The Tenth Premise: The Matter of Transference (Possibility) — The Dialogue Between the Mutakallim and the Philosopher

Location and Structure of the Tenth Premise

We are holding here in the middle of the tenth premise. We learned that the tenth premise is what they call the matter of transference, which is the principle that can be translated as possibility — which is the matter that all things can be in all manners.

Everything we see, we see in nature, we see in the world that it tends to be thus, that it is in a certain manner — they claim there is no necessary cause, no true reason that it cannot be in another manner: larger, smaller, higher, lower, in a different color. All the differences we can imagine, everything can be — except for explicit contradictions. Logical contradictions they agree cannot be, but all other things, all other possibilities are truly correct.

And the Rambam claimed that this matter, he will now claim and open the argument that this premise, and upon the basis of this premise stands much of their wisdom as we shall see later in the matter of the creation of the world and so forth.

The Two Central Claims of the Rambam

Now, the Rambam essentially claims two things here, in the continuation of this premise, in the continuation of his words on this premise — he essentially claims two main things.

The First Claim: Dependence on Kalamic Premises

The first is that this possibility is possible only if we assume all the Kalamic physics that he explained in the previous eight premises. They are all necessary so that we can state this possibility. One must understand that there is some innovation here, we will speak about this in another moment.

The Second Claim: The Confusion Between Intellect and Imagination

And the second thing, this is what he wrote at the end of the previous section, that he spoke about how they actually admit that there is something called impossibility — meaning what logic, one can say the intellect, says is impossible, and this they actually admit is impossible, that it cannot be.

But all other things they claim can indeed be. They claim intellectually, one can imagine a person the size of an elephant and an elephant the size of a person, all sorts of such things, and they claim that one can think about this, and therefore they do not give a reason why this cannot be — only that there is a custom, there is a custom of nature that tends not to do this, but this is not a necessary reason.

And the Rambam claimed about this that what you call intellect is not truly intellect but something else that I will call imagination. He quoted Abu Nasr who already claimed this about the Mutakallimun, and this is one of the very fundamental things that one must object to in their approach.

Development of the Two Arguments

So there are two things he will further develop.

First thing: The claim that the matter of possibility is not merely an epistemological matter. It is not a matter of pure logic as it were, that all things we can imagine are possible. In order to believe this, in order to claim this, one must assume Kalamic physics. And he claims that this is actually the reason they assume this physics, so that they can say this, because this is essentially what they need.

We learned other things — they need the absolute dominion of God, so that He can do everything. But this absolute dominion of God is the ability of all things to be in all manners, which also enables them and requires them to say that God is the one who particularizes, who makes each thing what it is — which is the function of accidents, which is the direct action of God at all times. So they need this, and they need this philosophically, and they also need the non-distinction between intellect and imagination.

So now we are advancing to two parts that the Rambam — perhaps I will only teach the first today — but the Rambam will also detail why the seemingly epistemological argument, or seemingly metaphysical argument, that all things can be in another manner, is actually a physical argument. That is, if one assumes Aristotelian physics it cannot be correct, only if one assumes Kalamic physics can it be correct.

The Special Note on Intellect and Imagination

And the second thing he gives here later with the heading “note” — this is very interesting. A note is something one must think much about. That is, when the Rambam writes the word “note,” there are only, I don’t remember, three or four times that he writes this word in this book. And this is on the topic — he dedicates a note on this topic, precisely on the topic of intellect and imagination.

Opening the Dialogue: The Mutakallim and the Philosopher

Okay, so let’s begin like this. And this is the premise — this is the premise of transference, the tenth premise.

It will not be true except with the nine premises whose mention preceded. It cannot be correct — it will not be true, it is not correct, unless one assumes the nine premises that we preceded to mention. And for its sake, without doubt, it was necessary to premise them — the entire reason they premised, that the Rambam premised (alright, not that he premised them, but they also premised them in the sense of assuming these physical assumptions), because of the assumptions of possibility that he called this a pillar — a pillar of the wisdom of Kalam, a pillar of the wisdom of the Mutakallimun.

The Promise to Reveal the Inner Meaning

And the Rambam says, it will be somewhat difficult for me to describe to you why all this is necessary, so I will describe to you something that occurs as a dispute. So he says thus: And the explanation of this — in order to explain this, that they need all the physical premises for this metaphysical principle — as I shall relate to you, and I shall reveal to you from the inner meanings of these matters — I will reveal to you the inner meanings, the inwardness (the same word, butin) of these matters.

There is here, the Rambam here gives an argument, as we shall see throughout the chapter, gives an interesting argument about what is the true intention, what is happening here — the inwardness, like the interior of the arguments of Kalam. They do not always reveal their intention, they wage all these premises and one might think this is just physical speculation or something. And he says, no, enter into the interior of these things, enter into what they know otherwise, what their motivation is, and you will understand that all this is necessary for this.

And he will describe it thus, by way of a dispute — I would call this a dialogue — that occurred between the Mutakallim and the philosopher. He will describe how a Mutakallim speaks with a philosopher, and according to the exchange between them we will easily discover how in order for the Mutakallim to hold all his doctrines he needs all these assumptions of his.

The Mutakallim’s Question: Why Is Iron Different from Butter?

So let’s begin the story. The Mutakallim said to the philosopher — so the Mutakallim comes and asks the philosopher — this is actually a simple and basic question:

Why do we find this body of iron in the utmost hardness and strength and it is black? We have a body — all things in the world are bodies, what we call bodies of iron, something strong. How is it very hard? Hard is the opposite of soft — difficult to pass through it, difficult to compress it. And it is also strong — it has, I forgot what this is called… it is also difficult to break it, two different things. And it is black, it has a black color, or I think it says here black can be translated as something like dark — dark, not black in the sense of the color black, because many times they use this word for dark colors.

These are the properties of the body of iron. While the body of butter is in the utmost softness — it is very soft, the opposite of iron which is hard and strong. It is in the utmost softness — you push it and it is pushed and it does not resist. And it is white — and it is the opposite, it is light, it is white. Butter is usually…

This is a question, like, this is a question that is the foundation of the… This question is a fundamental question of physics — a fundamental physical question. Why are there different types of materials, what we call materials? What is the difference?

The Philosopher’s Answer: Two Types of Accidents

So I will answer him to the end with the answer. The philosopher answered him and said: He has an answer, he says thus:

Consider that every natural body — every natural body (natural as opposed to artificial) — has two kinds of accidents. There is what we call accidents, accidents of a natural body, and there are two types of accidents.

First Type: Accidents from the Side of Matter

Accidents that come to it from the side of its matter — it has accidents that it receives, that come to it from the side of its matter. What happened from the side of its matter? From the side of the thing it is made from — matter is the answer to the question what is it made from, from what is it… what do we call this? What shall we say, from what the thing is made.

And he gives an example: such as that a person is healthy and becomes ill. That a person has health and illness, these are things that happen to a person, can be both — we remember the definition of accident. An accident is something that changes without destroying the thing it is upon. A person remains a person, and still can be a healthy person, who has an accident of health, a sick person, which is called that he has an accident of disease and of illness…

Accidents of Matter and Accidents of Form — The Aristotelian Distinction

Accidents from the Side of Matter: Health and Illness

From the side of the thing it is made from, yes, matter is the answer to the question what is it made from, from what is it, what do we call this? Yes, what shall we say, from what the thing is made, yes? And he gives an example, such as that a person is healthy and becomes ill. That a person has health and illness, these are things that happen, a person can be both, we remember the definition of accident. An accident is something that changes without destroying the thing it is upon. A person remains a person and still can be a healthy person, who has an accident of health, a sick person, which is called that he has an accident of disease, and of illness and they do not turn the person into something else.

So from the side of what, yes? From the side of what does a person have these accidents of health and illness? This is from the side of his matter, yes? When we say person, he has accidents, he can be in different manners, how can he be in different manners? To be healthy and to be sick are not things that relate to the Form of a person, yes? The Form of a person is that he is a rational animal, yes? A thinking animal. This is the Form of the person. This is the thing that if you remove this from a person, the person ceases to be a person, yes? He becomes a dead person or he becomes not a person, he becomes an animal or something like that.

Accidents of Matter and the Proper Temperament

But besides this he has accidents, and now he has two types of accidents. He has accidents that belong to his body, to what we call his body, to his matter, yes? Yes, his body, I don’t want to say the word his body, because the body is the whole thing, he is speaking here about a natural body, yes, which is a translation of natural body. But this body, it has accidents, yes, the materials it is made from can have the proper temperament, yes, they call it thus, they can be in the proper measure, in the form, the sufficient amount of, of, what would we call this, the different humors and the different fluids that are in a person. And when they are in the proper form, in the proper number, in the proper measure, then this is called that they are healthy, when they are in an improper measure, this is called sick, yes? So a person insofar as he has matter, has health and illness.

Accidents from the Side of Form: Laughter and Wonder

And he also has accidents that come to him from the side of his Form, good, yes? A person also has accidents that he receives, that come to him, not from the side that he is made from something, but from the side that he is something, yes? And he gives examples such as… I don’t know what this standing is, such as a person’s wonder and his laughter. I need to check for a moment. Wonder is like this, Schwartz also translates wonder.

Properties — Unique Characteristics That Are Not Definition

That is, this is Aristotle’s idea. That Aristotle said, yes, sometimes these things are called properties in Hebrew. I think if we look at what this is called, in the original words, we will see that property is a word that calls a characteristic of a thing that is not a characteristic of its matter, like that a person has color, yes, a better example, or he calls this health and illness, which belong to his matter, and that he has, a person has laughter, yes? A person is a type of animal that laughs. Aristotle claimed, I remember correctly, that no animal laughs except man, yes? Therefore I call this a property. This is something that distinguishes man from animal, yes? If you look at what are the differences between man and animal, man laughs, animals do not laugh. This needs to be checked, but thus he claimed.

But one must remember that this is not something that makes the person a person. If a person did not laugh, how do we know this? Good question. But if a person did not laugh, he would not cease to be a person. Laughs, meaning he can laugh, he has the ability and tendency to laugh. A person who does not laugh does not cease to be a person. But, so therefore this is an accident of the person, this is not the definition of the person, this is not what makes the person a person. But this is an accident that belongs to the fact that the person has a certain Form.

Accidents of Form Are Not the Form Itself

That is, an animal that thinks, sometimes it wonders, yes? And even if a person did not have this characteristic that he can wonder, that he sometimes wonders, he would not cease to be, he would not cease to be a person. But this is a characteristic, this is an accident of the person, not in the sense of what he is made from, yes? The materials from which a person is made are not what cause him to laugh. But that a person has the possibility to be amazed at something, one can say, I see that others translate here boredom, all sorts of such things, this is an accident of the Form.

Forms of a person, speaking forms, sometimes have laughter or wonder, or one can speak about many other, what we call emotions, yes, many of them animals also have, so they are not special accidents of man, but all sorts of such characteristics, yes, one can say to wonder, this is an intellectual characteristic, yes, one needs intellect, but also to laugh, yes, in order to laugh, when I say, animals do not laugh, I do not mean, they do not make sounds, yes, that sound like laughter, they do not laugh, yes, but one can be a complete person without ever laughing, this is not what will destroy the person, not to laugh, but in order to laugh one must be a person, yes, one must laugh at something, laugh from something, one must be a person, so this is called, this is a type of Form, a Form that belongs to matter, sorry, an accident that belongs to the Form of the thing. This is Aristotle’s general principle.

Now, and we will see afterwards, of course, this is only an example, a clearer example than what he will speak about, which is the softness of butter, yes? The softness of butter is also an accident of the Form of butter, as we shall see. So one can also speak about a person, but insofar as he is a person, perhaps these are only matters like laughter and wonder.

But this is important, this distinction between accidents that belong to this, accidents that belong to this, is an important distinction that allows us to speak about different types of accidents. Sometimes people think that these accidents, that accidents of Forms, are themselves Forms, but they are not Forms, they are accidents of the type of Forms, accidents that stand, that belong to the Form of the thing.

The General Premise: Natural and Artificial Bodies

So this is the general premise, yes, the Aristotelian, the philosopher, yes, philosopher here is always Aristotelian. And the philosopher gave him a general premise, every natural body has two accidents, a natural body is always something that has a Form, yes, a natural Form, yes, as opposed to an artificial body, which does not necessarily have a Form, yes, it has a Form, but the Form comes to it from outside, yes, this is not an inherent Form, but an external Form, like a table.

The Example of the Table

Because most of the properties of the table will actually be properties of the wood or of the metal it is made from. It has a bit of Form given to it from outside, which is that it functions as a table. But not necessarily will it have, it may have, there will also be accidents from the side of the Form, and not necessarily, because most of the accidents of most things true about a table are true about the wood also, from the side of its wood, not from the side of its table-ness. But there are also accidents of the Form of artificial things, but now we are speaking about natural materials, which are the same things, yes, natural bodies, not materials. Bodies are already things made from matter and Form.

What Is Natural Form?

There are things there that truly have Form, yes, we often call this natural Form. And yes, truly the meaning is within themselves, yes, in an internal manner. Because if you destroy a table, then it remains wood, and if you destroy wood, then it does not remain wood, it remains the matter from which the wood is made, and if you plant a table, then wood grows and not a table, yes? This shows that this is not natural. But we are not now dealing with the distinction between natural and artificial.

The Central Question: Why Does Iron Have Different Properties from Butter?

We are now dealing with explaining the answer to this very simple question, which is why does metal, why does iron have different properties than butter? Something, a very interesting question, yes, why, both are also bodies, yes, but butter is soft and white and iron is hard and black. This is a very interesting question, why is this different? So Aristotle, in order to answer the question, explained to us that there are two types of accidents, and yes.

The Final Composition — Composite Bodies

Now he says thus, And the matters of bodies composed from the final composition, yes, the finally composed bodies, that is, we are not now speaking about the elements themselves, which are, one can say, the primary materials of nature, which are not composed of several elements and so forth, they have one composition. Now we are speaking about the final composition, yes? When I ask about my iron, I am speaking about it after all the mixtures, after all the compositions it is composed from, and it becomes a complete body that I see, yes?

So their matters differ greatly according to the Forms particular to the matters, according to the Forms that belong to the matters of the bodies we see. These bodies change according to their Forms until the substance of iron will be different from the substance of butter. First of all, also the substance of iron, yes? Iron and butter are both substances, substances they call this in English, both are things that in themselves are composed of many layers, one can say, of matter and Form. In order to be iron one must combine I don’t know how many measures of the elements, and each element has a Form of its own, and then one combines this again and again, until its final Form, which we see as iron or as butter, has, this is already a substance. It has a property, a certain definition, which is called iron and this is called butter, and this is because of the different compounds of the elements they are composed in, which itself changes according to the number of matters. One can say such a number of components of the primary elements, the four elements, is called, is defined as iron and so forth.

Distinction Between Accidents of Form and Accidents of Matter

And there follow after them now, but one must remember that strength and softness or their color, this is not even this. And there follow after them from the different accidents what you will see — because there is such a thing as iron, first of all one must understand, there is such a thing as iron and there is such a thing as butter, they are not the same thing, they are different substances. Iron is something composed of such and such elements, and therefore has such and such a Form, and butter is something composed in another manner, therefore it has the Form of butter. One can say, this combination creates this Form, and the strength in this and the softness in this which are accidents — so therefore because they are composed of different things and they are different substances, therefore they also have different accidents.

Strength and Softness — Accidents of Form

There is here, there follow after them from the different accidents what you will see, so until we see that they have different accidents. The strength in this and the softness in this, for the accidents follow after the division of their Forms — strength and softness are not accidents of matter, they are accidents of the Form of the thing. Things that one can say something like this, they are not, in our day we would say, they are properties of universals, not properties of particulars. Which is the same thing, what he is saying, they are accidents of the Form.

to be soft, we would say today, it’s a configuration of the molecules that compose the thing, that have more space between them, or they’re arranged in a way that allows them to more easily intermix with one another, and therefore it’s soft. But where is the softness? Softness is not a word for the number of atoms or the number of proximity and distance of the molecules. Within the essence, softness you could say is a kind of relationship that this essence maintains when force is applied to it, or something like that, a kind of response, how much it reacts to force applied to it.

This is not its Form, the Form, the essence of iron is that it’s iron. This essence, this Form, has a property, has an accident that it’s hard. Why is it hard? Because it’s made, let’s say, of such and such a number of different materials, and therefore it comes out hard, and the opposite — sorry, butter is soft and iron is strong etc. So these are accidents that follow from the division of Forms, because they have different Forms, therefore they have different accidents.

Blackness and Whiteness — Accidents of the Ultimate Matter

And blackness and whiteness, which are accidents that follow from the division of their ultimate Matter — color. Color is not something that relates to the Form of iron, it’s not related to what makes it iron, it’s related to what iron is made of. The thing that iron is made of is black, and therefore iron is black, and the thing that butter is made of is white, and therefore it’s white.

The Philosophical Answer and Its Meaning

So this was the philosopher’s answer to this question, why is iron hard and black and butter soft and white. The answer is that these are divisions in their accidents, accidents of the Form and accidents of the Matter, according to the essence and Matter, the essence and their own accidents, according to the ultimate Matter they’re made of.

Now, so the philosopher has an answer to this question, that’s the point, he has an answer to the question why is this like this and that like that. Now, therefore one must remember — immediately it can’t be just anything, anything.

Butter Cannot Be Hard

So now, if you ask this philosopher whether butter can be hard, he’ll say no. Because butter is a kind of thing made from milk in such and such a way, and from this comes out such and such a composition, and this is its Form, that this whole story is its Form, and therefore it’s soft, and therefore it’s white. So it can’t be black butter. Black butter would cease to be butter, it would be something else, but there can’t be black butter.

And we remember, in order to, if we were to say it becomes something else, then this is the same interesting argument of the Mutakallimun about possibility. The possibility they’re arguing about is that it remains butter, but who told you butter has to be soft? Maybe butter can be hard. There’s no reason. But the philosopher has now given a reason, he said, what, I know the reason, because butter is made of such materials and has such a Form and therefore it’s soft. It can’t be otherwise, it must be thus. I have an answer to this very childish and simple question, but the most scientific question in the world, why is butter soft and iron hard.

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The Mutakallim Denies the Philosophical Answer

Now comes the Mutakallim, and he denies this entire answer. The Mutakallim refuted this entire answer and their premises completely, according to what I will explain.

Now, the Mutakallim, in order to state his possibility, in order to say no, you’re not right, butter can be black and hard, there’s no other reason, only God’s will that makes it so — says, your answer is nonsense. And in order to say it’s nonsense, he needs to use all his premises.

Premise 8: No Form Exists At All

And what he says is this, first of all, no Form exists at all, as you think, sustaining the essence until you posit primary substances. There’s no such thing as essence at all, you decided there’s such a thing as butter, that it’s a thing made of such and such things and has such and such a Form. That is to say, there’s no such thing. What makes the essence, what makes the thing into something, is not Form, doesn’t begin.

Which you posit as primary substances — they’re primary at least in relation to the accidents they bear, they’re primary. Says the Mutakallim, there’s no such thing, as we brought from the Mutakallimun in the eighth premise. If we remember, the eighth premise was that there’s nothing but substance and accident and even natural Form is an accident.

So the eighth premise, which is actually a very direct application of their first premises, says there’s no such thing as Form at all, and therefore the answer the philosopher gave, that said why is butter soft, because it has the Form of butter, is nonsense, because the Form of butter is an invention, there’s no such thing.

No Difference Between the Essence of Iron and the Essence of Butter

And apparently he then says, he continues and says, there’s no difference between the essence of iron and the essence of butter. So, but, a difficulty remains. You say, there’s no such thing as the Form of butter and the Form of iron, what do you mean there’s no difference? I see there’s a difference.

He explains to him — actually this is the whole explanation, he goes here in reverse, he shows you in simple conversation how all these things arrive at these simple statements. He says, what’s the difference? You say Form, there’s no such thing as Form, what does Form mean? After all there are differences. He tells him, there are no differences, there’s no such thing as the essence of iron. In order to say this, in order to say this without just saying nonsense, one must say thus, there’s no difference between the essence of iron and the essence of butter. There’s no difference at all between the essence of iron and butter. What does this mean?

Everything Is Composed of Identical Atoms

And everything is composed of separate similar substances. All these things, both iron and butter, despite appearing very different, one is extremely strong, one is extremely soft, are all made of similar atoms, identical to one another. As we brought from their opinions in the first premise, which was the existence of substances, the existence of individual substances.

From which necessarily followed, the second and third premises — the second and third premises, which are, how do I read the second premise? The second premise was that there’s void, which is to enable the atoms to move and gather and separate, and the third premise, that time too is composed of atoms of time which are moments.

The Chain of Premises Required for Denial

So the Rambam simply wants to bring us in one simple conversation, in order to deny that there’s a reason why butter is soft, one must believe in all the assumptions together. That in order to say there’s no difference between the essence of iron and the essence of butter, one must believe there are no essences in the sense of Forms, there are only essences in the sense of atoms, which is the first premise, the second and third, which are all developments of the fundamental belief that there are atoms, and therefore one must believe there’s also empty space here, and therefore one must also believe that time has a certain kind of atomization etc.

Premise 12: The Senses Lie

And the Rambam says, okay, so you think I’ve already used four premises, I have several premises left. He says, and also, premise 12 must be as an individual substance — we already mentioned this when we studied it. Premise 12 is that the senses lie.

Premise 12 says, let me just look at myself quickly.

Part I Chapter 73 – The Need for All Premises: From Butter to Iron

Premise 12 as Foundation for the Entire System

The Mutakallimun say that you see something like this and it’s no proof that it’s really like this, right? And the Rambam said, remember that premise 12, for this whole story, for it to begin, one must believe in premise 12, right? Why? Because no one has ever seen substances, right? Atoms, right?

We see things, and in order to claim there are atoms one needs all kinds of dialectics, right? Like the millstone substance disperses when it grinds, all kinds of things like that, and their answer to this too is that the senses aren’t right. And in short, even for the fundamental belief in the individual substance one needs premise 12, and therefore they have premise 12.

Demonstration: How All Premises Are Required for One Claim

Right, it’s impossible, right, so we remember there were more premises here, and the Rambam simply shows us how they’re all needed for this simple statement of theirs that God makes butter be soft and white and not that there’s a Form of butter and Matter of butter that does this, they need all their premises.

Denial of Accident Bearing Accident

Right, it’s impossible, right, because after all one could claim there’s an accident of an accident, that there’s something, that some property of, okay, someone could say, right, yes, everything begins with individual substances, which are all the same thing, but when several of them meet, they have a certain property, and that’s what causes butter to be white, right?

And then at least you have some answer to the question why butter is white and soft, but they deny this, right? It’s also impossible according to the Mutakallim that there be some accidents particular to this substance until there be in it something prepared to receive second accidents, right? There’s no question, there are also no intermediate answers, right?

One also can’t say there’s an accident of a certain substance that distinguishes it, this is a word simply to answer it, an answer to exactly this kind of question, why is this different from something else, right? But we can never answer according to their opinion, anything, but rather the direct substance, the first substance, the individual substance, the atom that has an accident directly upon itself.

Premise 9: No Accident Bears Accident

Why? Because they have a belief that this follows from necessary atoms, because according to them an accident doesn’t bear an accident, as we brought in the ninth premise. There’s no such thing, why is it white? Why? Because it’s made of milk which is white. No, because that would be called, what is it to be milk? Milk is an accident of substance, and you say, and why is butter, which isn’t the same thing as milk, made of milk and is white because there’s a prior accident? No, there’s no accident that bears an accident.

So you must say directly, butter is white because the atoms of butter are white. You’re not allowed, not allowed, right, not allowed, but it’s not correct according to their opinion to say there are also intermediate stages, because according to them an accident doesn’t bear an accident as we brought in the ninth premise.

Premise 6: Accident Has No Persistence

And you also can’t answer that it’s white because it was white yesterday, right? A second ago, because an accident has no persistence, as was clarified in the sixth premise, which is another form actually to say, which would be very similar to saying the accident makes an accident, right? The accident of yesterday or of a moment ago, of one moment before, right? A moment of time ago, was what causes this, and therefore none of these things can be, right?

Summary of Required Premises

And when it dies, so thus the Rambam shows us that all his premises actually, he explicitly went through here the eighth and ninth and first and second and third and sixth and eighth. I’m only missing here the fifth and seventh, right? Right?

The fifth dealt with the fact that substances must, all substances in life and smell have accidents and only substances and not the universals which are actually also a development of something else and the seventh was that the impossibles are also accidents which perhaps isn’t related here to this story of butter and iron. Of course it’s another absurdity that according to his opinion comes out of their question but not necessary.

In any case, so at least most of the premises he showed us in a very simple conversation how they’re all needed in order to say their simple statement that God makes butter be soft and white and not that there’s a Form of butter and Matter of butter that does this, they need all their premises.

The Conclusion: Complete Equality Between All Substances

And thus he concludes and when the Mutakallim established everything he wanted according to his premises and succeeded in this, right now when he yes he reached this conclusion, and he succeeded in knowing from this that the substances of butter and iron, substances are similar composites, right, both butter and iron are all similar, they’re identical in essence, similar he means identical, but in different number, right, it’s simply another substance, but it’s the same thing.

Equal Relation of Every Substance to Every Accident

And the relation of each substance to every accident is one relation, right, this is also something important, right, the relation, meaning the possibility of every substance to every accident in the world is the same relation, right, and there isn’t, and he explains in negation of this, and there isn’t, this substance more suited to this accident than that, right? There’s nothing, right?

And this is what he questioned in the ninth and fifth and sixth premises, as he explained to us, right? That there’s nothing that distinguishes a certain accident to bear upon it another accident, right? And therefore it comes out that there’s nothing that says this substance at any stage in the chain of existence, there’s nothing that says it’s more suited to it, more correct for it, more appropriate, meaning, it has a reason to be in this accident.

Examples: Motion, Life, Intellect

And just as this individual substance, is no more suited to motion than to rest, as right, as in opposites, in these richnesses, there’s no reason that says this individual substance is more suited to be in motion than at rest.

Right, no substance is more suited to receive the accident of life or the accident of intellect or the accident of sense than another substance, right? This isn’t only about simple things like, or we can actually perhaps understand intuitively that there’s no reason this substance should be in motion and not at rest. Very easy to imagine, very easy to say it would be opposite.

So too for other greater things, which are ultimately only, one could say, binary choices between opposites in atoms, as he explained throughout the matter. Right, therefore there’s nothing when we come to say that a certain substance is more suited to receive the accident of life. There’s no reason that a human is alive and not a stone, right? Or intellect, or sense, sense in the meaning of sensation.

Denial of the Claim That Multiplicity of Substances Creates Difference

And the multiplicity of substances or their fewness, and if you think no okay, so I perhaps right at the level of the individual substance, but after we combine several substances this will help us somehow, he tells us no. And the multiplicity of substances or their fewness adds nothing to this, this doesn’t help us at all to say no.

Right that if you’re talking about the first atom, there’s no reason this atom would speak about intellect more than another atom, but this also isn’t right, but if you combine 500 atoms, then already this configuration of 500 atoms begins to be a brain, right? It begins to be something that has the possibility to be intellect, this doesn’t help them, right?

Because the accident indeed has its existence in each and every substance, as we brought from the Mutakallimun in the fifth premise, good, so here he uses the fifth premise explicitly, right? That they said there’s no such thing as accidents of universals, right? There are only accidents, right, which was Form, which is also something they don’t believe in. The accidents must sit, be upon each and every substance by itself. So it won’t help us at all what the accident of its neighboring substance is, right? Because the accident isn’t on its neighboring substance, it’s on it, directly.

Sharp Example: Man and Bat

Therefore it doesn’t come out that there’s no other reason that could be that butter would be like this and iron would be like this, and he draws the broader conclusion, it even follows according to all these premises, which is the same premise, but he gives us a sharper example, which shows us according to his opinion why this is strange, that man is no more suited to have intellect than the bat, right? The bat is apparently stupid, I don’t know. But in any case it has no intellect, it doesn’t study the Guide for the Perplexed.

But according to all these premises it comes out that there’s no reason that man, right, even after man is man, right, one must remember this, even after man has hands and eyes and brain and all these things, still, right, which aren’t judgments about man at all, they’re simply a collection of accidents that by chance, not by chance, by God’s will, stand next to each other and so on in custom, but there’s no reason, right, the word suited means here, there’s no reason. There’s no reason that man should have intellect and not bat.

Connection to the Premise of Admissibility

And what they said about admissibility follows, and this is only from all the things they say about admissibility, since he described earlier what’s called admissibility, there could be a man the size of a mountain, and a mountain that weighs less than a feather, all these things are possible precisely because of these physical assumptions, and because of this premise was all the effort, because of the premise of admissibility, that they strove, that they worked hard, right, the search, I don’t know if effort is, how would it be, how did he call it? The endeavor, right, all the endeavor they made was to reach this premise because it was

Summary: The Premise of Possibility as the Central Foundation in the Doctrine of the Mutakallimun

The Special Status of the Premise of Possibility

The Rambam says, the strongest foundation that serves the Mutakallimun for everything they need to establish, right? Which are the four sought things of God’s existence, creation of the world, God’s existence, His unity and that He’s not a body. The strongest thing, true they have other proofs, but of course whoever will boast, right? In the coming chapters when he goes over their proofs for these things, we’ll see this is the strongest proof.

The Central Role of All the Premises

Wait, and therefore they actually need all these things in order to enable the premise of possibility. This is the little dialogue he said, which shows us how all these premises are needed in order to state this possibility, okay?

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Is this okay? Is this understood or not understood? It’s not understood. Okay, so that’s enough for me for today. Okay, thank you very much.