הקדמה שניה ושלישית – האטומיזם של הזמן והמרחק | חלק א פרק עג (ג) | מורה נבוכים 158 (Auto Translated)

The Second Introduction – The Doctrine of the Void and Atomism

Introductory Notes and General Context

Okay, I’m here, you can see it but, maybe it needs to be enlarged. I don’t have mine, so I’m just bringing what’s here. The Arabic here isn’t arranged in the right place, so anyway.

We’re here at the second introduction, yes? The second introduction, the doctrine of the void, yes? The first three premises/introductions essentially deal with the foundations of their atomism.

Three Fundamental Notes Regarding Atomism

I want to mention two things just generally regarding this. The first thing is yes, three things.

A. The Rambam’s Basic Position on Atomism – Chapter 51

The Example from Chapter 51

First thing is that fundamentally, the Rambam like Aristotle very much does not believe in the matter of atomism, and what’s interesting is that here in chapter 51 the Rambam wrote like this, he brought this as an example. Yes, chapter 51, part of the chapters on attributes, yes, and all the chapters on attributes are also an open debate with the Kalam, so there’s a connection, only here he arrives at the foundations in a more philosophical, physical manner and so on.

The Rambam’s Rhetorical Argument

But there he wrote like this, in the first section of chapter 51 it’s written, his argument is that there are many things that are clear and evident essentially, to anyone with sense or to anyone who has perception, but still people deny this and therefore proofs need to be brought for them, yes, this is the foundation, and on this he built a kind of rhetoric that essentially the premise that God has attributes is actually a first principle that it’s not correct, only people erred, so we even need to argue about this at all.

Examples of First Principles that People Deny

But he brings examples of these kinds of things, yes, he says in reality, in existence there are evident things, there are first principles and there are things close to them that essentially naturally every person acknowledges, like the existence of motion, the existence of human capability, and that there is generation and corruption, the natures of things like fire has heat and water has cold, etc.

The Need for Proofs of Clear Things

But when strange opinions emerged, whether because someone erred, or someone aimed at this for another purpose, when someone didn’t err but lied, yes, they had a reason to try to convince us, then the wise men need to bring proofs for things, yes, yes, which is a bit strange, to bring proof for something visible to the eye, and we need to do this because of this madness of people.

The Root Criticism of the Kalam

And then we didn’t understand this, but this is essentially the root criticism of the Rambam on the physics of the Kalam, yes? About this he elaborated in chapter 71, when he gave us the history and he let us understand that the Kalam denies what is visible to the eye, also chapter 72, which was essentially a description of things visible to the eye, or close to them, visible to the senses and close to them.

The Kalam’s Begging the Question

And he claims that they didn’t even really start by believing in them, they started with wanting to prove certain things, and in order to prove them correctly they needed to assume all these premises, which is backwards, this is begging the question.

B. Examples from Aristotle of Proofs for Clear Things

Aristotle versus Zeno – The Existence of Motion

And what’s interesting is that he brings examples here, as we find. Aristotle will establish motion because it was rejected, here Aristotle has proofs in the Physics to establish that there is motion, yes? And it was rejected because Zeno, as is known, claimed there is no motion in the world, yes? Parmenides and Zeno proved this with his famous paradox proofs, claiming there is no motion, so Aristotle as if proves that there is motion.

The Kalam Did Not Argue About Motion

So that’s one thing, we’re not dealing with motion now, because motion is, the Kalam didn’t argue about whether there is motion, yes? Yes, they’re more or less in the opposite direction as we discussed, yes, as Aristotle bases all of physics on the question of change and what changes from what’s constant, so Parmenides and Zeno are on the side that there is no motion, no change, specifically atomism is more, it’s not exactly, but it’s more on the side that there is only change, or that there are no things larger than an atom that are constant.

Aristotle Against the Indivisible Part

But he brings another thing, the second thing, and he will bring proof for the negation of the indivisible part because they established its existence. So Aristotle has proofs against the indivisible part, which is exactly the atom, which is what happens here, a discrete substance is another word, and here it’s written indivisible part, which is the same thing, yes? The atom is simply ah like no, yes? Ah is a Greek prefix for things that are not, and tom is to cut, yes? The thing that is not cut, so in Greek that’s literally the translation.

The Conclusion: Atomism as a Refuted Idea

So why am I bringing this just randomly? Because the Rambam comes here from Aristotelian foundational premises, that simply think that the idea that there are atoms is a refuted idea, and this is essentially so refuted that it doesn’t need to be proven, yes? This is just a delusion, no one ever saw atoms, there’s no reason to think there are atoms, only for those who have vested interests, for those who have a reason to prove this.

So this is the first note that needs to be remembered in the context of the book, that of course everything is connected to this.

C. Dispute Between Early Kalam and Later Kalam

The Quote from the End of the Chapter

Second thing, that is written explicitly, in the continuation of the book, of this chapter itself, at the end of the chapter, which I’ll just bring examples, yes, here, in chapter aleph samech aleph, from whoever made these letters, I don’t know, it says, “And don’t think that the Mutakallimun agreed on this premise for nothing, as most of the later ones think.” As most of the later ones think, “for the effort of their predecessors to establish the part has no need.”

The Content of the Dispute

The Rambam brings that there is a dispute between the early Kalam and the later Kalam. The later ones claimed that all the effort of the earlier ones in believing in the atom is not needed. Need to check who the names are there, who gave this. I don’t, he doesn’t write, he doesn’t write a name here.

The Possibility of Managing Without Atomism

I’ll check, there is, there were really, we already talked about this, that apparently you can say all the principles of faith of the Kalam without saying atomism, yes? Their principles of faith, meaning, the principle that we’ll argue with also in chapter 68 or 9, I don’t remember, is that God acts, yes? That God is the only actor in the world, and they claimed that therefore it’s forbidden to believe in causality, meaning, it’s forbidden to believe in nature.

The Connection Between Atomism and Negation of Causality

And the early ones among them connected this to the topic of atomism, yes? Yes? Meaning, this is a kind of physical confirmation that there is no causality, yes? Because causality, as it was understood by Aristotelians, by all philosophers then, was connected to the cause of things being their nature, yes? If the nature of a human is to do human things, then that’s essentially the cause of it.

The Atomistic Solution

And they said, there is no, there is no such thing as human nature, there are only atoms that God directly creates accidents for them at every moment, and also creates the atoms at every moment and so on. That’s how it was possible to say that God is the actor at every moment.

The Position of the Later Ones

So afterwards others claimed that this isn’t needed, you can say there are humans or in some sense, and still say that God does everything.

The Opinion of Modern Scholars

Need to get into this, if they’re right, who’s right. Specifically all those I’ve seen who talked about this, also Harry Wolfson, who wrote a whole book on the Kalam, it seems to me that he actually holds like the later Kalam here, who claimed it’s not needed, atomism isn’t needed for the principles of faith, yes?

D. The Nature of the Kalam’s Investigation – Theology Not Physics

The Theological Goal

It’s agreed, more or less, also on the Kalam it’s agreed that they’re looking for confirmation of the principles of faith, yes? In the style of Rav Saadia Gaon, what we know among us, that he’s not a researcher, he’s not a scientist, he’s not researching physics, he’s researching theology, yes? Explicitly, but he thinks he needs rational theology, so he wants to base it on reality, he doesn’t want to say just anything, contrary to reality. But still his goal is theological, not physical.

The Claim That Atomism Isn’t Needed

And according to this goal, many claimed and also today many claim that atomism really isn’t needed.

The Rambam’s Position – All the Premises Are Needed

The Rambam disagrees with this, so we need to see how Wolfson explains this, I haven’t reached that part in his book. But in any case, I’ll note here that the Rambam understands that to be a consistent Kalamist, one really needs to believe in each of these 12 premises, especially the premise of the indivisible part, yes? I have the Arabic on the side here, it’s complicated. And that this is needed.

E. The Rambam’s Purpose in Presenting the Kalam’s Worldview

The Reductio ad Absurdum Method

And therefore the Rambam essentially presents us with a complete worldview of the Kalam in order to show us what essentially, in a certain part of it this is a kind of what we call reductio ad absurdum, yes? He proves it by seeing how absurd it is, yes? Yes, how much one needs to change the order of creation according to his style in order to say these principles, yes? And really it’s impossible without this to say this, this is important.

Yes, al-juz, the part, that’s exactly it.

Two Principles to Remember

So the second introduction that I wanted to show, or need to remember all the time, these two things, that the Rambam thinks, first thing, that the reality visible to the senses, as he described it in chapter 72, essentially contradicts all this, so he’s telling us here a worldview, a physical worldview that really isn’t connected to physics, there’s no good reason, there are internal reasons for everything they bring, yes?

The Fine Distinction Required

So we need to distinguish here very carefully, to reconcile these two things I’m saying, yes? On one hand, there’s no single reason to hold this entire worldview in its entirety without theological foundational premises, that essentially a believer who says we don’t need all these foundational premises, yes? Yes, mainly because he can prove the existence of God without all this.

The Open Topic of the World’s Creation

Yes, there are things he apparently does need this for, which is the topic of the creation of the world, but he hasn’t started dealing with that yet.

Two Parallel Arguments

And second thing, but on the other hand, within this worldview, yes, meaning, the whole story in its entirety is nonsense, they don’t need it, and it’s against nature, it’s the reversal of the order of creation. But if you do want to believe in these principles, which are theological principles, that one can’t argue about the theology itself from within reality, yes?

Continuation: The Atomism of the Kalam – Consistency of the System

F. The Consistency of the Kalam System According to the Rambam

If one starts from certain foundational premises, then one really does need to assume all these premises. So the Rambam on one hand thinks that all of Kalam is nonsense, on the other hand he thinks specifically the opposite of some of the Kalam themselves, who thought that some of their premises aren’t necessary – the Rambam specifically thinks that it is a very consistent worldview within itself, only that the whole story isn’t needed, yes? Is that clear? That’s clear.

The Difference Between Kalam Atomism and Greek Atomism

The third thing is what we already noted a bit last time, and today I have nothing new to add about it, and that is that the specific atomism of the Kalam is different also from Greek atomism. There’s a very big question among recent scholars – Professor Wolfson wrote about this, Shlomo Pines wrote a whole book about it, and today there are others who disagree and get into this. There’s a big question why, where did they really arrive at their type of atomism from, it’s not clear.

Because we know Greek atomism which is Democritus the pre-Socratic and afterwards Epicurus who is known here as a kind of source for this worldview, but in many details, and they are very fundamental details, they don’t share the same picture at all.

The Theological Changes – Understandable

So part of it we understand, yes? Part of the changes, meaning the changes connected to theology we understand, yes? This the Rambam himself mentions here at the end of the first introduction, yes? Epicurus said that the parts exist from then, or as they translate the word, we talked about this, that according to Epicurus, there are infinite eternal particles, and this the Kalam cannot accept – neither that there are infinite nor that they are eternal, for the same reason, yes? Yes, because as we’ll see in the eleventh introduction, the Kalam doesn’t agree that there is infinity in any sense, not in time and not in things, so therefore it cannot be.

And second thing, which is itself connected to this because of the matter of faith, they believe after all in the creation of the world and not only in the creation of the world, in the creation of will at every moment, and therefore they cannot accept Epicurus, who is the extreme opposite position, yes, he holds that there is no order in the world, no providence, none of these things. So they only take his supposedly physical correctness, without his supposedly theological, philosophical metaphysical explanation. So this change is clear why it exists.

The Physical Changes – Less Understandable

But there are many more changes, many more changes, like that they hold that the atomic part has no magnitude, has no size, yes, it’s only like a mathematical point, which is a bit unclear what this even is, although there are perhaps some internal reasons to think about this – Epicurus, no one thought this.

They also think that all atoms are similar to each other, which is also something the predecessors didn’t think. So, yes, I’m now, I’m now going to go, you can say. Yes, you can say.

And this too can be understood why they think this, because this is essentially what allows them to say there is no nature, yes, also these atoms have no specific nature that causes certain accidents to attach to certain atoms, but this too is very different from what’s found in ancient atomism. Of course there’s a whole discussion here about modern atomism, which is also a third topic not really connected to all this.

Okay, so that’s the third thing we mentioned as a general introduction to this topic.

The Necessary Connection Between the Premises

I don’t know how much this connects to the second topic, what it somewhat connects to is what the Rambam thinks, this is a bit of a topic, touches a bit on the second point, and that is that the Rambam claims that there is a general worldview here, even though there are, yes, he himself sometimes talks about there being disputes within the Kalam, and very big disputes, supposedly, if so, if so, and then everything within the details, not only the details of the biggest thing they need to believe that there is no nature in the world, but also within the details of the agreed matters, that they need to believe generally in atomism, even though they can argue whether atoms perhaps do have size, or perhaps when do they receive quantity, when do they receive size, yes? All these things, they can argue.

And the Rambam as is his way ignores all these disputes, because he claims that there is still something common that unites them all, that they all need, yes? Because he claims that their worldview is coherent within itself, so therefore he needs to ignore, he needs to take less seriously the disputes between them within these details, because he claims it doesn’t matter, this is already, the smallest details are not needed – one can be a Kalamist with any of them, they don’t contradict their foundational principles. But the middle details so to speak – the principle of atomism and so on – they do need, and he also explains why they need some of their premises explicitly. Okay, so up to here this introduction.

The Necessary Connection Between the Premises

Now we can also show how several of these premises essentially derive from each other, yes? This is not – you can say all three of the first premises certainly the Rambam himself says – it’s essentially the premise of atomism, but he simply details what is entailed, what is entailed from this. And also yes that he claims there is something here that is entailed from each thing also allows him to laugh at this and refute it by way of reductio ad absurdum, which he himself says explicitly.

G. The Second Introduction: The Doctrine of the Void

The second introduction is the doctrine of the void. The statement that there is void, void is empty. You can say empty space, because space is already a thing, so that’s a bit of a problem, but this is the second introduction, and this is essentially, this is a known thing, an agreed thing among all atomists since then, thus they said that in the world there are atoms and void and nothing.

The Rambam’s Explanation of the Need for the Premise of the Void

And the Rambam explains why they need this, and he says like this:

The Term “Shorashiyim” (Root Scholars/Theologians)

“The early Mutakallimun” – there’s a strange translation here by Ibn Tibbon, of the new edition of Ibn Tibbon, I don’t know where they got this from, or what the story is, need to ask him, what’s really happening here, because what’s written here is simply the Arabic word that translates as “the root scholars.” Schwartz translates here “the theologians,” “the root scholars” is Ibn Tibbon’s translation also in other places in the same context.

And the reason, and we know that they are al-usuliyyun and they called themselves literally in Arabic “the root scholars,” they called themselves this because they dealt with the roots of religion, the word principles of religion or roots of religion, principle and root are the same thing like root, yes? Principle is an agricultural metaphor – root, and there’s a building metaphor which is foundation, yes? Two metaphors for the same thing.

This idea that there are roots to religion, which is theology, yes, which is knowledge of God, the intellectual principles. This is the expression, this is actually a Kalamist formulation, the Rambam himself uses it sometimes, and they called themselves “root scholars,” sages who deal with the roots of religion.

No, you can take, can’t help you now. Baruch, Yasel plug, please close the door, I can’t, I can’t have this now.

Sorry, I’m just explaining this word that’s written here in words. So this is the simple meaning of the word, this is the word that’s written, “the root scholars,” and this is simply another word for Mutakallimun, they themselves called themselves “root scholars,” and perhaps sometimes also “speakers,” but this is how they presented themselves in the context of being sages of religion. Yes, there are the sages of the branches who are the sages of halakha who deal with what needs to be done and not with what exists, what exists religiously.

The Rambam’s Use of the Term “Shorashiyim”

This seems, so first of all there’s a question here why he suddenly started writing this. Like, until now he simply spoke, the premise of the speakers, the mutakallimun, mutakallimun. It’s not clear why he suddenly gives them this name, and this is still not clear to me. It seems a bit elsewhere in chapter 71 it’s written “the root scholars meaning ya’ani the Mutakallimun” and apparently he means that he doesn’t want to recognize that they are root scholars or something like that – like from their perspective they deal with roots, from his perspective they deal with nonsense, it could be something like that.

And it could be that this is also a kind of hint that their whole system is built for the purpose of making beliefs, yes? He speaks here also, the word belief, it’s written “believers,” i’taqad, “believers,” which wasn’t written like this in the previous part for example, that he knows, he wrote that they think, yes? We talked about this, that there are things they say, there are things they think, there are things they believe, I don’t know, all these words seem to me words of disdain, and apparently…

The Problem with Ibn Tibbon’s Translation

Ibn Tibbon for some reason decided to translate here in this long sentence, I don’t know what’s happening here, that he apparently understood that the Rambam means that not everyone believes, perhaps there really were those who argued about the idea of the void, or perhaps there was also an argument – perhaps there was also an argument – whether the early Kalamists really believed in this or whether this is fundamental, this is foundational for the Kalam to believe in this or not, because the void is really a problematic premise, also one of the things that Aristotle strongly attacked in the atomistic premise.

So it could be that he means here, apparently he means here that the Kalamun, that he, this is how he translates, yes, so if we imagine he translates here “principle,” not in the sense of root scholars, but in the sense of the early Mutakallimun who were the principle of the wisdom of speech. Strange translation, I don’t know what’s happening here, and really apparently there are editions here, need to ask the scholars about this matter.

The Essential Contradiction of the Void

So let’s continue. They also believe, yes, also, meaning, besides believing that atoms exist, they also believe that void exists, that there is void. Now, the existence of void is of course somewhat problematic, yes, because it’s a contradiction. An essential contradiction – how can something that doesn’t exist, exist? This is one of the reasons Aristotle thought this couldn’t be.

And he translates and it is one distance distance, yes, a kind of, one can translate this correctly, the meaning is a kind of place, but not place, or distances or more, yes, because later we’ll see that there could be two options, meaning either everything is one void or there are different types, different parts of the void, that have nothing in them at all, there’s nothing in them, they are empty of any body, yes, body is the thing created from atoms, devoid of any substance, meaning any atom.

The Logical Necessity of Void

Now, this is their belief, and why do they need this? We arrive at the explanation. And this premise is necessary for them, they must believe in this, to believe the first premise. Because they believe the first premise about atoms, they must also believe in the premise of void. This is indeed agreed upon by every atomist. And why?

And that is, if the world were full of those parts, yes? Because the other side is that the entire world is full of atoms. And then how would the moving thing move, how could there be movement? How would things, how would these atoms move at all? And it cannot be conceived, for the other option would have to be that one atom enters into another, but that’s impossible, it sounds to them like a contradiction, a logical contradiction, yes? Cannot be conceived, the meaning is it’s impossible to think. It’s impossible to think, that bodies would enter into each other, this is a kind of convention. A body cannot enter into another body unless it has a place.

But what does it mean that it has a place? Place is void, how can there be place? We are very accustomed to thinking in such a way that there is void, so it’s hard for us to understand why this is absurd, but it is absurd. One needs, needs, needs to think more to understand this. But this was the original claim, and this is because it’s impossible for a body to enter into another body, especially if you’re an atomist, yes? That everything is exactly something, it’s not that according to Aristotle there can be a certain type of body entering into body, but the body itself changes, yes? When something enters into something else, it doesn’t really enter into the other thing, they become a third thing, or they change, but according to the atomists they cannot change. So it’s impossible for one thing to enter into another thing.

So the only other side would be that there’s no real movement, but there is, and it’s impossible for those parts to aggregate and separate except through their movements. We explain all the changes in the world as the aggregation and separation of atoms. And if they cannot move, they cannot go anywhere, then everything would have to be static for all eternity. So this cannot be, we see that this is not correct.

And therefore we must posit an empty place. Hence they necessarily need to affirm void so that those parts can aggregate and separate. How do they move? Because they exit from the empty place and enter into the place next to something else. And their movement becomes possible in that void which has no body in it nor any of those substances, yes, so this is clear.

The Conception of Space as Atomistic

Later we’ll see that for some reason, and this is something not explained here, I don’t know exactly how to understand this. Later we’ll see that they think that space itself is a kind of atoms, yes, yes, this void is built somehow from a place as if for each atom specifically, therefore they hold that movement is always at the same speed, because each atom needs to enter into as if a place, another additional place that’s stuck like that, yes, that a second atom enters into and so a third. But this wasn’t written here, so I don’t know why, something is missing for me here, this thing.

The Third Premise: Atomism of Time

Let’s read the third premise here, okay? The third premise, so this is the second premise and this is the existence of void, this is indeed something that follows from the assumption of atomism and this itself is a problematic thing, because such a thing as void is something contradictory and problematic.

Okay, then we continue. What do we continue with? There’s a third premise, what is the third premise?

The Claim: Time is Composed of Atoms

The third premise is, their saying, now until here we spoke about what exists, the bodies and the place they are in as if, one can call it, these are the distances, the empty place, the void, yes, place is a problematic word, but okay.

And the third premise is their saying, they also say that time is composed of “nows”, yes, from particles of atoms, nows. They mean by this that they are many times that do not accept division due to the shortness of their measures. They cannot be divided because they are a kind of atoms of time, yes? Yes, they cannot be divided because they are too small and cannot be divided further.

The Logical Necessity from the First Premise

And now the Rambam explains why they also need this premise, and this premise is also necessary for them because of the first premise. Why is it necessary because of the first premise? Because all these things are connected to each other.

For they, and that is that they saw, and here we see that the Rambam understands that they have one consistent system, that from one thing all the rest follows, they don’t just make things up, yes? Everything is just made up, but they don’t just make up things. And conversely, they also understand well even the necessities of what Aristotle said, yes?

And that is that they saw without doubt, without doubt that they saw Aristotle’s proofs. Aristotle brought proof that the path, the path meaning simply distance, yes? The distance that a thing traverses in its movement. And time, yes? And local movement, meaning movement in place, the three of them are equal in existence, meaning, they are the same type of thing, they work in the same way. We mean that the ratio of some of them to others is one ratio, that the ratio of part of time to part of distance, to part of movement, is the same thing, yes? And dividing one of them divides the other and in its ratio.

That is, I think the proof, the coordination here is very simple, if a thing moves, then it moves from place to place in a certain time, yes? Therefore, if you walk, the movement is in a certain type of time, yes, it divides into speed and slowness or something like that. So if it’s fast in a sense, at some speed, then it traverses some distance and in some time, yes, this is the definition of time and movement and distance.

And therefore, to the extent that one of them divides, the other will also need to divide. To the extent that one of them is continuous and doesn’t divide, then all of them need to be continuous and not dividing, yes? So, this I think is quite clear.

The Necessary Conclusion

And therefore, it follows from this simple premise, they knew necessarily, that if time were continuous, yes, continuous is what we call continuous, and would accept infinite division, yes, if time were something that doesn’t divide, not atomistic, yes, it’s actually according to Aristotle’s system, but Aristotle thinks there is no time. In any case, if time were something that accepts infinite division, it would necessarily follow that the part which they posited as indivisible would divide.

Yes, why does it come out this way? Because what is it that a thing moves? That the thing, whatever the thing is, that has movement, arrives from place to place in a certain time, yes, within a certain length of time. Now, is there

The Necessary Connection Between Atomism of Matter, Time and Space

The Connection Between Division of the Thing and Division of Movement

If we divide it once, then the thing must also divide exactly that once, yes? Because otherwise we could say that a thing is partially in the previous place and partially in the place it’s arriving at, yes?

Yes, so with every possible division in things there is also a division in their movement, because every movement always allows speaking about the stage in which part of the thing is in the new place and part of the thing is still in the old place, meaning it lags behind it, yes, this is understood. So the more you divide the movement the more you divide the thing. We, this goes in the same ratio.

The Principle of Resolution

If the movement is a large movement, then if we divide the movement into large measures, yes, then we will speak about time in large times. If we enter into smaller resolutions, then we will divide both of them in smaller resolution, yes?

The Conclusion: Continuity or Atomism

And therefore, if you posit, if you think that all these things are continuous, then there’s no problem, they all divide infinitely. And if you’re an atomist, then you also need to make atomism of time and space. For exactly the same reason, because otherwise, you would need to imagine, as he will explain in a moment, movement as jumps and not as something continuous, even though it appears to us as something continuous.

They will say no, because otherwise it’s impossible to make movement that is continuous without continuous time and without continuous things, that the thing itself, because every thing that has movement, there is always a part that has already arrived, already touched the new place and a part hasn’t, so that part is to divide.

The Problem of Sides in Atoms

Of course that one can always speak of a part is itself a bit of a difficulty in the structure of atoms, yes? Because you say an atom has no division so does it have sides, that’s a bit of a problem. And therefore indeed they thought that atoms have no size.

In any case, but assuming there is atomism then there must also be atomism of movement, which is automatically atomism of time and automatically atomism of space. And therefore indeed these truly adopted all, all these assumptions, yes.

The Accepted Connection in Physics

The connection between these three things is still accepted in physics, there are many complications about this, but it’s still clear that these things go together, and this is actually the thing that everyone agrees on, yes, also the Kalam, also Aristotle, everyone agrees that these things go together, and therefore it all goes together, yes.

This is what he says, that if time were continuous and would accept division, it must be that the part also divides infinitely. And conversely, when you posit the path as continuous, because if you’re talking about local movement, the distance that you travel in movement that is continuous, it necessarily follows that it divides like the now of time which is posited as indivisible.

So he takes it from the opposite direction. If we divide the path, yes, the distance, yes? Local distance, that’s the word for path. Yes, not the distance in which we move therefore. If we divide it infinitely, then time would also need to divide, because then we need to say that the thing is at this time, found in this place, and then how is there such a time, it must divide.

The Necessity of Temporal Atomism

Because everything is indivisible, as Aristotle explained in the book called Physics, that’s their name for physics. And therefore they were compelled that the path is not continuous, yes, also the distance, yes? So also time and also distance must be not continuous, not continuous, but composed of parts, upon which division ends. There must be a place where division divides and ends, which is the atom, the indivisible part. And so time, yes.

Note on the Structure

So also distance is actually the premise, it’s not the second premise, yes, the second premise is void, and now we’re in some, this is what I, it’s not clear to me, a certain part of this void, or somehow the distance, he calls this the path, it’s not exactly the same thing as the void apparently, but I don’t understand what’s happening here exactly, so question, maybe we’ll discover it. In any case, the path is divided and so is time.

Example of Time Division

This is that the third premise arrives at nows, they don’t accept division. For example, he gives an example that the hour for example is 60 minutes and the minute, we say minute, he says minute, is 60 seconds, we say seconds, they didn’t know masculine and feminine, I don’t know. And the second is, yes, which is seconds, this is simply because it’s the second division after the division of the hour into minutes.

Continuation of Division

And then therefore one can divide the second into thirds, this is how the Rambam also uses in all his astronomical calculations, he calls them minutes, seconds, thirds. This is not only regarding time, yes, also regarding space, when we divide the sphere into 360 degrees, then we speak of minutes of degrees and seconds of degrees, seconds of degrees or thirds of degrees.

The End Point – The Temporal Atom

And in short, and finally the matter arrived for them at parts that are bound for example, yes, ten divisions or finer than them, it doesn’t matter exactly how big, they will not accept, they will not divide at all, they will not accept division like the path. Hence time became, if so, having position and order, time is something very clear, yes, it accepts order, accepts position, it accepts a kind of existence, it becomes a thing, having position and also having order, meaning it is ordered in this atomistic way.

The Rambam’s Critique: The Kalam Did Not Understand the Essence of Time

The Central Claim

And here there’s an interesting section of the Rambam regarding time, yes, that says that these theologians do not understand the essence of time at all, they don’t understand the essence of time at all. And rightly so for them, rightly so for them, and so it is fitting for them. Why is it rightly so for them?

The Rambam’s Explanation: Time as a Philosophical Problem

Says the Rambam, here the Rambam, yes, this is another interesting thing the Rambam does throughout this chapter, that he shows that they’re not completely crazy this Kalam, there are real problems here and they don’t understand very fundamental and delicate and complex and deep things, they’re not completely crazy, yes? All their motivation makes them crazy, makes them crazy, but there’s something here.

One needs to understand why he does all these games, but I’m just saying what he says, he says that it’s fitting for them not to understand the matter of time, yes? To say that time is, to say that things are atomistic, there are problems with this, that’s understood. To say that time is not atomistic is necessary from, yes, they do the calculation well, this is indeed what’s needed if one believes in atomism of things. But this is also a kind of very far from the reality of the essence of time, it’s very far, but it’s fitting, this is fitting for non-deep philosophers.

Why? Time as a Real Problem

Why? This is indeed, time is a philosophical problem and if someone is not very deep, they indeed encounter paradoxes in understanding the essence of time. Actually also Aristotle has chapters on the essence of time, and actually there was also a very famous dispute between the Platonists and Aristotelians about the essence of time.

And Aristotle mentions this, and then there is, I don’t know if the Rambam knew, but there is Plotinus and others who return and refute Aristotle in his explanation. The Rambam goes with Aristotle’s way generally, but still one can see there that there’s a problem here, and the Rambam didn’t know something of the Platonist system from what he read of Galen, of Galen, who was a kind of more Platonist than the other philosophers the Rambam read.

The Example of Galen – Admission of Difficulty

And he says like this, and rightly so for them that if the quick philosophers were confused by the matter of time, even good philosophers were confused because of the matter of time, and some of them did not understand its matter, some of them indeed didn’t understand it until Galen so Galen at least admitted the truth, yes? When he didn’t understand what this is he said.

When he said, the Rambam as is known thought that Galen generally exaggerates, he says that he knows more than he actually knows, the Rambam wasn’t such a follower of his, but still apparently he brought him as an example that he was a kind, he wasn’t stupid and he said he doesn’t understand this, he said that time is a divine matter, its standing cannot be grasped. So divine is something that cannot be, yes.

One needs to understand, I think Galen meant something here, as I say, this is connected to the Platonist system of time, but the Rambam quotes this, brings this as something that shows that understanding the essence of time, to answer the question what is the definition, what is the definition of time, is indeed a problem.

All the More So for the Kalam

And all the more so those who do not look at the nature of any thing, yes, yes, but they don’t believe in nature and definition at all, they don’t understand the definition of anything. So all the more so they don’t understand the definition of time, and it’s fitting for them, this is fitting for them not to understand the concept of time. This is a section that needs to be understood more, yes. I’m just telling, I’m just reading it now.

Transition to the Next Part: The Absurd Conclusions

Now, let’s finish, let’s see if we have time to finish this section. Now let’s finish, so until here the first three premises that explain the principles of their atomism, that each of these premises follows from the other in a very clear way.

Says the Rambam, now understand how much this is nonsense. And hear what follows for them according to these three premises and they believed. He says, see what comes out, what follows for them, meaning, what is the conclusion that comes out of these premises, and they indeed believed in what comes out of this, yes? They didn’t say, ah, this indeed comes out too absurd.

The Rambam’s Critique of the Kalam’s Theory of Motion

The Rambam’s Assessment of the Conclusions

Says the Rambam, now understand how much this is nonsense. And hear what follows for them according to these three premises and they believed. He says, see what comes out, what follows for them, meaning, what is the conclusion that comes out of these premises, and they indeed believed in what comes out of this. Yes, they didn’t say, ah, this indeed comes out too absurd, we don’t believe – they indeed believed in this. But indeed one who looks from outside sees that this is strange.

The Definition of Motion According to the Kalam

So they said like this, what is motion? Motion is the transfer of an individual substance, yes, an atom, from one of those parts, one of them, from an individual substance, meaning from a place of an individual substance – I don’t know, this is the thing I said I don’t understand – to an individual substance adjacent to it. Yes, so individual substance, meaning the substance of space, the path here, yes?