Auto Summary and Transcript Black Box prophecy vs Open Prophecy

Summary

This philosophical dialogue between Yitzchok Lowy and Shnayor Burton examines Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise and its central claim that the Bible contains only simple moral exhortations, not philosophical truth. Spinoza’s project aims to free philosophy from scriptural authority by arguing that the prophets received imaginative symbols tailored to their existing beliefs, not eternal truths.

Three Responses to Spinoza

Shnayor develops three distinct answers to Spinoza’s deflationary reading:

1. Complex Presuppositions: Even if the surface message of Tanakh is “simple” (be just, be righteous, obey God), these concepts presuppose an enormously complex metaphysics. The notion of God alone requires extensive philosophical elaboration. Tanakh takes its premises for granted—but that doesn’t make them basic.

2. The Prophet’s Perspective: The most innovative argument. Spinoza (and Ibn Tibbon before him) only asks what the Torah means to readers. But what did it mean to write it? What was prophecy like from the inside? True interpretation requires adopting the creative mindset of the prophets—not just reading their conclusions, but understanding how they arrived at them. As Yitzchok puts it: “The definition of understanding something is being able to do it. Someone who learns Sefer Yetzirah should be able to create the world.”

3. Torah She-ba’al Peh (Oral Torah): Later authorities like Maimonides can reach into the presuppositions behind the text and legislate them explicitly. The Rambam’s principle that God has no body wasn’t in the written Torah, but he brought the secret to the surface and made it law. “Today everyone’s like: what’s the big chiddush? Everyone knows Hashem is not a guf. So he made it that way.”

The Central Problem: Psikas Nevo’ah

The dialogue turns on a provocative question: Are religions of the book more rooted in the cessation of prophecy than in its appearance? Is psikas nevo’ah a bigger principle of faith than the existence of prophecy itself?

Shnayor’s theory: Before prophecy ceased, contradictions between prophetic books weren’t problematic—everyone writes books, it’s ongoing, alive. But once prophecy ended, the relationship to texts fundamentally changed. Instead of studying to be prophets, people began studying the prophets. This required canonization, internal consistency, a fixed curriculum. The books became conclusions to accept rather than guides to doing what the prophets did.

Why Spinoza Couldn’t Claim Prophecy

If Spinoza had new philosophy to sell, why not claim prophetic authority? Yitzchok suggests it’s because prophecy and philosophy have been separated in his worldview—prophecy is something to obey or disobey, not to understand or continue. You can only do prophecy by continuing Moses’s project, speaking his language, using his terms. Spinoza was “speaking Japanese”—his philosophical vocabulary was disconnected from the prophetic tradition.

The Stagnation Problem

Yitzchok raises a devastating question: If the Rambam, the Arizal, and Chassidus were all trying to get back inside the prophets’ minds, why didn’t the project progress? Physics has a 3,000-year tradition with clear advancement. Torah interpretation, even by its own values, seems stuck.

Shnayor suggests that those who succeed in finding God tend to “monopolize the conversation” differently than in other fields. The success of great interpreters makes it hard to see where they came from—people systematize the conclusions without understanding the questions that generated them.

Conclusion

The dialogue ends with a striking claim: Spinoza is a symptom of chasimat ha-nevo’ah in a very deep way. If you accept that prophecy has truly ceased—that it’s a black box we can only obey, not enter—then Spinoza’s deflationary reading follows naturally. The only escape is to reject psikas nevo’ah itself, to insist that the project of becoming prophets remains open.

Shnayor admits he’s “thankful” for psikas nevo’ah as a practical matter (“I would not like everyone walking around trying to be prophets—we’ll get a bunch of false prophets”). But he maintains a third way must exist. Both speakers leave the question open.

Transcript

Introduction: Spinoza’s Political Project and Biblical Interpretation

Yitzchok Lowy: Okay, a gut voch, Reb Shneur, and to all the listeners, a gut voch. So, our previous discussion was about the political goal of this whole book, which is, according to Spinoza, creating or enabling the freedom of philosophy, right? The freedom of thought. And we discussed at length how really all of his arguments are in service of this goal. Like, it is always the political meaning. So that was our previous discussion.

And I think that we do also want to get into some of the actual arguments, especially the discussion of the interpretation of the Tanakh, of the Bible. By him, “Bible” means also the New Testament, so that is another problem. But in any case, at least of the Jewish Bible—and because I’m not sure to what extent it can be separated from the political goal, but at least to us it is important to try to understand and to also engage, like to answer to some of his points that he makes about what it actually does say in the Tanakh, what it doesn’t say. So I think we want to discuss some of that. Does that make sense?

Shnayor Burton: Yes. And I will say that overall I found myself more in agreement with his claims about what Tanakh presents than in dissent. But it’s more about what he does with that—I found it to be very thin.

Yitzchok Lowy: Meaning?

Shnayor Burton: Meaning his ramifications of that, twofold—not just the political but even in terms of the truth content.

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Spinoza’s Central Argument: Separating Philosophy from Religion

Shnayor Burton: I mean, okay, what’s his big vort? What’s his big chiddush? What he does is he separates philosophy from religion. So the content of Tanakh is not philosophy and it’s not where you should look for your metaphysical truths. That’s his big point. And therefore—so that’s a big move for his freedom of thought. He has to first free thought from scripture.

So what’s his argument in favor of that? He believes there are metaphysical inconsistencies within Tanakh, contradictions regarding matters of metaphysics. And that indicates to him that the Nevi’im [prophets] are not—it’s not revealed to the Nevi’im absolute eternal truths, but rather they have imaginative perceptions, imaginative symbols of things that encourage moral perfection. And the symbols are tailored to the particular prophet’s truth-beliefs. They’re not actually giving him messages of truth-beliefs, but rather they’re telling him something about morals mediated through his existing notions of what he believes to be true or not.

Of course, like much of this book, we know that this is inspired by the Guide [Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed], right, by the Rambam. I mean, you agree with that, no?

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah. We can take apart every sentence in this paragraph and disagree to some extent, right? But let’s try to think about what you just said—so you agree that Tanakh is not philosophy, right? Is that true or not? Because the Rambam doesn’t agree, or maybe he doesn’t.

Shnayor Burton: I’m not so sure. Okay. The Rambam does not agree with it.

Yitzchok Lowy: Okay, this is question number one. It’s a big question. Meaning to say, so this is one big machlokes which we already have.

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The Seduction of Spinoza’s Reading

Yitzchok Lowy: You say that you identify with a lot of what he says about something like how to read Tanakh, or what it is trying to say, or how it works—maybe in some very general sense, probably not with all of his pshatim in Parshas Ki Sisa or whatever, but things like that. But you don’t agree with what he does with that, or with his political and philosophical conclusions?

Shnayor Burton: Right.

Yitzchok Lowy: Actually, I think that there is a lot of, how do you say, pituy—

Shnayor Burton: Seduction, yeah.

Yitzchok Lowy: —seduction in the way he tries to… And since, at least from my position—I don’t know if I could disprove it, but from the position where I come from, or what I was taught, like you say, even from the Guide, which we’ll talk about in a second—is that it’s this that I want to overcome. But that’s a different discussion maybe.

Shnayor Burton: This—when you say “this,” you mean what? What specifically?

Yitzchok Lowy: Like this seduction, that this is what the Tanakh is doing. And it seems like if you read it simply, without importing foreign ideas, that’s what it’s doing.

Shnayor Burton: Okay.

Yitzchok Lowy: I think that it’s seductive but wrong.

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First Criticism: The Complex Presuppositions Behind “Simple” Messages

Shnayor Burton: Okay. Well, here’s the thing, and here’s why I think we’re not in so much disagreement. This is my first criticism of Spinoza. In a way, to me this is the less interesting one, but let’s talk about this first one, which is: the content is not metaphysical, but Tanakh assumes a very complex and deep metaphysics and philosophy.

So what are we accomplishing by making the message of Tanakh simple? Even if we grant it—I don’t think it is, my second criticism is I don’t think it’s simple, the message. I think it’s moral and psychological to a certain extent, but I don’t think it’s simple.

But my first criticism is: even if it is simple, so like, what is “simple” for Spinoza? You should be obedient to God—he likes using the word “obedience”—justice, charity, righteousness. So like these notions that he calls basic. But I don’t think they’re basic at all. Obviously the notion of God is not basic—there’s a lot of philosophy to talk about regarding the notion of God.

So just because the Tanakh is taking its premises for granted—and he makes that point, Tanakh never tells you what it means by God or by all these terms—I think that’s a very important point. It’s a point I make as well.

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. So that’s after—it’s based on a lot of assumptions.

Shnayor Burton: For sure. So in terms of Tanakh as an authority—I mean, that’s a starting point. He’s trying to demote Tanakh from an authoritative position of telling people what to think. But if Tanakh is taking certain things for granted, then you are not consistent with Tanakh if you think certain things.

So just take an example: if you think there’s no God because you have freedom to philosophize, then you are not in line with Tanakh. So in that sense, I think we are in agreement, you and I, that it may be that the Tanakh, the actual core content of Tanakh, is in a certain sense simple, but what it’s based on is very complex. And therefore it’s a reflection of a very complex truth content, a very complex philosophy.

And that “reflection” word is inspired by the Guide, where we have the notion of the imaginative faculties reflecting the truths of the intellect. So, I mean, I’m thinking of that.

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The Main Point: More Than Spinoza Claims

Yitzchok Lowy: I see. I think we want to get to this, the main point that we want to get to tonight, which is what you’re saying: that there is something, even on the surface level of the message, that seems to be more than what he claims it is. And maybe his claim is very weird—he doesn’t really justify it very well. I also asked the chat to say if anyone told us what the justification is, and it’s like three verses in John or something, not helping me.

Shnayor Burton: I mean, I think he’s saying like, you know, begadol what do the Nevi’im want from you? Be a good guy. I think that’s his main point.

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. So then he does another thing with the law. I think the law—he pigeonholes the law into being a constitution for a state. He has that chapter on the ceremonial law. So then he’s looking at everything else besides for the law and he’s saying: okay, what is the essence of the prophetic message? And that is: be a good person.

Shnayor Burton: Right. So that’s after—it’s based on a lot of assumptions.

Yitzchok Lowy: For sure. He assumes that Vayikra [Leviticus] is not real, because if Vayikra is real, then it’s very complex. There’s something going on there.

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The Rambam, Ibn Tibbon, and the Two Levels of Torah

Yitzchok Lowy: The main issue—this is just like a mareh makom [reference] for a future problem. To me, it’s maybe the most important question here, or at least for my purposes, for my shittah to work—is that it seems to me that there’s a real machlokes here. Maybe we could work on it and figure out something better than a real machlokes. But there’s a real machlokes.

I know one location where this machlokes, this question happens, which is in Shmuel ibn Tibbon’s—I forgot where—in his commentary, I think in Yikavu HaMayim, he says explicitly that he disagrees with his teacher, the Rambam. You know this, right?

Shnayor Burton: I know the place where he dismisses—

Yitzchok Lowy: I was taught this by Yehuda Seewald, and I’m not—this isn’t how he taught it. I’m still not sure that it’s really what Ibn Tibbon says, but it seems like sometimes he says this. He says that he disagrees with his teacher because the Rambam says many times explicitly that the Torah has two levels of meaning. The pshat is in the level of pshat—it’s trying to convince the regular people in the imaginative language that works for them and so on.

And then the Rambam says there’s also a sod [secret meaning] for the Torah which is Maaseh Bereshit and Maaseh Merkavah [the esoteric teachings concerning Creation and the Divine Chariot], and he has these keys of how to read it out into the Torah and so on—a lot of parts of the Guide are just about that. And he thinks that the true science is the true meaning of the Torah, the true wisdom of the law and so on.

Ibn Tibbon says: look, I’ve read the science and I’ve read the Torah, and yeah, there’s three lines of Aristotle that maybe are in the Torah, even if you agree with the Rambam’s interpretations, but it’s not there.

Shnayor Burton: Yeah.

Yitzchok Lowy: So he says: I disagree with my teacher. I think that the Torah was only for the external meaning, or mostly. And even to the extent that it is also the secret meaning, it’s only so it shouldn’t disagree with it, so the smart people shouldn’t be upset—things like that.

Shnayor Burton: Right.

Yitzchok Lowy: So I think that this is where there’s a real—Spinoza seems to be with Ibn Tibbon, with this so-called radical interpretation.

Shnayor Burton: Correct. Yeah, and by the way, there’s a response to Ibn Tibbon, which I’m not sure where he stands on this. And this is an argument against Spinoza as well.

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Inside vs. Outside: The Perspective of the Prophet

Shnayor Burton: The Torah has two levels that you could look at it. You could look at it from the inside, you could look at it from the outside.

From the outside, I mean to say: okay, we have these books that are canonical, we consider them useful to be our books. What is the use that—when I say “we,” the sages that canonized it, the nation that’s busy reading them in shul—you could look at either of those. You could say: what are we trying to get from these books? Why do we teach people to study these books?

And there are two possible answers for that: the external surface level one for the masses, or the more inner one—whatever the Rambam believes in.

But there’s another question, which is: what are these books from the inside? Meaning, if you’re a prophet, what does it look like to be writing these books, to be thinking this way?

And this is why I say it’s a response to Ibn Tibbon and Spinoza as well. What’s it like for the Navi? Is he closer to the secret meaning, to the Sitrei Torah [secrets of the Torah]? I think, as far as I remember, Ibn Tibbon doesn’t talk about that. Everyone’s taking the Torah after it exists and asking: okay, what do we do with this? What does it talk to us?

And the same argument, I think, is a very strong argument against Spinoza. Nowhere in the book—there’s like one place I think, if I remember correctly—where he acknowledges that he has no idea how prophecy happens. But that’s really where it gets interesting. What’s it like from the perspective of the prophet? What exactly is happening to him that he has this message?

And if you can’t answer that, then A, I don’t think you really understand the book, and B, I think you might be underselling what it has to offer—because you’re just assuming that whatever was going on for the real masters of the book, the ones who wrote it, can’t be happening to you.

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Understanding Means Being Able to Do

Yitzchok Lowy: I see, that’s a very interesting formulation because maybe it’s going to help me. I like it very much. Because I always think that the definition of understanding something is being able to do it, which is why someone who learns Sefer Yetzirah [the Book of Formation, an early Kabbalistic text] should be able to create the world, right? Otherwise you didn’t understand it.

Shnayor Burton: Yeah. And if you learn the prophets, you should be able to write prophecy.

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. The Rambam also pretty much explicitly acknowledges that he doesn’t know how to be a prophet himself, I think. Maybe it’s not explicit, I’m just imagining this according to my imagination.

Shnayor Burton: What are you referring to?

Yitzchok Lowy: It’s a prophecy.

Shnayor Burton: I think it’s a false prophecy you’re referring to.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, okay, let’s scratch that then, maybe it’s wrong.

Shnayor Burton: No, look, because the whole idea of the Guide as being the training for prophecy obviously is what supports the way I’m looking at it. And maybe Ibn Tibbon is right for everyone who’s not a prophet—that for those who are not prophets, that’s the main meaning of the Torah. But the Rambam wants to bring you into it. If you read the Guide as an initiation to prophecy, then the Rambam is training you how to get to the inside.

Yitzchok Lowy: So this would work together with the same thing that you said before: that maybe it’s true that the meaning of the text—like the historical meaning, what Spinoza calls the historical meaning—simply is what it says, it’s on the surface, there are no secrets. Although nobody knows what Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh [the divine name “I Am That I Am” from Exodus 3:14] means, but okay, maybe you can make a simple pshat.

Shnayor Burton: But that’s the thing, by the way. Spinoza also likes to say—and I know you like this too, I don’t—that we don’t even know what they mean. Like, okay, sometimes there’s an obscure text and he gives up, he says there’s no way, it was a machlokes, one guy says this, one guy says that, and they’re fighting to the death. And it all becomes about which meforaish [commentator] is right. And meanwhile, why don’t we just all acknowledge that we have no idea what it means?

To me, that doesn’t solve anything. First of all, I think we can know what it means. That’s one position I have all the time—that we can, and we can grade perushim [interpretations] according to how compelling they are. And we don’t have to respect every single perush and say eilu v’eilu divrei Elokim chayim [“these and these are the words of the living God”]. Let’s apply the tools of criticism and say which one is most compelling. So I disagree with Spinoza on that.

And also, even if we couldn’t—okay, so what? So we have a problem.

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The Secret of Making Torah vs. Reading Torah

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. Okay, but that’s aside. What you’re saying now is that it would work, would be the same thing as what you just said: that maybe the surface, the text, doesn’t have a secret meaning. Let’s say so-and-so doesn’t mean that in this way, let’s say that’s not what it means. But that doesn’t mean, like you said, that it doesn’t presuppose some metaphysical truths or some things.

Shnayor Burton: Right. But why are you saying that this is not what the Rambam means by Sodot HaTorah [the secrets of the Torah]? Why do we say that? Maybe it does.

Yitzchok Lowy: Wait, let me see in a second if we could make that work together. And you say these presuppositions are also what the author—the author in the sense of the prophet, not God—of the Torah, the one that makes the Torah, is doing or knows. Maybe knows by himself, or is doing something like that. Is this the same thing? Because you want to say that the secret of the Torah is the secret of making the Torah, not the secret of reading the Torah.

Shnayor Burton: Well, because I agree with you that those two are identical. If you know the secret well enough, then you’re going to be making more of it. I also think that making more Torah is very much what the Torah really wants. Like, the Torah is to train further Nevi’im who are then going to guide history.

This has to do with my political criticism of Spinoza. I think that Nevi’im have a lot to do with politics, and that’s how the Torah creates history and creates states. We can get to that at a different time. But in other words, I think it’s integral to the Torah, it’s part of what the Torah is trying to do—train people to get inside the Torah.

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Multiple Levels of Meaning

Yitzchok Lowy: Does this work with the Rambam? I’m trying to think—I don’t know right now how I see that it’s the same, but what would be the difference between this and someone who says the simple pshat of saying that there’s a secret level in the Torah?

Shnayor Burton: What’s the simple pshat, that like the Torah is there to speak in codes or something like that?

Yitzchok Lowy: Also in codes, also. The Torah wants you to—in other words, that there’s information, it’s not that the Torah wants you to think like the Nevi’im thought, but rather, maybe it does. Besides for that, it also has some information that it’s hiding, and it’s in codes or whatever, and when you figure it out, you’re in on the secret.

Shnayor Burton: Right.

Yitzchok Lowy: So I guess, if we talk about two different distinctions—one is about the literal meaning and the more esoteric meaning—I think obviously it’s not a big deal, unlike what Spinoza maybe thinks. It’s not a big deal for a text to have multiple layers of meaning. Like the Zohar says, I could write a text like that.

Shnayor Burton: Of course.

Yitzchok Lowy: Like no big deal. Maybe Spinoza also writes texts like that. Like what’s the deal?

Shnayor Burton: I don’t think Spinoza does. No, honestly, no—he seems to really be missing that.

Yitzchok Lowy: You think he really thought Christ was the greatest philosopher?

Shnayor Burton: Okay, no, he could write with multiple meanings in a Straussian way. I’m saying yes, he could lie. But I don’t think he appreciates the richness of like parables, of imagination, and the way that could shade into meaning and have various levels between it and truth. By him, it’s like either you’re going to be Spinoza and do philosophy, or you’re just simple. He seems to really have not appreciated that there’s a whole gradation, a spectrum between true philosophy and what’s simple.

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Three Different Answers to Spinoza

Yitzchok Lowy: Okay. But let’s go back to this thing. If we can talk about two things: one is this different levels in a text, which is the basic theory of Sodot HaTorah. Then there’s another thing, which the Rambam by the way talks less about. That’s why most of the Guide is framed around this first point—the Torah has a secret and let me explain to you how to find it.

But then there is this other point which, in the context of faith—Rav Saadia Gaon and people like that—the Rambam more or less assumes all the time but almost never explains it. I think maybe never explains it, I’m not sure. The quotes that people usually bring don’t mean that. This is the difference between secondhand truth and firsthand truth.

Shnayor Burton: Okay. You’re saying in terms of prophecy as well—in terms of being a prophet as opposed to…

Yitzchok Lowy: So usually it’s termed, it’s framed in terms of Kabbalah [received tradition], right? Taklid [imitation/following] and yediya [knowledge] and chakira [philosophical inquiry], and so on.

Shnayor Burton: Right.

Yitzchok Lowy: The question is—this is real, maybe there’s a big machlokes on a lot of things people say about this. The question is: to what extent are these two things, the second level of both of these things, to what extent is it identical? Is there such a thing as Sodot HaTorah be-derech Kabbalah, just receiving it?

Shnayor Burton: Why not? I don’t understand what you mean by that. Why would that not be?

Yitzchok Lowy: In the sense that the true meaning of the Torah—because I think true knowledge, or say the same thing as true prophecy, true prophecy is only if you know it yourself.

Shnayor Burton: Okay. I see.

Yitzchok Lowy: And therefore if there’s a true meaning of the Torah—like im dargas ha-iyyun [according to the level of philosophical inquiry] as it’s called in the Moreh—then you end up with Ibn Tibbon’s question: so what are we doing with all these codes? What are they about? There’s a problem.

Shnayor Burton: Right. I mean, my argument is that the codes are there in the Guide to initiate you into the world of the prophets, to be a firsthand prophet.

I don’t really think that, to be honest. I’m saying I don’t really think that’s the only thing that’s happening in the Guide. Certainly not.

Yitzchok Lowy: No. Ibn Tibbon would say that, but in a very simple way—it’s geared to convince someone that’s just reading the Torah that there is philosophy, but then you have to go and do the philosophy.

Shnayor Burton: Right. Okay, you could say that. Exactly right. That’s not very interesting still.

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The Role of Later Legislators: Rambam’s Innovation

Shnayor Burton: In the Moreh, there’s a whole other thing going on. This is another ta’ana [argument] against Spinoza, but I think it’s a very side point—or maybe related to the core issue, I’m not sure. He’s very bothered that the Torah doesn’t say—Torah never says to believe Hashem is not a guf [body]. And then comes Maimonides and says you have to believe Hashem is not a guf.

He’s very upset about this because the Torah says lo sosif v’lo sigra [“you shall not add and you shall not subtract”]. He’s very frum [pious/observant]. He’s like: Moshe Rabbeinu who said lo sosif v’lo sigra never said this!

So it’s like, okay, ela mai [so what], vayst ois [it turns out] it’s Torah She-ba’al Peh [the Oral Torah], vayst ois the Torah’s not ended with Moshe the first, and Moshe Maimonides also has what to say. That’s my pshat. And I don’t have a problem with that.

Yitzchok Lowy: That’s your pshat. But wait, so this—very good, so then that would be another whole kind of answer, right?

Shnayor Burton: I know, as I’m saying. So this also I like. Well, sometimes it might be time to bring out the sodos as Torah. In other words, exactly, it’s a whole different answer.

Because even if you say that the sodos, such as they were once upon a time, were the domain, the purview of the prophets who were on the inside of the Torah—once in a while you’ll have a Torah She-ba’al Peh figure like the Rambam who will say: okay, now it’s time to bring those out to the surface.

That’s why I was saying before, I don’t think the Moreh Nevuchim is there only to initiate Nevi’im—certainly not. Because he certainly thinks we have to bring things out and tell it to everyone. He says so explicitly. He says this is for the hamon [the masses], he says meforash [explicitly] that it’s for the hamon.

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. So that would be the active Torah She-ba’al Peh theory of the Guide. Right now we have three theories, three different things.

The first thing was: maybe we could assume that it’s there, the surface is simple, but there’s a background or presuppositions.

The second thing was that the prophet himself—that’s a very interesting one for me—how does it look from the inside? I’m going to tell you something, I have to talk about this one more point about that still.

And now you’re saying a third thing, which Spinoza entirely ignores because his whole framework is that we’re using the authority of the text. He doesn’t believe in the authority of the interpreters, unless they could claim to have a true tradition, which he just doesn’t believe in.

But for that, the answer would be Torah She-ba’al Peh. But I see—it seems like your Torah She-ba’al Peh answer is still somehow based on this “behind the text” really existing there, right?

Shnayor Burton: As in the presupposed—yeah. It’s not yesh mi-ayin [something from nothing]. While originally it wasn’t there in the text because the text was kept simple, now you could have a legislator who says: this truth is now going to be brought down to the textual simple level. And everyone’s going to accept simply that, oh, Hashem is not a guf.

Like today, everyone’s like: what’s the big chiddush in the Moreh Nevuchim? Like, everyone knows Hashem is not a guf. So he made it that way.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, I know.

Shnayor Burton: But I mean to say, that happens, right? You heard that. Everyone hears, everyone in yeshiva teaches Moreh Nevuchim. They hear that from people like: wait, don’t we know this already?

But the point is, I was saying, that yes, maybe Spinoza’s right that all the revealed Torah is simple and that’s all Torah wants from people—but that doesn’t mean that once in a while someone could reach into the behind-the-scenes, the presuppositions, and bring it out to make it simple.

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. So you’re answering like the Tosafos question more—more than the—if someone would argue that the Torah seems to believe that God does have a body, which I don’t know, some people have argued, then you’re not answering that. You’re answering someone that says it doesn’t say anything.

This is really what Spinoza says, because Spinoza can’t have the Torah saying anything positive that way either. So he has to say it just doesn’t say anything, or it says whatever the Navi at that moment imagined, which is not supposed to be authoritative.

Shnayor Burton: Right.

Yitzchok Lowy: And you’re saying: okay, maybe that’s true, but at some point some people for various reasons could decide that this should be part of the law. And then it becomes a law.

Shnayor Burton: Yeah.

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The Problem of Prophecy and Psikas Nevo’ah (Cessation of Prophecy)

Yitzchok Lowy: Okay. I think that this question of—I want to talk for a second more about how prophecy from the inside is. Because, I mean, for one, a great sense of orthodoxy, or however you want to call it, in all of its forms, is precisely negating this—just like it’s negating the other thing.

Shnayor Burton: Okay, that’s very interesting. I want to make sure I don’t miss this.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, let me fill in the “thing” and the “other thing,” right?

We said that there are two orthogonal questions. One is the question of independent or direct knowledge of truth, in whichever way—whether by imagination, whether by mysticism, whether by philosophy, it doesn’t matter right now which way. The direct apprehension, which maybe you could call being mechadesh [innovative/original], right? You could have a new—maybe it’s not new, if it’s true then it was always true, but new to you—or some new revelation kind of thing.

Versus just believing what you’re told, or like chasimat ha-nevi’im [the sealing/end of the prophets], the book is sealed, it’s canonized, this is what it is, there’s lo sosif v’lo sigra [no adding or subtracting], and so on.

And there’s another question of particular dogmas, particular truths: do you have to do this, do you have to believe that, should you be a philosopher or mekubal [Kabbalist] or a mystic or a chasid, or all these kinds of things.

Very often these two questions get thrown together. Like, I quoted you the Rivash—the philosophers say that direct knowledge is better than tradition. But it’s not only the philosophers that say this. Every mekubal says this too.

Shnayor Burton: Okay, let’s not get into interpretation of that. Maybe he doesn’t mean that. Let’s assume people say this.

Yitzchok Lowy: Fine. If not him, then someone else. What’s the difference? People make this identification. And Spinoza makes this identification, for example, right? Because he’s really about—or anyone whose rhetoric is like “you should think for yourself,” and therefore “you should think what I think”—is doing this identification. Like, why believe what you were told?

Shnayor Burton: Explain. They’re doing an identification between?

Yitzchok Lowy: Between specific beliefs, or like specific beliefs against what you were told or something, and the idea of thinking for yourself, or the idea of direct contact with truth—which might not be entirely the same idea.

Shnayor Burton: Yeah. Well, isn’t that just because they think that if you think for yourself, this is what you would think?

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah. Of course. But it does get confused. It gets confused from both sides, it gets entangled from both sides.

And the other people say: no, our religion is not about thinking for ourselves because Moshe already told us, and so on. The moment you say: okay, very nice that Moshe told us—how did Moshe know, right?

And the moment you open the Rambam—definitely, this is something that the Rambam for sure does. This I a hundred percent agree with you. The Rambam and I think all the Rishonim—all in the sense of everyone that has something to say—to all of them, prophecy is an open question in the sense of it’s something that human beings do or that happens to them, doesn’t matter. It’s still something that can be talked about. It’s not a black box.

But to anyone else, maybe this is really where the big, big reason why Spinoza can’t really be the Rambam—because to anyone else, this doesn’t work. You can’t be a prophet. You could be a tzaddik [righteous person] according to his rebbe, to whoever teaches him. There’s always some weirdos that think they are prophets, but in general—you see what I mean?

Shnayor Burton: According to Spinoza, you mean?

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah.

Shnayor Burton: Is it coherent to prophecy in a black box? Like, what does that even mean? In other words, it seems almost to me like Spinoza’s—it’s only coherent if you deny prophecy, to me basically.

Yitzchok Lowy: Let’s…

Shnayor Burton: No, that’s what it seems. Like, the only way to read Spinoza coherently, I think, is esoterically—that he really denies prophecy as having any validity. Nonetheless, he sees these books as having political power and force over people’s minds, so he has to figure out what to do with them.

Yitzchok Lowy: But wait, before Spinoza, everyone—all the religious people, right—why? Let’s say something. If I can try to make a statement like this, would it be true that the religions of the book are more rooted in the cessation of prophecy than in the appearance of prophecy? Is psikas nevo’ah a bigger ikkar emunah [principle of faith] than yesh nevo’ah [there is prophecy]?

Shnayor Burton: Fascinating question. It’s a fascinating question. Love it. Let me think about this for a minute.

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The Historical Context of the Cessation of Prophecy

Shnayor Burton: Let me see what happens if we go here. I once had this thought. How did it go? Something like this.

Right, they want to be gonez [hide/archive] Yechezkel [Ezekiel] because it contradicts the Torah. When did they want to be gonez Yechezkel? Like hundreds of years after Yechezkel was written—three hundred years, something like that, four hundred, whatever. What happened till then?

Okay, so my theory goes basically like this. Before psikas nevo’ah, no one has a problem with a book that contradicts another book. Because he writes a book, you write a book, I’ll write a book. It’s fun, it’s lebedik [lively]. It’s ongoing. We don’t have to make everything work.

But when you have psikas nevo’ah—so instead of me and you studying to be prophets, we’re going to be studying the prophets. So when we have a curriculum, we have to have the authoritative pshat, the footnotes that make sure that the curriculum is internally consistent.

So it was when there was this decision that we’re having a curriculum relating to the books as—not things that are going to guide us to do what they were doing, but rather books that will tell us the conclusions or something—then we have to make sure that there’s a consistency to the books that are canonized, basically.

So I feel like in that sense, psikas nevo’ah is takeh [indeed] a really big ikkar because it’s a very different relationship to the books. Right? Is that sort of what you’re getting at?

Yitzchok Lowy: I mean, yeah, it makes sense what I’m thinking, for sure. I would say something like: why, for example, Spinoza in a—this is a real question—we could talk about the Rambam. For the Rambam there’s no ikkar psikas nevo’ah, there’s an ikkar of nitzchiyus nevuas Moshe [the eternity of Moses’s prophecy], which is the Rambam’s substitution for that. I think we’re getting too far if we open this thing.

But for Muslims there’s an explicit ikkar psikas nevo’ah, for example. For Christians there isn’t, and it’s one of the things that define—how they call it—the denominations.

But in reality, there’s psikas nevo’ah.

What am I saying here? If you assume—so there’s a question: what is the more paradigmatic or genuine case of a religious society? Spinoza is trying to theorize what that is. Spinoza is just taking the most deflationary account of it.

Is it the one where there’s a live prophet, or is it the one where there’s a dead prophet?

Shnayor Burton: Well, I think that’s not a fair question because I think we have to consider: why is psikas nevo’ah important to people? In other words, what conditions made psikas nevo’ah an important idea?

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, I don’t know if it’s better.

Shnayor Burton: You’re looking at it—I think you’re looking at it like somehow there’s a better religion that way. But I would say: well, before psikas nevo’ah there wasn’t.

Yitzchok Lowy: No, it could be worse.

Shnayor Burton: No, there has to have been some reason why psikas nevo’ah became a thing.

Yitzchok Lowy: For sure. And there’s for sure reasons for it. But what I’m saying is that our conception of the Torah, or even of a Torah, for the most part, is the one in which there is not a prophet, or at least not one with authority.

Shnayor Burton: Speak for yourself.

Yitzchok Lowy: Well, the Rambam said this—the Rambam said the only real prophet was Moshe and there was only one.

Shnayor Burton: Oh, that’s what you mean. Okay. Yeah, the Rambam poskens [rules] it was Moshe, for sure. True.

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Why Doesn’t Spinoza Just Claim to Be a Prophet?

Yitzchok Lowy: Right? And in other words, if Spinoza or any apikoros [heretic] like Spinoza—someone that wants, right—let’s again, just like he could give a deflationary account of the prophets, we could give a deflationary account of him, right? Anyone that comes and says: look, I have my own thoughts, I want to sell it to you. I wrote this book of Ethics, follow it, don’t follow the Torah.

And then people say: what do you mean, you have a Torah? So what would be his response in a truly live religious phase? He would just say: ah, I’m a bigger prophet than Moshe. I could make bigger miracles. I don’t know, he would have to do something, obviously.

Maybe that’s why he didn’t do it because he couldn’t do bigger miracles. But—

Shnayor Burton: But wait a second. I think we got confused over here. Because we were talking about Spinoza and the fact that he’s deflating the message of the prophets. And we were talking about prophets, post-Mosaic prophets. The fact that in the Rambam the only true prophet is Moshe is not relevant for our discussion, because even—we’re talking about psikas nevo’ah from the Nevi’im who were able to interpret Moshe or understand Moshe.

Yitzchok Lowy: This is a big wrench in the whole story here. Does Spinoza talk about this difference between Moshe and other prophets in the Rambam’s way?

Shnayor Burton: He does, yeah. Well, he has the thing about Moshe’s voice. Moshe had a real voice, the others didn’t. Things like that.

Yitzchok Lowy: Ah, Moshe had a real voice, for them it was imagination. That whole thing. A little bit. He has that somewhere in the second chapter?

Shnayor Burton: Yeah.

Yitzchok Lowy: But like—I mean to say, I feel like I told you I’m going to get very stuck with this whole Moshe and other prophets thing.

In any case, let’s—because, let’s be real, a prophet that—I have, I think you agree, we agree on this—according to the Rambam, prophets, post-Mosaic prophets, are kind of useless in terms of doctrine and in terms of mitzvos. They’re only useful for politics in some sense.

Shnayor Burton: So that’s not—that’s a big deal. No, in other words, doctrine as it applies to politics. Like, that’s why I would say there’s no new doctrinal chiddushim [innovations]. But there are doctrinal applications within providence, within history. That’s the, you know—

Yitzchok Lowy: So the question is: what if—in the reality, in the actual religion that we have, the thought, the principle that there is no prophets nowadays, is probably more important than the principle that there were ones. Or at least equally important.

Shnayor Burton: You’re talking about even post-Moshe?

Yitzchok Lowy: I think—I’m not sure. No, I think the Moshe one. Because we don’t follow prophets.

Shnayor Burton: No, I’m saying post-Moshe. I meant to say: once Moshe died after 120 years, now—that’s what I meant.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah. It’s analogous to Muhammad by the Muslims, right? The Chotam HaNeviim [seal of the prophets]—it’s the same thing. The law finishes.

Could someone tell you that you have to do a war? It seems for the Rambam that you don’t have to be a prophet for that, really. So I’m not sure I have another problem with that. Hora’as sha’ah [temporary emergency ruling] doesn’t need prophecy, and doing wars doesn’t need prophecy. So it’s not really like prophecy is good to have but not needed really for the Torah to work.

Hilchos Nevo’ah [Laws of Prophecy], as far as I can tell—the Rambam doesn’t make this clear. We have to figure this out.

Shnayor Burton: Just makes it that a guy’s chayav misa [liable to death] if he doesn’t listen, whatever. But who cares? Misa bi-yedei shamayim [death by heavenly hands].

Yitzchok Lowy: Well, if you don’t listen—yeah, it doesn’t make a difference. But if you don’t listen to the rebbe, it’s a true story, you know.

Shnayor Burton: That’s also a Gemara, right? Chaviv divrei chachamim [beloved are the words of the sages]. So what’s the difference? Okay, I hear.

Yitzchok Lowy: Doesn’t make a difference. Right. And Beis Din makkin v’onshin shelo min haTorah [the rabbinical court can punish even without explicit Torah law]—all of that, you don’t really need nevo’ah for this.

Shnayor Burton: Okay. Interesting. Interesting. All right.

Yitzchok Lowy: So but that’s a different problem. Let’s talk about whatever the text that we’re using as an authority, and we’re only fighting with the text. You can say this is where it goes back to your point—the problem with your point, or the big chiddush with your point—which is that you can’t be a prophet because you can’t be from the inside. We can interpret what it would mean to be Moshe, but we can’t be Moshe, or we could only be Moshe and not something else.

Shnayor Burton: Well, yeah, so—oh, that’s the thing, right? It is possible that we could be Moshe, as the Gemara says, and the Tikkunei Zohar says, every generation there’s a Moshe—the itpashtusa d’Moshe b’chol dar [the extension of Moshe in every generation], whatever.

Yitzchok Lowy: Those are trying to get around this problem. I see.

Shnayor Burton: No, but I think it’s fine. No, because what they’re saying is that chasimat ha-nevo’ah just means—like the Rambam says—it’s perfect. So what are you adding? Doesn’t mean you can’t be him. Adrabah [on the contrary], you’ll be him. You’ll be so identified with him that you’ll have nothing to say.

Yitzchok Lowy: No, but that’s exactly what opens the Rambam—what opens us to Spinoza’s criticism in chapter whichever-it-is about the law, about divine law.

Shnayor Burton: Why? How so? I don’t understand what you mean by that.

Yitzchok Lowy: Okay, this is a whole different problem. Let’s move back.

Shnayor Burton: No, but I’m saying—how didn’t we solve that problem of chasimat ha-nevi’im by saying: yeah, he’s the chosem ha-nevi’im [sealer of the prophets], and get with it?

Yitzchok Lowy: Wait, wait. Yeah, but that’s just circular, right? We have to at least say something like this: like Moshe, if you want to be—I’ll tell you in a Chassidish way—Moshe made mistakes, at least at some point. He wasn’t always Moshe, right? In order to become Moshe, you have to hit the rock or—I don’t know, that’s not a very good example.

Shnayor Burton: That was no mistake, I had a mashiach back then. That was not a mistake according to the Rambam.

Yitzchok Lowy: Okay, I know it’s not a good example.

Shnayor Burton: I don’t know, Tchilas Nevo’ah [the beginning of prophecy], it was also through a malach [angel]. So whatever, this week’s parshah, right?

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, okay, very good, yeah—Tchilas Nevo’ah. Okay, so in order to be Moshe you have to make some mistakes and you have to think that God has a body. That’s basically what having nevo’ah only with a malach means. So—

Shnayor Burton: Okay, could you please qualify that instead of just dropping these bombs like that? It has to be mucha [proven]?

Yitzchok Lowy: What? No, okay—whatever, I just make stuff up. It’s fine. I’m just making stuff up. Anyways, it’s imperfect, it’s imperfect. It’s not the point.

My point is that you have to do aveiros [sins]. Assuming that Moshe wasn’t born perfect, maybe he achieved perfection, maybe when he died only he achieved perfection, right? You have to be imperfect.

Shnayor Burton: You have to start imperfect, right?

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. Why is it a problem? Well, no—thank you very much, we’re also imperfect. So why is this a problem?

It’s a problem because Moshe’s Torah doesn’t really allow you to make certain kinds of mistakes.

Shnayor Burton: Right. Okay, so he edited it.

Yitzchok Lowy: No.

Shnayor Burton: No, I’m serious. What’s the problem?

Yitzchok Lowy: No. If I’m going to be Moshe, if I’m going to do exactly what he did, I’m not going to be able to start where he finished. I have to start where he started, right? In order to do it myself. Which means going out of the boundaries of the Torah, or before—not out, you could call it pre-Matan Torah, right?

Shnayor Burton: I don’t see the problem. I mean, he could have perfected the system for all those who want to now be like him.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, there’s too many Ishbitz-hanachos [assumptions from the Ishbitzer Rebbe’s teachings] in this, but it’s true. But I don’t know, I agree that I didn’t—you could say what you say.

What I mean to say is that there is something basic to this, and I see why—and on the other hand, maybe we should figure out how people like the Rambam didn’t have this problem, or maybe they did and they played around with it, I don’t know.

I see why there’s—because what would be an—again, we could have, we have to talk about imagination and prophecy and morals and all of these things.

But based on this other part, where there’s two—right? Remember that there’s the—according to me, the more important difference between people that are doing it themselves and people that are receiving it from others as some complete system or complete thing.

Now, what if you open prophecy to say: “Be a prophet yourself”? Then prophecy is the same thing as philosophy. The whole distinction falls away. Let’s say it’s a different method—I don’t care. So it’s a different method. But it’s still working the same way.

What is this freedom to philosophize? It’s just the freedom to make mistakes, right? Or to figure out things on your own.

Shnayor Burton: Hmm. So you want to read Spinoza’s maskana [conclusion] as that we’re reopening chasimat ha-nevo’ah. That’s your ta’ana [claim].

Yitzchok Lowy: What?

Shnayor Burton: I see. That would be your response to it though. Spinoza can’t do it because he believes that prophecy and philosophy are totally different things. And he believes that because that’s what he was taught. He has to believe this because prophecy is only a thing that can be obeyed or disobeyed—it can’t be understood.

Yitzchok Lowy: What doesn’t make sense?

Shnayor Burton: But you’re not explaining that. That doesn’t make any sense, does it? No, I’m serious. Why would that be? I see the vibe you’re picking up in the book. I get it. And the only thing it sounds like you’re saying is that he was stuck with a paradigm because he went to school and everyone’s stuck in that paradigm. But is that—Spinoza…

Yitzchok Lowy: Well, you went to that school, so tell us how to get out of it through that school. That’s really the question for you. You also went to the same school, right?

Shnayor Burton: And one day the switch went off in my head: wait a second, why am I not being a prophet? Let me try. Ha.

Yitzchok Lowy: Nu. But it’s not an issur [prohibition] to be a prophet? There’s no issur? You’re sure? You’re sure there’s not a chashash [concern] of a p’sul [disqualification]? I don’t know. You’re sure it’s not an issur or something? Chashash navi sheker [concern of being a false prophet], at least?

Shnayor Burton: I saw that they bring from Rav Chaim Brisk that he said that that’s the last pasuk [verse]—because the pasuk is saying, why hinei anochi sholei’ach lachem [behold I am sending to you], Zichru Toras Moshe Avdi [remember the Torah of Moshe my servant]. Because the pasuk is saying that until Eliyahu HaNavi there’s not going to be another Navi. So until then, all you got to do is Zichru Toras Moshe Avdi.

Yitzchok Lowy: Oh no, you have to talk with Eliyahu HaNavi [Elijah the prophet]. That’s why everyone was talking with Eliyahu HaNavi all this time.

Shnayor Burton: I see. Okay. I hear, that’s interesting. No, but I honestly, I don’t know of a source for that—that the return of nevo’ah has to be davka [specifically] Eliyahu HaNavi.

No, what I’m saying is he’s reading it like a pasuk that’s like a din [law]. I think he says—the way it was quoted, it wasn’t his ksav yad [handwriting], whatever. It was like someone quoting: if a navi would come and say “no,” he said this—he said if someone would come and say “I’m a navi,” we would say “no, you’re not a navi.” Right, which is against the Rambam saying, if you’re ra’ui l’nevo’ah [fit for prophecy] and you have a miracle, we believe you. Doesn’t say any conditions on that. Yeah, that’s what he’s saying. That’s a big problem though.

Yitzchok Lowy: But that’s the halacha, like—do you know the true answer, right? We just won’t believe you that you’re a navi, even if you do a miracle. At least that’s the Eidah Chareidis [ultra-Orthodox community]. That’s the excuse.

Shnayor Burton: Well, because the Rambam has the biggest carve-out. He says: if someone comes who’s ra’ui l’nevo’ah, or something like that—you know what I mean?—and he does a miracle. What do you mean?

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, I know.

Shnayor Burton: Is that the lashon [language]? You want to look it up if that’s exactly what he says?

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, I know what you mean. The Rambam gives this excuse. And also, well, on the other hand, the Rambam makes the miracle as small as predicting it’ll rain tomorrow. Like, you don’t really have to do any miracle.

Shnayor Burton: A person who we knew—shehayinu yod’im bo mitchilaso shehu ra’ui l’nevo’ah [whom we knew from the beginning that he was fit for prophecy]. You think he’s deliberately—what? You think he’s deliberately making this big carve-out? Why would he do that?

Yitzchok Lowy: I don’t know if it’s deliberate. No, I’m not saying what the Rambam would do. I’m saying in reality, people—we know this because someone tried this and his name was Nathan of Gaza, and people actually were dan [judged] according to these halachos.

Shnayor Burton: No, that’s possible. But what I’m saying is, what I’m arguing is that if someone did have something interesting—come write a Nevi’ei Malachi and write a new Yeshayahu—you’ll have my attention. He’ll have people’s attention.

Yitzchok Lowy: The Rav Sasport actually works with this Rambam, and so on, and basically—

Shnayor Burton: No, I don’t chap [understand]. Mashiach can’t come according to Orthodoxy either. What’s your point?

Yitzchok Lowy: But this is the problem. Okay, we’re getting into a different discussion. The reality is that almost by definition of—again, call it orthodoxy, I don’t know what it’s called—it’s not going to work. And whatever the excuse will be, it doesn’t really matter what the excuse is. Because this is—

Shnayor Burton: Okay, so then Orthodoxy is internally inconsistent. Fine.

Yitzchok Lowy: Exactly. That’s the problem. It’s entirely consistent—it’d be like Leibovitz said: he waits for Mashiach, but Mashiach can’t come. It’s very consistent.

Shnayor Burton: Sometimes I am in awe of the open-mindedness of the Orthodox. I’m serious. You can’t be Orthodox without this tremendous open-mindedness to these interesting ideas.

Yitzchok Lowy: No, but you see the problem—like, okay, maybe you could say the theoretical answer is that the Beis Din [rabbinical court] will decide that you’re Mashiach, and then everyone would agree, or something like that.

Shnayor Burton: Exactly. That’s my answer. Just make sure I’m on the Beis Din. See, that’s my whole point. I think we can discern. I think we can discern between good Torah and bad Torah, and good prophecy and bad prophecy.

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The Japanese Prophet: Historical Contingency and Prophecy

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, but what I’m saying is that there’s still for sure a very serious thing where—I don’t even know if it’s only a mistake, and we could even justify this probably.

I have a question for you. If the new prophet comes and he writes in Japanese—nebach [unfortunately], he grew up in Japan, turns out his mother was Jewish and he only speaks Japanese, and this is how the malach or whoever—God Himself—speaks to him. And we can only access it in translation, but he does all the other conditions, passes all your tests. Is he a Jewish prophet?

Shnayor Burton: He’s writing Japanese to the Jews or to the Japanese?

Yitzchok Lowy: To the Jews. Has to be translated because the Japanese don’t understand what he wants.

Shnayor Burton: Okay. I think he’s a Jewish prophet. He would have to come up with a shtickel Torah [a bit of Torah teaching], why Hashem is talking Japanese all of a sudden. But I don’t get—what are you getting at with this question? What are you getting at?

Yitzchok Lowy: Okay, whatever—there’s no Jews there and he had rachmanus [compassion] and he found some guy in Japan.

I’m getting at that this would be like—it’s probably not a good mashal [parable], but I’m trying to get at that there’s these dynamics, like historical dynamics, that you were telling me. There’s these historical dynamics where you can’t really do what Moshe did—because you have to be a parashat Moshe [explaining/extending Moshe], not maybe not even for truth reasons, but for historical contingent reasons. And if even just being in Japanese already precludes you from being a Jewish prophet…

Shnayor Burton: Oh, very good. Yes, yes. By the way, that’s a very true point. I agree with that. I actually do agree with that.

And by the way, there’s a corollary to that, which has to do with Gershom Scholem’s—what he said about Hebrew. He said that speaking Hebrew is going to unlock, unleash the hidden forces within Lashon HaKodesh [the holy tongue]. In other words, anything in the original language automatically is miskasher [connected] with the Torah, with Toras Moshe.

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. Exactly. But I assume that it’s the original language, yeah. To the extent that it is.

Shnayor Burton: Yeah. So that’s true. I mean, I think, yeah, it has to do with—some parts of Tanakh are in Aramis [Aramaic].

You have the Gemara in Sanhedrin that something was going to change, so it’s a new time. You know the Gemara in Sanhedrin—Ezra was worthy of giving the Torah through him, and it was offered to be given in Aramis. I think it means like: okay, a new Torah is like—the writing down in Aramis—we would no longer be in communication with Toras Moshe.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, but he only changed the font in the end.

Shnayor Burton: But some parts of Tanakh are in Aramis, which I suspect—

Yitzchok Lowy: No, chas v’shalom [God forbid], those parts are authentic.

Shnayor Burton: They are. Oh, but one second—here’s the thing. Yeah, okay. But we’re making the same mistake here, I see. Because I’m trying to talk about the Nevi’im that are in conversation with Toras Moshe, and even those came to an end. Spinoza’s not even granting…

Yitzchok Lowy: Wait, what—okay, wait. I was just going to go back, get back. You’ll tell me in a second. I’m just trying to get back to the point that maybe then—if Spinoza’s speaking Japanese, then that’s his problem.

Like, I was trying to ask: why can’t he come and say “I’m a prophet”? Why does he have to do this whole thing and say “prophets are nothing, listen, believe me as a philosopher”—which is this separate thing? Why not just say you’re a prophet?

Shnayor Burton: So I say: because he has nothing unique. What?

Yitzchok Lowy: Maybe because prophecy ended and you can’t do that, and you’re saying you could do prophecy.

Shnayor Burton: One second. Why not? Because he’s nothing unique? Maybe because he looked at himself—no, no, no, I’m serious. I don’t get your question. He doesn’t say anything interesting about himself except for his reason. I just don’t understand your question.

Yitzchok Lowy: You could always say he’s got nothing to sell and the kashye [question] doesn’t start. But assuming that he is really stuck with this problem—why doesn’t everyone believe me? That’s not really what he’s stuck with, but I’m saying this story: he’s stuck with this problem—why doesn’t everyone believe me? Oh, because they’re all looking into this book. So let me explain to them why they shouldn’t look into the book and they should believe me, right?

But if—and then what he says is Japanese. So why didn’t he just say it in Hebrew, and then it would just be peirush [commentary], or even we could call it—if it would be good enough—a new prophet?

Shnayor Burton: But he doesn’t believe that. No, but that would be inauthentic—because he thinks the Torah’s not selling philosophy. So you want him to sell his philosophy as a prophet? I don’t get it. That would be a new Torah, because the Torah’s not philosophy. And he was doing philosophy. I don’t understand what you want.

Yitzchok Lowy: I mean, according to him, he decided the Torah is not philosophy because he wanted people to believe in his philosophy. And there, he couldn’t say that it’s Torah because he believed that—not because it wouldn’t work. But if he would have believed like you, that you could be a prophet from the inside, then theoretically—I don’t know if Mr. Spinoza personally could have done this—but theoretically someone could do this.

Shnayor Burton: But here’s the thing. No, but I agree with you—the answer to that is: of course, you could only do prophecy to the extent that you’re continuing the project of Moses and the prophets, because they take up a lot of energy. And you have to be talking their language—not just Lashon HaKodesh, but their terms—and there’ll be gezeira shavas [analogical interpretations] and drashos [homiletic expositions], and everything that, you know, how Tanakh builds on itself.

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. But so here is the question that I am keeping on asking, the same one: is there a reason that he and really nobody else can do that?

Or at least—no, you could claim that the Rambam did it. The Rambam also got into a bunch of opposition, of course. You could claim that the Kuzari did it. He didn’t get into opposition as much—was just ignored. And so on.

How do you—do you have an explanation for that? Is there a reason? Yeah, why doesn’t it work?

Shnayor Burton: Yeah. I have a long explanation for that, but I feel like—why are we talking about that? I want to make sure I know before I launch into it. I don’t see how that became the question here.

Yitzchok Lowy: I’m not sure. No, I don’t know—because you’re—I just latched onto this thing where you said that at least part of the answer, or maybe to me the most interesting part of the answer, is that Tanakh is not too simple.

Shnayor Burton: Right.

Yitzchok Lowy: Of course you really have to say that it’s not simple at all. That would be what we’re trying to say. But first you said that it might be simple outside, but it is not simple to make it.

Shnayor Burton: But that’s what I’m saying—the thing, but you know, it’s not simple at all if you’re in the mindset.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, and then you’re saying that the true interpretation becomes involved with making it and not with reading it.

Shnayor Burton: Right. In other words, a true interpretation requires being in the mindset of the writers—is basically what I’m saying. So I’m not saying you have to be a Navi, you know. I’m saying it involves adopting a kind of mindset. And that mindset is very interesting.

Yitzchok Lowy: Discovering, maybe not creating, but creating this language. And it’s not only Spinoza that’s in this mindset—it’s basically everyone since psikas nevo’ah that’s in this mindset.

Shnayor Burton: Yes. Absolutely.

Yitzchok Lowy: So that’s why we got into this question. That’s why.

Shnayor Burton: Right, right, right. No, totally. But I mean to say: why do we care why that’s the case? In other words, how is that going to shed light on our core question here, which is: what is Tanakh?

Like I said before, I think it seems to me Spinoza’s assumption is Tanakh is nothing, really—because he can’t answer that question, why this is the case that we don’t do it anymore. And his real answer is: nothing. And that’s his esoteric meaning—that’s what I suspect.

But if we’re going to assume it’s something…

Yitzchok Lowy: Would even the kind of Rambam or something like that solution work for him?

Shnayor Burton: What do you mean by that? What kind of solution?

Yitzchok Lowy: I don’t know. Is there a solution? Do you think really that all these Rishonim are wasting our time and we should listen to Spinoza and go back to the Tanakh? Or did they have some solution that stopped working at some point? It obviously stopped working. Like, that project didn’t continue really.

Shnayor Burton: The project of nevo’ah?

Yitzchok Lowy: The project of—in the broadest sense, right—of actually understanding the Torah.

Shnayor Burton: Or you mean finding like the true meaning of, of discovering the true meaning—that project? What do you mean?

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah.

Shnayor Burton: Oh, no, I don’t think we should accept Spinoza on that. No, absolutely not. That’s what I’m saying. I’m a maximalist and I think we have to go back—we have to utilize all these perushim to get back all the way back into the minds of the Nevi’im themselves.

Otherwise, if we can’t do that, I sort of do accept Spinoza’s point: like, what are we doing even?

Yitzchok Lowy: That’s why—

Shnayor Burton: Which is my kashye on a lot of the perushim. Like, what’s it for? What does it do for you?

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Why the Project Stagnated: The Problem of “Succeeding Too Well”

Yitzchok Lowy: No, but I ask—that’s why, that’s why—if they think that they can’t do it themselves, then why are they wasting the time? Why can’t they just figure it out? Why can’t they just say—well, what should they say? Something like Spinoza says?

Shnayor Burton: Well, they could say: look, no, he would say—reading these texts is good for your moral purity, whatever, Evelyn. You sit down in your rocking chair, read the Bible, and you’ll be a better person. And more than that is not so important. Like, why are we writing so many books and trying to figure out the true meaning? Who cares?

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. But I mean, Spinoza’s also right that most people are not even doing that. They’re just trying to give drushai haTorah [Torah interpretations]. That’s different.

Shnayor Burton: So here’s the thing. I don’t know. I try to have a more charitable view of these Torahs. And I think, if you suspect that all the tzaddikim were in on my secret, then maybe they were all trying to just bring us back—nudge us back to the inside.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, of course. The true ones, by definition.

Shnayor Burton: No, but I think—you know what I mean. I’m saying it might be broader. Do you agree with that? My way of thinking may be a lot broader than is apparent in many of the books, and especially the modern books. I’d say the Chasidim—like when you say the Piaseczno [the Piaseczner Rebbe] says that the Chasidim were trying to bring back nevo’ah, b’etzem [essentially], things like that.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yes. And they—yeah, I can get into that. True. But also, in order to do that, they make a very limited definition of what nevo’ah is. And they also, in order to do that, cut themselves off from a lot of the sources.

In other words, they’re not trying—you’re trying to do something much harder. And maybe they were right for making it easier because it’s too hard. But they’re not trying to interpret the whole Tanakh and the whole Mishnah based on this. They’re just like: I’m going to do three pesukim [verses]—maybe that’s enough for me.

Shnayor Burton: Right. Oh, maybe they’re right, you know?

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. This is why again—

Shnayor Burton: But I guess that basically brings you straight to Spinoza, no?

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. This is why the question—this is why I asked you the question of if there’s a reason.

Because if there’s a reason, then either we’re stuck with that. Is the reason something historical? Is the reason because the project was tried and failed? Like, what is really the reason?

And is the reason just because—you could just give a different—is the reason just because most people are dumb? And I’m sorry, we shouldn’t call them dumb. Most people are not billion-IQ, which you really need for any of this.

Like, if you look at any of these projects as open projects—if you say Moreh Nevuchim is really an invitation, like the Rambam says—or it’s just a hakdama [introduction]. It’s maybe not even a shittah, maybe just the key to the shittah, which is better, I guess.

Or take a later project like the Ari z”l [Rabbi Isaac Luria]—it’s just the beginning of a project, but it just didn’t continue for the most part. You end up just systematizing it a little more and getting stuck there.

And the reason it didn’t continue is because the success of these projects makes it very hard to see where they’re coming from. Does that make sense?

Shnayor Burton: The success—what do you mean? Because it becomes like a closed system? Like as if it’s a perfect…

Yitzchok Lowy: Someone starts with a set of questions and builds up some beginning of a mahalech [approach], let’s say, or like science. But that mahalech—most people don’t even understand the mahalech.

And then you really want to say: wait, there’s still the questions. There’s still some holes. There’s still what to do. You still didn’t become a prophet, right? Obviously. Mashiach didn’t come yet.

And that’s how you would say. And if the Rambam would still be alive—he would come out ready with a choveres [pamphlet] every few years. The Rizhiner [Rabbi Israel of Ruzhin] has said this—that the Rambam was trying to bring Mashiach.

Shnayor Burton: Oh, he said that? Yeah, nice.

Yitzchok Lowy: I have to finally send you—

Shnayor Burton: Yeah, I’d like to see where that is.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, to be Mashiach. Meila [so]. Well, yeah, it’s different.

And probably he meant that he was also trying in his own way—

Shnayor Burton: To be.

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah. To be, or to bring, whatever, yeah.

But if it didn’t work, then we should try to see where did it—was there a good—is it even a good start? Or—but there’s almost no projects that continued in this way.

Shnayor Burton: What do you mean there’s no projects that continued in this way? In what way? If you want—didn’t you put the Arizal and the Rambam and the Chassidus all together? They’re all doing it.

Yitzchok Lowy: You could put them all together, and they’re not—it’s not getting better. It’s very hard to see the progress. Maybe there’s a little progress.

Shnayor Burton: Ah.

Yitzchok Lowy: I mean, again, nowadays, everything—even Spinoza would say something like this, right? Actually, I don’t know if he does, but nowadays people say: take another intellectual project, like physical science, right? Which is this three-thousand-year-old project, which has more or less been progressing all of that time. Not entirely progressing—there’s some regress, there’s some questions that open and close and so on.

But there’s a real tradition. Of course, it also gets stuck in its own loops. I’m not going to romanticize it too much. But it’s pretty clear what it’s about and it’s doing something.

Some other sciences are not like that. Physics is the only one—or maybe biology, chemistry. There’s certain sciences that are working, right? And the Torah is not like that. It just isn’t. Not only because you can’t find physics in the Torah—because even for its own values, it’s not really working out as well.

Shnayor Burton: Yeah, that’s great. That’s a great point. And I think, if this is what you mean, that’s the same point as—because to me, the difference between physics and the Torah is that physics has a guiding question that it’s always aiming for, which is looking for physical truth.

And if you have one specific question or project—if your project is well-defined—then you expect it to make progress. With chasimat ha-nevo’ah, I identify chasimat ha-nevo’ah as people basically stopping to engage in the core project, or seeking something instead—doing taklid, basically, accepting something top-down instead of being engaged in the search.

Yitzchok Lowy: Someone like Spinoza would say that the mashal is: like after Newton or Einstein or Aristotle—they have this story about Aristotle, which is not really true, but they tell themselves a story where at some point people just… like Aristotle was the greatest teacher, everyone should just follow him and make no progress.

Shnayor Burton: Right. So nobody could think beyond him.

Yitzchok Lowy: And that’s what happened to Moshe Rabbeinu. That’s what they would tell you. I don’t know, it’s just probably too simplistic—because it assumes the yetzer hara [evil inclination], it’s based on yetzer hara theory. Like, why would there be such a thing? You see what I mean? Like superstition—or this is not really superstition, but—

Shnayor Burton: Yeah. There may be something unique about the search for God that once people find Him, they close discussion, you know? In a different way than physics.

Yitzchok Lowy: Well, it’s not just the search for God. It’s more like the search for God and all that follows from that, which is still open, right?

Shnayor Burton: What do you mean, “still open”? I don’t know—to the extent that it was discovered, maybe.

Yitzchok Lowy: We still don’t—I mean, of course, Spinoza would say that nature is what God does, and we still don’t know much of that. And even if you talk about morals or law or ethics—which is also, the Rambam says that mitzvos are just another thing that God does, right? We still don’t understand Him. It’s not true that it’s finished.

Shnayor Burton: No, totally. But what I’m saying is that those who have made some progress—what I’m suggesting is that those who made some progress and had some success in the search for God tend to monopolize the conversation in a different way from other sciences. It’s hard to search past them.

Yitzchok Lowy: Why would they do that? I mean, why? If you talk about people—people always do that. They do that in physics too. It just moves on at some point.

Shnayor Burton: Right. So we can’t really answer this question without getting to what prophecy is—the thing that Spinoza puts in the black box. Right? Okay. So we’re back to where we started.

Yitzchok Lowy: But is it—is it that part of the thing that stops it is not even answering what it is? Is the question—is there something that causes the question to be hidden always? I mean, there is—but why would it? Why?

Shnayor Burton: Yeah.

Yitzchok Lowy: Maybe you could help me.

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The Practical Question: Is Torah True? vs. What Is the Meaning of Life?

Yitzchok Lowy: So a Yid [Jew] came to me and said that he has two questions. One is: is the Torah true? And the second question is: what is the meaning of life?

Shnayor Burton: Okay.

Yitzchok Lowy: And I told him: okay, do these two questions have something to do with each other? And he was like: well, I was taught that the Torah is the meaning of life, but if it’s not true, then I don’t know the meaning of life. But is there a meaning of life?

And I’m trying to figure out: is it the same question? All I’m getting at is—I would be looking for the way in which it should be the same question. But saying that Torah is the meaning of life is not the meaning of life. Something like that. I don’t know.

For sure, could you help me? Do you know how to—

Shnayor Burton: I mean, I think I know where he’s coming from, but I don’t know if that’s going to help you.

Yitzchok Lowy: No, I’m trying to help him—to save him. How do you get him—because, do you think that it’s good to have these two questions be the same question for this person in the way it is?

Shnayor Burton: No, of course not. Because I want him to be a prophet.

Yitzchok Lowy: It’s not good, right? Why not?

Shnayor Burton: Yeah, exactly.

Yitzchok Lowy: I see. Very good, that’s where I’m trying to get. Why is it not good to have—like, it’s true, 100%: many people are very intensely searching for “is Bible criticism true?” But they don’t really care about the book, right? They care about the meaning of life.

Shnayor Burton: A hundred percent. All the time.

And what I tell them, basically—yeah. I mean, what I tell people—I think it’s a very similar question—and I never had it formulated in that particular two-pronged dilemma.

Yitzchok Lowy: No, someone mamash [actually] came and said this. I didn’t say it.

Shnayor Burton: Yeah, that’s great. But the way I see it is that a person should care about the Torah only if he has some questions that the Torah is responsive to. And you have to first start there: is there something you care about? Is there something you’re looking for? Something you want?

Let’s see if there’s something you want. Maybe it’s God. Maybe it’s purpose. I don’t know. I think it should be God. If you’re looking for God, then let’s figure out how you’re going to find Him and what the Torah could do for you.

But people are not taught that, right? So they think that the Torah—

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. What do they think? I’m trying to figure out what they think.

Shnayor Burton: They think that the true reality for them personally comes from externally, comes from the outside, is imposed upon them.

Yitzchok Lowy: Known as Torah. So-called Torah, which is that’s what they call Torah. Something like that.

Shnayor Burton: Exactly. So they’re like: wait a second, is that—is Torah what supplies meaning, or maybe not? And if it’s true that it supplies meaning, if not, then where’s meaning?

And meanwhile, we have to turn it upside down. We have to make people alive again and make them have meaning from within. And meaning of life is what you desire. And we also have to hope that they desire God, and do what it takes to get them to desire God.

Yitzchok Lowy: Right. But so that’s a—that would be a different question. Like, is this already—I don’t, tell me how to disentangle this.

Am I telling him something like: look, the Torah is—you care about the meaning of life? Welcome, this is what Moshe Rabbeinu was worried about. Then he found God at the Sneh [burning bush], or whatever.

Shnayor Burton: No, he’s beyond—

Yitzchok Lowy: But then he’s going to tell me: nice pshat, but whatever. Who told you that pshat?

So what’s—but why, what am I looking for here? How—because otherwise I say: okay, it’s like you said, that the Torah is about—I don’t even know. Is it because—how does it work? How are you taught that the Torah is the meaning of life, but it’s not? I’m trying to figure it out.

Shnayor Burton: Because they have a black box that contains it, which is the Torah. Right, exactly. Chasimat ha-nevo’ah.

Yitzchok Lowy: The Jewish people don’t worry about the meaning of life because they already know it.

Shnayor Burton: That’s right. You just summed it up.

Yitzchok Lowy: But then life doesn’t actually have a meaning.

Shnayor Burton: Right. Exactly.

Yitzchok Lowy: So this is what we have to figure out how to—so Spinoza would tell you: forget about the Torah. Let’s search for the meaning of life. The Torah’s good for exactly what it is. No problem. Move on.

Shnayor Burton: Exactly.

Yitzchok Lowy: And you want to tell me: well, maybe the Torah is about that.

Shnayor Burton: I would tell you that if you’re going to search for true meaning—like Moshe and all the other prophets did—this is what you’ll find. You’ll find God at Mount Sinai. Maybe. Or at least you’ll find Him in the—like Yeshaya [Isaiah] saw Him in the Heichal [Temple]. Even if you won’t see Him at Har Sinai.

Yitzchok Lowy: Or at least something analogous enough—like to be one more prophet with another mashal, something like that.

Shnayor Burton: Right. I don’t know. You know, there’s also an element of decision. Because if you tell someone this, a lot of times what you’ll get is: you know what, I don’t want to do that. I’m scared. I’m not interested.

So what he’s saying is that he’s doing his own personal chasimat ha-nevo’ah, and what happens then is that he’s basically outsourcing meaning to this black box. And then maybe 10 years later he’s going to wake up and say: hey, I don’t like that. What’s the meaning? Maybe.

I don’t know if it’s true, but I’m saying: people are scared to do that. People don’t want to take responsibility. They don’t want to take ownership, you know.

Yitzchok Lowy: Or the—this meaning, right? Even the—or you want to outsource the dis-meaning. Like, the Torah doesn’t—or it’s not provable that the Torah is this, and therefore whatever. I guess not, something like that.

But you would also say that’s outsourcing, because you didn’t do any work.

Shnayor Burton: Yeah. Exactly.

Yitzchok Lowy: Spinoza’s not like that, right? He does think that you should think for yourself, or he’s not afraid of it. He just doesn’t do it in the way that you want him to do it.

Shnayor Burton: Exactly. Which is why I started with—a lot of what he says actually resonates. Which is why I find him so interesting. One of the reasons.

Yitzchok Lowy: Like, you think this whole anti-superstition drasha [homily] is really a true Kotzker drasha? You should follow it?

Shnayor Burton: Why not? I love it.

Yitzchok Lowy: I don’t know about it.

Shnayor Burton: It’s cute. I love these books that start with this—like, you’re like: why are they doing that right here? Okay. Warming up the crowd.

Yitzchok Lowy: No, it’s going back to what I think. I do think that there’s something in that that is problematic. I’m anti-Kotzk a little. There must be something weird with this. It’s a reduction of human motivation to fear and hope and whatever.

Shnayor Burton: Okay.

Yitzchok Lowy: Who told you any of this? This is like a nice mussar drasha, but I don’t know if it’s true. Maybe it’s true.

Shnayor Burton: Alright. Go read the Ethics. See if it’s true. I don’t know.

Yitzchok Lowy: No, that’s just more layering of these kinds of things. I don’t think it proves it.

Shnayor Burton: Alright. Let’s wrap it up here. Should we do an abrupt ending or do we need any summaries? Are we good?

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Conclusion: Psikas Nevo’ah as a Self-Imposed Move

Yitzchok Lowy: Yeah, okay. Yeah.

Shnayor Burton: What’s the maskana [conclusion]?

Yitzchok Lowy: Don’t tell us the maskana.

Shnayor Burton: That Spinoza is a symptom of chasimat ha-nevo’ah in a very deep way. But we’re not sure what to make of that, because chasimat ha-nevo’ah is a big thing.

Yitzchok Lowy: That seems to be important. Seems to be hard to get away from.

Shnayor Burton: And I suggested that it’s actually a move that people impose upon themselves. And I’m very thankful that they do, to be clear. I would not like everyone walking around trying to be Nevi’im, because then we’ll get a bunch of false prophets. I think it’s actually a very good move, very smart idea.

And it may just be—I’m willing to accept that it’s simply this self-imposed decision, which I like. As I said, a lot of people would consciously say that, you know, let alone unconsciously, subconsciously.

And then there’s a whole host of other things that follow from that, which is this outsourcing of meaning and outsourcing of command and knowledge even. And then Spinoza wants to reduce it to non-knowledge, because you can’t outsource knowledge. So he’s like: okay, you know what? It’s not knowledge. It’s just whatever—moral exhortations.

Yitzchok Lowy: The “this” part of knowledge, yeah.

Shnayor Burton: Mm-hmm.

Yitzchok Lowy: So it turns out that if you agree with that psikas nevo’ah, then you have to go with Spinoza.

Shnayor Burton: That’s what I think we’re saying here. That is what is suggested.

Yitzchok Lowy: Since Reb Shneur doesn’t agree, then he has a way out.

Shnayor Burton: Right. Me too.

Yitzchok Lowy: I would hope that there’s a third way also, because of different—but I don’t know what it is.

Shnayor Burton: Me too. Let’s leave it at this with a question mark, okay? Hopefully we’re missing a lot.

Yitzchok Lowy: Okay.

Shnayor Burton: Okay. Take care.

Yitzchok Lowy: It’s a good question though. Okay. Thank you, bye bye.

 

Transcribed by Sofer.ai Edited and Summary by Claude Opus 4.5