is because he did it yesterday.

Student: Yeah.

Instructor: Like the Kotzker [Kotzker Rebbe] could have said that you shouldn’t do that.

Student: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Instructor: But I sort of think that nobody really says that. This is why I’m anti-Kotzk, because this is just a very weird judgment of people. Nobody doubted him because he doubted him yesterday. It even sounds weird. If you ask the guy, this so-called *mitzvos anashim melumadah* [commandments performed by rote], another guy, and they say, “Why are you putting on *tefillin* [phylacteries] today?” And he said, what did he tell you? “Because I put it on yesterday.”

Who, which normal—no human being would answer this answer. Only the people critical of him say that. They don’t really agree. They’re not into his mind. He’s saying, “Why am I putting on *tefillin*? Because I put on *tefillin*. Of course I do it every day because I put on *tefillin* every day.”

Student: Yeah, but not because he did it yesterday.

Instructor: I’d say more like a less than ideal rational understanding of what he’s doing, right? And he’s doing it for maybe something that is much less ethical than you would…

Student: Well, you could say, again, that’s what I think people mean by automatic.

Why “Automatic” Is a Bad Word

Instructor: It’s not automatic. It’s a very bad word. It’s not expressing what it’s trying to say. It’s not true that the person who puts on *tefillin* like yesterday is doing it automatically. It is true that he’s doing much less. It’s something different.

You could say something like: you’re only putting on *tefillin* like you could eat *tefillin*. Really what you should be doing is putting on *tefillin* *b’chol l’vavcha, b’chol nafsh’cha, b’chol m’odecha* [with all your heart, all your soul, and all your might] to serve God, which is a different action. It expresses itself in the same physical part, but it’s a different action.

But that’s nothing to do with automatic. It can do something else. Automatic would be a weird description for doing something in a minimal way or something like that. It’s usually what people are criticizing, though, what they really want to criticize when they’re saying something’s automatic.

Student: That’s interesting. I hear what you’re saying.

Instructor: Yeah.

Conclusion

Instructor: Okay, we’re done. My life is complete. I could close it, or we’ll get to… We’ll finish more next time. That’s it.