Laws of Megillah, Chapter 1, Halachah 1–4 (Auto Translated)

Makkos 23b: The Agreement of the Heavenly Court, and Reading the Megillah as a “Problematic Enactment”

Introduction — A Forgotten Gemara About Reading the Megillah

Speaker 1:

Let’s continue with the laws of Megillah, the reading of the Megillah (krias megillah). I saw one Gemara — I forgot about it yesterday — one interesting Gemara. The Gemara with Salmon brought it to my attention. The Gemara in Makkos 23, page b, it says… Did you see it?

Speaker 2:

No.

Speaker 1:

It’s very interesting. We need to see if it appears in other sources. I forgot one Gemara yesterday — we were talking about the enactment (takanah) of reading the Megillah. Here is another Gemara that says clearly that reading the Megillah is a problematic matter, which also has a similar… it could be. It’s hard for me to see… Bring a computer or… I’ll bring a screen here.

Speaker 2:

Okay, I can buy myself a screen so you’ll see what I see.

Speaker 1:

What happened with the lights here? It’s a bit dim. You can’t. You need to buy such a screen. Makkos 23, page b, it says as follows… I could actually buy such a screen. But it’s also good to use for your shiurim, like when you want to show anything, a piece of PowerPoint. I just forgot to bring the printout of Rabbi Chaim Vital.

Speaker 2:

Can you bring out the screen?

Speaker 1:

Okay, but wait a minute, I don’t have room for it either. Good, it says as follows, you hear?

Gemara Makkos 23b — Rabbi Chananya ben Gamliel, Kares, and “Who Went Up to Heaven?”

The Sugya: All Those Liable to Kares Who Received Lashes

Speaker 1:

The Gemara in Makkos 23, page b — that’s where the sugya is that I owe you, the sugya we need to learn. That’s not the sugya we need to learn. The “three transgressions where you forgo your money,” which comes from “and you shall greatly guard your souls” (v’nishmartem me’od l’nafshoseichem). The Mishnah of “all those liable to kares (excision) who received lashes” (kol chayavei kerisos she’laku) — do you remember it?

Speaker 2:

Look, it says like this, right?

Speaker 1:

No, I’ll tell you how it goes. Yes, Rabbi Chananya ben Gamliel… Who said it?

Speaker 2:

Rabbi Chananya ben Gamliel.

Speaker 1:

Rabbi Chananya ben Gamliel said, “All those liable to kares who received lashes are exempted from their kares” (kol chayavei kerisos she’laku nifteru midei kerisasan). Yes? It says… Rav Ada bar Ahavah said, Rav Ada bar Ahavah said in the name of Rav, the halachah follows Rabbi Chananya ben Gamliel. Okay? Rav Ada bar Ahavah came and said the halachah is like Rabbi Chananya ben Gamliel — that whoever is liable to kares and was given lashes is exempt from the kares.

Rav Yosef’s Question: “Who Went Up There?”

Speaker 1:

Rav Yosef said, yes? Rav Yosef said, “Who went up there?” (man salik leih?) — as if someone went up to heaven and brought back the answer.

Discussion: The Source from Rabbeinu Yonah — One Cannot Issue a Ruling on Matters of Faith

Speaker 1:

And you say this is the school of the Rambam. What should I do that the Rambam on this Mishnah says that one cannot issue a ruling (pasken) on matters of faith (emunah)? It’s not applicable.

It’s different from “the Torah is not in heaven” (Torah lo bashamayim hi). “The Torah is not in heaven” says that heaven cannot come down. This says the opposite. He’s saying a simple thing — he’s saying that the decision is in the hands of heaven. It’s a simple thing that I’m saying. When you issue a ruling about what the heavens should do, you can’t make laws… you can’t write a halachah about how to conduct oneself. You’re telling the Almighty what to do. You need to ask in heaven whether they agree with you. So says the Maharshal, for example — perhaps in heaven they won’t follow your halachah.

It’s not so strange. Rav Yosef was sitting in the study hall (beis midrash), and he can ask this question a couple hundred times. He can ask it about all the midrashim that expound what Avraham Avinu said, and what Yosef said. Hello, hello — now we’re talking about halachah. Halachah is different from aggadah. Aggadah often doesn’t have this issue. Perhaps he’ll make two approaches — we’ll go see. Abaye will indeed add other instances that they say there. But in general, he won’t tell you. You understand?

So, it’s a tremendous question there. Rabbeinu Yonah… this is the source of Rabbeinu Yonah, who says that one cannot issue a ruling on matters of faith. Because faith is about what the Almighty does. What’s the relevance? He doesn’t follow us, He doesn’t ask us. You need to ask Him.

Abaye’s Answer — Reish Lakish: “Three Things the Earthly Court Did, and the Heavenly Court Agreed with Them”

The Statement of Reish Lakish

Speaker 1:

Abaye said to him, “What is the reason?” It’s clear that this is what Rava wanted to figure out when he slaughtered Rav Zeira. Okay. Abaye said to him… Rav Yosef was ill. Okay. Abaye said to him — the student Abaye said, “If not for what Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said.” Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said, “Three things the earthly court (beis din shel matah) did, and the heavenly court (beis din shel maalah) agreed with them.” Do you know this statement? A statement from Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. “Three things the earthly court did, and the heavenly court agreed with them.”

Rashi says there, “Even though they are against the Torah.” That’s a novelty (chiddush). But in general, the idea that the Almighty relies on the earthly court — that’s not a novelty from Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. He always follows the earthly court, even when it’s not straightforward. The point is that He should do something novel — even something that seemingly shouldn’t work. It seemingly shouldn’t work, but in practice the earthly court agreed.

The Three Things: Reading the Megillah, Greeting with God’s Name, Separating Tithes

Speaker 1:

Reading the Megillah (mikra megillah)… These are the three things: reading the Megillah, greeting with God’s Name (sho’el shalom b’Shem), and separating tithes (hafrashas ma’asros). Three things that seemingly don’t hold up. Yes, three things that seemingly don’t hold up — there are only three things. But again, this is not a general principle of the Oral Torah (Torah sheb’al peh). The Oral Torah is a simpler matter, seemingly. The Oral Torah, on the contrary, did not go against the Torah. This clearly went against the Torah.

In what way did they go against the Torah? One needs to see the commentators, yes. Reading the Megillah — “do not add” (lo sosef) to the place — there is Rashi, there is Rashi in Pesachim. Reading the Megillah is from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi — Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says one is obligated in reading the Megillah, meaning one must do it.

Greeting with God’s Name — The Mishnah in Berachos

Speaker 1:

Greeting with God’s Name is the Mishnah in Berachos, right? That “from the place where they learned to greet one’s fellow with God’s Name, and you have no permission to mention God’s Name in vain.” A second interpretation says that one is obligated. In any case, this is a Gemara and a Mishnah at the end of Berachos, yes, that this is one of the things where “you shall not take the Name of Hashem your God in vain” (lo sisa es Shem Hashem Elokecha la’shav) applies.

Speaker 2:

A what? Regarding greeting with God’s Name?

Speaker 1:

You don’t remember the last Mishnah at the end of Berachos? Yes, a Mishnah. Yes, yes, yes, greeting with peace. Yes, that’s at the end of Berachos. That’s one of the sources that one may commit a transgression for a higher purpose (aveirah lishmah). At the end of Berachos it says, the last Mishnah in Berachos says, “And they enacted that people should greet each other with God’s Name, as it says, ‘And behold, Boaz came from Bethlehem and said to the reapers: Hashem be with you, and they said to him: May Hashem bless you,’ and it says, ‘Hashem is with you, mighty man of valor,’ and it says, ‘Do not despise your mother when she is old,’ and it says, ‘It is a time to act for Hashem — they have violated Your Torah'” (eis la’asos la’Hashem heiferu Torasecha).

But it says again — the Judges (Shoftim) had already permitted it. “Hashem be with you” — the Judges had already permitted it. They renewed it, they renewed the permission, but essentially it is forbidden, yes. “That people should greet each other with God’s Name.” It’s not clear how they resolved the contradiction. The contradiction is a straightforward contradiction. In any case, it’s seemingly talking about that topic, and it appears clearly — the Mishnah says that this is “a time to act for Hashem — they have violated Your Torah.”

Discussion: What Is the Prohibition in Greeting with God’s Name?

Speaker 2:

And tithes (ma’asros) is like this — that Ezra the Scribe penalized the Levites that they should not be given tithes. What is the initial assumption (hava amina) that this constitutes taking God’s Name in vain?

Speaker 1:

People say — everyone says — that every prayer that is not a holy prayer with proper intention (kavanah) is also in vain. It’s a nice thing — one says God’s Name, a great man, one says a good word to him. When one doesn’t say it in the manner of an oath or in a disrespectful manner, okay — I say, I don’t know what the prohibition is. The Mishnah understood that it shouldn’t go.

Speaker 2:

But it’s the opposite — “one whose mouth frequently mentions God’s Name” (hai Shem Shamayim shagur al piv).

Speaker 1:

Ah, the point is that he used the Tetragrammaton (Shem Havayah), he used the ineffable Name (Shem yimacheh), he didn’t say “the Merciful One” (Rachmana) or whatever. Okay.

Speaker 2:

And they say that one shouldn’t associate with such a person?

Speaker 1:

I don’t know, but it’s strong. It has value.

Tithes

Speaker 2:

Okay, tithes. And what are the tithes that…

Speaker 1:

Ah, one gives tithes to those who are unworthy. The tithe issue is significant — that Ezra the Scribe changed the tithe, that it was not given to the Kohanim (priests) but to the Levites. Or Chizkiyahu changed it so that the Levites should not receive the tithe. The tithe was actually for the Kohanim, not for the Levites. He changed it — there was a matter like that.

Back to the Question: “Who Went Up to Heaven?” — Also Regarding Reish Lakish!

The Same Question Can Be Asked About Reish Lakish

Speaker 1:

Okay, so it’s like this. So how do we see that heaven indeed agrees, seemingly? Yes? What will the Gemara say there? The Gemara there says that you’re telling the Almighty. The Gemara asks, it tells the Almighty further, “Who went up to heaven and did so?” (man salik le’eila va’avid hachi?) When Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that “the earthly court agreed with him” — is he told that? So one can ask the same question. Yes, Rav Yosef gives an answer there. When Rav Yosef wonders how one can rule like Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrkanos — what happened in heaven — Abaye asks him: Is this the only time we’re told what happened in heaven? I have for you a statement from Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that the heavenly court agreed with them — we are told this. Ah, that’s what he wants to bring, this Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. Yes, yes, continue.

On this you can also ask, “Who went up to heaven and did so?”

The Answer: “The Verses Testify” — We Know from Verses

Speaker 1:

Rather, the verses testify (kra’i kiddushin). Ah, we don’t say that… But we just say… When we say it, we don’t say that this is how we know what’s written in heaven, but rather this is how we see it in the verses. First, what does he say… the verses testify. Yes. But what he’s saying is… they called them holy, and I have this “they called them holy.” What is the meaning? What is the derivation (drashah) from the verse?

When we say that one is exempt from kares, I’m not saying what happens in heaven. He stated what’s written in the verses. He asked a question: How does one know who was in heaven? The Torah says — I know through the verse. The verse tells me what happened in heaven. This is seemingly the straightforward meaning. I know from the verse. You tell me we don’t know what happens in heaven? Seemingly we do know. How do we know? The verse tells us what happens in heaven.

Discussion: The Distinction Between a Verse and a Ruling

Speaker 1:

It’s the same thing when he rules like Rabban Gamliel. Rabban Gamliel has a proof from the verse, “sin will not cease from him” (lo yuchleh chet mimenu). Yes? He has an interpretation of the verse — that’s what he says. What’s the problem? What’s the problem? What’s the problem? It’s a verse after all.

Basically, one can say more, and one doesn’t have to. Does one need to say more? One can try to bring it out better, but yes, one can continue on this.

Speaker 2:

No, what’s wrong if the Torah is the Torah? How does one know?

Speaker 1:

No, because his question — the source was as if the Torah is something that happens now. Why does he say it now? It doesn’t matter what happens today in heaven. There is some principle, there is some rule to which heaven is bound, which is written in the verses.

Speaker 2:

No, because the verse doesn’t say what plays out in heaven.

Speaker 1:

Rather, he comes with a new Torah teaching — that heaven is also bound to what’s written in the Torah, to what’s written in the verses. I see a question here — I don’t want to say that one can’t say it your way.

These are derivations from the verses. He says, I know from the verse. What’s the problem? The verse comes from heaven — well, the verse is not a lie. It could be that there are two forces — we interpret the verse. But you see here that Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, when he states a halachah like Rabban Gamliel, he gives his interpretation of the verse. If he has a good interpretation of the verse — there are those who say there’s a difference of opinion, there are others who learn differently. Why do they learn differently? Not because they were in heaven, but because they have a different interpretation of the verse.

But when we state a halachah, one can say like this — there are two… The question was still about the one who stated the halachah. Yes? Was the same question asked about Rabban Gamliel himself? Seemingly. And it’s not asked about the one who stated the halachah. No.

Novelty: The Question Is About the One Who Says “Halachah”

Speaker 1:

So what’s the meaning? Ah, it could be the point is specifically about the word “halachah.” The first two people argued—

Halachah, the Agreement of the Heavenly Court, the Ban of Jericho, and Greeting with God’s Name

The Meaning of “Halachah” — Not What Happens in Heaven, but What Accords with the Verses

Speaker 1:

But when you say “halachah,” usually halachah means what? That the public conducts itself this way, that this is what has been accepted. But this is a matter where one is trying to know what happens in heaven — that was the question, as it were. And what is the answer? Because you can’t say the word “halachah.”

And what is the answer? The answer was that he said it’s written in the verses that this is the halachah. No, that was the original premise to begin with, no? That was the original premise — that it was understood from the verses.

So when he says that I stated a halachah, I mean to say not that this is how they conduct themselves in heaven, but that we must accept that this is how the verses align. Ah, do I want people to say that this is how it is in heaven? I don’t know — perhaps that is indeed the question even regarding Rabbi Eliezer. And the answer is that we know from the verses.

This is the meaning when he says “halachah” — the meaning is that he decides, he sees that the verse has the correct interpretation. This is what the Yerushalmi says in Berachos.

Yerushalmi Berachos — Three Things the Earthly Court Decreed and the Heavenly Court Agreed

Speaker 1:

Ah, there’s such a good piece by Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai — the Yerushalmi in Berachos says, and that place there, specifically on that Mishnah of… ah… do we have Rabbi Yehoshua? Yehoshua the deceiver is mentioned here. Is Yehoshua the deceiver here the same as Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai? I don’t know.

Three things the earthly court decreed — I’m just telling you the continuation — the heavenly court agreed with them, and it was said about them — he says different things there, by the way. The ban of Jericho (cherem shel Yericho).

Speaker 2:

That it’s a ban from the Land of Israel?

Speaker 1:

No, no — they made a ban on Jericho.

Speaker 2:

Ah, a ban — the ban of Jericho.

Speaker 1:

They made a ban on Jericho. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says, I make a ban on Jericho that whoever will build it, the Almighty should punish him — He should enforce the ban. Ah, the heavenly court agreed with them, okay. The Scroll of Esther (Megillas Esther), and the three greetings of peace from below.

The Two Examples — Different Kinds of Things

Speaker 1:

According to this, for our purposes, the two examples — this is a very different kind of thing. The Scroll of Esther — does this mean it’s also the same thing as here, that it became a holiday against the Torah? Is there also the concept of “against the Torah” there? As if Yehoshua did something against the Torah by making the ban? What do the commentators say there? I don’t know.

Speaker 2:

Ah, the ban of Jericho — he means yes, what Achan took, I’m not sure.

Speaker 1:

The commentators — what are the commentators? What we see clearly here is that this story is an introduction to Yoshiyahu’s question. How can it be that the earthly court does something that it seemingly would not have had the right to do?

And the parable of Yehoshua — what did he do wrong? The novelty is not that he did something wrong — the novelty is that he did it, and the Almighty did not say that he did something wrong.

Speaker 2:

But you can bring this too — Elisha also revived the child, and they came from heaven, because yes, you returned life to a…

Speaker 1:

Ah, it became a halachah. That one was punished for violating a ban.

Speaker 2:

We were talking about the laws of bans (hilchos cherem).

Speaker 1:

No, the next chapter, in the next story, in the battle of Ai, he spoke about the laws of bans — that one should be punished for something that Yehoshua bin Nun enacted. How so? He requested to make it. It’s not such a great question.

Speaker 2:

It’s a transgression seemingly, no? Or not a transgression?

Speaker 1:

No, Yehoshua did not commit a transgression.

Question: How Can a Ban Be Binding?

Speaker 1:

I’ll tell you a different question about this, because you can ask: What is it — yes, a ban is something that rabbis can make.

Speaker 2:

Not only rabbis — a person makes a vow (neder), a community can make a ban.

Speaker 1:

A community, a person. I make a vow — it could be that a ban-type vow is a kind of vow. I make a vow, “that I shall not eat” — do I receive a punishment from heaven?

Speaker 2:

Try to say that a cherem (ban) is different.

Speaker 1:

But regarding a community, it’s very different from what an individual does. An individual can make a neder (vow), he says that he is forbidden — that’s the halacha of communal vows. The Ramban says this in Mishpat HaCherem, do you remember?

Ramban — Mishpat HaCherem: The Consensus of All Israel Creates Torah SheBe’al Peh (Oral Torah)

Speaker 1:

The Ramban argues that this is the foundation — that a community can make a… from the verses, one can make a cherem, one can make a… you can take away someone’s money, right? No, I’m talking now about a neder, one can create something like a prohibition, and it is binding.

What is the main thing he wants to bring out in Mishpat HaCherem? This. Why does it take an entire book, why is it needed for this? An entire treatise.

Ah, this is the consensus of all Israel that creates Torah SheBe’al Peh.

Speaker 2:

Ah, that’s the Mishpat HaCherem?

Speaker 1:

That’s the approach of the cherem — that the community accepts that this is… that this is no one’s, no, “asher yacharim ish” (whatever a person devotes) — what do you derive from this, that it’s a transfer of ownership?

Speaker 2:

Ah, you’re talking about the actual acquisition; I’m talking about the concept of cherem.

Speaker 1:

Ah, the cherem in the manner of an oath and vow, that it is binding. The cherem of Rabbeinu Gershom, yes?

Speaker 2:

Ah, like the cherem that one doesn’t go live in Spain, an acceptance upon the community, the cherem of Rabbeinu Gershom.

Speaker 1:

Ah, he says, and the Yerushalmi says, Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani, “they would say, where are the tithes?” This is very interesting, and the Bavli already brings that Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani derived the cherem of millstones. Perhaps indeed because of that connection, because the cherem of millstones isn’t such a connection, it’s a simple…

Greeting with God’s Name — Mishna in Berachos, “Hashem Imachem,” and the Matter of Mentioning God’s Name

Where Do We Learn the Concept of Greeting?

Speaker 1:

Let me ask you, greeting with peace — the Mishna derives it from the Sotah passage, that the Torah allows erasing God’s name for the sake of peace… We learn it there from Sotah? I don’t know. Isn’t that what it says in the Mishna in Berachos?

Speaker 2:

No, the Mishna in Berachos doesn’t say that. Where does it say? It doesn’t say in the…

Speaker 1:

I remember from a Gemara that it’s a kal vachomer (a fortiori argument), ah, from David, ah, from the depths. But the Gemara doesn’t say it regarding every greeting of peace, that “great is peace” which becomes…

Speaker 2:

No, but you could say it that way, but no.

Against the Heretics — “Hashem Imachem” as Identification

Speaker 1:

It’s implied even in the Mishna that it has something to do with combating the heretics, that Boaz was possibly wicked — that doesn’t fit. It doesn’t mean that. How does one need to know about the heretics and the wicked? Okay, so says the… says the… I don’t have time to think. Says the…

Listen, the Gemara says, by the way, this is a comment. There’s a comment here, sorry that I’m stopping for another moment. I’m thinking that “Hashem imachem” (God be with you) is perhaps not like a blessing the way I had thought.

If it had been in the manner of a blessing or prayer, seemingly there wouldn’t have been a concern about mentioning God’s name in vain, because what’s the whole issue? A Jew always says “Baruch Hashem” (Blessed is God). The entire Tanach is full of “Baruch Hashem.”

But when it says against a heretic, it could be that it was like an identification. “Hashem imachem” — you are one of God’s people, “may God bless you.” That’s the meaning.

Speaker 2:

Obviously, it’s certainly a blessing. “Greeting with peace” is a type of blessing.

Speaker 1:

“To ask” — not “inquiring about peace.” It could be this is a new interpretation. “She’eila” is a language of asking. “She’eila b’shalom” means it’s like a test. Do you believe that God will give you a blessing? Can you naturally sing along, “someone is included in my participation”?

Speaker 2:

No, that’s seemingly not the true interpretation.

Speaker 1:

No, but I’m thinking about what this has to do with the heretics.

Speaker 2:

Ah, against the heretics means in general, that one should not willingly mention God’s name. Against the heretics who cause God’s name to be forgotten.

Speaker 1:

No, but I do see commentators who say that the reason it was indeed permitted in practice is because of “so that God’s name should not be forgotten.” Okay.

Question: What Is the Concern About Mentioning God’s Name?

Speaker 1:

I’ll tell you, you’re asking a good question, not about a tangential matter. Either there’s an initial assumption, or perhaps the fundamental law is that mentioning God’s name — as it says “in every place where I cause My name to be mentioned” — one only does so for the sake of Heaven, when it’s for God’s benefit. Perhaps indeed one may not bless. I mean, you’re asking good questions.

You know, when does one mention God’s name? In the Priestly Blessing, “and they shall place My name upon the Children of Israel” — that you should actually bless your fellow with God’s name. I don’t know. It’s not clear what the problem should be.

I believe the Me’or Einayim says this — that it was permitted because there were people who didn’t mention God’s name at all anymore. In order that God’s name should not be forgotten.

But that’s not our topic. Okay, our topic is something else.

The Gemara’s Approach: Mitzvah or Optional?

Speaker 1:

Our topic is that here there is a statement, yes, and fourthly, let’s briefly go through the Gemara quickly. And it brings here that one could mean “in reading.” And Idi says that perhaps it’s a mitzvah — if he means here “Hashem imachem” in greeting, “had you not sworn.”

Idi brings such an opinion that every time a Jew meets someone, it should be a mitzvah. So he says fine, the question is whether for the group of stoning, is it optional or meritorious. Seemingly it must be a mitzvah, because if not, how can one override a prohibition — if there’s a concern of prohibition, only because it’s a mitzvah can one override another concern of prohibition.

The Gemara says, derive the Gemara from the verses, which are also for the inheritance to override further. The Gemara says, “rather, the verses are the source.” Which verses? Specifically, how did one learn these verses?

Beis Din Shel Matah vs. Beis Din Shel Ma’alah — The Deeper Matter

Rav Yosef’s Approach: Beis Din Shel Ma’alah Must Follow

Speaker 1:

Yes, in short, Rav Yosef said that “rather, according to Rabbi Meir,” one can indeed say what the beis din shel matah (earthly court) does. By the way, he thinks into it, but there is indeed a fundamentally deeper matter, right? It’s not just like a line, that sometimes we’re told what God does. It’s much more than that, right? You get it?

Because the idea that there is such a thing that the beis din shel matah — there you can tell us differently. That’s the dispute you have with him. Right? If we ask… Rav Yosef asks a legitimate question, as he tells us, the law of kares (excision) is something that God does. It has been stated — does God have to follow you? Can one say yes?

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said, and there are many sources in the Chamdat Daniel. Yes, there is regarding Rosh Hashanah, it says that the beis din shel ma’alah (heavenly court) is then the… and when the beis din shel matah establishes the new month, and many other matters. One can say yes, and it doesn’t bother us to show. It is binding.

We suddenly need to check — we trust that they follow. They must follow; they don’t follow. My donkey will do. What are you not trusting — do you think God will go against what the Torah tells us? Heh, interesting. Right, that’s one approach.

Rabbi Meir’s Approach: We Know from the Verses

Speaker 1:

But Rabbi Meir says a different approach. But Rabbi Meir says another approach. But how does he know that the beis din shel ma’alah comes along? Because it says so in the verse?

But in this alone lies a tremendous thing — that the Beis Shmuel never invalidates based on this, because it could be, it says so in the verse. For the Beis Shmuel it’s “live and kicking” — it comes up now, they are bound. But then there’s no problem, if it says so in the verse.

Chiddush: The Beis Shmuel’s Position

Speaker 1:

And I wanted to say this chiddush (novel insight) that one can derive from the Beis Shmuel what he argues, because he is correct that all these sources and many of the things stated in the Chamdat Daniel are from the verse — that the Beis Shmuel agrees.

Continuation: Understanding “The Agreement of Beis Din Shel Ma’alah,” Kiymu V’Kiblu, and Reish Lakish/Shmuel

Further Clarification: How Do We Know What Beis Din Shel Ma’alah Does — and What Is the Chiddush?

Speaker 1: But how do we know that the beis din shel ma’alah agrees? Because it says so in the verse. And that wasn’t the point.

But in this alone lies a tremendous thing — that the beis din shel ma’alah never changes from this. You’ll be able to bring proof — it says so in the verse! With the beis din shel ma’alah there’s no lobbying and kicking. Someone comes up now, they are bound to… that’s not a problem.

If it says so in the verse, we have no chiddush that one can say what the beis din shel ma’alah does. Because you’re right, all these sources are simply things stated in the verse. What’s the chiddush that the beis din shel ma’alah agrees?

So we have sources that establish the… from the verses we learn that sources had to be this way. Did you think it went against the Torah? No. Whatever. From the verses, all he brings from this is that one can find that sometimes there is… no, one doesn’t need to fill in the… one can be precise from the verse about what happened in that generation. That’s all.

No, no, no. One needs to understand it this way. All these things — the prohibition existed before the permission. It’s bal tosif (do not add) that the Torah wrote. Reading the Megillah is… with Megillas Esther they wanted to add a new mitzvah. Here they got confused. They said, but bal tosif is older than the new enactment of saying there’s a war. Could be.

From this they said, how was one permitted to begin doing this? But once they said “we derive from the verse,” we see that the basis for permission is already in the verse. Therefore there’s no chiddush from the Sages. It was always this way. Bal tosif is true. It’s different. It’s not a case of “the beis din shel ma’alah agreed.”

Again, the miracle of Purim didn’t happen every day. But in the halacha there is already a derivation from the verse. Ah, no, the derivation there is “they agreed and accepted.”

What we’re discussing now from Maseches Makkos about those liable to kares who received lashes — that’s not something that happened. It’s not something that the beis din shel ma’alah ruled on. It’s simply how the halacha was from the outset.

So the straightforward understanding — one can go deep, but the straightforward understanding of the discussion in the Gemara is only that from this we see from the bas kol (heavenly voice) that it’s a normal thing. It’s not something from a verse about what God does.

Two Levels of Understanding “Punishments in Beis Din Shel Ma’alah”

Speaker 1: By the way, one can now think — in general, when we learn about the matter of punishments in beis din shel ma’alah, what do we mean when we say it?

Do we mean to say that we rule and because of that they carry it out in Heaven? Or do we say the opposite — we try to figure out how things are conducted in Heaven, based on what’s written in the verses?

The normal way is that we try to figure out what goes on there, not because we command it. Ah, we try to figure out what goes on there.

The other way is no, we try to figure out what the halacha is, and in Heaven they’ve already done it. Like when Mashiach comes, we’ll check according to the majority whether he’s Mashiach. It turns out that according to the majority it doesn’t fit, then he’s not Mashiach, then Mashiach hasn’t come.

Speaker 2: What?

Speaker 1: The simple understanding is different. You can say deeper interpretations, but the simple understanding of the Gemara — we always need to keep our heads with the simple calculation. The simple calculation of the Gemara is that it tells us what happened in Heaven.

The truth is, I said why the simple understanding wasn’t sufficient for him — precisely because of Rabbi Shimon ben Levi, who has thousands of midrashim that he says on the topic of, I don’t know, of what? This is that a tzaddik decrees… that’s a different kind of thing. Right, right, right, right.

So where else do you see so many times that things changed against the halacha? But when the established halacha said that one cannot go make the reading of the Megillah, did he mean that this is Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s statement? Or is it the statement of Rabbi Chanina from Caesarea? Okay.

But here one doesn’t need to resort to that. It could be from what Rav Ada bar Ahavah rules — as if he rules. But from this statement one doesn’t need to resort to it; from the entire Mishna you see it.

As you say, it appears that no, seemingly the entire interpretation of the She’iltos is not so. One must certainly think that a different opinion means to say that we can indeed rule halacha as we see from the three places. And how do we know this? It’s a matter of the verses there. But that’s not my answer to resolve the Gemara.

The Matter of the “Relationship” Between Beis Din Shel Matah and Shel Ma’alah Regarding Kares

Speaker 2: It could be that the problem here specifically is a bit different, because here we say as follows: the person is liable to kares. Are we going to say that when beis din shel matah gives him lashes, suddenly the beis din shel ma’alah releases his kares? That’s a different thing, because here the implication is that there’s an ongoing relationship. The beis din shel ma’alah checks — ah, he received lashes? He’s exempt. Once you already say we derive from the verse… it’s not really a problem, right? It’s not really a problem, right?

Speaker 1: I mean, as everyone says, the entire small world is what comes into the world. One can say it’s automatic, you understand? But it does add a new layer, because…

Speaker 2: I agree, I agree, it’s another layer, but there’s yet a deeper layer which is another cycle. Perhaps this is specifically important, yes. Okay.

“Kiymu V’Kiblu” — Shmuel’s Derivation and Reish Lakish’s Interpretation

Speaker 1: In short, these are the proofs, as follows. He says — the Otzar HaMefarshim or whatever — he says that the difference why the Bavli doesn’t bring salvations is because they indeed didn’t hold of salvations. In the Gemaras from Eretz Yisrael it says that the salvations should come easily, the salvations shouldn’t be guilty. I don’t know, I’m not going into the distinctions. It’s not really a contradiction or an incident, because after he did it, it worked — that’s what it means.

Okay, the Gemara says, what’s the proof? Yes, on the contrary, I have a better interpretation of Rav Yosef’s matter. Rav Yosef says, “one who went up above and did” means the opposite — who is the one that the heavenly ones recount that the Jew received lashes?

Speaker 2: That’s a good question.

Speaker 1: Why is that a good interpretation?

Speaker 2: A good interpretation — my God, you admit that he was handed over for the liability of kares?

Speaker 1: I don’t understand the matter.

Speaker 2: That you admit that the incident is not the question of how the incident played out in the world. You don’t admit that there was a shofar? The question is how…

Speaker 1: No, because that would also have been a good answer that the heavenly ones…

Speaker 2: I don’t mean it that way. But the heavenly ones agree that what happened here is that originally we could have removed an essential holiness that requires lashes here. That’s not the topic; that’s a different level. Okay, back.

Speaker 1: We were talking about the wisdom — that’s what you wanted to bring up, yes. Okay, very good.

The first level is that indeed we don’t need to know; we can say. The second level is what you say — that the essence of the body is a type where the heavenly ones follow the heavenly ones. All these things are true; they appear in other places; I’ve seen them.

But look, the next Gemara says the four unique holy ones in the court of Shem — perhaps now we’re talking about this. Okay, what’s the proof? What’s the verse? What’s the holy verse? So, for each thing there’s a verse.

For the reading of the Megillah there’s a verse: “they accepted upon themselves and upon their descendants.” “They established above what they accepted below.” Ah, there. It was accepted in Heaven that one may go make a holiday. Purim — a great deal from the Torah.

Speaker 2: I mean, the words are familiar to me, but I haven’t learned it inside here.

Speaker 1: I mean, it’s the third interpretation — the “kiymu v’kiblu” (they established and accepted) that we learned in the last few days.

Speaker 2: No, because “kiymu v’kiblu” means that the Jews accepted the Torah again. That’s one interpretation. And what did Shmuel say?

Speaker 1: Shmuel said…

Speaker 2: Ah, ah, Shmuel said that “kiymu v’kiblu” also means that it was accepted. Ah, ah, ah, right. And so on, how do we know about Megillat Esther? How do we know in the cities and synagogues (batei knesiot)? How do we know the Megillah? Because “kiymu l’ma’alah mah she’kiblu l’matah” — they confirmed above what they accepted below. I said that this is fascinating.

But in any case, this is Shmuel’s midrash. “Kiymu l’ma’alah” means literally, the Almighty continues speaking about the problem — how do we fulfill Purim? Because he says that “kiymu l’ma’alah”, that which was agreed upon above. This is how Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish explains it; Shmuel asked him what the practical difference is.

Reish Lakish’s Historical Position — Tanna or Amora?

Speaker 2: Right. Really? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was a Tanna?

Speaker 1: No, not a Tanna. He was a Tanna.

Speaker 2: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was an Amora. Some consider him a Tanna because he sometimes appears in the Mishnah, but that’s not — it’s not accurate. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was one of the first Amoraim of the Land of Israel. He was approximately in the period of Shmuel — Rav and Shmuel.

Speaker 1: Ah, seemingly, I don’t know. He was in the Land of Israel, Shmuel was in Babylonia. He appears sometimes in the Mishnah, but the straightforward understanding is not that he was simply a Tanna.

Speaker 2: He was, ah, Rabbi Shimon, by the way, just incidentally, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was the one who went to the Land of Israel. He was the mystic, yes. So there’s a question on him — how does he know…

Speaker 1: Ah, he was the one who said “if only, simply.” I was the one who said “if only, simply.”

Speaker 2: He was Eliyahu HaNavi — he was Eliyahu HaNavi. He spoke with him, he spoke with him about things.

Speaker 1: What’s the question on such a person?

Speaker 2: Ah, I see that the historians, just on Wikipedia they already bring that there’s a dispute among the historians. They are mentioned as being much later. He is mentioned in the Mishnah, but he is mentioned as the teacher of Rabbi Abba bar Kahana and the student of Rabbi Eliezer HaKappar. How can it be that he’s a colleague of Rabbi Chanina, when Rabbi Chanina is… Okay, I don’t see that it’s such a big question. No, they say there were two. Okay, it’s not such a big question. This is the Torah of Rabbi Benzion the righteous one that he brings.

Kri and Ksiv in “V’kibel/V’kiblu” — Rav’s Drasha in the Yerushalmi

Speaker 2: In any case, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi went to heaven. It’s interesting — there’s another midrash about Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that when righteous people die, they say what will happen to them. And in another midrash it’s stated in a slightly different way — that they say certain verses at the time of their departure from the world. This could also be an answer to the question that my assistant asked.

Okay, and in short, by the way, there’s also a dispute about what the meaning of the drasha “kiymu v’kiblu” is. In the Bavli it consistently says “kiymu l’ma’alah mah she’kiblu l’matah”, “kiymu mah she’kiblu”. But in the Yerushalmi — not in the Yerushalmi — let’s look at the Yerushalmi. In the Yerushalmi it says “kiymu v’kiblu” — Rav said, he says — it’s Rav explaining the drasha, not Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, rather Rav explains — he said “v’kibel” is how it’s written. Is it written without a vav in it? Could be. One needs to check. “This teaches that the heavenly court agreed with them.” This is the language that appears better in the… he brings the language here.

Speaker 1: So “v’kibel” means the heavenly court? Is the heavenly court expressed in singular form?

Speaker 2: Rav brings the language: “v’kiblu ha-Yehudim aleihem v’al zar’am” — “v’kibel ha-Yehudim.” There it says “v’kiblu.” Yes, “kiymu v’kiblu” is a kri u’chsiv (a difference between the written and read text). In the written text (ksiv) it says “v’kibel ha-Yehudim,” and in the read text (kri) it says “v’kiblu.” One needs to check this when reading the Megillah.

So, Rav says, “v’kibel ha-Yehudim” — the Master of the Jews accepted. Not the descendants. The Master of the Jews means the heavenly court.

Speaker 1: The “left side” is the Holy One, Blessed be He?

Speaker 2: In our times it always means the Holy One, Blessed be He, anyway.

Speaker 1: What’s the meaning that the Holy One, Blessed be He intentionally — something — I don’t know — the righteous one of the generation?

Speaker 2: That’s already stated…

Speaker 1: In our times it’s a way of saying the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy.

“V’kibel Ha-Yehudim” — Rava’s Drasha, the Agreement of the Heavenly Court Regarding Megillah Reading, and the Problem of “Lo Tosif”

Rava’s Drasha: “The Master of the Jews Accepted”

Speaker 1: And “v’kibel ha-Yehudim” is written “v’kiblu.”

And I was thinking when one learns the Megillah. So, he says — Rava says “v’kibel ha-Yehudim” — “Rabban shel Yehudim kiblo” — the Master of the Jews accepted it. Not the Jews themselves.

Does “the Master of the Jews” mean the heavenly court? The guardian angel of the Jews? Or the Holy One, Blessed be He?

Speaker 2: The heavenly court — both sometimes mean the Holy One, Blessed be He. What is the meaning of the heavenly court? The Holy One, Blessed be He surely doesn’t know something beyond… It’s a higher knowledge. It’s not… That’s already stated. The heavenly court is a way of referring to the Master of the Universe with the attribute of justice (middat ha-din), or whatever.

In general, simply put, there are angels that help, whatever, that one doesn’t get mixed up in these matters. In any case, this is a different version of the drasha “kiymu mah she’kiblu.” Interesting. Does this appear in the Midrash? In short, these are different versions of the Midrash.

Okay, this is the source — very interesting. This is the source that what? That the Almighty agreed to the acceptance of the innovation of Purim. And when else?

Greeting with God’s Name — Boaz, Gideon, and the Chronology Question

Speaker 2: What is the source for the other two things? We see here in Tractate Makkot, “greeting with God’s Name” — it says by Boaz “Hashem imachem” (God be with you), and then “va’yomer Hashem imcha gibor ha-chayil” (and he said, God is with you, mighty warrior). It says later by Gideon that the angel says “Hashem imcha gibor ha-chayil.” We see that the angel already speaks the same language that Boaz had innovated. As if — if it had been forbidden, the angel wouldn’t have done it. We see that the Almighty conducts Himself with the same principle of “acknowledging the truth,” just as… just as Gideon, just as Boaz.

Speaker 1: I don’t understand — Gideon comes before Boaz, though.

Speaker 2: Who asks this? Tosafot?

Speaker 1: Yes, Tosafot.

Speaker 2: Tosafot’s answer is that… Tosafot says that Boaz conducted himself this way, and afterward the whole world conducted itself this way. Aha. The Jews began to conduct themselves this way, and afterward the Almighty also conducted Himself this way.

Wow. It’s a custom of the world that existed. This is a proof that many times when we see something — the heavenly court established it — it’s not necessarily so; it was a custom. We see that it’s an ancient custom.

Speaker 1: What does Tosafot say? The Tosafot is valid? He’s right, and the explanation is like this — that there’s a valid king. Okay, in short, what’s the proof?

The Proof from Tithes — Ezra and the Prophet Malachi

Speaker 2: Let’s say that it’s indeed law, and what should the son do, etc. Listen, the Gemara doesn’t bring back just a proof from a story that’s written — where is the whole story? We see that what? That the Almighty indeed gave the blessing of the tithes (ma’asrot). The tithes that Ezra had established improperly — the Almighty said through the prophet that He would give, that He would give — how do you call it — yes, that He would give blessings for this. So it’s a sign that it worked. And from here we learn not like that one who argues that since shemittah is rabbinic, there’s no blessing of “you shall bring”? Yes, the implication is that if the earthly court were to nullify the tithes, the understanding is that one wouldn’t need to do it either.

Speaker 1: One can discuss this. Well, well.

The Difference Between Megillah Reading and the Other Three Things

Speaker 2: It’s interesting what comes in here — the Mahari brings that “it will never be nullified, its reading” (la titbatel kri’atah l’olam). What does this have to do with it? He didn’t understand this from “kiymu v’kiblu.” I understand that the Gemara doesn’t mean that the fulfillment of Beit Shammai is that there’s such a mitzvah, but rather that the fulfillment of Beit Shammai is that it will always remain. I don’t know clearly what this means. The simpler explanation is more like the Rabbanan and the Ritva who say that it became an accepted enactment (takkanah), the style of “kiymu v’kiblu.”

I don’t know — think about it. There’s something funny here, right? What’s funny? But I understand what’s funny here. What’s funny is two things. First of all, Megillah reading is not comparable to the other three things that we have here from “things that were confirmed in the heavenly court forever.” In two ways it’s not comparable.

In one way, the other three — something happened, Master of the Universe. Something happened. At least with two of them we see there’s a blessing. That Yehoshua bin Nun declared a ban (cherem), and the ban indeed took effect — meaning the Almighty wants it so. That Boaz, whatever, let’s say, makes a blessing, and the Almighty indeed gives the blessing. It says that what the others learned — that the tithes, the Song at the Sea, and the other three — it’s the same thing: the agreement, the ban, these things actually happened.

Megillah reading — how do you know that the Almighty agrees with the Megillah reading? What does it consist of? What does the Creator’s agreement consist of? It’s from nothing. The word of Boaz — it’s because we see he was helped, not just that he conducted himself that way. He was a righteous Jew and he conducted himself that way. But Manoach wasn’t alone — there was a great person, a righteous one, and the Almighty told him the same language. The meaning is that the practice didn’t remain only here in this world — the practice also went to heaven. In heaven they conduct themselves this way.

Yes, the same thing with karet (spiritual excision). If we rule that someone is liable for karet, the meaning is that something happens in the world. Whether we know it happens that way or not, but the idea is that something happens, and the person dies earlier. And with Megillah reading, what essentially happened? What happened is that every year there’s the same holiness that occurred in the year of Purim. Ah, that means if this is the explanation, then this is the concept.

The other things — we at least have a source from a good inference from the verse. I mean, the Almighty indeed requested a blessing, the Almighty indeed made a ban. Here we at least have some drasha that we read into verses that they themselves wrote.

Speaker 1: That’s not accurate, because a public fast one may indeed make — it’s with a Torah-level law of Megillah reading, and we don’t have a contrary proof. There’s a midrash “kiymu v’kiblu,” and what was accepted? It’s very funny.

Speaker 2: Again, and the fact that the reading of the haftarah — we also learn it from a verse.

Speaker 1: But something happened. The discussion is a real thing, right? The question is whether the person died or not. Reading — something happened.

Discussion: What Does the Agreement Consist of Regarding Purim?

Speaker 2: Here too, the Almighty accepted this as a holiday (Yom Tov), which we don’t know about, right? But what would it even mean? One may not make a holiday?

It says “lo tosifu” (you shall not add) — I mean, if you would have been… “lo tosifu” would have been worship. All other things — I mean, would it have been getting drunk, would it have been a joyous day, would it have been a gathering, would it have been a feast? One hundred percent. Forget about the oath. The simple explanation must be that it succeeded — that it became a holiday. It wouldn’t have succeeded otherwise. This is simply Divine assistance (siyata d’Shmaya), so to speak. That they made a holiday — how did you know it succeeded? Also an enactment of the heavenly court. A Yud-Tes Kislev, whatever.

Speaker 1: But that’s a big problem, because you can say that about every great phenomenon — since it reached so many Jews, you see. So you could also say that Zionism was a success, or Reform was a success.

Speaker 2: But here, yes, that’s already a different thing. That’s already a part, so to speak, meaning, a part of history.

Speaker 1: I hear, I hear, I hear. I don’t know. I don’t know. I don’t know. It’s perhaps an interesting thing. I don’t know.

Conclusion: Megillat Ta’anit Is a Problematic Matter

Speaker 2: In any case, what we see here from all these midrashim, all in all, all of them together — we see that Megillat Ta’anit is perhaps a problematic matter. It’s something that Jews did without permission, and the Almighty ultimately agreed to it.

Speaker 1: Yes. That’s still a major source, all in all, from these midrashim. And according to Chassidut, according to what we usually learn — there’s a concept that this is the… that people also did things, you understand? Sometimes it begins. Listen, it says — I did a search on the heavenly court, I wanted to see what the Sages said about the heavenly court.

The Problem of “Lo Tosif” Regarding Megillah Reading

Speaker 2: What is the concept of “lo tosif” (do not add)? The concept of “lo tosif” has to do with the commandments of the Torah. And all these Gemaras — but certain commentators explained the problem of Purim. No, but the straightforward reading of the Gemara — what should be the problem with making Purim? What should be the problem? Yes, there’s no problem. Why should there be a problem? With all the later authorities (Acharonim), you had three commentators who explain what the problem should be — Sho’el U’Meishiv, B’Shamayim Rosh — they explain what should be a problem. “Lo tosifu al ha-davar asher…” — how does the verse read? “Al ha-davar asher…” I don’t know. What’s the full verse?

“Eleh Ha-Mitzvot” — The Verse the Gemara Brings

Speaker 2: Okay, just to be clear, let’s try to say the things that are stated. One Gemara in Tractate… in the Yerushalmi in the Gemara — and not the Gemara actually — the Yerushalmi, the Bavli in the Yerushalmi brings no verse for the problem. Listen for a moment to what it says, okay? Are you following? Yes, yes. The Bavli in the Yerushalmi brings, if I remember, no verse for the problem. The only one who brought a verse for the problem was… Rabbi, who brought a verse for the problem? In which verse? Rabbi, which verse? In what? Well, well, well, you remember — we learned it. I sent it to you. In which verse? What did we learn yesterday where it said “bal tosif”? No, not “bal tosif.” Never brought “bal tosif” for this. So what did it say? Which verse? Well? Well?

Speaker 1: I’m thinking here of something else… not within this topic. Okay, let’s see what it says. Let’s try to learn what it says. Well, there’s one verse that the Gemara brought — a verse “eleh ha-mitzvot” (these are the commandments). Ah, “eleh ha-mitzvot.” “Eleh ha-mitzvot” — that these are the commandments and there are no more commandments; you can’t add.

Why Not “Lo Tosifu”?

Speaker 2: Why doesn’t he indeed bring “lo tosifu,” which is seemingly a clearer prohibition (lav)? Because the Gemara learned that “lo tosif” only means when one says it’s a commandment from the Torah.

What did the Gemara say? What’s the normal explanation for one who learns Tractate Pesachim? Ah — “the prohibition of adding” means when one puts three out of five for tzitzit (fringes) or something like that. It doesn’t mean making more and more.

So, but the Rashba said here — presumably not from the Rambam. The Rambam is the first one who said “bal tosif.” Aha. But “v’eleh” doesn’t make it a prohibition (lav) or anything, but one learns from the verse that one shouldn’t add.

Lo Tosif — The Rambam’s Explanation Versus the Gemara’s Explanation, Responsa of the Geonim Regarding the Oath on Purim, and “Everyone Is Obligated in Megillah Reading”

“Lo Tosif” — What Does It Mean According to the Gemara, and What Does It Mean According to the Rambam?

Speaker 1:

It’s only when one says that the Rambam — and only when one says it’s a Torah commandment… No! What did the Gemara say?! What’s the normal explanation for one who learns Tractate… Ah! “Lo tosif” means that one puts five threads of tzitzit and such things.

So, but the Ritva that you mentioned here — presumably not from the Rambam. The Rambam is the first one who said “lo tosif” in its plain meaning… But “v’eileh” doesn’t make it a prohibition or anything. But one learns from the verse that one shouldn’t add. “She’ein navi rashai l’chadesh” — that a prophet is not permitted to innovate — that’s the language, right. What you make of the Rambam on this topic — “she’ein navi rashai” was meant in the Gemara… But is it a positive commandment (aseh) or what? Is it a Torah-level positive commandment? Okay.

I want to tell you an interesting thing. I’m thinking of an interesting thing. “Eleh ha-mitzvot asher tzivah Hashem el Moshe” — these are the commandments that God commanded Moses — the language of the Yerushalmi. The Almighty gives a commandment; there can’t be more commandments. This is seemingly the plain, simple meaning! You don’t need to resort to any positive commandment. The Almighty gives a certain measure of commandments, and no more — so you’re making more commandments? What’s going on with you? That’s not good enough for you? We don’t know! That’s not the meaning. Um… very good.

So… the Chag”av, you don’t need to arrive at the precise inference from “these are the commandments” (eleh hamitzvot). So it stands on its own that it’s a weak inference. So it means, the idea still stands. We have mitzvot. What else does he do? You don’t need a positive inference. It’s just a nice rhetorical flourish. It’s a prototype. It’s a prototype. He goes on and on. It’s stated strongly. One can still interpret “these are the commandments” differently after this as well.

You’re saying a reverse reasoning. The reasoning that the Gemara understood in all those places is that it doesn’t work that way. There are mitzvot and there aren’t mitzvot. You can’t create new ones. You want to say that one can, God forbid, create new ones. You want him to be able to add one more. You want a different reasoning. That’s present in the reasoning.

And the counting isn’t even in the language of Rav’s ruling. Right? And how does that work? And all the sources had that it says something is a problem, but miraculously the Megillah succeeded. Just like Ezra’s tithe and just like… I don’t know what it says there in the plain meaning. But they want to say that “they established and accepted” (kiymu v’kiblu), from the verse “kiymu v’kiblu” is how one gives legitimacy to the holiday, or because it was accepted in heaven.

Two Answers for How Purim Could Be Established

Speaker 1:

But I think that with the interpretation of “they re-accepted it with love” (hadar kibluhah b’ahavah), there also shouldn’t be any problem, because “you shall not add” (lo tosif) to the matters means that now is an awesome, holy time, it’s the giving of the Torah (matan Torah), it’s the standing at Mount Sinai (ma’amad Har Sinai), now is a time when one can establish mitzvot and one cannot afterward. But if it’s a new giving of the Torah, that “they re-accepted it with love,” the meaning is that there was once again the same spiritual awakening, once again the same favorable time (et ratzon), so consequently there’s no longer a problem of adding a new holiday. So from both interpretations, from “kiymu v’kiblu” one explains how Purim could be established.

Speaker 2:

The second interpretation is however not Yonatan’s, it’s not reconsidered. Yonatan has a third interpretation, and that one has a second interpretation of adding. Right, right, right. The Jews were already exempt from the Torah and they made a new one. Not that they were exempt — they were eternally obligated, just in terms of the establishment.

Speaker 1:

Okay, so I’m going with the Ramban that this exemption only came about after the exile, but before that there was a condition regarding the Land of Israel.

Speaker 2:

Aha. And he says it’s the plain meaning of the world. And he says I should look here, and the Otzar has one here. Interesting. Listen? Nu? There was a question in the Responsa of the Geonim, of blessed memory, about one who swore to fast on Purim day.

Responsa of the Geonim: One Who Swore to Fast on Purim Day

Speaker 2:

He has a source in the Responsa of the Geonim according to what the Rema said.

Speaker 1:

No, the Rema didn’t say he has a source.

Speaker 2:

Someone swore to fast on Purim — must he fulfill his oath? According to the principle that an oath doesn’t take effect on mitzvot, because one doesn’t swear to violate mitzvot. The question is, this is a rabbinic mitzvah (mitzvah d’rabbanan) — is that stated in the Gemara? That’s the question here.

Speaker 1:

That’s a very good question. Right.

Speaker 2:

He says here, the Gaon says, it’s not from the Torah (d’oraita). Why? Because it’s not “sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” (mushba v’omed me’Har Sinai). Mitzvot that are from Sinai are d’oraita. But he says, where does he get this from? Because the Mishnah says, “Certainly if one swore not to read the Megillah and not to read Psalms, etc., at all, we see that it’s not an oath in vain, for Moshe already swore about them at Sinai — what the Scribes would innovate in the future — we derive from this: reading the Megillah.” And he brings the Gemara on folio 7 that there is the verse “kiymu v’kiblu,” and the Gemara of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who says that “kiymu v’kiblu” — the two Gemaras of “they established what they had already accepted.”

The answer is that he says let us return — this is only since they fulfill the Megillah and mishloach manot, but the feast he can make at night. Ah, I must be joyful, but it’s with the service. In short, since one can fulfill the obligation of the feast at night, consequently it’s the reverse. The Gaon says there is a second version in the opinion of the Geonim, an argument, that reading the Megillah does not mean “sworn and standing from Mount Sinai.” Because where does he get this from? From the Gemara in Shevuot that we saw, that “they accepted upon themselves with an oath” the mitzvot that would be innovated in the future — we derive from this: reading the Megillah. He quotes that Gemara, yes? You remember? That “he is sworn and standing from Mount Sinai.”

And what do we see from this?

Speaker 1:

Interesting.

Discussion: An Oath Not to Learn a Certain Book — Is That “Sworn and Standing from Mount Sinai”?

Speaker 2:

When someone makes an oath that he won’t learn a certain book, can’t one say that he is “sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” to learn the entire Torah, according to the laws of Torah study (hilkhot talmud Torah)?

Speaker 1:

No, I’ve been thinking the whole time, because the Megillah also has Torah study. On the contrary, the mitzvah of reading it every night is only… So why is the Jew seemingly just “sworn and standing from Mount Sinai” to learn? He can’t make an oath that he won’t learn a certain book of the Torah. From that perspective it’s d’oraita, no? He can’t make an oath…

Speaker 2:

No, no, no, he said it, he made an oath that he won’t read. I don’t know if one can’t make such an oath. I don’t know the answer to your question in general. But he’s talking here now about the mitzvah of reading the Megillah. Right. Not about Torah study.

Summary: Reading the Megillah Is a Problem, and It’s Not as Simple as the Rambam’s Interpretation

Speaker 1:

So what remains from all these discussions? Right, but how does one bring it all into one clarity? Or for Yehudah? I don’t know. But one sees from all these places that reading the Megillah is a problem, and it’s not the only such problem — there are other laws that are a problem — but it is a problem. And it’s not as simple as the Rambam resolved it on the plain level, that one says, the entire piece of Torah that he says there at the beginning of the end of the counting of the mitzvot — the Rambam is… the Gemara appears to have a different answer to the question, or that there is a verse, how he works there with the verses, there is “I expound from Scripture” (mikra ani doresh), there is “what expounding” (mai drush) that the Gemara says is needed, it’s the same idea of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish — an exposition that the sages agreed upon — there’s simply an obligation. There are many ways to learn it, but one sees that it’s not so easy to fit into the Rambam’s interpretation, and you should try a better interpretation of what the Rambam says in the other places and understand. Okay, that’s what I said.

“All Are Obligated in Its Reading” — Who Is Obligated in Reading the Megillah?

Speaker 1:

So now I can see who is obligated in the Megillah. Okay, “All are obligated in its reading” — who is everyone? As we already said, “The Jews established and accepted upon themselves and upon their descendants and upon all who joined them.” Okay, men and women and converts — men and women. Yes, seemingly, “they too were part of that miracle” (af hen hayu b’oto ha’nes). No, that’s not always the rule. Yes. The Mishnah in Arakhin, “All are obligated in the Megillah” — what does “men” mean? Just as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, whom we just learned, said, “Men are obligated because they were part of that miracle.” Yes. And converts and freed slaves? As if even their grandfathers weren’t there, but they are obligated in all mitzvot.

Novel Point: Why Would One Have Thought Converts Are Exempt?

Speaker 1:

One might have thought that… Ah, the words are quite interesting, one can learn a lot here. A person could have thought that many mitzvot in the Torah certainly obligate a convert and a freed slave, but this is perhaps an acceptance that the grandfathers undertook — for all their descendants. He tells me no, the grandfathers undertook it, and it became an obligation on the nation, it became an obligation on the people. Because “the Jews established and accepted upon themselves.” But what I said isn’t bad Torah — what did he say?

Ah, if you want to say it this way — that all mitzvot obligate converts and freed slaves because they are obligated with the entire Torah, with the whole Torah that was given to Moshe at Sinai. But why are Jews obligated with reading the Megillah? Because their grandfathers undertook it. It’s an acceptance, a vow of the grandfathers, an undertaking of the grandfathers. But the grandfathers undertook it — “the Jews established and accepted upon themselves.” Ah, the answer to this is that no, the grandfathers undertook it, and consequently it became a rabbinic law (din d’rabbanan). It’s not like you learned in the Rambam — a mitzvah not from the count. It’s very different from all other things.

Because what — when you say it, it’s a very simple thing. Why do I make a holiday? Because my grandfather was saved. So if not for that day, I wouldn’t have existed. Must I thank the Almighty? Indeed, not necessarily the view that says it’s a logical reasoning, exactly like Passover. They were liberated, they were saved. The Gemara says this. But what does the Gemara say? That from the obligation of Hallel on Passover one derives that every time one is saved from death to life. But what does it say?

So, let’s go further. I’m saying, why would a person have thought — why could one have heard that converts and freed slaves are exempt? Okay, you’re right, it’s “all who joined them” (kol ha’nilvim aleihem), a verse. But it also has to do with how one views the obligation. Because the obligation doesn’t simply mean that because your grandfather was saved, therefore because you’re alive you must thank the Almighty. One could hear such a reasoning. The answer to this is that it’s an obligation on the community — it became an obligation on all of Israel (Klal Yisrael). Consequently you too are obligated — it became a mitzvah from the words of the Scribes (mi’divrei sofrim).

Women — “They Too Were Part of That Miracle”

Speaker 1:

The same concept… Ah, because women are only obligated through “they too were part of that miracle” (af hen hayu b’oto ha’nes). So it’s equal between the women and the men.

Speaker 2:

The men are obligated because it’s a mitzvah, but the women would be exempt because it’s a time-bound positive commandment (mitzvat aseh she’hazman grama). And only because of this — it’s a matter of reasoning — it could be that female converts should be exempt, female converts according to this calculation.

Speaker 1:

Because it’s not even — without the miracle, you can say it does mean even, because they are part of the people.

Discussion of “They Too Were Part of That Miracle” — Female Converts, Freed Slaves, and the Foundation of the Obligation of Reading the Megillah

The Distinction Between Men and Women in the Source of the Obligation

Speaker 1:

Ah, because women are obligated through “they too were part of that miracle.” So this is inclusive between the women and the men. The men are obligated because it’s a mitzvah, but the women are exempt because it’s a time-bound positive commandment, so what then? It’s a matter of reasoning.

The Question of Female Converts — Whether They Are “They Too Were Part of That Miracle”

Speaker 1:

So it could be that female converts are exempt — female converts according to this calculation. Why not? They weren’t “they too were part of that miracle.” You can say it does mean “they too,” because they are part of the people. Yes.

The Case of a Non-Freed Slave

Speaker 1:

What about a non-freed slave? A non-freed slave is exempt from mitzvot because they are like a woman. But he wasn’t part of the miracle, because he’s a non-Jew — he doesn’t descend from people who were part of that miracle.

One needs to know — perhaps a female convert is the same thing, and one can make a distinction between a female convert and a non-freed slave. The novel point is that the female convert is also “they too.” One can’t say about her alone that she was part of that miracle, because her grandfathers weren’t there. But we rule that a convert is like a newborn child (ger k’tinok she’nolad) — we say she descends from the Jewish people. From whom does she specifically descend? I don’t know. But we do say that Sarah our mother or Abraham our father were not “they too were not part of that miracle.” Yes?

The Problem with “Our Fathers” for Converts

Speaker 1:

Regarding a convert, we generally say — how do they descend from the Jewish people? They are children of Abraham our father and Sarah our mother — they were not “they too were part of that miracle.” I understand, one needs to know the source for this. Regarding a convert — what they have — whether they already descend… whether they can be “they too were part of that miracle.”

On the contrary, we go against the Tannaim and don’t ask any question? That’s the point here. A non-freed slave should seemingly be exempt because one can’t say “they too were part of that miracle.” The question is about a female convert. About a female convert, one can also say that she wasn’t “they too were part of that miracle.” The male convert is obligated like all mitzvot. The female convert is exempt because it’s a time-bound positive commandment. A time-bound one, and it’s not… one can’t say a fine matter of the miracle. Can one tell me, there’s a problem with “our fathers” — if one says “our fathers”… Okay, say a nice piece for a… so what? I don’t understand. Do you want me to include that a convert can’t, or not? You’re not listening to me — you’re in other places.

Speaker 2:

No, but I can’t go as fast as you. I can’t go at that pace. My head is racing. That’s how I… then I know nothing, and at the end one comes out.

Speaker 1:

But it’s nothing! We didn’t have a nice time with the… you heard.

Speaker 2:

No, I’m not so strong in the lengthy and detailed analysis. Everything needs to not be drawn out.

Speaker 1:

That’s very good. The balance between the two of us produces good Torah.

Speaker 2:

I don’t agree with this piece of Torah, but it’s a nice Torah.

Summary of the Question: Female Converts and Non-Freed Slaves

Speaker 1:

Female converts. Write down female converts and non-freed slaves. Both things.

Speaker 2:

But a slave is a miracle.

Speaker 1:

And a slave doesn’t raise a must.

Speaker 2:

If the slave is… you mean sometimes they didn’t recognize any… the captivity of people.

Speaker 1:

Yes, but it’s not your grandfather.

Speaker 2:

What it is is a servant. Just, what it is is a servant who was just brought from Africa.

Speaker 1:

And also I’m not the…

Speaker 2:

No, she could be his grandchild! You descend from Jews, from that generation.

Speaker 1:

It also appears to be a convert.

Speaker 2:

The question is about a convert. Here one needs to… the question is about a convert, and it seemingly has to do with the issue of “our fathers.”

Speaker 1:

Whether one can say “our fathers.”

Speaker 2:

Show me that Mishnah?

Speaker 1:

Because one can’t connect that it has to do with that issue.

Speaker 2:

One can’t connect it with that issue.

Speaker 1:

Why? Because if she can’t say “our fathers,” the meaning is that she doesn’t descend from that person, even though she became a convert.

“A Convert Is Like a Newborn Child” — Born from Whom?

Speaker 2:

The question is — a conversion is like a child being born. Born from whom? Goodness! One can’t be born by oneself — only the Christians believe one can be born without a father, without parents. So born from whom? You say born from the Jewish people. The Jewish people gave birth to a child.

Speaker 1:

What’s the source — a convert can say “our fathers” and a convert… what’s the Mishnah? There’s a dispute in Bikkurim, and there is a teaching from the Rambam to the previous Adrienne.

Speaker 2:

Aha. Okay. Umm… I hear… I don’t know. I hear what you’re saying, I hear… I don’t know. I thought that it’s a bit lighter now, he’s letting me go more — so we say Torahs, in the manner of Purim Torahs. A bit lighter. Purim, one can prepare… No, I said what one doesn’t do. Prepare the real Torahs for the — how one can say Purim Torahs. After that, on Purim he must say Torahs. Because you already know what it says — that the Purim Torahs are already built full, one on top of Purim Torahs. He has such… and the honor of Torah — he is… they say that it’s honor and respect, he would say the Torahs. He can’t say them.

The Rambam’s View on “Our Fathers” for Converts

Speaker 2:

The Gemara says, I have… the nations of the world are considered like all children of Abraham. Not for halakhic counting purposes. Not for halakhic counting purposes. Beloved, and that Abraham, lover of the entire world. His healing… the appointed one. For the Rambam’s view, Shemonah Perakim, yes. I mean, in the Commentary on the Mishnah. Umm… but the Rambam… since the halakhah is not like that Mishnah. Rather it’s… and Bikkurim. And… one needs to know. One can still deliberate here whether a female convert needs to read the Megillah. It’s a very good question, and the hardest day to have my volunteer in the hospital is Purim.

Digression: A Story with the Hospital on Purim

Speaker 2:

I had to pick up two years ago on Purim, and I drive my family at the beginning of Purim, beginning of the day, to the hospital with a big queen to pick up my wife. And in practice, the discharge took about six hours, and my children spent the entire Purim in the lobby. They also didn’t let children under ten come up, or something like that. It was the sixth day. Now I know that one can interpret that female converts (giyoros) are exempt from reading the Megillah, and on that day one could have used them… Okay, okay, say if one rules that female converts are exempt… ah, right, right. I see how there are practical implications that female converts are exempt. This is actually a fine position that the women are still obligated to hear, they can fulfill the obligation for others. Do you know that position?

Two Interpretations of “They Too Were Part of That Miracle” (Af Hen Hayu B’oso HaNes)

Speaker 1:

If there is an “af hen hayu b’oso hanes” it is weaker than…

But what is the meaning that just not drunk? What’s going on with what the Lechem Mishneh says?

Interpretation A: The Miracle Happened Through Women

Speaker 2:

“Af hen hayu b’oso hanes” doesn’t mean that they were also saved. I mean, it has to do with when one says they were also saved, but “af hen hayu b’oso hanes” many times means that the miracle happened through women. When does one say this and when does one say that?

Speaker 1:

And the poskim (halachic authorities) bring this.

But what is the meaning that just not drunk? What’s going on with what the Lechem Mishneh says? First of all, what is the meaning? I haven’t yet clarified it, but I haven’t yet seen it.

Speaker 2:

“Through a woman the miracle was performed” (al yedei ishah na’aseh nes).

But “af hen hayu b’oso hanes” doesn’t mean that they were also saved. I mean, it has to do with when one says they were also saved, but “af hen hayu b’oso hanes” many times means that the miracle happened through women. When does one say this and when does one say that?

The Lechem Mishneh’s Position Regarding Chanukah and Purim

Speaker 2:

No, I’ll tell you why. This is a contradiction from the Torah. Certain Rishonim (early authorities) regarding Chanukah… it depends. Just as the Lechem Mishneh says here on the spot, “through a woman the miracle was performed.” Here regarding Chanukah, the story of Yehudis…

Speaker 1:

It depends on Esther.

Speaker 2:

Esther, ah. But it also depends… they were all saved.

Interpretation B: They Were Also Saved

Speaker 2:

The Responsa of the Maharam brings Rabbi Yoel Leib, “they too were in danger of being destroyed, killed, and annihilated” (af hen hayu b’safek l’hashmid laharog). The decree was against the women. It’s like Hitler wanted to kill all Jews, even those who weren’t religious, and then you’re going to say they weren’t let into the country. It’s the same idea. It can’t be that they could have been killed.

Practical Difference for Female Converts

Speaker 2:

But I want to come back to my question about a female convert (giyores). If the point is “through a woman the miracle was performed,” it’s not relevant because you’re a grandchild of someone who was saved. You understand? Only because the group of women are a part.

Speaker 1:

No, that’s how I understand it. The grandchild doesn’t come into play here. You know what? It’s not a grandchild, so what? It’s not true, because you survived.

The Foundation of Gratitude for Miracles — For Oneself and For One’s Ancestors

Speaker 1:

One must give thanks not only for every piece of bread that I have, but for every piece of bread that every grandfather of all my grandfathers and grandmothers ever had. Because if not for each of those pieces of bread, I wouldn’t have existed, God forbid. But even that seems enough for me… What one says “modeh anachnu lach” (we give thanks to You), for all the good, one says for all the good from eternity to eternity, that is God.

So here’s another sharp point, so say that when I think deeply, there is such a thing as making a blessing on a miracle that happened to one’s ancestors (nes shena’aseh la’avosav). It could be that Megillas Esther or all these things are the prototype of the greater concept — not just my father, but also his father and his father. And every day one must give thanks because thousands of miracles happened throughout all the generations.

One must understand that if not for one of my grandfathers being saved — let’s say each one of my grandfathers had many times when he was saved — the meaning is that without each of those incidents I wouldn’t be here, right? I am after all a combination of all those grandfathers. So my existence requires giving thanks not only for everything that happened to me, but for everything that happened to each one of those people ever. One can’t actually do it, it’s without measure, it’s without measure.

Why the Sages Chose Specific Miracles

Speaker 1:

So one does take a few such things, and this is the approach that one derives, as it states the principle one derives — a penguin — when the Jews were saved at the sea one must truly learn, but this one must truly say, no, as the word states, when one was saved from being struck and beaten each time by half, this is the whole thing that was derived — “what does it expound? What does it expound?” But this is indeed a major reason why the Sages enacted an ordinance — this is not an inherent obligation, right? Ah, very good, very good, so very good.

The Distinction Between the Exodus from Egypt and Purim

Speaker 1:

So you can say that essentially, I mean one can indeed — a few times when the Jews were saved, a few times it was indeed established that one should forever give thanks for a miracle that once happened. No, it’s not like that — the Exodus from Egypt has more, it’s more of a national matter. It’s not that I exist, that if not for then I would never have been born because my grandfathers would have died then. That’s not the point. It has much more of a national dimension (inyan la’umah), a matter that the nation was saved and the Torah was given — the Torah is much more than that.

But when one speaks about someone who experienced a miracle or such, one does look at it more in the way that everyone was saved. It’s a greater version, just as a person makes the blessing “Who performed a miracle for me” (she’asah li nes).

The Rambam’s Reason for Women’s Obligation in Reading the Megillah

Speaker 1:

Because we see simply in halachah, not homiletics — the Rambam in the Laws of Megillah gives a reason why the Sages enacted the Megillah also for women. The answer? Because the women also experienced the suffering and needed to be saved. Very simple. But it fits with the foundation that we learned yesterday.

Summary of the Lecture — Continuation: “They Too Were Part of That Miracle” — Female Converts, Freed Slaves, the Sifrei of Rav Hamnuna, and the Sifrei Regarding Reading the Megillah as “Words of the Scribes”

—

“They Too Were Part of That Miracle” — Two Interpretations and the Practical Difference for Female Converts

Speaker 1:

But when one says “af hen hayu b’oso hanes,” one does look at it more in the way that everyone was saved. It’s a greater version of how a person makes the blessing “Who performed a miracle for me” (she’asah li nes), because “they too were part of that miracle.”

Because we see in the Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law), not explicitly stated. But it’s a reason why the Sages enacted the Megillah for women to read, because the women also experienced the suffering and they needed to be saved. It’s very simple.

But it fits with what we learned yesterday, that it’s a full obligation (chiyuv gamur), because one derives it from when one goes from being liable to death to life. It’s not an obligation… no, it’s not a Torah-level obligation (d’Oraysa), but there one sees that it’s an obligation. No, we’re already saying that women are also obligated — “they too were part of that miracle.” The Sages may do such a thing. That is the plain meaning of the Gemara, nothing more than that.

I know there is a Chasam Sofer, I also know there is a Maharatz Chayes and a Sfas Emes who want to say more than that. I don’t know what you’re talking about. We need to go back to the generations before the heretics arose. Understood? Understood. They were born after those times. We are after all from the… what is, what does it mean?

Rashi in Tractate Sukkah says this — the miracle was through Esther, whatever. Ah, that is sorely needed. That is sorely needed. The question is whether a female convert is obligated or not. I come to my question. I want to say that female converts can be exempt if they want. Why are they exempt? Because one cannot say “they too were part of that miracle,” because she is not a descendant of those people. And it’s a time-bound positive commandment (mitzvas aseh shehazman grama).

But if one says that the miracle was through Esther, the point is not because your grandmother was saved, but the point is because the miracle happened through a woman. It’s a matter of the camp of women. It’s not that your grandmother was saved.

Speaker 2:

What is the practical difference? Just an ordinary Jewish woman?

Speaker 1:

Yes, but it’s a joy among Jewish women — so the female convert is also a Jewish woman. It’s not that your grandmother was saved — not every Jew descends from Esther. I am real, hello? Only when you want to make novel Torah insights (chiddushei Torah) you may… I’m trying to present the Torah as it stands. It’s not any… even “af hen hayu b’oso hanes” says that women are exempt, that time-bound commandments they are exempt from — this is a new novelty that obligates them, that they were included in the holiday because their grandmother was part of the miracle.

Speaker 2:

Purim Torah, because you don’t say it — you say it’s the acceptance of the Torah, Shavuos Torah, and you don’t say Purim Torah.

Speaker 1:

The truth is that almost all holidays they do the work. It can’t be that you make a holiday only for the men who weren’t part of the decree. Ah, just your sense — you don’t know what the Torah says, what’s written in the Gemara. You’re right, you’re just telling a story.

Okay, but it has nice Torah-level implications (pispusei d’Oraysa), perhaps I have some clarity.

—

Discussion: If a Female Convert Calls with a Question About Reading the Megillah

Speaker 2:

What’s a good question — if the phone doesn’t stop ringing with questions, if a female convert happens to call me asking whether she needs to read the Megillah.

Speaker 1:

There is a Beis Yosef regarding a freed slave (eved meshuchrar).

Speaker 2:

Yes, here, the Lechem Mishneh brings it — I repeated it to you, and you yelled.

Speaker 1:

Because regarding women it states “rather, man and woman” (ela ish v’ishah), regarding a freed slave it doesn’t state that, because he is not from the camp of women. That’s what I told you — you didn’t want to hear.

It’s not a contradiction with the Lekutim, because you can further ask — if they are obligated in everything that a woman is obligated in, then a woman is also obligated. He says the reason why a woman is obligated is because a woman was involved in a miracle. It doesn’t concern me the gender; it concerns me the fact, not the halachah of what a freed slave is.

When you say that the Beis Yosef says, you say that Rashi says so, you stand with your great audacity and say he’s laughing at it. I’ll tell you, that’s not the meaning. “Af hen hayu b’oso hanes” — if you wanted to say that they performed the miracle, you could say that one is now holding a miracle. No, “af hen hayu b’oso hanes” means not that they were saved in the miracle — they were part of the miracle, part of the experience through Esther.

Speaker 2:

Okay.

Speaker 1:

But you’re right that every holiday, in practice, women are part of it for a different reason, but they are exempt from dwelling in the sukkah at night and such things.

A verse doesn’t create an obligation.

Even the explanation — they were already connected to perform what is due to their importance (mishum chashivus).

—

Slaves and Maidservants — The Rambam and the Gemara

Speaker 2:

Okay, let’s now have the open discussion about slaves and maidservants — what is the halachah with slaves and maidservants, and why. Somewhat the Rav holds that slaves and maidservants are obligated — he does say it: “One trains the minors to read it” (mechanechin es haketanim likrosa). What is the Gemara?

Speaker 1:

“And one trains the minors” — he says there is a Mishnah regarding the Kutim (Samaritans), and he clarifies that Kutim are obligated. I see you’ve noted that the Sifrei of Rav Hamnuna says “it is a mitzvah to inform them” (mitzvah l’hodi’am), and “like a brook of the naive” (k’nachal pesa’im). So on this there should also be a source for converts, just as “all who joined themselves to them” (kol hanilvim aleihem).

Speaker 2:

I said that, but what is the source though? What is the proof though?

Speaker 1:

Something has a Sifrei — I see here in the notes that you’ve marked something has a Sifrei, Rav Hamnuna says “it is a mitzvah to inform them.” It’s an interesting thing, as if more than just ordinary — not just an ordinary obligation like all converts, but there’s something special — there’s something of a holiday aspect in converts, there’s some connection through Rav Hamnuna saying “it is a mitzvah to inform them.”

—

Discussion: Searching for the Mishnah About the Kutim

Speaker 2:

I want to look regarding the Kutim. It states as follows, it states… it states a verse in Parshas… What does it say on? It states… On which halachah does it state this in the Mishnah? It states in the Gemara as follows… There’s a Mishnah here, okay? The holiday… there’s also another Gemara. Wow, it’s indeed a Gemara. Clarify for me, asking another Gemara, and you test with… it states… Look over how you test with… What is a Gemara?

Speaker 1:

I don’t have a Gemara. Megillah?

Speaker 2:

Yes. I have you test with… it states, Rabbi Chibbur said, but Rabbi Yochanan? One… what comes in here. It doesn’t come in here at all. Rabbi Chibbur, Rabbi, but Rabbi Yochanan? Ah, girls Tzipah, alone. Is there a Gemara, Megillah?

Speaker 1:

I do have one. I have Gemara, from all the Gemaras that have… I don’t see a Gemara, Megillah. But Rabbi Yochanan?

Speaker 2:

Do I also have a large Megillah? A purchase of a large black one that you need. Just, just, do I have further?

Speaker 1:

Okay, okay, but it’s good.

Speaker 2:

Peace, please. It’s good, it’s good, it’s good, it’s good. Now does one need to… You test, page one, there’s a Mishnah, chapter… Rabbi bar Abba, Rabbi Yochanan, girls, scribe to them, like all these matters… in the gate of the city that he chose. Yes, there’s a verse in the parshah — you test page one, do you say?

Speaker 1:

Excuse me, you test page one, there’s a Mishnah that states before evening… Rabbi Chibbur but from Rabbi Yochanan, yes, what does it say there?

Speaker 2:

There’s a Mishnah? Indeed, there’s a Mishnah. What you hear, you test page one with… the place, you test page one, page two, sorry. Okay, Rabbi Chibbur said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: “And upon them all the matters that Hashem spoke with them on the mountain, upon them” — where does this verse appear, a verse in the second tablets?

Speaker 1:

“And upon them all the matters that Hashem spoke with them on the mountain” — regarding the tablets, yes?

Speaker 2:

Now, what does he say?

—

The Sifrei of Rav Hamnuna — “And Upon Them All the Matters” and Reading the Megillah as “Words of the Scribes”

Speaker 1:

Interesting, it fits with the Pesikta and the… it teaches that the Holy One showed… it teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, showed Moses… it states this clearly? “It teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, showed Moses the fine details of the Torah, the fine details of the Scribes, and what the Scribes would innovate in the future. What is the source? Reading the Megillah.” Wow. They truly carried a banner with this matter of reading the Megillah.

Rabbi Yochanan. Yesterday we also had Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Yonasan? Amazing. What was here before? There’s something very suspicious about this reading of the Megillah. And also, everyone agrees that reading the Megillah is not sufficiently subject to the decree of the Scribes (gezeiras sofrim). Whatever the decree of the Scribes means. That the decree of the Scribes apparently means that one reads Torah mixed with other things. Or that the decree of the Scribes is Rabbeinu Esther.

The decree of the Scribes is indeed a complete novelty. They made an innovation. In its plain meaning (peshuto k’mashma’o). An act of the Scribes and an act of a new secular matter. They made an entirely new halachah. He already brings in the Minchas Chinuch the question that we learned. Torah, Torah, an act of the Scribes.

There’s another proof that here we’re speaking about reading the Megillah, because it states “on the day of the assembly” (b’yom hakahal), and when there is a Megillah it states “the Jews gathered” (nikhalu haYehudim). That this is the continuation of the same verse, “which the words of Hashem your God in your love,” “on the day of the assembly.” Wow. “On the day of the assembly” one offers a sacrifice. It’s interesting. Very interesting. It’s hard to understand what’s going on here. True. He says one should look in the Moreh Nevuchim (Guide for the Perplexed).

In short, very interesting. Yes. In short, there’s a lot, a lot. That was the sixth piece.

There’s a lot surrounding the Megillah. Anyway, and the Mishnah afterward states as follows: “All are fit to read the Megillah” (hakol kesherin likros es haMegillah). We learned an important Mishnah. “All are fit to read the Megillah, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor” (chutz me’cheresh, shoteh, v’katan). It’s interesting — regarding Chanukah we didn’t even have one who had such a problem. We had one thing, it reads. But on the point of performing a mitzvah, here is the discussion of “and He commanded us” (v’tzivanu). What does “v’tzivanu” mean?

Reading the Megillah — Mishnah “All Are Fit to Read the Megillah,” Deaf-Mute, Imbecile, and Minor, and the Status of Reading the Megillah as a Rabbinic Commandment

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The Mishnah: “All Are Fit to Read the Megillah Except for a Deaf-Mute, an Imbecile, and a Minor”

Speaker 1:

Yes, now, there are many, many — there is a sixth piece of Gemara that says there is a problem with the Megillah. Anyway, in the Mishnah after that, it states as follows: “Hakol kesherin likrot et ha-Megillah” — “Everyone is qualified to read the Megillah” — it’s an important Mishnah. “Hakol kesherin likrot et ha-Megillah chutz me-cheresh, shoteh, ve-katan” — “Everyone is qualified to read the Megillah except for a deaf person, an imbecile, and a minor.”

It’s interesting — regarding Chanukah, we didn’t even have a single one who had such a problem. There was one thing — one reads it. But on the point of performing a mitzvah, that is the sugya of “ve-tzivanu” — “and He commanded us.”

Yes, “ve-tzivanu.” Not regarding the manner, to what extent one may. Here one always goes to the mitzvah. He is after all a bar chiyuva — one who is obligated. He is after all a bar mitzvah. There can be no doubt.

But the Rambam says that there are two mitzvos from the words of the Sages (mi-divrei sofrim). It is counted in the Rambam the same way. Another distinction between the Rambam and the Chazon Ish. In the Rambam it is the same level. Because he says there are two mitzvos mi-divrei sofrim. Because you see, from all these Gemaras it appears that mikra Megillah — the reading of the Megillah — is something of a real thing. It’s a mitzvah, but there are mitzvos and there are mitzvos. Right. And there it is only sufficient to be kosher enough to raise the question about the formula of “ve-tzivanu.”

—

What Does “Mikra Megillah” Mean — The Megillah Itself or the Entire Set?

Speaker 1:

What bothers them about this? Can they answer because one does it more in the manner of… perhaps the term “mikra Megillah” more than the other things. Does “mikra Megillah” mean the whole thing, the entire set? Or is there an extra order regarding the Megillah — not the mishloach manos, the mitzvos of the day, but the Megillah specifically, that one reads it like Torah, because one reads it like a Sefer Torah, something like that. One sees a whole sort of indication that mikra Megillah is something prominent. I don’t know what exactly.

—

The Problem of “Davar She-lo Ba La-olam” — Whether Megillas Esther Was Given at Sinai

Speaker 1:

And he adds what it states — he doesn’t mean mikra Megillah. He doesn’t say that the Almighty gave him the Megillah, Megillas Esther, as it were. Perhaps yes. But according to how I understand it, this perhaps goes into… I’m not sure. Into the sacred writings. One can be medayek — make a precise inference — I don’t know. An incomplete matter, yes.

But mikra Megillah is — one day a Megillah will be given, and that Megillah will be a mitzvah. The Megillah didn’t exist yet. It doesn’t say that He will give him the Megillah. He will give him the mitzvah that one day it will come and there will be a Megillah, and then there will be a mitzvah.

Right. How does such a thing work? What does he mean to say? That the Almighty… What is a “davar she-lo ba la-olam” — a thing that has not yet come into the world? The Megillah didn’t exist yet. There are other letter combinations that one needs to know, but simply it is a great problem.

Speaker 2:

But the Almighty gave Moshe Rabbeinu a story that Achashverosh tells Haman all these things?

Speaker 1:

Ah, because the Almighty is not limited by time and so forth, the Almighty can. But one must say that it was given… I know according to what other seforim say about other things, with other letter combinations, I don’t know what. Because Achashverosh didn’t exist yet, it would have been a lie, because at that time they hadn’t yet done “shirusei chadashim ve-shemen ha-mor” — the treatments with new perfumes and oil of myrrh. It’s a question, but one must say that it wasn’t worthwhile for them to be new.

Here one can say, the simple meaning is: mikra Megillah means that the Megillah didn’t exist yet, but there is a mitzvah — the mitzvah is the concept of it.

You’re asking a true question, you’re asking a true question, it’s a good question, but the Midrash doesn’t follow that logic, and the Rebbe answers that it’s a Midrash, it doesn’t work that way. Very good.

—

Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yonasan — Two Approaches and the Connection to “Megillah Beteilah”

Speaker 2:

So, one minute, what did we learn yesterday also from Rabbi Yochanan? Should the two Rabbi Yochanans agree? Yesterday it was learned… What else did Rabbi Yochanan say? Yesterday, when it was also learned… I almost got it right, that I don’t learn inside the text, just like this I mix on my phone, it’s the same thing. Rabbi Yochanan said that… Rabbi Yochanan — “ve-ika de-amri Rabbi Yonasan, ve-ika de-amri Rabbi Yochanan” — “and some say Rabbi Yonasan, and some say Rabbi Yochanan.”

Speaker 1:

That one can have a connection to this, according to how one understands why he is either… a dispute (machlokes)?

Speaker 2:

No, which machlokes is the main machlokes?

Speaker 1:

Pathways to the circles of wisdom.

Speaker 2:

Ah, ah. There is the Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yochanan, and the pathway with the machlokes… one minute… but there’s a question… if it’s one Rabbi Yochanan, how can Rabbi Yochanan say that the Sages say one cannot?! It’s the source of the Megillah, the Sages had it that… that Rabbi Yochanan himself says that Moshe Rabbeinu was the source of the Megillah. So because of that there is the “some say Rabbi Yochanan and some say Rabbi Yonasan”?

Speaker 1:

No, no. Rabbi Yochanan in the Yerushalmi says that the source of the Megillah will become nullified, if one understands that it’s a machlokes. Yes, Rabbi Yochanan, regarding the Shelah’s approach, Rabbi Yochanan should have the nullification happen, but not Torah. And the Shelah HaKadosh also says, Megillas Esther is a “davar zikaron le-Yosef” — a memorial for Yosef. And I mean, what does that mean? That Rabbi Yochanan didn’t hold of this. He didn’t hold so strongly of the Megillah as it exists. But wait, it was given through Moshe — because what is the topic? Can you share your screen with me?

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Technical Discussion — Sharing the Screen

Speaker 2:

Such a wonderful… I need to, yes, I must now, when I come back, I must start setting up, bring my computer, and I must make myself comfortable. I can share to your computer, then I don’t need another screen. I don’t want a certain person to see it.

Speaker 1:

No, asher.lebina at gmail. Like that?

Speaker 2:

Yes, at gmail.

Speaker 1:

You need to look at the topic, maybe you need to add more chiddushim here. The topic is not a topic. This way we can also be on Zoom, because then you can share the screen on Zoom.

Speaker 2:

Okay.

—

Return to the Sugya — Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yonasan

Speaker 1:

No, but it’s really a good Torah thought that I’m saying — that according to this approach one can understand why it says Rabbi Yonasan instead of Rabbi Yochanan. But according to the Rabbi Yochanan here, Haman wouldn’t have been able to ask the question about Esther. What is the answer? After the answer, after the answer, after the answer — it was revealed that it was already “ke-khol ha-devarim” — “according to all the matters.”

I mean it states — one cannot use this as a proof. It says so, after all. If there is someone who says one cannot, it says “ke-khol ha-devarim.” I would have said, if not for the piece about Rabbi Yonasan, I would have asked a contradiction between the two Rabbi Yochanans. One sees that it’s not a contradiction.

Because he says that after they found the verse “hayah ra” — “it was evil” — one can learn it into the principle of “ke-khol ha-devarim.” But before that, one cannot.

Speaker 2:

No, it makes sense. Don’t you agree with me?

Speaker 1:

Okay, I don’t agree, because if Rabbi Yochanan was one of the continuers, the Rambam counts the tradition not the tradition of the Torah, then he also received the entire memo.

Speaker 2:

Okay. He was already long after the Megillah. We’re talking now about a story that he tells. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yonasan were two such Eretz Yisrael Amoraim who were outstanding.

Speaker 1:

But did both come from Eretz Yisrael to Bavel?

Speaker 2:

Did they come? I don’t think so. I think they came. Rabbi Yochanan was in Tiberias though. Yes. And also Rabbi Yonasan. But Rabbi Yochanan was also in Bavel, no? As it is stated, no? As it is stated Rubin, not Rabbi Yochanan?

Speaker 1:

No, not Rabbi Yochanan.

Speaker 2:

Okay.

—

Why Minors Are Not Obligated Under “Af Hen Hayu Be-oso Ha-nes”

Speaker 1:

I see in our notes that the question was asked why minors are not obligated under “af hen hayu be-oso ha-nes” — “they too were part of that miracle.” But I think it’s a foolish question, because “af hen hayu be-oso ha-nes” doesn’t create an obligation. Women are generally obligated anyway, it’s just that there might be an issue of “mitzvas aseh she-ha-zman grama” — time-bound positive commandments — and “af hen hayu be-oso ha-nes” says that they do belong in the mitzvah. But children are exempt because they don’t have da’as — understanding. Is what I’m saying correct?

Speaker 2:

Yes, it’s true. One cannot say “af hen hayu be-oso ha-nes” regarding minors. Minors are not obligated by law. And must one educate children also regarding rabbinic commandments (de-rabbanan)? Is it a chiddush — a novel idea — that one must educate children also regarding de-rabbanan?

Speaker 1:

One must educate minors in the reading of the Megillah (li-kri’asah). I told you, look in the Mishnah. There is a Mishnah on daf 19a, amud beis. It states as follows: “Hakol kesherin likrot et ha-Megillah” — “Everyone is qualified to read the Megillah.” Do you have that Mishnah there? Where, in the document you sent me?

Speaker 2:

In the Mishnah! You sent me the Mishnah. You said you were going to test me on the Mishnah.

Speaker 1:

Okay, okay, okay, nu, nu, nu, yes, the next Mishnah. I have it here. Ah, I brought the Gemara. I prefer the Gemara. I have right away the commentaries, the ones on the Torah.

Speaker 2:

Nu, but afterwards one forgets how it was.

Speaker 1:

Nu, nu, chas ve-chalilah — God forbid. Do you know me?

Speaker 2:

Yes, I know you.

—

The Mishnah and Gemara — “Everyone Is Qualified to Read the Megillah Except a Deaf Person, an Imbecile, and a Minor”

Speaker 1:

“Hakol kesherin likrot et ha-Megillah chutz me-cheresh, shoteh, ve-katan. Rabbi Yehudah machshir be-katan.” — “Everyone is qualified to read the Megillah except a deaf person, an imbecile, and a minor. Rabbi Yehudah validates a minor.” Do you hear? But here we’re not talking about obligation, here we’re talking about being qualified to read, right? “Rabbi Yehudah machshir be-katan.”

Speaker 2:

Yes.

Speaker 1:

The Gemara says as follows — in the middle it states as follows in the Gemara, okay? I want to learn the entire piece of Gemara. Does it bother you? I’m in the mood to learn. I want to learn the entire piece of Gemara.

Speaker 2:

I’ll learn Gemara with you.

Speaker 1:

The Gemara says as follows. The Mishnah states: “Hakol kesherin likrot et ha-Megillah chutz me-cheresh, shoteh, ve-katan. Rabbi Yehudah machshir be-katan.” Okay? That’s the Mishnah.

The holy Gemara says — I have here a beautiful Gemara that I love to learn with. “Mani masnisin de-amar cheresh afilu be-di’eved lo yikra? Amar Rav Masnah, Rabbi Yosi hi. De-tnan, ha-korei es Shema ve-lo hishmi’a le-ozno — yatza. Rabbi Yosi omer, lo yatza.” — “Who is the author of our Mishnah that says a deaf person even after the fact (be-di’eved) should not read? Rav Masnah said: It is Rabbi Yosi. As we learned in a Mishnah: One who reads the Shema and did not make it audible to his own ear — he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Yosi says: He has not fulfilled his obligation.” Rabbi Yosi argues that one must hear it, meaning one is not yotzei — does not fulfill the obligation — through the other person. “Mai ta’ama de-Rabbi Yosi?” — “What is Rabbi Yosi’s reason?”

Speaker 2:

If so, if he himself cannot hear, then he is automatically not yotzei, and therefore he also cannot be motzi — fulfill the obligation for — someone else.

Speaker 1:

Exactly, exactly, exactly. The fact that it states that a deaf person even be-di’eved cannot — he cannot be motzi anyone — that is Rabbi Yosi.

The Gemara says: How do you know? Perhaps it means only le-chatchilah — ideally? Say it is Rabbi Yehudah — le-chatchilah one should not, but be-di’eved it is fine (shapir dami).

And read — it cannot be, because it is listed together with an imbecile and a minor. Yes. “Mah shoteh ve-katan be-di’eved nami lo, af cheresh be-di’eved nami lo.” — “Just as an imbecile and a minor even be-di’eved cannot, so too a deaf person even be-di’eved cannot.”

Ha, HaKadosh Baruch Hu — the Holy One, blessed be He. One catches the same language, because one is exempt and one is incapable. Then he has another answer. “Ki-de-tanya be-Sifra de-Rabbi Yehudah, machshavah be-katan bi-khlal derushah, lamah li Rabbi Yehudah?” — Rabbi Yehudah, because he is the one who says what? About a deaf person. How does Rabbi Yehudah come in? Because in the Mishnah there is a dispute between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehudah. “Ha-korei Shema ve-lo hishmi’a le-ozno” — “One who reads the Shema and did not make it audible to his ear”…

Rabbi Yehudah Validates a Minor, Terei De-rabbanan, Educating Minors in Mikra Megillah, and Kohanim Interrupting Their Service

Rabbi Yehudah Validates a Minor — The Gemara’s Sugya

Speaker 1: Rabbi Yehudah, because he is the one who says what — about a deaf person… How does Rabbi Yehudah come in here? Because the Mishnah is a dispute between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehudah — the lenient opinions that Ezra brings that they have not fulfilled, and the stringent opinions that Ezra brings that they have not fulfilled — Rabbi Yehudah is not mentioned there.

Speaker 2: Yes, where does Rabbi Yehudah appear? It doesn’t bring any Rabbi Yehudah at all.

Speaker 1: Rabbi Yehudah from the Mishnah — Rabbi Yehudah validates a minor. Nu, and what about a deaf person? What did Rabbi Yehudah say about a deaf person? In short, one doesn’t have to say it’s Rabbi Yosi — it’s the same Rabbi Yehudah. I don’t understand how Rabbi Yehudah comes in.

The Gemara answers: “Rabbi Yehudah machshir be-katan, u-machshir be-cheresh” — “Rabbi Yehudah validates a minor and validates a deaf person.” That’s what he’s trying to say as an answer to your question. “Ve-amar Rabbi Yehudah, mai ta’ama de-Rabbi Yehudah? Di-khtiv ‘kasam ke-Rabbi Yehudah,’ de-amar ‘ha-niglos ve-ha-nistaros la-Hashem Elokeinu'” — “And Rabbi Yehudah said, what is Rabbi Yehudah’s reason? As it is written, ‘The revealed and the hidden things belong to Hashem our God.'” Okay.

I don’t understand the entire piece of Gemara — it’s truly wondrous. What is the inference? Because the latter part is Rabbi Yehudah — Rabbi Yehudah only argues about a minor, he doesn’t argue about a deaf person. “Midi de-havah a-reisha di-pesulah ve-seifa di-kesheirah” — “Just as the beginning disqualifies and the end validates.” That means it’s not at all the answer, he says.

Then the Gemara says another option: “Afilu teima kulah Rabbi Yehudah, ve-eino medaber bi-shnei ketanim, kegon zeh. Ha katan she-higi’a le-chinuch, ve-ha katan she-lo higi’a le-chinuch” — “Even if you say the entire Mishnah is Rabbi Yehudah, and he is speaking about two types of minors, like this: this one is a minor who has reached the age of education, and this one is a minor who has not reached the age of education.” Even one who has reached the age of education — even le-chatchilah — Rabbi Yehudah permits, Rabbi Yehudah validates a minor.

The Gemara says this cannot be, because Rabbi Yehudah is speaking about a personal matter — “cheresh de-lav bar da’as hu, katan le-chatchilah” — “a deaf person who lacks understanding, a minor le-chatchilah.” The inference from Rabbi Yehudah is only with this. “Ela mai, de-amrinan amrinan” — “Rather what, we say what we say.”

I don’t understand it so well — why can’t the Gemara say it clearly? Why must everything be said in such a convoluted way? “Hu de-amar ke-hai tanna, ve-hu de-amar ke-hai tanna” — “He says like this Tanna, and he says like that Tanna.”

A Deaf Person — Is He Like a Minor or a Category of His Own?

Speaker 1: But let’s not look at the convolutedness — let’s see what chiddush is here. That he says perhaps the deaf person has an extra problem with “hashma’as ozen” — making it audible to the ear — is a comfort that you derive from his mouth. Is he the same category as a minor, or is he a category of his own?

I just wanted to see whether one can see from the Gemara that due to chinuch — education — a minor does read, yes. But what concerns me here is the consideration regarding a minor. What comes into the category of reaching the age of education? Rabbi Yehudah considers a minor, a Rabbi Yehudah minor should properly learn… What is the revelation of this approach? What is the point of this? What is the point?

The Story with a Minor — Circular Reasoning

Speaker 1: The next level of Gemara — Rabbi Yehudah tells about the son of warriors. Yes, fine stories. A minor should properly — says Rabbi, who saw from the marketplace. This is also the circular reasoning, just as you said earlier. If you are biased, one cannot rely on it. Conversely, what they read from them — I also cannot rely on you with that story; this is now outdated.

Because your bearing, when it says this to a person, that would be the help. I, the bearing, say that you were a minor. Well, how does one view a minor? Indeed, a minor doesn’t have the full picture. Perhaps they also wanted to make him feel good, and that one uses it later for oneself. And you know, was he a minor? A minor doesn’t take.

There is indeed a Gemara about taking a minor to say in the greatness of the parable… wait… aha, a certain discovery. Okay. Okay, I don’t know.

A Minor Is Qualified — But Is He Obligated Mi-de-rabbanan?

Speaker 1: Here we see that a minor is qualified, and Rabbi Yehudah said that a minor is qualified. But it doesn’t state here whether a minor is obligated through chinuch. So that’s an extra sugya.

Now the question is whether a minor is obligated through chinuch. Because even if they are obligated through chinuch, it could still be that they cannot be motzi others, or they are still not a bar chiyuva — one who bears an obligation.

It’s somewhat interesting, because the issue is a question of whether they are truly obligated or not truly obligated. But honestly, the whole thing is the Rabbis — what one could say is that there is no difference, because the children are anyway obligated through the Rabbis.

It stands to reason — you can say that regarding de-oraisa — Torah law — there is a distinction between a bar chiyuva and a non-bar chiyuva. But when the Rabbis say that one should do mitzvos with children — isn’t that so?

Speaker 2: Nu, nu, it’s understood — terei de-rabbanan — a double rabbinic layer.

Speaker 1: You can say the opposite — you can say this makes it weaker, because perhaps the entire obligation is only chinuch and only for de-oraisas. After all, there is a Gemara in Berachos about terei de-rabbanan.

Speaker 2: Ah, that is like terei de-rabbanan.

Speaker 1: Ah, like “ke-Hillel yoshev be-seser de-rabbanan” — that kind of concept.

Speaker 2: Ah, lav terei de-rabbanan. That’s what the Gemara in Berachos calls it.

Speaker 1: But since all of chinuch is de-rabbanan — terei de-rabbanan — very good.

Tosafos’s Question and Answer — Terei De-rabbanan

Tosafos Asks Both Ways

Speaker 1: “Ve-khen katan she-higi’a le-chinuch” — “And similarly a minor who has reached the age of education” — this makes it harder. If we’re talking about one who has not reached the age of education, how can he be motzi someone who is obligated? If he has reached the age of education, then he is obligated mi-de-rabbanan just like everyone else — why can’t he be motzi others? This is what Tosafos asks.

Tosafos asks the question both ways. Tosafos, the holy Tosafos. Do you have a Tosafos here?

Speaker 2: A Tosafos — one says words. But look in Tosafos. Tosafos is Rabbeinu Tam, he considers. Yes, yes. Cheresh, cheresh, cheresh. Nu, let’s see. That’s what the Gemara has. Here we have cheresh — look in Tosafos — and so many other things.

Speaker 1: You have a large Gemara — it’s a Tosafos. Where — we have here literally in this small house, and everything you need is lying here. It’s a Megillah. Okay. Yes, here there is a… what else is it called? I also know hidden things about Megillah? Yitzchak — he coined the term “metzachek” — jesting, excess.

Tosafos’s Answer — Terei De-rabbanan

Speaker 1: Tosafos asks, if he hasn’t reached the age of chinuch (education), then he’s exempt. If he has reached the age of chinuch, then he’s obligated rabbinically just like everyone else, so why can’t he be motzi (fulfill the obligation for) others? That’s what Tosafos asks.

Ah, the opposite — the Gemara in Berachos says that a son can make the blessing for his father, even though he’s a minor, because the father ate only a rabbinic measure, so the rabbinic obligation can be motzi another rabbinic obligation. Ah. And similarly it says in the chapter of Lulav HaGazul that a minor cannot be motzi others in Hallel, and in Birkas HaMazon for adults — not bad.

One can answer, as Tosafos says, that this is two levels of rabbinic obligation (trei d’rabbanan). In the case of Birkas HaMazon, the minor is obligated from the Torah — he only has an obligation from chinuch. It’s a very interesting calculation, you follow?

The Gemara is, regarding Birkas HaMazon, that if there’s a measure — if one didn’t eat a measure of satiation, then the entire Birkas HaMazon is only rabbinic. Our rabbinic obligation creates the minor’s rabbinic status. But the minor, says Tosafos, meanwhile has eaten a measure of satiation, because otherwise it would have been two levels of rabbinic obligation, you follow? Ah, it would have been two rabbinic levels. The minor is only one rabbinic level. He is one… two rabbinic levels is a problem.

In Practice — Responsa of Rabbi Yosef

Speaker 1: It comes out in practice, that it says in the Responsa of Rabbi Yosef that an adult is motzi, because they held that matzah is rabbinic, and they were forced converts (anusim), they held that matzah is like… one cannot be motzi others, because he’s not a bar chiyuva (one who is obligated).

Digression — A Blind Person (Suma)

Speaker 1: But what about a blind person? What about someone who was a bar chiyuva, and then became blind? The obligation didn’t go away.

The later authorities (Acharonim) already seek reasoning regarding the blind person issue. Tosafos asks a question, and Tosafos has an answer to this matter. It’s not that the Gemara means what Tosafos says — on the contrary, the Gemara states the leniency that a rabbinic obligation can be motzi another rabbinic obligation. And Tosafos said that this only works for one level of rabbinic obligation; for two levels of rabbinic obligation it doesn’t work.

Why should one say that mitzvos that depend on rabbinic status where there isn’t any… when it’s only — you’ll come to Pesach anyway, so why do you need a source? Aha. The sefarim say a powerful point about this — that since he became obligated when he had sight, he remains in that status.

I mean, nobody becomes a non-reader again. A minor is just a passage. What I mean to say is, a blind person… a minor is currently on the way in; a blind person is on the way out.

Speaker 2: Yes, what is a blind person? A blind person is usually an elderly person, although blindness can also sometimes come from illness. But usually it’s blindness, it’s something that happens to very old elders. He’s already on the way out, so now we’re going to…

Speaker 1: I understand, but he’s not going to stop now. Imagine telling a person, when you’re ninety, now you can become blind, maybe not, are you exempt from the entire Torah? He continues on.

Essentially, you’re telling a Jew that after a certain age, they’ve discovered that you descend from non-Jews — is he now going to grope around under a dark cloud? I mean, what’s the difference? He’s already the same Jew. Okay.

Back to the Sugya — Chinuch of Minors in Megillah Reading

Speaker 1: Okay, back to the sugya. Okay, back to the Rambam. One is obligated with chinuch — to read the Megillah with the children.

“Go Gather All the Jews” — Children in the Megillah

Speaker 1: When Esther tells Mordechai there that the Jews should fast, she says “men, women, and children” (anashim v’nashim v’taf), yes? Where does it say in the verse? “Lech k’nos es kol haYehudim” — “Go gather all the Jews.” When Esther tells Mordechai “Go gather all the Jews,” does she also include the children, “men, women, and children”?

Speaker 2: Yes, children are also there? What is the language in the verse? “L’hashmid laharog es kol haYehudim” — it does say “nashim v’taf,” right? “Taf v’nashim.” “Taf v’nashim b’yom echad.” But “Lech k’nos es kol haYehudim” doesn’t include any details.

The Rambam — One Must Educate the Minors

Speaker 1: Okay, the Rambam says one must educate the minors. He says it’s stated in Divrei Shalom. How does one go about dealing with the children? Ah, with that interesting Midrash that the verse “l’fasikach” and “k’nog sho’ales harav.” Because I’m thinking about how the children come into the picture.

Okay. Yes. He says that the chinuch is explicit in the sugya — he means the Maggid Mishneh says that the chinuch is about the Gemara that I told you about. So it appears that it’s something that is appropriate for chinuch. It’s not stated entirely clearly, but that’s what the Maggid Mishneh says. He’s talking about the minors. Okay.

The Gragger — A Beautiful Torah’le

Speaker 1: Last year we had a beautiful Torah’le about the gragger, remember? That this is the concept of the gragger, because what is a minor who has reached the age of chinuch? As it says, “hayodea l’na’ane’a” — “one who knows how to wave.” How do you know? You know if he can hear. So they made a sign — every time one says the word Haman, if he catches on every time one says Haman, and how do you see it? You see he makes a sign — then you know he’s already a minor who knows how to read (katan hayodea likros).

Is that a good Torah?

Speaker 2: Oh, that’s a good Torah.

Halacha 1 — Even Kohanim in Their Service Must Stop

Speaker 1: “Even Kohanim in their service must stop their service.” One shouldn’t think that the service in the Beis HaMikdash is more important. “And during the daytime they stop their service and come to hear the reading of the Megillah.” Okay, that’s actually one halacha.

What does the Gemara say? “One stops Torah study, even Kohanim in their service — all mitzvos are pushed aside.”

Stopping Torah Study for Megillah Reading — Pushing Aside Mitzvos, Mes Mitzvah, and “Both the Reader and the Listener”

Halacha 1: One Stops Torah Study and Other Mitzvos for Megillah Reading

Speaker 1: One shouldn’t think that the service in the Beis HaMikdash is more important. During the day and night, they stop their service and come to hear the reading of the Megillah.

Okay, this is actually a new halacha. One stops Torah study. What does the Gemara say? One stops Torah study to hear the reading of the Megillah, all the more so for other mitzvos of the Torah, for they are all pushed aside for the reading of the Megillah. How do we know it’s a mitzvah of the Torah? And there is nothing that pushes aside the reading of the Megillah, except for a mes mitzvah (an unattended corpse) that has no one to bury it — if one encounters it, one buries it first and then reads. All other things, when the time comes, the mitzvah of reading the Megillah simply pushes everything aside.

The Meaning of “Pushing Aside” — Prioritization, Not Complete Exemption

Except for a mes mitzvah, a corpse that has no one to bury it, which the Rambam also says one must understand — it comes out that all of these… where do we learn this from? It comes out clearly that the entire “pushing aside” simply means prioritization. First one reads the Megillah, and then afterward. It doesn’t mean that one doesn’t do it at all. It’s not a complete exemption.

Discussion: What Is a “Mes Mitzvah That Has No One to Bury It”?

Speaker 2: What’s different from other cases? Different from what? Different from, for example… pushed aside… I don’t know, Krias Shema. How long is one exempt from the mitzvah?

Speaker 1: I mean, there is such a thing, but afterward it goes back to the original obligation. What’s the difference? Simple. With Krias Shema, one is exempt nowadays during a funeral or something. One is exempt as long as the matter is ongoing. But a mes mitzvah is a good one. But only a mes mitzvah that has no one to bury it. It’s actually the regular law of one who is engaged in a mitzvah (osek b’mitzvah), with one’s own deceased. There is something afterward. It’s actually a mes mitzvah, as the Rambam says, a corpse that has no one to bury it. Does that mean for every corpse one first takes care of the deceased?

A corpse that has no one to bury it. If there’s already someone taking care, then that other person takes care.

Speaker 2: Again, the question is now — someone just died, plain and simple.

Speaker 1: No, you see that there’s an extra dimension to a mes mitzvah, because it’s lying ownerless and you encountered it — don’t walk away.

Speaker 2: It occurs to you that it comes first?

Speaker 1: No, it’s simply a concern about burial of the dead.

Speaker 2: No, that’s stated… mes mitzvah isn’t just any case.

Speaker 1: No, you’re talking about a specific thing. What does mes mitzvah mean? There’s a law, already in the Gemara in Bava Kamma daf 81. There’s a law of “koneh mekomo” (it acquires its place). Mes mitzvah has specific laws.

Speaker 2: It doesn’t say mes mitzvah here. Does your Rambam say mes mitzvah?

Speaker 1: Except for a mes mitzvah. That’s what it says in mine.

Speaker 2: Ah, okay, now you’re saying that. Don’t just criticize. Next time when I say something, take me seriously. “Except for a mes mitzvah that has no one to bury it.” You see it right there — “except for a mes mitzvah that has no one to bury it.”

Speaker 1: That’s a distinction — it’s the same thing. Mes mitzvah means someone who has no one to bury him.

Speaker 2: And why are you saying a mes mitzvah can’t? Because you’re going to continue on your way, because you’re traveling, and you found a corpse, a body, on the side.

Speaker 1: It doesn’t say anything about traveling.

Speaker 2: That’s what mes mitzvah means.

Speaker 1: Mes mitzvah means the mitzvah of burying the dead.

Speaker 2: The Gemara says in Eruvin, when it discusses mes mitzvah, the Gemara…

Speaker 1: The Gemara in Berachos means that someone became… who takes care? It means like this: if there’s someone who takes care, then the other person is exempt from the Megillah. If there’s no one, then the first person who sees him is obligated. What this actually means is, if someone… no one is taking care, you should take care. But it also doesn’t mean that one must first have the funeral before Megillah.

Speaker 2: One must take care first.

Speaker 1: Yes, but again, I would say that usually what happens is one takes the deceased and sets a time. One can arrange for the funeral to be Purim afternoon. I would understand that we’re talking here about a specific scenario: a person is going to the Gemara reading, and he encounters a body, and he continues on. That’s the simple way one learns the words “except for a mes mitzvah.” Okay, let’s see what’s here… It means a corpse that has no one to bury it, or you yourself will come later — but the problem is later. It could be that first you should take care of this, even with your own deceased. With your own deceased, you are the one who buries.

Dispute Among the Rishonim — Literally a Mes Mitzvah or Not Specifically

So the Gemara says that he creates a dispute among the Rishonim whether we’re talking about a mes mitzvah literally or not. He says that the Rambam implies that it’s not specifically. The Yeshuos Chen adds “that has no one to bury it sufficiently” (she’ein lo kovrim k’dei tzorcho). He added words. “That has no one to bury it sufficiently” — yes, in general, I don’t know what, but it probably comes to introduce the novelty that we don’t mean to say specifically someone who is literally a mes mitzvah, but rather if there aren’t enough people to deal with it, that’s the implication, apparently.

Human Dignity (Kevod HaBriyos) Is Greater Than Publicizing the Miracle (Pirsumei Nisa)

In other words, the Almighty’s service, all such things are more important than the Megillah. But burial of the dead is more important. That’s what he wanted to say.

The Gra’s Piece — A Question from Krias Shema (Berachos 19a)

He had a beautiful… he brings a beautiful piece from the Gra on this sugya. What I didn’t understand simply is, the Gemara says that all mitzvos are pushed aside for the reading of the Megillah. Yes, it includes mitzvos of charity, kindness. If there isn’t something special about mes mitzvah, why should one say that specifically this one mitzvah of… because the Gemara says “gadol” (great is)… that everything is pushed aside for Torah study. What else does it say? The Temple service. Service and Torah study.

So what does it mean, for example… the Gemara says that there is kevod habriyos (human dignity), anything that involves human dignity. So what does it mean — a bride, a wedding canopy, whatever such a thing? No, he says very well that the concept of human dignity is much more general than some specific matter of mes mitzvah. Very good. But he asks a question from, for example, Krias Shema. He says no, he says specifically “b’hischilu” — if one has already begun dealing with the burial, then one doesn’t leave for the reading of the Megillah, but if not, one should first do the reading of the Megillah. He says, just as we see regarding Krias Shema. It’s not the same, because Krias Shema takes a minute, so he goes and reads Krias Shema. The Gemara says — he refers to Berachos 19a — why should he first read Krias Shema? Let’s look at Berachos 19a.

The Main Point — Human Dignity Is Even More Important

The main point is, there is a great mitzvah of the Megillah, but there is no greater mitzvah than human dignity. Okay? Let us know, pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle) is very important, but kevod habriyos is even more important. Okay?

So the bottom line is, everyone must hear the Megillah. But this is a beautiful Torah — that what you’re saying, that the reading of the Megillah takes a long time, that’s a beautiful Torah. It’s good. No, it fits with this, that one can be upset. Anyway, that’s what you’re here for, and that’s what I’m here for.

Why the Law of “Pushing Aside” Is Stated Right at the Beginning — The Deeper Connection

Anyway, the main point is, there is a mitzvah to read the Megillah, it’s a very great mitzvah, everyone is obligated. It’s also a very great mitzvah in that it pushes aside all other mitzvos. It’s very interesting that this is like the first thing stated about the Megillah. And what about Chanukah? The last thing stated about Chanukah lights is which things it pushes aside. It’s interesting the way things are hinted at, that this is the beginning.

So it apparently has to do with the concept of whether the reading of the Megillah is legitimate — it’s a part of the Torah. We see that Chazal were busy with this. It’s perhaps connected in a way.

Discussion: Is the Megillah Torah?

Speaker 2: No, it’s not a part of the Torah, and it’s a chiddush (novelty) that it pushes aside even Torah itself. The Sages were upset — so what’s the question of how one may institute it? It would have been even more. Not only that, but we say it even pushes aside Torah itself. One needs answers. Okay, this itself is Torah — “lo sasur mikol asher yorucha” (do not deviate from all that they instruct you), “u’shmartem la’asos k’chol asher yorucha” (and you shall observe to do all that they instruct you).

Speaker 1: But it’s interesting, because all the yeshiva discussions always love to ask the question that the Megillah itself is Torah, and it’s only lacking in the… quality, yes, the Torah. But no — but when we think about all the Gemaras we’ve learned, it makes a bit more sense. Because we see clearly that they have a problem saying that the Megillah is Torah. Ah, it’s certainly not Torah. True, it’s a part of Kesuvim (Writings). But one doesn’t learn the main mitzvah from it. It became a part of the Torah — that’s a mitzvah. But before that… because the same people, they say that one should have the Tanna Kamma opposing the entire concept of the Megillah — they have an argument, perhaps one doesn’t need to include it in Tanach. Apparently, no?

So now one can hear, when it says it pushes aside Torah study, it means to say: you should know, we’re going to fast. It was only an arbitrary approach to this. You remember, for Chanukah you made a very beautiful one, like a story of what the Rav came in to say. You can make that sort of thing here, about the contradiction. So after we’ve said that the contradiction has been resolved, we say that to the extent it has become a part of the Torah — to the extent that one must indeed push aside the daily daf yomi shiur, and before that push aside the Chumash shiur, because it has already become a part of the Torah. And that’s why it’s stated here at the beginning. You did say that you asked a good question — why by Chanukah it’s stated as such a detail at the end of some question about monetary matters. Here it’s stated right at the beginning, because it’s connected to the main question of whether the reading of the Megillah is at all legitimate, where it derives its legitimacy from. Either as bal tosif (do not add), according to the Ramban and the Ritva there on the spot, or the other commentators, or “aleh devarim.” Right?

One minute. Yes, hello? Okay, so let’s leave it for the next halacha. Okay, Chaim, thank you, you’ve kept us well engaged. Okay, that’s not our matter now.

Halacha 2: “Both the Reader and the Listener from the Reader Have Fulfilled Their Obligation”

Speaker 1: “Both the reader and the one who hears from the reader has fulfilled his obligation.” It’s implied that the term is very strongly “reading of the Megillah” (krias haMegillah). I don’t want to introduce it, but regarding the blowing of the shofar (tekias shofar), the same language is also used. The name of the mitzvah is called tekias shofar, and people assume that the mitzvah is the blowing. But we say no, the mitzvah is the hearing. Even the one who blows, blows in order to hear it himself. The mitzvah is the hearing. It’s relevant, but it means that when a person reads and doesn’t say the words out loud with his mouth,

Reading vs. Studying with the Eyes, Reading It in Its Entirety, and the Obligation to Read at Night and Repeat It by Day

Halacha 2: “Both the Reader and the One Who Hears from the Reader Have Fulfilled Their Obligation”

“Kriah” (Reading) in Lashon HaKodesh Doesn’t Mean Reading with the Eyes

Speaker 1: If the term is “hearing” — “and one should hear from someone who is obligated” — if the term is hearing, it could be that automatically the halacha also stands that one is not yotzei (does not fulfill the obligation) by reading it with one’s eyes.

But regarding Krias Shema it says “kara v’lo hishmia l’ozno” — “he read but didn’t make it audible to his own ear.” How does that come in here?

Speaker 2: It comes in very well. A deaf person (cheresh) — you’re talking about a deaf person.

Speaker 1: Not a deaf person. When a person reads the Megillah with his eyes but doesn’t say it to his ears, he never fulfills his obligation.

Speaker 2: You’re saying a big chiddush (novel idea) now, because seemingly that means reading, that means kri’ah. When you read a book, that’s what it does.

Speaker 1: No, you’re forgetting Hebrew. “Kri’ah” means saying, not reading with the eyes.

Speaker 2: But for example, by kri’at Shema (recitation of Shema) they do say, “kara v’lo hishmi’a l’ozno” (he read but did not make it audible to his ear), right?

Speaker 1: It doesn’t mean reading with the eyes. This is important. Reading with the eyes — one is certainly not fulfilled according to any opinion. That’s not the word “kri’ah” in lashon hakodesh (the holy tongue). It’s not a Hebrew expression.

What is it called in lashon hakodesh? “Iyun.” “Iyun” means looking with the eyes, from the root “ayin” (eye). But “kri’ah” means saying, speaking.

Were it not for the war, one wouldn’t have… people didn’t used to. What you have is a hirhur, hirhur b’libo (thought in one’s heart)…

Speaker 2: Ah, that means hirhur b’libo, seemingly. It could be that one fulfills kri’at Shema with that.

Speaker 1: But what the Torah calls “kri’ah” is not… that doesn’t play any role at all.

Connection to Simcha (Joy)

Speaker 1: And it actually fits very well with what you said, that it’s a part of the simcha. Of course, one reads the story and tells the story with joy. Very good.

This has implications regarding the tzibbur (congregation) — whether it’s a service that is called agudah (gathering) more than kri’ah (reading).

Speaker 2: Okay, because there it’s as if one says it in one’s own language.

Speaker 1: It’s the same thing.

“Therefore, if the reader was a minor or a shoteh (mentally incompetent)”

Speaker 1: Therefore, if the reader was a minor or a shoteh, one who hears from him has not fulfilled the obligation. Simply, because you’re hearing from one who is not obligated — someone in the category of… there isn’t someone who is obligated in the matter. Very good.

Speaker 2: But a minor is obligated from the standpoint of chinuch (education), and Tosafos raises a question about this — well, he doesn’t know.

Speaker 1: Okay.

Speaker 2: Yes, but he’s not truly obligated.

Speaker 1: But in Kesubos, by the Rabbis, don’t they say that it means the language?

Speaker 2: Nu, what does Tosafos answer?

Speaker 1: Let’s come back to this in a few minutes.

Speaker 2: Ah, ah, ah, yes, yes, yes. Ah, very good.

Halacha 3: “It is a mitzvah to read it in its entirety”

What does “in its entirety” mean?

Speaker 1: It is a mitzvah to read it in its entirety. What does it mean that the mitzvah is the entire unit as one piece? As if it’s a sort of thing like me’akev zeh es zeh (one invalidates the other)? What does it mean?

Speaker 2: “In its entirety” means literally — one must read… one fulfills the obligation when one finishes the whole thing. If someone read only a portion of it, one has not fulfilled anything at all.

Speaker 1: Ah, what’s the chiddush?

Speaker 2: Look in the Magen Avraham, he doesn’t say… he asks from the Mishnah “reads it in its entirety.” So the Gemara is right here — what does the Gemara say in the Mishnah?

Speaker 1: Daf 19a.

Speaker 2: The Mishnah says as follows: “From when does one read the Megillah? One reads it in its entirety.” Therefore, it is forbidden to do melachah d’Oraisa (biblically prohibited work), but regarding the Megillah there is no melachah d’Oraisa.

Speaker 1: Okay, very good.

Speaker 2: So it says that it’s not so simple. It says that it’s a mitzvah to read the Megillah — one could have said you read a few verses from the parsha. After all, the main thing is to mention the miracle, right? So you could choose the most important of the days. But they say no, one must read it in its entirety. One must read the whole thing. Why?

Speaker 1: Okay, he answers: it’s a mitzvah to read it at night and during the day. One must read it twice.

“It is a mitzvah to read it at night and during the day”

Speaker 2: From where do we derive that one says it at night and during the day? A person is obligated to read the Megillah at night and to repeat it during the day. Every matter whose mitzvah is at night — no. From where do we know this halacha? Why shouldn’t we say that once is enough? From where do we derive it?

Speaker 1: Again, once what?

Speaker 2: That one should read the Megillah once. From where do we know that one must do it twice?

Speaker 1: Yes, the Gemara has a proof for this.

Speaker 2: The Gemara has a proof. You don’t remember?

Speaker 1: No.

Speaker 2: Ah, you don’t remember? Look in the Gemara. Do me a favor — “you don’t remember” is not an answer.

Speaker 1: The halacha is on daf 4.

Speaker 2: “As it says: ‘l’ma’an yezamercha chavod v’lo yidom, Hashem Elokai l’olam odeka’ (So that my soul may sing praise to You and not be silent, Hashem my God, forever I will thank You).” Can you tell me what’s going on?

Speaker 1: It’s Rashi — “and to repeat it during the day.”

Rashi’s own interpretation

Speaker 2: Rashi gives his own interpretation: “zecher l’nes she’hayu tzo’akim mi’tzarasam yomam va’lailah” (as a remembrance of the miracle, that they cried out from their distress day and night). Rashi’s own interpretation — amazing. Because Rashi seemingly wasn’t satisfied — it was difficult for Rashi that we derive it only from that verse. He held that there must be some other reason.

The Gemara’s sources

Speaker 2: The Gemara brings. What?

Speaker 1: What don’t I understand? What are you saying?

Speaker 2: From where do we derive that one says it at night and during the day? Nu? The Gemara says, Rabbi Chelbo said in the name of Rav Huna… ah, I’m sorry, there’s something before that.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: A person is obligated to read the Megillah at night and to repeat it during the day, as it says: “Elokai ekra yomam v’lo sa’aneh, v’lailah v’lo dumiyah li” (My God, I call out by day and You don’t answer, and at night there is no silence for me). And this is a prayer that the Jews prayed through Esther.

Discussion: What does “and to repeat it during the day” mean?

Speaker 2: The Gemara says in another place that the elders of Mehalel would read the Megillah at night and study Mishnayos during the day. The meaning being to learn Mishnayos of Megillah during the day. Why should one say the Megillah itself twice?

Rabbi Yirmiyah said no — it means to say it in the manner of “avar parashta da v’isanei” (he went over this section and reviewed it), meaning to learn and review. “V’lishnosah” doesn’t mean to learn about it.

He wanted to interpret the statement, so you shouldn’t think that he means to say that at night… It’s actually a quite nice interpretation: at night one should read the Megillah, and in the morning one should learn Mishnayos of Maseches Megillah. And then when one comes home, one should read the Megillah again.

It was also stated: Rabbi Chelbo said: A person is obligated to read the Megillah at night and to repeat it during the day, as it says: “L’ma’an yezamercha chavod v’lo yidom, Hashem Elokai l’olam odeka.”

Speaker 1: An interesting ending. You don’t understand the source?

Speaker 2: Okay, no.

Speaker 1: No, the other source is a quite beautiful Torah, because it says “Elokai ekra yomam v’lo sa’aneh, v’lailah v’lo dumiyah li.” Okay, the distress was… it’s still… but who says that for the salvation one must also do the same thing?

Remembering the distress and the salvation

Speaker 1: It’s interesting — it could be that just as by Pesach there is one mitzvah of remembering the distress, like maror (bitter herbs), and one mitzvah of remembering the salvation, like, I don’t know, charoses for whatever purpose. You understand?

It could be that through the act of doing it twice, one commemorates the crying by day and by night, the suffering. Perhaps the suffering of repeating it — “ah, I’m going to do it again” — the suffering is something of a… because the reading of the Megillah itself is part of the simcha.

Speaker 2: The… okay, also a Torah, a Purim Torah.

Speaker 1: Yes, okay. Yes.

Therefore, perhaps that’s why one says a few pieces with the reading of Megillas Eichah (Book of Lamentations), the fast.

Speaker 2: Okay.

Speaker 1: The fast is indeed for this purpose. One should remember here the Fast of Esther. So one sees, seemingly, the person cries so much at the Megillah — it’s to remember the piece, to remember the matter.

Speaker 2: Okay, actually, I mean a certain percentage of the Megillah — you can say that everything is a preparation for the simcha. After all, every good happy story is — the longer you make the scary part, the end, the peak, is more joyful. It’s tied and bound together.

So, you can say most of the Megillah, more parts of the Megillah are sad than happy, right? Because you can count. Where does the salvation begin? More toward the… what percentage of the Megillah is the salvation and how much is until the salvation? The salvation begins approximately in the middle.

Speaker 1: But the suffering is part of the… it’s not that kind of suffering, a different kind of suffering. It’s a suffering that ends… it’s a build-up for the simcha with which it concludes.

Speaker 2: No, no, no — it says the Fast of Esther, whatever the concept of suffering here is, it’s a build-up to the simcha, no?

Speaker 1: Yes, yes, that could be, but he reads the Megillah twice — he says that this is the concept of remembering the previous day.

Speaker 2: Okay, for now we haven’t found a better source. That’s what the Gemara says. Either someone finds something in the Yerushalmi or what’s here…

A strange thing — the same mitzvah twice

Speaker 2: Which other mitzvos — for example, the mitzvah of Chanukah candles — is once, once a day, at night. There’s nothing of doing the same mitzvah twice. Is this the only one?

Speaker 1: The rule is the same thing. Reading the Megillah once, reading the Megillah again. You can read the same said thing once. We are accustomed to it. We have two kedushot (sanctities) with things.

Speaker 2: Yes, we have two sedarim (Pesach seders).

Speaker 1: Seemingly, it is indeed a weird thing. We just learned it. A few Shabbosos ago we learned it.

Speaker 2: What are you doing now?

Speaker 1: Okay, as you say, it makes a bit more sense, because this is the format of the seudah (festive meal) at both meals. But yes.

It could be it’s a part of Purim. One makes the party twice — that’s known.

Speaker 2: Shabbos also has a seudah during the day and at night.

Speaker 1: But one doesn’t make a seudah at night — rather, there was the “Mi Sheberach” beforehand, “b’ni al yislach amuso.” And they say that this is only about the servant, and in any case. One doesn’t make a seudah at night.

Speaker 2: Aha.

Blessings of the Megillah — Shehecheyanu during the day, and the concluding blessing “Harav es riveinu”

Blessings before reading the Megillah — three blessings at night, two during the day

Speaker 1: What are you doing now?

Speaker 2: Okay, as you say, it makes a bit more sense, because this is the format of the seudah at both meals. But… yes. As it were, it’s a part of the party, and one makes the party twice. That’s known. Shabbos also has a seudah during the day and at night. But one doesn’t make a seudah at night, but one makes a mishteh (feast), “as everything that will be explained before you, etc.” I mean, they say that here it’s only b’di’eved (after the fact), but l’chatchilah (ideally) one doesn’t make a seudah at night.

Okay, and the entire night is valid for its reading, and the entire day is valid for its reading. The time is the entire day. We were not limited to a specific time.

Speaker 1: Wait a moment — which other mitzvos can one do the entire day?

Speaker 2: “Kol mitzvah she’zmanah ba’lailah, kasher kol ha’lailah” (Every mitzvah whose time is at night is valid the entire night). The Gemara says so. You want to know more and more? Not kri’at Shema — kri’at Shema states clearly “u’v’shochb’cha u’v’kumecha” (when you lie down and when you rise). The Gemara says, because this is the rule, “every mitzvah whose time is…” A seudah — there are very many things that are valid the entire day. Nu, finally the Mishnah arrives at a rule: The entire night is valid for the reaping of the Omer and for the burning of fats and limbs. This is the rule: something whose mitzvah is during the day is valid the entire day; something whose mitzvah is at night is valid the entire night. You ask about kri’at Shema — the Gemara says, well, there’s a verse; perhaps the Rabbis made the limitation.

In any case, we see what? That it’s the entire day and the entire night. Wonderful.

Halacha 3: Three blessings at night — “Al mikra Megillah,” “She’asah nissim,” “Shehecheyanu”

Okay, and before one makes the blessings before its reading, at night three blessings. The first blessing: Asher kid’shanu b’mitzvosav v’tzivanu al mikra Megillah (Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us regarding the reading of the Megillah). The second is She’asah nissim la’avoseinu ba’yamim ha’heim ba’zman ha’zeh (Who performed miracles for our forefathers in those days at this time) — which is seemingly a birkas ha’shevach (blessing of praise). And the third is Shehecheyanu v’kiy’manu v’higi’anu la’zman ha’zeh (Who has kept us alive, sustained us, and brought us to this time). And during the day one does not say Shehecheyanu. Shehecheyanu is said for having merited to perform the mitzvah.

One can, however, say differently — one can say that if someone, for example, forgot to read at night…

Speaker 1: Ah, that is seemingly, yes, seemingly. There’s nothing to do with that.

Speaker 2: That’s the first point.

Speaker 1: Very good.

The Rambam’s language “eino chozer u’mevarech” — implying that during the day is only if one already said it at night

Speaker 2: The Rambam says… the Rambam doesn’t say this explicitly. The Rambam doesn’t say clearly, but the Rambam doesn’t speak about the case where one didn’t say it at night. He says eino chozer u’mevarech (he does not go back and bless again). He doesn’t say “during the day he doesn’t bless” — he says during the day he does not go back and bless again. The meaning? That’s the word. During the day he does not go back and bless again, says the Rambam.

Rabbeinu Tam’s position — Shehecheyanu twice, because the primary mitzvah is during the day

The Hagahos Maimuniyos brings that Rabbeinu Tam disagrees, and he says that he holds that the primary mitzvah is during the day, even if one read it at night, one has not fulfilled the obligation. And consequently, he says that one should indeed say Shehecheyanu twice. And he says and so the Maharam practiced, and so the Ba’al HaRoke’ach.

Speaker 1: I would actually take… yes, the responsa of the Maharam, the Maharam of Rothenburg, simply. Yes, that he himself would practice quietly… very nice.

Speaker 2: Let’s finish this halacha, and afterward we’ll say goodbye to our friend R’ Shlomo.

The Maharam’s practice — “quietly so as not to be embarrassed before the congregation”

Speaker 1: No, on the contrary — the people practiced according to the opinion of the Mechaber that one says Shehecheyanu only once. Later, the Maharam would say it quietly according to the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam.

Speaker 2: Ah, aha.

Speaker 1: Quietly, so as not to be embarrassed before the congregation.

Speaker 2: Aha.

Speaker 1: It could be that there are notes about this — let’s see.

Speaker 2: Here?

Speaker 1: No, not really. We don’t have that.

Speaker 2: Okay, we need to take something more practical.

Digression: The Yosef Ometz regarding a minor — testing if he can learn a parsha

Speaker 1: The Yosef Ometz explains it well. It says here: And similarly a child, meaning, one should see if he is a minor who knows chinuch — anyone who can learn a parsha from him.

Speaker 2: No, that’s what we discussed.

Speaker 1: That it’s a way to test if he can read, if he picks up enough good words — then he is a minor for whom the mitzvah is relevant. It’s a nice way of… okay.

The concluding blessing — “Harav es riveinu”

Okay, fine. And one makes blessings. Okay, let’s say we learn three blessings up to here. Okay, and the next one. Okay, and the next one. And in a place where the custom is to bless afterward, one blesses. What is the blessing that is customarily said afterward? Baruch Atah Hashem Elokeinu Melech ha’olam, harav es riveinu (Blessed are You, Hashem our God, King of the universe, Who fights our fight).

Speaker 2: Also “harav es riveinu”?

The text of the blessing — five expressions of vengeance

Speaker 1: Also “harav es riveinu,” v’hadan es dineinu (Who judges our judgment), v’hanokem es nikmaseinu (Who avenges our vengeance), v’hanifra lanu mi’tzareinu (Who exacts payment for us from our oppressors), v’ham’shalem g’mul l’chol oyvei nafsheinu (Who repays all the enemies of our soul), v’hahoreg es kol tzareinu bamidbar (Who slays all our enemies in the wilderness). It appears that all of them, instead of speaking about the salvation, speak more about the punishment of the wicked, about the vengeance, the punishment. Very puzzling. Why don’t you say “ha’go’el ha’moshi’a lanu” (Who redeems and saves us)?

Speaker 2: Vengeance, vengeance.

Speaker 1: No, the main thing is the vengeance. We were saved. We were saved. “Nitzalnu mi’yadam” (We were saved from their hands), “v’hotzi’anu l’cheirus” (and He brought us out to freedom). By the… what is the language? What does one say on Pesach? Does one ever say such a thing that the Egyptians were killed, or more that we went out of Egypt? “She’hotzi’anu mi’Mitzrayim mi’beis avadim” (Who took us out of Egypt, from the house of slaves).

Speaker 2: You learned in Chumash — I saw that very many of the Egyptians went out.

Speaker 1: Right, but I want to say, the blessing here has a great inclination toward different words, many variations of the same thing. Rav (fights), dan (judges), nokem (avenges), nifra (exacts payment), meshalem g’mul (repays) — five. There’s something of a secret here, there’s a certain…

Speaker 2: What’s here though is rav…

Speaker 1: …state of mind that one should be in.

Discussion: “Rav es riveinu” — language of judgment, not war

Speaker 2: By “rav es riveinu,” the language is of a judgment, like “ki yariv bein anashim” (when men quarrel).

Speaker 1: Right, right, right.

Speaker 2: “Between vessels facing each other.” The Almighty adjudicated between us.

Speaker 1: “Between the oppressor and the one who fights with him.”

Speaker 2: The Almighty said that he is right and the horse is not right, and the Almighty took our side.

Speaker 1: Yes.

Speaker 2: “Nokem” and “nifra” is more like the concept of war. “Meshalem g’mul” is also such a concept.

Speaker 1: By “rav es riveinu,” what is the concept?

Speaker 2: I mean to say, “rav es riveinu” is a different miracle than “Al HaNissim.” “Al HaNissim” is “she’masarta giborim b’yad chalashim” (You delivered the mighty into the hands of the weak).

Speaker 1: But “rav es riveinu” is the concept of “v’nikmas nikmasam al tzareihem” (and their vengeance was avenged upon their enemies).

Contrast with “Al HaNissim” of Chanukah

Speaker 2: Ah, now Chanukah — “Al HaNissim” is “she’masarta giborim b’yad chalashim, v’rabim b’yad me’atim, u’t’mei’im b’yad t’horim, u’r’sha’im b’yad tzaddikim, v’zeidim b’yad oskei Sorasecha” (You delivered the mighty into the hands of the weak, the many into the hands of the few, the impure into the hands of the pure, the wicked into the hands of the righteous, and the wanton into the hands of those who engage in Your Torah). By “rav es riveinu,” we’re talking about the hanging on the tree.

Speaker 1: “V’salu oso v’es banav al ha’eitz” (And they hanged him and his sons on the tree).

Speaker 2: And in “Al HaNissim” of Chanukah it does say “rav es riveinu.” And this is the vengeance that the Gemara says is always placed between two Names. Here too, the vengeance is between two Names from both sides. Yes, “Keil nekamos Hashem” (God of vengeance, Hashem).

Two dimensions in the blessing — salvation and justice

Speaker 1: I was thinking that we see here two conclusions. This is also what — when Klal Yisrael calls out to their oppressors, the world is saved. The world is saved — well, yes, we’re speaking somewhat about saving the Jews. The end.

One word was left over for the liberals, those who don’t want to take vengeance. You know what the Almighty also helped with? “Ki lo yishkach shav’as anavim” (For He does not forget the cry of the humble). “Ta’avas anavim shamata Hashem” (The desire of the humble You have heard, Hashem). This is also said in “yashiv avonos ligmol al rosham” (He will return iniquities to repay upon their heads). So, there is here a concept of righteous judgment. There are two things: one is that the Almighty loves the Jews, “olam meshu’ah” (a world of salvation), and again, the Almighty made justice — the world is not hefker (ownerless). Yes, that is what the Rambam said.

Speaker 2: Yes, but that’s what it showed. The very specific thing is more that when the Jews were in a time of trouble (eis tzara), the Almighty answered our prayer, “He is close to our cry” (hovi karov l’shav’einu). But that doesn’t stand here specifically. Yes, true, but the focus is not on the Creator who is close to our cry. They are saying in the future tense, “Where is the One who is close to our cry?” (ayeh karov l’shav’einu), as it says there. No, Rebbe, it’s not a contradiction, but that’s not what he’s showing.

Conclusion

Speaker 1: Well, may there be vengeance upon the enemies, and may our enemies burst from jealousy. We should be thinking, and we’ll see each other. There’s no food, we’re going to give a hug, we’ll see each other on Purim, and we’ll see each other.